

**INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE ON HONG KONG'S  
FRANCHISED BUS SERVICE**

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90.	<i>“Franchises of NWFB, LWB and CTB (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau bus network)”</i> by THB, TD [LC Paper No. CB(1)464/11-12(04)]	11/2011	SEC-2	880 – 883
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96.	Minutes of Meeting of Panel on Transport on 15 January 2016 by Council Business Division 4, Legislative Council Secretariat [LC Paper No. CB(4)1298/15-16]	26/08/2016	SEC-2	967 – 989
97.	Letter from THB to Secretary General, Legislative Council Secretariat [LC Paper No. CB(4)697/15-16(01)]	09/03/2016	SEC-2	990 – 994
98.	“ <i>New Franchise for Bus Network of the KMB – Report on the Public Consultation on the New Franchise</i> ” by THB, TD [LC Paper No. CB(4)1124/15-16/(05)] (part)	06/2016	SEC-2	995 – 1002
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105.	" <i>Safety of Franchised Bus Operations</i> " by Environment, Transport and Works Bureau and TD [LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07/(03)]	10/2016	SEC-3	1310 – 1317
106.	Information Note – " <i>Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in selected overseas places</i> " by Legislative Council Secretariat	18/04/2008	SEC-3	1318 – 1322
107.	" <i>Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation</i> " by Environment, Transport and Works Bureau and TD [LC Paper No. CB(1)783/06/07/(01)]	01/2007	SEC-3	1323 – 1332
108.	" <i>Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation</i> " by THB and TD [LC Paper No. CB(1)2023/06/07/(03)]	07/2007	SEC-3	1333 – 1341
109.	Minutes of special meeting of Legislative Council Panel on Transport held on 15 February 2018 by Council Business Division 4, Legislative Council Secretariat [LC Paper No. CB(4)1441/17-18]	26/07/2018	SEC-3	1342 – 1362

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115.	Press Releases – LCQ10: Pilot Programme to combat traffic contraventions with: (i) Annex 1: “ <i>Number of Actions Taken under the Pilot Scheme (in December 2018 and January 2018)</i> ” (ii) Annex 2: “ <i>Number of Fixed Penalty Tickets Issued under the Pilot Scheme (December 2017 to January 2018)</i> ”	23/05/2018	SEC-3	1424 – 1428
116.	“ <i>Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link – Local Public Transport Arrangement for the West Kowloon Station</i> ” by TD [Paper No.109/2017 of T&TC of the Central & Western District]	12/2017	SEC-3	1429 – 1436  1437 – 1439 (Translation)

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119.	Translation of news article of Economic Times titled <i>“[Typhoon Mangkhut] “Mangkhut” aftermath has not yet come to a halt, there were at least 6 incidents of buses being hit by tree crotches today, among which one person was injured and sent to the hospital”</i>	18/09/2018	SEC-3	1445 – 1446
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# **Tuen Mun Road Traffic Incident Independent Expert Panel**

## **屯門公路交通事故獨立專家小組**

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27 November 2003

The Honourable Tung Chee Hwa  
Chief Executive  
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region  
5<sup>th</sup> Floor, Main Wing  
Central Government Offices  
Lower Albert Road  
Hong Kong

Dear Chief Executive,

### **Report on Enhancement of Highway Safety**

We are pleased to submit the Report on Enhancement of Highway Safety (the Report). The Report outlines issues we have examined and contains recommendations to improve Hong Kong's highway safety, having regard to the traffic incident that occurred on Tuen Mun Road on 10 July 2003. Matters relating to the causes and liability of persons involved in the incident fall outside the Panel's terms of reference and do not feature in our review.

First, we would like to convey our most sincere sympathy to the families of those who unfortunately died in this incident, and hope that those who were injured have recovered fully and speedily.

The road transport system consists of three major components, namely, road users, road infrastructure and vehicle. The Panel has reviewed key safety issues relating to each of these three components. After assessing current measures and standards against international practices, we conclude that Hong Kong's highway design and traffic management measures are generally in line with international standards.

We have also analysed the traffic accident trends in Hong Kong and concluded that the safety of our road system is on par with that of other major cities. While our accident rates remain at a relatively low level, many have reached a plateau and shown little improvement for a number of years. The number of slight accidents and accidents involving public buses and public

light buses has shown a slight upward trend. This signals the need for improvement measures.

After reviewing the various factors contributing to traffic accidents, we note that driving behaviour has the greatest bearing on safety. To bring about a visible improvement in our safety performance, we should target efforts to promote good driving practices and foster a responsible and considerate driving culture. Looking ahead, we should aim to make Hong Kong's road system the safest, and the driving culture the most considerate and courteous, among major cities in the world.

The Panel appreciates that parapet design attracted much public attention following the July incident. We wish to point out that parapets provide only a passive line of defence to reduce the severity of accidents. No parapet can have the perfect height and containment level to provide the ideal protection to all vehicles under all conditions. We advocate a total safety management approach to deploy resources effectively to prevent catastrophic accidents.

Road safety is a vast subject covering a wide spectrum of issues and areas. On-going efforts by the Administration and all road users are vital for further enhancement of Hong Kong's road safety performance.

Yours sincerely,



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Dr Cheng Hon-kwan  
Chairman



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Ir Edmund Leung Kwong-ho  
Member



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Dr Wong Sze-chun  
Member

Encl.

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# Executive Summary

## APPOINTMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT PANEL

1. A major traffic incident involving a container truck and a double-decked bus occurred on 10 July 2003 on Tuen Mun Road. The bus broke through a section of vehicular parapet on a section of highway above Ting Kau Village and plunged into the hillside beneath, resulting in 21 fatalities and 20 injuries. The incident raised concerns about the safety standard of Tuen Mun Road and the highway network in general. The Chief Executive appointed an Independent Expert Panel (the Panel) to examine and make recommendations on safety measures to prevent similar catastrophes. Issues relating to the causes and liability of persons involved in the incident were investigated by the Police and fell outside the Panel's terms of reference.

## THE PANEL'S WORK PLAN

2. The Panel inspected the incident site, the vehicles involved in the incident and the damaged parapet sections, and held regular meetings with relevant government departments to examine the latest developments and international practices of various road safety issues. To ensure public participation in the process, the Panel called for public views from 4 August 2003 to 3 September 2003, and held consultation sessions with the transport trade to more fully gather their views. The Panel studied the public views and suggestions carefully and thoroughly and has taken them into account in mapping out the recommendations.

### JULY INCIDENT AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENT TRENDS

3. The Panel has examined different aspects of the July incident including highway design, traffic signs, parapet design, human factors, etc. to identify areas for improvement. In addition, the Panel analysed traffic accident trends to assess the safety level of Hong Kong's road transport system. The Panel notes that there was a drop in the total number of traffic accidents as well as the fatality and casualty rates in 2002 as compared with 1982. However, the increase in slight accidents and the relatively high involvement rate of public buses and public light buses in traffic accidents warrant attention. On international comparison, Hong Kong compares favourably with other major cities for the per population accident rate but less favourably in terms of the rate per kilometre of road.

### ENHANCING DRIVING BEHAVIOUR

4. The Panel has reviewed the major factors contributing to traffic accidents over the past ten years and notes that about 65% of the accidents are driver related. This points to the importance of fostering a more considerate and responsible driving culture through focused and sustainable publicity programmes launched by the Road Safety Council (RSC) in collaboration with District Councils, effective evaluation methodology to fine-tune publicity strategies and additional avenues to extend the coverage of publicity efforts.

5. While there is no imminent need to further tighten the driving test standards and requirements, the Panel recommends that the Government explore the feasibility of introducing mandatory courses for repeat traffic offenders, enhancing training for professional drivers, expanding the 'probationary' driving licence arrangement for motorcyclists to cover new private car and light goods vehicle drivers, and instituting a 'Quality Driving Instructor Course' to upgrade the skills of driving instructors.

### LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT

6. Comprehensive legislation and effective enforcement are necessary to combat undesirable driving behaviour. The Panel notes that the Government has kept road safety related legislation under constant review to ensure that Hong Kong's road safety regime is on par with international standards and meets the changing needs of the community. New legislation imposing fixed penalties for some common traffic offences and creating a new offence against tailgating is under deliberation. The Panel recommends that preparations for the proposed legislative changes be expedited.

7. Road safety legislation and publicity programmes need to be complemented by an effective enforcement regime. To increase the deterrent effect, the Panel recommends that the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) continue to devise enforcement programmes in tandem with the publicity plans mounted by RSC, and to deploy advanced technology to facilitate traffic enforcement. In particular, the Panel recommends that the Speed Enforcement Cameras (SECs) for Tuen Mun Road and 59 other locations be put into operation as soon as possible. The Government should also extend SEC coverage to other parts of the strategic road network and those routes with speeding problems.

### TRAFFIC ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT

8. Safe transport infrastructure and an efficient traffic management system are important pillars of road safety. After examining highway design standards in Hong Kong and overseas, the Panel considers that Hong Kong's highway design meets international standards and places proper emphasis on road safety, despite the challenges presented by limited space and a hilly topography. Members point to the need to differentiate between requirements for safety and comfort in highway design and are of the opinion that a well-designed road should provide an acceptable level of safety with the intended level of comfort at an acceptable cost.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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9. The Panel points out the close relationship between highway design and speed, and the safety considerations concerning the design speed and posted speed limit. Members recommend that the Transport Department (TD) continue to conduct regular reviews of speed limits and, if necessary, adjust the speed limits to optimise traffic flow without compromising road safety.

10. Traffic signs and road markings are integral parts of the road system that convey important information to drivers on directions and driving rules. After examining the current practices, the Panel concurs that the signing arrangements in Hong Kong accord with international practices. The Panel notes that improvement measures arising from the 'Comprehensive Review of Directional Signing in Hong Kong' are in the pipeline. These include rationalisation of the route numbering system and provision of exit numbers on the strategic road network. The Panel calls for an early implementation of the improvement measures and the launch of publicity measures to keep motorists informed of changes in signing standards.

11. The Panel notes that some controls and restrictions on heavy vehicles and specific safety measures for franchised buses are already in place. The Panel recommends that the Government keep a close watch on the safety records of specific types of vehicles and take proactive steps to enhance their safety standards with participation of the relevant transport trades.

## VEHICLE CONTROL

12. Despite modern designs that have made vehicles safer, it is the way in which a vehicle is used and maintained that has the greatest bearing on safety.

13. Speeding is a common problem. For better speed control, the Panel recommends that appropriate speed display and control devices be installed in passenger services vehicles. Subject to an evaluation of the speed display units (SDUs) installed in green minibuses running overnight routes, Members recommend that the use of SDU be extended to other public light buses. The Panel also

recommends that newly-registered franchised buses be required to install speed limiters. Consideration should also be given to install speed limiters in other heavy vehicles, subject to consultation with the transport trade. As for tachographs, which can serve accident investigation and fleet management purposes, the Panel recommends that TD explore the fitting of such devices in franchised buses, and subject to evaluation of effectiveness, consider extending them to other types of passenger services vehicles.

14. Regular inspections and roadside enforcement are useful measures to ensure that vehicles are kept in good working order. The Panel recommends that temporary or permanent check sites for roadside enforcement be established close to major trunk roads or expressways and that joint roadside spot checks on heavy vehicles by HKPF and TD be stepped up. The feasibility of extending the stability test (tilt test) to heavy goods vehicles should also be explored.

### VEHICULAR PARAPET DESIGN

15. Parapets are protective devices designed to reduce the severity of an accident. They provide a passive line of defence and are not the cause or a contributory factor of an accident.

16. After examining local and international standards, the Panel considers that the existing parapet design standards adopted by the Highways Department (HyD) are generally in line with international practices. Taking into account the standards adopted for road design, and the measures put in place to control various types of vehicles and drivers, the Panel is of the view that the various types of parapets are suitable for general application and for uses on elevated structures in terms of containment capacity and height protection. However, there is room for enhancement at critical locations where penetration of the vehicular parapet may result in catastrophic consequences. The Panel advocates a total safety management approach and recommends that a proper risk assessment and cost benefit analysis be carried out before any parapet enhancement programme is implemented. The Panel considers

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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that there is a strong socio-economic case to devote resources to a mixture of proven measures to reduce occurrence of accidents rather than to reduce the severity of low probability accidents.

17. On parapet design, the Panel notes that a strong parapet designed to a high containment level may stop a heavy vehicle in the desired manner, but may cause considerable damage to a small vehicle and subject the occupants to severe acceleration force and injury. Conversely, a parapet designed to a lower containment level for light vehicles would not perform equally well for larger vehicles that may penetrate the parapet. There is at present a technical dilemma for a parapet design to satisfy different containment levels at the same time. For enhancement of parapet design in the long term, the Panel recommends that HyD expand the range of containment levels, in particular at the high end, and review the parapet height requirements, having regard to the extensive use of double-decked buses and the maximum legislated vehicle weight permitted on the road system in Hong Kong. The Panel also recommends that HyD continue to monitor the development of multiple containment parapet overseas, and develop appropriate parapet designs for Hong Kong.

18. In anticipation of an expanded parapet hierarchy, and the possibility of introducing more height variations, the Panel recommends that detailed guidelines and analysis procedures be provided on the choice of containment level and parapet height.

19. As materials and workmanship have a bearing on the strength of the parapets, the Panel recommends that suitable testing requirements for fabricating the steel components used in vehicular parapets be included in the General Specification for Civil Engineering Works. HyD should conduct research work in collaboration with local tertiary institutions on new parapet designs and materials. Evaluation of parapet designs on the basis of damage information collected after traffic incidents should also be carried out to refine various types of parapet designs.

### TUEN MUN ROAD

20. Having examined past accident statistics, the Panel considers that Tuen Mun Road is intrinsically safe as seen by its accident rates, which are about average for all expressways, including those more recently built to current design standards. Bearing in mind the high proportion of heavy vehicles using Tuen Mun Road, there is no evidence indicating that heavy vehicles are more prone to accidents along Tuen Mun Road.

21. Noting that the major contributory factors of traffic accidents along Tuen Mun Road are driver related, the Panel considers that enforcement actions should be stepped up. The Panel recommends that TD and HKPF expedite the necessary preparatory work to bring the SEC system on Tuen Mun Road to full operation as soon as possible. The Panel further recommends that once the SEC system is in operation, HKPF should deploy more resources to patrolling, and to target at tailgating and careless lane changing which are the top two contributory factors of traffic accidents.

22. In regard to the geometric standards, the Panel notes that some sections of Tuen Mun Road fall outside the current standards because of the topography of the route. As worldwide highway design standards are being raised beyond the required safety margins to give a high level of comfort to motorists, the Panel considers that the marginally lower standards at a few locations on Tuen Mun Road mainly affect the comfort of motorists but not their safety.

23. For the traffic management system, the Panel considers that the traffic signing and road marking arrangements along Tuen Mun Road are effective. Although there is no intrinsic deficiency in the design at the incident site, the Panel considers it prudent to draw up a package of enhancement measures for the road section in the vicinity of the incident location, taking into account the recommendations made in the recent studies on traffic signing and road markings.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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24. Despite suggestions to ban buses and heavy vehicles including container trucks from using Tuen Mun Road, the Panel does not support this proposal. There is no evidence to show that these categories of vehicles are more prone to traffic accident along Tuen Mun Road. In addition, banning these vehicles from using Tuen Mun Road would have serious economic and social impacts on the northwest New Territories (NWNT). Tuen Mun Road is a vital route linking urban areas with the NWNT as well as the Lok Ma Chau Crossing. Any buses and heavy vehicles banned from using Tuen Mun Road would have to use other alternative routes, resulting in widespread traffic congestion and unnecessarily long travelling time, particularly during peak hours.

25. The Panel notes that improvement works carried out at different stages on Tuen Mun Road have resulted in gradual upgrading of standards along the road. Members recommend that a comprehensive road safety review be conducted for Tuen Mun Road, particularly from the drivers' perspective, to identify any possible safety enhancement measures. Improvement measures that can be implemented within a relatively short period, such as traffic management modifications, will be carried out as interim enhancement, while major engineering items will be covered under the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project.

26. The Panel notes that the public is keen to see an early completion of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project. The Panel has worked closely with TD and HyD to identify opportunities for advancing the project. The Panel is pleased to note that by streamlining the planning and design process, the start of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project can be advanced by six months to mid-2005 for completion in phases between mid-2009 and mid-2011. The Panel recommends that HyD continue to refine the construction programme with a view to further reducing the construction period.

### MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

27. Apart from the above focus areas, the Panel has also responded to miscellaneous improvement proposals concerning driver's health, safety of parapets and railings at specific locations, road maintenance, Government communication with the transport trade and driver associations, and the application of the 'two-second' rule. Public views and suggestions that were not related to highway safety or the Panel's scope of work were referred to relevant departments for follow-up action.

28. The rationale and details of the recommendations put forth by the Panel are covered in various chapters, while an overview is set out in the summary of recommendations.

## Chapter 1

# Introduction

### APPOINTMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT PANEL

1.1 A major traffic incident occurred at 0630 hours on 10 July 2003 on Tuen Mun Road westbound above Ting Kau Village. A container truck with a 40-foot empty trailer collided with a double-decked bus. The bus carrying 40 passengers broke through a section of vehicular parapet and plunged into the hillside about 31 m beneath Tuen Mun Road. The traffic incident resulted in 21 fatalities, one of them being the bus driver, and 20 injuries.

1.2 The Government was deeply concerned about this serious traffic incident which not only brought about losses of precious lives, but also raised concerns about the safety standard of Tuen Mun Road and the highway network in general. The Chief Executive, Mr Tung Chee Hwa, has appointed an Independent Expert Panel (the Panel) to address these important issues.

### MEMBERSHIP

1.3 The Panel was chaired by Dr Cheng Hon-kwan, who is currently the Chairman of the Transport Advisory Committee. The other two members were Ir Edmund Leung Kwong-ho, Past President of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, and Dr Wong Sze-chun, Associate Professor in the Department of Civil Engineering of the University of Hong Kong. The Panel members were selected for their knowledge of Hong Kong's transport system, experience in different engineering disciplines and expertise in transportation, highway design and traffic management. Please see **Appendix I** for biographical notes on Members.

## TERMS OF REFERENCE

1.4 Having regard to the circumstances of the traffic incident on Tuen Mun Road on 10 July 2003, the Panel was tasked to examine and make recommendations to the Chief Executive on safety measures to prevent similar catastrophes. While a wide spectrum of issues and subjects have a bearing on highway safety, given the time constraint, the Panel focused on key items which were of concern to the public and required immediate attention.

1.5 Issues relating to the causes and liability of persons involved in the incident were investigated by the Police and fell outside the Panel's terms of reference.

## MODUS OPERANDI

1.6 The Panel was supported by a secretariat. Government departments including the Highways Department (HyD), the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and the Transport Department (TD), provided Members with information on current practices/standards and the latest developments regarding various road safety issues. They also conducted researches into specific areas for the Panel's deliberation.

## WORK PROGRAMME

1.7 The Panel worked under a very tight schedule in the past four months. They held their first meeting on 28 July 2003 to map out their work plan, and inspected the incident site, the two vehicles involved in the traffic incident and the damaged parapet railings and posts on 29 July 2003. Members had since held regular meetings with relevant government departments to examine various road safety issues. To ensure public participation in the process, the Panel called for public



views from 4 August 2003 to 3 September 2003 and met with representatives of the transport trade to gather their views. With the benefit of public views and information gathered from an extensive review of road safety issues, the Panel mapped out its recommendations and submitted a report to the Chief Executive in November 2003.

## OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT

1.8 Following a brief introduction in this Chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the Panel's work in the past four months. An account of the July incident is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 covers a detailed analysis of traffic accident trends in Hong Kong to identify potential areas for improvement. The Panel then examines road safety issues relating to the three major components of the road transport system, namely, road users, the road environment and vehicles. Given that human factors contribute to a high percentage of traffic accidents, public education and driver training are discussed in Chapter 5. Road safety publicity has to be supplemented by an effective enforcement programme. The Panel therefore examines the legislative and enforcement regime in Chapter 6. Issues on traffic engineering and management that define the road environment are discussed in Chapter 7. The subject of vehicle control is examined in Chapter 8. Although vehicular parapets only provide a passive line of defence, and cannot be a contributory factor of an accident, the Panel considers it prudent to devote a full Chapter 9 on various aspects of parapet design, which have attracted public attention after the incident. Improvement measures for Tuen Mun Road are given in Chapter 10. Miscellaneous improvement proposals are set out in Chapter 11. Chapter 12 contains a summary of recommendations put forth by the Panel.

2.1 As investigation of liability issues fell under the purview of the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), a detailed analysis of the causes of the traffic incident was left to HKPF. Nonetheless, the Panel had examined the factual account of the incident, the environment of the incident site, the mechanics of the vehicles and the street furniture involved to identify factors which might affect highway safety, and to propose corresponding improvement measures.

2.2 The Panel's deliberation went beyond Tuen Mun Road and covered other high-speed roads and locations with characteristics similar to the incident site. The Panel examined key elements of road safety, reviewed current standards and international practices, and considered public and expert views to come up with recommendations to improve highway safety in general. The following outlines the Panel's work in the four-month period.

## FIRST MEETING

2.3 The Panel held their first meeting on 28 July 2003 to agree on the scope of work and work plan. It was agreed that the Panel would examine different safety aspects, including driving behaviour, highway design, traffic management and regulation, and vehicular parapets, taking into account special characteristics of the road system in Hong Kong.

## SITE VISIT

2.4 The Panel had a site visit on 29 July 2003 to obtain first-hand information on the incident site and the damaged vehicles and parapet. The Panel examined the design and highway facilities for the incident site, including the signage leading to the site, and inspected the hillside at Ting Kau Village where the double-decked

bus landed. Following the site visit, the Panel inspected the container truck and the bus involved in the incident at the Siu Ho Wan Vehicle Detention Pound, and the damaged parapet railings and posts at the Tsuen Wan Police Station. The Panel's observations are set out in Chapter 3.

## COLLECTION OF PUBLIC VIEWS

2.5 The Panel had kept track of views expressed by different sectors in the media and at other open fora since the incident occurred. To facilitate public participation in the process, the Panel called for public views on ways to enhance highway safety from 4 August 2003 to 3 September 2003. An invitation for written submissions was published in three Chinese newspapers and one English newspaper. Letters were also sent to professional bodies in the engineering, transport and construction fields, engineering departments of local academic institutions, transport trade associations, franchised bus companies, driving schools and other relevant organisations such as the Road Safety Council appealing for suggestions. A list of these organisations is set out in **Appendix II**. The Panel received 93 written submissions from different sectors during the one-month consultation period. The Panel also briefed the Transport Advisory Committee and consulted Professor Richard Allsop of University College London, an expert on traffic safety and management in the UK.

2.6 The Panel attaches great importance to the views of the transport trade personnel who are frequent users of the road and key stakeholders of highway safety improvement measures. To gauge their views more fully, the Panel invited 90 transport trade organisations representing taxis, public light buses, light goods vehicles and heavy vehicles to attend three consultation sessions designated for different trades on 19 September 2003. Please refer to **Appendix II** for the invitation list and organisations participated in the consultation sessions.

2.7 The views collected through written submissions and consultation sessions were analysed and classified into five main categories –

- ☐ driving behaviour;
- ☐ enforcement;
- ☐ traffic engineering and management;
- ☐ parapet design issues; and
- ☐ other miscellaneous items.

A categorised summary of the public views is set out at **Appendix III**.

2.8 The Panel considered the views and suggestions fully and carefully, and took them into account when formulating the improvement measures. The Panel's responses to the views are set out in individual chapters covering different key areas and a quick reference to the relevant paragraphs is provided in **Appendix III**. The Panel would like to express profound gratitude to all those who have expressed their views and shared their thoughts.

## REGULAR MEETINGS WITH RELEVANT DEPARTMENTS

2.9 The Panel held regular meetings with the relevant government departments including the Highways Department (HyD), HKPF and the Transport Department (TD) to collect information about current practices/standards and the latest developments of various road safety issues including –

- ☐ accident and parapet damage statistics;
- ☐ highway and parapet designs;
- ☐ traffic management;
- ☐ legislation and enforcement;
- ☐ management and control of different classes of vehicles;
- ☐ training for drivers; and
- ☐ public education and publicity.

2.10 Through a detailed analysis of the information collected from the submissions and the consultation process, and in-depth discussions with government departments, the Panel identified areas for improvement and mapped out enhancement recommendations for both Tuen Mun Road and the highway network in general.

2.11 The Panel kept the public abreast of their work through media briefings at key junctures. The Panel briefed the media on their scope of work and work plan after the site visit on 29 July 2003. They shared with the media the public views collected after the consultation with transport trade organisations on 19 September 2003 and briefed the media on the key recommendations on the release of the report.

## Chapter 3

# The Incident

### AN ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT

3.1 On the morning of 10 July 2003, a fine and clear day, a KMB double-decked bus of Route 265M (registration mark JU 4667) was on its normal haul from Lai Yiu Tsuen, Kwai Chung to Tin Shui Wai. At 0630 hours, when the bus was on Tuen Mun Road above Ting Kau Village, a collision occurred between it and a container truck (a tractor with an empty trailer, with registration marks JE9488 and 39401T respectively). The bus veered off through the parapet and plunged 31 m down to Ting Kau Village below. After the incident, the container truck stopped at the hard shoulder and across the nearside lane, adjacent to the parapet (**Figure 3.1**).

#### The bus

3.2 The bus plunged head-down after the collision, and its front part was crushed beyond recognition (**Figure 3.2**). The extent of the crushing was more severe at the upper than the lower deck. Most seats were detached or distorted as a result of the impact force. For the 40 passengers on board, 20 died, and 20 were injured. The driver of the bus died instantly.

Figure 3.1 – The container truck after the collision





Figure 3.2 – The damaged bus in police detention pound

3.3 The bus was relatively new (**Figure 3.3**). Information about the bus is set out below –

- ❑ Make : Neoplan (manufactured in 2000)
- ❑ Dimensions : 12 m (L) x 2.5 m (W) x 4.35 m (H)
- ❑ Centre of Gravity : 1.985 m above the ground (at its worst case with a fully laden upper deck and empty lower deck)
- ❑ Axle Weights :
  - 16 340 kg (unladen)
  - 23 200 kg (laden)
- ❑ Seating capacity :
 

Upper deck	59
Lower deck	31
Standees	36



Figure 3.3 – Record photo of a Neoplan bus



### The container truck

3.4 The container truck was made up of a tractor and a semi trailer. The semi trailer was empty at that time. The weights of the tractor and the trailer were 6 690 kg and 6 830 kg respectively. The tractor was first registered on 9 June 1992, and the trailer on 10 August 1999. This category of vehicle is subject to an annual examination when its licence is renewed.



Figure 3.4 – The damaged driving cab of the container truck

3.5 The damage to the container truck was relatively light (**Figure 3.4**). Only the nearside of the tractor was dented. The driver was not injured and was able to assist the police with the investigation at the scene. He also passed the alcohol test.

### The road

3.6 Tuen Mun Road was designed during the period of the late 1960's and the early 1970's as a high capacity dual three-lane 15 km highway connecting Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun. The road was built to cope with the expected traffic volume arising from the then newly developed Tuen Mun satellite town. Construction of the Tsuen Wan bound carriageway started in 1974 and was completed in 1978. The carriageway was situated on higher terrain. The Tuen Mun bound carriageway was mostly supported on columns and its construction was completed in 1983.

3.7 The stretch of road at the incident spot was subsequently widened to accommodate the slip road leading to the Tai Lam Tunnel approach road of the Tsing Long Highway (**Figures 3.5 and 3.6**). It was a three-lane carriageway with a slight left curve which should not offer any obstruction to the sightline. The road was wide as there was a hard shoulder almost one lane wide between the nearside lane and the parapet plus a taper of the slip road of almost equal width.





Figure 3.5 – An aerial photo of Tuen Mun Road at the location of incident (by courtesy of Ming Pao)

Figure 3.6 – Tuen Mun Road from Ting Kau Village



### The scene

3.8 On the morning of the incident, the weather was fine, and the road surface was dry. The incident happened at the spot where the nearside lane was widened to accommodate a slip road leading to the Tsing Long Highway. The speed limit in force was 70 km/h. The gradient of the road was gentle downhill. No traces of oil slick or other substance which would reduce the normal level of friction were observed. The road surface was constructed with an asphalt wearing course. The section of the road concerned was resurfaced in 1999. Previous records showed that this was not an accident black spot.

3.9 At the time of the incident, the bus was travelling along the nearside lane, and the container truck was in the middle lane. A collision occurred between the vehicles with the points of impact being the nearside front of the container truck behind the driver cab and the offside front bumper of the bus. There were tyre marks on the road surface from the container truck, and some tyre marks left by the

bus on the curb under the parapet. The front bumper of the bus was found at the point where the container truck rested.


3.10 The truck and the bus travelled together for a short distance, across the initial section of the slip road and then across the hard shoulder, before the bus plunged down to Ting Kau Village below. The truck stopped across the hard shoulder, right at the parapet in front of the gap in the rails cut open by the bus. The point where the bus plunged was about 50 m past the road sign gantry located at the start of the slip road to Tsing Long Highway.

### The parapet

3.11 The parapet was a three-rail steel parapet, which is generally adopted for the whole of Tuen Mun Road wherever parapets are required. Beneath the parapet, there was a concrete curb. The three steel rails were bolted to the posts, which were in turn welded onto base plates bolted to the curb. The base plate and the bottom part of the post were protected with concrete. All the rails as well as the posts were constructed of steel box sections. Spigot and socket joints were provided at intervals to allow for the expansion and contraction of the jointed sections of the rails due to temperature changes. **Figure 3.7** shows a typical parapet of similar design.



Figure 3.7 – A typical parapet of similar design



3.12 In the incident, a total of 13.35 m of this parapet were damaged, along with four supporting steel posts (**Figures 3.8 and 3.9**). Two of the posts were sheared off the base plate at the welded joint and fell to Ting Kau Village below (the concrete protection blocks were smashed entirely), and another two posts (one preceding, another ensuring the two sheared off posts) were bent. Some of the rails were snapped at the position where they were bolted to the posts, and some were split at the expansion joint and fell to Ting Kau Village below. Not all of these sections were recovered afterwards. Some of the bent rails remained on the posts and a segment of broken rail recovered showed that it was bent through almost 180 degrees in a direction opposite to the impact.



Figure 3.8 – The broken parapet




Figure 3.9 – Elevation of the parapet showing damaged portions

## Chapter 4

# Traffic Accident Trends in Hong Kong

## INTRODUCTION


4.1 With a total area of 1 102 km<sup>2</sup>, Hong Kong has a population of 6.8 million and 522 912 licensed vehicles as at 30 June 2003. The length of public roads runs to 1 932 km, with 111 km being expressways. Against this background, the Panel has reviewed the accident rates and trends in Hong Kong in the past two decades, and compared the records with those of other major cities to assess the safety level of the road transport system in Hong Kong.

4.2 Members recognise that there are different parameters for monitoring accident trends and assessing road safety performance. Other than total number of accidents, accident rates can be compared against different levels of population, motorisation and road network built, i.e. in terms of *number of accidents per million population, per thousand licensed vehicles, per kilometre of road or per million vehicle-kilometre respectively*. As each parameter has its advantages and limitations, the Panel has reviewed the accident trends using various parameters to arrive at a more comprehensive analysis.

## OVERALL TREND

4.3 The historical trend of the *total number of traffic accidents* (**Figure 4.1**) provides a comparison of road safety performance over a period of time. From 1982 to 2002, the *number of accidents* dropped by about 15%. However, a slight

**Figure 4.1 – Total number of accidents in Hong Kong (1982 - 2002)**




upward trend was observed since 1998. In terms of *accident rates per 10 000 population* and *per 1 000 vehicles*, they have reached a plateau for quite a number of years.


## SEVERITY TREND

4.4 During the same period, the *number of fatal<sup>1</sup> and serious<sup>2</sup> accidents per year* reduced by 63% (from 434 to 162) and 60% (from 8 043 to 3 118) respectively. Both show a downward trend with the drop stabilising in the past few years as shown in **Figures 4.2 and 4.3**. On the other hand, the *number of slight<sup>3</sup> accidents per year* increased by about 25% from 9 836 to 12 296 as shown in **Figure 4.4**.

**Figure 4.2 – Number of fatal accidents (1982 - 2002)**



**Figure 4.3 – Number of serious accidents (1982 - 2002)**




<sup>1</sup> A fatal accident is one in which at least one person is killed immediately, or is injured and subsequently dies of his injuries within 30 days of the accident.

<sup>2</sup> A serious accident is one in which one or more persons is injured and detained in hospital for more than 12 hours.

<sup>3</sup> A slight accident is one in which one or more persons is injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours.


**Figure 4.4 – Number of slight accidents (1982 - 2002)**



## CASUALTY TREND


4.5 The *number of casualties* involved in traffic accidents between 1982 and 2002 exhibits a trend similar to that of the total number of traffic accidents. During the period, the total number of casualties dropped from 24 222 to 20 600, representing a 15% reduction, as illustrated in **Figure 4.5**.

**Figure 4.5 – Total number of casualties (1982 - 2002)**




4.6 During the same period, the number of fatalities and serious injuries fell from 453 to 171 and from 9 615 to 3 426 respectively (see **Figures 4.6 and 4.7**). However, the number of slight injuries increased by 20% from 14 154 to 17 003 (see **Figure 4.8**).


**Figure 4.6 – Number of fatalities (1982 - 2002)**



**Figure 4.7 – Number of serious injuries (1982 - 2002)**



**Figure 4.8 – Number of slight injuries (1982 - 2002)**





## VEHICLE INVOLVEMENT TREND

4.7 Apart from reviewing the number of traffic accidents and their severity, the Panel has also examined the vehicle involvement rates to assess whether a particular vehicle type is more prone to traffic accidents. For a better appreciation of the mix of vehicles in Hong Kong, the number of different types of licensed vehicles as at 30 June 2003 is set out in **Figure 4.9**.


**Figure 4.9 – Number of different types  
of licensed vehicles as at 30 June 2003**

Motor cycle/tricycle	29 163
Private car	338 534
Taxi	17 997
Government vehicle	6 776
Light goods vehicle	68 275
Medium goods vehicle	38 428
Heavy goods vehicle	3 333
Light bus	6 297
Franchised bus	6 281
Non-franchised bus	6 594
Private bus	478
Special purpose vehicle	756
<b>Total</b>	<b>522 912</b>


4.8 From 1982 to 2002, the *total number of vehicle involvements* in accidents dropped by 12% from 24 882 to 21 967, as shown in **Figure 4.10**. As there was an increase in the total number of licensed vehicles from 297 997 to 525 111 during the same period, *the involvements per 1 000 vehicles* dropped even more significantly by 50%, from 83.5 to 41.8. However, the Panel notes that in recent years, some vehicle classes such as public buses and public light buses recorded an increase in the absolute number of accident involvements as shown in **Figures 4.11 and 4.12** respectively. This development warrants our attention.




**Figure 4.10 – Number of vehicles involved in accidents in Hong Kong (1982 - 2002)**



**Figure 4.11 – Number of public buses involved in accidents in Hong Kong (1982 - 2002)**



**Figure 4.12 – Number of public light buses (PLB) involved in accidents in Hong Kong (1982 - 2002)**



## COMPARISON OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT RATES WITH OTHER MAJOR CITIES

4.9 The Panel has also compared Hong Kong's road safety performance with other major cities for benchmarking purposes. **Figures 4.13 and 4.14** show Hong Kong's ranking among other major cities in terms of *road traffic fatality rate per million population and per kilometre of road*. Similar comparisons on the *number of road accidents per year* are shown in **Figures 4.15 and 4.16**. Hong Kong has one of the lowest rates in terms of *fatalities per million population* and *accidents per 1 000 population*. In terms of *fatalities* and *number of accidents per kilometre of road*, Hong Kong is one of the cities with higher rates, probably because the total length of roads in Hong Kong is relatively short but the road usage is high. The Panel notes that the per vehicle-kilometre accident rate is another commonly used parameter. As data on this parameter for major overseas cities are not readily available, no comparison is made in this report.

**Figure 4.13 – Fatality rate per million population in different cities**




Figure 4.14 – Fatality rate per kilometre of road in different cities




Figure 4.15 – Accident rate per 1 000 population in different cities





Figure 4.16 – Accident rate per kilometre of road in different cities



### OBSERVATIONS

4.10 The Panel concludes that despite an increase in population and vehicles, there has been a reduction in the total number of traffic accidents and fatalities in the past two decades. A similar reduction was recorded for the casualty rates. **However, the increase in slight accidents and in the number of accidents involving public buses and public light buses warrants attention.**

4.11 As for international comparison, Hong Kong's road safety performance is on par with other major cities. Hong Kong compares favourably with other cities for the per population accident rate but less favourably in terms of the rate per kilometre of road. **The Panel considers that there is always room for improvement.**

## Chapter 5

# Driving Behaviour

### INTRODUCTION

5.1 Road environment, vehicles and road users are all part of the road transport system. Among them, the human factor is the most complex and dynamic. Whether the road users follow traffic rules and adopt a careful and considerate driving attitude has a great bearing on road safety. Therefore, the Panel considers it vital to focus on ways to improve the driving attitudes of the motoring community.

### IMPACT OF INAPPROPRIATE DRIVING BEHAVIOUR ON ROAD SAFETY

5.2 The Panel has reviewed the major contributory factors of traffic accidents in Hong Kong in the past ten years (i.e. 1993 - 2002) and notes that, on average, about 65% of accidents are driver related. Inappropriate driving behaviour commonly exhibited by drivers includes –

- ☐ driving too close to the vehicle in front;
- ☐ turning or reversing negligently;
- ☐ careless lane changing;
- ☐ driving at an inappropriate speed;
- ☐ failing to obey traffic signals; and
- ☐ late use of or failing to use indicators.

## COMMUNITY VIEWS ON CAUSES OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS IN HONG KONG

5.3 Following the Tuen Mun Road incident on 10 July 2003, views were sought on ways to improve road safety from members of the public, including professional bodies, tertiary institutions and trade associations. A large number of those who made written submissions perceived that traffic accidents in Hong Kong were related to inappropriate driving behaviour. Common bad practices cited include driving at an inappropriate speed; prolonged occupation of the fast lane; tailgating; changing lanes without warning; overtaking using the slow lane; heavy vehicles ignoring light vehicles; failing to allow traffic to filter; and jumping red lights. Many considered that these problems were common along Tuen Mun Road.

5.4 The Panel received the following suggestions on measures to improve driving behaviour and the code of conduct for drivers –

- ❑ require drivers with 12 driving offence points to take a refresher course;
- ❑ impose mandatory driving courses for drivers of high-risk vehicles;
- ❑ require learners to attend improvement/advanced driving courses including driving on expressways;
- ❑ upgrade training of drivers, including drivers of buses and heavy vehicles;
- ❑ review training/test requirements to include elements of driving attitude;
- ❑ upgrade training/standard of driving instructors;
- ❑ review traffic blackspots and educate drivers; and
- ❑ launch education and publicity campaigns to improve driving behaviour and the general attitude of road users.

## IMPROVEMENT MEASURES

5.5 The Panel considers that in order to improve driving behaviour and foster a considerate and responsible driving culture, the following measures would be most effective –

- ☐ publicity;
- ☐ driver training; and
- ☐ strengthened enforcement.

## SUSTAINABLE PUBLICITY PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE DRIVING BEHAVIOUR

5.6 The Panel notes that publicity is one of the major non-engineering ways of influencing road users. It plays an important role in promoting road safety concepts, building awareness and promoting safety messages within the general community.

5.7 The Road Safety Council (RSC), which comprises both government and non-government representatives, is responsible for developing the annual road safety campaign, as well as monitoring and coordinating publicity activities. Road safety publicity in Hong Kong generally focuses on three main areas –

- ☐ changing road users' attitude to make the road network safer for all;
- ☐ alerting the public about ways to prevent traffic accidents; and
- ☐ making road users aware of new legislation.

5.8 The RSC conducts year-round activities using various media including TV and radio announcements, outdoor advertisements, teaching kits, posters and pamphlets, and community outreach activities such as large-scale publicity events.

5.9 Since 2001, the RSC has adopted 'Smart Driving' as the main theme of its road safety campaign. The campaign aims to promote good and safe driving practices and highlights bad driving behaviour that increases the risk of accidents for drivers and other road users. The Panel notes from a recent survey that the campaign has been successful in raising alertness among various audiences. However, the effectiveness of the campaign in bringing about changes in actual driving behaviour requires further assessment.

5.10 Recently, a Working Group on a 'Smart Driving Publicity Strategy' campaign has been set up by the RSC with representatives from the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, the Transport Department (TD), the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), the Information Services Department and three non-government organisations. The campaign will place greater emphasis on promoting 'smart driving behaviour' and encouraging drivers to abandon bad driving habits. **The Panel endorses this approach.**

5.11 The Panel is also pleased to note that the RSC has taken the initiative to develop a new Vision and a new Symbol to motivate the public, the Government and other relevant parties to focus their efforts in enhancing road safety. Competitions on the design of the Vision and the Symbol for the road safety campaign will be organised by the RSC in late 2003 and early 2004 respectively. The new designs will be used in all the activities, publications and publicity programmes of the RSC starting from mid-2004.

5.12 Following the Tuen Mun Road incident, the RSC revised its 2004 annual publicity programme. Professional drivers, and drivers of heavy goods vehicles and passenger services vehicles were identified as target groups for the publicity and education programme. More emphasis will also be accorded to driving on expressways. **The Panel fully supports the RSC's initiatives.**

5.13 Road safety programmes are more likely to be successful if they address specific driving behaviour in a sustainable manner. Otherwise, drivers tend to revert to previous bad practices over time. The ultimate goal of the publicity and education programme is to change motorists' driving behaviour to make them careful and considerate to all road users.



**5.14 The Panel recommends that, to ensure continuity, consideration be given to drawing up a longer term programme extending beyond the normal annual cycle. In addition, collaboration with District Councils should be actively pursued to extend the reach of road safety campaigns.**

5.15 The Panel considers that there is a need to measure the effectiveness of the publicity programme properly, particularly in respect of individual and self-employed drivers, to ensure that appropriate promotional strategies are adopted for different audiences.

**5.16 The Panel recommends that in addition to measuring public awareness of the publicity programmes, an evaluation methodology involving targetted surveys of the driving population be devised to assess the effectiveness of the programmes. Research on the evaluation methodology can be conducted in conjunction with local tertiary institutions.**

5.17 Apart from the publicity programmes conducted by the RSC, TD publishes the Road Users' Code that contains comprehensive guidelines for road users under most road and traffic conditions. TD has been making efforts to foster the road safety message to the public transport trade. For instance, a 'Road Safety Forum for Franchised Buses' is organised with participation of all franchised bus companies and HKPF. The forum has focused, among other things, on accident prevention measures for franchised buses. Between 2002 and July 2003, TD has organised eight road safety seminars for franchised bus drivers to promote road safety awareness and proper driving behaviour. TD also holds regular meetings with franchised bus companies to discuss bus safety issues. For other road passenger transport, including non-franchised buses, public light buses and taxis, TD has conducted a series of seminars and workshops for operators and drivers with road safety as one of the major discussion topics. TD also publishes regular newsletters to enhance communication with members of the trade. Information relating to measures and practices to enhance road and passenger safety is disseminated through these newsletters.

5.18 The Panel notes that the road safety seminars and meetings organised by TD are mainly targetted at companies with large vehicle fleets and transport trade associations. Self-employed or individual drivers without affiliation to any such associations may face practical difficulties in attending seminars and meetings of this nature.

5.19 **The Panel considers that there is a need to reach out to self-employed or individual drivers, and recommends that additional avenues be identified to extend the coverage of the publicity work to cover them.**

5.20 **Regarding the approach to be adopted for publicity programmes, the Panel recommends that, apart from condemning aggressive driving behaviour, consideration be given to promoting good driving practices and fostering a considerate driving culture. A few examples of good practices are listed in Figure 5.1.**

**Figure 5.1 – Examples of good driving practices**

**(A) Lane-changing discipline**

- (i) Always use the left-most lane unless you are overtaking.
- (ii) Before changing lanes, check your mirrors and glance over your shoulder to check road conditions. Indicate your intentions well in advance.

**(B) Expressway driving**

- (i) On entering an expressway, start matching your speed to the speed of vehicles on the expressway along the slip road.
- (ii) When driving on the expressway, give due consideration to other vehicles entering the expressway from the slip road.

**Figure 5.1 – Examples of good driving practices (Cont'd)**

**(C) Stay alert**

- (i) Other drivers' intentions can often be anticipated. Look out for signs, e.g. changes in the position of vehicles in lanes; drivers looking in their mirrors; and positions of the driver's hands on the steering wheel.
- (ii) Look out for inattentive drivers, especially those talking on mobile phones or turning to talk to passengers, as well as vehicles wandering in and out of lanes or following too close to the cars in front.
- (iii) When being caught in slow moving or stationary traffic, watch out for motorcycles, which may be making their way in-between lanes.

**(D) Safe speed**

- (i) Keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front. A good guideline is to maintain a distance of a 2-second time gap away from the vehicle in front. Double the time-gap under wet weather.
- (ii) Maintain a consistent speed where conditions permit.

**(E) Others**

- (i) Do not drive alongside other vehicles, particularly large trucks, for longer than necessary, because the truck drivers may not be able to see you. Also, other vehicles at your side may block your escape route in case of emergencies.
- (ii) When approaching a stationary or slow moving traffic, use your hazard flashers to warn other up-coming vehicles behind that you are slowing down.
- (iii) If a driver feels tired while driving, he/she should find a safe place to park the vehicle and take a break before continuing the journey.
- (iv) Give way to buses waiting to move out from stops.
- (v) Give due consideration to vehicles which have indicated their intention to change lanes.

## DRIVING TEST AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

5.21 The Panel believes that publicity programmes, seminars and talks are no substitute for formal courses of instruction and driving tests, particularly as a basis to ensure that drivers acquire the correct habits and attitudes from the start.

5.22 The Panel has reviewed the existing driving test and training requirements in Hong Kong and found them comparable to those of overseas countries such as Singapore and the United Kingdom. There is no imminent need to further tighten driving test standards and requirements. However, the Panel considers that the Government should take action to tackle driving attitude problems in the following ways, as discussed in paragraphs 5.23 to 5.33 below –

- ❑ mandatory courses for repeat traffic offenders;
- ❑ pre-service training for drivers of passenger services and commercial vehicles;
- ❑ Skills Upgrading Scheme for passenger services transport trades;
- ❑ probationary driving licence for new private car and light goods vehicle drivers; and
- ❑ Quality Driving Instructor Course.

### Mandatory courses for repeat traffic offenders

5.23 The introduction of the Driver Improvement Scheme in September 2002 aimed to promote road safety and make drivers more law abiding through a better understanding of what proper driving behaviour and attitudes should be. Many developed countries have introduced similar schemes for some years and such schemes have been effective in reducing traffic accidents and inducing positive change to the driving attitudes. Currently, motorists are encouraged to join the Driver Improvement Scheme on a voluntary basis, except for those who are directed by the court.

**5.24 The Panel recommends that the Government explore the feasibility of requiring drivers who have accumulated a certain number of ‘Driving Offence Points’ (for instance, 8 points or above, at the time when TD issues warning letters to such drivers) to attend the Driver Improvement Scheme on a mandatory basis to be trained on good driving practices.**

### **Pre-service training for drivers of passenger services and commercial vehicles**

**5.25** Recently, TD has developed proposals to revise the entry requirements for taxi drivers. Under the new proposals, all applicants for a taxi driving licence will be required to attend a mandatory pre-service training programme before they can qualify for a taxi driving licence. This means that all new taxi drivers in future will undergo proper training on driving attitude and behaviour before they are permitted to drive a taxi.

**5.26 The Panel recommends that TD review the effectiveness of the pre-service training requirement and consider extending it to drivers of public light buses followed by other professional drivers, in light of experience gained from the taxi scheme.**

### **Skills Upgrading Scheme for passenger services transport trades**

**5.27** Currently the Vocational Training Council, supported by TD, is developing a Skills Upgrading Scheme for the passenger services transport trades (including taxis, public light buses, and non-franchised buses). The Scheme, scheduled for launch in early 2004, will provide comprehensive training to taxi, public light bus and non-franchised bus drivers. It will help improve driving attitude, knowledge of traffic rules and regulations as well as road safety concepts and skills for handling accidents and emergencies on roads. The Government will provide financial incentives (reimburse up to 70% of the training fee for the Scheme) to drivers from these passenger services transport trades who attend the Scheme on a voluntary basis.

**5.28 The Panel recommends that the content of the Skills Upgrading Scheme be reviewed to ensure that sufficient emphasis will be placed on promoting good driving practices and that recognition be given to drivers who have completed the course to increase the incentive for enrolment. The Panel also recommends that the Government explore with the relevant organisations the development and introduction of similar skills upgrading training for drivers of the trucking industry, in light of experience gained from the passenger services transport trades.**

### **Probationary driving licence for new private car and light goods vehicle drivers**

**5.29** Hong Kong's expressway network is expanding rapidly. However, learners of all types of vehicles are not required to acquire field training on expressway before being issued with a driving licence. The Panel recognises that there are practical difficulties to include expressways as part of the training and testing requirements in Hong Kong, and notes that certain roads with speed limits of 70 km/h are open to learner drivers to practise their driving skills.

**5.30 The Panel recommends that the Government explore the feasibility of expanding the existing 'probationary' driving licence arrangement for motorcyclists to cover new private car and light goods vehicle drivers. The proposed arrangement would allow drivers who have passed the driving test to obtain on-the-road practical experience, including expressway driving experience, during the 'probationary' period before being issued with a full driving licence.**

### **Quality Driving Instructor Course**

**5.31** At present, there are two designated driving schools in Hong Kong. Learner drivers can also receive driver training from private driving instructors.

**5.32** The Panel considers that there is a need to upgrade the skill level of driving instructors in tandem with the overall direction of enhancing road safety in Hong Kong.

**5.33** The Panel recommends that TD explore the feasibility of introducing a ‘Quality Driving Instructor Course’ to ensure that driving instructors have the proper knowledge and teaching skills to pass on good driving practices to their students. The Course should aim to enhance the professional competency of driving instructors, including teaching skills, defensive driving skills, proper driving attitude and good practices, traffic rules and regulations, and the handling of emergency and accident situations. The Panel also recommends that recognition be given to driving instructors who have completed the course.

### Enforcement

**5.34** Apart from enhanced training, the success of any road safety initiatives also depends on a properly formulated enforcement programme. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

## Chapter 6

# Legislation and Enforcement

## INTRODUCTION

6.1 To cultivate a considerate and responsible driving culture, enforcement and public education have to go hand-in-hand. Apart from mounting promotional efforts to change the mindset of the motoring community as set out in Chapter 5, comprehensive legislation and effective enforcement are necessary to combat undesirable driving behaviour. The Panel has reviewed road safety related legislation and enforcement measures to identify areas for further improvement.

## LEGISLATION

### Traffic offences

6.2 Major traffic offences are provided for in the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) and the associated regulations listed in **Figure 6.1**. The enforcement agents are the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF).

**Figure 6.1 – Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) and the associated regulations**

Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374)	
Section 36	Causing death by dangerous driving
Section 37	Dangerous driving
Section 38	Careless driving
Section 39	Drink/drug driving
Section 39A	Driving with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit
Section 41	Driving in excess of speed limit
Section 55	Restriction on motor racing



**Figure 6.1 – Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) and the associated regulations (Cont'd)**

<b>Road Traffic (Traffic Control) Regulations</b>	
Regulations 18 & 59	Failure to comply with traffic signals, signs and road markings
<b>Road Traffic (Expressway) Regulations</b>	
Regulations 12 & 13	'Not confining to nearside lane' and 'Overtaking from the nearside'

6.3 To ensure that Hong Kong's road safety regime is on par with international standards and meets the changing needs of the community, the Panel notes that the Government has kept relevant legislation under constant review. Amendments have been introduced in previous years to curb undesirable driving habits and to raise safety requirements. Details of the amendments are set out below.

### **Seat belt**

6.4 Seat belts can protect motorists and passengers and reduce the chance of death or serious injury in case of accidents. In 1983, legislation was first introduced on compulsory fitting and wearing of seat belts for drivers and front seat passengers in private cars. Since then such a requirement has been progressively extended to include drivers and front seat passengers of all types of vehicles. The seat belt legislation was further extended to cover rear seat passengers of private cars and taxis in June 1996 and January 2001 respectively.

6.5 In view of the relatively high rear seat casualty rate for accidents involving public light bus (PLB) and given that PLB is a popular mode of public transport, the Government considers it necessary to install passenger protection equipment, including seat belts and high back seats, on new PLBs to enhance passenger safety. The Panel notes that legislative amendments to this effect were passed by the Legislative Council in November 2002. To allow sufficient time for the vehicle manufacturers to develop and produce the new passenger protection equipment,

the Government intends to bring the amendments into effect in August 2004. **The Panel welcomes this move.**

6.6 There are suggestions to require passengers of all public transport vehicles to wear seat belts and to ban standing passengers. The Panel has reservations about extending the compulsory requirement of fitting and wearing seat belt beyond taxis and PLBs to buses and banning standing passengers in view of operational difficulties and traffic implications. The Panel also notes that some bus companies have installed seat belts on seats of higher risk exposure.

### Drink driving

6.7 Driving under the influence of alcohol is dangerous, as alcohol impairs judgement of speed and distance, slows down reaction time, affects co-ordination of body movements, blurs vision and gives a false sense of confidence. A legal limit of alcohol concentration in a driver's blood, urine and breath was first introduced in December 1995. Since 1 October 1999, the legal limit has been tightened up from 80 mg to 50 mg per 100 ml of blood to increase the deterrent effect on drink driving.

6.8 The Panel notes that since the introduction of the drink driving legislation in December 1995, the percentage of drivers involved in traffic accidents who had consumed alcohol showed a downward trend from 10.2% in 1996 to 6% in 1998. After the legal limit of alcohol concentration had been tightened up on 1 October 1999, the percentage of drivers involved in traffic accidents who had consumed alcohol dropped further from 4.2% in 1999 to 3.2% in 2002.

### Dangerous driving

6.9 The offence of 'reckless driving' was changed to 'dangerous driving' with effect from 1 July 2000 to address the difficulty in prosecuting reckless driving arisen from the need to prove the driver's subjective mental state. The test for dangerous driving is more objective, as it places the emphasis on actual driving behaviour rather than the driver's state of mind. Two criteria have been laid down for dangerous

driving – one is whether the driver's driving standard is far below that of a competent and careful driver, and the other is whether the driver's driving manner would cause obvious danger to others, or himself, or serious damage to property.

6.10 The Panel notes that before the new legislation came into effect, the number of reckless driving cases from July 1999 to June 2000 was 170. After the new legislation took effect on 1 July 2000, the number of dangerous driving cases rose from 169 in 2000 to 222 and 237 in 2001 and 2002 respectively.

### Use of hand-held mobile phone while driving

6.11 Overseas researches show that use of mobile phone while driving increases the risk of collision by four to six times mainly due to distraction and its possible effect on drivers' reaction time in emergency situations. The use of hand-held mobile phones while driving is prohibited in Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Switzerland.

6.12 Use of hand-held mobile phones while driving has been prohibited in Hong Kong since 1 July 2000. The prohibition was further extended to the use of hand-held telecommunication equipment, such as radio phones used in taxis, on 1 July 2001. **The Panel agrees that such legislative changes can reduce distraction to drivers and are in line with international practices.**

### Probationary driving licence for motorcyclists

6.13 An analysis of the road traffic accidents in Hong Kong reveals that motorcycles have a much higher accident involvement rate than that of private cars and light goods vehicles. Amongst motorcyclists, inexperienced drivers, i.e. those with one year or less driving experience, is five times more prone to traffic accidents than experienced drivers. In light of these, a probationary driving licence scheme was introduced to motorcyclists on 1 October 2000. Under the scheme, holders of the probationary driving licence are subject to additional driving restrictions during the one-year probation period, including the requirement to display a "P" plate on the motorcycle and prohibitions on carrying passengers and driving at a speed

above 70 km/h (even when the prescribed speed limit of the road sections concerned exceeds 70 km/h).

6.14 The Panel notes that between 1997 and 2000, the average accident involvement rate of motorcyclists with less than one year driving experience was 4.9 times higher than experienced motorcyclists. Between October 2000 to 2002, after the implementation of the probationary driving licence scheme, the average accident involvement rate of probationary motorcyclists reduced by about 60%. The Panel considers this a marked improvement which demonstrates the effectiveness of the scheme in reducing traffic accidents involving inexperienced motorcyclists. It also has the advantage of allowing new drivers to obtain on-the-road experience, including expressway driving experience, before being issued with a full driving licence, as discussed in Chapter 5. **The Panel recommends that the Government explore the feasibility of expanding the existing probationary driving licence scheme for motorcyclists to new private car and light goods vehicle drivers.**

### Higher penalties for excessive speeding

6.15 Speeding is one of the major contributory factors of traffic accidents. The Panel notes that since January 2001, the Government has increased the fixed penalty for speeding by more than 30 km/h from \$450 to \$600. The penalties for speeding by more than 45 km/h has also been revised upwards with an increase in fine from \$800 to \$1,000 and an increase in driving offence points from 8 to 10.

### Legislative amendments under deliberation

6.16 The Panel notes that some legislative amendments are under consideration by the Administration. One of them concerns failure to keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front which is often the cause of multiple collisions. At the moment, this act does not constitute any specific offence under the law, and can only be prosecuted under 'careless driving', of which the collection of evidence is rather complicated. HKPF are reviewing the feasibility of introducing a new offence against 'failing to keep a safe distance' or 'tailgating', to simplify the prosecution process.

6.17 Other proposed legislative changes under deliberation include imposition of fixed penalties for failing to drive in the nearside lane of an expressway and using hand-held mobile phone while the vehicle is in motion. **The Panel recommends that preparations for the proposed legislative changes be expedited.**

6.18 There are suggestions for a hefty increase in fines and a much harsher driving offence point system. **Members consider that the Government should continue to monitor the enforcement statistics and accident trend, and to make adjustment on the penalty level where necessary.**

## ENFORCEMENT

6.19 Road safety legislation needs to be complemented by an effective enforcement regime to achieve the intended effect. Many submissions to the Panel, including those from transport trade associations, pointed to the need to step up enforcement for abrupt lane changing, tailgating, speeding and other undesirable driving behaviour to increase the deterrent effect. The Panel has examined the current enforcement regime and identified areas to be further strengthened.

6.20 The Panel has also reviewed enforcement statistics. Although the total enforcement figures have shown a downward trend, enforcement statistics for certain offences, namely, speeding, lane discipline offences, drink driving and using hand-held mobile phone while driving, remain static.

### Selective Traffic Enforcement Policy

6.21 The Panel notes that HKPF have since 1993 been adopting a Selective Traffic Enforcement Policy (STEP) to target offences that are known to be causes for traffic accidents. There are annual reviews on the list of priority offences under STEP to ensure an efficient allocation of resources and to enhance the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.

6.22 Current enforcement focuses on expressways under STEP include –

- £ speeding;
- £ lane discipline offences;
  - › failing to confine to the nearside lane
  - › inappropriate lane changing
  - › tailgating
- £ drink driving;
- £ using hand-held mobile phone while vehicle is in motion;
- £ overloading and insecure load; and
- £ road work signage and lighting offences.

6.23 **The Panel endorses the STEP approach and recommends that HKPF continue to devise enforcement programmes in tandem with the publicity plan mounted by the RSC. Members consider that education for motorists on appropriate driving behaviour should be supplemented by enforcement as a deterrent.**

### Enforcement tools

6.24 Advanced technology can put roads under 24-hour surveillance and enhance enforcement efficiency. The Speed Enforcement Camera (SEC) system is a proven effective tool to deter speeding and enhance road safety. A pilot scheme on Tolo Highway (**Figure 6.2**) has been put into operation since early 1999. A study indicated



Figure 6.2 – Speed Enforcement Camera system

that, one year after the installation of the SEC system, the number of speeding related accidents on Tolo Highway reduced by 23%, and there was a 70% reduction in the number of vehicles exceeding 15 km/h of the speed limit.

6.25 The Panel notes that installation works for 75 additional locations for SECs are underway. Of the 16 SEC sites for Tuen Mun Road, 14 have been installed while the installation works for the remaining two would be completed before end 2003. As for the 59 locations outside Tuen Mun Road, the installation works for 22 sites have been completed and the remaining 37 are still ongoing. **The Panel recommends that TD work closely with the Highways Department, HKPF and other relevant parties to put these SECs into operation by early 2004.**

6.26 The Panel is aware that apart from the 75 locations on the existing road network, SECs will be installed along strategic routes, including the Deep Bay Link, Shenzhen Western Corridor and Route 9. **Members recommend that TD explore the feasibility of expanding the SEC coverage to new strategic road network (SRN) routes, existing SRN routes which do not have such systems as well as other routes with speeding problems.**

6.27 The Panel also recommends that, after the planned SECs have been put into operation, HKPF deploy more resources for mobile enforcement and patrolling to monitor other undesirable driving behaviour which cannot be captured by SEC such as abrupt lane changing and tailgating.

6.28 The Panel notes that apart from SECs, HKPF's enforcement efforts are aided by the following tools –



- £ portable Speed Detecting Radars (with camera) – introduced since 1991 for detection of speed violation offence (**Figure 6.3**);



Figure 6.3



- £ hand-held Laser Speed Detector – introduced since 1996 for detection of speeding and tailgating offences (**Figure 6.4**);
- £ overt/covert In-car Video System – introduced since 1989 for detection of speeding and offences relating to bad driving manner and lane discipline (**Figure 6.5**);



- £ Motorcycle Video System – introduced since 1999 for detection of speeding and offences relating to bad driving manner and lane discipline (**Figure 6.6**);
- £ Hand-held Drink Driving Screening Device – introduced in 1995 for detection of drink driving offence (**Figure 6.7**); and
- £ Red Light Camera (RLC) system – introduced in 1993 to deter drivers from red light jumping.



6.29 **The Panel recommends that HKPF continue to make good use of advanced technology and acquire additional equipment to facilitate traffic enforcement.**



6.30 The Panel received a suggestion from the public to adopt the ‘third party reporting’ system in New Zealand<sup>1</sup> to supplement HKPF’s enforcement efforts. The Panel notes that a similar reporting mechanism has been adopted in Hong Kong for years. Each of the five Police Traffic Formations has a Traffic Investigation Group responsible for the investigation of public complaints on undesirable driving manners. Members of the public can lodge complaints by e-mail, letter, fax, telephone or in person to any Police station or via the Transport Complaints Unit of the Transport Advisory Committee. In 2001 and 2002, a total of 4 769 and 5 241 traffic complaints were reported and investigated by HKPF respectively. However, many prosecutions failed because the complainants were unwilling to follow up and give evidence in court. **The Panel encourages the public to play its part and join hands with HKPF to combat undesirable driving behaviour.**

6.31 The Panel is of the view that enhancement of road safety is a continuous exercise requiring collaboration between the Government, road users and other related organisations. Apart from conducting constant reviews on existing legislation and deploying new strategy and advanced technology for effective enforcement, it is of utmost importance that the Government works closely with RSC, District Councils and other relevant parties to map out the directions for a sustainable road safety programme for the years to come.

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<sup>1</sup> Under the ‘third party reporting’ system used by the New Zealand Police, members of the public are invited to report undesirable driving behaviour via electronic means or a specific form. On receipt of such reports, the New Zealand Police will issue ‘advisory notes’ to the drivers concerned. The system is used for advising rather than instituting prosecution against the drivers.

## INTRODUCTION

7.1 Safe transport infrastructure and an efficient traffic management system are important pillars of road safety. The Panel has examined in depth issues concerning traffic engineering and management that define the road environment and shape the behaviour of road users. They include highway design standards, speed management, provision of traffic signs and road markings as well as other traffic control measures. As the July incident occurred on an expressway section of the Tuen Mun Road, the Panel has focused more on traffic engineering and management issues relating to the design of high-speed roads.


7.2 The Panel considers that Hong Kong's design standards meet international standards and place proper emphasis on road safety, despite the challenges presented by limited space and a hilly topography. Members point to the need to differentiate between requirements for safety and comfort in highway design standards which will be discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. The Panel has also reviewed various traffic management and control measures with reference to suggestions from the public, and put forth recommendations for further enhancement.

## HIGHWAY DESIGN


7.3 Highway design concerns the selection of a road's visible features and dimensions, which comprise road alignment factors and cross section elements. The road alignment is composed of various geometric parameters, including sight distance, gradient, horizontal and vertical curves and superelevation factors, which complement each other to serve the traffic in a safe, comfortable and efficient manner.

## Illustrations of different road alignment factors

**Sight distance** : The length of roadway ahead visible to the driver **(Figure 7.1).**




- Gradient** : The change in elevation per unit change in the length of roadway.
- Horizontal Curve (Bends)** : Circular arcs that connect straight sections of a road. The sharpness of a curve is measured by the radius of curvature - the shorter the radius, the sharper the curve.
- Superelevation** : Curves are banked (superelevated) so that the gravitational force associated with the weight of the vehicle can help counteract the centrifugal force which acts on objects travelling on a circular path. The frictional force between the vehicle's tyres and the road surface counteracts the centrifugal force to prevent the vehicle from sliding out of the curve. **(Figure 7.2)**



### Vertical Curve

: A vertical curve is either a hill crest or a sag. Vertical curves are designed so that a driver operating at the design speed<sup>1</sup> can react and brake to a stop on wet road surface within the sight distance.

7.4 Carriageway cross-section elements include carriageway width, marginal strip and hard shoulder width, and central reserve width. A typical cross section of an expressway is shown in **Figure 7.3**.



<sup>1</sup> Please see para. 7.16 for explanation of design speed.

7.5 Slip roads at diverging or merging points are defined by such factors as lengths of nose, taper, parallel lane and merging lane. They are illustrated in **Figures 7.4 and 7.5**.




Figure 7.4 – Diagram to show a typical direct entry merging lane




Figure 7.5 – Diagram to show different factors at a typical parallel merging lane

### Design standards and comparison with overseas countries

7.6 Highway design standards are guidelines for the selection of appropriate design elements to provide comfort, safety and convenience to road users. The current highway design standards in Hong Kong are set out in Volume 2 of the Transport Planning and Design Manual – Highway Design Characteristics published by the Transport Department (TD).

7.7 A comparison of the design standards in Hong Kong with those in the UK and USA is set out in **Figure 7.6**.

**Figure 7.6 – Comparison of highway design standards in Hong Kong, UK and USA**

**(a) Design speed**

	HK	UK	USA
Rural area	100 km/h	120 km/h	80 - 110 km/h
Urban area	70 km/h (80 km/h for new roads) or above	Less than 120 km/h	80 - 110 km/h

**(b) Sight distance**

Design speed (km/h)	Minimum sight distance (m)				
	HK		UK		USA
	Desirable	Absolute	Desirable	Absolute	
120	295	215	295	215	250
110	-	-	-	-	220
100	215	160	215	160	185
90	-	-	-	-	160
85	160	120	160	120	-
80	145	110	-	-	130
70	120	90	120	90	105

**(c) Gradients**

Design speed (km/h)	Maximum gradient				
	HK		UK		USA
	Desirable	Absolute	Desirable	Absolute	
120	4%	8%	3%	4%	-
110					5%
70 - 100					between 5% and 12%

**Figure 7.6 – Comparison of highway design standards in Hong Kong, UK and USA (Cont'd)**

**(d) Horizontal curve**

Design speed (km/h)	HK		UK		USA
	Desirable Minimum Radius	Absolute Minimum Radius	Desirable Minimum Radius	Absolute Minimum Radius	Minimum Radius
120	700 m	250 m	720 m	510 m	595 m
110	-	-	-	-	455 m
100	500 m	175 m	510 m	360 m	360 m
90	-	-	-	-	275 m
85	350 m	125 m	360 m	255 m	-
80	320 m	115 m	-	-	210 m
70	250 m	88 m	255 m	180 m	160 m

**(e) Vertical curve**

i) Minimum K value for vertical crest \*

Design speed (km/h)	Minimum K value for vertical crest			
	HK	UK		USA
		Desirable	Absolute	
120	182	182	100	95
110	-	-	-	74
100	100	100	55	52
90	-	-	-	39
85	55	55	30	-
80	55	-	-	26
70	30	30	17	17

ii) Minimum K value for vertical sag \*

Design speed (km/h)	Minimum K value for vertical sag			
	HK	UK		USA
		Desirable	Absolute	
120	37	37	37	63
110	-	-	-	55
100	37	37	26	45
90	-	-	-	38
85	26	26	20	-
80	26	-	-	30
70	20	20	20	23

\* The curvature of vertical curve should be as large as possible to provide for comfort and sufficient sight distance for safe stopping at design speed. The curvature should be derived from the appropriate K value where  $K = L$  (curve length in metres)/A (algebraic difference in gradients (%)).



**Figure 7.6 – Comparison of highway design standards in Hong Kong, UK and USA (Cont'd)**

**(f) Superelevation**

	Maximum superelevation		
	HK	UK	USA
Rural	7%	7%	8 - 10%
Urban	7%	5%	8 - 10%

**(g) Carriageway width**

	HK	UK	USA
Lane width	3.65 m	3.65 m	3.6 m

**(h) Verges and hard shoulders**

	HK	UK	USA
Verge	3.0 m	1.5 m	-
Hard shoulder	3.3 m	3.3 m	3.0 m

**(i) Minimum vertical clearance**

	HK	UK	USA
Minimum vertical clearance (m)	5.1	5.30 - 6.45	4.9

**(j) Minimum central reserve width**

	HK		UK		USA
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	
Minimum central reserve (m)	3.2	2.3	4.0	3.0	3.0 - 9.0
Marginal strip adjacent to central reserve (m)	1.0	0.5	0.7	0.7	1.2

**Figure 7.6 – Comparison of highway design standards in Hong Kong, UK and USA (Cont'd)**

**(k) Connector road design speed**

Mainline design speed (km/h)	Connector road design speed (km/h)		
	HK	UK	USA
120	-	70 - 120	70 - 110
110	-	-	60 - 100
100	80 - 100	60 - 100	50 - 90
90	50 - 80	60 - 85	50 - 80
80		(for design speed 85 km/h)	40 - 70
70	-	-	40 - 60

**(l) Merging and diverging lanes**

	Entry merging lane			Exit diverging lane		
	HK	UK	USA	HK	UK	USA
Single lane width (m)	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.65	3.6
Two lane ramp width (m)	3.7 each	3.7 each	3.6 each	3.7 each	3.65 each	3.6 each
Taper gradient			1:50			1:15
(i) Single lane	1:25	1:40	to	1:15	1:15	to
(ii) Two lane	1:25	1:40	1:70	1:15	1:15	1:25

7.8 The Panel notes that the Hong Kong standards are similar to those adopted in the UK. The major difference lies in the maximum gradient – the desirable and absolute maximum gradients of Hong Kong are 4% and 8% respectively while those of UK are 3% and 4%. The deviation is attributable to topographical differences between Hong Kong and the UK.

7.9 The Panel also notes that Hong Kong standards are comparable with the USA standards despite the following differences. The carriageway and hard shoulder widths in the USA are smaller than those in Hong Kong. The minimum sight

distance and the K value for vertical sag curves of the USA are greater than those of Hong Kong, but the maximum gradients and superelevation rate adopted in the US are also higher, denoting steeper road sections and sharper bends.

7.10 There are comments from the public on the inadequate length of merging lanes along the expressways in Hong Kong. The Panel notes that Hong Kong's standard for the length of such merging lanes is 205 m, lower than that of freeways and motorways in the US and UK, which ranges from 245 m to 385 m. The Panel considers that it is not practicable for Hong Kong to adopt overseas standards in this regard, given the constraints imposed by limited space and hilly terrain. Besides, the function and characteristic of freeways and motorways which are intended for inter-city traffic should be differentiated from expressways in Hong Kong that only serve intra-city traffic.

### Safety vs comfort

7.11 It is shown in **Figure 7.6** that many standards are specified by both 'desirable' and 'absolute' values, and the values adopted vary slightly from one country to another. 'Desirable' values offer a high level of comfort and considerable safety margins at the design speed. 'Absolute' values specify a lower level of comfort. It should be noted that slight deviations from the standards would not have a substantial impact on the safety of a road. For instance, current standards specify that the minimum carriageway width for three lanes should be 11 m. It does not mean that a carriageway of 10.5 m is unsafe.

7.12 The superelevation rate and the maximum value of side friction are two key elements of horizontal curve design. Design values are usually set at such a level to avoid giving the driver the discomfort of sliding on the car seat. This is a good illustration of how comfort is being taken into account in highway design.

7.13 A vertical curve is designed on the basis of providing road users a reasonable sight distance over a crest. For a given design speed, the required sight distance is set according to two assumptions: (i) the reaction time for a driver to brake his car to an emergency stop and (ii) the frictional force that can be generated

between the vehicle's tyres and the pavement surface. To provide considerable margins of safety in design, the assumptions are usually based upon a near-worst case scenario, i.e. drivers locking their brakes and skidding to a stop on a wet pavement. Under normal circumstances, the braking distance, and thus the sight distance required, should be shorter.

7.14 Highway design standards are a product of accumulated experience and a model of good practices at the time of design. Such standards and practices evolve with time, as the information, judgments and economic considerations that determine them keep on changing. Hence, when there is a change in design standards, it does not mean that existing roads which fall short of the revised standards are not safe. Theoretically speaking, more generous dimensions give rise to safer roads. However, no road is accident proof, no matter how generous the dimensions are, as accidents are multi-factor random events involving human elements, vehicles and the road. **In light of the above, the Panel considers that a well-designed road should be one that provides an acceptable level of safety with the intended level of comfort at an acceptable cost.**

## SPEED MANAGEMENT

7.15 There is a close relationship between highway design decisions and the speed. To enhance the readers' appreciation of the choice of design speed and posted speed limit for highways, explanations of the concepts of design speed and speed limit are set out below.

### Design speed

7.16 The design speed of a road is the speed chosen to correlate various design features, such as the minimum horizontal and vertical curvature and superelevation. It should be a realistic estimate of the speed adopted by vehicles. As pointed out in the section on highway design, many highway features have built-in safety margins to cater for near-worst case scenarios and to provide a high level of

comfort at the design speed. As such, the design speed of a highway is not the ‘maximum safe speed’ along the road.

### Posted speed limit

7.17 The posted speed limits are determined by a combination of factors including the design speed, results of speed surveys, accident rates, and road surface characteristics. They are used as a means to control the speed of traffic to an appropriate level under the general conditions. They are not supposed to be exceeded. Motorists are always required to drive with care and make necessary allowances in respect of their vehicles, driving skill, traffic conditions, climatic conditions, and constraints such as bends and surface characteristics of the road.

7.18 There are suggestions to review the speed limits in Hong Kong. The Panel notes that a Working Group comprising members from relevant departments and related non-government organisations has been conducting regular reviews of speed limits. Approximately 50 sections of roads, including expressways, are covered each year. The review takes into account the results of speed surveys, road configurations, accident rates, traffic conditions and the need to avoid frequent changes of speed limit over a short section of road etc.

7.19 **The Panel recommends that TD continue to conduct regular reviews of speed limits and, if necessary, adjust the speed limit to optimise traffic flow without compromising road safety.**

7.20 The Panel also received suggestions to tighten the speed limit of expressways. Members point out that this would reduce the efficiency of Hong Kong’s road network and increase the economic costs in terms of longer travelling time and business foregone by the freight industry. Setting an unrealistically low speed limit for a road, which is capable of accommodating traffic travelling at higher speeds, would also bring about serious enforcement problems.

7.21 As regards the proposal to set different speed limits for different lanes on expressways i.e. designating a slow lane for heavy vehicles and fast lanes for other vehicles, the Panel notes that there is a similar requirement in the Road Traffic (Expressway) Regulations. Under the Regulations, heavy vehicles are prohibited from using the offside lane (i.e. the fast lane) on an expressway with three or more lanes, unless it has to get access to an offside exit (see lane discipline for heavy vehicles in paragraph 7.57).

7.22 On the suggestion to impose different speed limits for heavy and light vehicles, the Panel notes that heavy vehicles, including medium and heavy goods vehicles and buses, are already subject to a maximum speed of 70 km/h (see speed limit for heavy vehicles in paragraph 7.58). Hence, a difference in speed limits between heavy and light vehicles already exists on roads with a speed limit exceeding 70 km/h. The Panel does not recommend a wider differential in speed limits between heavy and light vehicles, as it may increase the risk of traffic accidents.

7.23 For the proposal to limit the speed of passenger services vehicles to 70 km/h, the Panel notes that the maximum speed for buses, including both franchised and non-franchised buses, is already set at 70 km/h, but this limit does not apply to taxis and public light buses (PLBs). The Panel does not see any strong justification on road safety grounds to restrict the maximum speed of taxis and PLBs to 70 km/h. Members also point out that this will affect the efficiency of Hong Kong's public transport system.

7.24 **Instead of limiting the speed of passenger services vehicles (other than buses), the Panel recommends that targetted education programmes and more stringent enforcement be mounted to inculcate a good driving culture. The Panel also recommends that TD evaluate the effectiveness of those speed display units currently in use in green minibuses running overnight routes, and consider the advantages of extending their use to other PLBs.** Please see Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion about the installation of speed display and control devices in vehicles.

7.25 There is also a suggestion to lower the speed limit for buses under strong wind conditions. The Panel notes that all franchised bus operators have already issued guidelines to their drivers on operating bus services under strong wind conditions. Slowing down the vehicles is one of the requirements. The Panel is satisfied with the existing administrative arrangement.

## TRAFFIC SIGNS AND ROAD MARKINGS

7.26 Traffic signs and road markings are integral parts of the road system. They convey important information to drivers on the directions and the driving rules.

7.27 The Panel notes that the design of traffic signs and road markings in Hong Kong is largely based on the UK Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1975 and 1981. These regulations are in turn developed on the basis of the Convention on Road Traffic and Road Signs and Signals, Vienna 1968, the European Agreement, Geneva 1971, and the Protocol on Road Markings, Geneva 1973. With the adoption of the above conventions, a high degree of uniformity of traffic signing and road marking is achieved throughout the world.

### Traffic signs

7.28 The Panel considers that traffic signs intended for vehicular traffic have to transmit clear messages at the right time to motorists who are travelling at normal speed. It is hence important for traffic signs to have correct legibility distance, simplicity of content and layout and effective illumination or reflectorisation. They need to be appropriately located in relation to the junction, restriction, hazard or other features to which they apply.

7.29 Traffic signs serve regulatory, warning, informative and directional functions as specified by their shapes and colours. Regulatory signs give orders. They are normally circular in shape, and are either mandatory or prohibitive in nature. They are located at the point where the regulatory effect commences (**Figure 7.7**).



Figure 7.7 – Examples of regulatory traffic signs

7.30 Warning signs are normally triangular in shape, bearing a black symbol on a white background with a red border while informative signs are usually rectangular in shape (**Figure 7.8**).




Figure 7.8 – Examples of warning and informative traffic signs



7.31 Directional signs enable motorists to find their way to a desired destination. Directional signs can be of different types and in various formats. They can be installed at the roadside or on gantries over the carriageway depending on actual site situations and road conditions.

7.32 For expressways, trunk roads, primary distributor roads and rural roads, a set of three signs, namely, “Advance Direction Sign”, “Final Advance Direction Sign” and “Direction sign” must be provided at all junctions or locations at which there is a slip road branching from the main road. These signs provide drivers with sufficient advance information to choose the correct route (**Figure 7.9**).



7.33 There are suggestions to review the standard of road signage, install more directional and traffic signs to give early warning to motorists and to improve the visibility of the signs. The Panel considers that the signing arrangements in Hong Kong accord with international practices, and notes that TD has recently

completed a study titled 'Comprehensive Review of Directional Signing in Hong Kong', which recommends improvements in signing strategy, sign provision, sign format and sign mounting. A pilot scheme to assess the effectiveness of the recommendations will be carried out in Shatin. More details of the Review are set out in paragraphs 7.43 - 7.46.

7.34 On the other hand, the Panel expresses reservations about the proposal to provide a countdown facility for vehicular signals. According to overseas studies, any advance facility indicating imminent change of traffic signal may increase the risk of traffic accidents, as motorists may have different perceptions and reactions to the advance indication.

### Road markings


7.35 Road markings are designed to convey regulatory, advisory and warning messages. Regulatory markings are used to –

- ☐ prohibit certain actions;
- ☐ indicate the direction for vehicles to follow;
- ☐ determine the area where certain activities are permitted; and
- ☐ direct a driver to take certain actions.

7.36 Warning and advisory markings serve the following functions –

- ☐ promote full utilisation of the carriageway;
- ☐ warn of a hazard ahead;
- ☐ provide carriageway delineation;
- ☐ direct traffic around an obstruction or signify a change in traffic lane alignment;
- ☐ warn of an action to be taken;
- ☐ provide route information; and
- ☐ delineate hazardous areas.

7.37 In general, white markings are intended to direct and control moving vehicles, and yellow markings to control stopping of vehicles, e.g. box junction, hatched marking, and yellow lines are stopping restrictions. Road markings should be designed and verified for their compatibility with all traffic signs, directional signs, traffic signals as well as any variable signs and signals. **Figure 7.10** are some examples of road markings.



7.38 Many submissions from the public touch on road markings. There are suggestions to use double white lines to deter lane changing activities at certain road sections (e.g. high-risk locations). The Panel considers that double white lines have already been used at locations where lane changing is considered potentially dangerous, and the suitability of applying double white lines to specific road sections should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. It should be noted that an extensive use of double white lines runs the risk of diluting the respect for such markings, which will not reduce the amount of lane changing but merely shift the act upstream to where the double white lines begin.

7.39 As for suggestions to use double white lines to prevent last-minute attempts to change lanes at diverging points, the Panel considers that, if there is clear visibility ahead of the interchange, coupled with adequate directional signing, it may not be necessary to apply double white lines. Imposing double white lines at diverging points might indeed shorten the time allowed for drivers to observe traffic condition for lane changing and could create an adverse impact on safety.

7.40 There are also suggestions to use double white lines to deter lane changing on roads with speed limit at 70km/h, which are mainly expressways. The Panel appreciates that there are practical and legitimate needs for drivers to change lanes along the way, especially at and near to intersections. The Panel also recognises that when lane changing is not allowed, slower moving vehicles would largely dictate the traffic flow and result in congestion.

7.41 On the suggestion to use road markings to provide motorists travelling on expressways with more information, the Panel notes that this is already in practice. In general, information is best provided through signs mounted on gantries rather than road markings, as the latter could be easily obscured by other travelling vehicles.

### Recent development of traffic signs and road markings in Hong Kong

7.42 The Panel notes that TD commenced in July 1999 a comprehensive review on the traffic signs and road markings. The objectives of the review were to identify problem areas from complaints received, research into the latest practices adopted in major overseas cities, and put forth a set of recommendations with priorities. The Study brought about the following improvements –

- ❑ improve the layout of the no-stopping restriction sign;
- ❑ simplify contents of traffic signs, such as removing the letters 'km/hr' from speed limit signs to enable a larger speed limit numeral to be shown;
- ❑ adjust the orientation of taxi and light bus stand signs to face the traffic to enhance their visibility from a distance; and

- ❑ use distinct wide short dotted markings to delineate exclusive turning lanes and lane drops on expressways/trunk roads and at other suitable locations to facilitate motorists' timely entry into the correct lane.

7.43 In August 2001, TD undertook another study titled 'Comprehensive Review of Directional Signing in Hong Kong'. The objectives were to assess the design standards of directional signing adopted in Hong Kong against those of overseas countries, and to identify areas for continual improvement. The Study was completed in early 2003.

7.44 The Study concludes that the current design standards and provision of directional signs in Hong Kong are generally in line with those of major overseas countries, but a number of problem areas are identified –

- ❑ inadequate directional guidance for access to the strategic road network;
- ❑ discontinuity and inconsistency in destination names;
- ❑ insufficient advance signing;
- ❑ inadequate visibility due to obstruction or improper positioning of some signs; and
- ❑ bulky appearance of gantry structures.

7.45 To address the above problems, the Study recommends that improvements should cover four key areas, viz. signing strategy, sign provision, sign format and sign mounting, along the following lines –

- ❑ develop a four-level destination hierarchy comprising Regions, Sub-regions, Districts and local destinations;
- ❑ adopt new design techniques to address junction importance, speed, lane change and maximise sign visibility;
- ❑ provide an advance information sign (AIS) 1 000 to 2 000 m ahead of strategic road network junctions to provide early alert to motorists;
- ❑ incorporate distance indicators and optimise x-height (size of letters and numbers on the sign) to improve the sign format; and

- ❑ use alternative sign mounting techniques to address space constraints, minimise risks of crashes on signs and enhance the aesthetic value.

7.46 To follow up on the recommendations of the Study, TD will rationalise the route numbering system and provide exit numbers on the strategic road network to give clearer directions to inter-district and inter-region traffic. This enhancement measure is scheduled to be completed by early 2004. A pilot scheme, in Shatin, to assess the other recommendations is under planning.

**7.47 The Panel endorses the above improvements and recommends to expedite the implementation of the pilot scheme and the evaluation process so that an implementation programme can be drawn up for the rest of the road network as soon as possible.**

**7.48 The Panel also recommends that a publicity programme be formulated to brief motorists whenever there are changes in signing standards to avoid creating any confusion.**

## USE RESTRICTIONS

7.49 Apart from traffic signs and road markings, there are suggestions on other traffic control measures. For instance, some suggest that the ‘keep left’ restriction should be strictly imposed on all roads with two or more lanes. The Panel notes that there are already mechanisms to implement the ‘keep left unless overtaking’ requirement, which is a basic driving principle set out in the Road Users’ Code. It is also reinforced by the installation of ‘Keep Left Unless Overtaking’ signs at selected locations where additional warning is warranted. On expressways, the requirement to keep to the nearside unless for overtaking is stipulated in Regulation 12 of the Road Traffic (Expressway) Regulations, and failure to comply may result in prosecution.

7.50 On the other hand, there are suggestions to remove the ‘keep left’ restriction on all expressways. The Panel does not support this proposal as the ‘keep left’ restriction is a basic safety requirement for expressway driving. This

requirement aims to prevent excessive weaving and to help bring about a more orderly traffic flow. Removing the 'keep left' restriction would allow motorists to overtake on the nearside, which is potentially hazardous to other road users.

7.51 There is also a proposal for heavy goods vehicles and buses to use only the middle lane. The Panel has reservations about this proposal as motorists are well accustomed to the 'keep left unless overtaking' practice required under the Road Traffic (Expressway) Regulations. The proposed change may create confusion and increase the risk of accidents. In addition, Members also point to the potential danger arisen from this lane-use restriction to passengers during emergency evacuation, if a bus broke down in the middle of the road.

## TRAFFIC CONTROL IN TUNNELS AND TSING MA CONTROL AREA

7.52 The Panel notes that specific traffic control measures are introduced on safety grounds for certain types of vehicles in tunnels and Tsing Ma Control Area.

### Tunnel Restrictions

7.53 While vehicles conveying dangerous goods are prohibited from using the tunnels, different Tunnel Regulations require some or all of the following vehicles to be confined to the nearside lane of the tunnel –

- ☐ bus;
- ☐ goods vehicle with a permitted Gross Vehicle Weight in excess of 5.5 tonnes;
- ☐ vehicle requiring certain specified permits; and
- ☐ vehicle towing another vehicle.

### Measures taken in Tsing Ma Control Area

7.54 The Tsing Ma Control Area (General) Regulations require that permits have to be obtained for vehicles of excessive weight, height, length and width to travel in the Tsing Ma Control Area, and that the vehicles have to be accompanied by an escort vehicle.

7.55 The Panel notes that during strong wind conditions, High Wind Management is implemented at Lantau Link and Ting Kau Bridge. Under Stage I when the hourly mean wind speed is between 40 km/h - 65 km/h, wind susceptible vehicles (vehicle with an overall height exceeding 1.6 m, motorcycles or motor tricycles) are prohibited from using the Ting Kau Bridge and the upper deck of the Lantau Link. During Stage II when the hourly mean wind speed is between 65 km/h - 165 km/h, only the lower deck of the Lantau Link can be used. At wind speeds in excess of 165 km/h, both road links will be completely closed to traffic.

### TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT MEASURES ON HEAVY VEHICLES

7.56 In light of the traffic incident on Tuen Mun Road on 10 July and the recent accidents involving franchised buses, there is heightened public concern about the safety standard of heavy vehicles, especially container trucks and franchised buses. The Panel notes that some safety related controls and restrictions on heavy vehicles are already in place, and some improvement measures will be adopted in light of the traffic accidents.

#### Lane discipline

7.57 Under the Road Traffic (Expressway) Regulations, heavy vehicles including medium and heavy goods vehicles and buses are prohibited from using the offside lane of an expressway with three or more lanes. This regulation helps



segregate the slower heavy vehicles from the faster light vehicles, and hence minimises potentially dangerous lane cutting activities. For other major roads, 'Keep Left Unless Overtaking' traffic signs, climbing lanes on uphill roads and passing bays are provided where appropriate to perform the same function.

### Speed limit

7.58 To enhance road safety, the Road Traffic Ordinance restricts the maximum speed of heavy vehicles to 70 km/h on roads with a posted speed limit over 70 km/h.

### Loading of vehicles

7.59 There are traffic regulations stipulating the maximum weight and size of loads permitted to be carried by goods vehicles. TD has issued a Code of Practice on Loading of Vehicles to advise goods vehicle drivers and operators of the practice and manner for safe conveyance of goods, so that goods vehicles will not pose a danger to other traffic.

### Prohibitions

7.60 The Panel received suggestions for imposing restrictions (full time or time limited) on buses and heavy vehicles from using certain road sections. The Panel notes that heavy vehicles are prohibited from entering around 120 locations throughout the territory due to site constraints, such as steep gradient, substandard width or bends, or insufficient headroom or turning radius.

## SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR FRANCHISED BUSES

7.61 The Panel notes that franchised buses are subject to specific safety measures in terms of route planning, withdrawal of old vehicles from service and

working conditions of bus drivers. The Panel has examined in detail the major accidents involving buses and reviewed the entry requirements and training for bus drivers as well as improvement measures taken/being considered in the wake of the traffic accidents.

### Route planning

7.62 In formulating a bus network, bus routes or route changes, the following factors will be taken into account –

- ☐ transport policy and objectives;
- ☐ volume of passenger demand;
- ☐ suitability of operating bus services with regard to the nature of terrain and conditions of roads and transport termini<sup>2</sup>;
- ☐ deployment of suitable vehicle models on the route;
- ☐ availability of existing services;
- ☐ possibility of meeting the anticipated increase in passenger demand by adjustment of existing services;
- ☐ bus network efficiency and financial viability of the route; and
- ☐ views of the local community including the District Councils.

7.63 Where necessary, there will be additional requirements on specific franchised bus routes. For instance, since 1993 double-decked buses operating on steep roads with a gradient of 10% or more have been required to have integral retarders to improve the braking efficiency of the vehicles. Double-decked buses running on Route Twisk have been required to be equipped with tachographs since 1988.

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<sup>2</sup> Traffic engineers will advise on the suitability of the roads for bus operation in areas without existing bus route or on roads which have been realigned. Bus trial runs, with the assistance of Traffic Police, will be arranged.

### Withdrawal of old vehicle from service

7.64 Under an agreement with franchised bus companies, buses will be withdrawn from service before they reach the age of 18. A younger and more modern fleet will ensure a high level of safety and reliability and generate less pollution.

### Entry requirements for franchised bus drivers

7.65 All franchised bus companies, except the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Ltd (KMB) and Long Win Bus Co Ltd (LW), recruit new driver trainees who are holders of public bus driving licences. For KMB and LW, their driver trainees have to be holders of private car driving licences for at least three years. Unless the driver trainee has already obtained a public bus driving licence, he must pass the driving tests set by TD upon completion of training.

### Training, continual education and publicity targetted at bus drivers

7.66 Franchised bus companies provide new drivers with basic training courses with durations ranging from a few days to about three weeks depending on the driving qualifications of the drivers. The programmes cover classroom and on-the-road training which include the following aspects –

- ☐ driving legislation and code of practice;
- ☐ bus and facilities operation;
- ☐ bus checking procedures;
- ☐ bus driving techniques including manoeuvring, driving responses and manners on the road; and
- ☐ route training and driving practices.

7.67 In addition, one to two-day refresher and enhancement courses are provided for incumbent franchised bus drivers on a regular basis. The main objectives of these courses are to –

- ❑ strengthen drivers' driving skills and manners, including defensive driving;
- ❑ enhance drivers' understanding of the potential risks of the routes they serve and the appropriate reaction; and
- ❑ reinforce concepts of road safety.

7.68 Apart from formal training courses, TD has been conducting Road Safety Seminars for franchised bus drivers since 2002. The Seminars highlight concepts of safe driving and analyse major accident spots and common contributory factors of bus accidents. In addition, franchised bus companies also remind their drivers of the importance of safe driving through regular issue of circulars, notices and in-house publications.

### Working conditions of bus drivers

7.69 The issue of fatigue driving was raised in some of the submissions from the public. There are suggestions to introduce legislation on the maximum working hours for professional drivers. The Panel notes that TD has issued guidelines on the working hours of franchised bus drivers, as follows –

- ❑ drivers should take a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes;
- ❑ maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours and driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours; and
- ❑ the break between successive working days should not be less than 8 hours.

**To prevent fatigue driving, the Panel considers it important for bus operators and drivers to adhere to the above guidelines.**

### Safety improvement measures

7.70 Apart from reviewing the existing safety measures, the Panel has examined in detail the following major traffic accidents involving franchised buses which occurred from 1998 to 2003 –

- ❑ Tonnochy Road Flyover on 30 January 1998;
- ❑ Lung Mun Road on 2 February 1999;
- ❑ Tate's Cairn Tunnel on 8 September 2001;
- ❑ Tuen Mun Road near So Kwun Wat on 23 January 2003;
- ❑ Lantau Island on 26 January 2003;
- ❑ Tuen Mun Road on 10 July 2003; and
- ❑ Western Kowloon Expressway on 18 October 2003.

7.71 The Panel notes that specific traffic improvement and engineering remedial measures were taken after some of the above traffic accidents when the road environment was found to be a contributory factor. The Panel also notes that TD has requested the franchised bus companies to carry out a comprehensive review of their safety arrangements as a matter of urgency in three months.

7.72 **The Panel recommends that TD continue to implement the following safety improvement measures –**

- ❑ **identify the cause of bus accidents and map out improvement measures to enhance bus safety;**
- ❑ **monitor closely the trend of bus accident rate of different franchised bus companies and take actions, such as that mentioned in paragraph 7.71, to improve the trend; and**
- ❑ **promote bus passenger safety and safe driving through different means of publicity such as Announcements of Public Interest (APIs) on TV and radio.**

### **Safety measures for non-franchised buses (including cross boundary coaches)**

7.73 The Panel notes that apart from franchised buses, specific safety measures are applicable to other buses. Under the Road Traffic Ordinance, all operators of public and private buses must apply for a Passenger Service Licence (PSL) which regulates the operation of the service.

7.74 To cope with the surge of cross boundary vehicular traffic arising from closer economic and social links between Hong Kong and the Mainland, a quota system for cross-boundary traffic was introduced in 1982 to help regulate the volume of cross-boundary traffic. It is jointly administered by the Hong Kong and Guangdong/Shenzhen authorities. The operation of cross-boundary coach service is subject to quota restrictions.

7.75 The Panel notes that the following safety measures for cross boundary coaches have been implemented –

- ❑ non-franchised buses registered on or after 1 June 2002 which are deployed to provide cross-boundary coach service should be installed with seat belts according to the standards set by TD;
- ❑ with effect from 1 February 2002, a PSL condition has been imposed for operators to report to TD on a quarterly basis any accidents involving injury and fatality which occurred in the Mainland or Hong Kong;
- ❑ to facilitate passengers to offer comments or lodge complaints related to the coach service, a PSL condition has been imposed since 1 February 2002 requiring each operator to set up a hotline and to publicise the phone number inside the bus and on the ticket for the coach service; and
- ❑ the traffic accident records of operators have been used as one of the determining factors for quota allocation starting from 2002.

## OBSERVATIONS

7.76 After examining the highway design standards and various traffic management measures, the Panel considers that Hong Kong has a safe highway network and an efficient traffic management system. The Panel also notes that improvement measures arising from systematic reviews are in the pipeline. The Panel urges the Government to expedite the implementation of the improvement measures and to keep track of the best practices in overseas countries.

7.77 The Panel also recommends that the Government keep a close watch of the safety record of specific vehicle types and take proactive steps to enhance their safety standards with participation of the relevant transport trades.

## Chapter 8

# Vehicle Control

### INTRODUCTION

8.1 Technological advancement has made the design of motor vehicles much safer than before. High strength steel offers passengers much better protection without adding undue weight to the vehicle. Antilock braking system improves vehicle performance in case of emergency braking. Padded interiors, special seating design and occupant restraints, such as safety belts and frontal and side airbags, enhance passenger safety during impact situations.

8.2 Despite modern designs that have made vehicles safer, the Panel considers that it is the way in which a vehicle is used and maintained that has the greatest bearing on safety. A proper control on their usage is therefore necessary.

8.3 As shown in Chapter 4, there has been an increase in the number of accidents involving public buses and public light buses in the past two decades. The Panel is of the view that more attention should be paid to these vehicle types. Taking into account suggestions received from the public, the Panel considers that two aspects relating to control of vehicle warrant more detailed examination. They are speed control and vehicle maintenance.

### SPEED CONTROL

8.4 The high performance of vehicles is often subject to abuses, and speeding is a common problem. Apart from roadside enforcement, the Panel considers that in-vehicle equipment can be used to curb this undesirable driving behaviour. The following are some speed control devices.



### Speed display and warning devices

8.5 At present, there is no legal requirement for the installation of speed display or speed warning devices on motor vehicles. A trial scheme on the installation of speed display units (**Figure 8.1**) commenced in August 2002, and by April 2003, speed display units have been installed in 243 green minibuses (GMBs) running overnight routes. The Transport Department (TD) is at present closely monitoring the effectiveness of the device with reference to accident statistics, speeding offences and complaints.



Figure 8.1 – A typical speed display unit on minibus

8.6 **The Panel recommends that, subject to an evaluation of the speed display units installed in GMBs running overnight routes, TD should extend their use to other public light buses.**

8.7 Another type of speed display device is speed display lights at the front top of the driver cab (**Figure 8.2**). The function of these lights is to deter speeding by putting such vehicles under public surveillance.

Figure 8.2 – Typical speed display lights



8.8 The Panel has received suggestions to install speed display devices on top of heavy vehicles. The Panel notes that such a practice used to be adopted in Japan, but was found to be ineffective in view of the large amount of resources required for enforcement by the police. The Japanese authorities have since dropped the use of external speed display and opted for speed limiter instead.

## Speed limiters

8.9 A speed limiter is a device that can limit the speed of a vehicle to a pre-set maximum value under certain operating conditions. There are a variety of products available in the market ranging from mechanical add-on devices to electronic engine management systems<sup>1</sup> (**Figure 8.3**).

8.10 While at present there is no mandatory requirement for speed limiters to be installed in motor vehicles in Hong Kong, it is a common regulatory practice to install speed limiters on heavy goods vehicles in overseas countries, including Australia, European Union, Japan, and Singapore.

8.11 The Panel considers that there are merits in installing speed limiters in passenger services vehicles for better passenger safety. Members note that many new franchised buses have been installed with electronic engine management systems which have incorporated speed limiting functions. **However, consideration should be given to formally requiring newly registered franchised buses to install speed limiters to ensure that the speed limiting device is present and functioning properly.**




Figure 8.3 – A speed limiter

<sup>1</sup> Electronic engine management systems are used to manage engine operation and performance including engine speed, fuel supply and power.

8.12 **The Panel also recommends that consideration be given for speed limiters to be installed in other heavy vehicles to enhance their safety.** Members recognise that one issue to be addressed is the different speed limits adopted by heavy goods vehicles across the boundary. Medium and heavy goods vehicles are currently restricted to a maximum speed of 70 km/h in Hong Kong. However, the maximum speed limit of heavy goods vehicles on expressways in the Mainland is 90 km/h. While the speed limit differential between the two places can be overcome technically, there will be cost implications. **The Panel recommends that relevant transport trades be consulted on the proposal.**

8.13 The Panel is aware that speed limiters do not offer perfect solutions. They can only prevent speeding on roads with a speed limit equal to or higher than the set speed. They could also be susceptible to abuses and illegal modifications. Besides, almost all types of speed limiters fail to function when the vehicle is running downhill, as they only control the speed of the engine but not the wheels. Nonetheless, they are more effective than speed display units and are less costly than tachographs.

### Tachograph

8.14 Besides controlling the speed of a vehicle by mechanical or electronic means, another option to deter speeding is to keep a full record of the operating conditions of the vehicle including its speed. A ‘tachograph’, often known as ‘black box’, is such a device .

8.15 The word ‘tachograph’ can be broken down into ‘tacho’, from the Greek word ‘takhos’, which means speed, and the word ‘graph’ a record. It is in essence a combination of a clock, a speedometer, an odometer, a tachometer and a recorder (**Figure 8.4**). During a trip, it continuously records vehicle operating information into circular charts inside the unit, depending on the technology used (**Figure 8.5**). This device is commonly used in some countries to control the duty cycle of drivers to prevent fatigue.

Figure 8.4 – A tachograph



Figure 8.5 – Record from a tachograph

8.16 The information recorded in a tachograph is very useful for accident investigation, as it can, depending on the design, tell exactly what state the vehicle was in before the accident by giving information about speed, acceleration, distance travelled, emergency sirens and lights, brake applications, etc.

8.17 The Panel received suggestions to introduce the use of vehicle blackbox (i.e. tachograph) in heavy and passenger services vehicles. In view that a tachograph can serve accident investigation and fleet management purposes, **the Panel recommends that TD explore the fitting of such devices in franchised buses, and, subject to evaluation of effectiveness, extend them to other passenger services vehicles.**

## VEHICLE EXAMINATION

8.18 Another aspect of vehicle safety is to ensure that the vehicles are properly maintained and their mechanical parts are in good operating condition. The Panel has examined the current vehicle examination regime. The Vehicle Safety and Standards Division (VSSD) of TD is responsible for formulating vehicle construction and maintenance standards, and conducting and monitoring statutory vehicle examinations to ensure the safety of vehicles on the road.

### Legal requirements

8.19 Each vehicle is required to be roadworthy and to be registered/licensed before it can be used on the road.

8.20 The relevant laws related to vehicle safety and roadworthiness are summarised below –

Chapter	Title
Cap 374	Road Traffic Ordinance
Cap 374A	Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (specifies basic technical requirements for all vehicles)
Cap 374F	Road Traffic (Safety Equipment) Regulations (specifies requirements for seat belts, helmets and fire extinguishers)
Cap 374H	Specification of Safety Glass Notice
Cap 230	Public Bus Services Ordinance (regulates the maintenance of franchised buses)

8.21 The law only specifies the minimum requirements. The ultimate responsibility for the detailed design and construction rests with the vehicle manufacturer, while the vehicle owner is responsible for upkeeping the vehicles in good operating condition.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL CLASSES OF VEHICLES

### Vehicle type approval

8.22 New vehicle models of all classes of vehicles have to undergo a type approval process before they can be registered and licensed for use on the road. This process aims to ensure the vehicles' roadworthiness and compliance with the design and construction requirements stipulated in the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations.

8.23 The type approval process involves checking of technical specifications and associated documentation from vehicle manufacturers as well as an examination of a sample vehicle.

### Annual examination

8.24 Except for motorcycles, and cars not older than six years, all other classes of vehicles are required to undergo an annual examination to ensure their roadworthiness before they can be re-licensed.

### Call up inspections

8.25 Any motor vehicle may be called up for vehicle examination. Call-up inspections are generally initiated by public complaints or referrals by the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF). Upon receipt of a complaint or referral, a Vehicle Inspection Office of TD would issue a Vehicle Examination Order to the vehicle owner for delivering the vehicle concerned to government vehicle examination centres on a specified date for an examination of the items causing the complaint/referral.

### Roadside enforcement

8.26 Roadside enforcement is a very effective measure to ensure that the vehicle owners or drivers maintain their vehicles in a roadworthy condition and in compliance with relevant regulations. Vehicles can be selected randomly for examination and directed to the check sites by a police officer. Vehicle examiners will inspect and check the mechanical components of the vehicles and condition of the bodywork against applicable construction and maintenance standards.

8.27 The Panel notes that in the UK, roadside checks are held over the country, at roadside as well as permanent sites such as weighbridge stations. **Members recommend that apart from the existing vehicle examination centres, temporary or permanent check sites for roadside enforcement be established in Hong Kong, and preferably be located close to major trunk roads or expressways.**

8.28 The Panel also recommends that joint roadside spot checks on heavy vehicles by the HKPF and Vehicle Examiners from TD be stepped up.

## ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL VEHICLES AND PASSENGER SERVICES VEHICLES

### Pre-registration examination

8.29 Subsequent to the type approval, new commercial vehicles including goods vehicles, buses, light buses, taxis, and trailers are required to undergo a pre-registration examination to confirm their conformity with the type-approved design before their first registration.

8.30 For vehicles carrying large numbers of passengers, such as franchised and non-franchised buses, they are required to undergo a Certificate of Fitness (COF) examination in lieu of a Certificate of Roadworthiness (COR) examination at certain intervals.



### Additional requirements for franchised buses

8.31 The Panel notes that franchised buses are subject to additional requirements under the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap 230). Franchised bus companies are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify, and TD's examiners are empowered to inspect the buses and maintenance facilities at any reasonable time.

8.32 Franchised bus companies are required to inspect the overall condition of their buses at least once per month. Each bus company has its own additional programmes, e.g. checking wheel, tyres or brakes at specified intervals, and requiring their bus drivers and depot staff to report any observable defects. TD closely monitors the maintenance programme of franchised bus companies and holds regular meetings with their engineering departments to discuss ways to enhance bus design and maintenance.

8.33 In addition, TD also conducts annual COR examinations and COF examinations at certain intervals as well as spot checks on in-service franchised buses to ensure their safety and roadworthiness. Any defects found will need to be rectified before the bus can resume service. Prosecution may be instituted if particularly serious defects are found.

### Stability test

8.34 An additional stability test (tilt test) is applicable to both franchised and non-franchised buses and light buses. The stability of a double-decked bus is checked by loading weights in relative positions to represent the driver and a full complement of passengers on the upper deck. If the surface on which the vehicle stands were tilted to either side at an angle of 28 degrees from the horizontal, at which point overturning occurs, the vehicle fails the test (**Figure 8.6**).

Figure 8.6 – A bus undergoing stability test





8.35 At the moment, the stability test requirement is only applicable to buses and light buses under the existing regulations. **The Panel recommends that the feasibility of extending the stability test to heavy goods vehicles be explored.**

### Qualification of vehicle mechanics

8.36 The Panel received a suggestion to improve the quality of mechanics for vehicle maintenance. The Panel agrees that the quality and experience of vehicle mechanics and the facilities of the servicing and repair workshops are essential to ensure the maintenance standard and thus roadworthiness of vehicles. To this end, the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau commissioned a consultancy study on devising a regulatory scheme for the vehicle maintenance trade in 2003. The results are expected to be available at the end of 2003. **The Panel supports measures to enhance the quality and service of vehicle mechanics.**

## Chapter 9

# Vehicular Parapet Design

## INTRODUCTION

9.1 After the incident on 10 July, concern was expressed about the design of the vehicular parapet at the incident spot and other locations with similar characteristics. For this reason, the Panel has devoted much effort in reviewing the issue of parapet design and will set out its findings in detail in this chapter.

9.2 Although this chapter is not intended to be a technical report, the Panel considers it essential and beneficial for the fundamental concepts behind parapet design to be explained and understood. The engineering principles involved are complex and technical. Therefore, an attempt has been made to put these principles in layman terms to help the public better understand the matter.

9.3 Parapets are protective devices that are designed to reduce the severity of an accident when an errant vehicle leaves the roadway. They provide a passive line of defence. As such, they cannot be the cause of, or a contributory factor in, an accident. Properly designed, they can reduce the severity of the consequence of an accident. At the same time, these vehicle parapets are also obstacles which means that a vehicle hitting a parapet can result in injury to the occupants as well as vehicle damage.

## BASIC DESIGN PRINCIPLES

### What happens when a vehicle collides with a parapet

9.4 To aid understanding, some of the physical principles involved in a collision between a vehicle and a parapet are explained below.

9.5 When a vehicle collides with a parapet, there are several possible outcomes that depend on a number of factors, including the strength and rigidity of the parapet,

the speed of the collision, the angle of incidence, vehicle weight and the centre of gravity of the vehicle relative to parapet's height. The result is that –

- ❑ the vehicle is retained and may either be stopped by, or rebound from, the parapet; or
- ❑ the vehicle may penetrate the barrier if it is not strong enough to withstand the impact; or
- ❑ the vehicle may roll over the parapet if the parapet is not high enough.

9.6 Where parapet retains the vehicle, the collision process may be broken down into four phases, as shown in **Figure 9.1** –

- ❑ collision of vehicle's front corner;
- ❑ lateral scraping against the parapet;
- ❑ collision of vehicle's rear corner; and
- ❑ re-entry of vehicle onto the carriageway.




Figure 9.1 – The four phases of collision against a parapet

9.7 The angle of incidence ' $\phi$ ' can be influenced by many factors such as site geometry, vehicle speed and friction on the road surface. The larger the angle of incidence, the more severe the collision. The likelihood of a vehicle penetrating the parapet will also be correspondingly higher.

9.8 The degree of the exit angle ' $\alpha$ ' depends on the amount of energy released in the collision. The more energy released (by deforming the parapet and/or the vehicle) the smaller the exit angle. The less energy released, the larger the exit angle. This will also increase the likelihood of secondary collisions by the errant vehicle running onto other vehicles on the roadway.

9.9 To analyse whether a vehicle will roll over a parapet is a complex process. It depends on the centre of gravity (CG) of the vehicle relative to the contact point with the parapet, the weight and speed of the errant vehicle, and the magnitude and duration of the reaction force the parapet exerts on the vehicle. If the vehicle's CG is above the point of contact between the vehicle and the parapet, the more flexible the parapet and the vehicle are, then the less likely will the vehicle roll over the parapet.

### Containment levels

9.10 It is international practice that safety features are developed and tested for selected normalised situations that are intended to encompass a large majority, but not all, of the possible in-service collisions. The Panel notes that lighter vehicles account for a much higher proportion of vehicle numbers, and are therefore more likely to be involved in a collision than other types of vehicles. Past accident records confirm that most crashes on vehicular parapets involved light vehicles.

9.11 Containment capacity refers to the ability of the parapet to contain the impact of an errant vehicle and to deflect it away in a controlled manner. A containment level is normally expressed in terms of the angle of incidence, the weight and speed of the vehicle which represent the magnitude of the impact that the parapet is designed to sustain.

9.12 Parapets are designed to satisfy a selected containment level. For any particular containment level, there can be a variety of designs.

9.13 A strong parapet designed to a higher containment level may stop a heavy vehicle in the desired manner, but may cause considerable damage to a smaller vehicle. Occupants of a small vehicle may also be subject to severe acceleration force and injury. Conversely, a parapet with a lower containment level designed for light vehicles would not perform as equally well for larger vehicles which, in case of a severe impact, may even penetrate the parapet. It is therefore important to seek a balance between risk and the level of containment.

### Crash testing

9.14 Because crash dynamics are complex, the most effective means to verify the performance of a parapet design is to conduct a full scale crash test. These tests can be very expensive especially when heavy vehicles are involved. Testing facilities are not available in Hong Kong.

### Testing standards

9.15 To ensure that parapet designs meet balanced requirements across all vehicle types and numbers, and to provide a unified standard for verifying parapet design, 'test levels' have been defined in more recent international standards. A 'test level' may include more than one containment level. In other words, for a particular 'test level' to be satisfied, parapet designs could be subject to multiple tests each representing a different containment level. Different international standards have slightly different 'test levels' defined. The range of 'test levels' also varies. Acceptance criteria for the tests are also different, but are normally expressed in terms of structural adequacy, vehicle occupant risk, vehicle damage and exit path requirements.

### Computer simulation

9.16 Given that physical tests are expensive, and that it is not feasible to duplicate every possible impact scenario and have it tested, computer simulation provides a viable and more economical alternative. Once a computer model of a particular combination of vehicle and parapet type is developed and calibrated, the model can be used to simulate different collision scenarios.

### Design objectives

9.17 The design objectives of all vehicular parapets are similar. The three main requirements are structural adequacy, reduction of occupant risk, and controlled post-impact vehicular response to avoid secondary accidents and to minimize undue risk to the errant vehicle and other road users.

9.18 Structural adequacy is a measure of the ability of the parapet being able to stop an errant vehicle from penetrating, under-riding or overriding the parapet, or to redirect the vehicle in a controlled manner. The parapet may undergo an acceptable sideways deflection.

9.19 Risk to occupant is based on the acceleration and deceleration experienced by the occupant during impact, and the hazard posed by detached elements. Consideration should be given to the risks posed to other road users by the detached fragments of the parapet after impact.

9.20 The third design objective is to control the exit angle and the post-impact vehicle direction to reduce the likelihood of subsequent multi-vehicle accidents involving the crash vehicle re-entering traffic after 'bouncing' off the parapet.

## PARAPET DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG

9.21 The Panel has examined the history of parapet design in Hong Kong. The Panel notes that constant review and improvement on protection requirements are carried out by the Highways Department (HyD) having regard to the latest international practices and local experience. Reference is made in particular to the requirements of British standards. Parapets are generally designed to prevailing standards at the time when new projects or major renovations are implemented. It is the opinion of the Panel that, since parapets only reduce the severity of an accident, and do not contribute directly to accidents, old designs should not be viewed as 'unsafe'. It is also not a recognised international engineering practice to replace all existing parapets whenever a new standard emerges. A risk assessment and cost benefit analysis, taking into account the likely hazard, type and volume of vehicles, speed, road geometry, accident statistics and the surrounding environment etc, should be carried out before any enhancement programme is implemented.

9.22 Guidelines for the design of parapets are given in Chapter 15 of the Structures Design Manual (SDM) published by HyD. Parapets are classified for design purposes into five groups, namely P1 to P5. Only P1, P2 and P4 are designed for vehicle impact at different containment levels, viz. 'normal', 'low' and 'high' respectively. P3 and P5 are pedestrian and bicycle parapets not designed for vehicle impact. The section of parapet involved in the incident belongs to the P1 group.

9.23 The following summarises the history of parapet design development in Hong Kong and highlights the special features and properties of each type adopted. The design requirements on P1, P2 and P4 are reproduced from the SDM in the following table. As P2 only applies to low speed roads, the following discussion only focuses on P1 and P4. There are about 248.5 km of P1 parapet and 1.2 km of P4 parapet installed in the territory.

Group	Containment level	Usage
P1	To restrain vehicles up to 1.5 tonnes travelling at 113 kph and a 20° angle of incidence	On expressways and limited access roads
P2	To restrain vehicles up to 1.5 tonnes travelling at 80 kph and a 20° angle of incidence	On low speed roads
P4	To restrain vehicles up to 24 tonnes travelling at 50 kph and a 20° angle of incidence	At bridges over railways and other high risk locations

9.24 In the 1970s, parapets in Hong Kong were designed to meet the P1 standard following the requirements of the document 'BE5' published by the Department of Transport, United Kingdom (UK). A three-rail steel parapet (called the 1<sup>st</sup> generation) was adopted as the design (**Figure 9.2**). This type of parapet is light and attracts less wind load. It is designed to absorb part of the impact energy through deflection of the parapet components so that vehicles rebound back at a smaller angle and a relatively lower speed.



Figure 9.2 – First generation P1 three-rail steel parapet



9.25 In 1975, a three-rail aluminium P1 parapet was introduced (**Figure 9.3**). The performance of this type of parapet is basically the same as its steel counterpart. However, the maintenance cost of aluminium is lower as it does not rust. The material is also lighter and can be moulded into more aesthetically pleasing designs.



Figure 9.3 – First generation P1 3-rail aluminium parapet

9.26 In 1981, HyD developed a concrete P1 parapet with a metal top rail (**Figure 9.4**). The ultimate containment capability is slightly higher, but the operation mode is different. An errant vehicle is lifted up by the profile of the parapet to dissipate a portion of the impact energy before being redirected back to the carriageway.



Figure 9.4 – Concrete P1 parapet with a metal railing

9.27 This type of parapet suffers less damage on impact, is easy to maintain, and has the advantage of preventing debris and splash from reaching the area beneath the elevated structure. However, this type of parapet absorbs less impact energy. Vehicles tend to rebound at a larger angle and a higher speed. There is also the risk of a vehicle overturning or overriding the parapet.

9.28 In 1979, Hong Kong considered it necessary to introduce a higher containment level for railway overpass parapets. The parapets were designed to contain a 24 tonne concrete mixer truck at 50 kph with an impact angle of no less than 20°. A fully loaded concrete mixer truck was the most common heavy vehicle at the time. This containment level was subsequently included in the SDM as the design requirement for the P4 Group parapet. A standard concrete design has been developed as shown in **Figure 9.5**.



Figure 9.5 – High containment P4 concrete parapet

9.29 Apart from the standard parapet designs, the Panel notes new parapet designs have been developed to meet special needs for individual projects. These designs may each offer a slightly different containment level.

9.30 For example, a special type of P4 was developed for the Tsing Ma Bridge, Kap Shui Mun Bridge and Ting Kau Bridge. This type of parapet consists of five high tension steel strands anchored on strong metal posts (**Figure 9.6**). It has the advantage of attracting minimal wind loads, is light, and is particularly suitable for long span bridges. However, they can only be applied on straight spans and cannot be applied over bridge expansion joints.



Figure 9.6 – Tensioned Steel-strand P4 parapet of the Tsing Ma Bridge

9.31 For the Ting Kau Bridge approaches, due to the relatively tight radius involved, and to maintain a gradual transition with the P4 parapet on the bridge, another special design was adopted (**Figure 9.7**). Two top rails instead of one on a concrete base have been used.



Figure 9.7 – Ting Kau viaduct

9.32 Between 1999 and 2000, HyD continued to refine the design of the P1 parapet. A new generation of the three-rail P1 parapet was developed. Major modifications consisted of re-orienting the top rail, strengthening the post-to-rail and post-to-base plate connections, and bolting the splicing between the rails. Example of a modified P1 steel parapet is shown in **Figure 9.8**, and an aluminium one in **Figure 9.9**.



Figure 9.8 – Modified P1 steel parapet

Figure 9.9 – Modified P1 aluminium parapet



### Computer simulations for P1 parapet

9.33 To verify the field performance of the parapet designs adopted in Hong Kong, HyD commissioned a consultancy in August 2000 to assess the performance of the two generations of P1 parapet using computer simulation technique. The computer model was calibrated using full-scale field tests conducted in a testing laboratory in the USA (**Figures 9.10 and 9.11**).



Figure 9.10 – Impact process – overhead view



Figure 9.11 – Impact process – upstream view

9.34 The study covered the following five types of P1 vehicular parapets –

- ❑ three-rail steel vehicular parapet (1<sup>st</sup> generation);
- ❑ three-rail aluminium vehicular parapet (1<sup>st</sup> generation);
- ❑ concrete vehicular parapet with aluminium top rail;
- ❑ three-rail steel vehicular parapet (2<sup>nd</sup> generation); and
- ❑ three-rail aluminium vehicular parapet (2<sup>nd</sup> generation).

9.35 The test found that all five types of P1 vehicle parapet met the designed level of containment as required by the SDM. The computer simulation showed that the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation three-rail P1 parapet had a higher containment capability than the 1<sup>st</sup> generation. The 2<sup>nd</sup> generation three-rail P1 was capable of arresting a 1.5 tonne errant vehicle at 113 kph but at a higher impact angle of 40°.

9.36 HyD then proceeded to schedule replacement of all 1<sup>st</sup> generation three-rail P1 parapet in Hong Kong. Of 90 km of the 1<sup>st</sup> generation three-rail P1 parapet in Hong Kong, about 42 km have been replaced.

9.37 **The Panel recommends that the replacement programme be expedited, taking into account other recommendations in this report.**

## Computer simulation for bus collision

9.38 As a double-decked bus was involved in the incident, the Panel has made some effort, but was unable to obtain any documented technical information in Hong Kong or abroad, on the containment capability of common parapet types in respect of a double-decked bus collision. On request of the Panel, HyD conducted computer simulations during the period of this review to determine the crashing capacities of P1 parapets for different scenarios of bus impact. The preliminary results show that the P1 parapets are capable of retaining a double-decked bus striking at a low angle of incidence.

Parapet	Angle of Impact	Speed	Simulation Case Result
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation P1 Steel Parapet	10°	50 kph	double-decked bus retained
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation P1 Steel Parapet	10°	60 kph	double-decked bus retained
Concrete P1 Parapet with Top Rail	20°	50 kph	double-decked bus retained

9.39 **The Panel recommends HyD to conduct further computer simulations to establish the ultimate capacity of all P1 vehicle parapets relating to an impact by a double-decked bus. In view of the particular situation in Hong Kong where double-decked buses are used on almost every part of the road network, the Panel further recommends that when new parapet designs are developed, double-decked bus should be included as one type of heavy vehicle for design consideration.**



## INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

9.40 Owing to limited research activities in Hong Kong, and the lack of testing facilities, the Panel notes that HyD's work in parapet design relied heavily on international standards, in particular the British Standard BS6779 (Highway Parapets for Bridges and Other Structures), based on which the current SDM was developed. The Panel notes that the European Standard – EN1317 (Road Restraint Systems), which is being developed, would ultimately replace BS6779. The design approach adopted in Report 350 of the National Cooperative Highway Research Programme (Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance Evaluation of Highway Features) of the USA is very similar to EN1317. The Panel has therefore made a detailed examination of these standards to identify rooms for improvement in the design process in Hong Kong.

### British Standard BS 6779

9.41 Three levels of containment are specified for metal parapets in BS6779 with the following minimum parapet height and vehicle impact characteristics –

Level of containment	Minimum height of parapet (m)	Vehicle Mass (kg)	Height of CG (mm)	Angle of impact	Speed (kph)
Normal	1.0	1 500	480 to 580	20°	113
Low	1.0	1 500	480 to 580	20°	80
High	1.5	30 000	1 650	20°	64

9.42 The standard sets out guidance on the choice of level of containment. For instance, the 'low' level of containment is used in urban situations where speed restrictions up to 80 kph apply.

9.43 The 'high' level containment was introduced in the early 1980s, largely as a requirement of British Rail for certain railway lines, where a vehicle falling onto a track would almost certainly result in multi-casualty accident. However, high containment parapets are necessarily strong and hence less yielding. This means they are likely to cause additional damage to light vehicles that strike them and may result in vehicles being deflected at a greater angle than desirable, thereby increasing the risk of injury and secondary accident. It is therefore stated in the standard that the use of 'high' level containment should be largely restricted to cases such as bridges over railways.

### European Standard EN 1317

9.44 EN 1317 contains five parts altogether and is still being developed. Currently, only three parts are available. This standard is set to replace the corresponding British Standard.

9.45 EN1317 is more sophisticated and comprehensive than BS6779. For vehicular parapets, in addition to containment capacity, the standard also includes requirements on vehicle deformation, parapet deflection and occupant risk. Occupant risk is expressed in terms of impact severity level, which is determined by the total acceleration and deceleration experienced by vehicle occupants during impact with the parapet.

9.46 For parapet design, the major differences between BS6779 and EN1317 are that –

- ❑ the containment level specification is more refined in EN1317;
- ❑ impact tests are required for both heavy and light vehicles in most cases for any particular design in EN1317; and
- ❑ the coverage of the impact test report in EN1317 is more comprehensive than BS6779, in particular on impact severity.

9.47 EN 1317 has taken a slightly different approach in defining containment level. Four containment levels are defined. Each containment level consists of a number of sub-levels. Each sub-level represents an impact scenario equivalent to a test level.

9.48 Instead of the two types of vehicle specified in BS 6779, eight types of vehicles of mass ranging from 900 kg to 38 000 kg (that is, car, rigid heavy goods vehicle, bus and articulated heavy goods vehicles of different sizes) are specified for acceptance testing. A set of 11 different tests is specified. The tests differ in terms of the impact speed (65 kph to 110 kph), impact angle ( $8^\circ$  to  $20^\circ$ ), weight and type of vehicles.

9.49 The extent to which a parapet is deformed on impact is characterised by the dynamic deflection and the working width. The working width is the distance between the parapet face on the traffic side before impact and the maximum dynamic lateral position of any major part of the parapet (**Figure 9.12**). The dynamic deflection and the working width can be used to define the conditions under which the parapet can be installed and the distance to be provided in front of obstacles.




Figure 9.12 – Illustration of the concept of working width

9.50 Except for parapets specifically designed to contain light vehicles, the evaluation of containment levels will require the carrying out of two tests, one based on a heavier vehicle, and another using a lighter vehicle. This will ensure that while the heavy vehicle is contained (without excessively deforming the parapet), the light vehicle is not excessively damaged (or causes injury to the occupant).



### Report 350

9.51 In Report 350, six test levels for different applications are specified. Test level '1' is the lowest and '6' the highest. The higher the test level, the more it applies to a road carrying a larger number of heavy vehicles.

9.52 For these tests, six types of vehicles ranging from 700 kg to 36 000 kg are specified for impact testing (the vehicle types range from car, pickup truck, van truck, tractor with van trailer or tanker trailer). For each test level, three to four tests are specified. Each test is based on a different size of a particular test vehicle impacting on the parapet at a certain speed (50 kph to 100 kph), and a certain angle (15° to 25°). The test criteria include the three major aspects of structural adequacy, occupant risk, and vehicle trajectory. The objective of all tests is generally to ensure that heavy vehicles are contained and damages to light vehicles are acceptable. In other words, the parapet design is expected to perform for both heavy and light vehicles.

9.53 Parapet design is evaluated using the dynamic performance criteria on the basis of real impact tests.

### Application of international standards to Hong Kong

9.54 The Panel notes that, when compared with EN1317 and Report 350, the current SDM, which is based on BS 6779, is more restrictive in terms of the coverage of containment levels specified in the standard.

9.55 The Panel accepts that design standards are never static, but are constantly evolving based on local experience and sentiment, tradition, practice, technological level and economy of a particular country, or by borrowing from experience from other countries. What may be suitable for one country may not be entirely suitable for another. **The Panel considers that adoption of standards from other countries should be done judiciously.**

9.56 The Panel notes that HyD has constantly kept abreast of the latest international design standards, particularly in advanced countries and regions. **The Panel accepts that the British Standard is still the mainstay for historical reasons, but expects HyD to adopt new unified standards where possible, besides evolving its own standards in new works and major renovations.**

9.57 The Panel recommends that as the UK is also transiting from BS6779 to EN1317, HyD should follow closely the development of EN1317 and other international standards, and bring the SDM in line with the new internationally recognised standards in due course.

### Development of new designs

9.58 Having examined the local and international standards, the Panel notes that there are very limited design choices for vehicular parapets in particular for the P4 high containment level. The standard P4 concrete wall configuration, though capable of containing double-decked buses, is not suitable for many forms of bridge design.

9.59 The Panel also notes that foreign standards do not make reference to double-decked bus. The extensive use of double-decked buses is a distinct feature of Hong Kong's transport system, but the containment capacity of the various types of parapets for this type of vehicle has not been fully evaluated.

9.60 The maximum legislated weight for a vehicle in Hong Kong is 44 tonnes. **The Panel considers that there is a need to review whether a higher containment level than P4 should be introduced for a certain combination of topographic and traffic conditions.**

9.61 There is at present a technical dilemma in preparing a parapet design that can satisfy different containment levels at the same time. However, as technology develops, provisions have been made in more recent international standards, in particular in EN1317, for parapets to be designed to meet more than one containment level. This is to ensure that parapet designs will perform within acceptable limits for selected categories of heavy and light vehicles.

9.62 The Panel recommends that HyD expand the range of containment levels, in particular at the high end, having due regard to the extensive use of double-decked buses in Hong Kong, and the maximum legislated vehicle weight permitted on the road system. The Panel also recommends that HyD continue to monitor the development of multiple containment parapet in the international scene, and develop workable parapet designs for the Hong Kong situation.

9.63 The Panel is pleased to note that HyD has already taken forward this recommendation at the time of preparing this report. In line with the Panel's recommendation, a comprehensive review of the design requirements for vehicular parapets will be carried out jointly with the Transport Department.

## PARAPET HEIGHT

9.64 After the incident, there was public concern that parapets in Hong Kong are not high enough. A parapet may be strong enough to prevent penetration by a vehicle, but unless it is also high enough, an impacting vehicle or its cargo hitting a parapet may roll over the railing. The Panel has therefore examined the mechanism behind roll-over scenarios using a simple static approach.

9.65 The following table shows the parapet height currently specified in the HyD Standard Drawings for parapet group P1, P2 and P4 –

Group	Application	Height (mm)
P1	Normal vehicular parapets	1 100
P2	Normal vehicular parapets	1 100
P4	High containment vehicular parapets for railway overpasses and other high risk situations	1 500

9.66 The likelihood of a vehicle rolling over a parapet of a given height may be estimated using a simple static method by balancing the roll-over moment against the stabilising moment (**Figure 9.13**). The roll-over moment is the product of the 'lateral impact force exerted by the vehicle onto the parapet' and the 'difference in height between the vehicle CG and the effective parapet height'. The balancing moment is the product of the 'vehicle weight' and 'half the width of the vehicle'.




Figure 9.13 – The roll over and stabilising moments acting on a vehicle

9.67 A double-decked bus has a large stabilising moment due to its typical weight, passenger loading and vehicle width. To roll over the parapet, the roll-over moment must be larger than this stabilising moment.

9.68 In a study conducted by HyD on a 1.1 m high post and rail type parapet, the roll-over moment during impact is envisaged to be much smaller than the stabilising moment. This is because the deflection of the parapet components and the deformation of the bus will lessen the impact force, and the corresponding roll-over moment.

9.69 Computer simulations on existing P1 parapets so far show that a 1.1 m parapet would be adequate to prevent a double-decked bus travelling at 50 km/h from rolling over if the impact angle is small.

9.70 Based on this analysis, the Panel does not at this stage consider a 2 m high parapet, as suggested by some members of the public, is necessary for the safety of double-decked buses.

9.71      **The Panel recommends that HyD generate more simulation results involving other impact scenarios in order to fully evaluate the adequacy of the standard height adopted for the P1 parapets.**

## SELECTION CRITERIA

9.72      International standards do not normally provide guidelines to determine where a safety feature, satisfying a given test level and with specific performance characteristics, would have applications. That decision rests with the highway agency responsible for the implementation of the safety feature.

9.73      The Panel agrees with Report 350 on its recommendation that highway agencies should develop objective guidelines for the choice of safety features and the appropriate test levels, taking into account factors such as traffic conditions, traffic volume and heavy vehicle composition, site characteristics, the consequence of vehicle penetration and the cost effectiveness of other safety alternatives.

9.74      The current guidance provided in the SDM is relatively crude. A P1 parapet is suitable for general application, while a P4 parapet is used for bridges over railways and high risk locations. There is limited guidance as to what constitutes high risk. Professional experience is relied upon when deciding whether a new design has to be developed for certain site specific conditions.

9.75      **The Panel recommends that, in anticipation of an expansion of the parapet hierarchy, and the possibility of introducing more height variations, detailed guidelines and analysis procedures be given to designers on the choice of containment level and parapet height with particular attention to the congested environment in Hong Kong and the unique situation of having a large fleet of double-decked buses operating on the road network.**

## DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR PARAPET COMPONENTS AND CONNECTION DETAILS

9.76 Chapter 15 of the SDM specifies the design requirements of metal parapets. It incorporates by reference the requirements from BS 6779, and qualifies by stating that ‘where Hong Kong specifications or conditions differ from the requirements or conditions described in the British Standards, adjustments appropriate to Hong Kong shall be made’.

9.77 For reinforced concrete parapets, a separate standard in the form of a table is set out in the SDM specifying the required strength.

## MATERIALS AND WORKMANSHIP

9.78 BS 6779 specified in great detail quality control requirements. It contains strict specifications on workmanship control particularly on metals. Reference is made to other relevant British Standards for quality control on steel and aluminium alloys. Welding and testing requirements including non-destructive testing are also clearly specified.

9.79 Part 3, Section 20 of the General Specification for Civil Engineering Works (GS) published by the then Hong Kong Government in 1992 covers the material standard for ‘Vehicular Parapets’.

9.80 The GS specifically provides that steel for vehicular parapets, including welding, should comply with the requirements of Section 18 on structural steelwork, but testing requirements are exempted.

9.81 The Panel understands that such an exemption does not mean the steelwork will not be tested. Particular specification on testing requirements may be included by the designer of individual construction contracts.

9.82      **Taking into account the structural significance of the parapet, the Panel recommends that the GS be revised to include suitable testing requirements for fabricating the steel components used in vehicular parapets.**

9.83      For aluminium, reference is made in the GS to other British Standards for welding and testing requirements.

### NEW MATERIALS AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

9.84      The Panel has received public suggestions on new parapet designs and materials. A design by the University of Wisconsin involves a parapet made of reinforced glass fibre shaped into multiple rectangular sections in different sizes. Research work has indicated that the design is suitable for restraining both large and small vehicles. Other designs suggested include the use of rubber tubes containing rice husks and wood bran. A student has also made an innovative suggestion of using magnetic parapets.

9.85      The Panel does not rule out the potential of any particular design but notes that research work to properly evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness will be required. The Panel understands that HyD is also following closely the technological developments in the international scene, and is prepared to introduce new designs into Hong Kong for trial if they can be adapted to local conditions.

9.86      **The Panel recommends that HyD could carry out some research work in collaboration with local tertiary institutions.**

9.87      There is a suggestion to enclose a section of Tuen Mun Road with steel nets. The Panel has reservations about the technical viability of such a proposal, in particular the feasibility of such a retrofitting programme.

### IN-SERVICE EVALUATION

9.88 The Panel notes that vehicular parapets are designed and tested to selected containment levels. However, testing cannot duplicate every roadside condition or vehicle impact situation. The evaluation process should not therefore stop with successful completion of crash tests.

9.89 **The Panel recommends that HyD carry out in-service evaluation of the parapet designs on the basis of the damage information collected after traffic accidents so that various types of parapet design can be refined and improved on an on-going basis.**

### HIGH PRIORITY LOCATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

#### Collision statistics

9.90 In conjunction with the HyD, the Panel conducted a desk-top study on traffic accident records in the past five years in which a vehicle ran into a vehicular parapet or a roadside safety barrier. Of the 2 000 cases identified, it was found that 94.3% involved light vehicles, 4.4% involved medium and heavy goods vehicles and 1.3% involved buses.

9.91 The records indicated that most of the errant vehicles were successfully retained by the vehicular parapets. Of all the recorded accidents, only four involved vehicles penetrating or rolling over a vehicular parapet.



9.92 Having examined the issues relating to parapet designs in great details and past collision statistics, the Panel considers that the existing standards adopted by the HyD for parapet design are generally in line with international practices. Taking into account the standards adopted for road design, and the measures in place to control various types of vehicles and drivers, the Panel is of the view that the various types of P1 parapet are suitable for general application and on elevated structures in terms of containment capacity and height protection. However, in view of the July incident, and the limited knowledge about bus collisions, **the Panel considers that there is room for enhancement at critical locations where penetration of the vehicular parapet would result in catastrophic consequences. A proper risk assessment procedure should be developed for such situations.**

### Priority locations for road safety enhancement

9.93 Before a systematic procedure is fully developed for the selection of containment level and the assessment of parapet height, the Panel worked closely with HyD to identify a list of high priority locations having similar characteristics as the incident site where road safety enhancement, including where appropriate higher containment parapets, would have a significant effect in reducing the severity of an accident.

9.94 The July incident spot is identified as having the following characteristics –

- ☐ high posted speed limit;
- ☐ high traffic volume;
- ☐ high bus usage;
- ☐ high percentage of commercial vehicles;
- ☐ located near expressway entrance with weaving traffic;
- ☐ high level above ground; and
- ☐ having residents underneath the road structure.

9.95 A scoring system was then developed to rank bridges and elevated road sections against the above characteristics. Based on results made in the analysis, a preliminary list of road sections has been drawn up for which consideration should be given to providing some road safety enhancement work.

Item No.	District	Location
1	NT	Tuen Mun Road (7 locations)
2	NT	Tolo Highway (4 locations)
3	NT	Tsuen Wan Road (3 locations)
4	NT	Sha Tin Road (3 locations)
5	NT	Shing Mun Tunnel Road (3 locations)
6	NT	Tseung Kwan O Tunnel Road (2 locations)
7	NT	Yuen Long Highway (3 locations)
8	NT	Cheung Tsing Highway (3 locations)
9	NT	Lion Rock Tunnel Road, section between Kak Tin and Fung Shing Court
10	NT	North Lantau Highway (2 locations)
11	K	Ching Cheung Road (2 locations)
12	K	Kwun Tong Bypass, slip road connecting Lei Yue Mun Road
13	K	Kwai Chung Road, section fronting Mei Foo Shun Chuen
14	K	Lung Cheung Road near Tai Wo Ping Interchange
15	HK	Shek Pai Wan Road (2 locations)
16	HK	Island Eastern Corridor, section between Victoria Park Road and Healthy Street West

9.96 The Panel considers that the incident on 10 July was a rare occurrence, the cause of which has yet to be established. Neither the incident site nor the list of road sections identified in paragraph 9.97 above are accident black spots. In considering measures that could enhance safety, expert world-wide will ask : does it make economic sense or is it appropriate to spend large sums to prevent accidents of very low probability (albeit entailing severe consequences), or is it better to spend resources on a package of known measures by which more lives could be saved and injuries prevented in general?

9.97 The Panel advocates a total safety management approach. A risk assessment should be conducted when road safety enhancement schemes are formulated. Strengthening the parapets is but one enhancement measure. It would not be the only measure and may not be the most cost effective option. In certain cases, a good traffic management scheme to accommodate driver behaviour may be more effective.


9.98 **The Panel recommends that a detailed study be conducted immediately to formulate a package of road safety enhancement measures for these road sections.**

## Chapter 10

# Tuen Mun Road

### INTRODUCTION

10.1 Tuen Mun Road was designed during the period between the late 1960's and the early 1970's as a high capacity dual three-lane carriageway connecting Tsuen Wan with Tuen Mun. Construction of the 15 km long carriageway commenced in 1974 and was completed in 1983. Since completion, a number of improvement works have been carried out to enhance the road to meet the growing needs. A general layout of the Tuen Mun Road, from south of Tuen Mun Town (Wong Chu Road) to Tsuen Wan Road, is shown in **Figure 10.1**.



10.2 The section of Tuen Mun Road where the July incident occurred was widened in the mid 1990's to accommodate the slip road leading to the Tai Lam Tunnel approach road of the Tsing Long Highway. The Panel notes that the location of the July incident is not an accident blackspot. Prior to the July incident, there was no history of any fatal or major traffic accident at this location.

10.3 In order to assess the safety performance of Tuen Mun Road, the Panel has reviewed the accident statistics of the road for the past ten years (1993 - 2002). The Panel then examined in depth the traffic engineering standards adopted and management measures implemented along Tuen Mun Road. The Panel has also studied carefully public suggestions to enhance the safety of Tuen Mun Road. Where appropriate, the Panel has made recommendations for further improvements on the basis of these suggestions. Parapet design and the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project are two other important subjects covered in this chapter.

## ACCIDENT STATISTICS

10.4 Accident statistics provide a direct measure of the safety performance of a road transport system. The Panel has studied in detail the accident rates of Tuen Mun Road in the past ten years (1993 - 2002) and compared the rates with those of other roads in Hong Kong.

10.5 The traffic accident trends on Tuen Mun Road by severity in the past ten years have been analysed. During this period, accident rates in terms of *accidents per million vehicle-kilometre* were on a downward trend with rates dropping about 26%, from 0.53 to 0.39. The number of fatal accidents has also been falling over the past ten years.

## Comparison of accident rates with other expressways and all roads

10.6 In order to assess the relative safety performance of Tuen Mun Road, the Panel has compared the *number of accidents* and the accident rate *per million vehicle-kilometre* of Tuen Mun Road and other expressways in Hong Kong. The Panel notes that Tuen Mun Road had the highest number of traffic accidents in the past ten years. However, using a more encompassing rate measured in terms of *number of accidents per million vehicle-kilometre*, the performance of Tuen Mun Road is better than the overall average<sup>1</sup>, and is on par with other expressways including those more recently built to the current standards (e.g. Western Kowloon Expressway, Cheung Tsing Highway etc).

## Comparison of vehicle involvement rates

10.7 The Panel analysed the vehicle types involved in the traffic accidents and their severity in the past three years (2000 - 2003) in order to ascertain whether a particular vehicle type was more prone to an accident on Tuen Mun Road.

10.8 The Panel examined the accident involvements and involvement rates per million vehicle-kilometre of major vehicle types for Tuen Mun Road, for all expressways and for all roads. In general, the involvement rates of heavy vehicles such as public buses and medium and heavy goods vehicles were lower than those of light vehicles such as private cars, taxis and motorcycles. This was also the case on Tuen Mun Road.

10.9 The Panel reviewed the trends of fatal accidents involving different vehicle types along Tuen Mun Road and other expressways in the past three years. For Tuen Mun Road and all expressways, the majority of fatal accidents involved private cars and light goods vehicles. Also, the fatal accident involvement rates for heavy vehicles on Tuen Mun Road were generally lower than those on all roads.

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<sup>1</sup> In 2002, Tuen Mun Road had a rate of 0.39 accidents per million vehicle-kilometre, whereas the range for all expressways was between 0.18 and 0.70. For all roads, the average accident rate was 1.35.

### Tuen Mun Road on par with other expressways

10.10 Having examined the past accident statistics, the Panel considers that Tuen Mun Road is intrinsically safe as is evidenced by its accident rates, which are about average for all expressways, including those more recently built to current design standards. Notwithstanding the high proportion of heavy vehicles using Tuen Mun Road, there is no evidence to indicate that heavy vehicles are more prone to accidents along Tuen Mun Road. The Panel notes that the overall number of traffic accidents on Tuen Mun Road remains at around 250 per year despite increases in the annual traffic throughput. **Nonetheless, the Panel considers that there is always room for improvement.**

### Major contributory factors of traffic accidents

10.11 The Panel has analysed the contributory factors of traffic accidents along Tuen Mun Road with respect to other roads in Hong Kong. The following major factors have been identified –

- ❑ driving too close to vehicle in front;
- ❑ careless lane changing; and
- ❑ loss of vehicle control.

10.12 All of the above factors are driver related. This finding is consistent with the general observation of major factors contributing to traffic accidents in Hong Kong, as discussed in Chapter 5. The Panel considers that to achieve a noticeable reduction in the number of accidents on Tuen Mun Road, enforcement action against these specific behaviours should be strengthened.

10.13 Loss of vehicle control is often associated with driving at an inappropriate speed. The Panel notes that 16 speed enforcement cameras (SEC) sites had been earmarked for installation at different locations along Tuen Mun Road. 14 have already been installed, with installation work on the remaining two scheduled for completion by the end of 2003.

10.14 The Panel recommends that the Transport Department (TD) and the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) expedite all necessary preparatory work so that the SEC system on Tuen Mun Road can be fully operational as soon as possible. The Panel further recommends that once the SEC system is operating, HKPF deploy more resources to patrolling, with particular emphasis on tailgating and careless lane changing.

## DESIGN STANDARDS

### Speed

10.15 The Panel has reviewed the appropriateness of the present speed limits along Tuen Mun Road, with focus given to the section of Tuen Mun Road where the July incident occurred. The current speed limit posted for this section of the Tuen Mun Road is 70 km/h.

10.16 The Panel notes that in 1991 and 1998, TD conducted two comprehensive reviews of the speed limits for Tuen Mun Road with a view to rationalising the speed limit for the whole expressway. The review in 1991 initially suggested raising the speed limit for the eastern half of Tuen Mun Road (between Tsuen Wan and west of Sham Tseng) from 70 km/h to 80 km/h. However, it was decided that the speed limit of 70 km/h was appropriate and should be maintained for this part of Tuen Mun Road. The decision was based on observed vehicle speed under free-flow conditions. Furthermore, there was concern that raising the speed limit might potentially increase the number of accidents. The subsequent review in 1998 recommended retaining the speed limit of 70 km/h for this part of Tuen Mun Road for the same reasons while increasing the speed limit for the western half from 70 km/h to 80 km/h.

10.17 In light of the July incident, the Panel has requested TD to carry out a check on whether the horizontal curves are adequate for the posted speed limits along the whole length of Tuen Mun Road. The Panel is satisfied that there is an adequate safety margin under the present speed limit.



10.18 There has been a suggestion from the public to reduce the speed limit for Tuen Mun Road to 50 km/h for heavy vehicles and 60 km/h for other vehicles to deter speeding. The Panel notes that the speed limit for Tuen Mun Road is subject to regular review and understands that setting an unrealistically low speed limit for a road, which is capable of accommodating higher vehicle speeds, would only result in serious and frequent violations by motorists and cause unmanageable enforcement problems.

### Geometric standards of Tuen Mun Road

10.19 As the speed limits posted for the eastern and western halves of Tuen Mun Road are 70 km/h and 80 km/h respectively, the Panel has focused on the highway design standards applicable to this range of speed and compared them with the current standards in Hong Kong.

10.20 Fundamental design principles and a comparison of design standards adopted by Hong Kong and overseas countries are discussed in Chapter 7. Key highway design elements of the current Hong Kong standards and Tuen Mun Road are tabulated in **Figure 10.2** on the next page for comparison.

10.21 The Panel notes that a small proportion of the total length of Tuen Mun Road falls outside the desirable values of the current standards as a result of the topography of the route. Those sections are not accident black spots.

10.22 The Panel recognises that the standards of highway design throughout the world, including Hong Kong, are gradually being raised beyond required safety margins to provide a higher level of comfort in addition to safety. Non-compliance with certain aspects of the latest design standard does not automatically infer a safety problem. The Panel considers that the marginally lower standards of Tuen Mun Road at a few locations, due to changes in standards over time, mainly affect the comfort of motorists but not their safety. The issue of designing for safety and comfort is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7.

**Figure 10.2 – Comparison of key highway design elements  
between current standards and Tuen Mun Road**

	Major design elements	Current Hong Kong standard (desirable values) for design speeds		Tuen Mun Road <sup>2</sup>	Tuen Mun Road at the accident location
		70 km/h	80 km/h		
(a)	Minimum sight distance	120 m	145 m	90 m	250 m
(b)	Maximum gradient	4%	4%	8.8% <sup>3</sup>	1%
(c)	Minimum horizontal curve radius	250 m	320 m	150 m <sup>4</sup>	300 m
(d)	Maximum superelevation	7%	7%	10%	3.8%
(e)	Minimum carriageway width (for three-lane carriageway)	11 m	11 m	10.05 - 11 m <sup>5</sup>	10.4 m
(f)	Width of hard shoulder	3.3 m		1.5 - 3.3 m <sup>5</sup>	3.2 - 3.4 m
(g)	Taper gradient of diverging lane	1:15		1:10.5 to 1:110	1:22.5

<sup>2</sup> The speed limit is 70 km/h for the section of Tuen Mun Road between Tsuen Wan and Sham Tseng and 80 km/h for the section between Sham Tseng and Tuen Mun.

<sup>3</sup> The maximum gradient of 8.8% occurs at a descending section of about 200 m long near Tsuen Wan; the other section with a gradient of 8.5% occurs at a descending section of about 500 m long near Tsing Lung Tau; the rest of the road meets current standards.

<sup>4</sup> The minimum radius of curvature of 150 m occurs only at an approximately 200 m long section of the highway near Yau Kom Tau; the rest of the mainline meets the current standards.

<sup>5</sup> Part of the Kowloon-bound 3-lane carriageway was widened to 11.0 m between 1994 and 2001. The hard shoulder was also widened to 3.3 m.

10.23 The Panel also notes that the section of Tuen Mun Road at the accident location generally satisfies the current Hong Kong standards, with the exception of the 10.4 m carriageway width which is less than the required 11 m. However, the overall width of the road at the location of the incident spot is considerably more than 10.4 m due to the presence of a diverging lane.

10.24 The diverging lane where the accident occurred has a taper gradient of 1:22.5, which is better than the standard of 1:15.

## TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT MEASURES

### Traffic signs

10.25 The Panel has examined the traffic signage along Tuen Mun Road. The Panel notes that a number of improvement works have been carried out along the road in the past decades. For example, TD implemented several traffic management improvement measures at nine individual sections/locations (near Sham Tseng, Pun Shan Tsuen, So Kwun Wat, Sham Tseng Interchange and Siu Lam) and lowered the past record of relatively high accident frequencies at these locations.

10.26 The Panel considers that the traffic signage along Tuen Mun Road is effective in general. Regulatory, warning and informative traffic signs along Tuen Mun Road are generally located correctly in relation to restrictions, hazards and other features to which they apply. The sizes of the signs are generally appropriate to the speed of vehicles using the road. The signs are clear of visual obstruction. Roadside directional signs and gantry signs are posted at an appropriate height.

10.27 At the accident location, typical direction signs, comprising an advance direction sign, a final advance direction sign and a direction sign, are provided to alert motorists of the diverging lane, which leads to the slip road connecting to the Tai Lam

Tunnel approach road. These signs are illustrated in **Figure 10.3** as *Sign Nos. 2, 4 and 5*. They are supplemented by a set of typical count-down markers (Sign No. 3). Photographs of these signs and markers are provided in **Figures 10.4 to 10.8** on next page correspondingly.




Figure 10.3

## Road markings

10.28 The Panel has also reviewed existing road markings along Tuen Mun Road and observed that lane lines, warning lines and bus lane lines in delineating traffic lanes are generally in order. Double white lines and hatched markings are provided at appropriate locations where special vehicle control is required and lane changing is prohibited. The warning chevrons, arrows, merging/diverging lane markings used in lane drops and merging/diverging points are also in order.



Figure 10.4 – Sign No. 1



Figure 10.5 – Sign No. 2



Figure 10.6 – Sign No. 3



Figure 10.8 – Sign No. 5



Figure 10.7 – Sign No. 4



## Enhancement measures

10.29 Although there is no intrinsic deficiency in the design of the section of Tuen Mun Road at the incident spot, there is always room for improvement. In line with the total safety management approach, the Panel considers it prudent to work closely with TD to draw up a package of enhancement measures specifically for this section of road, taking into account the recommendations made in those two studies on traffic signage and road markings outlined in Chapter 7.

10.30 **The Panel recommends the following package of enhancement measures be implemented –**

- ❑ **install a new advance information sign (AIS) 1 200 m before the final advance direction sign. The sign provides additional information to motorists of the exit at a distance of 1 200 m ahead;**
- ❑ **convert a 100 m section of lane line markings to warning line markings before the start of the diverging point to enhance the awareness that a diverging point is approaching;**
- ❑ **widen the edge line marking from 200 mm to 300 mm at the diverging point to enhance definition at that spot;**
- ❑ **align the advance direction sign (ADS) immediately over the inside lane to further alert motorists to keep left for the exit ahead to Yuen Long and Lok Ma Chau;**
- ❑ **install a ‘Get In Lane’ sign between the AIS and ADS to provide additional warning to motorists to change lanes where necessary; and**
- ❑ **install a crash cushion at the nosing between the main road and the slip road as a safety precaution.**

10.31 The Panel notes that the first recommendation to install an AIS has already been completed (see Sign No.1 of **Figure 10.3**). **Action is in hand to implement the other enhancement measures.**

## **Use restrictions**

10.32 Many submissions have been received from the public on traffic management measures for improving the safety of Tuen Mun Road. There are suggestions to restrict buses and heavy vehicles from using the slow lane along Tuen Mun Road. The Panel does not support the proposal because motorists, including drivers of heavy vehicles, are already accustomed to the well-established practice of driving on the nearside lane unless overtaking. It would be hard to translate this proposal into a workable and enforceable scheme. Its potential effect on the overall risk to bus users is also unclear. In addition, it would affect the operation of the existing bus lane designated on the nearside lane of the Kowloon-bound carriageway of Tuen Mun Road.

10.33 There have also been suggestions to ban buses and heavy vehicles, including container trucks, from Tuen Mun Road. The Panel does not support the proposal, as there is no evidence to show that these categories of vehicles are more prone to traffic accidents on Tuen Mun Road. In addition, banning these vehicles from Tuen Mun Road would have serious economic and social impacts on the northwest New Territories (NWNT). Tuen Mun Road, as part of Route 2, is a vital route linking urban areas to the NWNT as well as the Lok Ma Chau Crossing. Furthermore, any buses and heavy vehicles banned from using Tuen Mun Road would have to use other alternative routes. This would overload some of the road sections in the region, resulting in widespread traffic congestion and unnecessarily long travelling time, particularly during peak hours.

10.34 A suggestion has been received to divert heavy vehicles from Tuen Mun Road to Route 3 by renting some lanes from Route 3, or subsidising heavy vehicles to use them, or diverting buses to Castle Peak Road. The Panel considers that there is no need to divert heavy vehicles and buses from Tuen Mun Road to Route 3 on road safety grounds. Diversion measures should only be made for traffic management purposes. In this regard, Members note that TD has recently completed the Northwest New Territories Traffic and Infrastructure Review (the Review) which, as a first step, identifies the long-term transport needs of the NWNT and North Lantau areas. As part of the Review, TD is also looking into possible traffic

management measures and minor road improvements to improve the through traffic capacity of Tuen Mun Road in Tuen Mun Town Centre. The Panel also notes that the implementation timeframe and relative priorities of the various road proposals will need to be established in the next stage of the Review.

10.35 Another suggestion is to build an elevated by-pass along Castle Peak Road (i.e. double decking) to take buses running along Tuen Mun Road. The Panel does not support the proposal which is not a practical way to provide additional capacity for the Tuen Mun Road corridor. Moreover, there are serious physical and environmental constraints to building an elevated by-pass along Castle Peak Road.

10.36 There is a suggestion to prohibit lane changing along Tuen Mun Road to improve safety. The Panel considers the proposal not practical. Apart from the obvious need to change lanes at and near to intersections, Tuen Mun Road would be greatly under-utilised, resulting in widespread traffic congestion, especially during peak hours.

## PARAPET DESIGN

10.37 The Panel notes that the section of parapet (175 m long) at the incident spot has already been strengthened with additional posts. An additional line of safety barriers (164 m) has also been installed alongside the parapet. All other vehicular parapets along Tuen Mun Road have already been replaced with the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation P1 parapet.

10.38 The Panel is also advised by the Highways Department (HyD) that the department is reviewing all bridge sections along Tuen Mun Road, and is drawing up a priority list of locations with characteristics similar to those of the incident spot.

10.39 **The Panel recommends that the containment level of the parapet at the identified locations be reviewed and upgraded where necessary. Other enhancement measures including provision of additional traffic signs and road markings should be considered as a total package.**



## ROAD SAFETY REVIEW

10.40 The Panel notes that Tuen Mun Road has already been in service for more than twenty years. A number of major improvement works have been carried out on the road in the past years in accordance with prevailing design standards and guidelines. Small scale improvements have also been implemented as a result of previous accident investigations.

10.41 **The Panel recommends that a comprehensive road safety review be conducted for Tuen Mun Road, particularly from the drivers' perspective, to identify any possible safety enhancement measures. Improvement schemes which can be implemented within a short period should be drawn up as interim enhancement, while structural improvements will be covered by the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project.**

10.42 The Panel considers that this recommendation will serve the same purpose as a road safety audit as suggested by individual professional institutes.

## RECONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT

### Construction programme

10.43 The Panel notes that the public is keen to see an early completion of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project. However, the project cannot start before the completion of the Castle Peak Road improvement project, which is required to provide a diversion route with adequate capacity in case of traffic accidents on Tuen Mun Road.

10.44 The Panel has worked closely with TD and HyD to identify opportunities for advancing the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project. The Panel is pleased to note that through streamlining planning and design processes, work on the project can begin six months earlier in mid-2005 for completion in phases between mid-2009 and mid-2011 on the basis that three lanes in both

directions will have to be maintained during peak hours throughout the whole construction period.

10.45 As requested by the Panel, TD has reviewed the time window for lane closure and devised preliminary proposals to implement lane closures on Tuen Mun Road during daytime off-peak hours to facilitate reconstruction works. **The Panel has requested HyD to conduct another traffic impact assessment, taking into account relaxations on lane closure arrangements and the projected traffic condition of Tuen Mun Road, and to review the construction programme with a view to further shortening the construction period.**

### Highway design

10.46 In view of the July incident, the Panel recommends that the opportunity be taken to conduct a comprehensive review of the alignment design of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project to identify areas for further improvement to bring the entire length of Tuen Mun Road up to current expressway standards.

## Chapter 11

# Miscellaneous Issues

### Introduction

11.1 The Panel has addressed most of the improvement proposals suggested by the public in the previous chapters. Other proposed improvements which fall outside the scope of subjects discussed earlier or the Panel's scope of work are examined in the following paragraphs.

### Driver's health

11.2 In order to ensure that a driver is physically fit to drive, one suggestion is to impose regular check-ups on drivers. The Panel notes that illness only contributed to less than 1% of the traffic accidents over the past ten years and that motorists aged 70 or over are required to undergo annual medical checks before they are allowed to renew their driving licences. In addition, all franchised bus operators require their bus-drivers to undergo annual medical examination after they reach a certain age. Kowloon Motor Bus and Long Win Bus require their drivers of age 60 or above to undergo annual medical examination, while Citybus, New Lantau Bus and New World First Bus require their drivers to undergo annual medical examination after they reach the age of 50.

11.3 The Panel considers that the current requirements are working well, as reflected by the small number of traffic accidents caused by illness. There seems no strong grounds to extend the mandatory requirement of health examination to motorists below the age of 70.

11.4 Another suggestion is to stop issuing driving licences to drivers of age 60 or above to minimise the risk of traffic accidents. The Panel has reviewed the accident statistics in the past ten years and found that only about 4% of the traffic accidents involved drivers aged 60 or above. As there is no evidence indicating that drivers of age 60 or above are more prone to traffic accidents, Members do not support this proposal. The Panel also notes that the requirement of mandatory

medical checks for drivers of age 70 or above in Hong Kong is comparable with requirements in other developed countries. For instance, Singapore has recently raised the age at which drivers need to undergo medical examination from 60 to 65.

### **Safety of parapets and railings**

11.5 After the July incident, some members of the public have expressed concerns about the safety of parapets and railings along elevated road structures at certain locations such as Castle Peak Road, Island Eastern Corridor, Aldrich Bay Road (near Chun Fung Garden), an elevated road at Sham Shui Po and a flyover in Lam Tin etc. The Panel has relayed those public concerns to the Highways Department (HyD).

### **Road maintenance**

11.6 There are suggestions for more frequent road maintenance to ensure that road surface and road markings are in good condition, obstructions to sightline are cleared and anti-skid materials are applied on the road surface where required. The Panel welcomes those suggestions and has referred them to HyD for follow-up action.

### **Communication with the transport trade and driver associations**

11.7 There is a suggestion to improve the Government's communication with transport trade associations and to extend the membership of the Road Safety Council (RSC) to these associations. The Panel understands that the RSC's key function is to examine territory-wide road safety issues, and individuals from different sectors are appointed to the RSC. The Panel considers it appropriate to maintain the flexibility in the RSC's appointments, as the RSC's work does not focus on matters relating to a specific trade. The Panel also notes that there are at present regular conferences between TD and different transport trades (taxi, public light bus, public bus, goods vehicle) to facilitate communication.

### **‘Two-second’ rule**

11.8 A member of the public commented that it was difficult to comply with the ‘two-second’ rule during rush hours on Tuen Mun Road and Tolo Highway, especially under wet weather. The Panel notes that the ‘two-second’ rule is aimed to keep an adequate distance between travelling vehicles to minimise the risk of collision. In case of bad weather, the Road User’s Code recommends that the count should be doubled to four seconds or more.

### **Other suggestions**

11.9 There are a number of suggestions which are not related to highway safety nor fall within the Panel’s terms of reference, as follows –

- ☐ install noise barriers along Ching Cheung Road as part of the road widening works to minimise noise created by traffic;
- ☐ provide more toilets and relaxation areas along Tuen Mun Road;
- ☐ identify an alternative route for transportation of containers to reduce the number of container trucks using Tuen Mun Road;
- ☐ rectify the inappropriate use of land at So Kwun Wat where agricultural land is used for storage of containers; and
- ☐ provide better paramedic and ambulance services as well as trauma units in hospitals for victims of serious road accidents.

The Panel has referred the above suggestions to relevant departments.

# Summary of Recommendations

## INTRODUCTION

12.1 Road safety is determined by a dynamic interplay between road users, vehicles and the road environment. With the benefit of public views and inputs from relevant departments, the Panel has examined in considerable detail factors that affect these three elements, including design of parapets that serve as protective devices to reduce the consequences of accidents. The following is a summary of recommendations by the Panel on various aspects of road safety.

## DRIVING BEHAVIOUR

12.2 While road users, vehicles and road environment all have a bearing on road safety, the human factor is the most complex and dynamic. Accident trends and public views point to inappropriate driving behaviour as a major contributory factor of road accidents. The Panel considers that priority should be given to improving driving behaviour and attitude through public education and formal training.

### **Sustainable publicity programme to improve driving behaviour**

12.3 The Panel considers it important to publicise the road safety messages widely in the transport trade. Members recognise that some forms of publicity, such as road safety seminars and meetings are mainly targetted at companies with large vehicle fleets and transport trade associations. They may not be able to reach self-employed or individual drivers with no affiliation to such associations. In light of this, the Transport Department (TD) should identify additional avenues to extend the coverage of publicity efforts to individual drivers. (*paragraph 5.19*)

12.4 Regarding the approach to publicity programmes, apart from condemning aggressive driving behaviour, consideration should be given to promoting good driving practices and fostering a considerate driving culture. (*paragraph 5.20*)

12.5 To ensure the continuity and sustainability of promotional efforts, the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), TD and the Road Safety Council (RSC) should consider formulating a longer term programme that extends beyond the normal annual cycle. In addition, collaboration with District Councils should be actively pursued to extend the reach of road safety campaigns. (*paragraph 5.14*)

12.6 An effective feedback mechanism is vital for devising appropriate promotional strategies for different target groups. In addition to measuring public awareness of its publicity programmes, the RSC should devise an evaluation methodology, which involves targetted surveys on the driving population, to assess the effectiveness of the programmes. Research in this area can be conducted in conjunction with local tertiary institutions. (*paragraph 5.16*)

### **Mandatory driving courses for repeat traffic offenders**

12.7 Except when directed by the court, motorists only take part in the Driver Improvement Scheme (DIS) on a voluntary basis. To improve the driving behaviour and attitude of repeat traffic offenders, the Government should explore the feasibility of requiring drivers who have accumulated a certain number of 'Driving Offence Points' to attend DIS on a mandatory basis. (*paragraph 5.24*)

### **Pre-service training for drivers of passenger services and commercial vehicles**

12.8 TD has recently proposed that all applicants for a taxi driving licence attend a mandatory pre-service training programme, which includes training on driving behaviour and attitude, before they can qualify for a taxi driving licence. TD should, in due course, review the effectiveness of this programme, and, in light of experience, consider extending the programme to drivers of public light buses and other professional drivers. (*paragraph 5.26*)

### Skills Upgrading Scheme for passenger services transport trades

12.9 The Vocational Training Council is developing a Skills Upgrading Scheme to provide comprehensive training for the drivers of taxis, public light buses and non-franchised buses. The Scheme will help improve driving attitude, knowledge of traffic rules and regulations as well as road safety concepts and skills for handling accidents and emergencies on the roads. TD should review the course content of the Skills Upgrading Scheme to ensure that sufficient emphasis is placed on promoting good driving practices, and recognition should be given to drivers who have completed the course to increase the incentive for enrolment. The Government should also explore, with relevant organisations, the development and introduction of a similar skills upgrading programme for drivers in the trucking industry. (*paragraph 5.28*)

### Probationary driving licence for new private car and light goods vehicle drivers

12.10 The rapid expansion of Hong Kong's expressway network has increased the need for field training on expressways. However, in view of the practical difficulties to include expressways as part of training and testing requirements, the Government should explore the feasibility of expanding the existing 'probationary driving licence' arrangement for motorcyclists to cover new private car and light goods vehicle drivers. The proposed arrangement would allow new drivers to obtain on-the-road practical experience, including expressway driving experience, during the 'probationary' period before being issued with a full driving licence. (*paragraph 5.30*)

### Quality Driving Instructor Course

12.11 There is a need to upgrade the skill level of driving instructors to match enhanced road safety measures in Hong Kong. TD should explore the feasibility of introducing a 'Quality Driving Instructor Course' to ensure that driving instructors have the proper knowledge and teaching skills to pass on good driving practices to their students. Recognition should also be given to driving instructors who have completed the course. (*paragraph 5.33*)



## LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT

12.12 Comprehensive legislation and effective enforcement are essential to combat undesirable driving behaviour. The Panel has reviewed road safety related legislation and enforcement measures to identify areas for further improvement.

### Legislation

12.13 The Government has kept road safety related legislation under constant review. Legislative amendments concerning the imposition of fixed penalties for some common traffic offences and the creation of a new offence against tailgating are under deliberation. The Government should expedite preparations for these legislative changes. (*paragraphs 6.16 and 6.17*)

### Enforcement

12.14 Members consider that public education should be supplemented by enforcement as a deterrent. To maximise the impact on road users, HKPF should continue to devise enforcement programmes in tandem with the publicity plan mounted by the RSC. (*paragraph 6.23*)

12.15 The Speed Enforcement Camera (SEC) system is a proven effective tool to deter speeding and enhance road safety. Installation works for 75 locations for SECs are now underway. TD should work closely with HKPF, the Highways Department (HyD) and other relevant parties to put the SECs into operation by early 2004. Apart from the 75 locations on the existing road network, feasibility study should be conducted for expanding the SEC coverage to new strategic road network (SRN) routes, existing SRN routes which do not have such systems, as well as other routes with speeding problems. (*paragraphs 6.25 and 6.26*)

12.16 After the SECs have been put into operation, HKPF should deploy more resources for mobile enforcement and patrolling to monitor other undesirable driving behaviour that cannot be captured by SEC, e.g. abrupt lane changing and tailgating. (*paragraph 6.27*)

12.17 HKPF should continue to make good use of advanced technology and acquire additional equipment to facilitate traffic enforcement. (*paragraph 6.29*)

## TRAFFIC ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT

12.18 The Panel has examined in depth issues concerning traffic engineering and management that define the road environment and shape the behaviour of road users. As the July incident occurred on an expressway section of the Tuen Mun Road, Members have focused more on the design and traffic management issues concerning high speed roads.

### Highway design

12.19 After examining local and international design standards, the Panel concludes that local standards are in line with international practices while taking into consideration topographical constraints in Hong Kong. Members point out that there is a need to differentiate between safety and comfort requirements in highway design standards. (*paragraph 7.2*)

### Speed management

12.20 TD should continue to conduct regular reviews of speed limits and, if necessary, adjust the speed limits to optimise traffic flow without compromising road safety. (*paragraph 7.19*)

### Recent development of traffic signs and road markings in Hong Kong

12.21 The Panel fully endorses the recommendations made in the 'Comprehensive Review of Directional Signing in Hong Kong' commissioned by TD in 2001 to improve the signing strategy and the provision, format and mounting of signs in Hong Kong. Rationalisation of the route numbering system and introduction

of exit numbers on the SRN is already underway and will be completed in early 2004. Other recommendations will be assessed in a pilot scheme being planned for Sha Tin. TD should work closely with HyD for an early completion of the pilot scheme. Subsequent evaluation should be expedited, so that an implementation programme can be drawn up for the rest of the road network as soon as possible. (*paragraphs 7.46 and 7.47*)

12.22 TD should formulate a publicity programme to brief motorists whenever there are changes in signing standards to avoid creating any confusion. (*paragraph 7.48*)

### Safety measures for franchised buses

12.23 The safety records and performance of franchised bus operators have been closely monitored by TD. In order to enhance the safety of franchised buses, TD should continue to implement the following improvement measures –

- ❑ conduct careful route planning;
- ❑ remove old vehicles from the fleet;
- ❑ issue guidelines on working conditions of bus drivers;
- ❑ identify and study bus accidents and map out improvement measures to enhance bus safety;
- ❑ closely monitor the trend of bus accident rates of different franchised bus companies and take actions, such as urging bus companies to carry out a comprehensive review of their existing safety arrangements, to ensure these trends are improved; and
- ❑ promote bus passenger safety and safe driving through different publicity means such as Announcements of Public Interest (API) on TV and radio. (*paragraphs 7.62, 7.64, 7.69 and 7.72*)

### Continuous safety enhancement

12.24 The Government should expedite the implementation of improvement measures arising from systematic reviews such as the ‘Comprehensive Review of

Directional Signing in Hong Kong' and keep track of best practices adopted in overseas countries. (*paragraph 7.76*)

12.25 The Government should keep a close watch on the safety record of specific types of vehicles and take proactive steps to enhance their safety standards with participation of the relevant transport trades. (*paragraph 7.77*)

## VEHICLE CONTROL

12.26 Technological advances have made motor vehicles much safer than before. But regardless of improved vehicle safety, the manner in which they are used and maintained has a major bearing on road safety. The increase in the number of accidents involving public buses and public light buses warrants special attention. Control over their speed and maintenance is important.

### Speed control

12.27 As a trial scheme, speed display units (SDUs) have been installed in 243 green minibuses running overnight routes. TD should, subject to evaluation of effectiveness, extend the use of SDUs to all other public light buses. (*paragraph 8.6*)

12.28 There are merits in installing speed limiters in passenger services vehicles to enhance safety. Although many new franchised buses have installed electronic engine management systems with speed limiting functions, the Government should consider formally requiring all newly-registered franchised buses to be installed with speed limiters. Consideration should also be given to require other heavy vehicles to be installed with speed limiters, subject to consultation with the transport trades. (*paragraphs 8.11 and 8.12*)

12.29 Tachographs (vehicle blackboxes) are useful devices that can perform accident investigation and fleet management functions. TD should explore with franchised bus companies the fitting of such devices and, subject to evaluation of effectiveness, extend their use to other passenger services vehicles. (*paragraph 8.17*)

### Vehicle examination

12.30 Roadside enforcement is an effective measure to ensure that vehicle owners and drivers maintain their vehicles in a roadworthy condition. Apart from the existing vehicle examination centres, temporary or permanent check sites for roadside enforcement should be established, preferably close to major trunk roads or expressways. Joint roadside spot checks on heavy vehicles by HKPF and TD should also be stepped up. (*paragraphs 8.27 and 8.28*)

12.31 Under existing regulations, the stability test (tilt test) only applies to buses and light buses. TD should explore the feasibility of extending the stability tests to heavy goods vehicles. (*paragraph 8.35*)

### VEHICULAR PARAPET DESIGN

12.32 Parapets are protective devices designed to reduce the severity of an accident when a vehicle leaves the roadway. They are a passive line of defence, and do not contribute to the cause of an accident.

#### Parapet development in Hong Kong

12.33 Field tests and computer simulations have demonstrated that the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation P1 parapet is superior to its 1<sup>st</sup> generation design. HyD should expedite and prioritise the replacement of all 1<sup>st</sup> generation P1 parapets in Hong Kong, taking into account other recommendations in the report. (*paragraph 9.37*)

12.34 Because of limited knowledge worldwide about parapet behaviour during a bus impact, HyD should expedite the computer simulations commissioned during the period of this review to establish the ultimate capacity of all P1 vehicular parapets relating to an impact by a double-decked bus. In view of the particular situation in Hong

Kong where double-decked buses are used on almost every part of the road network, when new parapet designs are developed, double-decked buses should be included as one type of heavy vehicle for design consideration. (*paragraph 9.39*)

### International standards

12.35 For historical reasons, HyD has been using the British Standard BS6779 as the basis for developing local standards for parapet design. However, BS6779 will gradually be replaced by the more sophisticated European Standard EN1317 now being developed. HyD should follow closely the development of the European Standard and other relevant international standards, and align the Structures Design Manual with the new internationally recognised standards in phases. (*paragraph 9.57*)

### Development of new designs

12.36 HyD should expand the range of containment levels, in particular at the high end, with regard to the extensive use of double-decked buses in Hong Kong, and the maximum legislated vehicle weight permitted on the road system. HyD should continue to monitor the development of multiple containment parapets in the international scene, and develop workable parapet designs for the Hong Kong situation. (*paragraph 9.62*)

### Parapet height

12.37 Computer simulations commissioned during the period of this review on existing P1 parapet designs showed that a 1.1 m parapet would be adequate to prevent a double-decked bus from rolling over if the impact angle was small. HyD should generate more simulation results involving other impact scenarios to fully evaluate the adequacy of the standard height (1.1 m) adopted for the P1 parapets. (*paragraph 9.71*)

### Selection criteria

12.38 In anticipation of an expanded parapet hierarchy and the possibility of more height variations, HyD should give detailed guidelines and analysis procedures on the choice of containment level and parapet height, with particular attention to the congested environment in Hong Kong and the unique situation of a large fleet of double-decked buses using the road network. (*paragraph 9.75*)

### Materials and workmanship

12.39 To ensure a good workmanship control on vehicular parapets, HyD should revise the General Specification for Civil Engineering Works to include suitable testing requirements for fabricating the steel components used in vehicular parapets. (*paragraph 9.82*)

### New materials and research opportunities

12.40 Apart from following international developments, HyD should carry out research work on parapet design in collaboration with local tertiary institutions. (*paragraph 9.86*)

### In-service evaluation

12.41 Crash tests cannot duplicate every roadside condition or vehicle impact situation, hence, HyD should carry out in-service evaluation of the parapet designs on the basis of the damage information collected after traffic accidents so that various types of parapet design can be refined and improved on an on-going basis. (*paragraph 9.89*)

### High priority locations for improvement

12.42 The Panel and HyD have jointly identified a preliminary list of locations with similar characteristics as the site of the Tuen Mun Road incident. Although none of the

locations is an accident blacksite, HyD and TD should immediately conduct a detailed study to formulate a package of road safety enhancement measures for the road sections, where penetration of the vehicular parapet may result in catastrophic consequence, as identified during the preparation of this report. (*paragraph 9.98*)

### TUEN MUN ROAD

12.43 The Panel has assessed the safety performance of Tuen Mun Road from a traffic engineering and management point of view, and concludes that Tuen Mun Road is intrinsically safe. The Panel has also carefully considered suggestions from the public on measures to enhance the safety of the road.

12.44 In view of the fact that traffic accidents along Tuen Mun Road are mainly driver related, and that speeding is one of the common problems, TD and HKPF should expedite the necessary preparatory work for the SEC system on Tuen Mun Road, so that it can be fully operational as soon as possible. Once the SEC system is operating, HKPF should deploy more resources to patrolling, with particular emphasis on tailgating and careless lane changing. (*paragraph 10.14*)

12.45 Although there is no intrinsic design deficiency at the site of the Tuen Mun Road incident, the Panel considers it prudent to work closely with TD to draw up a package of enhancement measures as detailed below, taking into account public views and the recommendations made in recent studies on traffic signs and road markings –

- ❑ install a new advance information sign (AIS) 1 200 m before the final advance direction sign. The sign provides additional information to motorists of the approaching exit 1 200 m ahead (*already implemented*);
- ❑ convert a 100 m section of lane line markings to warning line markings before the start of the diverging point to enhance awareness that a diverging point is approaching;
- ❑ widen the edge line marking from 200 mm to 300 mm at the diverging point to enhance definition at that spot;



- ❑ align the advance direction sign (ADS) immediately over the inside lane to further alert motorists to keep left for the exit ahead to Yuen Long and Lok Ma Chau;
- ❑ install a 'Get In Lane' sign between the AIS and the ADS to provide additional warning to motorists to change lanes where necessary; and
- ❑ install a crash cushion at the nosing between the main road and the slip road as a safety precaution. (*paragraph 10.30*)

12.46 HyD should review and upgrade the containment level of the parapet, where necessary, at identified locations with characteristics similar to those of the incident site. Other enhancement measures, including the provision of additional traffic signs and road markings, should be considered as a total package. (*paragraph 10.39*)

12.47 Tuen Mun Road has already been in service for more than 20 years. Over the years, a number of major improvement works have been carried out in accordance with prevailing design standards and guidelines. Standards and guidelines are evolving and have been subject to constant review and enhancement. TD should conduct a comprehensive road safety review of Tuen Mun Road, particularly from the drivers' perspective, to identify any possible safety enhancement measures. Improvement schemes that can be completed in the immediate term should be drawn up as interim enhancement, while structural improvements will be covered by the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project. (*paragraph 10.41*)

12.48 The public is keen to see an early completion of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project. HyD has advanced the work on the project by six months to mid-2005 for completion in phases between mid-2009 and mid-2011. As requested by the Panel, TD has devised preliminary proposals to implement lane closures during daytime off-peak hours. HyD should review the construction programme with a view to further shortening the construction period. (*paragraph 10.45*)

12.49 In view of the July incident, the opportunity should be taken to conduct a comprehensive review of the alignment design of the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction and improvement project to identify areas for further improvement to bring the entire length of Tuen Mun Road up to current expressway standards. (*paragraph 10.46*)

# Acknowledgements

The Panel would like to express its gratitude to all those who have contributed to this Report. They include professional bodies, tertiary institutions, transport trade associations and other organisations that have rendered their valuable suggestions, and members of the public who have shared their views in written submissions and through other channels. The Panel is particularly indebted to Professor Richard Allsop for his expert advice on traffic safety and management issues.

The Panel is grateful to the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, the Highways Department, the Hong Kong Police Force and the Transport Department for providing detailed information on various road safety issues and conducting extensive and timely researches into different subjects of interest. We would also like to thank the Official Languages Division of the Civil Service Bureau for their Chinese translation service, the Efficiency Unit for their assistance in page and layout design, and the Information Services Department for the cover design.

The Panel wishes to record its appreciation to Ir Wai Chi-sing, the Secretary to the Panel, for his efficient and dedicated support to the Panel, and to other staff of the Secretariat for their assistance.

## Appendix I – Biographical Notes on Members

### CHAIRMAN

#### **Dr Cheng Hon-kwan, GBS, JP**

Dr Cheng Hon-kwan is a civil and structural engineer by profession with over 50 years of experience in the field. Dr Cheng is a Past President and Honorary Fellow of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers and was awarded the Gold Medal by the Institution of Structural Engineers (UK) in 2002 in recognition of his contribution and achievement in the structural engineering field. Dr Cheng is currently the Chairman of the Transport Advisory Committee and is fully conversant with road safety legislation and the local transport scene. Dr Cheng has extensive experience in public services and has taken up the chairmanship of many advisory boards and committees.

### MEMBERS

#### **Ir Edmund Leung Kwong-ho, JP**

Ir Edmund Leung is a mechanical engineer by profession with over 35 years of experience. Ir Leung has been involved in many major highway design projects and has considerable experience in motor vehicles. Ir Leung is a Past President of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers and the Past Chairman of the Hong Kong Branch of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (UK). Ir Leung is active in public services, which cover areas of engineering, environment and education.

#### **Dr Wong Sze-chun**

Dr Wong Sze-chun is an Associate Professor in the Department of Civil Engineering of the University of Hong Kong. Dr Wong specialises in transportation and traffic engineering and is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in Hong Kong and the Vice President and Founding Member of the Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies. He is also on the Editorial Advisory Board of a number of transportation and urban planning journals.

## Appendix II – Public Consultation

### INVITATION FOR WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

#### (1) Professional Bodies

- £ Construction Industry Training Authority
- £ Hong Kong Institution of Engineers
- £ Hong Kong Institution of Highways & Transportation
- £ The Association of Consulting Engineers of Hong Kong
- £ The Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport in Hong Kong
- £ The Hong Kong Construction Association
- £ The Institute of Highways & Transportation (UK) – Hong Kong Branch
- £ The American Society of Civil Engineers – Hong Kong Section
- £ Hong Kong Academy of Engineering Sciences
- £ Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies
- £ Institution of Civil Engineers (UK) Hong Kong Association
- £ Joint Structural Division of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers and the Institution of Structural Engineers (UK)

#### (2) Academic Institutions

- £ City University of Hong Kong – Department of Building and Construction
- £ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
  - › Department of Civil Engineering
  - › Department of Mechanical Engineering

- £ University of Hong Kong
  - › Department of Civil Engineering
  - › Department of Mechanical Engineering
  - › Institute of Transport Studies
- £ Hong Kong Polytechnic University
  - › Department of Civil and Structural Engineering
  - › Department of Mechanical Engineering

### (3) Transport Trade

#### ***Franchised Bus Companies***

- £ Citybus Limited
- £ Long Win Bus Co. Ltd
- £ New Lantao Bus Co. (1973) Ltd
- £ New World First Bus Services Ltd
- £ The Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Ltd

#### ***Driving Instructors Associations***

- £ Articulated & Commercial Vehicle's Instructors Union
- £ Driving Instructors Association
- £ Driving Instructors Merchant Association Limited
- £ Hong Kong Commercial Vehicle Driving Instructors Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Driving Instruction Club Limited
- £ Hong Kong & Kowloon Goods Vehicle Omnibuses and Minibuses Instructors' Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Motor Car Driving Instructors Association Limited

- £ Hong Kong Society of Articulated Vehicle Driving Instructors Ltd
- £ Kowloon Motor Driving Instructor's Association Limited
- £ Motor Transport Workers' General Union (Driving Instructors' Party)
- £ Public & Private Commercial Driving Instructors' Society

#### ***Designated Driving Schools***

- £ Hong Kong School of Motoring Ltd (Wong Chuk Hang)
- £ Hong Kong School of Motoring Ltd (Shatin)
- £ Hong Kong School of Motoring Ltd (Yuen Long)
- £ Tsuen Wan Driving School

#### ***Designated Driving Improvement Schools***

- £ The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Union Occupational Retraining Centre Ltd (Hong Kong Island)
- £ Hong Kong School of Motoring Ltd (Kowloon West)
- £ Hong Kong Driving Improvement School Ltd (Kowloon East)
- £ Hong Kong Driving Improvement School Ltd (NT)

#### ***Transport Trade Associations***

- £ Institute of Advanced Motorists Hong Kong
- £ Hong Kong Automobile Association
- £ Hong Kong Logistics Association
- £ Hong Kong Road Safety Association

Other transport trade associations invited to attend the consultation sessions have also been invited to submit their views in writing.

#### **(4) Other Organisations**

- £ Road Safety Council

## INVITATION TO CONSULTATION SESSIONS

### (1) Taxis

#### *Urban Taxi Associations*

- £ Chuen Lee Radio Taxis Association Ltd
- £ CTOD Association Company Limited
- £ Fraternity Taxi Owners Association
- £ Happy Taxi Operator's Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong & Kowloon Radio Car Owners Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong and Kowloon Rich Radio Car Service Centre Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Kowloon Taxi & Lorry Owners Association Ltd \*
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union
- £ Pak Kai Taxi Owners Association Ltd
- £ Quadripartite Taxi Service Association Ltd
- £ Rambo Taxi Owners' Association Ltd
- £ Rights of Taxi Owners & Drivers Association Ltd \*
- £ Royal Best Quality Taxi Association Ltd
- £ Tai Wo Motors Ltd
- £ Taxi Drivers & Operators Association Ltd
- £ Taxicom Vehicle Owners Association Ltd
- £ The Hong Kong Taxi and Public Light Bus Association Ltd
- £ The Kowloon Taxi Owners Association Ltd \*
- £ The Taxi Operators Association Ltd \*
- £ Traffic Services Employees Association
- £ United Friendship Taxi Owners & Drivers Association Ltd \*
- £ Urban Taxi Drivers Association Joint Committee Co. Ltd

- £ Wai Fat Taxi Owners Association Ltd
- £ Wai Yik Hong Kong & Kowloon & NT Taxi Owners Association
- £ Wing Lee Radio Car Traders Association Ltd
- £ Wing Tai Car Owners & Drivers Association Ltd

***NT Taxi Associations***

- £ Hong Kong Tele-call Taxi Association
- £ North District Taxi Merchants Association
- £ NT Taxi Merchants Association Ltd \*
- £ NT Taxi Owners & Drivers Fraternal Association
- £ NT Taxi-call Service Centre
- £ Public Vehicle Merchants Fraternity Association
- £ Sai Kung Taxi Operators Association Ltd
- £ Sun Hing Taxi Radio Association
- £ Tang's Taxi Companies Association Ltd
- £ Taxi Dealers & Owners Association Ltd \*
- £ The Association of NT Radio Taxicabs Ltd
- £ The Fraternity Association of NT Taxi Merchants

***Lantau Taxi Association***

- £ Lantau Taxi Association

**(2) Public Light Buses**

- £ G.M.B. Maxicab Operators General Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Kowloon & NT Public & Maxicab Light Bus Merchants' United Association
- £ Hong Kong Public Light Bus Owner & Driver Association
- £ Hon Wah Public Light Bus Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Public & Maxicab Light Bus United Association



- £ Kowloon Fung Wong Public Light Bus Merchants & Workers' Association Ltd
- £ Lam Tin Wai Hoi Public Light Bus Association
- £ Lei Yue Mun Ko Chiu Road Public Light Bus Merchants Association Ltd
- £ Lung Cheung Public Light Bus Welfare Advancement Association Ltd
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union (Public Light Bus Branch)
- £ NT PLB Owners Association
- £ NT San Tin PLB (17) Owners Association
- £ PLB General Association \*
- £ Sai Kung PLB Drivers and Owners Association
- £ The Kowloon PLB Chiu Chow Traders & Workers Friendly Association
- £ Tsuen Wan PLB Commercial Association Ltd
- £ Tuen Mun PLB Association
- £ Yuen Long Tai Po PLB Merchants Association Ltd
- £ Hong Kong Scheduled (GMB) Licensee Association \*

**(3) Light Goods Vehicles**

- £ Organisation of Hong Kong Drivers
- £ The Hong Kong Union of Light Van Employees
- £ Transport and Delivery Workers Union

**(4) Heavy Vehicles Other Than Buses**

- £ Container Transportation Employee General Union \*
- £ Container Truck Drivers Union
- £ Federation of Hong Kong Industries

- £ Hong Kong Container Drayage Services Association Ltd \*
- £ Hong Kong Container Tractor Owner Association Ltd \*
- £ Hong Kong Dumper Truck Drivers Association \*
- £ Hong Kong Transportation Association Ltd \*
- £ Ken On Concrete Co. Ltd Lorry Owner-Drivers Association
- £ Kowloon Truck Merchants Association Ltd
- £ Lok Ma Chau China - Hong Kong Freight Association \*
- £ Mixer Truck Drivers' Association
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union
- £ Pioneer Concrete Owners Drivers Association
- £ The Concrete Producers Association of Hong Kong Ltd
- £ The Goods Vehicle Fleet Owners Association Ltd

## **(5) Buses**

### ***Franchised Bus Drivers Unions***

- £ Citybus Limited Employees Union
- £ KMB Workers General Union \*
- £ Kowloon Motor Bus Staff Union L.W.B. Branch \*
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union City Bus Branch
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union New World Bus Branch \*
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union, KMB Branch
- £ Motor Transport Workers General Union, L.W.B. Branch
- £ New World First Bus Company Staff Union

***Non-franchised Bus Associations***

- £ Hong Kong Guangdong Boundary Crossing Bus Association
- £ New Hong Kong Bus Company Limited
- £ Private Hire Car for Young Children Association Ltd
- £ Public Omnibus Operators Association Ltd \*
- £ School Buses Operators Association Ltd
- £ School Children Vehicle Section, Motor Transport Workers General Union

\* denotes associations which have sent representatives to attend the consultation sessions on 19 September 2003.

## Appendix III – Summary of Public Views

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
<b>(1) Driving Behaviour</b>	
£ Improve training by –	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› requiring drivers who have accumulated 12 Driving Offence Points to attend a mandatory refresher course;</li> </ul>	5.23, 5.24
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› imposing mandatory driving courses for drivers of high-risk vehicles, e.g. passenger services and commercial vehicles;</li> </ul>	5.23 - 5.28
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› requiring learners to attend improvement/ advanced driving courses including driving on expressways;</li> </ul>	5.30
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› upgrading the training of vehicle drivers including drivers of buses and heavy vehicles;</li> </ul>	5.25 - 5.28
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› reviewing the driving training/test requirements to include elements of driving attitude; and</li> </ul>	5.21 - 5.30
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› upgrading the training/standard of driving instructors.</li> </ul>	5.33
£ Step up public education by –	5.6 - 5.20
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› launching education and publicity campaigns to improve driving behaviour and general attitude of road users;</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› promoting good driving practices; and</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› reviewing traffic accident blackspots and educate drivers.</li> </ul>	
£ There is a suggestion that most traffic accidents are related to inappropriate driving behaviours, which are common along Tuen Mun Road; and	5.1 - 5.3, 10.11, 10.12

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
£ Other suggested adopting the driving practices in Australia where drivers are required to give way to buses.	Figure 5.1 (E)(iv)
<b>(2) Enforcement/Sanction</b>	
£ Require passengers of all public transport vehicles to wear seat belts; and ban passengers from standing.	6.6
£ Impose higher sanction for traffic offences (e.g. increase fine by 250%; and deduct 5 points for every breach up to 15 points and thereafter temporary or permanent suspension of the driving license for further breach).	6.15, 6.18
£ Step up enforcement action against traffic offences, such as driving at inappropriate speed, tailgating, drink driving, abrupt lane changing, abuse the use of fast lane, careless and dangerous driving, overloading, poor maintenance and wrong tyre pressure.	6.22, 6.23
£ Strengthen enforcement and sanction by installing more speed enforcement cameras; increasing frequency of patrolling; using dummy police vehicles where necessary.	6.25 - 6.27 Note 1
£ Reduce the number of police officers deployed to enforcement against speeding, and deploy more manpower to patrolling, particularly for Tuen Mun Road.	6.27, 10.14
£ Make full use of new technologies, e.g. automatic speed checking equipment, in-vehicle video, and aerial surveillance etc.	6.29

Note 1 The Panel does not recommend the use of dummy police vehicles due to space constraints.

## SUGGESTIONS

## RESPONSES

(relevant  
para. no.)

- |   |  |        |
|---|--|--------|
| £ | Adopting a “third party reporting” system as in New Zealand to encourage the public to report undesirable driving behaviour via electronic means or a specific form. | 6.30   |
| £ | Installation of the traffic control and surveillance system.   | Note 2 |

### (3) Traffic Engineering and Management

#### *Highway Design Standards*

- |   |   |              |
|---|---|--------------|
| £ | Enhance existing highway design standard including extending the length of merging lanes, improving superelevation for downhill bends.  | 7.8 - 7.14   |
| £ | Upgrade Tuen Mun Road to current highway design standards by – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› improving the road alignment, removing sharp bends;</li> <li>› using bridges and tunnels to achieve a straight alignment and if necessary converting three-lanes to two-lanes to overcome spatial constraints; and</li> <li>› improving the layout of exit and slip roads to avoid the need for special manoeuvre.</li> </ul> | 10.41, 10.46 |

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Note 2 Traffic Control and Surveillance (TCS) facilities, in the form of variable message signs, lane control signals, closed circuit television (CCTV), variable speed limit signs, speed enforcement cameras and incident detectors are installed in all tunnel areas and the Tsing Ma Control Area.

The Panel notes that for expressways under construction or being improved, namely Shenzhen Western Corridor, Deep Bay Link, Yuen Long Highway and Route 8 between Tsing Yi and Sha Tin, TCS facilities will also be provided. This may be provided in other future new highways, and retrofitted to existing highways where possible.

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
<p>£ Improve the cross-section of Tuen Mun Road by upgrading the carriageway lane to the standard width of 3.65 m, and provision of –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› hard shoulder with adequate width;</li> <li>› buffer area and more lay-bys; and</li> <li>› a 3.65 m wide emergency lane and an extra-lane for slow traffic.</li> </ul>	10.41, 10.46
<p>£ Reviewing current traffic condition of Tuen Mun Road and incorporating the finding in the road upgrading works.</p>	10.46
<p>£ Road surface materials should be appropriate for the types of travelling vehicles.</p>	Note 3
<b><i>Traffic Signing</i></b>	
<p>£ Review the standards of traffic signs with a view to improving their visibility, positioning, size, content, and incorporating overseas practices/standards from USA, Korea and Europe.</p>	7.42 - 7.48
<p>£ Erect more directional and traffic signs (or provide a screen) to give early warning to motorists.</p>	7.45 - 7.48
<p>£ Implement findings of TD's study on signage conducted a few years ago.</p>	7.42 - 7.48
<p>£ Provide a countdown facility for vehicular signal, e.g. by indicating the time for changing colour or by flashing the green light before it changes to amber.</p>	7.34

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Note 3 The use of appropriate road surfacing materials is always part of road design considerations.

## SUGGESTIONS

## RESPONSES

(relevant  
para. no.)

- |   |  |        |
|---|--|--------|
| £ | Install remote control speed limit signs to facilitate adjusting the speed limits in response to sudden changes in traffic flow due to a traffic accident. | Note 4 |
| £ | Erect warning signs at locations of substandard road sections prior to undertaking the road upgrading works.   | Note 5 |
| £ | Road bends should be colour-coded according to their risk level.   | Note 6 |

### Road Markings

- |   |   |            |
|---|---|------------|
| £ | Use double white lines to restrict lane changing and over-taking at high-risk locations, and at diverging points to stop last-minute attempt to change lanes. | 7.38, 7.39 |
| £ | Use of double white lines for roads with speed limit of 70 km/h and for three-lane carriageways (mainly expressways).   | 7.40       |
| £ | Use road markings to give more information e.g. paint traffic signs on the road.  | 7.41       |

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Note 4 This is also called Variable Speed Limit Signs (VSLS). Such have been installed in the Tsing Ma Control Area and in the tunnels completed in the late 90s and are being retrofitted in some older tunnels. For some expressways under construction, namely Shenzhen Western Corridor and Route 8 between Tsing Yi and Sha Tin, VSLS will be provided. TD will consider the same for existing busy highways as part of TCS facilities.

Note 5 Rather than erecting warning signs to identify substandard road sections, the Panel considers it more appropriate, and is indeed the current practice of TD, to erect signs to warn drivers about the actual hazards such as sharp bends, the need to reduce speed etc.

Note 6 A sign about the direction of the bend, if it is a double bend, the need to reduce speed, etc. is more useful to drivers than information about risk level. There is no objective measure of risk level of road bends.



SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
£ Wider use of “cat-eye” stones for road markings; and use “textured” lanes to differentiate emergency lane from traffic lanes.	Note 7
<b><i>Use Restriction</i></b>	
£ Remove “keep left” restriction on all expressways, but other suggested imposing “keep left” restriction on all roads with two or more lanes.	7.49, 7.50
£ Buses and heavy vehicles to use middle lane only.	7.51
£ Prohibit buses/heavy vehicles in occupying the middle lane for too long except for overtaking; container trucks should use slow lane only.	7.57
£ Heavy goods vehicles should be prohibited from overtaking.	7.51, 7.57
£ Ban red minibus from using the Castle Peak Road.	Note 8
£ Restrict heavy vehicles from using certain roads during certain time and under conditions (e.g. use middle lane under bad weather conditions).	7.60
£ Use single-decked buses (in lieu of double-decked buses) for Tuen Mun Road and other elevated expressways at hilly locations.	7.62, 7.63
£ Prohibit lane changing at the accident spot at Tuen Mun Road by using double white lines.	10.36

Note 7 Current design guidelines for expressways and trunk roads require the provision of cat-eye stones. Lighting level in most urban environment renders cat-eye stones unnecessary. The Panel considers there is no need to use textured lanes to differentiate hard shoulders.

Note 8 Red minibuses are currently prohibited from using Tuen Mun Road, Route 3 and Tai Lam Tunnel. Banning them from using Castle Peak Road would cause them to make a long detour for reaching northwest New Territories, and reduce the choices for passengers along Castle Peak Road. The Panel considers this is not in the interest of passengers.

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
£ Restrict buses/heavy vehicles from using the slow lane of Tuen Mun Road.	10.32
£ Ban heavy vehicles (i.e. buses, container trucks and other heavy vehicles) from using Tuen Mun Road. One suggestion noted the adverse effects of banning buses from using the road.	10.33
£ Use ‘tunnel mode’ operation (i.e. prohibiting lane changing) throughout Tuen Mun Road.	10.36
£ Remove bus only lanes; and allow buses and coaches to use hardshoulders during rush hours.	Note 9

### Speed Management

£ Review current speed limits in Hong Kong.	7.18, 7.19
£ Improve speed management by –	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› lowering speed limits for expressways from 80 to 70 km/h;</li> </ul>	7.20
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› using a consistent speed limit throughout a road;</li> </ul>	7.18, 7.19
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› adopting different speed limits for heavy and light vehicles e.g. impose a lower speed limit for heavy vehicles on expressways especially along high risk roads;</li> </ul>	7.22
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› limiting the speed for passenger vehicles and good vehicles to 70 km/h;</li> </ul>	7.23, 7.24
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› imposing a speed limit of 50 km/h for buses and lorries (like Singapore) and install external speed display devices (e.g. an amber flashing light) on heavy vehicles along Tuen Mun Road;</li> </ul>	8.8, 10.18

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Note 9 Allow buses or coaches to use hard shoulders would jeopardize their function and would obstruct the passage of emergency vehicles.

**SUGGESTIONS****RESPONSES**(relevant  
para. no.)

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› adopt different speed limits for different lanes on expressways as in Mainland; and</li> <li>› lower the speed limit especially for buses/coaches under strong wind condition whilst one suggested increasing it to 90 km/h.</li> </ul>                                | <p>7.21</p> <p>7.25</p>                               |
| £ | Tighten the speed control of Tuen Mun Road by –   |   |
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› lowering the speed limit for the western stretch to 60 km/h;</li> <li>› imposing a speed limit of 50 km/h for heavy vehicles along the whole length of the road; and</li> <li>› limit the speed to 30 km/h for the Sham Tseng section at the incident spot.</li> </ul> | <p>10.16, 10.18</p> <p>10.18</p> <p>10.15 - 10.17</p> |

**Vehicle Control**

- |   |  |                  |
|---|--|------------------|
| £ | Install in-vehicle speed display devices for passenger service vehicles and heavy vehicles to facilitate speed control.  | 8.6, 8.8         |
| £ | Enhance speed control by using new technologies e.g. in-vehicle black box, GPS-based speed adaptation system and speed limiters.   | 8.5 - 8.17       |
| £ | Impose more stringent vehicle examination including checks on the tyre conditions.   | 8.27, 8.32, 8.33 |
| £ | Review the stability design of buses taking into account loading weights due to passenger's preference to sit at the upper deck. To improve stability of buses, passengers should not be allowed to sit at the upper deck until the lower deck seats have been filled. | 8.34             |

## SUGGESTIONS

## RESPONSES

(relevant  
para. no.)

- £ Improve quality of mechanics for vehicle maintenance.

8.36

### (4) Parapet Design

- £ Carry out full-scale impact tests and computer simulation for parapet design; and conduct studies on the dynamic instability problem upon collision.

9.14, 9.16,  
9.39, 9.71

- £ Review the current design standard for parapets in Hong Kong, taking into account overseas practices e.g. US standards.

9.56, 9.57,  
9.62

- £ There is concern that P4 type parapets cannot stop a 38 tonne heavy goods vehicle traveling at 70 km/h.

9.62

- £ Provide more choices of parapet types and detailed guidelines in their selection.

9.62, 9.75

- £ Explore the use of new parapet materials and designs (e.g. magnetic parapets, parapets made of rubber tubes filled with rice husks and wood bran etc.).

9.84 - 9.86

- £ Enclose Tuen Mun Road with a steel net.

9.87

- £ Workmanship and quality control are important, especially at the welding joints between the parapet posts and the base plate; and parapets should be securely anchored.

9.80, 9.82

- £ Strengthen the design of parapets by –

9.12, 9.29

- › adopting 'composite' barrier design in which outer barrier can be used to protect light vehicles and the inner barrier for heavy vehicles;

9.61, 9.62

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› adding steel beams to strengthen the open space between railings; and</li> <li>› wider use of concrete barrier walls with additional railings on top to increase the containment level.</li> </ul>	
£ Increase the containment level of parapets by –	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› raising the parapet containment height to 2 m or above for double-decked buses; and</li> </ul>	9.69, 9.70
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› using P4 type (i.e. high containment parapets) instead of lower level type parapets at high risk locations.</li> </ul>	9.23, 9.74, 9.75
£ Review existing parapets at high risk locations for improvement (e.g. along bridges, elevated road structures and central barriers of highways) and conduct an regular inspection once every five years.	9.93 - 9.98
£ Use tensioned steel strand type parapets, or tensioned wire in conjunction with steel rails to reduce the direct impact force.	9.12, 9.30
£ Others	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› wider use of crash cushions at high risk locations; and</li> </ul>	Note 10
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› using hard materials for parapets may cause considerable injury and damage while high parapets may adversely affect sight-line.</li> </ul>	9.13

Note 10 The Panel notes crash cushions have been installed at high-risk locations. The Panel notes TD's undertaking to install such at other high-risk locations in future.

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
<b>(5) Miscellaneous</b>	
£ Examine the problem of fatigue driving and improve conditions of professional drivers by introduction of legislation to limit their working hours; and limit the working hours of bus drivers to 12 hours.	7.69
£ Conduct road safety audit for Tuen Mun Road, and establish a road safety audit system for Hong Kong (like Australia and Singapore).	10.41
£ Divert buses and heavy vehicles from Tuen Mun Road to Route 3 (by providing incentives to use this route) or to Castle Peak Road to relieve the traffic on Tuen Mun Road.	10.33
£ Build an elevated by-pass along Castle Peak Road (i.e. double-decking) to take buses running along Tuen Mun Road.	10.35
£ Improve the blackspot areas along Tuen Mun Road as soon as possible.	10.29, 10.41
£ Review the long-term transport needs of the northwest New Territories, and advance the Tuen Mun Road reconstruction project;	10.33, 10.44, 10.45
£ Explore the feasibility of prohibiting drivers aged 60 or above to drive heavy vehicles and requiring motorists to undergo mandatory medical checks.	11.2, 11.4
£ Assess the adverse effect of “infotainment” (i.e. in-vehicle TV) on bus drivers.	Note 11

Note 11 The only one speaker of 'Infotainment' on the lower deck of buses is separated from the driver and the volume is set to no more than 2 dBA above the ambient noise level. It should not distract the driver.

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
£ Impact of strong wind (e.g. Typhoon Signal 3 or above) on stability of buses should be examined.	7.25 Note 12
£ Review the parapet/railings and road safety of elevated road structures at the following locations – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Castle Peak Road;</li> <li>› Island Eastern Corridor;</li> <li>› Aldrich Bay Road (near Chun Fung Garden);</li> <li>› a flyover in Lam Tin; and</li> <li>› an elevated road at Sham Shui Po.</li> </ul>	11.5
£ Carry out more frequent road maintenance (e.g. ensure road surface and road markings are in good condition; remove obstruction to sightline; and apply anti-skid materials where required etc.).	11.6
£ Install noise barriers along Ching Cheung Road as part of the road widening (for the Route 9 Project) to minimise traffic noise.	11.9
£ Provide more toilets and resting places along Tuen Mun Road.	11.9
£ Improve communication with the transport trade and driver associations and extend membership of the Road Safety Council to trade associations.	11.7
£ Difficult to comply with the “2-second” rule during rush hours at Tuen Mun Road and Tolo Highway, especially under wet weather.	11.8

Note 12 The Panel notes that there is no evidence of accidents involving buses overturning due to strong wind. Most bus services would be suspended after typhoon signal No. 8 is in force. All franchised bus operators have issued guidelines to their drivers about operation in strong wind, which include driving at a slower speed.

SUGGESTIONS	RESPONSES (relevant para. no.)
£ Examine the freight route of containers in order to find ways to ease the traffic congestion problem due to container trucks, e.g. identify alternative freight routes, restrict the container trucks from travelling during rush hours etc.	11.9
£ Rectify inappropriate use of land at So Kwun Wat where agricultural land is used for storage, in order to reduce the number of container trucks using Castle Peak Road.	11.9
£ Provide better paramedic and road-side ambulance services as well as trauma units in hospitals for victims of serious road accidents.	11.9



## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **Measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation**

#### **PURPOSE**

This paper gives an account of the measures taken and being planned to ensure and enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

#### **BACKGROUND**

2. As at 30 September 2003, there were 6,221 franchised buses providing public bus services for the carriage of around 4 million passengers daily. Transport Department (“TD”) monitors the operation of franchised bus services in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“PBSO”) (Cap. 230) and the Road Traffic Ordinance (“RTO”) (Cap. 374) and their Regulations. The franchised bus operators are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify, and TD’s examiners are empowered to inspect the buses and maintenance facilities at any reasonable time. While buses should observe the general speed limit designated on roads, the maximum speed of a bus is restricted under the RTO to 70 km/h on roads with a posted speed limit over 70km/h.

#### **EXISTING MEASURES**

3. The existing measures to ensure the safety of franchised bus operation were developed over the years and implemented stringently. They include:

##### Bus vehicles

- (a) Every new model of franchised buses has to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements stipulated in the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) before they can be registered and licensed for use on the road. The aforesaid Regulations require that every vehicle including all body work and

fitting shall be: (i) soundly and properly constructed of suitable materials; (ii) in good and serviceable condition; and (iii) of such design and method of construction as to be capable of withstanding the loads and stresses likely to be encountered in operation.

- (b) Moreover, all franchised buses must also undergo an additional tilt test to ensure stability. The stability of a double-deck bus is checked by loading weights in relative positions to represent the driver and a full complement of passengers on the upper deck. If the surface on which the vehicle stands is tilted to either side at an angle of 28 degrees (35 degrees for single-decker) and the bus does not overturn, then it will be considered as having passed the test.
- (c) The franchised bus operators implement monthly maintenance and inspection programmes. TD closely monitors such programmes and holds regular meetings with the operators to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, to formulate actions to enhance bus safety.
- (d) Every franchised bus has to undergo annual examinations to ensure its safety and roadworthiness, and a comprehensive examination would be conducted at specified intervals to check its structural integrity. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor the proper maintenance of the buses. Such checks normally cover about 2-6% of the total franchised bus fleet each year.
- (e) The franchised bus operators are encouraged to introduce new safety technology on their buses including speed limiters which can limit the speed of vehicles to a pre-set maximum level under certain operating conditions. More than 50% of the franchised buses were installed with speed limiters in the Engine Management System or add-on type speed limiters.

#### Bus drivers

- (f) Franchised bus operators provide various training programmes for their drivers. Basic trainings with different duration ranging from a few days to about 3 weeks are provided to new drivers. Unless a driver trainee has already obtained a public bus driving licence,

he/she must pass the driving tests set by TD upon completion of the training.

- (g) Refresher and enhancement courses are provided to in-service drivers from time to time. Safe driving is one of the essential themes of these training courses.
- (h) The franchised bus operators have issued instructions to their drivers reminding them of proper driving manner. New instructions are issued from time to time to alert drivers of specific areas requiring attention.
- (i) TD has issued guidelines to the franchised bus operators on drivers' working hours to ensure that their drivers are provided with reasonable rest time -
  - (i) bus drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes;
  - (ii) maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day;
  - (iii) driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day; and
  - (iv) break between successive working days should not be less than 8 hours.
- (j) The franchised bus operators require their drivers to undergo annual medical examination when they reach certain age, which varies from 50 to 60 depending on the operator's internal requirement.
- (k) TD organizes "Road Safety Forum for Franchised Bus" regularly with participation of all franchised bus operators and the Traffic Police. The forum focuses on, among other things, accident prevention measures for buses. TD, in collaboration with the Traffic Police, has organized 10 road safety seminars in the past two years

for franchised bus drivers to promote their road safety awareness and proper driving behaviour.

Passengers

- (l) Road safety campaigns and publicity arrangements are conducted from time to time. The production and launching of the Announcement of Public Interest on gripping of handrails jointly arranged by TD and the franchised bus operators was one of the examples.

Other road users

- (m) The Road Safety Council and its two sub-committees on research and publicity respectively continuously explore effective measures for enhancing road safety and promulgate among motorists and pedestrians the messages of road safety through the organization of publicity campaigns and dissemination of information via the media and publicity materials.
- (n) TD published the Road Users' Code for use by the public. The Code contains comprehensive guidelines for road users covering most road and traffic conditions.

4. Through the efforts of all parties concerned, franchised buses have relatively stable safety records. In the past four years, there is in general a downward trend of the number of accidents involving franchised buses per million km operated, and most of them are not serious accidents. Details are set out in

Annex

**Annex.**

**FURTHER MEASURES**

5. Nevertheless, a few serious accidents involving franchised buses occurred in the past few months. This has caused some concern about the safety of franchised bus operation. In view of the concern, TD has requested all franchised bus operators to conduct a thorough review and submit a detailed report to TD in January 2004 on their safety arrangements and areas where further enhancement to road and passenger safety could be made. The review covers the following areas:

- (a) vehicle examination;
- (b) means to prevent speeding and the possible use of other monitoring

- devices, and plans for installation of these devices;
- (c) bus driver training;
- (d) bus driver working schedule;
- (e) possible ways and incentives to promote bus safety; and
- (f) any other improvement measures of relevance to road and passenger safety.

6. The Administration would also take into account the recommendations to be announced by the Independent Expert Panel on the Tuen Mun Road Traffic Incident in examining the operators' review reports.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
November 2003

**Accidents Per Million Km Operated**

	1999			2000			2001			2002		
	Slight	Serious	Fatal	Slight	Serious	Fatal	Slight	Serious	Fatal	Slight	Serious	Fatal
KMB <sup>1</sup>	2.65	0.56	0.05	2.55	0.45	0.02	2.36	0.47	0.03	2.27	0.52	0.01
	3.25			3.03			2.85			2.8		
CTB(F1) <sup>2</sup>	4.47	0.83	0.03	4.55	0.88	0.05	4.57	0.91	0.02	4.06	0.99	0
	5.33			5.48			5.5			5.05		
CTB(F2) <sup>3</sup>	1.26	0.22	0	1.42	0.28	0	1.56	0.16	0.04	1.21	0.12	0.04
	1.49			1.7			1.76			1.37		
NWFB <sup>4</sup>	4.6	1.11	0.06	5.0	0.9	0.07	3.99	0.89	0.03	3.53	0.62	0.06
	5.77			5.97			4.91			4.21		
LW <sup>5</sup>	1.22	0.13	0	0.5	0.25	0	0.82	0.21	0	0.77	0.2	0.04
	1.35			0.75			1.03			1.01		
NLB <sup>6</sup>	0.78	0	0	0.41	0.41	0.2	0.41	0	0	0.97	0.58	0
	0.78			1.02			0.41			1.55		

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<sup>1</sup> KMB – Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

<sup>2</sup> CTB(F1) – Citybus Limited (Hong Kong Island and cross harbour bus routes)

<sup>3</sup> CTB(F2) – Citybus Limited (Airport and North Lantau bus routes)

<sup>4</sup> NWFB – New World First Bus Services Limited

<sup>5</sup> LW – Long Win Bus Company Limited

<sup>6</sup> NLB – New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport****Report on Franchised Bus Operators' Review of  
Arrangements to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation****PURPOSE**

Legislative Council (“LegCo”) Panel on Transport was last briefed in November 2003 (LC Paper No. CB(1)406/03-04(04)) on the measures to ensure the safety of franchised bus operation and that Transport Department (“TD”) had asked franchised bus companies to conduct a review on their safety arrangements and areas where further enhancement to road and passenger safety could be made. This paper informs Members of the major findings of the review and the recommended measures to further enhance bus safety.

**BACKGROUND**

2. TD asked the franchised bus operators in late October 2003 to conduct a review on their safety arrangements to enhance safety of franchised bus operation.

3. All the five franchised bus operators have submitted their review reports. The review covered the following areas:

- (a) analysis of correlation between bus accidents and drivers’ age, experience and working hours;
- (b) driver training;
- (c) driver working schedule;
- (d) installation of safety devices and measures to monitor driving behaviour;
- (e) vehicle examination; and
- (f) measures to promote safety awareness of drivers and passengers.

4. In considering the operators’ review reports, TD has taken into account the recommendations made by the Tuen Mun Road Traffic Incident Independent Expert Panel (“IEP”) and comments expressed by LegCo Members and Transport Advisory Committee members during earlier discussions on the subject.

## MAJOR FINDINGS

5. The franchised bus operators and TD have analyzed the bus accident records and have the following major observations:

- (a) franchised bus operation has a relatively stable safety record. In the past five years, there was in general a downward trend in the number of bus accidents per million km operated and most of them were slight accidents. Details are set out in Annex A;

Annex A

- (b) no direct correlation is identified statistically between bus accident rates and drivers' age, years of service and working hours as depicted at Annexes B, C and D respectively; and

Annexes  
B, C & D

- (c) driver factor contributed to about one-third of the bus accidents involving injuries in 2003. Passengers not holding handrails tight was also one of the major causes of personal injuries in bus accidents. The driver contributory factors of the accidents are set out in Annex E.

Annex E

## RECOMMENDED MEASURES

6. In the light of the above observations and as continuous efforts to provide better services, the bus companies have suggested additional measures with a view to further enhancing the safety of franchised bus operation. Details are given in the following paragraphs.

### Driver Age and Experience

7. At present, it is a mandatory requirement for all motorists aged 70 or above to undergo medical checks before they are allowed to renew their driving licences. As for the franchised bus companies, Citybus Limited (“CTB”), New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”) and New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited (“NLB”) require their drivers aged 50 or above to undergo annual medical examination while Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) and Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) do not have similar requirement. While the bus accident analyses do not indicate any direct correlation between accident rate and drivers’ age, KMB and LW have agreed to consult their unions on the



introduction of annual medical check for drivers aged 50 or above in line with the practice adopted by the other franchised bus companies.

8. Although analyses do not show any correlation between bus accident and drivers' experience, the operators would assign new bus drivers to serve in "simpler" routes in their first few months of appointment to help them to familiarize with franchised bus operation.

### **Bus Driver Training**

9. All franchised bus operators provide various training programmes for their drivers including:

- (a) **training course for new drivers** ranging from a few days to four weeks depending on the driving qualifications the trainees possess. A trainee driver must pass the driving tests set by TD before he/she is allowed to drive a bus for hire unless he/she has already obtained a public bus driving licence;
- (b) **one to two-day enhancement/refreshers training for incumbent drivers** to reinforce concepts of road safety awareness, driving skills and manners including defensive driving technique; and
- (c) **special/remedial training** for drivers who are found to have driving irregularities and those who have been away from driving duties for a relatively long period due to sickness or other reasons.

10. TD considers that driver training currently provided by the franchised bus operators is generally adequate and comprehensive. The franchised bus companies agreed to further enhance the training by sending drivers to attend the "Quality Driver Instructor Course" to be organized by TD. They also undertook to regularly review the content of the training courses in the light of changing traffic environment, passenger requirements and accident/operation records. In view of the increase in the number of accidents involving passengers falling within bus compartment in recent years, the operators have agreed to strengthen training on proper driving manner, e.g. not to apply the brake abruptly.

### **Bus Driver Working Schedule**

11. TD has introduced a set of voluntary guidelines on working schedule for bus drivers in early 1980's. The guidelines were last reviewed in March 2000 and are listed below:

- Guideline A      Bus drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes;
- Guideline B      Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day;
- Guideline C      Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day; and
- Guideline D      Break between successive working days should not be less than 8 hours.

#### Annex F

12. According to TD's recent research on overseas practices as set out in Annex F, the length of maximum duty of bus drivers ranges from 9 hours to 16 hours per day; the maximum driving duty from 7 to 13 hours per day; and the minimum rest period between working days from 8 to 12 hours. TD's current guidelines lie within the aforesaid ranges.

13. TD and the franchised bus operators have jointly reviewed the working hours of their drivers. It is found that:

- (a) all franchised bus operators except NWFB were able to fully comply with the guidelines; and
- (b) NWFB fully complied with Guidelines B and D while the rate of compliance with Guidelines A<sup>1</sup> and C<sup>2</sup> in the second half of 2003 were 94% and 88% respectively. NWFB will take action as explained in

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<sup>1</sup> The non-compliance with Guideline A was mainly due to the overnight shifts in which drivers usually had a rest after each trip, but not a break of 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty, since the maximum length of driving duty in overnight shifts was usually less than 7 hours.

<sup>2</sup> The non-compliance with Guideline C were relatively slight deviations from the requirement and the maximum driving duty in such cases were around 12 hours in a day.

paragraph 15(b) below.

14. TD has examined with the operators the possibility to shorten the maximum duty length and driving duty duration (i.e. Guidelines B and C) but all of them do not support the ideas because:

- (a) there is no observed correlation between bus accident rate and the length of drivers' duty hours;
- (b) the current requirements are in line with overseas practice;
- (c) at present, the average duty length of a bus driver is about 10 hours a day which is well below the maximum of 14 hours stipulated in the guideline; and
- (d) reducing the maximum driving hours allowed will reduce flexibility in bus scheduling and operation.

15. In view of the importance to prevent fatigue driving as expressed by the IEP and LegCo Members, franchised bus companies have agreed to the following changes:

- (a) all companies have increased the minimum break for drivers between successive working days from 8 hours to 9 hours (Guideline D); and
- (b) NWFB will ensure full compliance with Guidelines A and C by early 2005 through re-scheduling of driver duties and redeployment of drivers.

16. TD has asked the franchised bus companies to keep in view the need to modify the guidelines having regard to the local operating environment and overseas practices.

### **Installation of Safety Devices and Measures to Monitor Driving Behaviour**

#### ***Speed Limiter***

17. As at end 2003, over 95% of the franchised buses are installed with Engine Management System, Electro-mechanical Speed Limiter or Mechanical Governor to confine the maximum speed to 70 km/hr. The current position of each bus operator is summarized in Annex G.

18. Having regard to the recommendation of the IEP, all companies agreed to install speed limiters on all new buses when they are purchased. In addition, KMB will explore with its manufacturer to retrofit speed limiters on the existing 165 Mitsubishi single-deck buses which do not have speed limiting device.

### ***Blackbox***

19. A blackbox is an electronic tachograph that records information including the driving hour, vehicle speed, engine speed, brake application, door movement and vehicle tilt angle of a bus. The blackboxes are useful for accident investigation and fleet management. At present, about 1,300 buses of KMB, 40 buses of LW, 4 buses of CTB, 2 buses of NWFB and 10 buses of NLB are fitted with blackboxes.

20. All franchised bus companies agreed to the recommendation of the IEP to have blackboxes installed on all new buses to be purchased. In addition, KMB, LW and NLB planned to retrofit more buses with blackboxes in 2004. CTB and NWFB have agreed to conduct a trial for six months on the performance and cost effectiveness of retrofitting blackboxes on existing buses.

### ***Speed Guns***

21. In addition to deploying plain-clothed/uniformed inspectors and management staff on buses and at critical locations to monitor driving attitude of their drivers, all companies except NLB use laser speed guns for speed check against their drivers. NLB is considering the deployment or hiring of speed guns to conduct speed checks.

### ***Seat belts***

22. It is a mandatory requirement to provide seat belts for driver seats. Seat belts are provided for passenger seats in some of the newer buses. Nevertheless, it is observed that most passengers do not use seat belts because it makes boarding and alighting activities inconvenient, in particular for those who travel over a relatively short distance.

23. TD has collected information on the requirements of installation of seat belts on buses in 6 overseas countries and the European Union. Most countries examined require the installation of seat belt on driver's seat but do not require the

installation of seat belts on other seats on buses. For countries where the seat belt requirement applies, urban bus routes are exempted. Studies conducted in Australia and Canada indicated that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belt on all seats in a bus might not be as great as envisaged. Unrestrained passengers, particularly where standees are allowed on buses, can cause injury to other passengers who have fastened the seat belts. It is also very difficult to ensure that all passengers will use seatbelts.

24. In view of the above, CTB, NWFB and NLB will include armrests at exposed seats in their specifications for new buses whilst KMB and LW will provide seat belts at exposed seats and armrests for aisle seats without handpole. CTB, KMB and LW have completed retrofitting of armrests to exposed seats of existing buses, and NWFB plans to complete the retrofitting by end 2004. In addition, TD has asked all the franchised bus operators to conduct a review to ascertain any need to retrofit additional handrails to the buses.

### **Vehicle Examination**

25. Stringent measures have been developed over the years to ensure safety of franchised bus operation. These include:

- (a) subjecting every new model of franchised buses to a type approval process to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements stipulated in the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) before they can be registered and licensed for use on the road;
- (b) requiring franchised buses to undergo a tilt test to ensure stability;
- (c) requiring every franchised bus to undergo annual examination and a comprehensive examination at specified intervals to check its structural integrity;
- (d) the bus companies implementing monthly maintenance and daily inspection programmes; and
- (e) TD conducting random spot checks on franchised buses to ensure proper maintenance.

26. All bus companies are required to keep their performance record. TD will continue to monitor their maintenance programmes and hold regular meetings with the companies to discuss bus examination results and where appropriate formulate actions to enhance bus safety.

### **Measures to Promote Safety Awareness of Drivers and Passengers**

#### ***Driver***

27. The operators have undertaken to continue participating in the Road Safety Forum for Franchised Buses organized by TD, and to facilitate their drivers to attend the Road Safety Seminars and Road Safety Campaigns organized by TD and the Police.

28. Apart from the various training opportunities, franchised bus operators offer various Safety Bonuses and organize functions such as "Bus Captain of the Year" to motivate drivers and promote their awareness of road safety.

#### ***Passenger***

29. The review identified a need to strengthen bus passengers education on safety awareness. Last year, TD launched a publicity campaign aimed at reminding passengers to hold handrails tightly with broadcast of Announcement of Public Interest and distribution of posters and stickers. Separately, KMB produced a video on the proper ways in using bus services for on-bus broadcasting and distribution to schools, elderly homes and community centres. They also produced a series of 10-second TV commercials to remind passengers of safety messages including "holding onto handrails" and "no standing on stairway". KMB and LW have also incorporated road safety messages in their bus stop announcement systems.

30. KMB, CTB and NWFB are considering launching a series of publicity including:

- (a) use of on-bus broadcasting for promotion of safety tips;
- (b) display of posters inside buses to raise passengers' safety awareness;
- (c) display of safety messages on bus shelter panels and in the rear part of buses targeting at other motorists; and
- (d) inter-company bus captains driving skill competition.

31. TD will continue to work with the franchised bus operators and co-ordinate efforts on public education about bus safety.

## **WAY FORWARD**

32. TD will together with the bus companies:

- (a) expedite the implementation of the recommended improvements and actions;
- (b) continue to monitor bus operation closely and analyze the causes and trend of bus accidents and map out improvement measures to enhance bus safety;
- (c) continue to conduct careful route planning, taking into account the suitability of franchised bus operation with due regard to the design or conditions of the roads and deployment of suitable bus models on the routes;
- (d) continue to ensure that all buses are maintained up to the required standard;
- (e) continue to foster a responsible and caring driving culture through publicity and driving training, and promote the safety awareness of bus passengers through various publicity means; and
- (f) keep track of the best practices of bus safety arrangements in overseas countries and consider the adoption of appropriate arrangements in Hong Kong.

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### No. of Bus Accidents by Severity of Accident (1999 - 2003)

Year	KMB			CTB (F1)			NWFB			NLB			LW			CTB(F2)			All Operators			
	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Fatal	Serious	Slight	Total
<b>1999</b>	16	193	909	2	51	275	3	58	240	0	0	4	0	3	29	0	6	34	21	311	1,491	<b>1,823</b>
<b>2000</b>	7	163	920	3	55	285	4	52	290	1	2	2	0	6	17	0	7	35	15	285	1,549	<b>1,849</b>
<b>2001</b>	10	181	907	1	57	285	2	54	243	0	0	2	0	5	20	1	4	38	14	301	1,495	<b>1,810</b>
<b>2002</b>	3	202	885	0	63	259	4	41	232	0	3	5	1	6	18	1	3	30	9	318	1,429	<b>1,756</b>
<b>2003</b>	11	184	848	5	42	241	0	49	241	0	2	4	0	2	17	0	5	31	16	284	1,382	<b>1,682</b>


Note 1 : Figures excluding accidents involving franchised buses the operator of which could not be identified (82 in 2003).


Note 2: A fatal accident is one in which at least one person is killed immediately, or is injured and subsequently dies of his/her injuries within 30 days of the accident.

Note 3: A serious accident is one in which one or more persons is injured and detained in hospital for more than 12 hours.

Note 4: A slight accident is one in which one or more persons is injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours.








Note 1: Figures were based on bus accidents occurred in a 12-month period in 2002/03.


Note 2: No driver below the age of 26 is employed by CTB(F1), LW and NLB.

Note 3: No driver above the age of 60 is employed by KMB, CTB(F2) and LW.



Note 1: Figures were based on bus accidents occurred in a 12-month period in 2002/03.

Note 2: There were only 3 drivers with experience between 9 and 10 years; and only 1 driver with over 10 years experience serving CTB(F2). Since the bases were small, the accident rate in the year might not be representative of the age categories as a whole.



*Note: Figures were based on bus accidents occurred in a 12-month period in 2002/03.*

**Road Accidents with personal injuries involving franchised buses in 2003**  
**Driver Contributory Factors as reported by Police**

<b>Contributory Factors</b>	<b>No. of franchised bus drivers involved</b>	<b>% of total</b>
Driving too close to kerb / vehicle in front / vehicle alongside	124	6.8%
Stopping / starting negligently	88	4.8%
Trying to avoid collision	82	4.5%
Overtaking / changing lane negligently	59	3.2%
Driving too fast for road environment	33	1.8%
Reversing / Turning left or right negligently	24	1.3%
Opening door negligently	21	1.1%
Did not observe traffic signal / road markings	20	1.1%
Distracted by action inside / outside bus	19	1.0%
Exceeding speed limit	1	0.1%
Other driver factor <sup>1</sup>	192	10.5%
No driver factor <sup>2</sup>	1,165	63.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,828</b>	<b>100%<sup>3</sup></b>

<sup>1</sup> Other driver factor means the bus accidents were contributory to driver's action including lost control of vehicles with or without reasons, inattentiveness of drivers, etc.

<sup>2</sup> No driver factor means the bus accidents were not contributory to driver's actions, e.g. pedestrian negligence, negligence of other motorists, bus passengers not holding handrails properly, objects on road, environmental factor like slippery road surface etc.

<sup>3</sup> The sum of the individual percentage figures do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

**Summary of overseas requirements on bus driver working hours and rest breaks**

<b>City / Country</b>	<b>Maximum duty hours per day</b>	<b>Service break requirement</b>	<b>Maximum Driving Duty per day</b>	<b>Break between 2 successive working days</b>
(1) British Columbia, Canada	15 hrs	Nil	13 hrs	8 hrs
(2) Norway	9 hrs	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min of work (b) Meal break not stated	9 hrs	11 hrs
(3) San Mateo County, California, USA	16 hrs	(a) Rest break after 6 hr of work (b) Meal break after 6 hr of work	10 hrs	8 hrs
(4) Switzerland	12 hrs	(a) Rest break after half of work time (b) 3 rest breaks of at least 30 min	7 hrs	12 hrs
(5) Queensland, Australia	14 hrs	Rest break after 5 hrs	12 hrs	10 hrs
(6) Denmark	-	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min (b) No restriction on meal break	9 hrs	11 hrs
(7) Hong Kong	14 hrs	(a) Rest break after 6 hr of work (b) Total service breaks of at least 20 mins within the 6-hour duty	11 hrs	9 hrs

**No. of buses fitted with speed limiting devices**

<b>Type of speed limiter</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>LW</b>	<b>CTB (F1)</b>	<b>CTB (F2)</b>	<b>NWFB</b>	<b>NLB</b>
Engine Management System	2,192 (51%)	136 (94%)	399 (51%)	164 (100%)	550 (75%)	9 (11%)
Mechanical Governor	1,666 (39%)	9 (6%)	391 (49%)	0 (0%)	184 (25%)	0 (0%)
Electro-mechanical speed limiter	272 (6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
No speed limiting device	165 <sup>1</sup> (4%)	0	0	0	0	71 (89%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,295</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>790</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>80</b>

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<sup>1</sup> These are Mitsubishi single-deck buses. KMB is working with the manufacturer of these buses to explore whether speed limiters can be retrofitted on the buses.

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **Supplementary Information** **Measures to enhance the safety of bus operations**

#### **Purpose**

This paper provides Members with the following information:

- (a) overseas experience on installation of seat belts on all seats in a bus; and
- (b) number of different levels of warnings issued and the number of dismissals made by the franchised bus operators in the past five years.

#### **Background**

2. At the meeting of the Legislative Council Panel on Transport on 28 November 2003, Transport Department (“TD”) mentioned that according to TD’s research on overseas experience, the additional safety benefit of installing seat belts on all seats might not be as great as envisaged. TD agreed to provide relevant information for Members’ reference. The information is at Annex A.

Annex A

3. Members also requested the Administration to provide information on the number of different levels of warnings issued and the number of dismissals made by the franchised bus operators in the past five years. The requested information is provided at Annex B.

Annex B

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
May 2004



**Overseas experience on  
installation of seat belts on franchised buses**

Transport Department has collected information on requirements of installation of seat belts on buses in some overseas countries including Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, European Union, New York State of U.S.A., Canada and Singapore. It is observed that most countries examined require the installation of seat belts on driver's seat but do not require the installation of seat belts on all other seats of buses. For countries where the seat belt requirement applies, urban bus routes and urban bus with standing passengers are exempted. The requirements are summarised below –

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Australia</b>	Seat belt shall be installed on driver's seat on all buses. As regards other seats, installation of seat belts is required for exposed seats but urban routes are exempted from the requirement.
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Installation of seat belts on all seats is required for buses first used on or after 1.10.2001. However, such requirement does <u>not</u> apply to buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
<b>New Zealand</b>	All light motor vehicles manufactured on or after 1.10.2003 shall have seat belts installed on all seats. However, this requirement does not apply to buses with over 12 seats and exceeding 3.5 tonnes.
<b>European Union</b>	The requirements to install seat belts on all seats will apply to all new vehicles including buses on the market from July 2004 onwards. The new requirements are expected to be implemented across member states in 2006. However, requirements for seat belts on urban buses will be left to member state governments to decide.
<b>New York State of U.S.A.</b>	Large school buses manufactured after 1 July 1987 shall have seat belts installed on all seats.

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Canada</b>	A bus with a gross vehicular weight greater than 4,536 kg shall have seat belt installed for the driver seat but seat belts for the other passenger seats are not required.
<b>Singapore</b>	Installation of seat belts is required for the driver's seat and the specified passenger seats*.

2. Studies on fitting of seat belts on buses conducted in Australia and Canada indicated that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belt on all seats in a bus might not be as great as envisaged due to the following reasons:

- (a) unrestrained passengers can cause injury to other passengers who have fastened the seat belts. Hence, installation of seat belts might not be an effective safety measure if standees are allowed on buses; and
- (b) overall effectiveness of seat belts also depends on whether the belts are used by all passengers. It is difficult to ensure that all passenger use seat belts on buses, e.g. passengers carrying large bags and parcels may find fastening seat belt inconvenient and may not bother to do so. Passengers sitting on aisle seats may also find it inconvenient to unbuckle seat belts to allow passengers in and out of window seats.

**Transport Department**  
**May 2004**

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\* "Specified passenger's seat" means:

- (a) a forward-facing front seat alongside the driver's seat; and in the case of a vehicle which has more than one such seat, the one furthest from the driver's seat; or
- (b) if the vehicle has no such seat as mentioned in (a) above, the forward-facing front seat for a passenger which is foremost in the vehicle and furthest from the driver's seat, unless there is a fixed partition separating such seat from the space in front of it alongside the driver's seat.

**Number of different levels of warnings issued and  
number of dismissals made by franchised bus operators in the past 5 years**

In general, bus companies have established guidelines on disciplinary procedures. According to bus companies, all drivers, irrespective of their years of services, are subject to the same guidelines and disciplinary procedures. Any drivers who are not satisfied with disciplinary action may appeal. Details of different levels of warnings issued and number of dismissals made by the franchised bus operators in the past 5 years are set out in the tables below. Some operators have issued a large number of warnings because they employ a large number of drivers and they adopt the practice of giving repeated verbal and written warnings to the same drivers before dismissing drivers who persisted in committing misconduct.

**Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Ltd.**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	3,028	508	3,536	52
2000	2,407	473	2,880	81
2001	2,403	454	2,857	79
2002	2,059	384	2,443	81
2003	2,067	551	2,618	73

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 8,229*

**Long Win Bus Company Limited**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	13	10	23	0
2000	105	17	122	0
2001	70	17	87	0
2002	149	29	178	1
2003	106	24	130	0

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 304*

Citybus Limited (Hong Kong Island and cross-habour services)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Final Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	692	293	66	1,051	36
2000	469	301	74	844	21
2001	416	262	58	736	16
2002	654	311	58	1,023	18
2003	984	340	66	1,390	10

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 1,724*

Citybus Limited (Airport and North Lantau bus services)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Final Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	165	57	12	234	10
2000	113	59	19	191	7
2001	148	81	21	250	8
2002	135	68	30	233	6
2003	223	51	18	292	5

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 387*

New World First Bus Services Limited

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	603	194	797	31
2000	356	808	1,164	26
2001	329	664	993	44
2002	465	552	1017	25
2003	484	375	859	15

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 1,752*

New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited

<b>Year</b>	<b>Verbal Warning</b>	<b>Written Warning</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Dismissal</b>
1999	12	5	17	4
2000	18	6	24	3
2001	11	6	17	4
2002	11	8	19	2
2003	13	9	22	3

*Strength of drivers as at 31.12.2003: 106*

Transport Department  
May 2004

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Franchised bus services on Hong Kong Island**

**Purposes**

The purpose of this paper is to inform Members of:

- (a) the co-operation possibilities between Citybus Limited (“Citybus”) and New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”);
- (b) the bus service changes on Hong Kong Island for implementation under the Route Development Programme in 2004 and 2005; and
- (c) recent labour issues of Citybus and NWFB.

**Co-operation possibilities between Citybus and NWFB**

2. At the joint meeting of the Legislative Council Panel on Transport and Panel on Economic Services on 27 June 2003, Members were informed of the acquisition of Citybus by the Chow Tai Fook Enterprises Limited (“CTF”), and that CTF and NWS Holdings Ltd. (“NWSH”) would consider co-operation possibilities between Citybus and NWFB. CTF is the major shareholder of New World Development Co. Ltd., which in turn has interests in NWSH (which was the holding company of NWFB).

3. CTF and NWSH announced in December 2003 that they had entered into a Share Exchange Agreement under which their respective transport and related businesses, including Citybus and NWFB, would be placed under Merryhill Group Limited (“Merryhill”), an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of CTF which held Citybus. The share exchange was completed in March 2004 and Citybus and NWFB have since then become member companies of Merryhill.

4. The corporate restructuring of their holding companies did not involve any change in the bus franchises separately granted to Citybus and NWFB. The two franchised bus companies remain to be two separate legal entities and continue to operate their respective route networks to provide

proper and efficient bus services as required under the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("PBSO") (Cap. 230) and the terms of their respective franchises.

5. Citybus and NWFB have taken the opportunity of the corporate restructuring to realign their management resources and offered voluntary exit schemes to the affected staff in early 2004. The schemes were well received and the staff who joined the schemes have started to be released gradually since February 2004.

6. Citybus and NWFB have also been examining the scope to modify their networks to enhance efficiency, achieve synergies in depot operation, and offer further fare concessionary measures including joint fare concession schemes to benefit passengers, taking into account their operating conditions and the likely synergies that can be achieved.

7. The changes in services and fare reduction or concessions so far identified by the two companies are set out in paragraphs 8-10 below.

### **Bus service changes on Hong Kong Island in 2004 and 2005**

8. In August 2003, Citybus and NWFB submitted proposals on bus service changes in their respective Route Development Programmes ("RDPs") including introduction of new routes, frequency adjustments, route cancellation, truncation and modification, and change of service operation period for implementation in 2004 and 2005.

9. Transport Department ("TD") has evaluated carefully the proposals having regard to all relevant factors including passenger demand, availability of alternative services, network efficiency and traffic and environmental considerations. In February / March 2004, the concerned District Councils were consulted on the relevant proposals. Taking into account the views obtained during the consultation, TD has agreed to a total of 39 items of bus service changes involving 58 routes for implementation in 2004 and 11 items involving 11 routes for 2005. The 11 proposals for 2005 would be reviewed in the forthcoming Route Development Programme for 2005 and 2006, on which the relevant District Councils would be consulted.

10. After implementation of the agreed items, many passengers will benefit from lower fares offered by the two companies through the following:

- (a) fares of 5 bus routes will be reduced ranging from \$0.7 to \$1.7;
- (b) new section fares will be introduced on 5 bus routes; and
- (c) a total of 11 bus-bus interchange schemes with fare concessions ranging from \$1.3 to \$8.4 will be introduced on 42 bus routes.

11. Implementation of the rationalization schemes in 2004 would lead to a reduction of 57 bus trips in a morning peak hour in busy corridors in Causeway Bay, Admiralty and Central. This will help relieve traffic congestion and reduce road-side emission. Through the introduction of bus-bus interchange schemes with fare concessions, passengers would continue to have adequate bus services at the same or lower fares.

### **Recent Labour Issues**

12. Since 2001, Citybus and NWFB had 4 and 7 labour incidents respectively which might possibly lead to industrial actions. The incidents largely arose from disagreement on pay increase / provision of benefits, disciplinary arrangement of the companies and staff's support of industrial actions initiated by staff unions of other franchised bus companies.

13. When the labour incidents occurred, the two companies maintained dialogue with their staff with a view to addressing their concern and resolving the incidents as quickly as practicable. Labour Department ("LD") and TD also assisted in the discussions as appropriate to facilitate conciliation.

14. There was only one incident in which some drivers resorted to working to rule during the morning peak hours on 9 September 2003. To minimize the impact of the incident, Citybus and NWFB put in place plans to mobilize their management and other operational staff to operate supplementary bus services. TD coordinated with other public transport operators for provision of additional service if in case this should be required, and worked with the Police to ensure smooth traffic flow. The Emergency Transport Coordination Centre was also activated to monitor the traffic and



transport situation on the ground during the incident. It was observed that the work-to-rule action<sup>1</sup> had an insignificant impact on the traffic and transport situation that day. The issue was eventually settled between management and the staff with the assistance of LD.

15. To ensure provision of proper and efficient bus services without interruption, TD has reminded Citybus and NWFB to take necessary actions to minimize the possibility of industrial actions:

- (a) to cultivate a better relationship and improve communication with respective staff unions, and to reach out to staff as far as possible;
- (b) to develop skills and techniques in handling staff issues; and
- (c) to solicit advice from LD on labour disputes where appropriate.

16. The Government will continue to closely monitor the performance of both Citybus and NWFB to ensure that proper and efficient bus services are provided to passengers.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
July 2004

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<sup>1</sup> The work-to-rule launched on 9 September 2003 was in the form of:

- (a) driving at a safe speed;
- (b) keeping to the left and no overtaking;
- (c) opening the door of buses for boarding / alighting only after the buses are parked right at the bus stop sign; and
- (d) checking the fare paid by each passenger carefully before allowing the next passenger in.

# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(1)112/04-05

Ref: CB1/PL/TP

## **Panel on Transport**

### **Background brief on Work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies**

#### **Purpose**

This paper provides background information on work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies, and summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by Members in the past.

#### **Background**

2. It has been reported that some bus drivers and trade unions complained that the franchised bus companies which they served forced the drivers to operate buses of different models and run various routes every day, and they were not given reasonable time for meal, rendering the drivers more prone to mistakes and thereby increasing the chances of traffic accidents.

3. At the Panel meeting on 12 October 2004, members agreed to review the related issues with the Administration and the concerned franchised bus companies at the forthcoming meeting to be held on 29 October 2004. Representatives of labour unions from the concerned companies have also been invited to the meeting to give views on the matter.

4. A relevant oral question was raised by Hon WONG Kwok-hing at the Council meeting on 13 October 2004. The question and the Administration's reply are in **Appendix I**. Members were mainly concerned about the safety of franchised bus operation, in particular, the correlation between bus accident rate and the length of drivers' duty hours/work arrangements.

#### **Previous discussions by the Panel**

5. Safety of franchised bus operation has always been high on the agenda of the Panel. In November 2003, the Panel reviewed with the Administration on measures taken and being planned to ensure and enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

6. According to the Administration, Transport Department (TD) has issued guidelines to the franchised bus operators on drivers' working hours to ensure that their drivers are provided with reasonable rest time. The guidelines were reviewed in March 2000 and are listed below:

- Guideline A bus drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes;
- Guideline B maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day;
- Guideline C driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day; and
- Guideline D break between successive working days should not be less than 8 hours (subsequently increased to 9 hours (see paragraph 15 below).

7. Some members were concerned about the long working hours of bus drivers and the resulting safety implications. They requested the Administration to expeditiously review the said guidelines so that bus drivers would not be required to work for more than 8 hours a day.

8. Some other members however held the view that while there should not be any compromise on road safety, the issue of working hours of bus drivers must be considered objectively. In reviewing the matter, it would be most important to consider the views of the bus drivers as some might find the present arrangements acceptable. They might even welcome the opportunity to work a longer shift so that they could get extra pay or make better use of their rest time. Hence, a certain degree of flexibility should be allowed.

9. In response to members' concerns and in order to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation, the Administration asked all franchised bus operators to conduct a thorough review on their safety arrangements and areas where further enhancement to road and passenger safety could be made. The review covered the following areas:

- (a) analysis of correlation between bus accidents and drivers' age, experience and working hours;
- (b) driver training;
- (c) driver working schedule;
- (d) installation of safety devices and measures to monitor driving behaviour;

- (e) vehicle examination; and
- (f) measures to promote safety awareness of drivers and passengers.

10. In May 2004, the Panel noted the information paper provided by the Administration on the findings of the review and the recommended measures to further enhance bus safety. In brief, the franchised bus operators and TD had analyzed the bus accident records and had the following major observations:

- (a) franchised bus operation had a relatively stable safety record. In the past five years, there was in general a downward trend in the number of bus accidents per million km operated and most of them were slight accidents;
- (b) no direct correlation was identified statistically between bus accident rates and drivers' age, years of service and working hours; and
- (c) driver factor contributed to about one-third of the bus accidents involving injuries in 2003. Passengers not holding handrails tight was also one of the major causes of personal injuries in bus accidents.

11. Regarding bus driver working schedule, the Administration has provided the following information to the Panel.

12. According to TD's recent research on overseas practices as set out in **Appendix II**, the length of maximum duty of bus drivers ranges from 9 hours to 16 hours per day; the maximum driving duty from 7 to 13 hours per day; and the minimum rest period between working days from 8 to 12 hours. TD's current guidelines lie within these ranges.

13. TD and the franchised bus operators have jointly reviewed the working hours of their drivers. It is found that:

- (a) all franchised bus operators except New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB) were able to fully comply with the guidelines; and
- (b) NWFB fully complied with Guidelines B and D while the rate of compliance with Guidelines A<sup>1</sup> and C<sup>2</sup> in the second half of 2003 were 94% and 88% respectively. NWFB will take action as explained in paragraph 15(b).

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<sup>1</sup> The non-compliance with Guideline A was mainly due to the overnight shifts in which drivers usually had a rest after each trip, but not a break of 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty, since the maximum length of driving duty in overnight shifts was usually less than 7 hours.

<sup>2</sup> The non-compliance with Guideline C were relatively slight deviations from the requirement and the maximum driving duty in such cases were around 12 hours in a day.

14. TD has examined with the operators the possibility to shorten the maximum duty length and driving duty duration (i.e. Guidelines B and C) but all of them do not support the ideas because:

- (a) there is no observed correlation between bus accident rate and the length of drivers' duty hours;
- (b) the current requirements are in line with overseas practice;
- (c) at present, the average duty length of a bus driver is about 10 hours a day which is well below the maximum of 14 hours stipulated in the guideline; and
- (d) reducing the maximum driving hours allowed will reduce flexibility in bus scheduling and operation.

15. In view of the importance to prevent fatigue driving as expressed by the Tuen Mun Road Traffic Incident Independent Expert Panel and Legislative Council Members, franchised bus companies have agreed to the following changes:

- (a) all companies have increased the minimum break for drivers between successive working days from 8 hours to 9 hours (Guideline D); and
- (b) NWFB will ensure full compliance with Guidelines A and C by early 2005 through re-scheduling of driver duties and redeployment of drivers.

16. Details of the other recommended measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation are set out in LC Paper No. CB(1) 1955/03-04(01).

17. A list of relevant papers is at **Appendix III**.

**LegCo Question No. 3**  
(Oral Reply)

Asked by : Hon WONG Kwok-hing    Date of meeting : 13 October 2004

Replied by : Secretary for the Environment,  
Transport and Works

Question:

It has been reported that some bus drivers and trade unions complained that the franchised bus companies which they served forced the drivers to operate buses of different models and run various routes every day, and they were not given reasonable time for meal, rendering the drivers more prone to mistakes and thereby increasing the chances of traffic accidents. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

- (a) whether it has received complaints about the above problems from bus drivers or trade unions of franchised bus companies over the past three years; if so, of the number of complaints received, the details of the authorities' response and how the cases have been handled;
- (b) of a breakdown, by type and number, of the accidents and complaints in respect of the franchised bus services provided by the New World First Bus Services Limited, as well as the annual rates of accident and complaint, in the past three years, and how such figures compare to those of the former China Motor Bus Company; and
- (c) whether any guidelines have been formulated on the bus models and number of routes to be run by franchised bus drivers every day, as well as the timing of breaks for meal and rest, etc.; if so, of the details; if not, whether such guidelines will be formulated; if they will be, when they will be formulated and issued?

Reply:

Madam President,

- (a) Over the past three years, Transport Department (“TD”) has received a total of eight comments or complaints from representatives of the trade unions of franchised bus companies or individual bus drivers expressing their grievances about drivers being arranged to operate various routes on the same day, unreasonable mealtime and prolonged duty time, etc.

Upon receipt of the complaints, TD immediately conveyed the staff’s concern to the relevant bus companies and requested their follow-up actions. TD also encouraged the bus companies and their staff to reach a mutual understanding and to resolve the matter by agreement through communication in order to provide proper and efficient services. The bus companies concerned had held meetings with the union representatives to explain and follow up the issues.

- (b) On 1 September 1998, New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”) started to provide bus services previously operated by China Motor Bus Company Limited (“CMB”). During the three years between 2001 and 2003, the number of accidents involving NWFB was 288.67 per year on average and the accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre was 4.54. During the three years between 1995 and 1997, the number of accidents involving CMB was 249.67 per year on average and the accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre was 5.55. As regards complaints, NWFB was involved in 291 cases per year on average during the three years between 2001 and 2003 and the complaint rate was 1.54 per million passenger journeys. CMB was involved in 779.33 complaints per year on average during the three years between 1995 and 1997 and the complaint rate was 4.25 per million passenger journeys. Details of the bus accidents and types of complaints are in Annexes I and II distributed to Members. The performance of NWFB is better than CMB in the above two respects.
- (c) TD has issued guidelines on work schedule of bus drivers to all franchised bus companies. Bus operators are responsible for making appropriate arrangements on driving duty and mealtime for their staff. Details of the guidelines are in Annex III distributed to Members.

The guidelines did not cover the number of bus models or routes operated daily by bus driver. TD recently received comments from franchised bus staff unions about the number of routes and buses operated in a day as well as mealtime arrangement. TD has discussed the matters with the bus companies including whether there is a need to draw up guidelines

for the above issues. Having considered that there is no information showing that the number of bus models or bus routes operated by a bus driver per shift has adverse impact on bus safety, we do not have any plan to introduce additional guidelines on the above aspects.



**Comparison between NWFB and CMB - Bus Accident Rate****CMB**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Fatal Accidents<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Serious Accidents<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Slight Accidents<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Accident Rate<sup>4</sup></b>
1995	2	54	193	249	5.62
1996	4	45	206	255	5.73
1997	3	48	194	245	5.30
<b>Annual Average</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>197.67</b>	<b>249.67</b>	<b>5.55</b>

**NWFB**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Fatal Accident<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Serious Accidents<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Slight Accidents<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Accident Rate<sup>4</sup></b>
2001	2	54	243	299	4.91
2002	4	41	232	277	4.21
2003	0	49	241	290	4.50
<b>Annual Average</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>238.67</b>	<b>288.67</b>	<b>4.54</b>

Note 1      A fatal accident is one in which at least one person is killed immediately, or is injured and subsequently dies of his injuries within 30 days of the accident.

Note 2      A serious accident is one in which one person or more is/are injured and detained in hospital for more than 12 hours.

Note 3      A slight accident is one in which one person or more is/are injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours.

Note 4      Number of accident per million vehicle-kilometre.

**Comparison between NWFB and CMB – Bus Services Complaints****CMB**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Service Arrangement<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Service Quality<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>General<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Complaint Rate<sup>4</sup></b>
1995	202	743	31	976	5.11
1996	132	535	22	689	3.84
1997	100	536	37	673	3.81
<b>Annual Average</b>	<b>144.67</b>	<b>604.67</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>779.33</b>	<b>4.25</b>

**NWFB**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Service Arrangement<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Service Quality<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>General<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Complaint Rate<sup>4</sup></b>
2001	71	139	25	235	1.21
2002	50	223	23	296	1.51
2003	53	271	18	342	1.89
<b>Annual Average</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>1.54</b>

Note 1 Including complaints received by the Transport Complaints Unit on passenger capacity, routeing, hours of operation and location of stops (complaints on cross harbour bus services are not included because some routes are jointly operated by different bus companies.)

Note 2 Including complaints received by the Transport Complaints Unit on regularity of service, conduct and performance of staff, passenger services and facilities (complaints on cross harbour bus services are not included because some routes are jointly operated by different bus companies.)

Notes 3 Including complaints received by the Transport Complaints Unit not related to service arrangement and service quality, e.g. bus fare, fare tendering and the impact made by buses on transport, etc.

Note 4 Number of complaints per million passenger journeys.

Guidelines on the Work Schedule  
for Bus Drivers Issued by Transport Department

- Guideline A      Bus drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes;
- Guideline B      Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day;
- Guideline C      Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day; and
- Guideline D      Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.

**Summary of overseas requirements on bus driver working hours and rest breaks**

<b>City / Country</b>	<b>Maximum duty hours per day</b>	<b>Service break requirement</b>	<b>Maximum Driving Duty per day</b>	<b>Break between 2 successive working days</b>
(1) British Columbia, Canada	15 hrs	Nil	13 hrs	8 hrs
(2) Norway	9 hrs	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min of work (b) Meal break not stated	9 hrs	11 hrs
(3) San Mateo County, California, USA	16 hrs	(a) Rest break after 6 hr of work (b) Meal break after 6 hr of work	10 hrs	8 hrs
(4) Switzerland	12 hrs	(a) Rest break after half of work time (b) 3 rest breaks of at least 30 min	7 hrs	12 hrs
(5) Queensland, Australia	14 hrs	Rest break after 5 hrs	12 hrs	10 hrs
(6) Denmark	-	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min (b) No restriction on meal break	9 hrs	11 hrs
(7) Hong Kong	14 hrs	(a) Rest break after 6 hr of work (b) Total service breaks of at least 20 mins within the 6-hour duty	11 hrs	9 hrs

### Work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies

#### List of relevant papers

Council/Committee	Date of meeting	Papers
Transport Panel (TP)	28 Nov 2003	Measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation [LC Paper No. CB(1)406/03-04(04)] <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf</a>
		Supplementary information on overseas experience on installation of seat belts on all seats in a bus and number of different levels of warnings issued and the number of dismissals made by the franchised bus operators in the past five years [CB(1)1815/03-04(01)] <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-1815-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-1815-1e.pdf</a>
TP	28 May 2004	Report on Franchised Bus Operators' Review of Arrangements to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation[CB(1)1955/03-04(01)] <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf</a>
Council	13 Oct 2004	Oral question raised by Hon WONG Kwok-hing on work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies

CB(1)111/04-05(03)



新世界第一巴士公司職工會(職工盟屬會)  
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## 有關行車時間表之意見

本會對有關公司行車時間表之問題，意見如下：

第一，我們對公司安排車長每天駕駛不會超過三條路線之政策原則，本會並不反對；

第二，我們認為車長駕駛三條路線之安排，並不會直接構成安全問題。但可能會對部份車長構成工作壓力；

第三，本會就著如何減低車長的工作壓力問題，已經參與由勞資雙方組成之工作小組，專責討論改善行車時間表的問題。對於行車時間表的其他細節會與公司進一步商討，務求達至共識。


此致

立法會交通事務委員會

各委員

新世界第一巴士公司職工會

2004 年 10 月 27 日



[Translation]

**Comments regarding driving schedule**

This Union has the following comments regarding the Company's driving schedule:-

Firstly, we do not oppose the Company's policy whereby bus captains are arranged to drive not more than 3 routes per day.

Secondly, we consider that the aforesaid arrangement of 3 routes per day would not directly cause any safety issues. However, the said arrangement may lead to working stress for some bus captains;

Thirdly, as regards how to minimize working stress for bus captains, this Union has already participated in the working group conducted by employers and employee, to discuss how to address the issues concerning the driving schedule. This Union will enter into further discussions with the Company regarding the details of the driving schedule in hopes that an understanding can be reached.

To:

Members of The Legislative Council Panel on Transport

New World First Bus Company Staff Union

27 October 2004

# 汽車交通運輸業總工會新世界巴士分會

MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION

NEW WORLD BUS BRANCH

會址：香港北角塘水道12號二樓

12, TONG SHUI ROAD, 1ST FLOOR, NORTH POINT.

TEL.: 2563 1495

## 汽車交通運輸業總工會新世界巴士分會主任朱本典發言稿

2004年10月29日

主席、各位議員：

對於新巴公司近年來不斷推行多項不利員工工作和危害市民生命安全的措施，汽車交通運輸業總工會新世界巴士分會是持堅決反對態度的。同時，我們也希望各位議員能夠關注這些問題，向我們提供協助，使問題能早日得到解決。

新巴公司近年所推行的不良措施主要有以下幾個方面：實施「跳線」和「跳飛機」的制度；沒有向員工提供合理的用膳時間；濫用重罰來威嚇員工；經常變動更表，使車長難以適應等等。具體的內容請各位議員抽時間看一看工會所提供的文件。

由於時間所限，本人在此只集中講一講「跳線」所造成的問題。近年來，很多新巴車長經常要接受駕駛不同巴士路線的安排，即俗稱的「跳線」。在這種情況下，不少車長在一天內要行走3-4條巴士路線，其中部份巴士路線更是屬於不同地區或過海的隧道巴士線。受到這種工作安排的影響，車長在駕駛不同路線時，除了要特別留意路面情況和避免發生交通意外之餘，也要緊記新路線的車站位置，確保不會停錯站。否則的話，輕則遭到乘客的指責或投訴，重則發生交通意外。由此可見，這項工作安排對車長造成很大的壓力，同時對廣大市民的生命安全也構成很大的威脅。

另外，環境運輸及工務局局長廖秀冬近期在立法會回應有關問題時表示，沒有資料顯示車長「跳線」和「跳飛機」的安排會對交通安全構成影響，因此不會制訂額外指引。對於這番言論，新巴分會認為它並沒有設身處地為車長和市民的安全著想，更不應出自一個問責局長之口。事實上，作為一個問責局長，理應關心和積極地處理保障市民生命安全的任何一個環節，而不是草率地推搪了事。在此，新巴分會表示強烈的不滿。另外，我們亦建議，廖秀冬局長能夠抽一些時間來駕駛一下巴士，親身體會車長們在「跳線」和「跳飛機」下所承受的壓力，以及更深入地認識這個問題的嚴重性。最後，我們再次請各位議員能夠協助我們跟進這些問題。

謝謝各位。





# 汽車交通運輸業總工會新世界巴士分會

MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION

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## 關注新巴員工的工作壓力 保障市民的生命安全

近年來，新世界第一巴士服務有限公司（下稱新巴）爲了追求更大利潤和節省營運成本，盲目地推行了多項不利員工工作和侵害員工權益的措施，使他們被迫承受著異常繁重的壓力。然而，這種壓力不僅對員工的身心健康帶來很大負面影響，而且對使用巴士服務的廣大市民也構成了十分嚴重的安全危機。

對於新巴的這些不合理措施，汽車交通運輸業總工會屬下的新世界巴士分會（下稱工會）曾多次向新巴的管理層反映意見，並要求盡快作出改善。可惜的是，新巴對於工會的要求則經常採取推諉卸責的態度，沒有認真地處理問題。在這種情況下，工會只好舉行『新巴車長：被迫「跳線」、「跳飛機」、「捱餓行車」——譴責新巴公司罔顧市民安全』的記者招待會，透過媒體向廣大市民講明了真相。

具體來說，新巴的無理工作安排主要有以下幾個方面：

### ● 實施「跳線」規定

在工作調配方面，許多車長經常要接受駕駛不同巴士路線的安排，即俗稱的「跳線」。在這種情況下，不少車長在一天內要行走 3-4 條巴士路線，其中部份巴士路線更是屬於不同地區或過海的隧道巴士線。受到這種工作安排的影響，車長們在駕駛不同路線時除了要特別留意路面情況和避免發生交通意外之餘，也要緊記新路線的車站位置，確保不會停錯站。否則的話，輕則遭到乘客的指責或投訴，重則發生交通意外。由此可見，這項工作安排對車長們造成很大的壓力，同時也對廣大市民的生命安全構成很大的威脅。

- 推行「跳飛機」的制度

爲了減少巴士的輪候時間，許多車長都要接受新巴的「跳飛機」安排（所謂的「跳飛機」是指車長到達巴士總站後，便要跳上另一部停車時間較長的巴士，開始另一項駕駛工作）。在這種情況下，不少車長在一天之內要駕駛 4-5 輛不同類型的巴士。由於車長不能駕駛固定的巴士，而且不同類型的巴士性能有異，再加上這種「跳飛機」的安排也在一定程度上增了車長們的工作強度，使很多車長不能及時和很好地適應和掌握巴士的性能。萬一處理不好的話，則很可能導致交通意外，造成車長、乘客、其他道路使用者以及市民的安全問題。

- 用膳安排十分不合理

爲了在更大程度上壓榨員工，新巴對車長的用膳時間更是作出了不少荒謬的安排。舉例來說，有些車長要在早上九時或下午四時吃午飯，而晚飯時間則安排在晚上十一時以後。這種「早茶/下午茶作午飯」、「宵夜當晚餐」的規定，不但嚴重影響車長健康和駕駛表現，而且對乘客的安全也構成很大潛在危機。

- 濫用重罰來威嚇員工

對於近年來新巴運作所出現的各種問題，它的管理層不但沒有進行反省和進行各項改善工作，反而意圖把所有責任推卸到員工身上。爲了達到這個目的，管理層除了經常無理地訓斥員工外，也濫用許多重罰的手段，如不同類別的警告，甚至解僱遇事的員工，使員工們感到非常沉重的壓力。對於資方的無理行徑，雖然許多員工爲求「保飯碗」而敢怒不敢言，但是他們心中已是怨氣沸騰，因此十分需要社會大眾的理解和支持。

- 經常突然更改編更表

新巴資方爲求行政上的方便，近年經常改動更表（即工作時間表），部份更表的通知時間更只有一至兩天。與此同時，更表的改動密度也非常高，使許多車長感到難以適從。在這種情況下，不少車長都十分擔心他們會因休息不足而影響工作表現。如果出現一些差錯的話，那麼他們更要面對公司的無理處罰，因此他們都感到十分無奈。

- 通宵更車長的工作時間過長

在今年年初，新巴開始改動通宵更車長的工作時間，使他們每天都要工作 12 個小時或以上。在這種情況下，長時間工作使這些車長的身心都十分疲累，因而影響了他們的工作表現，同時也會增加發生交通意外的機會。

- 站長的人手嚴重不足

目前，不少在巴士總站負責處理車務安排的站長遇到了人手嚴重不足的問題，尤其在繁忙時間內，一些站長需要處理上百輛巴士的調配工作，使其工作量暴增數倍。在這種情況下，不少站長都被迫承受著極大的工作壓力。

除了前線員工遇到許多不合理對待外，工會也了解到其他工作崗位的員工也遇到不少的權益問題：

- 意圖取消文職人員子女簿津貼

爲了削減員工的福利，新巴管理層企圖以瞞天過海的手法，要求文職人員簽署新合約。然而，在新合約當中，新巴則偷偷地取消文職人員子女每年 1000 元的書簿津貼。這種做法不但違反了新巴與工會早前達成的協議，同時也嚴重損害了員工應有的權益。

- 頻密地變動車房技工的工作崗位

爲了在更大程度上壓縮人手，新巴資方近期頻密地調動車房技工的工作時間和地點，意圖透過重整工作崗位來減省人手，因而造成車房工作的混亂和增加技工們的心理壓力。事實上，沒有一個良好的後勤和維修服務，也會給巴士安全問題帶來一個嚴重的隱憂。

針對上述多項不合理的工作安排，工會提出了下列要求，希望新巴能夠盡快作出改善：

1. 停止「跳飛機」安排，使車長能更好地掌握所駕駛巴士的性能；
2. 規定「跳線」次數，即每名車長每天最多只能跳線一次，減少車長出錯的機會；
3. 制訂合理的用膳時間，確保車長的健康；

4. 放棄以威嚇、懲罰和解僱的手法來對待員工，同時也要加強與員工方溝通，並及時地幫助車長們解決工作上的難題；
5. 反對經常突然變動更表，並提供足夠時間給車長適應新工作安排；
6. 將通宵更車長的工作時間減至每天 10 小時或以下，讓他們有足夠時間休息；
7. 增派人手及減輕站長的工作量；
8. 根據與工會達成的協議，重新向文職人員發放子女書簿津貼；
9. 立即停止車房技工的調動安排，使他們能夠安心地在原來工作崗位工作；

在工會的努力工作以及社會輿論的強大壓力下，新巴資方終於在口頭上同意採取一些改善的措施，如減少「跳飛機」的次數；改善車長的用膳時間；減輕站長的工作壓力；重新發放文職人員子女的津貼以及停止車房技工的調動安排等。不過，對於具體的落實時間和成效，新巴則沒有明確地作出回應，因此，工會希望各位立法會議員能夠協助我們跟進這些問題。此外，對於一些核心問題，如「跳線」問題，新巴則以多種借口而沒有接納工會提出的「1+1」方案（該方案是指車長們每人除了原來工作的路線外，每天不會駕駛超過一條其他的路線）。因此，工會也希望各位立法會議員能夠繼續關注這些問題，使它能夠早日得到解決。

除了要求新巴盡早就以上問題作出改善外，工會也希望有關政府部門能夠正視這些問題，並且向新巴員工提供協助，藉以維護員工們的權益和保障廣大市民的生命安全。然而，環境運輸及工務局局長廖秀冬近期在立法會回應這些問題時則表示，沒有資料顯示車長「跳線」和「跳飛機」的安排會對交通安全構成影響，因此不會制訂額外指引。另外，廖秀冬局長也表示，在 1300 條巴士路線當中，只有少於 2% 的車長需要在一天內駕駛超過 4-5 條的巴士線。對於廖秀冬局長的這番言論，工會認為它與現實情況存在著很大的差距。事實上，新巴車長在不合理的「跳線」和「跳飛機」的制度當中，已經承受著極大的工作壓力。與此同時，車長們還要面對著新巴的無理和高壓處罰手段，使他們的心身更為疲憊。在這種情況下，要保障廣大市民的生命安全似乎成為一個遙不可及的目標了。另一方

面，據工會所掌握的資料，在目前 1300 多個更份當中，有 170 多個更份是存在著前述的問題，故受影響的車長比例是超過 13%。無論如何，工會認為，廖秀冬作為一個問責局長，理應關心和積極地處理保障市民生命安全的任何一個環節，而不是草率地推搪了事。對此，工會表示強烈的不滿，同時希望各位立法會議員能夠協助我們跟進這些問題。



新世界巴士分會

2004 年 10 月 29 日

CB(1)111/04-05(07)

MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION NEW WORLD BUS BRANCH

12, TONG SHUI ROAD, 1ST FLOOR, NORTH POINT.

TEL: 2563 1495

Speech by Zhu Bun Din,

Director of New World Bus Branch of Motor Transport Workers General Union

29 October 2004

To: President and Honourable Members

In regard to several measures continuously implemented by First Bus in recent years which posed dangers to the work of its staff and lives of the public, the New World Bus Branch of Motor Transport Workers General Union firmly opposes against such measures. At the same time, we hope that all Honourable Members will pay attention to these issues and provide us with assistance so that such issues can be solved as soon as possible.

Undesirable measures implemented by First Bus in recent years include the following: implementation of "jumping among routes" and "jumping among models" system, no reasonable meal schedule available to employees, abuse of material penalties to threaten employees, changing timetable frequently which makes bus captains difficult to adapt, etc. For specific descriptions, please take time to study the documents provided by the Union.

Due to time constraints, I hereby only focus on the problems of "jumping among routes". In recent years, many bus captains of First Bus often have to accept arrangements for driving different routes, that is the so-called "jumping among routes", under which many bus captains are responsible for 3 to 4 bus routes within a day. Some bus routes even involve different districts or crossing the harbour tunnel. As a result of such arrangement, when bus captains are driving different routes, they not only have to pay special attention to the road conditions and avoid traffic accidents, but also need to keep in mind where the bus stops of the new route are to ensure that they will not miss any bus stops, otherwise they may be blamed or complained by passengers, which is a lighter outcome, but for the serious one, traffic accidents may occur. In view of that, such arrangement poses great pressure on bus captains and a great threat to the lives of the public.

Moreover, the Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works, Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, recently responded to the relevant questions in the Legislative Council, stating that no additional guidelines will be formulated as there is no information indicating that the arrangements of “jumping among routes” and “jumping among models” will have an impact on traffic safety. Regarding her comment, the New World Bus Branch considers that she does not put herself in their shoes for the safety of the bus captains and the public. Her comment is inappropriate to her position as an accountable secretary. As a matter of fact, she, as an accountable secretary, shall care about and actively deal with any matters relating to the protection of the lives of the public, rather than rashly finding an excuse for stalling the responsibilities. The New World Bus Branch hereby expresses its strong dissatisfaction. In addition, we also advise Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, the Secretary, to take some time for a bus ride to personally experience the pressure of bus captains under “jumping among routes” and “jumping among models”, and also to have a deeper understanding on the seriousness of the issues. Finally, we once again call on our Honourable Members to help us follow up these issues.

Thank you all.

**[chopped: MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION  
NEW WORLD BUS BRANCH]**

## MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION NEW WORLD BUS BRANCH

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### Concern on work pressure of First Bus staff

#### Protecting the lives of the public

In pursuit of higher profits and lower operating costs, the New World First Bus Services Limited (hereinafter referred to as “First Bus”) has blindly promoted a number of measures that adversely affected the work of employees and infringed their rights and interests in recent years, forcing them to face extreme pressure. However, the pressure not only adversely affects the physical and mental health of the employees, but also poses a material safety risk to the public who use the bus service.

For the unreasonable measures of First Bus, the New World Bus Branch under the Motor Transport Workers General Union (hereinafter referred to as the “Union”) has repeatedly expressed their opinions to the management of First Bus and requested for making improvements as soon as possible. Unfortunately, First Bus often shirks the responsibilities under the demand of the Union and does not address the issue seriously. In view of this, the Union has no choice but convenes a press conference, with the subject as “Bus captain of First Bus: be forced to take ‘jumping among routes’, ‘jumping among models’, ‘drive in hunger’ — an accusation against First Bus for its disregard for the safety of the public”, to make the truth clear to the public through the media.

Specifically, the unreasonable work arrangements of First Bus mainly include the following:

- Implementation of “jumping among routes”

In terms of work deployment, many bus captains often have to accept the arrangements for driving different bus routes, that is the so-called “jumping among routes”, under which many bus captains are responsible for 3 to 4 bus routes within a day. Some bus routes even involve different districts or crossing the harbour tunnel. As a result of such arrangement, when bus captains are driving different routes, they not only have to pay special attention to the road conditions and avoid traffic accidents, but also need to keep



in mind where the bus stops of the new route are to ensure that they will not miss any bus stops, otherwise they may be blamed or complained by passengers, which is a lighter outcome, but for the serious one, traffic accidents may occur. In view of that, such arrangement poses great pressure on bus captains and a great threat to the lives of the public.

- Implementation of “jumping among models”

In order to reduce the waiting time for buses, many bus captains are required to accept the arrangement of First Bus on “jumping among models” (the so-called “jumping among models” means that a bus captain has to get on another bus with longer parking time for another driving task when he or she reaches the bus terminus). In this case, many bus captains have to drive 4 to 5 different types of buses in one day. Since bus captains cannot drive a fixed bus and the performance of different bus models is different, together with the increase in the workload of bus captains to a certain extent under such arrangement of “jumping among models”, many bus captains are unable to well adapt and master the performance of the bus timely. Poor handling is very likely to lead to a traffic accident, causing safety problems of bus captains, passengers, other road users and the public.

- Very unreasonable meal arrangement

As to squeeze employees to a greater extent, First Bus even makes absurd arrangements for the meal schedule of bus captains. For example, some bus captains are required to have their lunch at 9 am or 4 pm, while dinner time is arranged after 11 pm. Such stipulations of “breakfast/tea as lunch” and “midnight snack as dinner” not only seriously affect the health and driving performance of bus captains, but also pose a great potential danger to the safety of passengers.

- Abuse of material penalties to intimidate employees

Regarding various problems in operation of First Bus in recent years, its management intended to lay the blame on the employees instead of having an introspection and carrying out improvements. As to achieve such intention, the management not only often rebukes the employees unreasonably, but also abuses many material penalties, such as different kinds of warnings, and even dismissal of the employees concerned, which pose heavy pressure on employees. Regarding the unreasonable measures of the employer, many employees who are in anger remain silent for the sake of “securing the job”. However, their innermost anger has reached the high and they thus need the

understanding and support from the public.

- Sudden change of timetable frequently

For the sake of administrative convenience, First Bus has often changed the timetable (that is the work schedule) in recent years, with notifications of some timetables as short as one to two days. At the same time, the frequency of changing the timetable is very high, making many bus captains difficult to adapt. In this case, many bus captains worry that their performance may be affected due to the lack of rest. If mistakes arise, they have to be subject to unjustified punishment from the company and thus feel very helpless.

- Too long working hours for bus captains in overnight shift

At the beginning of this year, New Bus began to amend the working hours of bus captains in overnight shift to 12 hours or above each day. In this case, long working time makes these bus captains physically and mentally exhausted, which affects their performance and increase the chance of traffic accidents.

- Serious shortage of stationmasters

At present, there is a serious shortage of stationmasters in many bus terminuses who are responsible for handling driving arrangements, particularly the peak hours during which some stationmasters need to deploy hundreds of buses, causing their workload to surge significantly. In this situation, many stationmasters are forced to work under tremendous pressure.

In addition to numerous unreasonable treatments on frontline staff, the Union also learned that employees in other positions also encountered a number of issues related to their rights and interests:

- Intention to cancel textbook and stationery allowance for children of office staff

In order to reduce welfare of its employees, the management of New Bus intends to request the office staff to sign a new contract with a trick, in which New Bus secretly abolishes the textbook and stationery allowance of HKD1,000 per year for children of office staff under the new contract. This practice not only violates the agreement previously reached between New Bus and the Union, but also materially undermines the rights and interests that the employees should have.

● Frequent job changes among garage technicians

In order to reduce the manpower to a greater extent, New Bus has frequently adjusted the working hours and place for garage technicians recently, with an intention to reduce manpower by reorganizing the posts, thus causing chaos in the garage and increasing pressure on technicians. As a matter of fact, poor backup and maintenance service will bring much concern to the bus safety.

In response to the several unreasonable work arrangements above, the Union makes the following requests and looks for improvements from New Bus as soon as possible:

1. Stop the arrangement of "jumping among models", so that bus captain can better master the performance of the bus he or she is driving;
2. Specify the number of "jumping among routes", that is, each bus captain can only make a jump once per day, so as to reduce the chance for making mistakes by them.
3. Establish a reasonable meal schedule to ensure the health of bus captains;
4. Renounce the use of threats, punishments, and dismissal among employees and enhance communication with them, and timely help bus captains solve problems relating to their works;
5. Oppose sudden changes of timetable frequently, and offer enough time for bus captains to adapt to the new work arrangement;
6. Reduce working hours of bus captains in overnight shift to 10 hours or less per day, so that they can have enough time for rest;
7. Increase the manpower and reduce the workload of stationmasters;
8. Grant the textbook and stationery allowance for children of office staff again in accordance with the agreement reached with the Union;
9. Immediately stop the job adjustments for garage technicians so that they can work at their original posts comfortably;

Under the efforts of the Union and strong pressure from public opinion, First Bus eventually verbally agreed to adopt some improvement measures, such as reducing the number of "jumping among models", improving the meal schedule for bus captains, reducing the work pressure of stationmasters, granting allowance for children of office staff again and stopping the job adjustments for garage technicians. However, First Bus makes no explicit response to the specific implementation time and effectiveness. Therefore, the Union hopes that all Honourable Members of the Legislative Council can help us follow up these issues. In addition, for some core issues such as the "jumping among routes", First Bus makes use of

several excuses to discard the “1+1” resolution proposed by the Union (this resolution advises that other than the original routes, each bus captain drives no more than one other route daily). Therefore, the Union also hopes that all Honourable Members of the Legislative Council can continue to keep an eye on these issues to get the solutions as soon as possible.

In addition to requesting First Bus to make improvements for the above issues as soon as possible, the Union also hopes that the relevant government departments can pay attention to these issues and provide assistance to employees of First Bus, so as to safeguard their rights and interests, as well as the lives and safety of the public. However, the response to these relevant issues from the Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works, Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, in the Legislative Council recently stated that no additional guidelines will be formulated as there is no information indicating that the arrangements of “jumping among routes” and “jumping among models” will have an impact on traffic safety. Besides, Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, the Secretary, also pointed out that only less than 2% of bus captains need to drive more than 4 to 5 bus routes each day among the 1,300 bus routes. In regard to the comments of the Secretary, the Union considers that there is a big gap with the reality. In fact, bus captains have already suffered tremendous work pressure under the unreasonable systems of “jumping among routes” and “jumping among models”. At the same time, bus captains also face the unjustified and highly stressful penalty, making them physically and mentally exhausted. Under such circumstances, ensuring the safety of the public seems to be an unreachable goal. On the other hand, according to the information obtained by the Union, more than 170 routes among 1300 routes or above suffered from the aforesaid problems. Hence, the proportion of affected bus captains exceeds 13%. In any case, the Union considers that Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, as an accountable secretary, shall care about and actively deal with any matters relating to the protection of the lives of the public, rather than rashly finding an excuse for stalling the responsibilities. In response, the Union expresses its strong dissatisfaction, and at the same time hopes that all Honourable Members of the Legislative Council can help us follow up these issues.

New World Bus Branch  
29 October 2004

**[chopped: MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS GENERAL UNION  
NEW WORLD BUS BRANCH]**

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汽車交通運輸業總工會城巴分會出席『交通事務委員會 2004 年 10 月 29 日舉行的會議』，本會將圍繞以下三方面內容發表意見：

- 一、每天駕駛不同型號巴士，關鍵要有相應的時間去適應。
- 二、每天行走不同路線，會增加交通事故發生的機會。
- 三、用膳時間安排不合理，長此下去有損車長健康。

[Translation]

Motor Transport Workers General Union Kowloon Motor Bus Branch will attend the “Conference held on 29 October 2009 by the Panel of Transport”, and the Union will provide comments on the following three areas:-

1. The key to driving different models of buses every day is to have the requisite time for adjustment.
2. Increasing the routes taken per day would increase the chances of traffic accidents occurring.
3. If the bus captains’ meal times are not arranged appropriately, the health of bus captains will deteriorate in the long run.



城巴有限公司職工會(職工盟屬會)  
Citybus Limited Employees Union

CB(1)127/04-05(01)

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### 有關行車時間表之意見

本會對有關公司行車時間表之問題，意見如下：

第一，我們對公司安排車長每天駕駛不會超過三條路線之政策原則，本會並不反對；

第二，我們認為車長駕駛三條路線之安排，並不會直接構成安全問題。但可能會對部份車長構成工作壓力；

第三，本會就著如何減低車長的工作壓力問題，已經參與由勞資雙方組成之工作小組，專責討論改善行車時間表的問題。對於行車時間表的其他細節會與公司進一步商討，務求達至共識。

此致

立法會交通事務委員會

各委員



城巴有限公司職工會

2004 年 10 月 27 日



[Translation]

**Comments regarding driving schedule**

This Union has the following comments regarding the Company's driving schedule:-

Firstly, we do not oppose the Company's policy whereby bus captains are arranged to drive not more than 3 routes per day.

Secondly, we consider that the aforesaid arrangement of 3 routes per day would not directly cause any safety issues. However, the said arrangement may lead to working stress for some bus captains;

Thirdly, as regards how to minimize working stress for bus captains, this Union has already participated in the working groups set up by employers and employees, to discuss how to address the issues concerning the driving schedule. This Union will enter into further discussions with the Company regarding the details of the driving schedule in hopes that an understanding can be reached.

To:

Members of The Legislative Council Panel on Transport

Citybus Limited Employees Union

27 October 2004

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Safety of Franchised Bus Service Operations**

**Purpose**

In view of recent concerns about some franchised bus companies' duty arrangement, this paper sets out the duty arrangements for bus drivers adopted by franchised bus companies and their relationship with safety of bus operation.

**Scheduling arrangements for bus drivers**

2. The scheduling arrangements of franchised bus companies have evolved through continuous adjustments and improvements over the years to meet the operational needs of the companies and staff requests. Basically, there are two main types of driving duties, viz. regular duties with continuous duty hours, and split duties with several hours' break embedded in the duty hours. Split duties are common practices for bus operation in other countries to meet peak travel demands efficiently and are adopted by some of the local franchised bus companies. Most companies have a rotation system in allocating driving duties to individual drivers within a certain period. A summary of the main features of the existing duty arrangements for bus drivers of the franchised bus companies is at Annex A.

Annex A

3. In scheduling their drivers' duties, the franchised bus companies generally take account of the need to:

- (a) provide adequate bus services to meet passenger demand at different times of a day and days of a week;
- (b) provide sufficient journey time, rest time and meal breaks for drivers to prevent fatigue and to ensure that bus safety will not be compromised;

- (c) cater for different traffic condition of individual bus routes;
- (d) optimize use of bus and driver resources to maintain operational efficiency to help keep fares at a reasonable level; and
- (e) consider the needs and requests of individual drivers.

#### Annex B

4. Transport Department (“TD”) has issued a set of voluntary guidelines on working schedule for bus drivers (copy at Annex B) to franchised bus operators. The guidelines specify the maximum duty length, the maximum driving duty duration as well as the breaks to be provided to drivers during their duty shift and between working days.

#### **Bus driver interworking arrangements**

5. To enhance efficiency and better utilise resources, it is not unusual that overseas bus companies will arrange their drivers to operate more than one bus or one bus route in a duty shift. In local franchised bus operation, most of the drivers are scheduled to operate one to two buses (varying between bus companies from 65% to 100%) and one to two bus routes (varying between bus companies from 63% to 99%) in a duty shift.

#### **New World First Bus’s response to drivers’ concerns about driver interworking arrangement**

6. In view of the concern expressed by its bus driver union on the number of bus routes in a duty, New World First Bus (“NWFB”) has voluntarily agreed to improve its duty arrangement as follows:

- (a) to review from time to time the driver duties taking account of the traffic situation to ensure that drivers will have sufficient time to operate the designated bus journeys, to rest and to have meal breaks;

- (b) to carefully consider the wishes of individual drivers in assigning driving duties to them;
- (c) to consult and consider the views of the affected drivers who are required to change driving duties, and give sufficient notice to them before implementing the changes; and
- (d) to provide sufficient training to drivers if they have to operate unfamiliar routes in the revised driving duties.

7. TD has encouraged the management of NWFB and the unions to maintain close liaison to discuss matters affecting staff and union members. The company and the staff union have held meetings to discuss the scheduling arrangement. The two parties will continue the discussion.

### **Duty arrangements and safety of franchised bus operation**

8. All franchised bus companies in Hong Kong have been providing safe and reliable services to passengers. In the past five years, there was in general a downward trend in the number of bus accidents per million kilometres operated and most of the accidents were slight ones. Details are at Annex C.

### Annex C

9. In early 2004, TD reviewed the Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers during the Bus Safety Review. To improve the arrangement concerned, TD has revised the relevant guidelines to increase the minimum break for drivers between successive working days from 8 hours to 9 hours. The new Guidelines have been adopted since 1 May 2004.

10. TD has recently asked all franchised bus companies to analyse their accident records in the past year to see if the duty arrangements have any implication on bus safety. The analysis does not identify any direct correlation between bus accident rates and the number of bus routes that a driver is required to operate in a duty shift. Details are at Annex D.

Annex D

11. To ensure bus operation safety, TD will continue to work with the franchised bus companies to:

- (a) ensure proper repairs and maintenance of buses by regular vehicle examination and random spot checks on franchised buses;
- (b) closely monitor the compliance of the guidelines on bus driver working hours by the franchised bus operators and review the guidelines from time to time;
- (c) conduct careful route planning, analyze the causes and trend of bus accidents and map out improvement measures;
- (d) keep track of best practices of bus safety arrangements in overseas countries and consider adopting of appropriate arrangements in Hong Kong; and
- (e) foster a responsible and caring driving culture through publicity and driving training, and promote the safety awareness of bus passengers through various publicity means.

**Major Features of Driver Scheduling Systems of the Franchised Bus Companies**


	<b>Kowloon Motor Bus ("KMB")</b>	<b>Long Win ("LW")</b>	<b>Citybus (Franchise 1) ("CTB(F1)")</b>	<b>Citybus (Franchise 2) ("CTB(F2)")</b>	<b>New World First Bus ("NWFB")</b>	<b>New Lantao Bus ("NLB")</b>
<b>Total number of driving duties</b>	6,611	243	1,263	329	1,346	87
<b>Split-duties (% of total duties)</b>	1,603 (24.2%)	37 (15.2%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	5 (5.7%)
<b>Average duty length (hours)</b>	10.44	9.77	10.22	9.83	9.70	9.52
<b>Average driving duty (hours)</b>	8.53	8.33	8.58	8.48	8.12	8.06
<b>Minimum duration of meal break</b>	30 minutes	30 minutes	1 hour	1 hour	1 hour	45 minutes
<b>Rotation of duties</b>	Driver duties will be rotated every month within a route group. Spare drivers are employed for fixed route groups.		Driver duties will be rotated every week within a route group. Spare drivers are employed for fixed route groups.		Fixed duty for each driver except for the spare drivers.	Driver duties will be rotated on the 1 <sup>st</sup> and 16 <sup>th</sup> of each month within a route group. Drivers have to serve as spare drivers on rotation.

**Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers**


(Revised on 1 May 2004)

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Guideline A | Drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes. |
| Guideline B | Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.  |
| Guideline C | Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.  |
| Guideline D | Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.   |

### Number of Bus Accidents Per Million Vehicle-Kilometre Operated (1999 - 2003)







Note: Based on bus accidents occurred in the 12-month period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004.

**Progress Report on follow up of the  
Motion on Safety of Franchised Bus Service Operations  
Legislative Council Panel on Transport Meeting on 29 October 2004**

**Purpose**

This paper reports the progress of the review on the Guidelines on working schedule of franchised bus drivers ("the Guidelines").

**Background**

2. At the Legislative Council Panel on Transport ("Transport Panel") meeting on 29 October 2004, the Panel carried a motion strongly urging the Administration to study revising the Guidelines that -

- (a) maximum duty (including all breaks) should be reduced from not exceeding 14 hours to not exceeding 10 hours;
- (b) driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should be reduced from not exceeding 11 hours to not exceeding 8 hours;
- (c) meal time schedule for drivers should not deviate from normal human biological clocks; and
- (d) schedules for driving routes should be given to bus drivers seven days in advance,

to enhance safety of franchised bus service operations.

**Present development**

3. The Transport Department has conveyed the motion passed by the Transport Panel to all franchised bus companies. They have been asked to study the feasibility and impact of implementing the proposed revisions and to consult their staff unions on the proposals.

4. Their preliminary responses are that most of their unions have expressed grave concerns on the proposed reduction of the maximum working hours and driving hours. Some of them consider that the revisions are not necessary because swapping duties is allowed for drivers who are not satisfied with their assigned duties, and adequate rest time is allowed between successive working days. Responses from some driver unions are awaited as they are conducting a survey to gauge views from their member drivers.

5. The bus companies are also examining the implications of the proposed shortening of working hours and driving hours, including the number of drivers that will be affected, impact on the drivers' take home pay, additional driving duties that would have to be created and the cost implications, etc.

6. As regards the period of notification on driver schedule and timing of the meal breaks, the franchised bus companies and their staff unions consider that driver scheduling arrangements vary among companies and their current arrangements are generally satisfactory. They indicate that there may not be a need to draw up guidelines on these two aspects. In response to the complaints made by a driver union of New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB") against meal break arrangements and insufficient advance notice for schedule changes, NWFB has already reached understanding with their unions that -

- (a) the bus drivers may raise undesirable meal break arrangements, and the company will consider adjusting the timings as far as possible; and
- (b) a 7-day notice will be given to drivers of change of normal duties.

7. The Transport Department will carefully consider all relevant factors, and report its findings and recommendations on whether the existing guidelines need to be revised after the concerned parties have been consulted.

**Report on follow up of the Motion on  
Safety of Franchised Bus Service Operations**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport Meeting on 29 October 2004**

**PURPOSE**

This paper reports the results of the review of the Guidelines on the working schedule of franchised bus drivers (“the Guidelines”), and provides the information requested by Members at the meeting of the Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) on 29 October 2004.

**BACKGROUND**

2. On 29 October 2004, the Panel carried a motion asking the Administration to study revising the Guidelines such that -

- (a) maximum duty (including all breaks) should be reduced from not exceeding 14 hours to not exceeding 10 hours;
- (b) driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should be reduced from not exceeding 11 hours to not exceeding 8 hours;
- (c) meal time schedule for drivers should not deviate from normal human biological clocks; and
- (d) schedules for driving routes should be given to bus drivers seven days in advance,

to enhance safety of franchised bus service operations.

3. At the same meeting, Members also requested the Administration to provide statistics on bus accident rates against the number of bus trips operated, bus accident rates of bus routes operated by Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Ltd. (“KMB”) and New World First Bus Services Limited

(“NWFB”) in different environments, and the compliance rate of the Guidelines over the past three years.

4. On 24 November 2004, the Administration submitted a report to the Panel on the progress of the review of the Guidelines. This report summarises the review findings and recommendations, and provides the requested information in respect of accident rates and compliance rates of the Guidelines.

## **REVIEW ON THE GUIDELINES**

### **Shortening of maximum duty and driving duties**

5. The Transport Department (“TD”) and the franchised bus operators have jointly reviewed the maximum duty and driving duty of franchised bus drivers. The major findings are as follows -

- (a) in the past five years, there was in general a downward trend in the number of bus accidents per km operated, per bus trip and per passenger carried. Moreover, most of the accidents were minor;
- (b) there was no direct correlation between bus accident rates and the number of hours that the drivers had been on duty before the accidents. A summary of the accident rates and the number of driving hours before accidents for KMB, Citybus (Franchise 1) (“CTB(F1)”), Citybus (Franchise 2) (“CTB(F2)”), NWFB, Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) and New Lantao Bus company (1973) Limited (“NLB”) is at Annex A;

- (c) the average duty hour<sup>1</sup> and driving hour<sup>2</sup> of a franchised bus driver in a day are 10.3 and 8.5 hours respectively, which are way below the maximum of 14 and 11 hours specified in the Guidelines respectively;
- (d) most of the franchised bus drivers working long duties of 12 to 14 hours in a day are on split duties. They have a long mid-day rest of about 3 hours; and
- (e) according to TD's research on overseas practices on the working hours of bus drivers (Annex B), the length of maximum duty of bus drivers ranges from 9 to 16 hours per day in various cities; and the maximum driving duty ranges from 7 to 13 hours per day. TD's current Guidelines lie within the aforesaid ranges.

Annex B

6. The franchised bus companies have consulted their driver unions or Joint Consultative Committee ("JCC") on the revisions proposed in paragraph 2 above. The driver unions or JCC do not support a shortening of maximum duty or driving hours. While some of them have not offered reasons to support their view, others have given one or more of the following reasons -

- (a) the current working or driving hours in the Guidelines are acceptable from the safety point of view;
- (b) the proposed shortening of the working and driving hours will reduce the income of the drivers and will have an adverse impact on staff morale; and/or

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<sup>1</sup> The time period between a driver reports and finishes duty on a working day. The working hours include all rest time of the driver during this period.

<sup>2</sup> The time period a driver works a day after deducting breaks lasting for 30 minutes or more, but includes short breaks which are less than 30 minutes.

- (c) drivers are generally satisfied with their driving duties, and swapping of duties are allowed for those who are not satisfied with their own duty arrangements.

7. In addition to the aforesaid reasons, all franchised bus operators do not support changing the existing maximum duty or driving hour arrangement because of the cost implication arising from the requirement of additional drivers for some 30% of extra duties, which will have a consequential impact on the fare level and the competitiveness of franchised bus service.

### **Meal time schedule**

8. Due to the need to provide adequate bus service to meet passenger demand, it is necessary to schedule drivers' meal breaks during different hours. The franchised bus driver unions consider that most of the existing meal break arrangements are acceptable. They would continue to work with their managements for improvement and do not consider a guideline on this aspect necessary. In response to the complaints made by a driver union of NWFB about meal break arrangements, NWFB has already reached an understanding with their unions that bus drivers may identify specific undesirable meal break arrangements for the company to consider appropriate adjustment.

9. As all bus companies have agreed to consider adjusting the schedule of undesirable meal breaks as far as possible, TD and the franchised bus operators consider it unnecessary to draw up a specific guideline on scheduling of meal time.

### **Advance notification of changes of driving schedule**

10. At present, franchised bus companies normally give 4 to 7 days' notice to drivers of changes of regular driving schedules. A union of NWFB asked for a 7-day advance notice of changes in driving schedules and the company has agreed to this arrangement. The franchised bus

driver unions are generally satisfied with the current arrangements. Some unions consider that imposition of a rigid guideline on advance notification of driving schedules will be less flexible.

11. The franchised bus operators do not consider a guideline on advance notification necessary because -

- (a) driver scheduling arrangements vary among bus companies and their existing systems on notifying drivers on schedule changes have been operating satisfactorily; and
- (b) the proposed guideline may limit their ability to respond quickly to ad hoc and unforeseeable changes.

## **OTHER INFORMATION**

### **Statistics on accident rates**

#### Annex C

12. The statistics on accident rates in terms of km operated, number of bus trips operated and passengers carried are at Annex C. All the statistics indicate that, in the past five years, there was in general a slight downward trend in the bus accidents rate.

### **Bus accident rates in different transport and road network**

#### Annex D

13. The accident rates of an individual company are affected by many factors, such as different transport and road networks. A breakdown of accident rates of different route groups operated by KMB and NWFB is at Annex D. As regards KMB, the accident rate per km operated for urban routes is much higher than that for rural routes and highway routes. For NWFB, the accident rate of buses operating in the highly urbanised northern shore of Hong Kong Island is higher than that of those serving less densely populated areas. It is not uncommon that there might be higher accident rates on busy roads with heavy traffic as well as intensive



pedestrian and kerbside activities. The hilly terrain and narrow and winding roads on Hong Kong Island may also be attributable to the higher accident rate.

### **Compliance with the Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers**

14. TD requires the franchised bus companies to submit quarterly reports on the compliance rate in respect of the Guidelines on the Working Schedule for bus drivers. A summary showing the compliance rates in the past three years is at Annex E. As at September 2004, except for NWFB, all franchised bus operators fully complied with the Guidelines. NWFB fully complied with Guidelines B<sup>3</sup> and D<sup>4</sup> while its compliance with Guidelines A<sup>5</sup> and C<sup>6</sup> is improving. NWFB has agreed to fully comply with Guidelines A and C by early 2005.

15. TD will, together with the franchised bus operators, continue to closely monitor the accident statistics, analyse causes and trends of bus accidents, and map out improvement measures to enhance bus safety where necessary. TD will also review the Guidelines from time to time and keep track of the practices of bus safety arrangements in overseas countries for continuous improvement.

March 2005

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau

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
<sup>3</sup> Guideline B refers to “maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.”

<sup>4</sup> Guideline D refers to “break between successive working days.” (The break between successive working days has been extended from 8 hours to 9 hours since 1.5.2004.)

<sup>5</sup> Guideline A refers to “drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes.”

<sup>6</sup> Guideline C refers to “driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.”

**Relationship between bus accident rates and  
the number of driving hours before accidents occurred**



*Note: Figures were based on bus accidents occurred in a 12-month period in 2002/03.*

**Summary of overseas requirements on bus driver working hours and rest breaks**

<b>City / Country</b>	<b>Maximum duty hours per day</b>	<b>Service break requirement</b>	<b>Maximum Driving Duty per day</b>	<b>Break between 2 successive working days</b>
(1) San Mateo County, California, USA <sup>(1)</sup>	16 hrs	Rest / meal break after 6 hr of work	10 hrs	8 hrs
(2) London, UK <sup>(2)</sup>	16 hrs	Rest break after 5.5 hrs of work	10 hrs	10 hrs
(3) British Columbia, Canada <sup>(1)</sup>	15 hrs	Nil	13 hrs	8 hrs
(4) New Zealand <sup>(2)</sup>	14 hrs	Rest / meal break after 5.5 hrs of work	11 hrs	9 hrs
(5) Queensland, Australia <sup>(1)</sup>	14 hrs	Rest break of 30 minutes after 5 hrs	12 hrs	10 hrs
(6) Berlin, Germany <sup>(2)</sup>	14 hrs	Minimum 12 minutes rest break after 4.5 hrs of work. Meal break after 6 hours of work	10 hrs	10 hrs
(7) Hong Kong <sup>(2)</sup>	14 hrs	Minimum 30 minutes rest break after 6 hrs of work, and within that 6-hr duty, service breaks of at least 20 minutes.	11 hrs	9 hrs

<b>City / Country</b>	<b>Maximum duty hours per day</b>	<b>Service break requirement</b>	<b>Maximum Driving Duty per day</b>	<b>Break between 2 successive working days</b>
(8) New York City, USA <sup>(2)</sup>	14 hrs	Meal break after 5 hrs 59 minutes of work	10 hrs	8 hrs
(9) Republic of Slovenia <sup>(2)</sup>	13 hrs	(a) Rest break after 4 hrs 30 minutes of work (b) Meal break not stated	9 hrs	Nil
(10) Montreal, Canada <sup>(2)</sup>	12 hrs 30 minutes	Nil	Nil	8 hrs
(11) Switzerland <sup>(1)</sup>	12 hrs	(a) Rest break after half of work time (b) 3 rest breaks	7 hrs	12 hrs
(12) Ireland <sup>(2)</sup>	12 hrs	Rest / meal break after 4 hrs 30 min of work	11 hrs	10 hrs
(13) Norway <sup>(1)</sup>	9 hrs	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min of work (b) Meal break not stated	9 hrs	11 hrs
(14) Denmark <sup>(1)</sup>	Nil	(a) Rest break after 4 hr 30 min (b) No restriction on meal break	9 hrs	11 hrs

(1) Information as at March 2004

(2) Information as at November 2004

**Accident Rates in Terms of km Operated, Number of Bus Trips Operated and Passengers Carried**

Franchised Bus Operators	No. of accidents per million km operated					No. of accidents per million bus trips					No. of accidents per million passengers				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
KMB	3.25	3.03	2.85	2.79	2.73	48.69	46.38	45.27	45.32	44.80	1.05	1.00	0.99	0.96	0.98
LW	1.35	0.08	1.03	1.01	0.78	46.51	35.29	38.17	39.82	31.07	1.89	1.33	1.32	1.23	0.99
CTB(F1)	5.33	5.48	5.50	5.05	4.56	77.00	80.33	82.45	76.85	70.94	1.72	1.72	1.70	1.58	1.50
CTB(F2)	1.49	1.70	1.76	1.37	1.48	59.70	72.41	75.44	58.62	64.29	3.25	3.12	2.92	2.13	2.38
NWFB	5.77	5.97	4.91	4.21	4.50	77.78	81.03	70.35	61.97	66.82	2.07	1.86	1.54	1.42	1.61
NLB	0.78	1.02	0.41	1.56	1.15	14.50	18.70	7.06	25.37	17.89	0.73	0.91	0.29	0.89	0.62

**Comparison of Accident rate**  
**by types of bus routes operated by KMB and NWFB**

(No. of accident per million km during the period from 1.7.2003 to 30.6.2004)

<b>Types of bus route</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>NWFB</b>
Urban routes (Note 1)	4.51	5.11
Rural Routes	2.45(Note 2)	4.76(Note 2)
Highways Routes	1.49	-

**Notes**

Note 1 : Urban routes are routes with over 50% of journey distance serving densely populated urban areas in Kowloon and northern shore of Hong Kong Island.

Note 2: KMB rural routes are routes with over 50% of journey distance mostly serving new towns in the New Territories. NWFB's rural routes are routes serving Southern District, a big number of which are operating on hilly terrain and narrow and winding roads.

**Compliance rate on**  
**Guidelines on working schedule of franchised bus drivers**

**Guideline A**

Drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have -total service breaks of at least 20 minutes

<b>Year</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>CTB F1</b>	<b>NWFB</b>	<b>CTB F2</b>	<b>LW</b>	<b>NLB</b>
2001	100%	99.0%	94.4%	100%	87.5%	100%
2002	100%	99.7%	94.6%	100%	100%	100%
2003	100%	100%	98.3%	100%	100%	100%
2004 (Jan-Sep)	100%	100%	99.8%	100%	100%	100%

**Guideline B**

Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours

<b>Year</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>CTB F1</b>	<b>NWFB</b>	<b>CTB F2</b>	<b>LW</b>	<b>NLB</b>
2001	99.9%	100%	99.8%	100%	100%	98.6%
2002	99.9%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98.7%
2003	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2004 (Jan-Sep)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Guideline C**

Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.

<b>Year</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>CTB F1</b>	<b>NWFB</b>	<b>CTB F2</b>	<b>LW</b>	<b>NLB</b>
2001	99.99%	99.5%	97.3%	100%	100%	100%
2002	99.97%	99.9%	97.3%	100%	100%	100%
2003	100%	100%	87.2%	100%	100%	100%
2004 (Jan-Sep)	100%	100%	96.5%	100%	100%	100%

**Guideline D**

Break between successive working days \*

<b>Year</b>	<b>KMB</b>	<b>CTB F1</b>	<b>NWFB</b>	<b>CTB F2</b>	<b>LW</b>	<b>NLB</b>
2001	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2002	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2003	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2004 (Jan-Sep)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: The compliance rate is the % of driving duties that meets the Guideline concerned.

\* The break between successive working days has been extended from 8 hours to 9 hours since 1.5.2004. The table above shows the compliance rate of a 8-hour break during the period from 1.1.2001 to 30.4.2004 and a 9-hour break from 1.5.2004 onwards.



**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(1)113/06-07

Ref: CB1/PL/TP

**Panel on Transport**

**Background Brief on  
Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

**Purpose**

This paper provides background information on safety of franchised bus operation, and summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by members of the Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) in the past.

**Background**

2. Transport Department (“TD”) monitors the operation of franchised bus services in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) and the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) (“RTO”) and their Regulations. The franchised bus operators are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify, and TD’s examiners are empowered to inspect the buses and maintenance facilities at any reasonable time. While buses should observe the general speed limit designated on roads, the maximum speed of a bus is restricted under the RTO to 70 km/h on roads with a posted speed limit over 70km/h.

3. There are five franchised bus companies in Hong Kong. They are:

<b>Franchised bus company</b>	<b>Expiry date of franchise</b>
• Citybus Limited (Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network)	1 June 2016
• Citybus Limited (Airport and North Lantau bus network)	1 May 2013
• New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited	1 March 2017
• Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited	1 July 2017
• The New World First Bus Services Limited	1 July 2013
• Long Win Bus Company Limited	1 May 2013

## **Previous discussions by the Panel on Transport**

4. Safety of franchised bus operation has always been high on the agenda of the Panel. In November 2003, the Panel reviewed with the Administration measures taken and being planned to ensure and enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

### Seat belt

5. In the course of deliberation, some members of the Panel urged the Administration to consider imposing a mandatory requirement for all new and existing buses to be installed with seat belts. The Administration's view was that according to TD's research on overseas experience, the additional safety benefit of installing seat belts on all seats might not be as great as envisaged. In response to members' request, the Administration had provided supplementary information on requirements of installation of seat belts on buses in some overseas countries (**Annex A**).

### Maximum duty and driving duty of drivers

6. The Panel had also reviewed the maximum duty and driving duty of franchised bus drivers. Some members were concerned about the long working hours of bus drivers and the resulting safety implications. They requested the Administration to expeditiously review the guidelines on bus driver working hours so that bus drivers would not be required to work for more than 8 hours a day. Some other members however held the view that while there should not be any compromise on road safety, the issue of working hours of bus drivers must be considered objectively. In reviewing the matter, it would be most important to consider the views of the bus drivers as some might find the present arrangements acceptable. They might even welcome the opportunity to work a longer shift so that they could get extra pay or make better use of their rest time. Hence, a certain degree of flexibility should be allowed.

### Review of the safety arrangements by franchised bus companies

7. Subsequent to the meeting in November 2003, the Administration had asked all franchised bus operators to conduct a thorough review on their safety arrangements and areas where further enhancement to road and passenger safety could be made. The review covered the following areas:

- (a) analysis of correlation between bus accidents and drivers' age, experience and working hours;
- (b) driver training;
- (c) driver working schedule;
- (d) installation of safety devices and measures to monitor driving behaviour;

- (e) vehicle examination; and
- (f) measures to promote safety awareness of drivers and passengers.

8. In May 2004, the Administration provided an information paper to the Panel (LC Paper No. CB(1) 1955/03-04(01)), informing members of the major findings of the review and the recommended measures to further enhance bus safety.

#### Findings of the review of the safety arrangements

9. The Administration advised that in considering the operators' review reports, TD had taken into account the recommendations made by the Tuen Mun Traffic Incident Independent Expert Panel and comments expressed by the Panel during earlier discussions on the subject. In brief, the franchised bus operators and TD had analyzed the bus accident records and had the following major observations:

- (a) franchised bus operation had a relatively stable safety record. Between 1999 and 2003, there was in general a downward trend in the number of bus accidents per million km operated and most of them were slight accidents;
- (b) no direct correlation was identified statistically between bus accident rates and drivers' age, years of service and working hours; and
- (c) driver factor contributed to about one-third of the bus accidents involving injuries in 2003. Passengers not holding handrails tight was also one of the major causes of personal injuries in bus accidents.

#### Recommendations to further enhance safety of franchised bus operation

10. The Administration also advised that in order to further enhance safety of franchised bus operation, TD would work together with franchised bus companies to speed up the implementation of a number of improvement measures, including the introduction of annual medical check for drivers aged 50 or above, enhancement of the training programmes for bus drivers, revision of the guidelines on working schedule for bus drivers, installation of speed limiters and blackbox on all new buses to be purchased, deployment of staff to conduct speed checks at critical locations to monitor driving attitude of drivers, retrofitting of armrests at exposed seats, etc.

11. The Administration also pointed out that TD would continue:

- (a) to monitor bus operation closely and analyze the causes and trend of bus accidents, and map out improvement measures to enhance

bus safety;

- (b) to conduct careful route planning, taking into account the suitability of franchised bus operation with due regard to the design or conditions of the roads and deployment of suitable bus models on the routes;
- (c) to ensure that all buses are maintained up to the required standard;
- (d) to foster a responsible and caring driving culture through publicity and driving training, and promote the safety awareness of bus passengers through various publicity means; and
- (e) to keep track of the best practices of bus safety arrangements in overseas countries and consider the adoption of appropriate arrangements in Hong Kong.

#### Guidelines on working schedule of franchised bus drivers

12. At the meeting on 29 October 2004, the Panel reviewed with the Administration and franchised bus companies the guidelines on working schedule of franchised bus drivers. The Panel carried a motion strongly urging the Administration to study revising the guidelines such that

- (a) maximum duty (including all breaks) should be reduced from not exceeding 14 hours to not exceeding 10 hours;
- (b) driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should be reduced from not exceeding 11 hours to not exceeding 8 hours;
- (c) meal time schedule for drivers should not deviate from normal human biological clocks; and
- (d) schedules for driving routes should be given to bus drivers seven days in advance

to enhance safety of franchised bus service operations.

13. On 24 November 2004, the Administration submitted a report to the Panel on the progress of the review of the guidelines. According to the Administration, concerns had been expressed by some staff unions on the proposed reduction of the maximum working hours and driving hours which might affect their income. Franchised bus companies were also examining the implications of the proposed shortening of working hours and driving hours, including the number of drivers that would be affected, impact on the drivers' take home pay, additional driving duties that would have to be created and the cost implications, etc.

14. As regards the period of notification on driver schedule and timing of the meal breaks, the franchised bus companies and their staff unions considered that driver scheduling arrangements varied among companies and their current arrangements were generally satisfactory. They indicated that there might not be a need to draw up guidelines on these two aspects.

#### **Recent bus incidents**

15. There has been wide public concern about the recent spate of bus incidents, including fatal traffic accidents involving franchised buses, emission of smoke due to engine failure, shattering of bus window and windscreen, passengers being thrown out from the upper saloon of a bus, etc. The Panel agreed to hold a meeting on 24 October 2006 to discuss measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation with the Administration and franchised bus companies.

16. A list of relevant papers is at **Annex B**.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
23 October 2006

**Overseas experience on  
installation of seat belts on franchised buses**

Transport Department has collected information on requirements of installation of seat belts on buses in some overseas countries including Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, European Union, New York State of U.S.A., Canada and Singapore. It is observed that most countries examined require the installation of seat belts on driver's seat but do not require the installation of seat belts on all other seats of buses. For countries where the seat belt requirement applies, urban bus routes and urban bus with standing passengers are exempted. The requirements are summarised below –

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Australia</b>	Seat belt shall be installed on driver's seat on all buses. As regards other seats, installation of seat belts is required for exposed seats but urban routes are exempted from the requirement.
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Installation of seat belts on all seats is required for buses first used on or after 1.10.2001. However, such requirement does <u>not</u> apply to buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
<b>New Zealand</b>	All light motor vehicles manufactured on or after 1.10.2003 shall have seat belts installed on all seats. However, this requirement does not apply to buses with over 12 seats and exceeding 3.5 tonnes.
<b>European Union</b>	The requirements to install seat belts on all seats will apply to all new vehicles including buses on the market from July 2004 onwards. The new requirements are expected to be implemented across member states in 2006. However, requirements for seat belts on urban buses will be left to member state governments to decide.
<b>New York State of U.S.A.</b>	Large school buses manufactured after 1 July 1987 shall have seat belts installed on all seats.

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Canada</b>	A bus with a gross vehicular weight greater than 4,536 kg shall have seat belt installed for the driver seat but seat belts for the other passenger seats are not required.
<b>Singapore</b>	Installation of seat belts is required for the driver's seat and the specified passenger seats*.

2. Studies on fitting of seat belts on buses conducted in Australia and Canada indicated that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belt on all seats in a bus might not be as great as envisaged due to the following reasons:

- (a) unrestrained passengers can cause injury to other passengers who have fastened the seat belts. Hence, installation of seat belts might not be an effective safety measure if standees are allowed on buses; and
- (b) overall effectiveness of seat belts also depends on whether the belts are used by all passengers. It is difficult to ensure that all passenger use seat belts on buses, e.g. passengers carrying large bags and parcels may find fastening seat belt inconvenient and may not bother to do so. Passengers sitting on aisle seats may also find it inconvenient to unbuckle seat belts to allow passengers in and out of window seats.

**Transport Department**  
**May 2004**

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\* "Specified passenger's seat" means:

- (a) a forward-facing front seat alongside the driver's seat; and in the case of a vehicle which has more than one such seat, the one furthest from the driver's seat; or
- (b) if the vehicle has no such seat as mentioned in (a) above, the forward-facing front seat for a passenger which is foremost in the vehicle and furthest from the driver's seat, unless there is a fixed partition separating such seat from the space in front of it alongside the driver's seat.

### Relevant documents on the safety of franchised bus operation

Date of meeting	Meeting	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
28.11.03	Panel on Transport	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)589/03-04 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp031128.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp031128.pdf</a>
		Administration's paper on the measures taken and being planned to ensure and enhance the safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)406/03-04(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf</a>
		Administration's supplementary information on "Measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation"	CB(1)1815/03-04(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-1815-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-1815-1e.pdf</a>
	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on the major findings of the review conducted by the franchised bus companies on their safety arrangements and the recommended measures to further enhance bus safety	CB(1)1955/03-04(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf</a>
29.10.04	Panel on Transport	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)286/04-05 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp041029.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp041029.pdf</a>
		Administration's paper on the duty arrangements for bus drivers adopted by franchised bus companies and their relationship with safety of bus operation	CB(1)111/04-05(05) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-5e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-5e.pdf</a>



Date of meeting	Meeting	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Background brief on work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies prepared by the Secretariat	CB(1)112/04-05 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-112-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-112-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's paper on the progress of the review on the Guidelines on working schedule of franchised bus drivers	CB(1)324/04-05(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-324-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-324-1e.pdf</a>
		Administration's supplementary information on "Report on follow up of the Motion on Safety of Franchised Bus Service Operations"	CB(1)1086/04-05(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-1086-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/papers/tp1029cb1-1086-1e.pdf</a>

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
 23 October 2006

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Safety of Franchised Bus Operations**

### **Purpose**

This paper briefs Members on the measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operations.

### **Bus Safety**

2. The total number of accidents which involved franchised buses slightly decreased from 1,772 in 2004 to 1,735 in 2005. This implies a decrease in the number of fatal and serious accidents from 311 to 264 and an increase of slight accidents<sup>1</sup> from 1,461 to 1,471. Whilst franchised buses run high mileage daily, the accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre decreased slightly from 3.162 in 2004 to 3.158 in 2005.

3. There were recent incidents such as broken window glasses and traffic accidents involving franchised buses which arouse public concerns on bus safety and bus maintenance requirement. Concerns such as better protection for passengers from broken window glasses and installation of seat belts have been raised.

### **Measures to Enhance Bus Safety**

4. The Transport Department (“TD”) monitors the operation of franchised bus services and maintenance of the buses in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“PBSO”), Cap.230, and the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap.374, and their Regulations. Safety is one of the major areas that TD would have particular concern.

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<sup>1</sup> A slight accident is one in which one or more persons is injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours. Serious accident involves injury to any person who is hospitalized for more than 12 hours. Fatal accidents refer to an accident causing death to any person within 30 days.

5. Measures to ensure the safety of franchised bus operation have been developed over the years and proved to be effective in ensuring bus safety. These measures are outlined from paragraphs 6 to 14 below.

A. Vehicle inspection and examination

6. The Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, Cap. 374A, stipulates the requirement of design and construction of franchised bus. Every new model of franchised bus has to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements before the buses can be registered and licensed for use on the road. The type approval includes a tilt test to ensure stability of the bus.

7. Under PBSO, Cap. 230, the franchised bus operators are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify. Every franchised bus has to undergo annual examination to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor the proper maintenance of the buses. TD closely monitors the franchised bus operators' maintenance programmes and hold regular meetings with them to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, to formulate actions to enhance bus safety.

B. Safety equipment and facilities

8. The franchised bus operators are encouraged to introduce new safety technology on their buses including speed limiter and blackbox<sup>2</sup>. About 3,000 franchised buses (or 51% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with blackboxes and the bus operators have agreed to retrofit the equipment to the existing and new buses. About 5,800 franchised buses (or 99% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with speed limiting devices and all bus companies have agreed to

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<sup>2</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operation data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and accident investigation.

include the device as standard equipment for buses to be purchased.

9. All the 5,883 franchised buses are equipped with handholds for seated and standing passengers. Majority of the fleet is also equipped with other facilities and equipment to enhance passenger safety such as high back seat and non-slippery floor. About 2,000 franchised buses (or 34% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with seatbelt at the exposed seats<sup>3</sup>.

#### C. Bus driver training and safety education

10. Franchised bus operators provide various trainings to their drivers, including basic training for new drivers and annual refresher and enhancement courses to serving drivers to enhance their safety awareness:

- (a) Basic trainings for new drivers range from a few days to a few weeks – the programmes cover classroom and on-the-road training which include company rules and code of practice, bus and facilities operation, bus driving techniques such as maneuvering and driving responses and manner on road, and route training and driving practices.
- (b) Refresher and enhancement courses for serving drivers are provided to -
  - (i) strengthen their driving skills and manners (including defensive driving);
  - (ii) help them to understand the potential risks of the routes they serve, e.g. the location of accident black spots and the appropriate reaction including emergency situation handling; and
  - (iii) introduce safety tips.
- (c) Franchised bus companies also remind their drivers on safe

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<sup>3</sup> Exposed seats are forward facing seats in a franchised bus which are not immediately behind another forward-facing seat or an internal partition/panel. There are usually 14 exposed seats in a double deck bus: 5 seats at last row on lower deck, 4 seats at third row facing backward-facing seats on lower deck, 4 seats at first row on upper deck and the middle seat at last row on upper deck

driving through regular issue of circulars, notices and in-house magazines.

11. Since 2002, TD has conducted at least four “Road Safety Seminars” for franchised bus drivers per year since 2002 in collaboration with the Police. Road safety experts are invited to highlight tips on safe driving, analyze major accident spots and common contributory factors of bus accidents to share with the bus drivers so as to promote their road safety awareness and proper driving behavior.

12. TD also organizes “Road Safety Forum for Franchised Bus” regularly with all franchised bus operators and the Police to examine the trend of bus accidents, identify major problem areas and formulate improvement measures.

13. To ensure that bus drivers have sufficient rest time, TD reviewed with the franchised bus companies the working schedule of their drivers and issued a set of guidelines on working schedule for bus drivers to franchised bus operators. The guidelines specify the maximum duty length, the maximum driving duty duration as well as the breaks to be provided to drivers during their duty shift and between working days. The franchised bus operators fully comply with the Guidelines according to their quarterly reports to TD.

#### D. Publicity on passenger safety

14. More than 50% of franchised bus accidents involved passengers being injured even the buses had not collided with any other vehicles, objects or pedestrians. Many of these accidents could have been avoided if passengers held tight the handrail while standing or sat properly. To remind passengers to be careful when using bus services, franchised bus operators have put in place publicity programmes through bus body advertisements and on-bus televisions. TD also produces television and radio announcements in the public interest (“APIs”) to promote passenger safety awareness with a view to helping reduce bus accidents. For instance, API was produced in 2001 and 2004 to remind passenger safety

precautions inside a franchised bus. A publicity programme was launched in June 2006. This includes broadcasting of APIs on television, radio and on-bus television, and display of notices and stickers at bus passenger shelters, bus customer service centres and inside bus compartments to remind passengers to hold handrail tightly inside moving buses.

## **Bus Windows**

15. Reg. 28 of the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, Cap. 374A, stipulates that glass or transparent material used in all windscreens, windows and partitions of a motor vehicle shall be safety glass or safety glazing and of a type approved by the Commissioner for Transport. The standards of windscreens and windows, are specified in the Specification of Safety Glass Notice, Cap. 374H. The two basic types of automotive glass commonly used on franchised buses are laminated safety glass<sup>4</sup> and toughened (tempered) safety glass<sup>5</sup>, both of which can reduce injury when being broken.

16. The driver's windscreens on franchised buses in Hong Kong are laminated glass to prevent the driver's vision from being seriously affected when the glass is broken. Side windows are usually constructed with toughened glass which can be broken to allow passengers to escape in case of accident or emergence.

17. In view of the recent incidents involving broken window glasses on franchised buses, TD in conjunction with bus operators are conducting feasibility study of adhering an anti-shatter protective film on the upper deck windscreen made of toughened glass to give better protection to passengers in case the glasses are broken.

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<sup>4</sup> Laminated glass has a plastic interlayer in between 2 glass layers, and is designed to retain the fragments when the glass is shattered.

<sup>5</sup> Toughened glass is glass that has been heat-treated to increase its strength, and to allow it to fracture into small pieces when broken

## **Seatbelt on Franchised Bus**

18. Under Road Traffic (Safety Equipment) Regulations , Cap.374 F, it is a mandatory requirement to provide seat belt for the driver of a franchised bus. As regards the passenger seats, about 34% of franchised buses have been equipped with seatbelt at exposed seats. These seatbelts had been installed by the bus manufacturers as standard equipment when the buses were purchased. All franchised bus operators have committed that new buses to be purchased by them will have seatbelts installed at the exposed seats. In the light of recent traffic accidents, TD has been reviewing with the franchised bus operators on retrofitting of seat belts on the existing buses, taking into account of the technical difficulties such as the structural strength of the seats, adequate anchorage points and design of the bus, etc.

19. We have conducted a research on overseas practices regarding the fitting and wearing of seat belts in buses. A summary of the corresponding seat belt requirements is at Annex. It can be seen that no overseas country requires fitting of seat belts in passenger seats of buses designed for urban use or for carrying standing passengers. Studies conducted in Australia and Canada indicated that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belt on all seats in a bus might not be as great as envisaged and that it is very difficult to ensure that all passengers will use seatbelts.

20. In view of the above, we consider that it is not appropriate to introduce mandatory requirements for installation and wearing of passenger seat belts for franchised buses. However, we will continue to work with the franchised bus operators to identify measures for better protection of passenger safety.

21. TD will, together with the franchised bus operators, continue to closely monitor the accident statistics, analyse causes and trends of bus accidents, and explore improvement measures to enhance bus safety.

### **Advice Sought**

22. Members are invited to note and give comments on the paper.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
Transport Department  
October 2006



### **Summary of Seat Belt Requirements for Buses in Overseas Countries**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Fitting of Seat Belts in Passenger Seats</b>	<b>Wearing of Seat Belts by Passengers</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
USA	No	N/A	
Canada	No	N/A	
United Kingdom	3-point/ lap-belt <sup>(1)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements are not applicable to buses first used before 1.10.2001 or buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
Australia (Victoria)	Lap-belt <sup>(2)(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to buses specially designed with spaces for standing passengers.
New Zealand	No	N/A	
Netherlands	Lap-belt <sup>(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to public transport buses.
Singapore	No	N/A	

**Notes :** (1) Lap belts may only be fitted in forward facing non-exposed seats where an appropriate energy absorbing seat or surface is present in front.

(2) Seat belts are to be provided for exposed seats.

(3) Lap-belt is the minimum requirement.

## **For Information**

### **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

#### **PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the progress in the pursuit of measures to further enhance safety of franchised bus operation.

#### **BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed on 24 October 2006 (LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07(03)) on measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration was asked to update the Panel in three months’ time on the progress of the following safety measures –

- (a) retrofitting seatbelt on franchised bus;
- (b) enhancing the standard of bus windscreen on upper deck;
- (c) installation of black box on franchised bus;
- (d) working schedule for bus captains;
- (e) promoting health of bus captains; and
- (f) employing bus captains under contract term.

#### **LATEST DEVELOPMENT**

##### ***(a) Retrofitting seatbelt on franchised bus***

3. As at November 2006, out of the 5,862 franchised buses, 2,122 buses have seatbelts at their exposed seats<sup>1</sup>. The Transport Department (“TD”) sought the advice of Alexander-Dennis Limited (“ADL”), the major bus body builder which supplied most of the franchised buses in Hong Kong, on the

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<sup>1</sup> Exposed seats are forward facing seats in a franchised bus which are not immediately behind another forward-facing seat or an internal partition/panel. There are usually 14 exposed seats in a double deck bus: 5 seats at last row on lower deck; 4 seats at third row facing backward-facing seats on lower deck; 4 seats at first row on upper deck; and the middle seat at last row on upper deck.

feasibility of retrofitting seatbelts on the existing buses. Their initial assessment regarding retrofitting of the seatbelts on the bus constructed before 1997, which constituted about 50% of the bus fleet, is summarized as follows –

- (a) A number of the older buses were produced by manufacturers who are no longer in operation, e.g. Walter Alexander and Duple Metsec. There may not be complete information on the detailed design of these buses, thus hampering technical analysis on the feasibility of retrofitting works;
- (b) There are some 30 different types of buses, each requiring extensive redesign and destructive physical testing. The cost for evaluation and redesign of one model of bus would be roughly \$3.4M per design. Assuming all information is readily available, it would take around 18 months for the design analysis before modification work can commence;
- (c) Modification work would be required to strengthen the structure of the buses to support the additional loading from the seatbelt mountings, which is substantial and costly, i.e. about \$150,000 per bus. Modification to each bus would take about four weeks to complete; and
- (d) The age of the pre-1997 buses is already 10 years or above. It is likely that their structures have undergone modifications and repairs during their service life. If seatbelts are to be retrofitted to the structures, the condition of each and every bus has to be assessed and repaired individually beforehand. The cost is likely to be very considerable.

ADL is still exploring the feasibility of retrofitting seatbelts on the post-1997 buses without seatbelts.

4. We have collected information from other countries on the requirements of fitting and fastening of seatbelts on buses. So far, we have not found any country that have legal requirements for the provision of seatbelts on passenger seats of buses designed for urban use and are allowed to carry standing passengers. According to the transport authorities of these countries,

the benefit of imposing a seatbelt requirement in their buses is uncertain. A summary of the findings is at **Annex I**.

***(b) Enhancing the standard of bus windscreen on upper deck***

5. The franchised bus companies and TD have carried out tests of the upper deck toughened glass<sup>2</sup> windscreens of the franchised buses and concluded that applying a transparent protective film onto the glass would effectively contain the shattered glass fragments in the event of an accident. This will help protect passengers from potential injury. All franchised bus companies which have double-deck buses have agreed to complete the modification work on the upper deck toughened glass windscreens of all existing buses or replace them with laminated glass<sup>3</sup> by mid 2008.

***(c) Installation of black box on franchised bus***

6. The franchised bus companies have been installing black boxes<sup>4</sup> on their buses to monitor the driving behaviour of their bus captains. New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB") has completed installation to its entire fleet in March 2006. As for the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") and Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW"), about 75% (or 3,033 buses) of KMB's fleet and 94% (or 144 buses) of LW's fleet have been installed with black boxes as at November 2006. The two bus companies will complete installation of black boxes on their fleets by end 2007. Citybus Limited ("CTB") and New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB") are conducting trials on two different types of black boxes on 100 buses. CTB will complete installation of black boxes to its entire fleet by end of 2007, while NWFB would formulate the detailed installation plan taking account of the result of the trial.

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<sup>2</sup> Toughened glass is glass that has been heat-treated to increase its strength, and to allow it to fracture into small pieces when broken.

<sup>3</sup> Laminated glass has a plastic interlayer in between two glass layers, and is designed to retain the fragments when the glass is shattered.

<sup>4</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operation data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and accident investigation.

***(d) Working schedule for bus captains***

Rest time between trips

7. The franchised bus companies schedule the working and rest time of bus captains based on the “Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers” issued by TD. Copy of the Guidelines is at **Annex II**. All franchised bus companies adopt the following principles to improve the bus captains’ scheduling arrangements –

- (a) review from time to time the driving duties taking account of the traffic situation to ensure that bus captains will have sufficient time to operate the bus trips, and have rest and meal breaks;
- (b) carefully consider the preferences of individual bus captains in assigning driving duties to them; and
- (c) give sufficient notice to bus captains before changing their driving duties.

8. Regarding breaks between trips, bus companies normally provide longer rest-breaks for routes with longer journey time, and will spread out the rest-breaks throughout the day as evenly as practicable. In practice, the length of rest-break is set at around 10% of the scheduled journey time of a bus route. Since the actual journey time of bus trips varies with traffic condition, the companies would deploy extra buses to cater for serious traffic congestion, special traffic incidents and ad hoc break-down of vehicles. This will help maintain the scheduled service timetable and allow the bus captains to have reasonable rest time between trips. The companies also review and adjust the scheduled journey time of the bus routes from time to time, taking into account the traffic conditions, passenger demand as well as the feedback from bus captains, regulators and driver unions.

9. The three major franchised bus companies i.e. KMB, CTB and NWFB operate many bus routes in the urban area where the traffic condition is more variable and sometimes unpredictable. These three companies conducted a survey on the actual between-trip rest-break time of their bus captains recently. About 64,000 bus trips were operated daily by the three companies during the survey period. The survey found that bus captains had rest-breaks of five

minutes or more between trips in 72% of the trips (46,000 trips) and had rest-breaks of two minutes or more between trips in 90% of the trips (57,800 trips). While the companies had arranged the bus captains to take rest-break as far as possible, TD has urged the companies concerned to review the scheduled journey time of the relevant bus routes and to propose realistic adjustments where appropriate.

#### Travelling time to and from work

10. The bus companies have implemented measures to shorten their bus captains' travelling time to and from work. According to KMB and LW, most of their bus captains live within the districts where their bus depots are situated. The companies operate crew buses to carry bus captains to and from depots and bus termini. In case a bus captain moves to other district, he/she may apply for transfer from one depot to another. The two bus companies did not have any outstanding application for transferal from the bus captains as at end November 2006. As for other bus companies, to facilitate bus captains travelling to and from work, CTB and NWFB provide crew bus to their bus captains, whereas NLB provides quarters for bus captains who live in a distant district.

#### ***(e) Promoting health of bus captains***

11. Apart from providing appropriate schedule arrangements for bus captains, to reduce the stress felt by bus captains while on driving duties, the franchised bus companies have been providing them with regular training and refresher courses to improve their driving skill and behaviour. They also regularly review the contents of their training courses in the light of changing traffic environment, passenger requirement, and accident occurrence. In addition, they also facilitate their bus captains in attending the safety courses and forums organized by TD and the Police.

12. All franchised bus companies provide medical care for their employees. In addition to medical treatment and paid sick leave, CTB, NWFB and NLB have been providing annual medical examination for their bus captains aged 50 or above whereas KMB/LW have been providing examination to bus captains aged 60 or above. After consultation with the drivers' unions,

KMB and LW will also provide annual medical examination for their bus captains aged 50 or above with effect from 2007.

13. In addition to the above, the franchised bus companies regularly organize recreational activities such as picnics, hikings and football matches, etc. for their employees in order heighten their awareness of the importance of maintaining a proper work-life balance. They also arrange seminars and counselling service for their bus captains to help them maintain a healthy physical and mental life. In 2007, KMB/LW will launch an Employee Caring Program which will provide counselling services, health talks, stress management tips and family days to their employees and CTB/NWFB will continue to organise Fun Day, etc. TD considers that the health-care services, training and other work-balance activities provided by the franchised bus companies are generally adequate and comprehensive in helping their bus captains to achieve proper work-life balance.

*(f) Employing bus captains under contract term*

14. KMB/LW and CTB/NWFB started to employ new bus captains on contract terms since 2000 and 2003 respectively after consultation with their trade and driver unions. Contract terms range from one to two years and the bus companies advise that 99% of the contracts are renewed on expiry. The number of contract bus captains in the bus companies as at December 2006 is as follows –

<b>Company*</b>	<b>Total no. of bus captains</b>	<b>No. of bus captains under contract terms</b>	<b>% of bus captains under contract terms</b>
KMB	8,170	1,920	23.5%
CTB	2,088	96	4.6%
NWFB	1,668	82	4.9%
LW	331	53	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,257</b>	<b>2,151</b>	<b>17.5%</b>

\* NLB has no contract bus captains.

15. KMB has the highest percentage of bus companies employed under contract terms. The company has analysed the accident rates of non-contract

and contract bus captains and a summary of the analysis is at **Annex III**. The findings do not show evidence that the contract bus captains have a higher accident rate than the non-contract bus captains.

16. TD will, together with the franchised bus operators, continue to closely monitor the accident statistics, analyse causes and trends of bus accidents, and explore improvement measures to further enhance bus safety.

#### **ADVICE SOUGHT**

17. Members are requested to note the contents of this paper.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
Transport Department  
January 2007



**Summary of Seat Belt Requirements in Buses in some Overseas Countries**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Fitting of seatbelts in passenger seats</b>	<b>Wearing of seatbelts by passengers</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
USA	No	N/A	-
Canada	No	N/A	-
UK	3-point/ lap-belt <sup>(1)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements are not applicable to buses first used before 1.10.2001 or buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
Australia (Victoria)	Lap-belt <sup>(2)(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to buses specially designed with spaces for standing passengers.
New Zealand	No	N/A	-
Netherlands	Lap-belt <sup>(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to public transport buses.
Singapore	No	N/A	-

**Notes:**

1. Lap belts may only be fitted in forward facing non-exposed seats where an appropriate energy absorbing seat or surface is present in front.
2. Seat belts are to be provided for exposed seats.
3. Lap-belt is the minimum requirement.

**Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers**

(Revised on 1 May 2004)

- Guideline A – Drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes.
- Guideline B – Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C – Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D – Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.

**KMB's Analysis of Bus Accident Rates of  
Contract and Non-contract Bus Captains**

All KMB bus captains employed before 2000 were not on contract terms, while those employed since 2000 were on contract term. In 2005, KMB compared the accident rates of the contract and non-contract bus captains.

2. As bus driving experience is one of the factors of bus accidents, KMB analysed the accident data of bus captains with less than 24 months bus driving experience in the periods 1998-1999 and 2002-2004. The accident records of two groups of bus captains were analysed:

- (a) those with less than 24 months experience in years 1998 and 1999.  
All of them were not on contract term; and
- (b) those with less than 24 months experience in years 2002 to 2004<sup>1</sup>.  
All of them were on contract term.

3. The findings are summarized below -

		<b>Drivers employed under non- contract terms</b>		<b>Drivers employed under contract terms</b>		
<b>Year</b>		<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
(a)	No. of accidents involving bus captains with experience less than 24 months	307	274	160	99	76
(b)	Average no. of bus captains with experience less than 24 months	1,377	1,395	1,155	834	609
(c)	Accident rate per bus captains (a / b)	0.223	0.196	0.139	0.119	0.125

4. The above findings do not show that KMB's contract bus captains had higher accident rates than the non-contract ones.

<sup>1</sup> Accident records of Years 2000 and 2001 were not used because in these two years, some of the bus captains with less than 24 months bus driving experience were on contract term and some were on non-contract term.

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

#### **PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the progress in the pursuit of measures to further enhance safety of franchised bus operation.

#### **BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed on 24 October 2006 (LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07(03)) and 2 March 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(1)783/06-07(01)) on measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration was asked to update the Panel on the progress of the following actions –

- (a) review of installation of seat belts on buses and the design of buses;
- (b) review of the employment of bus captains under contract terms;
- (c) review of the working schedule of bus captains; and
- (d) investigation on three bus accidents.

#### **BUS SAFETY**

3. The Transport Department (“TD”) monitors the operation of franchised bus services and maintenance of the buses in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“PBSO”), Cap. 230, the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374, and their Regulations. Safety is one of the major areas that TD has particular concern. TD’s analysis on the accidents involving franchised buses is set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 below.

4. The franchised bus accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre in 2006 was 3.23. This represents a drop of 21% as compared with the accident rate of 4.09 in 1997. Details of the franchised bus accident rate from 1997 to 2006 is shown at **Annex I**. The severity of the accidents involving franchised buses also reduced over the same period, with fatal accidents reduced by 39% and serious accidents reduced by 4%, though the number of slight accidents<sup>1</sup> increased by 25%. These records show that there has been marked

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<sup>1</sup> A slight accident is one in which one or more persons are injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours. A serious accident involves injury to any person who is hospitalised for more than 12 hours. A fatal accident is one which causes death to any person within 30 days.

improvement in the safety of franchised bus operation as reflected in the reduction in both the accident rate and the seriousness of the accidents.

5. In spite of the reduction in the accidents rate and the severity of bus accidents, TD noted the increase in slight accidents. About one-third of the slight accidents were cases in which passengers fell on buses. To promote passenger safety awareness, TD produced television and radio announcements in the public interest (“API”) and other publicity materials in 2001, 2004 and 2006. Another API is being produced for broadcasting shortly to remind passengers to travel safely on buses.

## **LATEST DEVELOPMENT**

### ***(a) Installation of seat belts on buses and review of the design of buses***

6. We have collected information from overseas countries on the requirements of fitting and wearing of seat belts on buses. As far as we know, so far no country has imposed legal requirements for fitting or wearing of seat belts on passenger seats of buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.

7. In the light of the public’s concern on the safety of passengers particularly those sitting in exposed seats, the bus companies have agreed to install seat belts at these seats on their new buses<sup>2</sup>.

8. For existing buses, the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”), Citybus Limited (“CTB”) and New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”) have jointly appointed a major bus manufacturer which supply most of the franchised buses in Hong Kong to conduct a feasibility study on the installation/retrofitting of seat belts on existing buses. The study will examine the technical feasibility and financial implication of installation/retrofitting of seat belts at the exposed seats. The study is expected to complete in three months’ time.

9. In respect of compulsory wearing of seat belt, there are practical difficulties for imposing such requirement on buses which are deployed on urban bus routes or buses that allow standing passengers. The enforcement of such requirement by the Police on franchised buses is much more difficult than on public light buses since passengers can stand or move around in a bus even when the bus is in motion. As such, we consider it is more effective to remind the public to wear seat belt on buses through education and publicity rather than through legislation. We are producing publicity materials for release shortly to

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<sup>2</sup> As at December 2006, out of 5852 franchised buses, 2127 buses have seat belts at their exposed seats.

remind passengers to use bus services safely, including the wearing of seat belts where provided. We are also discussing with the bus companies on means to further enhance publicity in this respect. We will review the effectiveness of the publicity programme and consider further steps if necessary.

10. At present, nearly all buses of New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) and CTB (Lantau and Airport network) which operate on expressways have seat belts. The fleet of the other bus companies, i.e., KMB, CTB (Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour network) and NWFB contains a mixture of buses of different ages and about half of their buses which operate on expressways have seat belts in exposed seats.

11. The majority of buses with seat belts are relatively newer buses which are more environmentally friendly and accessible to wheel chairs. The current deployment of different types of buses, including buses with seat belts, on the various bus routes has taken account of a number of factors. These include passenger demand, the objective of deploying more environmentally friendly buses on busy corridors to reduce roadside emission and the need to cater for the wheel-chair bound passengers<sup>3</sup>, etc. The percentage of buses with seat belt operating via expressway will gradually increase as older buses are phased out and more new buses with seat belts are put into service.

12. All buses registered for use in Hong Kong must comply with the requirements set out in the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, Cap. 374A, in respect of body strength, safety and stability requirements including passing the stringent 28-degree tilt test. All double deck buses currently operating in Hong Kong were imported from Europe and comply with the European requirements. The major bus manufacturers have confirmed that the body structure of franchised buses in Hong Kong is the same as those supplied to other countries such as the United Kingdom, the USA and Singapore. The major double deck bus body supplier also confirmed that the use of aluminum alloy on bus body has been an international trend in recent years. The supplier explains that the use of material stronger than aluminum may not be good during accidents as it may cause other types of casualties. In fact, the rigidity of the structure relies mainly on the design. The body strength has been designed based on safety, reliability and stability considerations for a life span of 20 years in arduous operating conditions. Optimum design using computerised analysis can achieve strength, reliability and stability. TD and the bus companies will discuss with the major bus body suppliers to further improve the body design to enhance safety.

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<sup>3</sup> To better serve the wheel-chair bound passengers, the current deployment of wheel-chair accessible buses is determined through regular discussions among TD, representatives of people with disabilities and the bus companies.

***(b) Review of the employment of bus captains under contract terms***

13. KMB/LW and CTB/NWFB started to employ new bus captains on contract terms since 2000 and 2003 respectively. The Information Paper LC Paper No. CB(1)783/06-07(01)), which Members considered at the meeting on 2 March 2007, presented the findings of a previous analysis on the accident rates of bus captains employed under non-contract and contract terms. The previous analysis concluded that there was no evidence to show that bus captains employed under contract terms had a higher accident rate than those under non-contract terms.

14. In view of Members' concern, another analysis using KMB's latest accident data in 2005 and 2006 was carried out. The analysis compared accident data of KMB bus captains with more than 24 months bus driving experience in 2005 and 2006. The comparison found that the accident rates of the two groups of bus captains were similar. It reaffirms the previous conclusion that there is no evidence to show that bus captains employed under contract terms have a higher accident rate than those employed under non-contract terms. The findings of the latest analysis are summarised as follows -

<b>KMB</b>	<b>Bus captains employed under non-contract terms</b>		<b>Bus captains employed under contract terms</b>	
<b>Year</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
(a) No. of accidents involving bus captains with experience more than 24 months	809	795	168	171
(b) Average no. of bus captains with experience more than 24 months	6,575	6,182	1,176	1,351
(c) Accident rate per bus captain with experience more than 24 months (a/b)	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.13

***(c) Review of working schedule of bus captains***

15. The franchised bus companies fully comply with the "Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers" ("the Guidelines") issued by TD to schedule the working and rest time of bus captains. The scheduling arrangement has evolved through continuous adjustments and improvements, balancing the operational requirements for meeting passenger demand as well as the bus captains' need for rest between trips and between working days. The bus companies also consult the bus captain unions and review the schedule arrangements from time to time. Members would note from Information Paper

No. CB(1)783/06-07(01)) considered at the meeting on 2 March 2007 that -

- (a) the bus companies normally provide longer rest-breaks between trips for routes with longer journey time, and will spread out the rest-breaks throughout the day as evenly as practicable;
- (b) in practice, the length of rest-break is set at around 10% of the scheduled journey time of a bus route;
- (c) the companies would deploy extra buses to cater for serious traffic congestions, special traffic incidents and ad hoc break-down of buses so as to maintain the scheduled service timetable and allow the bus captains to have reasonable rest time between trips; and
- (d) the three major bus companies, i.e. KMB, CTB and NWFB, operate about 64,000 bus trips daily. Recent surveys conducted by the three companies found that -
  - (i) rest time between trips for 72% of the trips (i.e. 46,000 trips) are five minutes or more;
  - (ii) rest time between trips for 18% of the trips (i.e. 11,800 trips) are two to less than five minutes; and
  - (iii) rest time between trips for 10% of the trips (i.e. 6,400 trips) are less than two minutes.

16. Further analysis of the survey findings found that most of the trips with short rest-break are short-distance routes with relatively short journey time. Usually, the bus companies would make up for the lost, if any, as soon as practicable, mostly at the end of the round trip. Often, the total actual rest-break time of a bus captain in a working shift is greater than the total scheduled rest-break time. For instance, an analysis of KMB's data found that on the survey day, the actual total rest times were 13% and 25% above the scheduled rest times for the peak and off peak periods respectively.

17. The actual journey times of bus trips vary with traffic condition and are outside the control of the bus captains or the bus companies. The bus companies would review and adjust the scheduled journey time of a bus route if its actual journey time frequently exceeds the scheduled journey time under the actual operating environment. For instance, in 2006, KMB obtained approval from TD to increase the scheduled journey time of 32 bus routes on 33 occasions (one of the bus routes increased the scheduled journey time twice). Such adjustment allows bus captains of the concerned routes to complete the journey in line with a more practical schedule and to enjoy between-trip rest according to the schedule.

18. We are currently reviewing the Guidelines with the bus companies



to see what practical improvements could be arranged in scheduling the rest-time of bus captains. The bus companies would also consult the bus captain unions and take into account their views before making any change which might affect the working patterns of the bus captains.

***(d) Investigation on three bus accidents***


19. Members were concerned about the causes of three accidents which involved franchised buses at Kwai Chung Road on 17 July 2006, at Waterloo Road on 17 October 2006 and at Tsing Long Highway on 17 February 2007. As all these cases are either under legal process or investigation, it is not appropriate to discuss the causes of these accidents at this stage. With regard to remedial and preventive actions, both the TD and the bus operators have continued to introduce measures to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

**ADVICE SOUGHT**

20. Members are invited to note this paper.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
Transport Department  
March 2007

**Accident Rate Per Million KM Operated on Franchised Bus**  
**(1997 - 2006)**



—◆— Accident rate per million km operated  
- - - Trend (accident rate per million km operated)

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

**PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the progress of measures implement to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

**BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed on 24 October 2006 (LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07(03)), 2 March 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(1)783/06-07(01)) and 23 March 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(1) 1149/06-07(03)) on measures to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration was asked to update the Panel on the progress of the following actions –

- (a) review on the retrofitting of seat belt on franchised buses;
- (b) review on requiring passengers to wear seat belts where provided;
- (c) review on the working hours of bus captains; and
- (d) other improvement measures to further enhance bus safety.

3. The Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) stipulates the requirement for the design and construction of franchised bus. All franchised buses that provide services to passengers must meet the safety requirements of the legislation and pass Transport Department’s (“TD”) stringent inspections. Every new model of franchised buses has to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements before the buses can be registered and licensed for use on the road. The type approval process includes a tilt test to ensure stability of the bus. Every franchised bus has to undergo an annual examination by TD to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor their proper maintenance. The buses are kept roadworthy by the companies’ own servicing and maintenance programmes. TD closely monitors the franchised bus companies’ maintenance programmes and holds regular meetings with them to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, formulate actions to enhance bus safety.

## **LATEST DEVELOPMENT ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE BUS SAFETY**

### **(a) Review on retrofitting of seat belts on franchised buses**

4. In the light of concerns raised by Panel Members, the franchised bus companies have sought expert advice on the need for, and the feasibility of, retrofitting seat belt on their fleets to further enhance passenger safety on double deck buses. The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”), Citybus Limited (“CTB”) and New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”) jointly appointed a major bus manufacturer to carry out a comprehensive study on the bus structure design and the feasibility of retrofitting seat belts. The major findings of the study are as follows -

- (a) The bus manufacturer confirmed that the buses designed for use in Hong Kong are safe and meet the most stringent specifications. The bus body structure has undergone all kinds of stringent tests adopted by the bus manufacturing industry including simulation loading test, physical stress test, accelerated durability test and tilt test before that type of bus is put into service. Their buses of the same designs have been widely used in many places in the world for over 30 years with excellent safety and reliability record.

#### **(b) Pre-1997 design double deck buses**

Retrofitting seat belt on bus types designed before 1997 is not feasible nor cost effective on the following grounds -

- these buses were not designed to have seat belts. If seat belts are to be retro-fitted to these buses, extensive disassembly and rebuilding of the bus body structure would be required so as to provide sufficient structural strength for anchoring the seat belts. Given that the bus was not designed for this process, the modification work might cause significant disturbance to bus components and hence reduce the vehicle reliability.
- There are approximately 29 different bus types which were designed before 1997. If seat belts are to be retrofitted to these buses, each bus type has to be evaluated and tested individually to accommodate the

seat belt configuration. The time required for redesigning each bus type would be about 20 months and the work cannot be done concurrently due to the limitation of resource and facilities. The redesign cost for each bus type of the pre-1997 design would be around HK\$ 4.3 million (or \$124.7 millions for all the 29 types).

(c) Post-1997 design double deck bus

It would be technically feasible to retrofit seat belts to the four exposed seats at the front row directly behind the windscreen on the upper deck without significant redesign and strengthening work as the structure of most post-1997 design buses has been reinforced in this area to take possible seat belt fitment.

- (d) There will be technical difficulty to retrofit a seat belt on the single exposed seat facing the aisle at the back on the upper deck. If a seat belt is to be provided for this seat, extensive disassembly, rework, and reassembly will be required in order to anchor the seat belt to the vehicle structure. The work is not cost effective. In the most common head-on accidents, the crash force usually comes from the front and its impact on this seat would have been greatly reduced by the absorbing effect of the body structure.
- (e) There would be little benefit to retrofit seat belts on the other seats on the upper deck of the post-1997 design buses. Passengers are effectively seated in a cell contained fore-and-aft by the seat and a bulkhead of the high back seat in front. The compartmentalisation effect already provides adequate containment to passengers against being thrown forward.
- (f) To retrofit seat belts to the seats in the lower deck would require extensive redesigning and strengthening of the body structure in order to have adequate mounting points for the seat belts. Notwithstanding the costly and extensive work required, the work may affect the integrity of the bus structure. These seats are all behind the front axle of the vehicle and so passengers are protected against direct impact in the event of a head-on collision. By the time the crash force reaches the back of the bus, it would have been greatly

reduced by the energy absorbing effect of its structure.

5. TD and the bus companies have examined the idea of banning the use of the four exposed seats without seat belts at the first row of the upper deck of buses operating on expressways. As pointed out in paragraph 3 above, all franchised buses which provide services meet the safety requirements of the legislation. All these buses are capable of providing safe service under normal operation and there is no justification to ban the use of the four seats at the first row of the upper deck even they are not fitted with seat belts. Furthermore, if the four seats are not used, the carrying capacity would be reduced, resulting in either a reduction in the level of service, or more buses have to be added to these routes with cost implications.

#### Recommendation on retrofitting of seat belts on franchised buses

6. Taking into account the professional advice of the bus manufacturer, we recommend the following measures to further enhance bus safety:

- (a) to retrofit seat belt at the four seats on the first row on the upper deck of post-1997 design buses. The feedback from the franchised bus companies is positive and work can be completed in 24 months;
- (b) to install/add handrail, armrest or other facilities where appropriate for the other exposed seats to further enhance passenger safety during sharp acceleration/deceleration;
- (c) to install an additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of pre-1997 design buses for further protection to the front seat passengers. The feedback from the franchised bus companies is positive and installation can be completed in 18 months;
- (d) to accord priority to the retrofitting of seat belt or installation of the additional guard rail on buses which operate on expressways;
- (e) to examine with the bus companies advancement of vehicle replacement programme to replace the old buses earlier as far as their financial situation permits; and

- (f) to ensure that new buses purchased by bus companies will have seat belts on all exposed seats.

**(b) Requiring passengers to wear seat belts where provided**

7. TD conducted a preliminary passenger survey in May 2007<sup>1</sup> to gauge the views of bus passengers on the wearing of seat belt. The findings revealed that majority of the respondents agreed to mandating wearing of seat belt where it is available.

8. We note that no overseas countries require fitting of seat belts on passenger seats of buses designed for urban use or for carrying standing passengers. There are also practical difficulties for imposing such requirement on buses deployed on urban bus routes or buses that allow standing passengers. The enforcement of such requirement by the Police on franchised buses is much more difficult than on public light buses since passengers can stand or move around in a bus even when the bus is in motion<sup>2</sup>. That said, we have an open mind and will be prepared to consider making wearing of seat belts if fitted on franchised buses a legislative requirement as and when the majority of franchised buses are fitted with seat belts for the exposed seats on the first row on the upper deck.

9. In the meantime, we will continue to encourage bus passengers to wear seat belt where provided through education and publicity. We have prepared a new version of TV Announcement of Public Interest (“API”) to promote safe use of bus service, including the wearing of seat belts where provided, and this will be launched in July this year.

**(c) Review on working hours of bus captains**

10. To ensure that bus drivers have sufficient rest time, TD issued “Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers”<sup>3</sup> (“the

<sup>1</sup> The preliminary survey was a household-based telephone questionnaire survey involving 2,221 successful respondents.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, a passenger caught failing to wear a seat belt may have a defence that he was just about to stand and leave the seat for alighting the bus at the coming bus stop.

<sup>3</sup> Guideline A - Captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes.

Guideline B - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.

Guideline C - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.

Guideline D - Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.

Guidelines”) to the bus companies. The franchised bus companies fully comply with the Guidelines as reflected in their quarterly reports. As a monitoring process, TD conducted a survey in May 2007 on the bus captains of 42 bus routes operated by KMB, CTB and NWFB to assess the compliance rate. The findings confirm that all bus companies comply with the Guidelines and no discrepancies have been noticed. On average, the bus captains have total service breaks of 30 minutes within the 6-hour duty, which is more than the minimum of 20 minutes as stipulated in the Guidelines.

11. The survey also found that a typical bus captain drive about 8 hours during his working period. All bus captains surveyed have rest time of 20 minutes or more during their 6-hour duty. The survey findings also reveal that the bus companies follow the principle of setting service breaks at about 10% of the journey time of a bus route.

12. TD, in conjunction with the franchised bus companies, reviewed the existing Guidelines and identified room to enhancing the rest time of bus captains. As revision of the Guideline would affect the scheduling of shifts which in turn may affect the working hours and shift arrangements of the bus captains, the bus captain unions were consulted. Taking into account of views of the bus captain unions and bus companies, the following revisions to the Guidelines have been made -

- (a) Guideline A stipulates that bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after six hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes. While maintaining this requirement, it is further refined to stipulate that a rest time of at least 12 minutes in total should be within the first four hours of the duty; and
- (b) Guideline D on the break period between successive working days would be revised from the current 9 hours to no less than 9.5 hours.

13. The bus captain unions support the above revision. The revised Guidelines incorporating the recommended revisions are at **Annex**.



**(d) Other improvement measures to further enhance bus safety**

Bus captain training

14. While the design, construction and maintenance of a bus are important factors ensuring the provision of safe franchised bus service, it is considered that the driving skill and behaviour of the bus captains are equally important. The franchised bus companies have been providing various training programmes to their bus captains including -

- (a) Basic training for new bus captains - All new recruits are required to attend training programmes which include desktop training and on-the-road training. These training programmes last from a few days to a few weeks, aiming to introduce to new bus captains the importance of safe driving, skills and techniques in preventing accidents and handling emergencies, defensive driving techniques, and customer service etc.
- (b) Enhancement / refresh training for serving bus captains - All franchised bus companies have pledged to providing each serving bus captains at least one enhancement / refresher training course every three years. The refresher training aims to enhance the bus captains' defensive driving skills, update them on new driving rules and legislations, draw to their attention accident black spots, and instill on them the importance of safe driving.
- (c) Remedial training - These are tailor-made training courses arranged on a need basis for bus captains.

15. In addition, TD, in collaboration with the Police, other experts, and the bus companies, conduct at least four "Road Safety Seminars" annually for the bus captains. Road safety experts are invited to introduce to the bus captains the latest safety driving techniques and contributory factors to traffic accidents so as to promote safety awareness and proper driving behaviours.

16. Apart from the various training programmes already provided for the bus captains, the bus companies will introduce new driving training programmes later this year. KMB will launch their computer-oriented driving simulator machines to bus captains in July this year. The new training

simulator will sharpen bus captains' reactions when facing emergency situations. CTB and NWFB will revise their training syllabus, putting more emphasis on improving driving behaviour with a view to reducing the "passenger loss balance" accidents inside bus compartment.

#### Publicity on bus safety

17. More than 50% of franchised bus accidents involving passengers injured do not involve collision between the buses concerned and other vehicles, objects or pedestrians. Many of these accidents could have been avoided if passengers sat properly or held the handrail tightly while standing. To remind passengers to be careful when using bus services, franchised bus companies have launched publicity programmes through bus body advertisements, on-bus televisions or other media. TD also produced television and radio APIs to promote passenger safety awareness to reduce bus accidents in 2001, 2004 and 2006. A new API will be launched in July to remind passengers to use bus service safely.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
July 2007

**Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours**

(Revised in July 2007)

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Guideline A | - Bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of the duty. |
| Guideline B | - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day.   |
| Guideline C | - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day.   |
| Guideline D | - Break between successive working days should not be less than 9.5 hours.   |

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

**PURPOSE**

This paper reports on the Administration's discussion with the franchised bus companies on the following suggestions raised by the Legislative Council Panel on Transport ("the Panel") Members at the Panel meeting on 9 July 2007 on measures to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation -

- (a) re-deploying more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways and restricting buses without seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways; and
- (b) advancing the replacement programme of the pre-1997 design buses.

**DISCUSSION OUTCOME**

**(a) Re-deploying more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways and restricting buses without seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways**

2. The Transport Department ("TD") has reviewed with the franchised bus companies on the deployment of buses on expressways. In general, in considering the deployment of buses on specific routes, a number of factors have to be taken into account, including passenger demand, safety and environmental concerns as well as the need to cater for wheel-chair bound passengers' special needs, etc.

3. As at June 2007, out of the 2,160 buses with seatbelts at exposed seats in Hong Kong, about 1,170 have been deployed on routes running on expressways. The reasons for not deploying the remaining 990 buses of this type on expressways are as follows -

- (i) in order to meet the travel need of the wheel-chair bound passengers, TD and the franchised bus companies have agreed to deploy low floor buses with wheel-chair accessible ramps on a number of bus routes. Whilst many of these wheel-chair accessible buses with seat belts at exposed seats are operating on expressways, some of them have to be deployed on routes operating on routes within the built-up areas. To redeploy more buses with seat belts at exposed

seats to operate on expressways would affect the existing wheel-chair bound passengers who are using these routes; and

- (ii) due to the public's concern on roadside air quality, the Administration and the franchised bus companies are committed to deploying environmentally friendly buses of Euro II or above emission standard on the major busy corridors including Yee Wo Street, Hennessy Road, Queensway, Des Voeux Road Central and Nathan Road as far as practicable. The majority of these environmentally friendly buses are newer buses with seat belts at exposed seats. To redeploy more buses of this type to operate on expressway routes would reduce the number of environmentally friendly buses operating on the busy corridors.

Despite the above constraints, TD and the bus companies have identified 30 more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways as from the fourth quarter of 2007.

4. TD has also examined the feasibility of restricting buses which do not have seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways. However, as the number of buses involved would be in the region of 1,180, the level of bus services would be seriously affected if the proposal were implemented. Despite so, to further enhance the safety of bus operation, the franchised bus companies have agreed to retrofitting seat belts on the upper deck front row seats of the post-1997 design buses, and installing additional guard rails across the upper deck windscreen of the pre-1997 design buses. The target is to complete the installation of guard rails on all those pre-1997 design buses operating on expressways by March 2008, and the retrofitting of seat belts on the 225 buses now operating on expressways by the fourth quarter of 2008. All buses deployed to run on expressways will have seatbelts or guard rails with the completion of these works.

#### **(b) Advancing the replacement of pre-1997 buses**

5. According to the current programme of the franchised bus companies, the replacement of all the pre-1997 design buses will be completed by 2015. TD has reviewed with the franchised bus companies the scope of advancing the replacement of their pre-1997 design buses as far as their financial situation permits and identified about 270 pre-1997 design buses the replacement

of which can be advanced by one to three years, taking into account a number of factors including the normal serviceable life of buses, the financial capability of the bus companies, the fare implications on passengers and bus resource requirement against the opening of more railways in the coming years. TD will constantly review with the bus companies from time to time to expedite the replacement programme as appropriate.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
December 2007

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

### **PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the actions taken by the Administration and the franchised bus companies to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

### **BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed in July 2007 on measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration also issued an information paper (LC Paper No. CB(1)434/07-08(01)) in December 2007 to provide supplementary information.

3. As at end 2007, there were 5,889 buses operating franchised bus services. These services are regulated and monitored by the Transport Department (“TD”) and safety is one of the major areas of concern. All franchised buses that provide services to passengers must meet the safety requirements of the legislation and pass TD’s stringent inspections. TD also issues guidelines on the working hours of bus captains and liaise closely with franchised bus companies on measures to enhance the safety of bus operation, including improvement in bus driver training and publicity on bus safety, etc.

### **PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES TO ENHANCE BUS SAFETY**

4. The franchised bus companies have been taking the following actions to further enhance the safety of bus operation :

- (a) Provision of black box<sup>1</sup> – All new buses are equipped with black boxes. The franchised bus companies are also retrofitting black boxes on the existing buses for completion before end 2009.

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<sup>1</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operation data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and accident investigation.

Details of the programme are shown in the table below -

<b>Bus Company</b>	<b>Licensed Fleet</b>	<b>No. of buses installed with black box (%)</b>	<b>Timing for completion of installation work</b>
Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB")	4,027	3,199 (79%)	End 2008
Citybus Limited ("CTB") (Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus services)	747	131 (18%)	September 2008
CTB (North Lantau and Chek Lap Kok Airport )	172	5 (3%)	End 2009
New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB")	694	34 (5%)	End 2009
New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited	94	55 (59%)	End 2009
Long Win Bus Company Limited	155	155 (100%)	End 2007
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,889</b>	<b>3,579 61%</b>	<b>End 2009</b>

- (b) Provision of seat belts at the exposed seats on all new buses – The franchised bus companies have committed to providing seat belts at the exposed seats of all new buses.
- (c) Retrofitting of seat belts at the front row on the upper deck of the post-1997 design buses – The franchised bus companies have committed to completing the retrofitting of seat belts on all post-1997 design buses operating on expressways by the fourth quarter of 2008, and the remaining post-1997 design buses by July 2009. They now agree to advance the completion of the



retrofitting work on all post-1997 design buses by October 2008.

- (d) Installation of an additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of the pre-1997 design buses – The franchised bus companies have committed to install the guard rails on the pre-1997 design buses running on expressway by March 2008 and the pre-1997 design buses by July 2008. They now agree to expedite their work and complete the installation by May 2008.
- (e) Improvement of working hours of the bus captain – The new guidelines were adopted since July 2007<sup>2</sup>. TD will continue to closely monitor the compliance of the bus companies.
- (f) Deployment of more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways since the fourth quarter of 2007 – An additional 30 buses have been identified for deployment on expressways by end January 2008, in addition to about 1,200 such buses which have already been deployed on routes running on expressways.
- (g) Advancing the replacement of pre-1997 design buses – About 270 buses have been identified for early replacement by one to three years.

## **FURTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE BUS SAFETY**

### **Further review on the design and structure of buses**

5. In the light of the serious bus accident at Tseung Kwan O on 14 December 2007, TD conducted an expert discussion forum on 10 January 2008 with the academics, professional institutions, bus manufacturer and franchised bus companies to explore feasible measures to further enhance the safety of double deck buses. Having analysed the result of the impact on the buses involved in accident, the bus manufacturer put forward the following two proposals:

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<sup>2</sup> Improvements include lengthening the minimum break period between successive working days from 9 hours to 9.5 hours; and refining the distribution of rest times during a driving duty so that the bus captain will enjoy better rest time, i.e. a rest time of at least 12 minutes in total would be arranged within the first four hours of the duty.

- (a) to strengthen the anchorage of the upper deck front 3 rows of seats by adding stronger plates and bolts on buses; and
- (b) to add an additional front guard rails which would be integrated with the body structure of the bus to further strengthen the body structure.

The experts at the discussion forum considered these proposals useful in enhancing the safety of passengers. TD is pursuing with the bus companies on these improvement proposals.

### **Restricting passengers from sitting on exposed seats on the upper deck of the buses**

6. TD and the bus companies have considered the proposal of restricting the use of the exposed seats on the upper deck of buses. As all franchised buses that provide services to passengers have met the safety requirements of the legislation and passed TD's stringent inspections, and improvement measures are being taken on both the pre-1997 and post-1997 design buses by installing guard rails and retrofitting seat belts on the upper deck front row seats respectively, there is no justification to restrict passengers from sitting on the exposed seats on the upper deck. Furthermore, if these seats are not used, the carrying capacity of buses would be reduced which may affect the service standard.

### **Bus captain training**

7. The franchised bus companies have been providing various training programmes to their bus captains including –

- (a) Basic training for new bus captains – All new recruits are required to attend training programmes which include desktop training and on-the-road training. These training programmes aim at introducing to new bus captains the importance of safe driving, skills and techniques in preventing accidents and handling emergencies, defensive driving techniques, and customer service etc.
- (b) Enhancement / refresh training for serving bus captains – All franchised bus companies have pledged to providing each serving

bus captains at least one enhancement / refresher training course every one to three years starting from March 2008. The refresher training aims to enhance the bus captains' defensive driving skills, update them on new driving rules and legislation, draw to their attention accident black spots, and instil in them the importance of safe driving.

(c) Driving Improvement / Remedial training – These are tailor-made training courses for bus captains to be arranged on a need basis.

8. Apart from the above, KMB has launched in January 2008 new computer based driving simulators to enhance bus captains' training. The new training simulators will enhance bus captains' driving skills and help sharpen bus captains' reactions when facing different driving situations. CTB and NWFB have revised their training syllabus and will issue to every bus captain with a pocket size booklet on safe driving behaviour to enhance their safety awareness.

9. The franchised bus companies will arrange regular checks on the driving behaviour of their bus captains and take appropriate disciplinary actions if improper driving behaviour is established. The franchised bus companies are considering conducting roadside checks on driving discipline at road junctions.

10. TD, in collaboration with the Police, other experts, and the bus companies conduct at least four Road Safety Seminars annually for the bus captains. Road safety experts are invited to introduce to the bus captains the latest safety driving techniques and contributory factors to traffic accidents so as to promote safety awareness and proper driving behaviours.

### **Publicity on bus safety**

11. To remind passengers to be careful when using bus services, franchised bus companies have launched publicity programmes through bus body advertisements, on-bus televisions or other media. The bus companies have been asked to strengthen safety publicity arrangements including deployment of safety ambassadors on buses and broadcasting of safety messages. TD has also produced television and radio announcements of public interest to promote passenger safety awareness.

**ADVICE SOUGHT**

12. Members are invited to note the above progress in further enhancing the safety of franchised bus operation.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
January 2008

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## INFORMATION NOTE

### Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in selected overseas places

#### 1. Background

1.1 At the meeting of the Panel on Transport on 28 January 2008, the Panel discussed safety issues relating to passengers standing on buses operating on expressways. During the deliberations, Members asked the Government to review whether passengers should be allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in Hong Kong, and requested the Research and Library Services Division (RLSD) to conduct a research on whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in overseas places, and measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers.

1.2 Against this background, enquiries were sent to the major cities of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and Singapore.<sup>1</sup> As at the publication of this information note, Queensland of Australia, Wellington of New Zealand, Toronto and Vancouver of Canada, San Francisco of the United States, and Singapore have responded to RLSD's enquiries. The findings are presented in the Tables below.

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<sup>1</sup> Enquiries were sent to the relevant government departments in New South Wales and Queensland of Australia, Auckland and Wellington of New Zealand, Toronto and Vancouver of Canada, London of the United Kingdom, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco of the United States, and Singapore.

**Table 1 – Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways**

	<b>Australia</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Canada</b>		<b>United States</b>	<b>Singapore</b>
	<b>Queensland</b>	<b>Wellington</b>	<b>Toronto</b>	<b>Vancouver</b>	<b>San Francisco</b>	
Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p> <p>However, according to Section 12 of the Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Standard 2000, there are two circumstances restricting passengers standing on buses:</p> <p>(a) no passengers are allowed to stand for more than 20 km; and</p> <p>(b) the roads the buses may travel on should not be in a steep environment.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p> <p>For bus services across municipal boundaries, there is a regulation that the total number of standing passengers should not be more than one-third of the total number of seats available on a bus. However, this regulation does not apply to bus services which mainly operate within the boundary of Toronto.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>

**Table 2 – Measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers**

	Australia	New Zealand	Canada		United States	Singapore
	Queensland	Wellington	Toronto	Vancouver	San Francisco	
Measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers	The buses must be equipped with suitable handholds, have sufficient aisle width to carry standing passengers, and must not be overloaded.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  According to the Wellington Regional Transport, overall safety would be improved as the bus fleet would be replaced with more modern vehicles.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  According to the Toronto Transit Commission, there are no additional safety measures, and the number of safety incidents involving passengers standing on buses operating on expressways in Toronto is small.	According to Section 9 of the Passenger Transportation Regulation:  (a) the buses should be equipped with a sufficient number of handholds, straps, rails or other equipment to provide support for the number of standing passengers authorized; and  (b) the vision or movement of the bus drivers should not be impaired in any way by the standing passengers.	No information is available on measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers.  According to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, no safety incidents involving passengers standing on buses operating on expressways have been reported in recent years.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  In addition, the bus drivers must observe the speed limit imposed on the buses.

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Prepared by Jackie WU  
18 April 2008  
Tel: 2869 9644

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# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(1)631/07-08

Ref: CB1/PL/TP

## **Panel on Transport**

### **Updated Background Brief on Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

#### **Introduction**

During the 2006-2007 legislative session, the Panel on Transport (the Panel) held four meetings on 24 October 2006, 2 and 23 March 2007, and 9 July 2007 with the Administration and the franchised bus companies to review measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation. A background brief for the meeting on 24 October 2006 was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)113/06-07. This paper updates members on major issues raised by the Panel in the last legislative session.

2. At the Panel meeting on 18 December 2007, the Panel agreed to revisit the related matters at the forthcoming meeting to be held on 28 January 2008.
3. At the Council meeting on 16 January 2008, Hon Albert Jinghan CHENG raised an oral question on the structural safety of franchised buses. The question and the Administration's reply are in **Annex A**.

#### **The Panel's views**

4. The Panel considers that the Administration should seriously consider the proposal to introduce mandatory requirements for installation and wearing of passenger seat belts on franchised buses to enhance bus safety. There is also a need to ensure that bus drivers have sufficient rest time and that refresher and enhancement courses be provided to serving and new drivers to enhance their safety awareness. The Panel also urges the Administration to review the design of bus structure and body with a view to providing maximum protection for bus passengers, and to closely monitor the franchised bus operators' maintenance programmes to ensure the mechanical road-worthiness and safety of buses.

#### Motion passed by the Panel

5. At the meeting on 23 March 2007, the Panel passed a motion urging the Administration to immediately implement measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The wording of the motion is as follows:

"That as a number of franchised bus accidents involving passenger casualties have occurred in recent years, this Panel urges the Government to immediately implement measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation, which should include the introduction of legislation to require bus passengers to wear seatbelts, and requirement of franchised bus operators to install seatbelts on their buses and to improve working schedule and rest-break arrangements for their bus captains, etc to ensure the safety of bus passengers; at the same time, this Panel also expresses dissatisfaction with and regret over the Transport Department's failure to accept members' views."

6. At the Panel meeting on 9 July 2007, the Administration briefed members on the progress of various measures implemented to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

### **Retrofitting of seat belts on buses**

7. On members' suggestion to require bus companies to install/retrofit seat belts on existing buses, the Panel notes that the bus companies have sought expert advice on the need for, and the feasibility of, retrofitting seat belt on their fleets to further enhance passenger safety on double deck buses. Having regard to the professional advice of bus manufacturers, the Administration recommends that the following measures be implemented to further enhance bus safety:

- (a) to retrofit seat belt at the four seats on the first row on the upper deck of post-1997 design buses;
- (b) to install/add handrail, armrest or other facilities where appropriate for the other exposed seats to further enhance passenger safety during sharp acceleration/deceleration;
- (c) to install an additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of pre-1997 design buses for further protection to the front seat passengers;
- (d) to accord priority to the retrofitting of seat belt or installation of the additional guard rail on buses which operate on expressways;
- (e) to examine with the bus companies advancement of vehicle replacement programme to replace the old buses earlier as far as their financial situation permits; and
- (f) to ensure that new buses purchased by bus companies will have seat belts on all exposed seats.

### **Requiring passengers to wear seat belts where provided**

8. On the proposal to require passengers to wear seat belts where provided, the Administration advises that it has an open mind and will be prepared to consider making wearing of seat belts if fitted on franchised buses a legislative requirement as and when the majority of franchised buses are fitted with seat belts for the exposed seats on the first row on the upper deck.

### **Review on working hours of bus captains**

9. On the review on working hours of bus captains, the Administration advises that Transport Department (TD), in conjunction with the franchised bus companies, has reviewed the existing Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers issued by TD to schedule the working and rest time of bus captains. They have identified room for enhancing the rest time of bus captains. Taking into account of views of the bus captain unions and bus companies, the following revisions to the Guidelines have been made –

- (a) Guideline A stipulates that bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after six hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes. While maintaining this requirement, it is further refined to stipulate that a rest time of at least 12 minutes in total should be within the first four hours of the duty; and
- (b) Guideline D on the break period between successive working days would be revised from the current 9 hours to no less than 9.5 hours.

The revised Guidelines incorporating the recommended revisions are in **Annex B**.

### **Other improvement measures**

#### Design and construction of franchised bus

10. Regarding the design and construction of franchised bus, the Panel notes the Administration's view that the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) already stipulates the requirement for the design and construction of franchised bus. All franchised buses that provide services to passengers must meet the safety requirements of the legislation and pass TD's stringent inspections. Every franchised bus has to undergo an annual examination by TD to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor their proper maintenance.

11. The Administration also advises that all double deck buses currently operating in Hong Kong were imported from Europe and comply with the European requirements. The major bus manufacturers have confirmed that the body structure of franchised buses in Hong Kong is the same as those supplied to other countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore. The major double deck bus body supplier has also confirmed that the use of aluminum alloy on bus body has been an international trend in recent years. The supplier explains that the use of material stronger than aluminum may not be good during accidents as it may cause other types of casualties. In fact, the rigidity of the structure relies mainly on the design. The body strength has been designed based on safety, reliability and stability considerations for a life span of 20 years in arduous operating conditions. Optimum design using computerised analysis can achieve strength, reliability and stability. TD and the bus companies will discuss with the major bus body suppliers to further improve the body design to enhance safety.

12. The Panel also notes the latest developments regarding bus captain training and publicity on bus safety.

#### **Follow-up to the meeting on 9 July 2007**

13. At the meeting on 9 July 2007, members requested the Administration and franchised bus companies to consider re-deploying more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways and restricting buses without seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways; and advancing the replacement programme of the pre-1997 design buses. A progress report in this regard provided by the Administration was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)434/07-08(01) in December 2007 (**Annex C**).

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
22 January 2008

## Press Releases

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LCQ4: Structural safety of franchised buses

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Following is a question by the Hon Albert Cheng and a reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Ms Eva Cheng, at the Legislative Council meeting today (January 16):

Question:

In Hong Kong in recent years, franchised buses were involved in a number of traffic accidents and it is often heard that the vehicle bodies of the double-decked buses involved in the accidents were severely damaged after colliding with other vehicles, and passengers on the upper deck who were thrown out of the buses were injured or died. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(a) apart from stipulating the design and construction requirements of franchised buses in the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, whether the Government has prescribed other requirements in respect of the vehicle bodies of buses (such as the materials used, structural safety and impact resistance, etc.); if so, of the details;

(b) whether there is a requirement that for the new buses purchased by the various franchised bus companies in Hong Kong, all the body components assembled in Hong Kong must be produced by the original manufacturers; if there is no such requirement, whether it has assessed if using components not produced by the original manufacturers will weaken the impact resistance of the vehicle bodies of buses; if such an assessment has been made, of the results; and

(c) following the occurrence of a number of the above accidents, whether the Government has reviewed the structural safety standard prescribed for the vehicle bodies of franchised buses; if so, of the results; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

Madam President,

The Government attaches great importance to the safety of bus passengers. Every bus has to pass a comprehensive inspection and a tilt test required by the Transport Department (TD) before it is put into service. A licence will be issued by TD only when legal requirements are met and structural safety is confirmed.

My reply to the three parts of the question is as follows:

(a) Regulation 5 of the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap 374A) stipulates that every vehicle, including a bus, shall be soundly and properly constructed of suitable materials. Manufacturers of the buses currently in use in Hong Kong all come from the European Union (EU) and their designs comply with EU requirements. Every bus is designed by its manufacturer and has undergone tests to ensure structural safety. In terms of structure, the double-decked buses running in Hong Kong are the same as those in other countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore.

Currently, there is generally no requirement on impact

resistance for buses around the world. There is also generally no specific requirement on the materials used for buses. Therefore, TD has not prescribed other requirements, such as on impact resistance or materials used in respect of the vehicle bodies of buses. When determining whether a bus fulfills the above legal requirements, TD will consider information provided by the bus manufacturer, including overseas experience in using the bus, compliance with requirements of the place of origin, and the track record.

(b) At present, new buses are mostly assembled locally. TD has no requirement on the source of body components of buses, but all parts of the bus bodies assembled in Hong Kong are provided by the original bus body manufacturers and the assembly work is conducted by trained personnel of the contractors. To ensure that the assembly standards meet the design requirements set by the manufacturers, the assembly work is undertaken by professionally trained personnel and the process is supervised by engineers from the bus body manufacturers. Moreover, all the buses assembled have to pass the safety examinations (such as those on the brake system, the lighting system and the steering system) and the tilt test required by TD before the issue of licence.

(c) Every bus operating in Hong Kong is designed by its manufacturer and has passed a comprehensive inspection and a tilt test required by TD. The body structure is safe. Whenever there are serious traffic accidents involving buses, TD will demand detailed reports and improvement plans from the bus companies in question.

In response to recent accidents resulting in severely damaged bus bodies and casualties arising from passengers being thrown out of the bus, TD has started discussions with bus companies to speed up the fitting of safety belts for exposed front seats on the upper deck or the installation of guardrails across the upper deck windscreen of existing buses.

To further enhance bus safety, TD has invited academics from mechanical engineering departments of universities and representatives from institutes of mechanical engineering, together with bus manufacturers and franchised bus companies to meet in early January to have a discussion on the structural safety of buses, such as the strength of seats on upper deck and the installation of guardrails across the upper deck windscreen. TD will continue to keep a close watch on the structural safety and maintenance of buses to ensure the safety of bus passengers.

Ends/Wednesday, January 16, 2008  
Issued at HKT 15:32

NNNN

**Guidelines on Bus Captain Workin**

(Revised in July 2007)

- Guideline A
  - Bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of the duty.
- Guideline B
  - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day.
- Guideline C
  - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day.
- Guideline D
  - Break between successive working days should not be less than 9.5 hours.



**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

**PURPOSE**

This paper reports on the Administration's discussion with the franchised bus companies on the following suggestions raised by the Legislative Council Panel on Transport ("the Panel") Members at the Panel meeting on 9 July 2007 on measures to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation -

- (a) re-deploying more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways and restricting buses without seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways; and
- (b) advancing the replacement programme of the pre-1997 design buses.

**DISCUSSION OUTCOME**

**(a) Re-deploying more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways and restricting buses without seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways**

2. The Transport Department ("TD") has reviewed with the franchised bus companies on the deployment of buses on expressways. In general, in considering the deployment of buses on specific routes, a number of factors have to be taken into account, including passenger demand, safety and environmental concerns as well as the need to cater for wheel-chair bound passengers' special needs, etc.

3. As at June 2007, out of the 2,160 buses with seatbelts at exposed seats in Hong Kong, about 1,170 have been deployed on routes running on expressways. The reasons for not deploying the remaining 990 buses of this type on expressways are as follows -

- (i) in order to meet the travel need of the wheel-chair bound passengers, TD and the franchised bus companies have agreed to deploy low floor buses with wheel-chair accessible ramps on a number of bus routes. Whilst many of these wheel-chair accessible buses with seat belts at exposed seats are operating on expressways, some of them have to be deployed on routes operating on routes within the built-up areas. To redeploy more buses with seat belts at exposed

seats to operate on expressways would affect the existing wheel-chair bound passengers who are using these routes; and

- (ii) due to the public's concern on roadside air quality, the Administration and the franchised bus companies are committed to deploying environmentally friendly buses of Euro II or above emission standard on the major busy corridors including Yee Wo Street, Hennessy Road, Queensway, Des Voeux Road Central and Nathan Road as far as practicable. The majority of these environmentally friendly buses are newer buses with seat belts at exposed seats. To redeploy more buses of this type to operate on expressway routes would reduce the number of environmentally friendly buses operating on the busy corridors.

Despite the above constraints, TD and the bus companies have identified 30 more buses with seat belts at exposed seats to operate on expressways as from the fourth quarter of 2007.

4. TD has also examined the feasibility of restricting buses which do not have seat belts at exposed seats from operating on expressways. However, as the number of buses involved would be in the region of 1,180, the level of bus services would be seriously affected if the proposal were implemented. Despite so, to further enhance the safety of bus operation, the franchised bus companies have agreed to retrofitting seat belts on the upper deck front row seats of the post-1997 design buses, and installing additional guard rails across the upper deck windscreen of the pre-1997 design buses. The target is to complete the installation of guard rails on all those pre-1997 design buses operating on expressways by March 2008, and the retrofitting of seat belts on the 225 buses now operating on expressways by the fourth quarter of 2008. All buses deployed to run on expressways will have seatbelts or guard rails with the completion of these works.

#### **(b) Advancing the replacement of pre-1997 buses**

5. According to the current programme of the franchised bus companies, the replacement of all the pre-1997 design buses will be completed by 2015. TD has reviewed with the franchised bus companies the scope of advancing the replacement of their pre-1997 design buses as far as their financial situation permits and identified about 270 pre-1997 design buses the replacement

of which can be advanced by one to three years, taking into account a number of factors including the normal serviceable life of buses, the financial capability of the bus companies, the fare implications on passengers and bus resource requirement against the opening of more railways in the coming years. TD will constantly review with the bus companies from time to time to expedite the replacement programme as appropriate.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
December 2007



# 汽車交通運輸業總工會

九巴分會 新巴分會 城巴分會 龍運分會

## 對專營巴士的營運安全問題之意見書

汽車交通運輸業總工會聯同屬下四間巴士分會（九龍巴士分會、新世界巴士分會、城巴分會、龍運巴士分會）（下稱本會）對於立法會交通事務委員會於 2008 年 2 月 22 日舉行的「專營巴士的營運安全問題」專題會議，提出下述意見：

### 一、職業司機是十分注重交通安全的

首先，本會必須在這裡強調的是，所有職業巴士司機都是十分注重交通安全的。主要原因是，在各種各樣的交通意外當中，司機往往會首當其衝，成為第一個受害者，因此沒有人願意以自己的生命安全作為代價，而進行粗莽大意的駕駛工作。從另一方面來說，照顧乘客和其他道路使用者的人身安全也是每名巴士司機都具有的良知和責任，因此他們絕不願意讓其他人的生命安全受到任何威脅。不僅如此，注重乘客的安全是每名巴士司機賴以為生的最重要基礎之一。事實上，假若專營巴士經常發生交通意外的話，便會引發乘客擔心生命安全的信心危機，從而造成整體乘客量下降的問題，使專營巴士公司無以為繼和巴士司機無從謀生。由此來說，本會認為本港職業巴士司機十分注重交通安全是毋庸置疑的。

### 二、不要引起社會人士的誤解

誠然，在繁忙的都市生活當中，每一輛巴士都會接載著大量乘客，因此很多使用巴士服務的市民以及社會人士都十分關心專營巴士的營運安全，並且極不願意看到專營巴士發生任何交通意外。據運輸及房屋局局長鄭汝樺所提供的數字，

本港近年專營巴士發生交通意外為 2004 年的 1,839 宗、2005 年的 1,864 宗、以及 2006 年的 1,892 宗。雖然每年都有微量的增幅，但是這和前環境運輸及工務局局長廖秀冬所提供的數字（即本港專營巴士在 2000 年發生的交通意外為 1,838 宗、2001 年的 1,934 宗、以及 2002 年的 1,858 宗）作一個簡單比較的話，我們可以看到本港專營巴士發生交通意外的數字並沒有呈現一個上升的趨勢。

從另一方面來說，專營巴士發生交通意外在本港整體交通意外中所佔的比率也是較低的。如在 2004 年、2005 和 2006 年裡，本港交通意外總數分別為 15,026 宗、15,062 宗和 14,849 宗，而涉及專營巴士的交通意外只是分別佔其中的 12.2%、12.4%和 12.7%。由此可見，專營巴士的運作可以說是頗為安全。此外，據政府公佈的數字，在這些交通意外當中，大約 30%與巴士司機的個人因素有關。如果我們將這個數字具體化一點來看的話，可以發現每年因司機個人因素而導致交通意外的數字約為 550 宗，即每天約有 1.5 宗。按照目前全港約有 14,000 名專營巴士司機來說，其比例約為萬分之一。

當然，本會提出這些數字並不是想為那些不注重交通安全的個人行為開脫，而是想在探討和落實各項措施來降低專營巴士交通意外的過程中，讓所有市民清楚地認識到各項涉及專營巴士交通意外的數據，以免他們產生不必要的誤解，從而更有效地針對問題根源來制定相應的改善辦法，降低發生交通意外的機率。此外，本會各分會長年以來都透過現存的溝通機制，與資方就營運安全的問題交換意見，並要求管理層盡最大努力和採取各種有效措施來保障所有司機、乘客、以及其他道路使用者的生命安全。本會認為，只有在勞資雙方共同努力下，才能更好地提升本港專營巴士營運安全的質素，同時得到所有市民的支持和信任。

### 三、政府過急和過度發展鐵路帶來的衝擊

從近年情況來看，受到政府過急和過度發展鐵路的影響，對專營巴士的生存空間造成極大窒礙。事實上，我們從 2000 年 5 月發表的《鐵路發展策略 2000》文件中可以看到，政府毫不諱言地表示，「到了 2016 年，鐵路在公共交通系統所佔的比例會由目前的 31%上升至 43%；若以乘客行程的距離計算，則會由 34%增

至接近 60%」。另外，政府在香港第三次整體運輸研究報告中，預計鐵路的載客人次到 2016 年會增加約 175%，佔公共交通工具總乘客人次的 50% 左右。從另一個角度來說，鐵路幹線的急速發展意味著其他交通工具的生存空間遭到無情侵蝕。按照政府所提供的數字，鐵路載客量的增長意味著其他陸路交通工具的不斷地流失客源，其幅度可能高達 40% 或以上。據九巴所公佈的數字，該公司的乘客總數正在逐年遞減，由 2002 年的 1,134.4 百萬人次減至 2006 年的 1,007.9 百萬人次，總數達 126.5 百萬人次。另外，我們從將軍澳鐵路、西鐵和馬鞍山鐵路在 2002 年開始相繼落成使用後也可以看到，專營巴士公司因此裁減了大量的就業職位。以九巴為例，該公司在 2002 至 2006 年間的已獲發牌巴士總數便削減了 420 輛，由 4,441 減至 4,029 輛。如果以每輛巴士需要聘用 3 名員工來計算的話，則專營巴士司機便流失了 1,260 個就業機會。

可惜的是，政府在整份文件中，並沒有提出未雨綢繆的構想，處理好其他交通工具從業員的生存空間和出路問題。更令廣大職業司機感到不滿的是，行政長官曾蔭權在 2007 年 10 月 10 日發表的《施政報告》中，提出興建南港島線、西港島線和沙田至中環線等多條鐵路的建議，更加突顯出扼殺業界生存空間、造成不公平競爭、出現供求失衡的現象以及浪費社會資源等問題。在這種情況下，專營巴士公司為了謀取和維持經營利潤，因而被迫使用各種手段來增加廣大巴士司機的工作強度，使他們感到壓力重重。由此來看，政府過急和過度發展鐵路是造成不能有效降低專營巴士交通意外的一個主要和深層的原因，同時使提升本港專營巴士的交通安全質素成為一種奢談。

#### 四、造成專營巴士交通意外的多重成因

其實，導致專營巴士發生交通意外的成因是頗為複雜的，而且很多因素，如道路設計、車輛設計與保養、天氣情況、公司管理、其他道路使用者的行為都是造成這些意外的主要原因。對此，許多政府官員在不同場合裡都反覆地作出類似的強調。可惜的是，社會上有些人士在有意無意間以孤立的態度來看待這個問題，把造成交通意外的責任都推到從事駕駛工作的巴士司機身上。顯然，這不但

無助於提升本港交通安全的質素，而且對巴士司機十分不公平。對於這一點，本會將在下述作進一步探討。

## 五、專營巴士司機面對的苦況

承接上點，在專營巴士司機在從事駕駛工作時，面臨來自三大方面的壓力，即政府制定交通法例的監管、資方的管理手法和乘客不斷提升的要求。其中又以政府和資方向他們施加的壓力最為巨大。主要情況是：

### 1. 政府監管方面

為了減低專營巴士發生交通意外的數字，政府並沒有進行全面的檢討和提出更多和更有效的解決辦法，反而只是一味使用嚴刑峻罰來對待職業巴士司機。舉例來說，政府在過往數年裡，已把「危險駕駛引致死亡」的最高罰款由 25,000 元增至 50,000 元，而最高監禁刑期亦由 3 年增至 5 年。不僅如此，政府還有意進一步修定有關罰則，將最高監禁刑期由 5 年增至 10 年。然而，對於巴士司機來說，路面上的交通情況千變萬化，而且很多情況是他們難以預料和控制的，因此這使在馬路上從事駕駛工作的司機仿若在虎口謀生，心中悲苦實不足外人道。從另一方面來說，作為專營巴士公司的員工，所有司機都與資方之間建立起十分明確的僱傭關係，因此他們按照香港法例的規定，受到現行《勞工法例》的保護。可惜的是，政府不但沒有為這些司機提供良好和安穩的工作條件，反而不斷地加重刑罰，使巴士司機要在心理壓力重重的情況下工作。由此來說，政府越是提高刑罰，越是難以改善本港的交通安全質素。

在實際操作中，政府似乎沒有很好地加強監管專營巴士公司，任由其使用各種不合理的管理方式，因此在很大程度上增加前線巴士司機的工作壓力和引起更多交通安全的變數。舉例來說，在專營巴士的編更方面，尤其是在節假日裡，資方管理層為了壓縮車輛的停留時間，不但經常改動巴士司機的工作時間，而且「更紙」的有效時間很短，使司機經常要在「跳線」和「跳飛機」的環境下工作，因而面對著很大的適應問題。雖然本會未能提供有效數據來證明這種工作安排與發

生交通意外之間存在著的關係，但是據不少會員的反映，這顯然會增加他們遇到交通意外的機率。

此外，在道路設計和交通燈號的管理方面，政府也生搬硬套地沿用一些海外經驗，而沒有依照香港的實際情況來改良和重新規劃。事實上，在很多情況下，受到香港路少車多和生活節奏快速的影響，不少乘客經常會在車輛行駛的期間站立和準備下車。然而，對於巴士司機來說，這無疑增加他們工作上的難題，尤其是在交通燈號轉換期間，使他們被迫要面對一個兩難的局面。換言之，也就是他們如果即時停車的話，很可能造成乘客跌倒或撞傷的安全問題。如果他們將車輛繼續向前開駛的話，則很可能得不到執法人員的諒解，面對著不遵守交通燈號的檢控。對於這個問題，本會早在多年前已經多番向政府提出建議，希望政府改善現時的交通燈號管理措施，如加設交通燈號倒計器或閃動裝置等。可惜的是，政府對廣大司機的良好願望置若罔聞，一直沒有落實有效的改善措施，為所有司機提供一個良好的駕駛環境。

## 2. 資方管理方面

近年來，專營巴士公司一直對員工採用多種無理的管理手法，尤其在巴士司機不幸遇到交通意外後，資方經常在司法機關還沒有作出明確的裁決之前，便立即使用開除、停薪休假、各種警告等手段，使員工雪上加霜，生計頓失依靠。不僅如此，當司機因發生交通意外而要面對司法機關的起訴時，資方亦沒有負起作為僱主的應有責任，提供法律援助給這些司機，協助他們面對這種艱難的處境。由於資方使用這種卸責的態度，使巴士司機不但沒有體會到資方的關懷，而且在駕駛工作時感到壓力重重。

此外，為了維持最大的經營利潤，專營巴士公司近年也「努力地」壓縮不同路線的行車時間。事實上，由一個巴士總站開達另一個巴士總站之間的行車時間往往會受到交通擠塞、乘客人數的多寡、年長和傷殘人士的需要而有所不同。可惜的是，資方管理層選擇性地忽略這些情況，沒有與司機們進行良好的溝通，提出一些未能符合實際情況的要求，徒增巴士司機的工作壓力。



不僅如此，對於社會上的一些言論，尤其是某些作為民意代表的立法會議員，在沒有具體認識實際操作的情況下，草率地推斷司機為了爭取休息時間而作出超速駕駛行為，嚴重誤導社會人士的視聽。對於這種言論，資方管理層也沒有及時作出澄清，結果不但增加社會人士的誤解，亦使司機們滿腹怨氣。由此可見，由於資方使用這種缺乏關懷的管理手法，使廣大巴士司機被迫要在一個很不安穩的環境下工作，因而無從提升他們的士氣和歸屬感，同時無助於改善本港的交通安全質素。

## 六、應從更廣層面來提升專營巴士的營運安全

儘管政府在過往多年裡為提升專營巴士的營運安全開展了不少工作，如確保車輛設計及構造符合安全標準、要求專營巴士公司加強車輛的保養及維修、提供更多的訓練及教育予巴士司機、重視巴士司機能夠得到合理的休息時間、敦促專營巴士公司提供促進巴士安全的方法和鼓勵措施、以及落實其他有關道路及乘客安全的改善措施等，但是從實際情況來說，這些工作的內容過於零碎，而且沒有從一個更為宏觀的層面來看待和處理整個問題，使改善專營巴士的營運安全缺乏成效。對於這個問題，本會認為政府必須從更廣層面來開展工作，主要建議有以下幾個方面：

### 1. 制定全面的交通運輸業政策

隨著社會經濟的發展步伐不斷加快，本港十分需要制定一套全面的交通運輸業政策，才能滿足廣大市民在交通方面日益增加的需求，以及更加有效地提升整體的營運安全質素。然而，政府在過往多年裡，一直沒有因應實際情況而制定相關政策。更甚者，政府近年在交通運輸政策上出現不少失誤，造成業界運作混亂不斷加劇的現象。在這種情況下，本港多種交通工具在缺乏定下良好的規劃和指引下，只能掙扎求存，同時給本港專營巴士的營運安全埋下很多不穩定的變數。對此，本會認為政府的當務之急是制定一套全面的交通運輸業政策，才能滿足香港社會不斷發展的需要。

## 2. 平衡鐵路發展對其他交通工具的衝擊

在前述評析中，我們可以看到，受到政府過急和過度發展鐵路的影響，本港專營巴士遇到生存空間極大窒礙的問題。可惜的是，政府在落實鐵路發展的同時，並沒有提出未雨綢繆的構想，處理好其他交通工具從業員的生存空間和出路問題。對於這種情況，本會認為廣大職業巴士司機深有體會，而社會人士亦可以清楚地看到政府操之過急地發展鐵路所造成的負面影響，故在此不贅。不過，本會在此再次強調的是，政府如果想提高當前專營巴士營運安全質素的話，則必須深入地探討和平衡鐵路發展對其他交通工具的衝擊，才能有效地達成這項目標。

## 3. 檢討現時交通和勞工法例

對於廣大受聘於專營巴士公司的司機來說，他們理應受到現行《勞工法例》的保護。然而，當司機遇到交通意外時，他們往往被無情地摒棄在勞工法例之外，遭到嚴厲的檢控和處罰，情形極為不公平。對此，本會認為，在提升本港道路安全的大前提下，政府應當及早地檢討現時交通和勞工法例，修補其間所存在的灰色地帶，並為廣大巴士司機提供一個良好的職業保障，使他們能夠安心地工作。相反來說，如果政府不落實這方面檢討和改善工作的話，那麼巴士司機便被迫要在心理壓力重重的條件下工作，增加道路安全的變數。

## 4. 改善現時道路交通的配套設施

從巴士司機的日常駕駛工作來說，他們每天都要經過很多交通燈號。然而，由於香港路少車多，再加上政府多年來都沒有致力改善現時的道路交通配套設施，使巴士司機在處理交通燈號轉換的問題時，都感到頗大的心理壓力。對於這個問題，本會早在多年前已經多番向政府提出建議，希望政府能夠改善現時的交通燈號管理措施，如加設交通燈號倒計器或閃動裝置等。本會認為，只有政府全面地改善這些配套設施，才能為所有司機提供一個良好的駕駛環境，有效地降低交通意外的頻率。

## 5. 加強監管專營巴士公司的運作

由近年情況來看，政府似乎對於專營巴士公司採取縱容的態度，使其管理層窺準現時勞工階層在勞動力市場處於較為被動的時機，任意使用一些無理的管理手法，因而在更大程度上加大巴士司機的工作壓力，同時增加整體營運安全的隱憂。事實上，本會對於這種現象，早在許多場合裡都要求有關政府部門及早跟進。可惜的是，政府官員依然我行我素，使問題越來越嚴重，而巴士司機的工作亦日益艱難。對此，本會要求，政府必須加強監管專營巴士公司的運作，使其善待員工，並為他們提供一個良好的工作環境，從而改善整體的營運安全質素。



## 汽車交通運輸業總工會

九龍巴士分會、新世界巴士分會、城巴分會、龍運巴士分會

2008年2月22日

CB(1)827/07-08(01)

Motor Transport Workers General Union

KMB Branch New World Bus Branch City Bus Branch Long Win Bus Branch

### Opinions on operational safety of franchised buses

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The Motor Transport Workers General Union and its four bus branches (KMB Branch, New World Bus Branch, City Bus Branch and Long Win Bus Branch) (hereinafter referred to as the “Union”) put forward the following opinions at the thematic meeting of “operational safety of franchised buses” held by the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council on 22 February 2008:

#### 1. Professional drivers pay high attention to traffic safety

First of all, what the Union must highlight hereby is that all professional bus drivers pay high attention to traffic safety. The main reason is that among all kinds of traffic accidents, drivers are often the very first to bear the brunt and become the first victim. Therefore, no one is willing to carry out ruthless driving at the cost of his or her own life. From another perspective, taking care of the safety of passengers and other road users is the conscience and responsibility of every bus driver, hence they are definitely unwilling to pose any threats to the lives of others. In addition, concerning the safety of passengers is one of the most paramount foundations for every bus driver to make a living. In fact, frequent involvement of franchised buses in traffic accidents may lead to a crisis of confidence among passengers who may worry about their lives and safety. As a result, the overall number of passengers may drop, making the business of franchised bus unsustainable and hence no way for bus drivers to make a living. Therefore, the Union considers that without any doubt, professional bus drivers pay high attention to traffic safety.

#### 2. Do not cause misunderstanding in the community

It is true that each bus carries a lot of passengers in a busy metropolis, and thus many citizens and members of the public who use the bus service are very concerned about the operational safety of franchised buses, and are extremely reluctant to see any traffic accidents involving franchised buses. According to the figures provided by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Ms. Eva Cheng, the number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses in Hong Kong in recent years was 1,839 in 2004, 1,864 in 2005, and 1,892 in 2006. Although there has been a slight increase every year, by simply comparing with the figures (that is, the

number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses in Hong Kong was 1,838 in 2000, 1,934 in 2001, and 1,858 in 2002) provided by the former Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works, Ms. Sarah Liao Sau Tung, we can find that the number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses in Hong Kong does not show an upward trend.

From another perspective, the proportion of traffic accidents involving franchised buses in the total number of traffic accidents in Hong Kong is relatively low. For example, the total number of traffic accidents in Hong Kong in 2004, 2005 and 2006 were 15,026, 15,062 and 14,849 respectively, while that involving franchised buses only accounted for 12.2%, 12.4% and 12.7% respectively. In view of that, the operation of franchised buses can be said to be quite safe. Moreover, according to the figures published by the government, among these traffic accidents, about 30% are related to personal factors of drivers. By looking at these figures more specifically, we can find that the annual number of traffic accidents due to personal factor of drivers is about 550, that is, about 1.5 cases per day. Such proportion is about one to ten thousand based on the existing number of 14,000 franchised bus drivers in Hong Kong.

Why the Union refers to these figures, of course, is not to justify those individual behaviour disregarding for traffic safety, but to let the public have a clear picture on the data of various traffic accidents involving franchised buses to avoid any unnecessary misunderstandings in the course of discussing and implementing various measures to reduce the number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses, thereby making more effective in addressing the source of problems to formulate corresponding improvement measures, so as to reduce the chance of traffic accidents. In addition, the branches of the Union exchange opinions on operational safety with the management of the bus companies through existing communication mechanism in the long run and request the management to put forth its utmost efforts and adopt various effective measures to protect the lives and safety of all drivers, passengers, and other road users. The Union considers that the quality of operational safety of franchised buses in Hong Kong can only be improved under joint efforts of both employers and employees, as well as the support and trust from all citizens can be obtained.

### 3. Impact of overhasty and excessive development of railway by the government

In view of the situations in recent years, overhasty and excessive development of railway by the government has significantly hindered the survival space for franchised buses. In fact, we can see from the Railway Development Policy 2000 issued in May 2000 that the government stated without hesitation that “the proportion of the railway in the mass transit system will increase from the current 31% to 43% by 2016. In terms of the distance traveled by

passengers, the proportion will increase from 34% to nearly 60%.” Moreover, in the third research report on overall transportation of Hong Kong, the government estimated that the number of passengers on the railway will increase by about 175% by 2016, accounting for about 50% of the total number of passengers using public transport. From another perspective, the rapid development of railway lines means that the survival space of other means of transport has been ruthlessly eroded. According to the figures provided by the government, the increase in passenger capacity of the railway means a constant loss of passengers among other land transport, possibly as much as 40% or more. According to the figures released by Kowloon Motor Bus, the total number of passengers of the company was declining year by year from 1,134.4 million in 2002 to 1,007.9 million in 2006, resulting in a total loss of 126.5 million people. In addition, we can see from the successive completion and operation of the Tseung Kwan O line, West Rail line and Ma On Shan line since 2002 that franchised bus companies cut a large number of jobs thereby. Take Kowloon Motor Bus as an example, the total number of licensed buses from 2002 to 2006 was reduced by 420 from 4,441 to 4,029. If 3 staff are needed for each bus, then there was a total loss of 1,260 jobs for franchised bus drivers.

Unfortunately, the government did not propose any forethought in the whole document for addressing the issues of survival space and way out for other transport practitioners. What makes the majority of professional drivers feel dissatisfied is the Policy Address of the Chief Executive, Mr. Donald Tsang, issued on 10 October 2007, which proposed the construction of several railway lines such as the South Island line, the West Island Line and the Sha Tin to Central link, further strangling the survival space for the industry and resulting in unfair competition, imbalances in supply and demand, waste of social resources and other issues. Under this circumstance, in order to pursue and maintain operating profits, franchised bus companies have been forced to use various means to increase the work intensity of bus drivers, which put them under heavy pressure. In view of that, overhasty and excessive development of railway by the government is the main and deep cause for the failure of effectively reducing the number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses. At the same time, it becomes a wasteful talk for the improvement of quality of traffic safety of franchised buses in Hong Kong.

#### 4. Multiple causes of traffic accidents involving franchised buses

Actually, the cause of traffic accidents involving franchised buses is quite complicated which involves a number of factors, for example, road design, vehicle design and maintenance, weather conditions, corporate management and behaviour of other road users are all the main causes of these accidents. As such, many government officials repeatedly highlight similar

views on different occasions. Unfortunately, some people in the society intentionally or unintentionally treat this issue in an isolated manner and lay the blame of traffic accidents solely on bus drivers engaging in driving. Obviously, it will not help improve the quality of traffic safety in Hong Kong but is very unfair to bus drivers. For this, the Union will further discuss the matter in the following.

## 5. Difficulties faced by franchised bus drivers

Following the above point of view, franchised bus drivers are under pressure from three major aspects when driving, namely the supervision in accordance with the traffic regulations formulated by the government, management practices of the bus companies, and increasing demands from passengers, among which pressure from the government and the bus companies are the most significant. The main situation is as follows:

### I. Supervision of the government

In order to reduce the number of traffic accidents involving franchised buses, the government only uses strict penalties to treat professional bus drivers rather than conducting comprehensive review and putting forward more effective solutions. For example, the government has raised the maximum fine for “dangerous driving causing death” from HKD25,000 to HKD50,000 in the past few years, while the maximum imprisonment term has also been increased from 3 years to 5 years. In addition, the government also intends to further revise the relevant penalties, with maximum imprisonment term increased from 5 years to 10 years. However, for bus drivers, the traffic conditions on the road are ever-changing with difficulty to predict and control usually. This means that drivers who are driving on the road are like making a living at a tiger’s mouth, and their misery is beyond description. From another perspective, as the employees of franchised bus companies, all drivers have established a very clear employment relationship with the employers, thereby they are protected by the prevailing Labour Laws in accordance with the provisions of the Hong Kong legislation. Unfortunately, the government even fails to provide good and stable work conditions for these drivers, but continuously increases the penalty, pushing bus drivers to work under heavy psychological pressure. In view of this, the more the government increase impose heavy penalty, the more difficult it is to improve the quality of traffic safety in Hong Kong.

In practice, it seems that the government fails to properly enhance the supervision of franchised bus companies but allows them to use various unreasonable management means, greatly raising the pressure on front-line bus drivers and posing more uncertainties to traffic

safety. For example, in preparation of timetable for franchised buses, particularly during holidays, the management of bus companies not only changes the working hours of bus drivers frequently, but also makes the effective time of “schedule form” very short for the purpose of reducing the parking time of buses. Due to such practice, drivers often have to work under the arrangement of “jumping among routes” and “jumping among models”, and hence are facing considerable adaptation problems. Although the Union fails to provide valid data to prove the relationship between such work arrangement and traffic accidents, many members reflect that the practice will obviously increase their chances of encountering traffic accident.

In addition, for the road design and management of traffic lights, the government also rigidly follows some overseas experience, but does not modify and re-plan in accordance with the actual situation of Hong Kong. In fact, as the number of roads fails to meet abundant vehicles, as well as under the influence of fast living pace, many passengers often stand and prepare to alight when the buses are moving, which undoubtedly increase work difficulties for bus drivers, especially during the conversion of traffic lights, which will force them to face a dilemma. In other words, if they stop immediately, it is likely to cause safety issue as those passengers may fall or be injured. But if they keep on driving the bus forward, probably they may not be understood by law enforcers and have to face the prosecution of non-compliance with traffic signals. In regard to this issue, the Union repeatedly proposed to the government many years ago, looking for improvement by the government on the existing management measures for traffic signals, such as installation of traffic signal counters or flashing devices. Unfortunately, the government pays no attention to the favorable expectation of the majority of drivers and has not taken any effective improvement measures for providing a good driving environment for all drivers.

## II. Management of bus companies

In recent years, franchised bus companies have been employing a variety of unreasonable management means on their employees. Particularly when bus drivers are unfortunately involved in traffic accidents, bus companies often immediately employ means such as dismissal, no pay leave and various kinds of warning before the judicial authority has made a clear ruling, making the situation of employees worse with the loss of livelihood. Moreover, when drivers are subject to prosecutions from the judicial authority as a result of traffic accident, bus companies have not fulfilled their responsibilities as employers to provide these drivers with legal assistance to help them overcome such difficult situation. As the employers shirk their responsibilities, bus drivers not only receive no caring from the employers, but also have to face heavy pressure when driving.



In addition, as to maintain maximum operating profit, franchised bus companies has “worked hard” to shorten the travel time of different routes in recent years. As a matter of fact, the travel time from one bus terminus to another is often subject to traffic congestion, number of passengers, needs of the elderly and the disabled. Unfortunately, the management of bus companies selectively ignores these situations and has no proper communication with the drivers, but puts forward requests out of reality, which increase the job pressure of bus drivers.

Moreover, some comments in the community, especially some Legislative Council Members who are the representatives of public opinion, under no specific knowledge of the actual operation, made rash inference that speeding behaviour of drivers is to strive for rest time. Their inference seriously misleads the public. For this kind of speech, the management of bus companies also does not timely make any clarification. As a result, the misunderstandings present in the community will be enhanced and the drivers are full of grievances. We can see that the majority of bus drivers have to work in a very unstable environment due to the uncaring management practices of the bus companies, and thus their morale and sense of belonging remain low, which is not conducive to improving the quality of traffic safety in Hong Kong.

#### 6. Operational safety of franchised buses should be enhanced from a broader perspective

Although the government has done a lot of work in recent years to improve the operational safety of franchised buses, such as ensuring that the safety standards in vehicle design and construction are met, requiring franchised bus companies to enhance vehicle maintenance and repair, providing more training and education to bus drivers, paying attention to reasonable rest time for bus drivers, urging franchised bus companies to provide means and incentive measures for promotion of bus safety, as well as implementing other improvement measures related to safety of roads and passengers. However, in practice, these works are too fragmented and fails to study and handle the whole issue from a more macro level, thereby the promotion of operational safety among franchised buses is ineffective. For this issue, the Union considers that the government must work from a broader perspective, with the main recommendations as follows:

##### I. Formulate a comprehensive policy for the transport industry

As economic development in the society is accelerating, there is a need for Hong Kong to formulate a comprehensive policy for the transport industry to meet the growing demands of

the public in transportation and improve the quality of overall operational safety more effectively. However, the government has not formulated the relevant policies in accordance with the actual conditions for years. What is even worse is that the government has made many mistakes in transportation policies in recent years and caused increasing chaos in the industry. Under such circumstances, due to the lack of good planning and guidance, various modes of transport in Hong Kong can only struggle for survival, as well as posing many uncertainties to operational safety of franchised buses in Hong Kong. In response to this, the Union considers that the urgent task for the government is to formulate a comprehensive policy for the transport industry to meet the needs of continuous development in Hong Kong.

## II. Balance the impact of railway development on other modes of transport

In the above analysis, we can see that franchised buses in Hong Kong have encountered problems that greatly hindered their survival space due to the overhasty and excessive development of the railway by the government. Unfortunately, the government does not propose any forethought for addressing the issue of survival space and way out for other transport practitioners while implementing the development of railway. For such situation, the Union considers that the majority of professional bus drivers have deep experience. As the public can clearly witness the negative impact of overhasty development of the railway, no repeated description will be made here. However, the Union makes emphasis again hereby that if the government wants to promote the quality of operational safety of existing franchised buses, such goal can only be achieved effectively by exploring in depth the issue and balancing the impact of railway development on other modes of transport.

## III. Review the existing traffic and labour legislation

The majority of drivers employed by franchised bus companies should be protected under the prevailing Labour Laws. However, drivers are often ruthlessly abandoned beyond the relevant labour laws and subject to severe prosecution and punishment when involving in traffic accidents, which is extremely unfair. In this regard, the Union considers that under the prerequisite of improving the road safety in Hong Kong, the government should review the current transport and labour laws as soon as possible to revise the existing grey areas and provide bus drivers with proper job security so that they can work at ease. On the contrary, if the government does not bring about such review and improvement, then bus drivers are forced to work under psychological stress, and the road safety may have more uncertainties.

## IV. Improve existing road traffic supporting facilities

In regard to daily driving of bus drivers, they have to pass through a lot of traffic signals every day. However, as number of roads fails to meet abundant vehicles in Hong Kong, as well as due to the failure of actively improving the existing road traffic supporting facilities by the government for years, bus drivers are under severe psychological pressure when dealing with the issue of traffic signal conversion. For this issue, the Union has repeatedly proposed to the government many years ago, looking for improvement by the government on the existing management measures for traffic signals, such as installation of traffic signal counters or flashing devices. The Union considers that the government can provide all drivers with a good driving environment and effectively reduce the frequency of traffic accidents only if these supporting facilities are comprehensively improved.

#### V. Enhance supervision over operations of franchised bus companies

In view of the situations in recent years, the government seems to adopt a loose approach towards franchised bus companies, under which their management grasps the opportunities that the current working class is in a relatively passive status in the labour market to arbitrarily use some unreasonable management means, thus increasing work pressure on bus drivers to a greater extent, as well as posing a higher potential risk to the overall operational safety. In fact, the Union has requested the relevant government departments in a number of occasions to follow up this phenomenon as early as possible. Unfortunately, the government officials persist in their old ways, which makes the problems even worse and poses increasingly difficulties to the work of bus drivers. To this end, the Union requests that the government must enhance supervision over the operations of franchised bus companies to ensure that they treat the employees properly and provide them with a good working environment, so that the quality of overall operational safety can be improved.

**[chopped: Motor Transport Workers General Union]**

Motor Transport Workers General Union

KMB Branch New World Bus Branch City Bus Branch Long Win Bus Branch

22 February 2008

## 有關立法會交通事務委員會 2008 年 2 月 22 日會議

### 「專營巴士營運之安全問題」議題之意見大綱

提交單位：新世界第一巴士公司職工會、專利巴士工會聯席。

2007 年內發生數宗涉及巴士的交通意外，引起大眾關注巴士行車安全問題。作為業界的一分子，我們在此提出一些影響行車安全的問題，供各位參考。

據道路專家報告，所有交通意外，只有三個元素：『人』、『車』、『路』。

『路』是較客觀的元素，先天設計缺憾的路段不多。但卻因路少車多，繁忙時段車輛切線爭路，巴士為免碰撞而煞車，造成乘客受傷的意外，無日無之。非法佔用行車道，令巴士不能停靠路上落客，險象橫生。工會透過公司向有關部門反映，有關部門似乎未能改善，以致情況依然嚴重。

『車』，隨著科技的進步，巴士的設計不斷提升。近數年巴士整體數量無大幅減少，但工程人員卻減少過半，不難想像工程人員面對的工作壓力。時間緊迫下，唯有優先處理重點工作，以致車輛質素下滑，每天都有巴士因故障而停泊路邊待救援。一些不涉及大眾安全的問題，工程部管理層更以種種方式推搪，例如：新巴車長駕駛倉冷氣不足，工程部拖了 9 年，仍在試驗解決方法。

『人』是感情動物，如能保持心境平和、輕鬆地工作，必可減少不必要的交通事故及提高服務質素。下列各點可供參考：

#### 1. 減少車長工作壓力 (跳線、行車時間)

以新創建交通服務有限公司管轄旗下新巴及城巴兩間專營巴士公司為例，公司在巴士營運方面，都務求以最少的人力資源來爭取最大的成本效益。因此，新巴及城巴公司大部份巴士車長，平均每天都會駕駛最少兩至三條不同的巴士路線，行內俗稱為「跳線」。由於「跳線」問題，令到車長每轉車可能駕駛不同路線，車長因此未能合時適應及掌握每條路線途經道路特有的潛在風險，因此容易產生不必要的交通事故。(新巴經營頭兩年，每名車長駕駛固定路線，可參考常年涉及的交通事故數字作參考。)

跳線也曾因道路塞車，車長趕不及接車，班次誤點影響乘客。

新巴職工會曾就跳線問題，多次向公司反映，但公司以營運效益推搪。

#### 2. 增加員工歸屬感 (包括減少薪級差距、提升福利)

新巴及城巴公司的車長薪酬及福利差距的問題。公司一直以市場決定薪酬為由，所以車長在不同時期入職，其入職的薪酬及福利都會有所不同。但是，卻沒有機制令後期入職的車長，因年資增長，而薪酬貼近舊員工。以新巴為例，經營 10 年，車長薪級已分九級。職工會於每年薪酬調整會議，嘗試以固定金額加幅，拉近薪級差距，但管理層堅持以百分比方式加薪，令薪距擴大，造成各車長薪酬及福利出現異常懸殊，無可避免令到部分車長對公司缺乏歸屬感，因而影響服務質素。

我們過去亦曾多次向公司反映，在薪酬調整時候，應該訂立一套公平的機制，以拉近員工薪酬差距，以及公司福利方面能夠一視同仁，但公司都拒絕接受。

### 3.增加車廠維修人手

至於公司維修車廠的人手問題。我們公司的車房人手問題出現不足。過去車房維修員工人手流失後，公司都沒有再作增補，但是車輛數目反而沒有減少甚至增多。因而造成現時車房員工的工作壓力不斷增大。新、城兩巴公司的車廠維修員工數目相加不多過四百，比起 7 至 8 年前減少有三分之一之多。

車房人手不足，無可避免令到車輛的故障都不能夠獲得妥善的修理，因而車輛「死火」事故宗數每年都不斷增加，甚至還有嚴重的故障。這些潛在因素，都會影響行車安全。

CB (1) 892/07-08(2) (22 February 2008): Joint submission on safety of franchised bus operation from New World First Bus Company Staff Union and Franchised Bus Unions Alliance

Re: Legislative Council Panel on Transport Meeting on 22 February 2008  
Outline of Submissions on “Safety of Franchised Bus Operation”

Submitted by: New World First Bus Company Staff Union and Franchised Bus Unions Alliance

There were a few traffic accidents involving buses within the year of 2007, which led to public concern on the safety of franchise buses. As part of the industry, we hereby raise a few issues regarding bus safety for your reference.

According to a road safety expert report, all traffic accidents are due to three elements: “people”, “vehicles”, and “road”

“Road” is the relatively objective criterion, and there are few roads which bear intrinsically flawed designs. However, since there are only a few roads yet many vehicles, during rush hours, many cars would cut in line. To avoid collision, buses would brake, causing injuries to the passengers. Other vehicles also illegally take over driveway, so buses cannot stop at the bus stops to drop off passengers, which is a dangerous situation. The unions have, through our companies, reflected these issues to the relevant government department, but it appears that the relevant department has not been able to alleviate these situations, and as a result the problems persist.

“Vehicles”—with the advancement of technology, bus designs have continuously improved. In recent years, although the number of buses has not seen a drastic decrease, the number of maintenance staff has reduced by more than half. It is hard to imagine the level of stress faced the maintenance staff on duty. Due to time constraints, the maintenance staff has no choice but to prioritize the more important work items. This has caused the quality of buses to deteriorate, and there are daily incidents where malfunctioning buses have to park on the side of the road to wait for rescue. As to other problems which do not concern public safety, the management of engineering department has resorted to various ways to push back the issues. For example, the engineering department of New World First Bus has sat on the problem regarding the lack of air conditioning in the driving seats of the New World First Bus buses for 9 years, claiming that they are still testing for a solution.

“People” are emotional creatures. Necessary traffic accidents can be reduced and quality service can be improved if one can work in a calm and relaxed state. A few points below for your reference:

1. Reducing the stress levels of bus captains (“jumping routes”, driving hours)

To take Citybus and New World First Bus, which are both owned by NWS Holdings, as examples, the companies have sought to maximize operation efficiency with the minimal amount of staff. As such, most of the bus captains of Citybus and New World First Bus have to drive at least two to three different bus routes every day. This is referred to as “jumping routes” within the industry. Because bus captains have to drive different routes every day,

they may not have time to adjust and master every route and access the risks of driving therein, causing unnecessary traffic accidents. (As a reference, you may refer to the number of accidents for the first two years of operation of New World First Bus, where each driver was assigned a fixed route).

Where there are tragic jams, the practice of “jumping routes” has also caused the bus captains to not be able to make it to the next bus, causing delay to the passengers.

The New World First Bus Company Staff Union has repeatedly made submissions to the company regarding the problem of “jumping routes”, but the company has sat on the issue, in the name of operation efficiency.

## 2. Increase sense of belonging for workers (including minimizing the salary gap, increasing benefits)

The problem regarding the salary and benefits gap in Citybus and New World First Bus bus captains: the company has, in the name of market pricing, offered different levels of salary and benefits to bus captains who entered the company at different times. As a result, bus captains who entered the company at different times would have different levels of salary and benefits. However, there is no mechanism for the newer bus captains to have their salaries increase to match those who entered the company earlier, as the newer bus captains continue to work in the company. To take New World First Bus, which has been in operation for 10 years, as an example, there are a total of 9 different remuneration levels for bus captains. In the past annual meetings on salary adjustment, the union has repeatedly proposed to have fixed increases in remuneration levels, so as to narrow the gaps between the remuneration levels, but the management has insisted on increasing remuneration by percentages, leading to the widening of the remuneration gap. This has caused significant gaps between different bus captains in terms of salaries and benefits, and has inevitably caused some bus captains to lose their sense of belonging to the company, ultimately affecting the quality of service.

We have, in the past, repeatedly suggested to the company that in making adjustments to remuneration, a fairer system should be adopted, so as to narrow the remuneration gap, and so that the company can be fair to everyone in terms of salary and benefits. However, the company has refused to adopt these suggestions.

## 3. Increase in maintenance staff

As to problems regarding the lack of staff at the maintenance depots: our company lacks maintenance staff. The company has not hired more maintenance staff, even after some of the staff has left; while the number of buses has not decreased and has even increased. This has led to the increased levels of stress for maintenance staff. There are currently only around 400 maintenance staff members between Citybus and New World First Bus, a 1/3 decrease compared to 7 or 8 years ago.

The lack of maintenance staff has inevitably led to situations where buses are not duly repaired even though they are malfunctioning, leading to the stalling of the engines. As such, there has been a continuous increase in the number of accidents, even serious malfunctions. These latent problems will serve to affect bus safety.

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局  
運輸科  
香港花園道美利大廈



Transport and  
Housing Bureau  
Government Secretariat  
Transport Branch  
Murray Building, Garden Road,  
Hong Kong.

本局檔號 OUR REF.: THB (T)L 2/4/96  
來函檔號 YOUR REF.: CB1/PL/TP

電話 Tel. No.: 2189 2101  
傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

20 June 2008

Clerk to Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council  
Legislative Council Building  
8 Jackson Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
(Attn.: Mr Andy Lau)  
[Fax No. : 2121 0420]

Dear Mr Lau,

**Panel on Transport**  
**Update on Review of Recent Bus Fire Incidents**

Thank you for your letter of 9 May 2008. This letter provides an update on the preventive measures to safeguard against bus fire incidents and to facilitate safe evacuation of passengers from a bus for Members' reference.

At present, all franchised buses that provide services to passengers must meet the safety requirements of the legislation and pass the Transport Department's ("TD") stringent inspections. One of the requirements is that all buses should be provided with emergency exits on both the upper and lower decks, and meet the height and width requirements of the passenger gangways to facilitate safe evacuation of passengers during emergency situations. Every new bus model has to undergo type approval by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the regulatory and safety requirements before it is put into service.

In addition, all bus operators have taken the following measures to safeguard against smoke/fire incidents -

New Bus:

- (a) To ensure hoseless design configuration in the engine compartment as far as practicable;
- (b) To include better fire retardancy standard in materials specification; and
- (c) To adopt proven designs against potential fire hazards as far as possible.



Existing Bus:

- (a) To re-route hoses, cables and other heat-susceptible components away from heat sources as far as practicable;
- (b) To replace critical components that might become potential fire hazards on failure according to the maintenance schedule;
- (c) To equip protective sleeve for oil hoses/electrical cable as and when required;
- (d) To review potential fire/smoke hazards and make modifications via internal feedback and modification trials; and
- (e) To issue maintenance notices advocating maintenance best practice and procedures that have contributed against fire hazards in an ongoing manner.

Every serving bus has to undergo annual examination by TD to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. Furthermore, TD conducts random spot checks to ensure that the buses are maintained properly. The fire-fighting equipments installed in the buses are examined during these annual and spot checks to ensure that they are in good condition and function properly. TD closely monitors the servicing and maintenance programmes of buses and holds regular meetings with the bus operators to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, to formulate measures to enhance bus safety.

On top of ensuring the standards of buses, all bus operators also provide different types of trainings to their new and serving bus captains to enhance their safety awareness. Procedures in handling emergency and evacuation of passengers from a bus are compulsory parts of the training programme which includes not only classroom training but also practical drills. The emergency handling procedures, such as steps for bus captains to facilitate safe evacuation of passengers from a bus on fire, are listed in the bus captains' handbooks/circulars. The bus operators review and enhance the handbooks/circulars from time to time.

Yours sincerely,

(Ms Emily Mo)

for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport (Attn. : Mr Albert Yuen)

Internal  
AS(T)2B

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局  
運輸科  
香港花園道美利大廈



LC Paper No. CB(1)1476/08-09(01)

**Transport and  
Housing Bureau  
Government Secretariat  
Transport Branch**  
Murray Building, Garden Road,  
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來函檔號 Your Ref. CB1/PL/TP

傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

30 April 2009

Clerk to Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council  
Legislative Council Building  
8 Jackson Road  
Central  
Hong Kong  
(Attn. : Ms Sarah Yuen)

Dear Ms Yuen,

**Panel on Transport  
23 January 2009**

At the Panel on Transport meeting held on 23 January 2009, Members discussed the "Recent bus fire/smoke incidents" and requested the Government to provide supplementary information on the causes of the incidents and preventive measures. Please find enclosed the information requested for Members' reference.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Constance Choy".

(Miss Constance Choy)  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport (Attn.: Mr Albert Yuen)

**Follow-up actions arising from  
Panel on Transport Meeting on 23 January 2009  
Recent bus fire/smoke incidents**

**(a) Information on the following issues:**

(1) *The Administration's and the bus companies' responses to the views of experts on how to prevent bus fire incidents as reported by Wen Wui Pao dated 8 January 2009 –*

(i) *as the occurrence of bus fire/smoke incidents might be related to bus age, it was necessary to more regularly carry out maintenance on buses over 10 years old, and to remind maintenance staff to pay special attention to components that might pose fire hazards as they aged;*

- The following table shows the total number of buses involved in fire incidents in 2006 to 2008, and the number of these buses which were over 10 years old.

Year	2006	2007	2008
(a) Number of buses involved in bus fire	16	9	19
(b) Number of buses in (a) which were over 10 years old	7	3	10
(c) % of buses involved in bus fire incidents which were over 10 years old [(b)/(a)]	44%	33%	53%

- As shown by the above statistics, there is no correlation between the occurrence of bus fires and the age of the bus concerned.
- Every serving franchised bus is examined by its own company every month, and it has to undergo annual examination by the Transport Department (TD) to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD will continue to closely monitor the maintenance of the franchised buses by continuing spot check on the in-service buses and buses which have just passed their monthly inspection. TD also holds regular meetings with the

franchised bus operators to evaluate and review the inspection results and maintenance quality, and will instruct franchised bus operators to carry out investigations and introduce remedial measures where necessary.

- TD has also reminded the maintenance staff of the operators to pay special attention to components that might pose fire hazards.

*(ii) that there was a need to improve the air circulation of bus air-conditioning systems to prevent overheating;*

- TD is now working with the bus operators and bus manufacturers to explore automatic shutdown of the air-conditioning ventilation system to prevent the propagation of fire to the passenger compartment in the event a fire breaks out in the engine compartment, and to improve the air circulation of the air conditioning system to prevent overheating.

*(2) Whether the occurrence of bus fire/smoke incidents was related to bus age;*

- There is no correlation between the occurrence of bus fires and the age of the bus concerned. Please refer to our response to (a)(1)(i) above.

*(3) As bus fire/smoke incidents were mainly related to overheating, whether suitable devices could be introduced to alert bus captains of overheating so that they could take timely actions; and*

- Some of the franchised buses have been installed with temperature sensors in their engine compartments to alert bus captains in case of overheating. In most of the cases, smoke / fire was seen before the sensor was triggered because the origin of fire varied from time to time. TD is exploring with the bus operators and manufacturers on how the present system can be improved.


(4) *How fire-proof were the bus body materials presently used, and what improvements in this regard could be made to existing buses to prevent bus fire incidents.*

- The double deck franchised buses in Hong Kong are supplied by European bus manufacturers, and the body materials are fire retardant. In order to prevent bus fire incidents, TD is working with the franchised bus operators and the manufacturers to enhance the checking and early replacement of parts and components which might pose fire hazards.

**(b) A comparison of the daily and monthly numbers of buses covered in spot checks before and after the three incidents, as well as the number of safety problems so identified, and the actions taken to address them.**

- The average number of spot checks in the year 2008 was 14 per working day. After the incidents on 10 December 2008, TD strengthened the number of spot checks per working day to 17 buses in January 2009. In the first quarter of 2009, no safety items related to potential fire hazards were found in the spot check.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
April 2009



致：立法會交通事務委員會

## 營運安全問題根源

### 九巴高壓管理 運輸署監管不力

本會得悉立法會交通事務委員會，將討論專營巴士營運問題，特此致函 貴委員會，表達本會對此議題之意見。


九巴公司日前發稿表示與運輸署達成共識以改善巴士營運安全，公司對外講得十分漂亮，但是內部卻是問題叢生，處處以高壓手法管理車長，而運輸署當局又未能做好監察的責任，令問題不斷重演！本會將九巴公司情況分列如下：

#### (1) 合約制車長流失量大 影響營運安全

- 引入合約制十年內共有一萬二千多人次入職
- 目前八千多名車長中，有二千九百人左右為合約制
- 即每四人之中有三人離職，流失量達百分之七十五
- 原因：
  - i. 兩年續約一次，造成過客心態，士氣十分低落
  - ii. 工資偏低，底薪只有七千元左右，又要面對高壓式管理
  - iii. 訓練不足，只接受十八天左右培訓(原為四星期)，便須在路面上駕駛多種型號車輛
  - iv. 嚴厲的懲處制度，沒有足夠機會給予車長累積經驗
- 影響：
  - v. 危害市民安全
  - vi. 構成加價壓力。公司培訓一名車長成本為七萬元左右，即過去十年共花費七、八億左右的訓練開支，無形中又加重了加價的壓力。
- 要求：
  - vii. 留住好車長，培育接班人。公司應該改善合約車長薪金福利待遇，讓車長可在良好工作環境下累積經驗

#### (2) 高壓式管理 車長心理包袱超大

- 公司內部諸多制度監察車長工作，令車長每日工作有如一心懸千斤碇
- 內部記分制：運輸署規定兩年十五分，九巴私行三年十分
- 車長表現管理小組：不時派出神秘乘客，監察車長駕駛情況及其他表現
- 即使法庭未有判定責任誰屬，發生意外後(不論大小)動輒扣起獎金，甚至解僱
- 接到乘客投訴後，便輕易訓示司機，有例子竟因行車過慢而遭口頭訓示及扣除獎金
- 稍有差池便遭判守行爲六個月，令車長蒙受心理壓力



- 請病假遭公司特別致電關照慰問，病假稍多更會安排約見作深入“了解”

### (3) 行車編排不當 車長被迫趕時間

- 編定行車時間多不切實際，引致巴士無法按照原定編排的時間開出班次
- 臨時抽調車輛、壞車、修理等，均會造成減車、收車、欠車的現象
- 藉削減行車時間以增加行車班次，增加車長工作量而令其收入減少之餘，又剝削了車長休息時間，不但影響了健康又打擊了士氣
- 因班次減少導致乘客擠迫，繁忙時間更有機會出現超載的情況出現。這潛在危機實在是個計時炸彈！
- 車長因前車收車，被迫提早開車，造成你追我趕現象，對道路安全造成隱患。

### (4) 運輸署監管不嚴 立法不足 欠缺配套

- 行車時間不足，車長被迫趕時間，當局未予理會，危害乘客安全
- 未有監督九巴是否如實執行“巴士車長工作時間指引”
- 違反情況：
  - i. 用膳時間與休息時間合併，剝奪了車長合理的休息時間。違反“車長工作6小時後最少應休息30分鐘”的規定
  - ii. 車長到站後往往被催促甚至要求即時再開車，根本沒有安排足夠的休息時間予車長“回氣”！違反“在6小時的工作時間內，應最少有合共20分鐘小休，包括在首4小時的工作時間內至少休息12分鐘。”的規定
  - iii. 因為公司排失當關係，令車長工作超過十四小時，做成車長工作過勞而增加意外發生機會。違反“一天內最長的工作時間(包括所有休息時間)不應超逾14小時。”的規定
- 要求及建議：
  - iv. 運輸署應立法規定車長有一小時用膳時間的同時，亦應規定每班車之間應最少有8至10分鐘時間休息
  - v. 巴士時速不會超越70公里，但有部分路段限速50公里，而在部分由70減至50公里時速的路段上，運輸署未有給予足夠的緩衝及提示，因此本會認為除加設告示牌之外，更應在路面鋪設減速凹凸坑紋，以微震提示駕駛者開始減速。
  - vi. 本會亦已經透過通告向各車長轉達運輸署訊息，警方已展開嚴厲檢控行動，打擊巴士超速行為，會在市區50公里，快速公路70轉50公里位置。工友們請注意安全，守法行車。

九巴員工協會  
二零零九年十一月二十四日

聯絡人：理事長 郭偉光 9186 9269  
副理事長 李國華 6374 3637



The K. M. B. Staff Union (Affiliated to HKCTU)

CB(1)509/09-10(02)

To: Legislative Council Panel on Transport

Root problem of operational safety

KMB high pressure management    Insufficient supervision from the Transport Department

This Union note that the Legislative Council Panel on Transport will discuss about issues in relation to the operation of franchised buses. We hereby send you a letter, to express our views in relation to this issue.

The KMB has issued a report a few days ago, stating that it has reached a consensus with the Transport Department to improve the safety of bus operations. The company has presented this very nicely to the outsiders, but there are various problems internally, the fact that the bus captains are working under high pressure and the Transport Department failed to deliver its responsibility in monitoring lead to the problem emerge repeatedly!

We set out the status of KMB as follow:

(1) Bus captains were employed under contract, leading to high turnover, affecting operational safety

- Introducing contract system, within 10 years there were 12,000 od people being employed
- currently there are around 8,000 bus captains, around 2,900 are employed under contract
- which means every 4 persons there are 3 that resigned, and the turnover rate Is 75%
- Reasons:
  - i. contract is renewed bi-yearly, leading to a by-passer attitude and low morale
  - ii. salary is relatively low, the base salary is only around \$7,000, and would have to work under high pressure management
  - iii. insufficient training, only required to take around 18 days training (originally 4 weeks), and would have to drive different types of vehicles on the road
  - iv. Severe punishment system, not enough opportunity for the bus captain to accumulate experience
- Effect:
  - v. endanger the safety of citizens
  - vi. causing pressure to increase bus fares, the cost of the Company for training a bus captain is around \$70,000, i.e. in the last 10 years HK\$7 to 8 billion has been spent on training expenses, which in a sense would increase the pressure of increasing bus fare.
- Request:
  - vii. keeping the good bus captain, nurture successors. The Company should improve the salary and fringe benefit of the bus captains employed under contract, so that bus captains may accumulate experience in a pleasant environment

(2) High pressure management    the bus captains have very large psychological burden

- many internal policies monitoring the work of the bus captains, making bus captains feeling heavy hearted every day at work
- internal scoring system: the requirement imposed by the Transport Department is 15



points within 2 years, while KMB requires 10 points within 3 years

- Bus captain performance management team: From time to time, mysterious passengers are dispatched to monitor the bus captain's driving condition and other performance
- Even before the court make any determination as to who is responsibility [for the accident], after the happening of the accident (regardless of its seriousness), bonus would be deducted, and the bus captains may even be laid off
- After receiving complaints from passengers, the bus captain would then be admonished, there is an example where bus captain was verbally admonished and bonus was being deducted because the bus captain drove too slow
- any issues arise would lead to the bus captain being bound over for 6 months, causing the bus captain to suffer psychological pressure
- calling sick would lead to phone call from the Company as an expression sympathy and solicitude, if [the bus captain] call in sick more frequently, an appointment would be arranged to more indepth "inquiry"

(3) Inappropriate bus route scheduling bus captains are forced to be in a hurry

- impractical to set the travel time, resulting in the inability for the bus to operate at the scheduled time
- spontaneous deployment of buses, breakdowns, repairs, etc., would lead to the phenomenon of less buses, buses being withdrawn from service, or not enough buses
- By reducing the driving time to increase the number of trips, increasing the workload of the bus captains and causing a reduction in their income, as well as exploiting the rest time for bus captains, this does not only affects health but also harmful to the morale.
- As bus trips have been reduced and there would be overcrowded passengers, there is even a greater chance of overload during peak hours. This potential crisis is really a time bomb!
- As the bus before has been withdrawn from service, the bus captains are forced to start the bus trip earlier, causing a phenomenon of chasing, causing hidden dangers to road safety.

(4) Insufficient monitoring by Transport Department    Inadequate legislation    lacking support

- Insufficient driving time, the bus captains are forced to be in a hurry, the authority neglect such issue which endanger the safety of the passengers
- Fail to supervise KMB's implementation of "Guidelines on Bus Captain. Working Hours"
- Condition of violations:
  - i. the combination of meal breaks and rest time, deprived the reasonable rest time of the bus captains, which is in violation of the guideline that "bus captains should have a rest break of at least 30 minutes after 6 driving hours"
  - ii. when the bus captain arrives the terminal, he is often urged or being requested to start the next bus trip immediately. There is insufficient rest time for the captain to "recover!", which is in violation of the guideline that "within that 6-hour duty, bus captain should have short rest breaks totalling not less than 20 minutes, of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. "
  - iii. By reasons of the Company's poor organization, bus captains have to work more than 14 hours, which leave to fatigue and the chance of accidents increased. This violates the guideline which states that "The longest working hours in a day (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours"
- Request and suggestions:

- iv. The Transport Department should impose legislation specifying that the bus captains should have 1 hour meal break, at the same time, it should also specify that there should be at least 8 to 10 minutes rest break between bus trips
- v. the speed limit for buses should not exceed 70km/h. However, some road sections have a speed limit of 50 km/h, and the Transport Department has not given enough buffers and reminders along some road sections where the speed limit should reduce from 70 to 50 km/h. Therefore, this Union suggests that other than adding signboards, there should also be deceleration bump pits on the road surface, in which the light shakiness may prompt the bus captain to start decelerating.
- vi. This Union has also conveyed the message of the Transport Department by way of notice, stating that the police have start a stringent prosecution action against speeding of buses at the 50km/h zone as well as locations along the highway where the speed limit should reduce from 70 to 50 km/h. Union members should pay attention to safety and abide to the law while driving.

The K. M. B. Staff Union  
24 November 2009

Contact person: President Kwok Wai Kwong (郭偉光) 9186 9269  
Nice-President Lee Kwok Wah (李國華) 6374 3637

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# 新世界第一巴士公司職工會 (職工盟成員)

九龍油麻地彌敦道 557-559 號永旺行 7 樓

電話：2770 8668 傳真：2384 0261



致：立法會交通事務委員會

## **關於專營巴士的營運安全意見**

本會知悉 貴委員會討論專營巴士的營運安全事宜，因此呈此意見書供議員參考。本會認為巴士安全是一個觸及多個範疇的議題，涉及不同的持分者包括公司管理層、司機、乘客及政府當局，不能將全部責任加之車長身上。本會謹列出以下四點意見：

1. 就新巴公司而言，不同路線的行車時間表有經常更改的情況出現，這會做成混亂，令到巴士車長無所適從，形成潛在危機；
2. 公司亦有安排通宵更的車長“替尾頂頭”，即安排車長駕駛夜更車最後一轉，及頂替早更車最初的一轉。這不但加長車長的工作時間，更影響駕駛的安全性。因為通宵工作違反人類正常作息時間，車長須付出額外精力駕駛，若繼續安排“替尾頂頭”，只會拉低安全系數！
3. 巴士總站設施不足，令車長未能得到充分休息。提供適切的設施予巴士車長是公司及運輸署的責任，當局在批出巴士總站之時亦以人性化的角度出發，安排足夠的設施予員工，例如員工休息室、洗手間等。
4. 維修政策混亂，質素難以保證。過去曾發生不少巴士著火事件，原因是公司過度使用車輛，未有安排適當的維修保養之故。另外維修保養的流程亦混亂，而負責月修及緊急維修的組員又混合工作，令到質素難有保證。同時車房員工反映，除零件經常缺貨之外質素亦欠佳。因此公司除有須要增加車房的人手外，更要改零件質素以保證每輛巴士出廠時也在最佳狀況。

新世界巴士公司職工會

2009 年 11 月 25 日

CB(1)489/09-10(02)



New World First Bus Company Staff Union

(Member of the Confederation of Trade Unions)

7/F, Wing Wong Building, 557-559 Nathan Road, Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon

Tel: 2770 8668 Fax: 2384 0261



To: Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council

**Re: Submission in relation to the operational Safe of Franchised Buses**

We are aware that your Panel has been discussing about the operational safety of franchised buses. Therefore, we file this submission for your Panel member's review. This Council believes that bus safety is a topic that touches upon multiple areas and involves different stakeholders including company management, bus captains, passengers and the government itself, and all responsibility should not borne by the bus captains. We set out 4 points below:

1. As far as NWFB is concerned, there are frequent changes to the scheduled timetable of different bus routes. This would cause confusion and bus captains were unable to adapt and poses a potential risk;
2. The company has also arranged overnight shift bus captain to “替尾頂頭”, i.e. to arrange the bus captain to drive the overnight shift as well as to work on the very first shift in the morning. This does not only lengthens the working hours of the bus captain, but also affects driving safety. It is because working overnight contravenes the human bio-clock, the bus captains have to pay extra attention while driving. If you continue to arrange for the "bus captain to drive the overnight shift as well as to work on the very first shift in the morning ", it will only lower the safety factor!
3. The lack of facilities at the bus terminus prevents the bus captain from getting enough rest. Provide appropriate facilities to bus captains are the responsibility of the bus operator and the Transport Department. When the authority is approving the bus terminal, it should also look from a humanize perspective, and arrange enough facilities for employees, such as employee rest room, lavatories, etc.
4. The policy for maintenance is chaotic, hence it is hard to guarantee its quality. There have been many incidents of fire in relation to buses in the past owing to the excessive use of bus of the Company, whilst there is no arrangement for the proper maintenance of the buses. In addition, the maintenance process is also chaotic. The team members responsible for monthly repairs and emergency repairs are mixed together, making it difficult to ensure the quality. At the same time according to the reflection of the staff of the garage, apart from the fact that parts are often out of stock, the quality is also unsatisfactory. Therefore, not only does the Company has to increase their number of staff working at the garages, the quality of parts must be changed to ensure that each bus is in the best condition when it leaves the depot.

New World First Bus Company Staff Union

25 November 2009

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## 城巴有限公司職工會(職工盟屬會)

致立法會交通事務委會：

### 專營巴士營運安全建議

本會得悉立法會交通事務委員會，將討論專營巴士營運安全問題，特致函 貴委員會，表達本會對此議題之意見。

本會認為就著專營巴士營運安全議題，需要多方面共同配合及努力，才能得以落實。所以不能只將責任加諸在車長身上，公司管理層以及政府運輸部門，同樣負有重要責任。本會列出以下四點意見：

第一，就城巴公司而言，公司會以薪來買取車長的休息時間。本會不贊同公司此做法。本會要求公司儘量編排讓車長獲得足夠休息時間。

第二，公司長期存在「跳飛機」問題，即一個車長一天須要駕駛多條不同路線，情況極端者，須要駕駛四條路線。本會認為一個車長一天不應駕駛多於兩條不同的路線，減少車長的工作壓力，及走錯路線的機會，造成對乘客不便。

第三，公司會設有鐳射鎗及隨機酒精抽查制度。目前，公司有關制度缺乏透明度及公信力，容易引起爭議。以鐳射鎗為例，公司對於懷疑超速車長，只會口頭告知被鐳射鎗檢測到超速，但完全沒有提供任何書面數據給予車長。再以公司酒精測試機為例，此設備沒有經過任何法定機構驗證，公司亦沒有第二部酒精測試機作覆檢，令到有關檢測結果備受質疑。

第四，部分由70減至50公里時速的路段上，運輸署未有給予足夠的緩衝及提示，因此本會認為除加設告示牌之外，更應在路面鋪設減速凹凸坑紋，以微震提示駕駛者開始減速；以及再加大在緩衝區內的50公里的圓圈標示。

城巴有限公司職工會

2009年11月27日

聯絡人： 理事長 鄧善慶 9287 1002

### **30-15**

CB(1)509/09-10(03) (27 November 2009) Submission on recent bus accident in TseungKwan O and safety of franchised bus operation from the Citybus Limited Employees Union

To the Panel on Transport

#### **Suggestions on Franchised Bus Safety**

This union has learned that the Legislative Council Panel on Transport will discuss the safety of franchised bus operations, and we are writing to express our views on this issue.

This union believes that in order for the safety of bus franchise operations to be implemented, various parties must work together. Therefore, the responsibility should not fall solely upon the bus captains. Company management and government transport departments also bear responsibility.

This union will list the following four points:

First, as far as Citybus is concerned, the company intends to “buy” bus captains’ rest hours with salary. This union does not agree with the company's practice. This union submits that the company should make arrangements so that bus captains can get enough rest time.

Second, the company has a long-standing problem of “hopscotching”. That is, a bus captain must drive multiple different bus routes a day. At one extreme, [some of them] have to drive four routes a day. This union believes that a bus captain should not drive more than two different routes in one day, so as to decrease bus captains’ stress levels and the probability of taking the wrong route, thereby causing inconvenience to the passengers.

Third, the company will set up a laser gun [speed] test and an alcohol spot check system. At present, the company’s systems lack transparency and credibility, and would easily lead to controversies. Taking the laser gun test as an example, the company will only give oral warning to drivers who were detected to have been speeding, but no written data was provided to the bus captain. And to take the alcohol test as another example, the equipment has not been verified by any statutory body,



and the company does not have a second machine to review the test result, so the results of the tests have been questioned.

Fourth, the Transport Department has not given sufficient buffers and notices on road sections with speed limits that were changed from 70 to 50 kilometers per hour. As such, this union suggests that, on top of adding sign boards, deceleration bumps and grooves should be laid on the road surface, so that the micro-vibrations would prompt the driver to start decelerating. Additionally, the circle sign within in 50 kilometers per hour buffer zone should be enlarged.

Citybus Limited Employees Union

27 November 2009

Person of Contact: Chairman Tang Sin Hing 9287 1002

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Bus Accident in Tseung Kwan O and Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

### **Purpose**

On 9 November 2009, a traffic accident involving a bus of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (KMB) occurred in Tseung Kwan O, of which the details are at Annex. In this connection, this paper briefs Members on:

- (a) the franchised bus companies' existing training and monitoring mechanism regarding their bus captains' driving skills and behaviour;
- (b) the measures taken by the franchised bus companies to enhance safety of operation; and
- (c) how the Administration regulates franchised bus companies in the relevant aspects.

### **Training for Bus Captains on their Driving Skills and Behaviour**

2. KMB, the Citybus Limited (CTB), the New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB), the Long Win Bus Company Limited (LW) and the New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited (NLB) arrange various training programmes for their bus captains, including:

- (a) training courses for the new recruits – Subject to the driving qualifications of the individuals, such courses would last for three to four weeks. Unless they possess public bus driving licences, trainee bus captains must pass the driving tests of the Transport Department (TD) before they would be allowed to serve on buses with passengers;
- (b) enhancement/refresher training for serving bus captains – Such training aims at enhancing bus captains' road safety awareness, driving skills and attitudes, including defensive driving techniques. Bus captains receive enhancement training about once every one to three years, depending on the operational arrangements of individual franchised bus companies. Refresher training will be arranged for bus captains when necessary, taking into consideration their driving performance, such as involvement in traffic accidents or upon the advice of the driving instructors;
- (c) special/remedial training – Such training lasts for a few days. It will be arranged for bus captains who are found to have improper driving behaviours or who have been away from driving duties for a long period because of sickness or other reasons.

3. In January 2008, KMB introduced the new driving simulator to strengthen the training on driving skills of their bus captains. As at September 2009, 2,500 bus captains have received such training.

### Monitoring of Bus Captains

4. All franchised bus companies have established mechanisms to monitor the driving skills and behaviour of their bus captains, and have put in place relevant incentive and penalty schemes. Drivers with commendable driving skills and service performance are rewarded with bonus. In the past three years, 98% or above bus captains in KMB, CTB, NWFB, LW and NLB were eligible for the monthly safe driving bonus.

5. As regards the monitoring system, all franchised bus companies deploy plainclothes inspectors who possess the qualification of driving instructors to ride on buses as passengers to assess the driving skills and service performance of the bus captains. This covers two categories of bus drivers: those who are involved in passengers' complaints or traffic accidents, and those who are randomly selected by the inspectors for different time slots and routes. In parallel, major bus companies deploy inspectors to traffic accident black spots or locations prone to speeding to check by using laser guns if their buses exceed the speed limits.

6. In the three years from 2006 to 2008, considerable on-board inspections and speed checks using laser guns were carried out by KMB, CTB, NWFB, LW and NLB every year. The bus captains in 97% of such inspections and checks of KMB, 98% of CTB, 97% of NWFB, 97% of LW and 98% of NLB were found to possess satisfactory driving skills and service performance without committing speeding. Details are as follows:

	<b>Average number of bus trips monitored per year from 2006 to 2008 (rounded figures)</b>		
<b>Franchisees</b>	<b>On-board inspections by plainclothes inspectors</b>	<b>Speed checks using laser guns</b>	<b>Total</b>
KMB	62,500	700	63,200
CTB	4,000	1,900	5,900
NWFB	4,000	900	4,900
LW	450	200	650
NLB	150	24	174
<b>Total</b>	<b>71,100</b>	<b>3,724</b>	<b>74,824</b>

7. Besides, franchised bus companies have started to adopt the electronic tachograph commonly known as "black box" to monitor their bus captains' driving behaviour and pattern. The bus companies have committed to equip newly purchased buses with "black box" and will continue to retrofit in-service buses with this device.

As at September 2009, about 70% of franchised buses have already been equipped with “black box”. The bus companies are now studying ways to enhance their random checks of the data retrieved from “black box”. When the record shows irregularities in journey time or upon receipt of passengers’ complaints on the driving behaviour of the bus captains, the bus companies will investigate the cases using the data retrieved from “black box”.

8. To help bus captains who have underperformed in terms of driving skills and behaviour or who have violated the traffic legislations, each franchised bus company has respectively put in place a mechanism to initiate follow-up actions, such as arranging special/remedial training or instructions for bus captains whose driving behaviour is considered improper. Bus companies may, as the circumstances require, impose on these bus captains different levels of penalties ranging from warning, wage deduction, suspension of duty and dismissal, etc. Like all other motorists, bus captains driving on the road are subject to the regulation of the Road Traffic Ordinance and the Road Traffic (Driving-offence Points) Ordinance. Offenders will be prosecuted by the Police and penalised by the Court. The penalties include fine, incurring of driving-offence points and licence suspension.

9. Separately, TD monitors bus operation safety by analysing various data in the operation reports, including statistics, categories and causes of accidents, submitted regularly by the bus companies, as well as complaints and feedback from passengers. Upon receipt of complaints on alleged violation of traffic legislations or poor service of the bus captains, TD will follow up and investigate the cases immediately with the bus companies concerned and require them to take appropriate improvement measures. TD will also engage independent consultants to conduct opinion surveys to solicit feedback from passengers on bus services. According to the survey results in the past three years, the service areas in which respondents generally rated satisfactory or above include compliance with traffic regulations, driving skills and travelling speed.

10. To promote bus operation safety, TD holds a number of workshops for the Road Safety Seminars for Franchised Bus Captains every year. Representatives of the Police are invited to attend the workshops and to brief bus captains on the safe driving skills and behaviour with a view to enhancing bus captains’ awareness of road safety.

11. TD, together with the Police and road safety experts, conducts quarterly review with the management of the bus companies on bus operation safety and requests the bus companies to set their indicators for lowering accident rate. The number of franchised buses involved in accidents per million vehicle-kilometre was 4.07 in 2007 and 3.83 in 2008, whereas the figure in the first three quarters of 2009 was 3.47. At the same time, the severity level of bus accidents has decreased. Compared with that in 2007, the number of fatal accidents in 2008 has decreased by

27.8%, serious accidents by 14.6% and slight accidents<sup>1</sup> by 6.2%. The above record shows that the safety of franchised bus operation has improved.

12. On the other hand, to promote safety awareness among passengers, TD has produced a number of TV and radio Announcements for Public Interest as well as other publicity materials to remind passengers of taking safety precautions when riding on buses. The latest promotional series are being broadcasted on TV and radio. As for the bus companies, they have been promoting safety awareness of the travelling public via different means.

### **Measures to Further Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

13. In view of the public concerns about bus service safety subsequent to the recent bus accident in Tseung Kwan O, the Secretary for Transport and Housing has met with major bus companies (KMB, CTB and NWFB). The bus companies have committed to strictly apply their internal monitoring systems to assess bus captains' safe driving skills and service performance, and to enhance bus captains' awareness of such systems. Major bus companies have also strengthened the manpower in their inspections carried out by plainclothes inspectors and their speed checks using laser guns, in particular for the night-time shifts and routes involving higher speed sections. Details of the enhanced improvement measures are as follows:

(a) Enhance On-board Inspections by Plainclothes Inspectors

Following the accident in Tseung Kwan O, franchised bus companies have increased the frequency of daily on-board inspections targeting at overnight bus services. In November and December, KMB would increase the number of on-board inspections for overnight bus trips from a monthly average of around 20 to 240 trips, while CTB and NWFB would each increase theirs from around 33 to 200 trips per month. Despite its infrequent overnight bus services, NLB has started to conduct on-board inspections for the relevant routes since November.

(b) Enhance Speed Checks Using Laser Guns

Major bus companies have strengthened their speed checks using laser guns at locations prone to speeding in the night time to check the travelling speed of the buses. In November and December, KMB would increase their frequency of speed checks from a monthly average of around 80-100 trips to 200-250 bus trips, while CTB and NWFB would increase theirs from around 14 trips to 170 bus trips in total.

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<sup>1</sup> A slight accident is one in which one or more persons is injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours. A serious accident is one in which one or more persons is injured and detained in hospital for more than 12 hours. A fatal accident is one in which someone is injured and subsequently dies of his/her injuries within 30 days of the accident.

(c) Enhance Employees' Awareness of the Monitoring System

To enhance its employees' awareness of the monitoring system, KMB has since November disseminated the results of internal monitoring of bus captains via internal circulars on a monthly basis. Posters are displayed to remind bus captains of driving safety. CTB and NWFB have issued circulars to all bus captains immediately after the Tseung Kwan O accident to urge them to drive safely. It is also stated in the circulars that disciplinary actions will be imposed on offenders according to the companies' existing mechanism. The bus companies will reiterate at the next meeting with the trade unions the consequence of disciplinary actions and penalties induced by non-compliance.

14. As regards the work and rest arrangements for the bus captains, franchised bus companies have followed the Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers (the Guidelines) in scheduling their working hours and rest breaks. Evolving from a number of adjustments and improvements, the existing scheduling arrangements strike a balance between the travelling needs of passengers and the rest time required by the bus captains between two successive bus trips or working days. The bus companies will from time to time consult the trade unions of the bus captains and review the scheduling arrangements. If the actual journey time of certain routes frequently exceed the scheduled hours due to genuine operational grounds, the bus companies will apply to TD for adjusting the journey time to ensure that the bus captains have proper rest. In the three years from 2006 to 2008, major bus companies extended the journey time of a total of 71 bus routes. CTB and NWFB will review the journey time of their bus routes every month while KMB has proceeded with its review of the journey time of its bus network as a whole. Subsequent to the accident in Tseung Kwan O, the bus companies have immediately tightened the relevant measures to ensure as much as possible that the bus captains have proper rest after each trip. In case of any delay due to various reasons such as traffic jam, the bus regulators will take necessary measures such as asking the bus captain concerned to drive the bus directly to an en route stop or the terminus, to cancel one bus trip, or to try their best to arrange a relief driver to serve the coming trip. Such arrangements aim at enabling the bus captains to have proper rest after each trip.

15. TD has been in close contact with franchised bus companies to make sure that measures mentioned in paragraphs 13 and 14 above on enhancing safety of franchised bus operation will be promptly and strictly implemented. In parallel, TD has met with major staff unions of the bus captains to listen to their views and urge them to remind the bus captains of the importance of safe driving.

16. Every year, TD conducts a random survey on the working hours of the bus captains to confirm if their rest time complies with the Guidelines. If non-compliance is identified, TD will request the bus companies concerned to review the situation and make corresponding adjustments. TD is prepared to extend the scope of the survey so as to collect more comprehensive data.

17. On publicity, TD is planning to launch a series of safe driving campaigns in the near future to enhance safety awareness among drivers of passenger vehicles and to promote road safety.

### **Traffic Safety Measures at the Bus Accident Spot in Tseung Kwan O**

18. Subsequent to the accident in Tseung Kwan O, TD has strengthened the traffic safety measures at the scene. The roundabout at the junction of Po Shun Road and Tong Ming Street in Tseung Kwan O conforms to the relevant design standards, with appropriate road markings and traffic signs to remind motorists to slow down before entering the roundabout. In spite of that, in view of the concerns raised by the relevant District Council and the public on the speeding problem at the road section concerned, TD has erected five temporary “Slow” traffic signs at the scene. TD is planning other measures to alert motorists to keep their driving speed within a safe limit.

### **Advice Sought**

19. Members are invited to note the content of this paper.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
November 2009

**Information on the Bus Accident  
occurred in Tseung Kwan O on 9 November 2009**

**(I) Bus Route Information**

Bus Company and Route	KMB Route 692 (Cross-harbour route)
Origin /Departure Time	Central (Exchange Square) / 11:40pm
Destination/Scheduled Arrival Time	Hang Hau (North) / 0:45am
Scheduled Journey Time	65 minutes <sup>1</sup>
Accident Location	At the junction of Po Shun Road and Tong Ming Street in Tseung Kwan O (towards Hang Hau)
Accident Time	9 November, 0:18am

**(II) Bus Captain**

Term of Employment	Full-time bus captain
Number of years in KMB	3.5 years
Nature of Position	Scheduled replacement captain for Route N293 <sup>2</sup>
Number of hours having worked when the accident occurred	1 hour (The working hour was from 11:40pm on 8 November to 5:45am on 9 November)

**(III) Vehicle Information**

Bus Age	12.8 years
Date of last monthly inspection	1 November 2009
Date of last annual inspection	30 December 2008
Date of last spot check conducted by the Transport Department	28 April 2009
Number of casualties	2 dead and 34 injured

<sup>1</sup> Scheduled journey time generally refers to the average journey time during peak hours.

<sup>2</sup> The concerned KMB bus captain was a “scheduled replacement captain” of KMB route N293 (Mong Kok East Station – Sheung Tak). The first trip of KMB route N293 sets off at 11:55pm from Sheung Tak every day and the last trip at 5:30 am from Mong Kok East Station and Sheung Tak. The bus captains serving this route work for about five to six hours per shift. Owing to relatively short service hours of N293, some bus captains serving this route are assigned to serve both route N293 and another specified route in the same shift. Besides, all bus captains are entitled to take annual leave and causal leave. When their bus captains take leave or are absent from duty, the bus companies will arrange “scheduled replacement captains” to provide bus services. In order to enable their bus captains to take leave or rest and to maintain bus services, all franchised bus companies adopt the “scheduled replacement captain” arrangement. “Scheduled replacement captains” have all received training in relation to the routes they are assigned to serve. They will not be arranged to serve unfamiliar routes.



For discussion  
on 28 June 2010

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Working Hour and Rest Time Arrangements of Franchised Bus Captains**

### **Purpose**

This paper updates Members on the progress in the pursuit of measures to further enhance the working hour and rest time arrangements for the bus captains of franchised bus companies.

### **Background**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (the “Panel”) was briefed on 27 November 2009 (LC Paper No. CB (1) 430/09-10(06)) on measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. To ensure that bus captains have sufficient rest time, guidelines have been issued by the Transport Department (“TD”) to the franchised bus companies for application in arranging the duties of their bus captains. The current guidelines, viz. “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours” (the “Guidelines”) at Annex was last reviewed and revised in 2007. The Panel requested the Administration to further review the Guidelines to ensure that bus captains have adequate rest time.

### **Review on Guidelines on Working Hours of Bus Captains**

3. Following the meeting of the Panel on 27 November 2009, TD reviewed the existing working hour and rest time arrangements of the bus captains in conjunction with the franchised bus companies. In the process of the review, TD has also arranged meetings with the bus captain unions to listen to their views on the current arrangements and their areas of concerns. The requests of the unions are mainly related to improvements to rest times during a duty, meal break times, breaks between two successive working days, and amenity facilities at some bus termini. While all the unions request for the provision of amenity and other facilities at bus termini to enhance their convenience and consider that time spent at termini in monitoring the boarding activities of passengers should not be taken as rest time, there are different views expressed with regard to the meal break

arrangement and breaks between successive working days. Their main concern appears to be on the resultant re-scheduling arrangement which would have impact on the bus captains' working pattern.

4. Taking into account the views of the bus companies and the bus captain unions, TD is pursuing the following improvements to the working hour and rest time arrangements:

- (a) during a 6-hour duty, a total service break of at least 20 minutes should be provided, of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of the duty. The time a bus captain spends at a terminal point preparing a bus for the next departure and monitoring passenger boarding will not be regarded as rest time;
- (b) the duration of the break between two successive working days will be revised from the current 9.5 hours minimum to 10 hours minimum; and
- (c) the meal break time for bus captains will be no less than 45 minutes initially, with further improvement to no less than one hour.

5. The bus companies are prepared to implement (a) and (b) above. However, they would need time to work out practicable arrangements, including mobilisation and re-scheduling some driving duties. In doing so, they would also need to engage their bus captain unions to work out the detailed arrangements, in particular for those bus captains whose working patterns would be affected. TD is working with the bus companies to have (a) and (b) implemented by December 2010.

6. The implementation of the improvements at (c) above will have more substantial impact on the working hours and working patterns of some bus captains. The bus companies will need to recruit and train additional bus captains to cover the service gaps arising from the increase in rest time and meal break time. In view of the changes in the driving pattern, the bus companies will also need to train up some of the existing bus captains to enable re-scheduling arrangement. The bus companies are consulting their staff unions on the proposals and detailed arrangements. Subject to further discussion between the bus companies and the unions, and on the basis that sufficient bus captains are recruited and trained, TD intends to request the bus companies to complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by around the third quarter of 2011 and the further improvement to no less than one hour in about one year thereafter.

## **Monitoring of Compliance of the Guidelines**

7. TD has requested the franchised bus companies to set up internal monitoring systems to ensure that the Guidelines, including the proposed improvements in paragraph 4 above when implemented, are complied with in actual operation and to submit regular monitoring reports to TD. TD will continue to monitor the actual implementation of the Guidelines and will conduct monitoring surveys from time to time to ensure compliance with the Guidelines. TD will also continue to maintain liaison with the bus captain unions to gauge their feedback on the working hour and rest time arrangements.

## **Enhancement of Amenity Facilities at Bus Termini**

8. The franchised bus companies are making on-going efforts to provide amenity facilities, such as rest rooms, toilets, drinking water dispensers, microwave ovens, or refrigerators at many bus termini for use by the bus captains and other frontline staff. Since 2009, the bus companies have improved amenity facilities at 71 bus termini. As at early June 2010, more than 70% of the bus termini have rest rooms/rest areas and toilets, about 80% have supply of free drinking water, and about 50% have microwave ovens and refrigerators. TD noted that some bus captain unions have requested for the provision of amenity facilities at more bus termini, or enhancement of existing facilities at some termini. The bus companies, after consulting their staff representatives, have drawn up plans to improve the amenity facilities of 25 bus termini within the next 12 months. TD will monitor progress and will facilitate implementation through liaison with and coordination among other parties where appropriate.

## **Advice Sought**

9. Members are invited to note the content of this paper.

Transport Department  
June 2010

**Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours**

**(Revised in July 2007)**

- Guideline A      -    Bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of the duty.
  
- Guideline B      -    Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day.
  
- Guideline C      -    Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day.
  
- Guideline D      -    Break between successive working days should not be less than 9.5 hours.

Our Ref : BD 76/201-1  
Your Ref :  
Tel. No. : 2829 5812  
Fax No. : 2519 7017

CB(1)2265/09-10(01)

11 June 2010

Mr KWOK Wai-kwong, Chairman  
The K.M.B. Staff Union  
7/F, Wing Wong Commercial Building  
557-559 Nathan Road  
Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon

Mr KWOK,

### **The Crux of the Operational Safety Problem**

With reference to your union's letter, dated 27 November 2009 to the Legislative Council (LegCo) Panel on Transport, which sets out your union's views on the operation of franchised bus services by Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (KMB), we would like to give our response as follows.

#### **Wastage of contract bus drivers**

The KMB has provided us with figures on the wastage of its bus drivers. In the years from 2008 to 2009, the wastage rate of KMB contract bus drivers was about 8% per year, which falls below the average employee wastage rate in Hong Kong during the same period, as according to Hong Kong Institute of Human Resource Management.

Staff wastage is related to personal inclination and changes in the job market. On the other hand, the bus company has, at our request, provided sufficient training to newly recruited bus drivers to enhance operational safety. To date, there has not been any figure that shows a direct relation between the employment terms of bus drivers and driving safety.

#### **Management of the company**

The prime task of a bus company is to provide service that ensures safety for its bus drivers, passengers and other road users. Therefore, we demand that all franchised bus companies should implement an internal monitoring mechanism with respect to the safe driving and service quality of bus drivers, and raise the staff awareness of such mechanism. The KMB has a panel of professional assessors with driving instructor qualifications who will in plain clothes conduct on-board operations to assess the overall performance of its bus drivers or be stationed at fixed positions such as traffic black spots or busy road junctions to observe the operation of buses passing by or to detect speeding of buses by means of laser guns and, conduct regular assessment of bus drivers in different aspects, including driving speed, driving attitude and customer service, etc. In recent years, there are, on average, over 60 000 assessments conducted every year with a passing rate of 97%. The KMB pointed out that such measures of monitoring staff performance are commonly adopted in the trade, and have been taken with a view to enhancing safety for bus drivers, passengers and other road users. On the premise of safety, we agree that franchised bus companies should conduct monitoring as regards the driving behaviour and service attitude of bus drivers as appropriate.

#### **Working hours and the work schedule of bus drivers**

To ensure the operational safety of buses, we have all along been concerned about the working hours and rest time of bus drivers. In that respect, we have issued to various franchised bus companies a *Guidelines on the Work Schedule for Bus Drivers* which will be reviewed from time to time, and urged them to make sure that their bus drivers are subject to proper working hours and provided with appropriate rest time. Following a revision of the Guidelines in July 2007, we have, in conjunction with the franchised bus companies, conducted a review of the same and will report the progress of the review to the LegCo Panel on Transport in due course.

We have also been concerned about the properness of the service schedules of various bus routes, and demanded that the bus companies should conduct reviews in that respect from time to time and apply to us for making proper adjustment to the schedules. As regards the daily operational routine, the journey time of bus routes may be extended because of unexpected traffic circumstances. Therefore, we have requested the companies to make adjustment as necessary to the routes taken up by or work schedule of the bus drivers, or to arrange for standby bus drivers familiar with the routes to be on duty so that the bus drivers are able to take a break properly after each journey.

#### Increased provision of slow-down signs and the provision of tactile markings

The TD has clear guidelines providing that additional signs will under normal circumstances be erected ahead of any road sections where the speed limit will be lowered to serve as a warning to motorists. The relevant arrangements are as follows:

- (a) first, warning signs will be erected at about 100 to 200 metres ahead of the road sections where the speed limit will be lowered;
- (b) speed limit signs will be erected at the starting point of the road section where the speed limit will be lowered; and
- (c) speed limit road marking will be painted on the road surface in the vicinity of the starting point of the road section where the speed limit will be lowered to 50 km per hour.

Therefore, the existing speed limit signs and road markings are adequate, and similar in design to those adopted in advanced countries overseas.

The purpose of providing “transverse yellow bar marking” is to give motorists the visual impression that they are driving through those yellow bars swiftly, thereby alerting them to be aware of any excess in vehicle speed and reminding them of the need to slow down. “Transverse yellow bar marking” is mainly applicable to

- (a) slip roads leaving expressways; or
- (b) approaches to toll plazas with speed limit of 70 km per hour; or
- (c) special road sections with circumstances that may make motorists unaware of the need to slow down. Under such circumstances, consideration may be given to using “transverse yellow bar marking” to enhance motorists’ awareness of the need to reduce speed in good time.

Should your union consider it appropriate to provide “transverse yellow bar marking” at individual locations, you are welcome to submit specific proposals to the TD.

(CHEUNG Jin-pang)  
for the Commissioner for Transport

c.c.: LegCo Panel on Transport

b.c.c. (incoming letter enclosed) :

Commissioner for Transport  
Deputy Commissioner for Transport /Transport Services and Management  
Assistant Commissioner for Transport / Bus and Railway  
Principal Transport Officer / Bus and Railway 1  
Chief Transport Officer / Bus and Railway 1  
Senior Engineer / Vehicle Safety  
Assistant Secretary for Transport & Housing (Transport) 1A

Our Ref : BD 76/201-1  
Your Ref :  
Tel. No. : 2829 5812  
Fax No. : 2519 7017

11 June 2010

Mr CHUNG Chung-fai, Chairman  
New World First Bus Company Staff Union  
7/F, Wing Wong Commercial Building  
557-559 Nathan Road  
Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon

Dear Mr CHUNG,

**Views on the Operational Safety of Franchised Buses**

With reference to your union's letter, dated 25 November 2009 to the Legislative Council (LegCo) Panel on Transport, which sets out your union's views on the operation of franchised bus services by New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB), we would like to give our response as follows.

**Schedule of Service**

If the actual journey time of a bus route often exceeds the scheduled journey time, NWFB would apply to this Department for approval to extend the journey time of the route to ensure that the bus drivers are able to take a break properly.

Due to actual operational needs, in case of circumstances such as traffic jam which might prolong the journey time, the bus regulators of various bus companies would make appropriate deployment measures to minimize the impact on passengers, such as arranging bus drivers to drive the bus to the en route stops or final stops directly, cancellation of certain trips, or assigning standby bus drivers who are familiar with the route in question to drive the bus that is about to depart, so that the bus drivers are able to take a break properly after each journey.

**Arrangement for bus drivers of overnight shift to "drive the last and the first trips of the day service"**

NWFB has made arrangement in respect of the working hours and breaks for its bus drivers (including bus drivers of overnight shift) according to the *Guidelines on the Work Schedule for Bus Drivers* issued by us. According to the report submitted by NWFB to us, apart from standby or relief bus drivers, its bus drivers of overnight shift are subject to fixed working hours and assigned to fixed routes. If individual bus drivers want to have their shift arrangement revised, they may make such request and the company would make arrangement as appropriate. Just like other bus drivers, the drivers of overnight shift would be allowed, before actual operation, to familiarize themselves with the bus routes they are to serve and will not be assigned to take up routes that they are not familiar with.

### Facilities at bus termini that are available for use by bus drivers

The bus companies bear the responsibility of providing their staff with suitable rest facilities. Same as other bus companies, NWFB would as far as possible, provide rest room at suitable location at all bus termini for bus drivers to take a break or to take their meals. At present, as far as NWFB is concerned, only 9 bus termini, each of which accommodates only 1 NWFB route, are not provided with a rest room, and five of which (including Stanley, Chi Fu, Nam Cheong, Hung Hom Pier and Sai Kung) had had rest room facilities but such facilities were scrapped due to low utilization because bus drivers mainly make use of the rest room at the other terminus of that route. As for the remaining 4 bus termini (including Siu Sai Wan Estate, peak tram terminus at Garden Road, Pokfield Road and Lee On), the provision of a rest room was impossible due to physical constraints. In order to cater to the bus drivers' need for a rest, NWFB has arranged to let the bus drivers make use of the rest room at the other terminus of the bus route.

A rest room is usually air-conditioned and fitted with facilities such as refrigerator, microwave oven, tables and chairs, etc, for the use of bus drivers and bus regulators. If there are no toilet facilities in the neighborhood of the bus termini, NWFB would apply to the authorities concerned for the provision of mobile toilets for its bus drivers.

### Bus maintenance

All franchised buses must comply with the safety requirements as stipulated by law and pass the stringent examination of TD before they are allowed to provide passenger services. Each serving franchised bus must undergo monthly examination by its company. In order to achieve optimum utilization of resources, NWFB depot would, taking into account the daily workload, flexibly arrange different groups of technicians to provide maintenance services. The technicians responsible for the conduct of monthly examination and maintenance services are qualified and registered technicians with the required skills and experience in respect of the same type of bus, hence the arrangement for them to take up various kinds of maintenance service would not affect the quality of maintenance. TD must examine each serving franchised bus annually, to ensure that it is safe and roadworthy. Meanwhile, TD will also conduct random check to ensure that the buses are properly maintained, its equipment are in good condition and normal operation. We always closely monitor the maintenance programme of franchised buses, and hold regular meetings with bus operators to discuss about the bus examination results, and will formulate measures as necessary to enhance bus safety.

(JP Cheung)  
for the Commissioner for Transport

c.c.: LegCo Panel on Transport

b.c.c. (incoming letter enclosed):

Commissioner for Transport

Deputy Commissioner for Transport /Transport Services and Management

Assistant Commissioner for Transport / Bus and Railway

Senior Engineer / Vehicle Safety

Chief Transport Officer / Bus and Railway 2

Assistant Secretary for Transport & Housing (Transport) 1A



Our Ref : BD 76/201-1  
Your Ref :  
Tel. No. : 2829 5812  
Fax No. : 2519 7017

CB(1)2265/09-10(03)

11 June 2010

Mr TANG Sin-hing, Chairman  
Citybus Limited Employees Union  
7/F, Wing Wong Commercial Building  
557-559 Nathan Road  
Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon

Dear Mr TANG,

**Proposals in regard to the Operational Safety of Franchised Buses**

With reference to your union's submission, dated 27 November 2009 to the Legislative Council (LegCo) Panel on Transport, which sets out your union's views on the operation of franchised bus services by Citybus Limited (CTB), we would like to give our response as follows.

**Overtime allowance in lieu of breaks for bus drivers**

CTB has drawn up schedules of working hours and breaks for its bus drivers in compliance with the *Guidelines on the Work Schedule for Bus Drivers* issued by the Transport Department (TD). Under the current arrangements, CTB will arrange for a meal break of one hour at the minimum for its bus drivers. In case a bus driver has less than an hour for actual meal break owing to a longer journey time arising from unforeseeable circumstances such as traffic congestion, CTB will compensate the bus driver concerned in the form of overtime allowance only if immediate deployment of another bus driver is impossible and the bus driver's prior consent has been obtained. In any case, the duration of breaks for the bus driver concerned will still not be shorter than that stipulated in the said Guidelines (i.e., bus drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty). Such arrangement applies only to the aforementioned special circumstances so that services would not be affected.

**Number of routes assigned to bus drivers**

For the purposes of efficiency enhancement and the optimum use of resources, some CTB bus drivers will be assigned to drive more than one route within a single shift. Other local bus companies and overseas bus operators have also adopted this practice. For bus drivers who are required to drive more than one route within a single shift, CTB has formulated the following measures accordingly:

- (a) The journey time of a bus route will be reviewed from time to time subject to actual traffic condition to ensure that bus drivers have sufficient time to complete the journey and at the same time have adequate time for breaks and meals;
- (b) Sufficient notification will be given to bus drivers prior to any changes to their shift schedule; and
- (c) Bus drivers will be allowed to familiarize themselves with the bus routes they are to serve before actual operation. Under no circumstances will a bus driver be assigned to drive a route he/she is not familiar with.

**Laser guns for bus speed detection and random breath tests**

CTB has been using the laser gun for detection of the speeds of its buses for many years. Subsequent to the serious bus accident in Tseung Kwan O in November last year, we have demanded all bus companies to step up their use of the laser gun to monitor buses on night services and those operating on high-speed roads in response to concerns about the safety of bus services expressed by the LegCo and the public.

The laser guns currently used by CTB are hand-held models, similar to those used by the Police. CTB regularly sends the laser guns to their supplier for checks in accordance with the supplier's guidelines so as to ensure accuracy. The inspectors responsible for speed detection are required to have undergone training given by qualified instructors. During speed detection, CTB will send two inspectors to work together. One of the inspectors will operate the laser gun, while the other will record the registration number and the speed of the vehicle under detection so that errors can be minimized.

We understand that the aim of CTB's implementation of random breath tests for its bus drivers since June 2009 is to better ensure the safety of bus drivers, passengers and other road users. Under current practices, CTB will allow a bus driver who fails his/her first random breath test to re-take the test immediately to ensure that the readings are correct. Test results of other bus drivers who have taken the test at more or less the same time will also be checked against those of the bus driver in question to ascertain that the instrument is accurate and the bus driver has not been treated unfairly. We believe that CTB will continue to communicate with your union, other labour unions and labour consultative committees to come up with even better arrangements in this regard.

Provision of "transverse yellow bar marking" alerting motorists to reduce speed

The TD has clear guidelines providing that additional signs will under normal circumstances be erected ahead of any road sections where the speed limit will be lowered to serve as a warning to motorists. The relevant arrangements are as follows:

- (a) first, warning signs will be erected at about 100 to 200 metres ahead of the road sections where the speed limit will be lowered;
- (b) speed limit signs will be erected at the starting point of the road section where the speed limit will be lowered; and
- (c) speed limit road marking will be painted on the road surface in the vicinity of the starting point of the road section where the speed limit will be lowered to 50 km per hour.

Therefore, the existing speed limit signs and road markings are adequate, and similar in design to those adopted in advanced countries overseas.

The purpose of providing "transverse yellow bar marking" is to give motorists the visual impression that they are driving through those yellow bars swiftly, thereby alerting them to be aware of any excess in vehicle speed and reminding them of the need to slow down. "Transverse yellow bar marking" is mainly applicable to

- (a) slip roads leaving expressways; or
- (b) approaches to toll plazas with speed limit of 70 km per hour; or
- (c) special road sections with circumstances that may make motorists unaware of the need to slow down. Under such circumstances, consideration may be given to using "transverse yellow bar marking" to enhance motorists' awareness of the need to reduce speed in good time.

Should your union consider it appropriate to provide "transverse yellow bar marking" at individual locations, you are welcome to submit specific proposals to the TD.

(CHEUNG Jin-pang)  
for the Commissioner for Transport

c.c.: LegCo Panel on Transport

b.c.c. (incoming letter enclosed):

The Commissioner for Transport  
Deputy Commissioner / Transport Services and Management  
Assistant Commissioner / Bus and Railway  
Senior Engineer / Vehicle Safety  
Chief Transport Officer / Bus and Railway 2  
Assistant Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport)1A

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局  
運輸科  
香港花園道美利大廈



Transport and  
Housing Bureau  
Government Secretariat  
Transport Branch  
Murray Building, Garden Road,  
Hong Kong.

本局檔號 OUR REF.: THB(T)L 2/4/96  
來函檔號 YOUR REF.:

電話 Tel. No.: 2189 2101  
傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

1 November 2010

Clerk to Panel on Transport,  
Legislative Council,  
Legislative Council Building,  
8 Jackson Road,  
Central,  
Hong Kong.

Dear Sir/Madam,

**Panel on Transport**  
**Meetings on 27 November 2009 and 28 June 2010**

At the meetings of the Panel on Transport on 27 November 2009 and 28 June 2010, Members discussed the items on “Bus Accident in Tseung Kwan O and Safety of Franchised Bus Operation” and “Working Hour and Rest Time Arrangements of Franchised Bus Captains” respectively. At the meeting on 27 November 2009, Members requested the Government to provide supplementary information on (i) random on-board bus surveys conducted by the Transport Department (TD); and (ii) the wastage rate of bus captains employed on contract terms. At the meeting on 28 June 2010, Members asked for information on bus termini where toilets are not available and why they could not be provided. The requested information is provided below.

**(i) *Random on-board bus surveys conducted by TD***

TD conducts annual surveys on franchised bus captains’ working hours with a view to assessing franchised bus companies’ level of compliance with the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours” (the “Guidelines”). A copy of the Guidelines (2007 version) is at **Annex 1**.

In 2009, similar to previous years, TD employed an independent contractor to carry out the survey between May and December to check the level of compliance with Guidelines A to C. Whole-day on-board and terminal surveys were conducted to collect information on the lay-over of buses to ascertain the bus captains' rest time. A total number of 770 bus captains (out of 12,000) from the five franchised bus operators were randomly selected for the survey. The survey covered about 40% of the bus routes on Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories.

As regards Guideline D, which refers to the break between successive working days of a bus captain of no less than 9.5 hours, TD inspected about 20% (or around 2,500 in number) of the bus captains' sign-on/sign-off log sheets on a random sampling basis to check the level of compliance.

The results of the survey revealed that the Guidelines were generally well adhered to (97.8% for Guideline A, 100% for both Guidelines B and C, and 99.8% for Guideline D). According to the franchised bus operators, the very small number of non-compliance cases in respect of Guidelines A and D were mainly caused by traffic congestion. Nonetheless, the franchised bus operators were reminded by TD to review the journey time of the concerned bus routes having regard to changing road and traffic conditions to ensure that the rest time of bus captains would not be affected.

**(ii) Wastage rate of bus captains employed on contract terms**

According to Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB"), Citybus Limited ("CTB"), New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB") and Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW"), the wastage rates of bus captains employed on contract terms in 2008 and 2009 for individual bus operators are as follows:

Year	Wastage rate <sup>1</sup> of bus captains employed on contract terms				
	KMB	CTB	NWFB	LW	Overall
2008	8.1%	13.9%	8.1%	8.3%	8.6%
2009	8.3%	15.5%	7.8%	8.5%	9.0%

<sup>1</sup> The employee wastage rate is the total number of contract bus captains left against the total number of contract bus captains serving the bus company during the year.

No bus captain of New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited is employed on contract terms.

***(iii) Bus termini where toilets are not available***

As at October 2010, about 70% of the bus termini were provided with toilet facilities. As regards the remaining 84 bus termini (listed at **Annex 2**), the breakdown is as follows:

- (a) toilet facilities available in the vicinity (about 3 minutes' walking distance): **21** bus termini;
- (b) applications for installation of portable toilet currently being processed: **40** bus termini;
- (c) applications for installation of portable toilet rejected because of local concerns: **19** bus termini; and
- (d) portable toilets cannot be provided due to site constraint: **4** bus termini.

Regarding (a) above, the franchised bus operators consider that the toilet facilities in the vicinity of the bus termini are generally convenient to bus captains, and will introduce improvement measures at the bus termini, if necessary. Regarding (b) above, TD is pursuing these applications in collaboration with the concerned Departments and parties. As regards (c), TD is working with the relevant Departments and parties to assess the extent to which public objection to the proposed toilet facilities may be overcome.

Yours faithfully,



(Miss Constance Choy)  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport (Attn.: Miss LUI Ying)

**Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours**

**(Revised in July 2007)**

- Guideline A - Bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty.
- Guideline B - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day.
- Guideline C - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day.
- Guideline D - The break between successive working days should not be less than 9.5 hours.

**List of Bus Terminus without Toilet Facility**

<b>(a) Bus terminus with toilet facilities available in the vicinity</b>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Bus terminus</b>
1.	Central & Western	Admiralty (East)
2.	Central & Western	Admiralty (Drake Street)
3.	Central & Western	Admiralty (Tamar Street)
4.	Central & Western	Admiralty (Rodney Street)
5.	Central & Western	Admiralty (West)
6.	Central & Western	The Peak
7.	Eastern	Braemar Hill
8.	Eastern	Heng Fa Chuen
9.	Eastern	Hing Wah Estate
10.	Eastern	Quarry Bay (Yau Man Street)
11.	Eastern	Siu Sai Wan Estate
12.	North	Ching Ho Estate
13.	Southern	Chi Fu Fa Yuen
14.	Southern	Cyberport
15.	Southern	Shek Pai Wan
16.	Southern	Stanley Plaza
17.	Sham Shui Po	Festival Walk
18.	Sha Tin	City One Shatin
19.	Sha Tin	Sha Tin Racecourse
20.	Tuen Mun	Chi Lok Fa Yuen
21.	Tuen Mun	Tuen Mun Town Centre
<b><i>Sub-total: 21 locations</i></b>		

<b>(b) Applications for installation of portable toilet currently being processed</b>		
<b>Item</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Bus terminus</b>
22.	Central & Western	Hong Kong Station
23.	Kowloon City	Kowloon City (Shing Tak Street)
24.	Kowloon City	Oi Man Estate
25.	Kowloon City	Tung Tau Estate
26.	Kwun Tong	Kai Yip Estate
27.	Kwun Tong	Kwun Tong (Tsui Ping Road)
28.	Kwun Tong	Ping Shek Estate
29.	Kwun Tong	Shun Lee Estate
30.	Sham Shui Po	Hoi Lai Estate
31.	Sham Shui Po	Lai Kok Estate
32.	Wong Tai Sin	Choi Wan Estate
33.	Wong Tai Sin	Diamond Hill Station
34.	Wong Tai Sin	Fung Shing Street
35.	Yau Tsim Mong	China Ferry Terminal
36.	Yau Tsim Mong	Tsim Sha Tsui (Canton Road)
37.	North	Cheung Wah Estate
38.	North	Tin Ping Estate
39.	North	Wah Ming Estate
40.	Sai Kung	Clear Water Bay
41.	Sai Kung	Tiu Keng Leng Station
42.	Sha Tin	Chevalier Garden
43.	Sha Tin	Kwong Yuen Estate
44.	Sha Tin	Yiu On Estate
45.	Tai Po	Fu Heng Estate
46.	Tai Po	Fu Shin Estate
47.	Tai Po	Tai Po Central
48.	Tai Po	Tai Po Market Station
49.	Tai Po	Tai Wo Estate
50.	Kwai Tsing	Mayfair Garden
51.	Tsuen Wan	Allway Gardens



Item	District	Bus terminus
52.	Tuen Mun	Fu Tai Estate
53.	Tuen Mun	Kin Sang Estate
54.	Tuen Mun	Leung King Estate
55.	Tuen Mun	Lung Mun Oasis
56.	Tuen Mun	Tai Hing Estate
57.	Yuen Long	Long Ping Estate
58.	Yuen Long	Tin Fu Court
59.	Yuen Long	Tin Shui Estate
60.	Yuen Long	Tin Tsz Estate
61.	Yuen Long	Tin Yan Estate

*Sub-total: 40 locations*

**(c) Applications for placement of portable toilet rejected because of local concerns**

Item	District	Bus terminus
62.	Islands	Yat Tung Estate
63.	Kwai Tsing	Cho Yiu Estate
64.	Kwai Tsing	Lai Yiu Estate
65.	Kwun Tong	Telford Garden
66.	Kwun Tong	Lok Wah Estate
67.	Sha Tin	Chun Shek Estate
68.	Sha Tin	Hin Keng Estate
69.	Sha Tin	Kam Ying Court
70.	Sha Tin	Lek Yuen Estate
71.	Sha Tin	Ma On Shan (Lee On Estate)
72.	Sha Tin	Ma On Shan Town Centre
73.	Sha Tin	Mei Lam Estate
74.	Sha Tin	Sui Wo Court
75.	Sha Tin	Sun Chui Estate
76.	Sha Tin	Sun Tin Wai Estate
77.	Sha Tin	Wo Che Estate

Item	District	Bus terminus
78.	North	Choi Yuen Estate
79.	Tuen Mun	Po Tin Estate
80.	Yuen Long	Sheung Tsuen
<i>Sub-total: 19 locations</i>		
<b>(d) Bus termini cannot be provided with portable toilet due to site constraint (e.g. on-street terminus with narrow footpath)</b>		
Item	District	Bus terminus
81.	Central & Western	Kotewall Road
82.	Eastern	Whitfield Road
83.	Wan Chai	Happy Valley (Upper)
84.	Tsuen Wan	Sea Crest Villa
<i>Sub-total: 4 locations</i>		
<b>Total: 84 locations</b>		

For discussion  
on 26 November 2010

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Fare Increase Applications from  
the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited and  
the Long Win Bus Company Limited**

**Purpose**

The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) and the Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) have submitted applications for fare increases. This paper provides information on the bus fare adjustment arrangement (“FAA”) and the franchised bus operations of these two operators. KMB and LW representatives will brief Members on their respective fare increase applications at the meeting on 26 November 2010. Members are invited to comment on these applications.

**Fare Increase Applications from KMB and LW**

2. KMB and LW submitted applications on 30 July 2010 for fare increases of 8.6% and 7.4% respectively. KMB and LW last increased their fares on 8 June 2008 by an overall average rate of 4.5%.

**Bus Fare Adjustment Arrangement**

3. Under section 13(1) of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“PBSO”) (Chapter 230), fares of franchised bus services are to be charged according to a scale of fares determined by the Chief Executive in Council. Under the current FAA, in assessing franchised bus fare adjustment applications for the purpose of making recommendations to the Chief Executive in Council, the Administration would take into account a basket of factors which include -

- (a) changes in operating costs and revenue since the last fare adjustment;
- (b) forecasts of future costs, revenue and return;
- (c) the need to provide the operator with a reasonable rate of return. In considering the reasonable rate of return to franchised bus operators, reference should be made to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of the bus industry;

- (d) public acceptability and affordability. Reference should be made to the magnitude of change in median monthly household income and changes in Composite Consumer Price Index (“CCPI”);
- (e) the quality and quantity of service provided; and
- (f) a formula (supportable fare adjustment rate =  $0.5 \times \text{Change in Wage Index} + 0.5 \times \text{Change in CCPI} - 0.5 \times \text{Productivity Gain}^1$ ). It should be noted that the formula does not operate as an automatic determinant of the fare adjustment outcome.

4. To assess the financial performance of the bus operators, our consideration is to ensure that they will have sound financial capability in providing efficient and quality public bus services. Under the FAA, we do not set any guaranteed minimum level nor ceiling of rate of return for the bus operators. The Administration will make reference to the basket of factors, as well as the comments made by Members of the Panel on Transport and the Transport Advisory Committee before submitting its recommendations to the Chief Executive in Council. The Chief Executive in Council continues to retain the ultimate control in determining the scale of bus fares in accordance with the PBSO.

### **Franchised Bus Operations of KMB and LW**

5. In monitoring the quality and quantity of bus services, we take into account objective indicators such as the findings of passenger satisfaction surveys and site surveys, complaint figures and accident rates. In general, both KMB and LW provided satisfactory services to passengers.

#### ***KMB***

6. As at end June 2010, KMB operated 375 franchised routes with a fleet of 3,861 buses and employed about 12,000 staff. All KMB buses are equipped with Octopus auto-payment system and bus-stop announcement system. As at end June 2010, the average age of KMB’s fleet was 10.8 years with 96% of the buses air-conditioned. Due mainly to the commissioning of new railways, KMB’s average daily patronage decreased from 2.70 million in 2008 to 2.59 million in 2010 (January to June), representing a drop of about 4%.

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<sup>1</sup> As approved by the Chief Executive in Council on 8 December 2009, the value of productivity gain in the formula has been set at zero until the next review in three years’ time.

7. On the environmental front, as at end June 2010, 95% of KMB's fleet used Euro emission standard engines, and the company is progressively scrapping the remaining 202 pre-Euro buses. To further improve the environmental performance of its fleet, KMB is retrofitting diesel particulate filters ("DPFs") on its buses of Euro II and Euro III emission standards for completion by the end of 2010.

8. As regards bus safety, KMB's accident rate was 3.14 accidents per million vehicle-km for the past three years (2007 – 2009), compared with the average rate of 3.74 for the same period for all franchised bus operators. Before the Chief Executive in Council granted the existing franchise to KMB under the PBSO in January 2006, the company had undertaken to install black boxes<sup>2</sup> on its whole fleet. Up to end June 2010, 94.4% of KMB's buses were equipped with black boxes. The remaining 5.6% (217 buses) will be scrapped and replaced by new buses equipped with black boxes by 2012.

*LW*

9. As at end June 2010, LW operated 19 franchised routes with a fleet of 166 buses and employed about 460 staff. The average age of LW's fleet was 9 years, with all buses air-conditioned and equipped with Octopus auto-payment system and bus-stop announcement system. Due mainly to the outbreak of the global financial crisis in late 2008, LW's average daily patronage decreased from 78,900 in 2008 to 76,800 in 2010 (January to June), representing a drop of about 3%.

10. On the environmental front, all LW's buses are using Euro-II or above emission standard engines. To further improve the environmental performance of its fleet, LW is retrofitting DPFs on all its buses of Euro II and III emission standards for completion by the end of 2010.

11. As regards bus safety, LW's accident rate was below 1.5 accidents per million vehicle-km for the past three years (2007 – 2009). All LW's buses have been installed with black boxes.

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<sup>2</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operational data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and investigation of accidents.

## **Cost Saving Measures of the Franchised Bus Operators**

12. In the face of the increasingly difficult operating environment in recent years due to rising operating costs like staff costs, fuel costs, tunnel tolls and competition from other public transport modes, the two franchised bus operators have taken various cost saving measures. These include bus rationalisation and improvement of fleet utilisation to enhance network efficiency.

### **Advice sought**

13. Members are invited to comment on the fare increase applications made by KMB and LW.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
November 2010

For discussion  
on 11 July 2011

## **LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON TRANSPORT**

### **Franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)**

#### **PURPOSE**

This paper informs Members of the Administration's plan to renew the franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") and Citybus Limited ("Citybus") in respect of its franchise for the Airport and North Lantau bus network ("Franchise 2"), which are due to expire in 2013; as well as invites Members' views on the requirements of the new franchises.

#### **BACKGROUND**

##### **Bus Franchises**

2. At present, there are five franchised bus companies operating six bus franchises. They are The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB"), Citybus (which operates two franchises, one for Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour routes ("Franchise 1") and another for the Airport and North Lantau bus network ("Franchise 2"), NWFB, New Lantao Bus Company (1973) ("NLB") and LW.

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("the Ordinance") (Cap. 230), the Chief Executive in Council ("CE-in-Council") may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding 10 years. If the CE-in-Council thinks fit, the CE-in-Council may grant a new franchise to an existing grantee for a period not exceeding 10 years to begin immediately upon the expiry of the existing franchise. Section 6 also provides that an existing grantee may request an extension of its franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

4. The Government's key consideration in awarding or extending a bus franchise is the provision of a proper and efficient public bus service. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise shall, at all times during the franchise period, maintain to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") a proper and efficient public bus service.

### **Expiry of Franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2)**

5. The current franchises of LW<sup>1</sup> and Citybus<sup>1</sup> (Franchise 2) commenced on 1 June 2003 and will expire on 1 May 2013. NWFB<sup>1</sup>'s current franchise commenced on 1 August 2003 and will expire on 1 July 2013. The three franchised bus companies have indicated an interest to renew their franchises for another 10 years to take effect upon the expiry of their current ones.

6. According to the established practice, bus companies who have proved themselves to be capable of providing proper and efficient services, and are willing to further invest in their franchised bus operations are granted new franchises for a period of 10 years. The certainty of a ten-year franchise would facilitate long-term planning and development of bus services including the operation of loss-making but socially desirable routes. It would also enable bus companies to secure financing on more favourable terms thus reducing operating cost. A ten-year franchise should embody room for weathering short-term volatility of business risks. As a labour-intensive service industry, a ten-year franchise is also conducive to a more stable working environment for the staff of the franchised bus companies, and therefore the provision of proper and efficient services to the travelling public.

7. To assess whether the franchised bus companies have been providing proper and efficient services, the Transport Department ("TD") has been conducting regular reviews of their performance through passenger satisfaction surveys, site surveys, vehicle inspections, examination of regular returns and public feedback. The assessments of the performance of the three franchised bus companies are highlighted below.

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<sup>1</sup> The main operating areas for LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) are in North Lantau and the Airport. The main operating areas for NWFB are on Hong Kong Island.



## ASSESSMENTS

### (A) Service Performance and Operational Efficiency

#### *NWFB*

8. As at end 2010, NWFB was operating 92 bus routes using 704 buses, and carrying about 470,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips<sup>2</sup> against the total number of trips was about 2.2% (ranging from 1.79% to 2.86%). During the same period, the annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the Transport Complaints Unit (“TCU”) was about 2.45 (ranging from 1.91 to 2.9). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was 5.74 per annum (ranging from 4.5 to 6.85)<sup>3</sup> over the same eight-year period. On the environment front, the percentage of buses in the fleet meeting the Euro emission standards<sup>4</sup> increased from 91.5% in 2003 to 98.4% in 2010.

9. Overall speaking, the operational and network efficiency of NWFB has improved, with the number of buses reduced from 732 in 2003 to 704 in 2010. Since 2003, NWFB has implemented 402 service improvement<sup>5</sup> and 211 service rationalisation<sup>6</sup> items. NWFB submits its 5-year Forward Planning Programme (“FPP”) on an annual basis with proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), NWFB planned to acquire a total of about 250 new buses, mainly for replacement of its old buses.

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<sup>2</sup> Lost trips refer to trips not meeting the schedules as agreed with TD.

<sup>3</sup> The number of NWFB buses involved in accidents per million vehicle-km per annum was relatively high since its bus routes were operating in urban areas which were more congested and vulnerable to traffic accidents.

<sup>4</sup> Euro emission standards define the acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of new vehicles sold in European Union member states. With reference to the prevailing Euro emission standards and the vehicle supply situation in Hong Kong, the Environmental Protection Department specifies, and updates from time to time, the requirement on newly registered heavy duty vehicles (including franchised buses) under the Air Pollution Control (Vehicle Design Standards) (Emission) Regulation (Cap. 311J). The emission requirements are updated on an on-going basis. Buses meeting Euro emission standards are either Euro I, II, III, IV or V buses.

<sup>5</sup> Service improvement measures mainly include introduction of new routes, frequency enhancement, extension of service hours and extension of routes.

<sup>6</sup> Service rationalisation measures mainly include route cancellation, frequency reduction, route truncation and re-routeing.

## **LW**

10. As at end 2010, LW was operating 19 bus routes with 165 buses, and carrying about 81,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips against the total number of trips was about 0.6% (ranging from 0.31% to 1.22%). The annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the TCU was 2.02 (ranging from 1.31 to 2.8). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was 1.15 per annum (ranging from 0.78 to 1.51) over the same eight-year period. On the environment front, the percentage of buses in the fleet meeting the Euro emission standards increased from 93.8% in 2003 to 100% in 2010.

11. The total number of buses for LW increased from 145 in 2003 to 165 in 2010 to meet the increase in passenger demand arising from the increase in population in Tung Chung new town and the travel demand to and from the Airport. Since 2003, LW has implemented 98 service improvement and 19 service rationalisation items. The number of daily passengers carried by LW increased from about 52,800 in 2003 to about 81,000 in 2010. LW submits its 5-year FPP on an annual basis with proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), LW planned to acquire a total of about 100 new buses (i.e. around 60% of its bus fleet) to replace its old buses and to further improve its service.

## ***Citybus (Franchise 2)***

12. As at end 2010, Citybus (Franchise 2) was operating 18 bus routes using 172 buses, and carrying about 62,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips against the total number of trips was about 0.6% (ranging from 0.34% to 0.94%). The annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the TCU was 3.78 (ranging from 2.71 to 5.01). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was about 1.92 per annum (ranging from 1.4 to 2.27) over the same eight-year period. All the buses in the fleet have met the Euro emission standards since the commencement of the existing franchise in 2003.

13. The total number of buses for Citybus (Franchise 2) increased from 164 in 2003 to 172 in 2010 to meet the increase in passenger demand. Since 2003, Citybus (Franchise 2) has implemented 51 service improvement and 41 service rationalisation items. The number of daily passengers carried by Citybus (Franchise 2) increased from about 41,500 in 2003 to about 62,000 in 2010. Citybus (Franchise 2) submits its 5-year FPP on an annual basis with

proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), Citybus (Franchise 2) planned to acquire a total of about 130 new buses (i.e. over 75% of its fleet size) to replace the old buses.

## **(B) Safety and Service Enhancement Measures**

14. NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have been taking measures to further enhance safety. For example, all of them have implemented incentive schemes such as safety bonus and safe driving awards to nurture a safe driving culture among the drivers. Furthermore, NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) have implemented a new set of working hour and rest time arrangement for bus captains since its promulgation by TD in October 2010 to provide the bus captains with longer rest times during duty hours. LW will implement the same in August this year. All the three companies have also adopted measures to strengthen their bus captains' driving skills, driving attitude and safety awareness by providing enhancement, refresher and remedial training courses on safe driving. To facilitate better monitoring of the bus captains' performance, LW has completed the retrofitting of black boxes on all its buses in 2007, while NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) will start retrofitting their fleets with black boxes in 2012<sup>7</sup>.

15. To further enhance service standards and quality, the three franchised bus companies have made continuous improvement on the provision of passenger information including customer service centres, route information panels at bus termini and stops. Passengers can also search for the most up-to-date bus service information on the companies' websites.

16. The three franchised bus companies have been offering bus-bus interchange ("BBI") schemes with fare concessions. As at end 2010, NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) were providing 80, 8 and 39 BBI schemes respectively, either on their own or jointly with other companies. The BBI schemes provided by LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) at the Toll Plaza of Tsing Ma Control Area and Tung Chung new town are particularly well received by the locals. All the three companies have been offering a \$2 flat fare concession scheme for the elderly on the majority of their routes on Sundays and public holidays since January 2006<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Due to unforeseen liquidation of the supplier, installation of black boxes on the fleets of NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) has been delayed.

<sup>8</sup> For Octopus card holders only and excluding NWFB's racecourse routes, as well as the airport "A" routes of LW and Citybus (Franchise 2).

### **(C) Public Opinion on Bus Services**

17. At present, passenger satisfaction surveys are conducted to gauge passengers' opinions on the service performance of the three franchised bus companies. The findings of the passenger satisfaction surveys are used as the basis for TD and each franchised bus company to monitor its overall performance, keep track of passenger satisfaction and identify areas for improvements.

18. In addition, TD commissioned independent opinion surveys on the passengers' general feedback on the services provided by the three franchised bus companies in June 2011. The results show that 86%, 87% and 90% of the respondents are satisfied with the overall quality of services provided by NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) respectively. The summary of the survey findings on the three companies is at Annexes A to C.

### **RENEWAL OF FRANCHISES**

19. On the basis of the above assessments, C for T is of the view that NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have been providing proper and efficient bus services and have demonstrated their willingness to invest for further improvements. Nonetheless, the bus companies have expressed concern about the increase in operating costs (especially the rising staff costs and volatility of fuel prices) and keen competition from new railways. It is expected that the market share of franchised buses will continue to shrink with the commissioning of the West Island Line (in 2014), South Island Line (East) (in 2015), Kwun Tong Line Extension (in 2015), and the Shatin-Central Link (by two phases - in 2018 and 2020).

20. Since the enactment of the Ordinance in 1975, a total of four public tender exercises for new franchises were carried out between 1991 and 1998. Three of them were conducted for the purpose of bringing in new operators in view of the unsatisfactory performance of the then China Motor Bus Company Ltd. The other one was to facilitate the provision of a bus network to meet the demand arising from new developments in North Lantau and the new Airport at Chek Lap Kok. The established practice is that new franchises for a period of 5 or 6 years were granted for operation of new bus networks or to newcomers in the franchised bus industry, so as to observe the performance of the operators before consideration is given to granting longer franchises to them. This arrangement applied to Citybus (Franchise 2), LW in 1996 and NWFB in 1998

when their franchises were first granted.

21. For operators who have proved themselves to be capable of providing proper and efficient services, and are willing to further invest in their franchised bus operations, they have been granted new franchises for a period of 10 years. This arrangement applied to Citybus (Franchise 2), LW and NWFB when new franchises were granted to them to commence in 2003. This also applied to KMB, NLB and Citybus (Franchise 1) since 1997. Given that NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have continued to provide proper and efficient services, they would have legitimate expectation that they would be granted new franchises, or have their existing franchises extended under the Ordinance, upon the expiry of their current franchises.

22. In order to ensure continuous provision of essential public bus services for the travelling public, the Administration plans to negotiate with the three franchised bus companies respectively new ten-year franchises to take effect immediately upon the expiry of their existing franchises in 2013. In the course of negotiating new franchises, the Administration would seek to update the terms and requirements so as to keep abreast of the times. Furthermore, we shall ask for the inclusion of provisions to enhance the level of services and their performance on environmental improvement, as well as fare concessions. We aim to conclude the negotiations by early 2012 and shall report the outcome of the negotiations to this Panel.

## **ADVICE SOUGHT**

23. Members are invited to note the plan of the Administration to renew the franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) upon expiry of their current franchises. Members are welcome to offer views on the requirements of the new franchises.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
July 2011**

## Transport Department

# **Passenger Opinion Survey for New World First Bus Services Limited**

## **- Summary of Survey Results -**

**Conducted and Prepared by**



**Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd.**  
米嘉道資訊策略有限公司

*July 2011*

## **Background & Objectives**

In order to collect views on the performance of the New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), the Transport Department has commissioned the Mercado Solutions Associates Limited (“MSA”) to conduct passenger opinion survey via telephone in June 2011.

## **The Survey**

The target population is the regular passengers aged 12 or above who take NWFB at least once a week. In order to ensure the findings of the survey are representative, a random sample of household telephone numbers were selected. Within the selected households, all individuals aged 12 or above who used the service of NWFB at least once a week were listed. After that, one target respondent of the selected household would be randomly picked by a random selection process.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 504 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 16 and 23 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 66%.



## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 86.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 13.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 77.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of NWFB. The percentage was higher than the 21.8% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 85.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 78.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 64.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of NWFB. The percentage was higher than the 34.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 10.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 48.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of NWFB on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 26.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 26.0% of the respondents indicated "No comment".



Transport Department

**Passenger Opinion Survey for  
Long Win Company Limited**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

Conducted and Prepared by



Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd

*July 2011*

## Background & Objectives

In order to collect views on the performance of Long Win Company Limited (“LW”), the Transport Department has commissioned the Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd (“OZZO”) to conduct on-board face-to-face interview surveys on LW buses in June 2011.

## The Survey

The target population is passengers aged 12 or above who take LW buses. The required sample size was allocated to different LW routes according to ridership. Target respondents were picked by a random process with reference to the seating position on board the buses.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 503 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 18 and 27 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 75%.

## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by LW. The percentage was much higher than the 11.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 84.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 14.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 90.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 6.8% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 75.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/ satisfied with the passenger information provided by LW. The percentage was much higher than the 16.3% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 56.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of LW. The percentage was higher than the 41.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 84.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 12.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 8.2% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 59.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of LW on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 7.4% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 32.4% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

Transport Department

**Passenger Opinion Survey for  
Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport  
and North Lantau Bus Network)**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

Conducted and Prepared by



Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd

*July 2011*

## Background & Objectives

In order to collect views on the performance of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network) ("Citybus Limited (Franchise 2)"), the Transport Department has commissioned the Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd (OZZO) to conduct the on-board face-to-face interview surveys on Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) buses in June 2011.

## The Survey

The target population is passengers aged 12 or above who take Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) buses. The required sample size was allocated to different Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) routes according to ridership. Target respondents were picked by a random process with reference to the seating position on board the buses.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 505 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 18 and 27 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 77%.

## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 90.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 7.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 85.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 12.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 9.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 72.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 19.6% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 68.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was higher than the 26.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 89.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 6.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 5.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 53.4% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 5.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 40.2% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

**For information on  
27 November 2012**

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **The Serious Traffic Accident in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012**

#### **Purpose**

On 19 November 2012, a serious traffic accident took place in Chai Wan involving a runaway bus operated by the New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”). This paper seeks to report to Members on the following:

- (a) investigation into the traffic accident and follow-up actions;
- (b) details of the health check and working hour arrangements for bus captains of franchised bus companies;
- (c) road design and road safety measures at the road section concerned; and
- (d) follow-up actions on road safety of road-based public transport modes.

#### **The Accident**

2. At about 11am on 19 November 2012, a NWFB Route No. 8 bus lost control when it was running along west-bound Chai Wan Road towards Shau Kei Wan and rammed into a taxi and a Route No. 118 bus operated by The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) on their east-bound journeys on Chai Wan Road towards Chai Wan, causing three dead and numerous injuries. Background information of the NWFB route, bus captain and bus involved is at **Annex I**.

#### **Investigation of the Accident and Follow-up Actions**

3. An in-depth investigation is being carried out by the Police in three areas, namely, mechanical failure, human negligence and breach of traffic regulations. It is expected that the investigation will take about five

months to complete.

4. Immediately after the accident, the Transport Department (“TD”) demanded a report from NWFB on the incident and met with all franchised bus companies on 23 November to reiterate the importance of operational safety of public bus services. NWFB has undertaken to do its utmost to facilitate the Police in the investigation and activated its compensation mechanism to offer assistance to the victims and their families. TD has also arranged to meet with major bus captain unions shortly to exchange views on measures and arrangements which can help prevent the recurrence of similar accidents.

5. On the day of the accident, the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”) made immediate contact with the families of the deceased, 18 hospitalised victims as well as those discharged after treatment and their families, so as to find out what their needs are and provide them with assistance such as emotional support, psychological counselling, financial aid, referral/follow-up services, etc. As for the two expatriates died in the accident, the Police have asked the relevant consulates to contact their families and follow up as appropriate. Apart from providing financial aid under the “Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme” (“TAVAS”)<sup>1</sup>, SWD has liaised with emergency charitable funds for assistance to the victims’ families in need. Among them, the “Jockey Club Emergency Relief Fund” and the “Sik Sik Yuen Emergency Relief Fund” will provide the family of the deceased taxi driver \$100,000 and \$20,000 respectively. The latter has also offered families of the victims who are hospitalized an amount of not more than \$20,000 per household. SWD will continue to provide the victims and their families with appropriate support.

## **Physical Health of Bus Captains and Requirements on Working Hours**

### ***(i) Legislative Requirements***

6. Under Regulation 9(1) of the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations (Cap 374B) (“the Regulations”), an applicant for a driving

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<sup>1</sup> The TAVAS administered by SWD is non-means tested and does not take into account the element of fault leading to the occurrence of the accident. Major considerations for payment under the scheme are whether the accident falls within the scope of the Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance and if it has been reported to the Police; and whether the victim died from the accident or the injury sustained by the victim gave rise to at least three days of hospitalisation or sick leave as certified by a registered medical practitioner.



licence (including bus captains) shall, on new application or reissue or renewal, make a declaration in the application form if he is suffering from any disease or physical disability specified in the First Schedule of the Regulations (see **Annex II**), or any other disease or physical disability which would be liable to cause his driving to be a source of danger to the public. Once the declaration is made, the Commissioner for Transport (“the Commissioner”) shall reject his application. It is stipulated in Regulation 9(2A) that the driving licence holder shall forthwith give notice in writing of the fact to the Commissioner after he becomes aware of the specified disease or disability, even if he did not suffer such disease or disability when going through the above licensing formalities. The Commissioner may, if after making the necessary inquiry he is satisfied that the holder is unfit to drive, cancel his driving licence.

7. It is also stated in Regulation 10(3) and 15(7) that applicants aged 70 years or more shall, on new application or renewal, produce a medical examination certificate issued by a registered medical practitioner who is acceptable to the Commissioner not earlier than four months before the application to prove that the applicant is medically fit to drive. In this connection, the applicant may choose to apply for a driving licence valid for one or three years as stated in Regulation 11(6B).

8. As for working hours, there is currently no law in Hong Kong governing the working hours of general employees including drivers of all commercial vehicles.

***(i) Other Requirements Applicable to Franchised Bus Companies***

9. Since 2007, all franchised bus companies (KMB, Citybus Limited, NWFB, Long Win Bus Company Limited and New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited) have required, as requested by TD, bus captains aged 50 years or more to undergo health checks every year. Items covered are currently determined by the individual bus companies but the scope is similar. They include chest examinations as well as eyesight, hearing, diabetes, blood pressure, blood and urine tests; for bus captains aged 60 or more, an electrocardiogram is also required. The companies also require their bus captains to declare any disease or physical disability specified in the First Schedule of the Regulations to ensure that the captains are medically fit for driving buses.

10. Furthermore, franchised bus companies have issued guidelines to remind bus captains not to continue driving if feeling unwell while on duty. Their working manuals also remind them to ensure physical and

mental fitness and to seek medical consultation promptly in case of sickness. Subsequent to the traffic accident, the Commissioner has requested the bus companies to review the health check items for their bus captains, and if necessary, will impose appropriate requirements on and guidelines for the bus companies.

11. On working hours, TD reviews the “Guidelines on Bus Captains’ Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” with the franchised bus companies from time to time. In October 2010, TD revised the Guidelines to further improve the working hour and rest time arrangements. Under the current Guidelines, bus captains should have a break of not less than 10 hours between successive working days; maximum duty should not exceed 14 hours and driving duty should not exceed 11 hours in a day; there should be a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and total service breaks of at least 20 minutes within that 6-hour duty; and there should be a meal break of 1 hour for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a day. The bus companies are required to submit a report every three months on the implementation of the Guidelines. Every year, TD will also engage an independent party to conduct a survey on the working hours of bus captains for verification purpose. As indicated by the report of the survey done in 2011, the compliance situation of the Guidelines is satisfactory.

12. To enhance the awareness of drivers of commercial vehicles in closely monitoring their physical health, TD launched promotional and educational activities in the past three years to remind them to drive safely and to take good care of their own health. Free health checks were also arranged for some drivers of commercial vehicles. The checks cover physical examination, lipid profiles, chest x-rays and fasting blood sugar tests, and benefit about 2,000 drivers every year. These activities will continue this year.

13. As for other major road-based public transport modes, different arrangements are in place as their operational modes and carrying capacities vary quite substantially from those of franchised bus companies. Details are at **Annex III**. In view of the bus accident, the Administration will review the relevant arrangements of the major public transport modes.

## **Road Design and Road Safety Measures of the Road Section Concerned**

14. The section of Chai Wan Road between Tai Tam Road and

Shau Kei Wan Road measures about one kilometre (km) in total length, with an average gradient of 1:10<sup>2</sup> and a speed limit of 50 km per hour. Except for the road junctions, the entire section is retrofitted with central concrete profile barriers to separate vehicles heading for opposite directions. There are three lanes in the uphill section and two lanes in the downhill section, with each lane measuring about 3.3 metres in width. The design of the road section is in compliance with the road design standards in the Transport Planning and Design Manual.

15. The road section concerned is not a traffic accident black site. To enhance road safety, TD has implemented a number of improvement measures at the section in recent years. Such measures include:

- (a) providing traffic signs such as “Gradient 1:10”, “Low gear now” and “Reduce speed now” as well as road markings such as “Slow”;
- (b) installing speed enforcement cameras and displaying warning signs to deter speeding;
- (c) paving the road ahead of the two sets of traffic signals (i.e. near the junction with A Kung Ngam Road and the junction with Lei Yue Mun link road) at the section concerned with anti-skid surfacing;
- (d) except for loading/unloading areas and locations with planters, crash barriers are provided at the roadside along the entire downhill section to enhance pedestrian protection; and
- (e) all bus captains are required to stop at the bus stop near the junction with A Kung Ngam Road, regardless of whether there are boarding/alighting passengers, before continuing with their trips downhill along Chai Wan Road to avoid travelling too fast.

16. It can be seen from above that measures which have been implemented to remind motorists to take extra care at the road section concerned are rather comprehensive. Nevertheless, TD will continue to monitor the traffic situation thereat and consider measures to further enhance road safety as necessary.

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<sup>2</sup> Refers to a rise of one metre vertically for every 10 metres travelled horizontally, giving a gradient of about six to seven.

## **Follow-up Initiatives on Road Safety of Road-based Public Transport Modes**

17. The Administration attaches great importance to road safety of public transport modes. TD will, in conjunction with franchised bus companies, review the arrangements of health checks for bus captains to enhance the road safety of franchised buses. Furthermore, the Administration will carry out thorough follow-up subject to the investigation report to be completed by the Police. If inadequacies in the existing legislation or policies are identified by the investigation report, the Administration will review the matter(s) in detail so as to ensure road safety of franchised buses and other major road-based public transport modes. If amendment to the legislation or policies is deemed necessary, the Government will fully consult stakeholders of the industry and the Legislative Council to ensure that the improvement proposals are operationally practicable.

18. Members are invited to note the contents of this paper. Members' views on the above are welcome.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
November 2012**

**Information of Bus Accident in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012**

**(I) Information of the NWFB bus route involved**

<b>Bus company and route number</b>	Route No. 8 operated by New World First Bus Services Limited, plying between Chai Wan (Hang Fa Chuen) and Wanchai Pier
<b>Place of accident</b>	East-bound Chai Wan Road near A Kung Ngam Road
<b>Time of accident</b>	About 11:38am

**(II) Information of the NWFB bus captain involved**

<b>Employment mode</b>	Full-time staff
<b>Year of service</b>	14 years and 2 months
<b>Post title</b>	Bus Captain
<b>Hours worked before accident</b>	About 6 hours and 36 minutes (including a break of 50 minutes)
<b>Last health check</b>	July 2012

**(III) Information of the NWFB bus involved**

<b>Age</b>	2 years and 8 months
<b>Last monthly examination</b>	31 October 2012
<b>Last annual examination</b>	2 February 2012
<b>Casualty</b>	3 dead and 57 injured (1 victim in critical condition)

**Diseases or Physical Disabilities Specified in  
First Schedule of Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations  
(Cap 374B)**

1. Epilepsy.
2. Liability to sudden attacks of disabling giddiness or fainting due to hypertension or any other cause.
3. Mental disorder for which the applicant for the licence, or, as the case may be, the holder of the licence is liable to be detained under the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap 136) or is receiving treatment as an in-patient in a mental hospital within the meaning of that Ordinance.
4. Any condition causing muscular incoordination.
5. Uncontrolled diabetes mellitus.
6. Inability to read at a distance of 23 metres in good daylight (with the aid of spectacles or other corrective lenses, if worn) a registration mark.
7. Any other disease or disability which is likely to render him incapable of effectively driving and controlling a motor vehicle or suitably adapted motor vehicle to which such licence refers without endangering public safety, provided that deafness shall not of itself be deemed to be any such disability.

**Arrangements of Medical Examinations and Working Hours  
for Drivers of Other Major Road-based Public Transport Modes**

- All drivers of road-based public transport modes (including trams) must be holders of a driving licence, and must therefore meet the statutory requirements regarding physical health of the licence holders on new application, reissue or renewal of a driving licence under the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations (Cap. 374B). Details are at paragraph 6 of the paper.

**Green Minibuses (“GMBs”)**

- In general, GMB operators do not require their drivers to undergo health check annually. However, drivers found to be unwell or in abnormal mental condition when coming to work will not be assigned driving duties and they will be asked to see a doctor for treatment or medical examination.
- As regards working hours, to ensure the provision of safe, efficient and reliable GMB services to the public, TD has formulated the following guidelines after consulting the trade: each shift period of a driver, including all rest breaks, should not exceed 14 hours per day; and the driving hours of a driver (i.e. the maximum hours of a shift period less all rest breaks that last for 15 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours per day.

**Trams**

- All drivers are required to undergo an eyesight test annually; drivers aged 55 to 59 are required to undergo eyesight and blood pressure tests annually; and drivers aged 60 or above are required to undergo a general check-up annually.
- Regarding working hours, a tram driver’s daily driving time does not exceed 11 hours, including a rest period of at least 30 minutes.

**Non-franchised buses**

- Similar to GMBs, non-franchised bus operators generally do not require their drivers to undergo health check annually. However,

drivers found to be unwell or in abnormal mental condition when coming to work will not be assigned driving duties and they will be asked to see a doctor for treatment or medical examination.

- As regards working hours, TD has not laid down any regulation. In general, non-franchised bus drivers work for about 10 to 12 hours a day, including rest time and meal breaks.

#### Red minibuses (“RMBs”)

- The drivers are mainly self-employed. TD does not regulate the routeing, operating hours and drivers’ working hours. TD will, through meetings with the trade, encourage RMB operators to remind their drivers to pay attention to their physical condition and undergo regular check-ups.

#### Taxis

- The drivers are mainly self-employed. TD does not regulate the routeing, operating hours and drivers’ working hours. TD will, through meetings with the trade, remind the drivers to pay attention to their physical condition and undergo regular check-ups.



# **立法會**

## ***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(1)205/12-13(02)

Ref: CB1/PL/TP

### **Panel on Transport** **Special meeting on 27 November 2012**

#### **Background brief on safety of franchised bus operation and safety of long downhill roads**

#### **Purpose**

This paper gives an account of the major views and concerns expressed by Legislative Council ("LegCo") Members and the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") in past discussion on the safety of franchised bus operation and safety of long downhill roads.

#### **Background**

2. The Transport Department ("TD") monitors the operation of franchised bus services in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) and the Road Traffic Ordinance ("RTO") (Cap. 374) and their Regulations. The franchised bus operators are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify, and TD's examiners are empowered to inspect the buses and maintenance facilities at any reasonable time. While buses should observe the general speed limits designated on roads, the maximum speed of a bus is restricted under RTO to 70 km/h on roads with a posted speed limit over 70km/h.

3. The Panel has all along been actively following the items on safety of long downhill roads and safety of franchised bus operation. The major incidents involving the operation of franchised buses and happening on long downhill roads are set out below.

#### Traffic accident on Tuen Mun Road

4. Following a serious traffic accident happened on Tuen Mun Road on 10 July 2003, in which a bus carrying 40 passengers broke through a section of vehicular parapet and plunged into the hillside about 31 metres beneath, resulting in 21 fatalities and 20 injuries, the Chief Executive

appointed an independent Expert Panel to examine and make recommendations on safety measures to prevent similar catastrophes. The Tuen Mun Road Traffic Incident Independent Expert Panel then reviewed with the Administration and franchised bus companies measures to enhance the safety of bus operation. At the Panel meeting held on 28 November 2003, the Administration reported that it had requested all the franchised operators to conduct a safety review, covering aspects such as the correlation between bus accidents and drivers' age, experience and working hours, driver training, driver working schedule, installation of safety devices, measures to monitor driving behaviour, vehicle examination, and measures to promote safety awareness of drivers and passengers.

5. In May 2004, the Administration made a report to the Panel [LC Paper No. CB(1) 1955/03-04(01)] on the major findings of the bus safety review mentioned in paragraph 4 above, and the measures to further enhance bus safety. These proposed new measures included the introduction of annual medical check for drivers aged 50 or above, enhancement of training programmes for bus drivers, revision of the guidelines issued by TD to franchised bus operators on drivers' working hours ("the Guidelines"), installation of speed limiters and black boxes on all new buses to be purchased, conduct of speed checks at critical locations, retrofitting of armrests at exposed seats, etc.

#### Serious traffic accidents happened on long downhill roads

##### *Fatal traffic accident on New Hiram's Highway*

6. A fatal traffic accident occurred on New Hiram's Highway near Nam Pin Wai Roundabout in Sai Kung on 1 May 2008, resulting in a total of 18 fatalities and 44 injuries. In light of that traffic accident, TD had, in conjunction with Highways Department and the Police, formed an expert group to examine the site environment concerned and to identify appropriate enhancement measures. With a view to further enhancing road safety, TD had also conducted a territory-wide review of long steep downhill roads and had identified a total of 29 downhill road sections in the territory. The list of road sections is set out in **Appendix I**. The review showed that with the existing traffic facilities, the 29 road sections were already in compliance with the prevailing safety standards. Nevertheless, the Administration had identified a number of measures to further enhance the safety of the road environment, including traffic control measures, improvements to traffic signs and road markings, roadside barriers and road surfacing, and the provision of speed enforcement cameras.

### *Fatal accident on Eastern Street*

7. In the wake of a recent fatal accident on Eastern Street in the Western District on 10 April 2012 involving a tow truck and a light goods vehicle pulled by it, some Panel members raised concern again on the safety of road sections that were relatively steep in May 2012. The Administration advised that the Central and Western District Council would establish an ad hoc working group to review comprehensively the road facilities and management measures at road sections that are relatively steep in the district. Relevant departments such as the TD, the Police and the Highways Department would actively participate in the working group's review.

### *Recent traffic accident on Chai Wan Road*

8. On 19 November 2012, a bus driven by a 57-year-old man was travelling downhill Chai Wan Road. On reaching near the junction of Chai Wan Road and A Kung Ngam Road, the bus reportedly hit two private cars in the front and crossed the opposite vehicular lane. It then rammed onto a taxi and a bus which were travelling uphill. The taxi was trapped between the two buses. According to the Administration, three men died and 56 persons were injured in the traffic accident.

## **Discussions by Members**

### Safety of franchised bus operation

#### *Health of professional drivers*

9. On 29 October 2004, the Panel discussed with deputations from bus drivers their duty arrangements and implications on bus safety. Some members opined that a maximum duty length of 14 hours and driving duty of 11 hours, as allowed under the Guidelines, were too demanding. The Panel passed a motion urging the Administration to consider revising the Guidelines and reducing the above maximum duty and driving duty to 10 and eight hours respectively. The wording of the motion is as follows:

"本會強烈要求運輸署研究修訂以下巴士車長編更指引：

- (1) 一天內最長的工作時間(包括所有休息時間)由不應超逾 14 小時減至 10 小時；
- (2) 一天內的駕駛時間(即最長的工作時間減去所有 30 分鐘或以上的休息時間)由不應超逾 11 小時減至 8 小時；

(3) 車長食飯時間不應偏離人體正常生理時鐘；及

(4) 編更路線不少於 7 天前發給車長。

藉以加強專營巴士服務營運安全。"

*(English Translation)*

"This Panel strongly urges the Administration to study revising the Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers so that:

- (a) maximum duty (including all breaks) should be reduced from not exceeding 14 hours to not exceeding 10 hours;
- (b) driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should be reduced from not exceeding 11 hours to not exceeding 8 hours;
- (c) meal time schedule for drivers should not deviate from normal human biological clocks; and
- (d) schedules for driving routes should be given to bus drivers seven days in advance, to enhance the safety of franchised bus service operations."

Although members reiterated the need to reduce the maximum working and driving hours specified under the Guidelines from 14 to 10 and from 11 to eight respectively, these are kept when the Administration revised the Guidelines in October 2010. The Guidelines are listed below for reference:

Guideline A - Bus captains should have a rest time<sup>1</sup> of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, they should have rest times totalling 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest time.

Guideline B - Maximum duty (including all rest times) in a working day should not exceed 14 hours.

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<sup>1</sup> Meal break is also regarded as rest time.

- Guideline C - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all rest times each of 30 minutes or more) in a working day should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D - The break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours.
- Guideline E - Bus captains working for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a working day should have a meal break. Bus companies should complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by the third quarter of 2011, and further improvement to no less than one hour in one year thereafter.

10. At the Council meeting on 23 February 2011, a Member raised a question relating to the health of professional drivers. The Administration advised that employers of commercial vehicle drivers and operators of public transport are obliged to ensure that their drivers are physically fit to provide safe transport services. Currently, some major public transport operators require their drivers to undergo regular medical check-ups. For instance, apart from providing staff with medical allowances, franchised bus companies require new bus captains to pass pre-employment health checks and serving ones aged 50 or above to undergo annual health checks. The relevant Council question and the Administration's reply are in **Appendix II**.

*Installation and wearing of seat belts on buses*

11. As a result of the spate of bus accidents that occurred during 2006-2007, which mostly involved passengers being thrown out from the window, the Panel strongly urged the Administration to seriously consider the proposal to introduce mandatory requirements for installation and wearing of passenger seat belts on franchised buses to enhance bus safety. At the Panel meeting on 24 October 2006, the Administration reported that it had been reviewing the feasibility of retrofitting seat belts on existing buses with franchised bus operators.

12. At the meeting on 23 March 2007, the Panel passed a motion urging the Administration to immediately implement various improvement measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation, in particular those regarding seat belts. Please refer to **Appendix III** for the wording of the motion.

13. The Administration subsequently conducted a research study on overseas practices regarding the fitting and wearing of seat belts in buses. The research findings revealed that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belts on all seats might not be as great as envisaged. Having regard to the professional advice of bus manufacturers, the Administration recommended in July 2007 that the following measures regarding seat belts be implemented –

- (a) To retrofit seat belt at the four seats on the first row on the upper deck of post-1997 design buses;
- (b) To install/add handrail, armrest or other facilities where appropriate for the other exposed seats to further enhance passenger safety during sharp acceleration/deceleration;
- (c) To install an additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of pre-1997 design buses for further protection to the front seat passengers;
- (d) To accord priority to the retrofitting of seat belt or installation of the additional guard rail on buses which operated on expressways;
- (e) To examine with the bus companies advancement of vehicle replacement programme to replace old buses earlier as far as their financial situation permitted; and
- (f) To ensure that new buses purchased by bus companies would have seat belts on all exposed seats.

*Design and construction of franchised bus*

(a) *Bus body*

14. The design and construction of franchised bus was also a major concern of the Panel because, in a number of bus accidents, the tops of the buses concerned were torn off, indicating the need for stronger bus body to provide greater protection to passengers. At the Panel meetings on 2 March and 23 March 2007, the Administration assured members that the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) had stipulated the requirement for the design and construction of franchised bus. All double deck buses currently operating in Hong Kong were imported from Europe and could comply with the European requirements. The major bus manufacturers had also confirmed that the body structure of franchised buses in Hong Kong was the same as those

supplied to other countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore.

*(b) Bus windows*

15. As a result of a spate of franchised bus incidents which involved broken windscreen and passengers being thrown away from the upper saloon of a bus after collision with another vehicle, the Panel discussed on 24 October 2006 measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, including the selection of better materials for windscreen and passenger windows on buses. The Administration reported in March 2007 that it had agreed with franchised bus companies to apply a transparent protective film onto the upper deck toughened glass windscreens of all existing buses, which would effectively contain the shattered glass fragments in the event of an accident, or to replace them with laminated glass.

*Installation of black boxes on buses*

16. At the Panel meeting on 27 November 2009, the Administration reported that as at September 2009, about 70%<sup>2</sup> of franchised buses were installed with black boxes. Bus companies were also studying ways to enhance random checks of the data retrieved from black boxes. When the record showed irregularities in journey time or when passengers' complaints on the driving behaviour of bus captains were received, the bus companies would investigate the cases using the data retrieved from black boxes.

*Restricting passengers from standing on double-deck buses operating on expressways*

17. Some Panel members urged the Administration to review whether double-deck buses should be allowed to operate on expressways in Hong Kong given their higher risks and if so, whether standing passengers should be allowed on them. The Administration advised that the standing capacity of a bus accounted for some 30% of its carrying capacity. The above proposal would have implications on the number of buses required and the fares, and required examination of whether there was sufficient justification for the restriction.

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<sup>2</sup> At the meeting of the former Bills Committee on Road Traffic (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2011 on 12 January 2012, the Administration advised that all franchised bus companies have committed to equipping new buses with black boxes, and retrofitting in-service buses with this device. As at January 2012, about 85% of the franchised buses have already been equipped with black boxes [LC Paper No. CB(1)842/11-12(01)].

18. The Panel had requested the Research and Library Services Division of the Secretariat to conduct a research on whether overseas countries allowed standing passengers on buses operating on expressways and the measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers. The research report (IN12/07-08) was issued on 18 April 2008 vide LC Paper No. CB(1)1307/07-08. In brief, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in Queensland of Australia, Wellington of New Zealand, Toronto and Vancouver of Canada, San Francisco of the United States, and Singapore. However, measures were taken to address the safety of standing passengers, such as the provision of handholds.

#### Safety of long downhill roads

19. During the meetings held on 30 June 2008 and 24 May 2012, members expressed concerns on the safety of long downhill roads arising from the traffic accidents which occurred on New Hiram's Highway and the Eastern Street. At the meeting on 1 May 2008, the Panel requested the Administration to review the safety of long downhill roads in the territory and introduce suitable improvement measures to enhance the safety of road users, including the provision of speed enforcement cameras or camera housings on all long downhill road sections identified, and impose more stringent speed limits than the 50 km/h generally applicable to roads in the urban area. The Administration informed members on 10 July 2008 that it would install fixed speed enforcement camera housings at the 29 downhill road sections [LC Paper No. CB(1)2156/07-08(01)].

20. At the Panel meeting on 24 May 2012, some members considered that the Administration should conduct a thorough review on all the steep roads on Hong Kong Island and requested the Administration to provide supplementary information on territory-wide measures to ensure steep road safety. The Administration advised that TD had been monitoring the traffic situation on road sections that were relatively steep on Hong Kong Island, and from time to time reviewed the relevant traffic management measures, which included paving anti-skid material and imposing some restrictions on certain steep road sections. It agreed to provide more details of the territory-wide measures on steep roads in Hong Kong after the meeting. The Administration's response is awaited.

#### **Relevant questions raised at Council meetings**

21. The hyperlinks to relevant papers and questions raised at the Council meetings of 16 January 2008, 18 March 2009, 25 November 2009, 17 March 2010 and 23 February 2011, and the Administration's response are given in **Appendix IV**.



### **Latest development**

22. Following the serious traffic accident happened on 19 November 2012 in Chai Wan, the Panel will hold a special meeting on 27 November 2012 to discuss the matter.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
26 November 2012

## Review of Long Steep Downhill Roads

### List of Locations

Road (maximum gradient, length)	Road Sections	
	From	To
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>		
1. Old Peak Road, Mid-levels (17%, 560m)	Old Peak Road/ Tregunter Path	Old Peak Road/Robinson Road
2. Magazine Gap Road, Mid-levels ( 10%, 1850m)	Magazine Gap Road/Peak Road	Magazine Gap Road/Garden Road
3. Garden Road, Central (13%, 800m)	Robinson Road	Queen's Road Central
4. Smithfield, Western (11%, 1000m)	Pok Fu Lam Road	Forbes Street
5. Sassoon Road, Southern (11%, 520m)	Pok Fu Lam Road/ Sassoon Road	Sassoon Road/Victoria Road Roundabout
6. Aberdeen Reservoir Road, Southern (16%, 500m)	Aberdeen Reservoir Road House No. 38	Aberdeen Reservoir Road/ Aberdeen Main Road
7. Blue Pool Road, Wan Chai (14%, 500m)	Tai Hang Road	98 Blue Pool Road
8. Broadwood Road, Wan Chai (10%, 900m)	Tai Hang Road	Link Road
9. Chai Wan Road, Eastern (11%, 880m)	Tai Tam Road	Shau Kei Wan Road
10. Chai Wan Road, Eastern (10%, 1000m)	Tai Tam Road	Chai Wan Roundabout
11. Pak Fuk Road, Eastern (10%, 800m)	Tin Hau Temple Road	Pak Fuk Road Safety Town
12. Cloud View Road, Eastern (10%, 520m)	33 Cloud View Road	Tin Hau Temple Road

Road (maximum gradient, length)	Road Sections	
	From	To
<b>Kowloon</b>		
13. Shatin Pass Road, Tsz Wan Shan (17%, 500m)	Fat Chong Temple	Nga Chuk Street
14. Wan Wah Street, Tsz Wan Shan (12%, 500m)	Tsz Wan Shan Road	Shung Wah Street
15. Clear Water Bay Road, Ngau Chi Wan (11%, 1350m)	Fei Ngo Shan Road	New Clear Water Bay Road
16. Ede Road, Kowloon Tong (11%, 560m)	Eastbourne Road	Cornwall Street
<b>The New Territories</b>		
17. Lam Kam Road, Yuen Long (13%, 800m)	Kadoorie Agricultural Research Centre	Route Twisk
18. Tai Mo Shan Road, Tsuen Wan (12.5%, 2000m)	Hong Kong Youth Hostels Association - Sze Lok Yuen	Route Twisk
19. Wah King Hill Road, Kwai Chung (10.5%, 900m)	Regency Park	Wah Yan Court
20. Keng Hau Road, Sha Tin (15%, 510m)	Tai Po Road (Sha Tin Heights)	Roundabout at Che Kung Miu Road
21. Lam Kam Road, Tai Po (10%, 730m)	Kadoorie Farm	Ng Tung Chai
22. Lo Fai Road, Tai Po (10%, 500m)	Ting Kok Road	Lo Ping Road
23. Hiram's Highway / New Hiram's Highway, Sai Kung ( 10%, 1600m)	Hiram's Highway near Chuk Kok Road	New Hiram's Highway near Nam Pin Wai Roundabout
24. Clear Water Bay Road near Ah Kung Wan Road, Sai Kung (10%, 600m)	Ah Kung Wan Road	Hang Hau Road Roundabout
25. Hang Hau Road, Tseung Kwan O ( 10%, 500m)	Clear Water Bay Road	Po Ning Road Roundabout

Road (maximum gradient, length)	Road Sections	
	From	To
26. Improved Tung Chung Road, Lantau (12.5%, 1300m)	Pak Kung Au	Lung Tseng Tau
27. Improved Tung Chung Road, Lantau (10%, 1400m)	Pak Kung Au	Cheung Sha
28. South Lantau Road, Lantau (10%, 850m)	Nam Shan	Pui O
29. South Lantau Road, Lantau (10%, 500m)	Nam Shan	Mui Wo

Source : LC Paper No. CB(1)1977/07-08(04)

## Press Releases

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LCQ11:Drivers' driving behaviour, health issues and working and rest time arrangements

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Following is a question by the Hon Wong Sing-chi and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Ms Eva Cheng, at the Legislative Council meeting today (February 23):

Question:

Regarding drivers' driving behaviour, health problems and working and rest time arrangements, will the Government inform this Council:

(a) of the number and location of traffic accidents caused by drink driving, drug driving and drivers having health problems while driving in each of the past three years, as well as the casualties involved and the percentage of these accidents which involved professional drivers, broken down by type of vehicle; whether it has compiled statistics on traffic accidents involving "discount gang" taxis, including the number and location of such accidents as well as the casualties involved; if it has, of the number and location of such accidents in the past three years as well as the casualties involved; if not, the reasons for that;

(b) of the measures implemented by the Government at present to safeguard the health of professional drivers; whether it has reviewed the effectiveness of such measures; if it has, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; whether the Government has made reference to how other places safeguard the health of professional drivers; if it has, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(c) whether it had, in the past three years, studied the introduction of legislation to require all professional drivers to undergo regular medical check-up; if it had, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(d) whether the Government had, in the past three years, considered undertaking relevant studies (e.g. selecting a number of bus captains as subjects and recording the changes in their physical conditions while on duty) for the purpose of understanding the relationship between bus safety and rest time of bus captains; if it had, of the details; if not, the reasons for that, and whether the Government has adopted other methods to study the working and rest time arrangements for bus captains; and

(e) of the number and percentage of bus termini not provided with facilities such as toilets and rest rooms, etc. in Hong Kong at present; whether the Government and various franchised bus companies have any plan to suitably enhance the facilities at these termini; if they have, of the details and the timetable; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

My reply to various parts of the question is as follow:

(a) The number of traffic accidents and casualties involving drink driving, drug driving and drivers having health problems while driving as well as breakdowns by districts where the accidents took place and vehicle types involved in the past three years are tabulated at Annex I. The Administration has been using driving behaviour, such as driving too close to the vehicle in front, careless lane changing, speeding and drink driving as one of the criteria in classifying traffic accidents. The Administration does not have statistics on traffic accidents involving the so-called "discount gang" taxis.

(b) and (c) To ensure driving safety, the Transport Department (TD) has been encouraging commercial vehicle drivers to receive regular health checks and enhancing alertness on their health conditions through publicity and education by such means as holding trade conferences, launching publicity campaigns and arranging free check-ups. Subsequent to the Safe Driving and Health Campaign for Professional Drivers organised from late December 2009 to early February 2010, the TD has launched the Safe Driving and Health Campaign in early 2011 to promote road safety by enhancing safe driving and health awareness of commercial vehicle drivers. Apart from free simple health checks (including measurement of health indicators such as height, weight, body mass index and blood pressure), participating commercial vehicle drivers will also be given assessment, analysis and advice on their health by registered Chinese medicine practitioners. Over 2,000 drivers are expected to benefit from the whole campaign. In the months following the health checks, they will also receive SMS messages with health tips via mobile phones from health check providers. To cater for the operation mode of commercial vehicle drivers, TD has also arranged to disseminate health information and providing drivers with timely tips on driving safety through radio programmes. In addition, commercial vehicle drivers may participate in seminars and workshops to obtain more information on safe driving and health matters.

Separately, employers of commercial vehicle drivers and operators of public transport are obliged to ensure that their drivers are physically fit to provide safe transport services. Currently, some major public transport operators require their drivers to undergo regular medical check-ups. For instance, apart from providing staff with medical allowances, franchised bus companies require new bus captains to pass pre-employment health checks and serving ones aged 50 or above to undergo annual health checks. The MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) also requires new train captains to pass pre-employment health checks, all serving ones to undergo regular health checks and those aged 45 or above to undergo annual health checks. These health checks are provided free by the bus companies and MTRCL.

On the proposal of requiring all professional drivers to undergo regular health checks, we must consider the potential impact on the community and the operation of the trade when examining the proposed measures. As at January 31, 2010, there were about 1.25 million holders of valid commercial vehicle and light goods vehicle driving licences, far exceeding the number of corresponding licensed vehicles (about 149,000). This indicates that the majority of such driving licence holders are not engaged in driving as their main occupation. If it is a mandatory requirement for these drivers to produce medical reports when applying for or renewing their driving licences, many of those

who are not engaged in driving commercial vehicles as an occupation will be affected.

From time to time the TD makes reference to the practices of other places and reviews the effectiveness of existing arrangements, such as exploring further improvement to the procedures and requirements for driving licence application and renewal.

(d) In response to the public concern on bus safety and bus captains' rest times, the TD has issued the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks (the Guidelines) to franchised bus companies and reviews the Guidelines from time to time.

Considerable improvements have been incorporated in the revised Guidelines in 2010, such as extending the break between successive working days for bus captains and further defining rest times and the duration of their meal breaks. The Guidelines are shown at Annex II.

Every year, the TD engages an independent consultant to conduct a random survey on franchised bus captains' working hours for monitoring compliance of the Guidelines by franchised bus companies. If non-compliance is identified, the TD will require explanations and corresponding adjustments from the bus companies concerned.

(e) The Government is very concerned about and understands the bus captains' requests regarding amenity facilities at bus termini, and has been following up with franchised bus companies in this regard. As at the end of 2010, more than 70% of the bus termini were provided with rest rooms/rest areas for use by bus captains and other frontline staff. Toilets were available at over 90% of the bus termini or in the vicinity (within a walking distance of about three minutes) for use by bus captains. The TD, together with the relevant bus companies, departments and organisations, are following up on the applications for providing toilets at the remaining bus termini, with a view to improving the amenity facilities at more bus termini.

Ends/Wednesday, February 23, 2011  
Issued at HKT 13:42

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		Driving behaviours involved in traffic accidents <sup>1</sup>								
		Drink driving			Drug driving			Drivers having health problems while driving		
Year		2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010
Number of accidents		239	109	77	2	1	12	13	5	5
Casualties		367	170	113	3	1	19	18	8	6
Number of vehicles involved in the accidents <sup>2</sup> (casualties in brackets)										
Vehicle type	private cars	218 (153)	101 (77)	58 (33)	1 (1)	0 (0)	11 (12)	2 (5)	0 (0)	1 (1)
	light goods vehicles	55 (23)	14 (4)	22 (6)	2 (2)	1 (1)	4 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	medium goods vehicles	7 (4)	6 (1)	7 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (3)	1 (1)
	heavy goods vehicles	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)
	public buses	5 (3)	4 (6)	2 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	taxis	75 (71)	33 (47)	21 (23)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (2)	9 (10)	2 (2)	1 (2)
	public light buses	8 (8)	4 (0)	3 (11)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (2)
	motorcycles	45 (51)	22 (23)	1 (16)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (2)	0 (0)
	other vehicles	8 (25)	2 (2)	3 (5)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
pedestrians		(29)	(10)	(13)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Regions where the accidents took place <sup>3</sup> (casualties in brackets)										
Regions	New Territories South	27 (38)	14 (20)	19 (30)	0 (0)	1 (1)	2 (4)	1 (1)	2 (4)	1 (1)
	New Territories North	62 (95)	37 (66)	16 (21)	1 (2)	0 (0)	2 (4)	4 (7)	0 (0)	1 (2)
	Kowloon East	33 (49)	19 (27)	13 (23)	1 (1)	0 (0)	2 (5)	2 (3)	1 (1)	1 (1)
	Kowloon West	61 (98)	19 (29)	16 (22)	0 (0)	0 (0)	5 (5)	6 (7)	0 (0)	1 (1)
	Hong Kong Island	56 (87)	20 (28)	13 (17)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	2 (3)	1 (1)

<sup>1</sup> Traffic accidents that involved personal injuries.

<sup>2</sup> All vehicles involved in traffic accidents. Each accident may involve more than one vehicle.

<sup>3</sup> Regions refer to Police Regions .



**Guidelines on Bus Captain  
Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks  
(Revised in October 2010)**

- Guideline A - Bus captains should have a rest time<sup>4</sup> of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, they should have rest times totalling 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest time.
- Guideline B - Maximum duty (including all rest times) in a working day should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all rest times each of 30 minutes or more) in a working day should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D - The break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours.
- Guideline E - Bus captains working for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a working day should have a meal break. Bus companies should complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by the third quarter of 2011, and further improvement to no less than one hour in one year thereafter.

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<sup>4</sup> Meal break is also regarded as rest time.

交通事務委員會  
在2007年3月23日會議上通過  
有關"專營巴士的營運安全問題"的議案

"由於近年出現多宗涉及乘客傷亡的專營巴士意外，本委員會促請政府立即落實加強專營巴士營運安全的措施，包括立法規定巴士乘客佩戴安全帶、要求政府規定專營巴士公司必須於巴士上安裝安全帶、改善巴士車長的編更及休息安排等，以保障巴士乘客的安全；同時，本委員會對於運輸署未有接納委員的意見，表示不滿及遺憾。"

動議人：李永達議員、劉江華議員、王國興議員、李鳳英議員

(Translation)

Panel on Transport  
Motion on "Safety of franchised bus operation"  
passed at the meeting on 23 March 2007

"That as a number of franchised bus accidents involving passenger casualties have occurred in recent years, this Panel urges the Government to immediately implement measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation, which should include the introduction of legislation to require bus passengers to wear seatbelts, and requirement of franchised bus operators to install seatbelts on their buses and to improve working schedule and rest-break arrangements for their bus captains, etc to ensure the safety of bus passengers; at the same time, this Panel also expresses dissatisfaction with and regret over the Transport Department's failure to accept members' views."

Moved by : Hon LEE Wing-tat, Hon LAU Kong-wah,  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, Hon LI Fung-ying

## Safety of franchised bus operation

## List of relevant papers

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
28.11.2003	Panel on Transport	<p>Administration's paper on "Measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation"</p> <p>Minutes of meeting</p> <p>Report on Franchised Bus Operators' Review of Arrangements to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation</p>	<p>CB(1)406/03-04(04)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1128cb1-406-4e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)589/03-04</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp031128.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp031128.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)1955/03-04(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb1-1955-1e.pdf</a></p>
29.10.2004	Panel on Transport	<p>Administration's paper on "Safety of franchised bus operations"</p> <p>Background brief on work arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat</p> <p>Submission from the New World First Bus Company Staff Union</p> <p>Submission from the Citybus Limited Employees Union</p>	<p>CB(1)111/04-05(05)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-5e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-5e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)112/04-05</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-112-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-112-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)111/04-05(03)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-3c-scan.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-3c-scan.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)127/04-05(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-127-1c-scan.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-127-1c-scan.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p>

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
		<p>Submission from the Motor Transport Workers General Union City Bus Branch</p> <p>Submission from the Motor Transport Workers General Union New World First Bus Branch</p> <p>Minutes of meeting</p>	<p>CB(1)111/04-05(04)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-4c-scan.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-4c-scan.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)111/04-05(07)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-7c-scan.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1029cb1-111-7c-scan.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)286/04-05</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp041029.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp041029.pdf</a></p>
24.10.2006	Panel on Transport	<p>Administration's paper on "Safety of franchised bus operations"</p> <p>Background brief on safety of franchised bus operations prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat</p> <p>Minutes of meeting</p>	<p>CB(1)110/06-07(03)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)113/06-07</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-113-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-113-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)294/06-07</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf</a></p>
28.2.2007	Council meeting	Hon LI Fung-ying raised a question on safety of window panes of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280138.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280138.htm</a>
2.3.2007	Panel on Transport	<p>Administration's paper on "Progress on measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation"</p> <p>Minutes of meeting</p>	<p>CB(1)783/06-07(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)1147/06-07</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf</a></p>

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
23.3.2007	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on "Progress on measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation"  Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1149/06-07(03)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-e.pdf</a>  CB(1)1407/06-07  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf</a>
9.7.2007	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on "Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation "  Minutes of meeting	CB(1)2023/06-07(03)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-e.pdf</a>  CB(1)2408/06-07  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf</a>
16.1.2008	Council meeting	Hon Albert CHENG raised a question on structural safety of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160165.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160165.htm</a>
28.1.2008	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on "Safety of franchised bus operation"  Updated background brief on safety of franchised bus operation prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat  Minutes of meeting  Paper on whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in selected overseas places prepared by the Research and Library Services Division [IN12/07-08]	CB(1)639/07-08(03)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf</a>  CB(1)631/07-08  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-631-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-631-e.pdf</a>  CB(1)838/07-08  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf</a>  CB(1)1307/07-08  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/sec/library/0708in12-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/sec/library/0708in12-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
22.2.2008	Panel on Transport	<p>Administration's paper on "Safety of franchised bus operation"</p> <p>Updated background brief on safety of franchised bus operation prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat</p> <p>Submission from the Motor Transport Workers General Union K.M.B. Branch</p> <p>Submission from Motor Transport Workers General Union L.W.B. Branch</p> <p>Submission from the Motor Transport Workers General Union New World Bus Branch</p> <p>Submission from the Motor Transport Workers General Union City Bus Branch</p> <p>Minutes of meeting</p>	<p>CB(1)639/07-08(03)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)631/07-08</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-631-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-631-e.pdf</a></p> <p>CB(1)827/07-08(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)827/07-08(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)827/07-08(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)827/07-08(01)</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0222cb1-827-1-c.pdf</a> (Chinese version only)</p> <p>CB(1)1123/07-08</p> <p><a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf</a></p>
18.3.2009	Council meeting	Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming raised a question on improving the design of roads to enhance road safety	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180251.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180251.htm</a>
25.11.2009	Council meeting	Hon Andrew CHENG raised a question on safety of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250138.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250138.htm</a>

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
27.11.2009	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on "Bus accident in Tseung Kwan O and safety of franchised bus operation"	CB(1)430/09-10(06)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1188/09-10  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf</a>
17.3.2010	Council meeting	Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming raised a question on health conditions of drivers and road safety	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170161.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170161.htm</a>
28.6.2010	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on "Safety of franchised bus operation "	CB(1)2316/09-10(03)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-e.pdf</a>
		Background brief on safety of franchised bus operation prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat	CB(1)2319/09-10  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2319-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2319-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's response to the KMB Staff Union	CB(1)2265/09-10(01)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-1-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's response to the New World First Bus Company Staff Union	CB(1)2265/09-10(02)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-2-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-2-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's response to the Citybus Limited Employees Union	CB(1)2265/09-10(03)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2265-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)105/10-11  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Committee	Minutes / Paper	LC Paper No.
23.2.2011	Council meeting	Hon WONG Sing-chi raised a question on drivers' driving behaviour, health problems and working and rest time arrangements	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102230104.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102230104.htm</a>
19.11.2012	-	Press Releases on fatal traffic accident in Chai Wan	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201211/19/P201211190529.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201211/19/P201211190529.htm</a>

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
26 November 2012





**范國威**

立法會議員辦事處

Office of Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai, Member of Legislative Council

范國威議員將在立法會交通事務委員會提出討論下列建議：

**推動重型車輛職業司機進行定期身體檢查**

近年發生不少司機在駕駛期間不適而昏迷的事故，部分事故更釀成交通意外，引致司機、乘客及途人傷亡，令人關注本港職業司機的身體健康狀況。現時，專營巴士、旅遊巴士、貨車、貨櫃車等重型車輛與及小巴司機工作時間長，工作時間往往接近十二小時，路面時間則長達八至十一小時，對身心做成極大壓力；鑒於職業司機健康問題直接影響乘客及道路安全，立法會促請政府盡快增撥資源，研究及制訂政策，以推動職業司機進行定期身體檢查，保障職業司機的健康及道路使用者的安全，其中包括：

- (一) 要求各專營巴士公司檢討現時車長的工作安排和人手編配，避免工時過長、休息不足及追更等因素影響車長的駕駛狀態。
- (二) 要求各專營巴士公司收緊巴士車長驗身計劃的要求和規定，例如強制把心電圖測試列為巴士車長的定期驗身項目，令驗身計劃能夠更全面和深入；同時，要求僱用重型車或小巴司機的機構推行司機驗身計劃；
- (三) 要求運輸署加強宣傳及公眾教育，使更多職業司機，包括上述重型車輛的司機、以至小巴、的士及客貨車司機更加關注及瞭解自身的健康狀況；
- (四) 研究由公營醫療部門，包括衛生署、醫院管理局等，以及勞工處的工人健康中心，為職業司機提供驗身服務；
- (五) 考慮要求職業司機於申請或續領牌照時提交驗身報告，以證明其健康狀況適合駕駛車輛；及
- (六) 研究立法要求所有職業司機均須進行定期的身體檢查，以保障道路安全及司機健康。



范國威

立法會議員辦事處

Office of Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai, Member of Legislative Council

Hon Gary Fan Kwok-wai shall raise the following suggestions for discussion at the Legislative Counsel Panel on Transport

Promote regular medical examinations for professional drivers of heavy vehicles

In recent years, many incidents were caused by drivers fell into a coma as they were feeling unwell while driving. Some incidents have also caused traffic accidents, causing drivers, passengers and pedestrians casualties, and this has led to the concern of the health of professional drivers in Hong Kong. Currently, franchised buses, coaches, trucks, container trucks and minibus drivers work for long hours, and their working hours often exceed 12 hours, and their time on the road is as long as 8 to 10 hours, which put tremendous pressure on them mentally and physically.

As the health of professional drivers directly affects passengers and road safety, the Legislative Council urges the Government to allocate more resources as soon as possible to study and formulate policies to promote regular medical examinations for professional drivers to protect the health of professional drivers and the safety of road users, in which includes:

- (1) Request franchised bus operators to review the current working arrangements and manpower arrangements of the bus captains to avoid excessive working hours, insufficient rest breaks and chasing of duties etc., factors that would affect the bus captains' driving condition.
- (2) Request franchised bus operators to tighten the rules and requirements of the medical check of bus captain, such as making electrocardiogram a regular compulsory item while bus captains have to undergo medical check, so that the medical check can be more comprehensive and in-depth; at the same time, request organizations that employ heavy vehicles or minibus drivers to implement plans for medical check;
- (3) Require the Transport Department to enhance promotion and public education so that more professional drivers, including drivers of the above-mentioned heavy vehicles, and even minibus, taxi or van drivers would pay more attention to and understand their own health conditions;
- (4) Study about the body check service provided for professional drivers by public health sector, including the Department of Health, the Hospital Authority, etc., as well as the Workers' Health Centre of the Labour Department,
- (5) Consider requiring professional drivers to submit a medical report when applying for or renewing a licence to prove that their health condition is suitable for driving a vehicle; and
- (6) Study about imposing legislation requiring all professional drivers to carry out regular body check to ensure road safety and the healthiness of the drivers.

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# 汽車交通運輸業總工會

## 對立法會交通事務委員會就 2012 年 11 月 19 日在柴灣發生的嚴重交通意外及相關事宜召開特別會議之意見書

汽車交通運輸業總工會聯同屬下四間巴士分會（九龍巴士分會、新世界巴士分會、城巴分會、龍運巴士分會）（下稱本會）對於立法會交通事務委員會於 2012 年 11 月 27 日召開 2012 年 11 月 19 日在柴灣發生的嚴重交通意外及相關事宜召開特別會議提出下述意見：

### 一、職業司機是十分注重交通安全的

首先，本會必須在這裡強調的是，所有職業巴士司機都是十分注重交通安全的。主要原因是，在各種各樣的交通意外當中，司機往往會首當其衝，成為第一個受害者，因此沒有人願意以自己的生命安全作為代價，而進行粗莽大意的駕駛工作。從另一方面來說，照顧乘客和其他道路使用者的人身安全也是每名巴士司機都具有的良知和責任，因此他們絕不願意讓其他人的生命安全受到任何威脅。不僅如此，注重乘客的安全是每名巴士司機賴以為生的最重要基礎之一。事實上，假若專營巴士經常發生交通意外的話，便會引發乘客擔心生命安全的信心危機，從而造成整體乘客量下降的問題，使專營巴士公司無以為繼和巴士司機無從謀生。由此來說，本會認為本港職業巴士司機十分注重交通安全是毋庸置疑的。

### 二、需要全面地分析造成專營巴士交通意外的多種成因

在 2012 年 11 月 19 日於柴灣道近亞公岩道發生的嚴重交通意外中，由於懷疑肇事的司機被乘客指其在駕駛巴士至上述地點期間暈倒而沒法控制車輛，因而導致三人死和五十六傷的嚴重交通意外。在這宗悲劇爆發後，社會上很多輿論都認為要加強職業巴士司機的身體檢查，以防止發生同類的事故。對此，本會深知每輛巴士都會接載著大量乘客，因此很多使用巴士服務的市民和社會人士都十分關心專營巴士的安全，並且極不願意看到專營巴士發生任何交通意外，故這種關注和要求是完全能夠理解的。事實上，在一套合理的身體檢查機制之下，的確能夠有效地防止職業巴士司機因患有各種疾病而增加發生交通意外的風險。可惜的是，一些社會人士則將巴士安全與加強司機身體檢查等同起來，並且提出頗為嚴

苛的標準，完全忽略了不少隱性和突發性疾病是無法從驗身中檢查出來和作出預防的。

其實，導致專營巴士發生交通意外的成因是頗為複雜的，而且很多因素，如道路設計、車輛設計與保養、天氣情況、公司管理、其他道路使用者的行為都是造成這些意外的主要原因。對此，許多政府官員在不同場合裡都反覆地作出類似的強調。可惜的是，社會上有些人士在有意無意間以這種孤立的態度來看待這個問題，把造成交通意外的責任都推到從事駕駛工作的巴士司機身上。顯然，這不但無助於提升本港交通安全的質素，而且對巴士司機十分不公平。

此外，本會要在此指出的是，除了不少隱性和突發性疾病是無法從驗身中檢查出來和作出預防，而且現時職業巴士司機所處的惡劣工作條件也在不斷地侵蝕他們的健康狀況。在日積月累之下，必然在很大程度上增加道路安全的危機。對此，本會認為，即使要求職業巴士司機進行更全面和深入的身體檢查，而沒有認真地改善他們工作環境，那麼要有效地提高本港專營巴士安全質素很可能只是流於空談。這不能不為社會各界人士不察。

### 三、政府在提升專營巴士安全質素方面未能對症下藥

為了減低專營巴士發生交通意外的頻率，政府一直沒有進行全面的檢討和提出更多和更有效的解決辦法，反而只是一味使用嚴刑峻罰來對待職業巴士司機。舉例來說，在現行《道路交通條例》中，危險駕駛的最高罰款額已增至 25,000 元和最長監禁期為 3 年；而危險駕駛引致他人死亡的最高罰款額則增至 50,000 元和最長監禁期為 10 年。不僅如此，從 2010 年 12 月 17 日起，政府更增設一項危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害的罰則，其最高罰款額為 50,000 元和最長監禁期為 7 年。由此來看，政府只是簡單地使用嚴刑峻罰便可以提高本港專營巴士的安全質素，只會造成相反的效果，而提高本港專營巴士安全質素也只會是緣木求魚。

然而，對於巴士司機來說，路面上的交通情況千變萬化，而且很多情況是他們難以預料和控制的，因此這使在馬路上從事駕駛工作的司機仿若在虎口謀生，心中悲苦實不足外人道。從另一方面來說，作為專營巴士公司的員工，所有司機都與資方之間建立起十分明確的僱傭關係，因此他們按照香港法例的規定，受到現行《勞工法例》的保護。可惜的是，政府不但沒有為這些司機提供良好和安穩的工作條件，反而不斷地加重刑罰，使巴士司機要在心理壓力重重的情況下工作。由此來說，政府越是提高刑罰，越是難以改善本港的交通安全質素。

在實際操作中，政府似乎沒有很好地加強監管專營巴士公司，任由其使用各種不合理的管理方式，因此在很大程度上增加前線巴士司機的工作壓力和引起更

多交通安全的變數。舉例來說，在專營巴士的編更方面，尤其是在節假日裡，資方管理層爲了壓縮車輛的停留時間，不但經常改動巴士司機的工作時間，而且「更紙」的有效時間很短，使司機經常要在「跳線」和「跳飛機」的環境下工作，因而面對著很大的適應問題。雖然本會未能提供有效數據來證明這種工作安排與發生交通意外之間存在著的關係，但是據不少會員的反映，這顯然會增加他們遇到交通意外的機率。

此外，在道路設計和交通燈號的管理方面，政府也生搬硬套地沿用一些海外經驗，而沒有依照香港的實際情況來改良和重新規劃。事實上，在很多情況下，受到香港路少車多和生活節奏快速的影響，不少乘客經常會在車輛行駛的期間站立和準備下車。然而，對於巴士司機來說，這無疑增加他們工作上的難題，尤其是在交通燈號轉換期間，使他們被迫要面對一個兩難的局面。換言之，也就是他們如果即時停車的話，很可能造成乘客跌倒或撞傷的安全問題。如果他們將車輛繼續向前開駛的話，則很可能得不到執法人員的諒解，面對著不遵守交通燈號的檢控。對於這個問題，本會早在多年前已經多番向政府提出建議，希望政府改善現時的交通燈號管理措施，如加設交通燈號倒計器或閃動裝置等。可惜的是，政府對廣大司機的良好願望置若罔聞，一直沒有落實有效的改善措施，爲所有司機提供一個良好的駕駛環境。

#### 四、資方採用的高壓管理方式增加道路安全隱憂

近年來，專營巴士公司一直對員工採用多種無理的高壓管理手法，尤其在巴士司機不幸遇到交通意外後，資方經常在司法機關還沒有作出明確的裁決之前，便立即使用開除、停薪休假、各種警告等手段，使員工雪上加霜，生計頓失依靠。不僅如此，當司機因發生交通意外而要面對司法機關的起訴時，資方亦沒有負起作爲僱主的應有責任，提供法律援助給這些司機，協助他們面對這種艱難的處境。由於資方使用這種卸責的態度，使巴士司機不但沒有體會到資方的關懷，而且在駕駛工作時感到壓力重重。

此外，爲了維持最大的經營利潤，專營巴士公司近年也「努力地」壓縮不同路線的行車時間。事實上，由一個巴士總站開達另一個巴士總站之間的行車時間往往會受到交通擠塞、乘客人數的多寡、年長和傷殘人士的需要而有所不同。可惜的是，資方管理層選擇性地忽略這些情況，沒有與司機們進行良好的溝通，提出一些未能符合實際情況的要求，徒增巴士司機的工作壓力。由此可見，由於資方使用這種缺乏關懷的管理手法，使廣大巴士司機被迫要在一個很不安穩的環境下工作，故無從提升他們的士氣和歸屬感，亦無助於改善本港的交通安全質素。

## 五、應從更廣層面來提升專營巴士的營運安全

儘管政府在過往多年裡為提升專營巴士的營運安全開展了不少工作，如確保車輛設計及構造符合安全標準、要求專營巴士公司加強車輛的保養及維修、提供更多的訓練及教育予巴士司機、重視巴士司機能夠得到合理的休息時間、敦促專營巴士公司提供促進巴士安全的方法和鼓勵措施、以及落實其他有關道路及乘客安全的改善措施等，但是從實際情況來說，這些工作的內容過於零碎，而且沒有從一個更為宏觀的層面來看待和處理整個問題，使改善專營巴士的營運安全缺乏成效。對於這個問題，本會認為政府必須從更廣層面來開展工作，主要建議有以下幾個方面：

### 1. 制定全面的交通運輸業政策

隨著社會經濟的發展步伐不斷加快，本港十分需要制定一套全面的交通運輸業政策，才能滿足廣大市民在交通方面日益增加的需求，以及更加有效地提升整體的營運安全質素。然而，政府在過往多年裡，一直沒有因應實際情況而制定相關政策。更甚者，政府近年在交通運輸政策上出現不少失誤，造成業界運作混亂不斷加劇的現象。在這種情況下，本港多種交通工具在缺乏定下良好的規劃和指引下，只能掙扎求存，同時給本港專營巴士的營運安全埋下很多不穩定的變數。對此，本會認為政府的當務之急是制定一套全面的交通運輸業政策，才能滿足香港社會不斷發展的需要。

### 2. 平衡鐵路發展對其他交通工具的衝擊

從近期的情況來看，受到政府過急和過度發展鐵路的影響，本港專營巴士遇到生存空間極大窒礙的問題。可惜的是，政府在落實鐵路發展的同時，並沒有提出未雨綢繆的構想，處理好其他交通工具從業員的生存空間和出路問題。對於這種情況，本會認為廣大職業巴士司機深有體會，而社會人士亦可以清楚地看到政府操之過急地發展鐵路所造成的負面影響。不過，本會在此再次強調的是，政府如果想提高當前專營巴士營運安全質素的話，則必須深入地探討和平衡鐵路發展對其他交通工具的衝擊，才能有效地達成這項目標。

### 3. 檢討現時交通和勞工法例

對於廣大受聘於專營巴士公司的司機來說，他們理應受到現行《勞工法例》

的保護。然而，當司機遇到交通意外時，他們往往被無情地摒棄在勞工法例之外，遭到嚴厲的檢控和處罰，情形極為不公平。對此，本會認為，在提升本港道路安全的大前提下，政府應當及早地檢討現時交通和勞工法例，修補其間所存在的灰色地帶，並為廣大巴士司機提供一個良好的職業保障，使他們能夠安心地工作。相反來說，如果政府不落實這方面檢討和改善工作的話，那麼巴士司機便被迫要在心理壓力重重的條件下工作，增加道路安全的變數。

#### 4. 改善現時道路交通的配套設施

從巴士司機的日常駕駛工作來說，他們每天都要經過很多交通燈號。然而，由於香港路少車多，再加上政府多年來都沒有致力改善現時的道路交通配套設施，使巴士司機在處理交通燈號轉換的問題時，都感到頗大的心理壓力。對於這個問題，本會早在多年前已經多番向政府提出建議，希望政府能夠改善現時的交通燈號管理措施，如加設交通燈號倒計器或閃動裝置等。本會認為，只有政府全面地改善這些配套設施，才能為所有司機提供一個良好的駕駛環境，有效地降低交通意外的頻率。

#### 5. 加強監管專營巴士公司的運作

由近年情況來看，政府似乎對於專營巴士公司採取縱容的態度，使其管理層窺準現時勞工階層在勞動力市場處於較為被動的時機，任意使用一些無理的管理手法，因而在更大程度上加大巴士司機的工作壓力，同時增加整體營運安全的隱憂。事實上，本會對於這種現象，早在許多場合裡都要求有關政府部門及早跟進。可惜的是，政府官員依然我行我素，使問題越來越嚴重，而巴士司機的工作亦日益艱難。對此，本會要求，政府必須加強監管專營巴士公司的運作，使其善待員工，並為他們提供一個良好的工作環境，從而改善整體的營運安全質素。

汽車交通運輸業總工會

2012年11月27日





# **Motor Transport Workers General Union**

## **Letter of advice on the special meeting held by the Legislative Council Panel on Transport in regard to the serious traffic accident occurred in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012 and its related issues**

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Motor Transport Workers General Union and its four bus branches (namely KMB Branch, New World Bus Branch, Citybus Branch and Long Win Bus Branch) (hereinafter referred to as the “Union”) jointly make the following remarks towards the special meeting held by the Legislative Council Panel on Transport on 27 November 2012 regarding the serious traffic accident occurred in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012 and its related issues:

### **1. Professional drivers attach great attention to traffic safety**

First of all, what the Union must emphasize here is that all professional bus drivers attach great attention to traffic safety, mainly due to the fact that drivers are always be the first to bear the brunt in any kind of traffic accidents. Therefore, no one is willing to drive recklessly at the expense of their own safety. On the other hand, taking care of the personal safety of passengers and other road users is also the moral responsibility that every bus driver should have. As a result, they are absolutely not willing to put the lives of others at risk. In addition, paying attention to the safety of passengers is one of the most important duties of bus drivers. Indeed, if traffic accidents associated with franchised buses often take place, it will trigger a crisis of confidence in passengers who are concerned about their personal safety. As a result, decline in overall patronage will cause an adverse impact on the operation of franchised bus companies, and many drivers may consequently lose their jobs. From this point of view, the Union considers that professional bus drivers in Hong Kong would undoubtedly attach great attention to traffic safety.

### **2. It is necessary to analyze the multiple causes of traffic accidents associated with franchised buses in a comprehensive manner.**

As to the serious traffic accident occurred at Chai Wan Road near A Kung Ngam Road on 19 November 2012, the driver involved lost control of the bus as he was suspected to be fainted while driving to the above location. As a result, three people died and 56 were injured in this serious traffic accident. Following the tragedy, quite a few public opinions considered that physical examination of professional bus drivers must be strengthened to prevent the reoccurrence of similar accidents. In this regard, the Union realizes that each bus carries a large patronage. Therefore, many citizens and members of the public that frequently use bus services are very concerned about the safety of franchised buses and extremely reluctant to see further accidents associated with them. Reasons behind such concerns and requirements are fully understandable. In fact, as long as a

reasonable check-up mechanism is in place, it is possible to effectively lower the risk of traffic accidents caused by various diseases of professional bus drivers. Nevertheless, it is a pity that some members of the public have equated bus safety with reinforcing medical checkups of drivers and put forward strict standards. It completely ignores the fact that many hidden and acute illnesses can hardly be found out during checkups, and no preventive actions can be adopted.

In fact, causes of traffic accidents associated with franchised buses are quite complicated. Many factors, such as road design, vehicle design and maintenance, weather conditions, corporate management and behaviors of other road users, are also the main reasons leading to these kinds of accidents. In this regard, many Government officials have repeatedly made similar remarks on different occasions. However, it is a pity that some members of the public have looked at this issue in an isolated manner, either knowingly or unknowingly, and shirked all the responsibility for causing traffic accidents to bus drivers. Apparently, this would not help us enhance safety of local transportation services, but on the contrary, would lead to unfair treatment to bus drivers.

In addition, the Union wishes to point out here that, except for many hidden and acute illnesses which can hardly be diagnosed during checkups and prevented, health status of professional drivers has been deteriorated by poor working conditions nowadays. As time passes, it will inevitably lead to substantial increase in the risk faced by road users. In this regard, the Union believes that even if professional bus drivers are required to conduct more comprehensive and in-depth physical examinations, effective safety enhancement of franchised bus services in Hong Kong is still likely to be mere idle talk on the assumption that no genuine improvement is made to bus drivers' working conditions. Such problem should not be overlooked by members of the community.

### **3. The Government fails to suit the remedy to the issue of improving safety of franchised bus services.**

In order to reduce the frequency of traffic accidents associated with franchised buses, the Government has only imposed strict penalties on professional bus drivers, instead of conducting a comprehensive review and put forward more effective solutions. For example, under the existing Road Traffic Ordinance, the maximum fine for dangerous driving has been increased to \$25,000 and the maximum imprisonment for which is 3 years; and the maximum fine for dangerous driving causing death has been increased to \$50,000 and the maximum imprisonment for which is 10 years. Apart from that, with effect from 17 December 2010, a new offence "dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm" has been introduced by the Government, with a maximum fine of \$50,000 and a maximum imprisonment of 7 years. From this point of view, if the Government simply uses harsh penalties to improve the safety of local franchised bus services, it would only give rise to counter-effects and just be a fruitless exercise to improve the safety of franchised bus services in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of bus drivers, traffic conditions on roads are ever-changing, and mostly unpredictable and out of their control. Accordingly, this leaves drivers on tenterhooks,

and the mental stress they experience are beyond the understanding of outsiders. On the other hand, as employees of franchised bus companies, all drivers have established a very clear employment relationship with their employers. Therefore, in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong, they are protected by the existing Labour Legislation. Unfortunately, the Government does not provide these drivers with decent and stable working conditions. Instead, it continues to impose heavier penalties, which generates considerable psychological pressure on bus drivers. From this point of view, the heavier penalties the Government imposes, the more difficult it is to enhance traffic safety in Hong Kong.

Practically, it seems that the Government has not properly strengthened its supervision of franchised bus companies, and casually allows these companies to adopt unreasonable management approaches. As a result, work pressure on front-line bus drivers has been greatly increased, causing increasing uncertainties to traffic safety. For example, in regard to rostering exercises, management of franchised bus companies frequently reschedule the working hours of bus drivers, especially on holidays, for the purpose of shortening the idle time of buses. Moreover, since the valid period of “duty notice” is very short, drivers are often required to serve “alternative route” and drive “unfamiliar vehicle”, which would result in severe adaptation problems. Even though the Union is not able to provide valid data for proving the relationship between the said work arrangement and the probability of traffic accidents, yet such arrangement will apparently increase the possibility of traffic accidents, according to the feedback received from many members.

Furthermore, in terms of road design and traffic signal management, the Government follows some overseas practices blindly, without further improvement and re-planning in accordance with the actual situation of Hong Kong. In many cases, due to the high vehicle flow and limited roads in Hong Kong, as well as the fast tempo of local people’s life, many passengers often stand and rush to get off while buses are in motion. However, this will undoubtedly increase job-related difficulties of bus drivers, especially for being put in a dilemma at the time of traffic light switching. In other words, that is, if they make an abrupt stop, bus passengers are very likely to fall or get injured. If they continue to move forward, it is very likely that they will be subject to prosecution for failing to obey traffic signals, without receiving any understanding from law enforcement officials. Regarding this issue, the Union made multiple proposals to the Government many years ago, with the hope that the Government would improve the existing management measures for traffic signals, either by installation of countdown or flashing devices. Regrettably, the Government turns a deaf ear to the aspirations of numerous drivers and has failed to implement effective improvement measures to provide a decent driving environment for all drivers.

#### **4. High-handed management by the bus companies heightens concerns about road safety**

In recent years, franchised bus companies have been employing a variety of unreasonable and high-handed management practices towards their employees. In particular, if a bus driver unfortunately gets involved in a traffic accident, their employers often take disciplinary actions,

including immediate dismissal, unpaid leave and warnings, against them before a clear ruling is made by judicial authorities, which exacerbates the plights of these drivers by depriving their means of livelihood. Furthermore, whenever a driver faces prosecution initiated by a judicial body because of any traffic accident, bus companies have not assumed the due responsibility as an employer to provide legal aid to those drivers and help them tide over the difficult times. Given the responsibility-shirking attitude of bus companies, bus drivers have to work under very stressful conditions without feeling any care from their employers.

In addition, in order to maximize operating profit, franchised bus companies have "strived to" shorten travelling time of different routes in recent years. In fact, the travelling time from one terminus to another can be easily varied by factors including traffic congestion, the number of passengers, needs of the elderly and the disabled, etc. Nevertheless, it is a pity that management of bus companies selectively ignore these situations, do not commence effective communication with drivers, as well as put forward some requirements regardless of actual conditions, which exert additional work pressure on bus drivers. Hence, the ruthless management practices adopted by bus companies put numerous drivers under an insecure working environment. As a result, the morale and sense of belonging of bus drivers, as well as traffic safety in Hong Kong, can hardly be enhanced and improved.

## **5. Operational safety of franchised bus services should be enhanced from a broader perspective**

The Government has launched a series of initiatives to improve the operational safety of franchised bus services over the years, such as ensuring that vehicular design and structure are in compliance with safety standards, requiring franchised bus companies to strengthen the maintenance and repair of vehicles, provide more training and education to bus drivers, concerning whether bus drivers can get sufficient rest time, urging franchised bus companies to provide methods and encouragement measures to promote bus safety, as well as implementing other improvement measures associated with road and passenger safety. Notwithstanding, from a practical point of view, particulars of these measures are too fragmented, and the entire problem has not been looked at and dealt with at a macro level, making it less effective to improve the operational safety of franchised bus services. To address this issue, the Union believes that the Government must commence its work from a broader perspective. Our key recommendations are follows:

### **1. Formulate comprehensive policy for transport industry**

With the accelerating pace of socio-economic development in Hong Kong, it is very necessary to formulate a comprehensive set of policies for transport industry, in order to meet the growing needs of general public in transportation, as well as enhance the overall operational safety in a more effective manner. However, over the years, the Government has not formulated relevant policies in

light of the actual situation. Worse still, the Government has made a lot of mistakes in transport policy in recent years, leading to increasingly chaotic situation in the industry. Under such circumstances, transport operators in Hong Kong have to struggle for survival in the absence of good planning and guidelines. Meanwhile, it has sowed the seeds of uncertainty in the operational safety of local franchised bus services. In this regard, the Union believes that the most urgent task for the Government is to formulate a comprehensive set of policies for the transport industry, so as to meet the needs of continuous socio-development of Hong Kong.

## **2. Strike a balance between railway development and its impact on other modes of transport**

Judging from the recent situation, the room for survival of franchised bus companies in Hong Kong has been seriously stifled, due to the hasty and excessive railway development by the Government. Unfortunately, at the time of pursuit of railway development, the Government has not proposed forward-looking ideas and properly dealt with problems associated with survival space and exit paths of practitioners engaged in other transportation services. The Union believes that professional bus drivers would have profound understanding of this situation, and the general public can now clearly see the negative impact of hasty railway development by the Government. Nevertheless, the Union wishes to stress once again that if the Government wants to improve the operational safety of franchised bus services, it must give deep thought to and strike a balance between railway development and its impact on other modes of transport, so as to ensure effective achievement of the said goal.

## **3. Conduct a review of the existing traffic and labour legislations**

As to numerous drivers hired by franchised bus companies, they should be protected by the existing Labour Legislation. However, when a driver gets involved in any traffic accident, they are often mercilessly excluded from the protection of Labour Legislation and subject to severe prosecution and punishment, which is extremely unfair. In view of this, the Union believes that under the premise of enhancing road safety in Hong Kong, the Government should conduct a review of the existing traffic and labour legislations as early as possible, make remedies to the grey areas in-between, as well as provide job security for numerous bus drivers, so that they can work without worries. On the contrary, if the Government does not conduct a review and put forward improvement measures in this area, bus drivers would have to work under enormous psychological pressure, which in turn casts further uncertainties on road safety.

## **4. Improve existing road transport facilities**

During their daily working hours, bus drivers have to drive through many traffic light intersections. However, due to the high vehicle flow and limited roads in Hong Kong, as well as the

fact that the Government has not been making efforts to improve the existing road transport facilities over the years, bus drivers are put under considerable psychological pressure at the time of traffic light switching. In order to address this issue, the Union made multiple proposals to the Government many years ago, with the hope that the Government would improve the existing management measures for traffic signals, either by installation of countdown or flashing devices. The Union believes that all drivers would be provided with a decent driving environment and thus the frequency of traffic accidents would be effectively reduced only when the Government improves these ancillary facilities in a comprehensive manner.

## **5. Strengthen the supervision of operation of franchised bus companies**

Judging from the circumstances in recent years, it seems that the Government has been giving its connivance to franchised bus companies, which allows their management to adopt unreasonable management practices at the time when the working class is in a relatively passive position in the labour market. As a result, bus drivers are put under greater work pressure, while concerns about overall operational safety are also heightened. In fact, the Union has requested relevant government departments to make timely follow-up on many occasions, in order to address this situation. Regrettably, government officials still stick to their own way. Accordingly, the problem has now become increasingly serious, and bus drivers have to shoulder a heavier work burden. In this regard, the Union requires the Government to strengthen supervision of the operation of franchised bus companies and ensure that these companies treat their staff well and provide them with a decent working environment, so as to improve the overall operational safety.

**Motor Transport Workers General Union**  
**[chopped: Motor Transport Workers General Union]**

27 November 2012

For discussion on  
27 November 2012

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Occupational Safety and Health of Professional Drivers**

### **Purpose**

This paper briefs Members on measures taken by the Labour Department (LD) to improve the occupational safety and health (OSH) of professional drivers, and the protection of professional drivers under the current legislative regime.

### **Background**

2. The Occupational Safety and Health Council (OSHC) has conducted a survey on the health conditions of professional drivers which reveals that professional drivers are required to work in small cabins for a long period of time, lack stretching exercise and have irregular meal time. In addition, some drivers take diets high in calories and have smoking habit, and are susceptible to diseases like high blood pressure, high cholesterol and heart diseases in the long run.

3. Besides, some Members raised concern about the risk of driving work of professional drivers, and requested the Government to consider extending the coverage of the Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance (OSHO) to professional drivers' driving work, so as to enhance the OSH of professional drivers.

### **Improvement Measures**

4. LD collaborated with OSHC and relevant workers' unions to promote OSH messages among professional drivers last year, with the main themes including prevention of musculoskeletal disorders and heat stroke at work. Apart from distributing OSH information leaflets and souvenirs during visits to their workplaces, we collaborated with the Hong Kong Physical Fitness Association to organise fitness exercise workshops for professional drivers to encourage them to perform fitness exercise regularly to prevent musculoskeletal disorders.

5. As the living and eating habits of professional drivers may lead to various health problems, LD collaborates with the Department of Health (DH) and OSHC this year to launch a series of activities with ‘Change for Health’ as the main theme. We make use of the following channels to disseminate to professional drivers the health messages of balanced diet, regular exercise, smoking cessation and less drinking, as well as prevention of heat stroke:

- (a) Outreach visits - We pay visits to public transport interchange areas or stations of buses, taxis, public light buses and trams, etc, factory loading areas and container terminals together with representatives of relevant workers’ unions. We distribute OSH information materials and souvenirs to professional drivers, and promote OSH messages directly to them.
- (b) Radio publicity - As professional drivers often listen to the radio at work, LD collaborates with the Radio Television Hong Kong to broadcast OSH tips after the traffic news to remind professional drivers to pay attention to OSH.
- (c) Publicity videos - We show publicity videos on mobile advertising media on board public transports to remind professional drivers to pay attention to occupational health, do stretching exercise regularly, and drink plenty of water in the hot summer.
- (d) OSH courses - An “Occupational Safety and Health of Professional Drivers” course is organised by OSHC to assist professional drivers to reduce accidents caused by work.
- (e) Health talks - Health talks on “Healthy Living of Professional Drivers” are delivered by representatives from LD and DH during gatherings of the motor transport industry.

6. LD is planning to collaborate with OSHC and relevant workers’ unions, and invite the Hong Kong Dietitians Association and Hong Kong Physical Fitness Association to launch a publicity campaign on healthy lifestyle and diet for professional drivers. The aim of this campaign is to provide counselling by professionals to encourage professional drivers to have healthy diet and perform



exercise regularly, so as to reduce the various health problems arising from living and eating habits. Besides, we plan to collaborate with individual bus companies, tram and coach companies to organise healthy lifestyle promotional activities to directly promote healthy living and diet to their professional drivers.

## **Legislative Regulatory Framework**

7. We have reviewed the existing legislation relating to professional drivers. The Road Traffic Ordinance (RTO) covers road safety issues concerning all drivers (including professional drivers). These include the design and maintenance of vehicles and roads, drivers' driving skills, the use of vehicle security devices, and the behaviour of other road users. The Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations regulate the construction and maintenance of vehicles, including safety after alteration and driver's accommodation providing adequate protection against bad weather; the Road Traffic (Safety Equipment) Regulations regulate the safety equipment of vehicles (such as seat belts); as well as the Road Traffic (Traffic Control) Regulations and the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations, etc.

8. In view of the scope of the provisions of the RTO, the OSHO does not cover the driver's seat of a vehicle. Nevertheless, the OSHO safeguards employed drivers' OSH while they are carrying out non-driving work, especially when their employers can reduce their risk of injury in a reasonably practicable manner in situations under their employers' control, such as providing the drivers with a safe and healthy working environment, and with appropriate tools for work involving manual labour or repetitive movements. Indeed, it is difficult for employers of professional drivers to fully ensure the occupational safety of drivers while they are driving, as drivers' driving attitude, road conditions and the behaviour of other road users are beyond their control in a reasonably practicable manner.

## **Way Forward**

9. LD will continue to collaborate with OSHC, other relevant Government departments and workers' unions of the industry to proactively promote the improvement of OSH of professional drivers.

Labour and Welfare Bureau  
Labour Department  
November 2012

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(1)1641/12-13  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB1/PL/TP/1

**Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of special meeting held on  
Tuesday, 27 November 2012, at 8:30 am  
in Conference Room 2 of the Legislative Council Complex**

- Members present** : Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP (Chairman)  
Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai (Deputy Chairman)  
Hon LEE Cheuk-yan  
Hon James TO Kun-sun  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon Ronny TONG Ka-wah, SC  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung  
Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP  
Hon NG Leung-sing, SBS, JP  
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming  
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH  
Hon CHAN Han-pan  
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki  
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH  
Hon TANG Ka-piu  
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-kwok, BBS, MH, JP  
Hon Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun, BBS, MH, JP  
Hon Tony TSE Wai-chuen
- Members absent** : Hon CHAN Hak-kan, JP  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip  
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP  
Hon CHUNG Kwok-pan

**Public Officers attending : Agenda item I**

Prof Anthony CHEUNG, GBS, JP  
Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Andy CHAN  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)

Mrs Ingrid YEUNG, JP  
Commissioner for Transport

Miss Cindy LAW, JP  
Assistant Commissioner/Administration &  
Licensing  
Transport Department

Mr LEUNG Tak-fai  
Assistant Commissioner/Technical Service  
Transport Department

Miss Rachel KWAN  
Principal Transport Officer/Bus and Railway  
Transport Department

Mr CHEUNG Chi-hoi  
Regional Highway Engineer/Urban  
Highways Department

Mr David LEUNG, JP  
Deputy Commissioner (Occupational Safety and  
Health)  
Labour Department

**Attendance by invitation : Agenda item I**

Mr TANG Wah-shing  
Executive Director  
Occupational Safety & Health Council

Mr Samuel CHENG  
Managing Director  
New World First Bus Services Limited

Mr William CHUNG  
Head of Operations  
New World First Bus Services Limited

Mr Vincent FUNG  
Senior Engineering Support Manager  
New World First Bus Services Limited

Mr Kenrick FOK  
Operations Director  
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

Ms Vivien CHAN  
Corporate Affairs Director  
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

Mr HO Chi-man  
Head of Depots  
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

Motor Transport Workers General Union New  
World Bus Branch

Mr CHAN Shu-ming  
Director

Kowloon Motor Bus Workers General Union

Ms CHU Siu-hung  
Chairman

Motor Transport Workers General Union K.M.B.  
Branch

Ms CHENG Wai-kwan  
Director

Motor Transport Workers General Union L.W.B.  
Branch

Mr CHEUNG Tsz-kei  
Director

New World First Bus Company Staff Union

Mr LAM Kam-piu  
理事長

Motor Transport Workers General Union

Mr LAM Tin-fu  
Deputy Secretary

Citybus Limited Employees Union

Mr TANG Sin-hing  
Chairman

The K.M.B. Staff Union

Mr CHAN Yee-chuen  
理事

Long Win Bus Staff Union

Mr LAU Kee-wai  
理事

Motor Transport Workers General Union City Bus  
Branch

Mr WONG Ka-lok  
Director

**Clerk in attendance:** Ms Sophie LAU  
Chief Council Secretary (1)2

**Staff in attendance :** Mr Andy LAU  
Assistant Secretary General 1

Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (1)2

Ms Clara LO  
Legislative Assistant (1)9

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Action

**I The serious traffic accident happened on 19 November 2012 in Chai Wan and the related issues**

- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| (LC Paper<br>CB(1)205/12-13(01) | No. - Administration's paper on<br>"The serious traffic accident in<br>Chai Wan on 19 November 2012"   |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)223/12-13(01)  | No. - Administration's paper on<br>"Occupational safety and health of<br>professional drivers"   |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)205/12-13(02)  | No. - Background brief on "Safety of<br>franchised bus operation and safety<br>of long downhill roads" prepared<br>by the Legislative Council<br>Secretariat |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)192/12-13(01)  | No. - Letter dated 19 November 2012<br>from Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki  |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)192/12-13(02)  | No. - Letter dated 19 November 2012<br>from Hon Christopher CHUNG<br>Shu-kun   |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)205/12-13(03)  | No. - Joint letter dated 20 November<br>2012 from Hon WONG<br>Kwok-hing, Hon TANG Ka-piu<br>and Hon KWOK Wai-keung   |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)205/12-13(04)  | No. - Letter dated 20 November 2012<br>from Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai  |
| LC Paper<br>CB(1)234/12-13(01)  | No. Submission from Hon Gary FAN<br>Kwok-wai)  |

Meeting with deputations and the Administration

The Chairman said that a serious traffic accident had taken place in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012 involving two buses and a taxi and this had aroused extensive public concern on the health and driving attitudes of professional drivers, particularly bus captains. At the request of fellow

members and trade unions, this special meeting was called to discuss the issues concerned. In addition to relevant Government Bureaux and departments, representatives of the Occupational Safety & Health Council ("OSH Council"), The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") and New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), and relevant staff unions of franchised bus companies were invited to attend the meeting. The Chairman also remarked that some workers unions of other transport modes had expressed interest to attend the meeting. However, given the considerable number of workers unions in the public transport sector, he had decided that only workers unions of franchised bus companies were invited to keep the discussion more focused.

2. Upon invitation, Secretary for Transport and Housing ("STH") and Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") gave a brief account on the Administration's paper [LC Paper No. CB(1)205/12-13(01)] which set out:

- (a) the Administration's investigation into the traffic accident and follow-up actions;
- (b) the details of the health check and working hour arrangements for bus captains of franchised bus companies;
- (c) the road design and road safety measures at the road section concerned; and
- (d) the Administration's follow-up actions on road safety of road-based public transport modes.

3. Deputy Commissioner (Occupational Safety and Health) ("DC(OSH)") of the Labour Department ("LD") also briefed members on the measures taken by LD to improve the occupational safety and health ("OSH") of professional drivers, and the protection of professional drivers under the current legislative regime.

4. The Chairman then invited representatives of the workers unions attending the meeting to express their views.

*Motor Transport Workers General Union New World Bus Branch*

5. Mr CHAN Shu-ming said that the bus captain of NWFB involved in the bus accident ("the NWFB captain") had been driving large coaches since 1984. He was understood to be health conscious, did not smoke and drink, and would sometimes do physical exercises. Mr CHAN considered that the



bus accident was unrelated to the working hours of the NWFB captain, who was on leave one day before the bus accident and was assigned only about 8.5 working hours on the day of the bus accident. The bus accident happened shortly after the tea break. Mr CHAN added that according to the management of NWFB, the captain concerned had successfully passed the health check arranged by NWFB in July 2012. Noting from the press reports that the NWFB captain was unconscious suddenly in the course of driving, Mr CHAN considered that the bus accident was beyond the control of the NWFB captain.

*Kowloon Motor Bus Workers General Union*

6. Ms CHU Siu-hung considered the health check provided by KMB acceptable. She said that at present, bus captains aged 50 years or more were required to undergo annual health checks, whereas for bus captains aged 60 or more, an electrocardiogram ("ECG") was also required. She said that bus captains were generally health conscious as they knew that their health conditions would possibly endanger the lives of a large number of passengers. However, attack of hidden or sudden illnesses was beyond the control and expectation of bus captains.

*Motor Transport Workers General Union K.M.B. Branch*

7. Ms CHENG Wai-kwan highlighted that bus captains were in fact under great pressure in respect of the possible responsibility to bear criminal consequences in case of traffic accident, or to a lesser extent, complaints lodged by passengers, tight bus schedule and the busy road traffic. She pointed out that such pressure would adversely affect the health conditions of bus captains. Ms CHENG said that although she was not opposed to enhancing the health check arrangements for bus captains, she considered that such measure would be costly and might not guarantee that bus captains would not suddenly faint.

*Motor Transport Workers General Union L.W.B. Branch*

8. Mr CHEUNG Tsz-kei cited two examples explaining that some hidden illnesses could not be easily identified by health checks and the current health check arrangements by Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") was already very effective. Pointing out that there were many possible causes of traffic accidents, for instance, bus captains' hidden illnesses, the life style or driving attitudes of individual bus captains, and stressful working conditions, Mr CHEUNG considered that the public should not just focus on the bus captains' health check because health check alone

could not solve the problem.

*NWFB Company Staff Union*

9. Mr LAM Kam-piu criticized the current transport policy because it had not addressed the traffic congestion problem in Hong Kong. He said that bus captains were facing high pressure from busy road conditions, tight bus schedule, and complaints from the public. He considered that the Guidelines on Bus Captain's Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks ("the Guidelines") adequate and flexible. He said that he did not object to strengthening the health check arrangements for bus captains and any programmes which might benefit bus captains' health.

*Motor Transport Workers General Union  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)234/12-13(02))*

10. Mr LAM Tin-fu considered that professional drivers attached great importance to road safety to prevent traffic accidents, which would not only put drivers' own safety at risk but also endanger passengers and other road users. Sharing the view of other deputations, he considered that strengthening the health check arrangements was not a panacea for enhancing road safety, as some hidden or sudden illnesses could not be easily identified.

11. Mr LAM was concerned that the tense working environment of bus captains, the strict management style of bus companies, and penalties for different traffic offences, had put great pressure on bus captains and affected their health, hence posing risks to road safety. He considered it unfair that bus captains were not protected from the relevant labour legislations in case of traffic accident. He urged the Administration to request bus companies to treat bus captains well, review the current grey areas of the relevant labour and traffic legislations, and to improve the traffic flow in Hong Kong.

*Citybus Limited ("Citybus") Employees Union*

12. Mr TANG Sin-hing said that the Union would not object to Citybus' plan to seek professional advice on requiring bus captains of the age of below 60 to take ECG. He pointed out that under the current Guidelines, the working hours of bus captains could be long or short, and swapping of duties were allowed. He hoped that the working hours of bus captains could be more evenly spaced. He also said that although bus companies were required to submit a report to the Transport Department ("TD") every three months on the implementation of the Guidelines, staff unions were not

informed of the content of the report. He complained that there was no channel for staff unions to reflect to the Government their views on the working conditions of bus captains.

*The K.M.B. Staff Union*

13. Mr CHAN Yee-chuen considered that the NWFB captain concerned should not be solely responsible for the bus accident as he might be suffering from hidden illness caused by pressure at work. He also reckoned that health check might not be able to identify hidden illnesses. Mr CHAN hoped that bus companies would communicate with staff unions with a view to understanding their hardship at work.

*LW Bus Staff Union*

14. Mr LAU Kee-wai said that although it was stipulated in the Guidelines that there should be a break of not less than 10 hours between successive working days, such a guideline did not take into account the sleeping and travelling time required by bus captains in between. He stressed that bus captains were under great pressure which would affect their driving attitudes. He also criticized that the meal break for bus captains very often did not follow the human biological clock, and there were insufficient rest times during working hours.

*Motor Transport Workers General Union City Bus Branch*

15. Pointing out that the health check arrangements for bus captains had been implemented for more than ten years, Mr WONG Ka-lok considered such arrangements effective. Mr WONG added that as there were in fact traffic accidents involving other modes of transport, he considered it unfair to single out the health problem of bus captains.

Health check arrangements for bus captains/professional drivers

16. Dr KWOK Ka-ki considered that bus companies should not be given discretion in arranging health checks for bus captains. He pointed out that people with heart diseases or other diseases were getting younger and younger and the morbidity rate of heart diseases for those in occupations like drivers was high. He advised that the majority of heart diseases could hardly be identified by resting ECG, unless treadmill stress test or other precise tests were used. He considered that the Administration should consult experts on the requirements of more stringent health checks for bus captains. Mr Ronny TONG raised similar concern.

17. STH replied that the Administration was aware of the public's concern about the health check arrangements by bus companies. He advised that the items covered in the health checks were currently determined by individual bus companies with similar scope. The Administration was open-minded to the arrangements and the bus companies would consult the medical sector on how the current mechanism could be improved. Staff unions of the bus captains would be consulted too.

18. Mr Samuel CHENG, Managing Director of NWFB ("MD/NWFB") and Mr Kenrick FOK, Operations Director of KMB ("OD/KMB") added that NWFB and KMB were also open-minded on the arrangements of health checks. At the moment, they were consulting medical practitioners and experts on how the current arrangements could be improved.

19. Mr POON Siu-ping asked for information on the number of traffic accidents caused by bus captains suffering from unconsciousness while driving. Noting that a detailed health check would be very expensive, he asked whether the Administration would consider subsidizing the fees for medical check-up taken by professional drivers.

20. STH said that there was only a small number of past cases in which the bus captain had become unconscious while driving. He added that there was no clear definition of professional drivers. If they were meant to be holders of driving licence for commercial vehicles, the number would be in the order of 1.3 million. Nevertheless, he took note of Mr POON's suggestion of subsidizing the fees for medical check-up taken by professional drivers.

### The Guidelines

21. The majority of members was dissatisfied with the existing Guidelines and urged the Administration to review them expeditiously. Members particularly pointed out that the following arrangements were very undesirable:

- (a) the prolonged working hours of bus captains, who were required to perform a maximum duty for as long as 14 hours, and driving duty for as long as 11 hours in a working day;
- (b) the insufficient rest time for bus captains, who very often had to give up their rest times in order to make up for the time lost in traffic congestion;

- (c) the insufficient break time of 10 hours between successive working days, which had not taken into account the time required for bus captains to travel from home to the workplace;
- (d) the practices of the so-called "route-hopping" and "vehicle-hopping", in which a bus captain was assigned to work on more than one route or even to drive different models of buses on a single shift; and
- (e) the practices of arranging bus captains to work on two split shifts, one in the morning and the other in the evening, to avoid granting the paid meal-hour.

22. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan referred to paragraph 17 of the Administration's paper [LC Paper No. CB(1)205/12-13(01)], which mentioned that TD would, in conjunction with franchised bus companies, review the arrangements of health checks for bus captains. He commented that the Administration was not working hard to address the health problems of bus captains at root. He urged the Administration to work out measures to strengthen the health of bus captains by dealing with the issue of rest time and made the following suggestions:

- (a) bus captains should be given at least five minutes break between two bus journeys;
- (b) within a six-hour duty, bus captains should have rest times totalling 30 minutes; and
- (c) one-hour meal break should be allowed for bus captains.

23. C for T responded that although the Guidelines did not specify the duration of break between two bus journeys, there was a provision that bus captains should have rest times totalling 20 minutes within 6-hour duty of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first four hours of duty; and a rest time of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty. She said that bus companies were required to report to TD the implementation of the above provision in their regular report.

24. STH invited members to note that the arrangements specified in the Guidelines were the minimum requirements which the bus companies should comply. According to the actual figures, the average maximum duty hours of bus captains in a working day were 10 hours and the average driving duty hours were 8.3 hours. He undertook that the Administration would review

the Guidelines in conjunction with stakeholders, including franchised bus companies and their staff unions. He added that TD was liaising with major staff unions of the bus captains to discuss the problems arising from the recent accident.

25. Mr TANG Ka-piu suggested that hourly-paid bus captains should be excluded when calculating the actual duty and driving hours, otherwise, the figures would be unable to reflect the true picture. He also declared that he was the Deputy Secretary of Motor Transport Workers General Union.

26. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung considered the current Guidelines too loose, which had encouraged bus companies to only meet the minimum requirements. He made the following suggestions:

- (a) the specified working time for bus captains in the Guidelines should be reduced and any overtime work of bus captains should be paid;
- (b) the Administration should consult the staff side when revising the Guidelines;
- (c) the Administration should introduce legislation regulating the working hours, rest times and meal breaks of bus captains; or alternatively, clearly specify them in the bus franchise;
- (d) bus companies should set up a fund for the public to monitor their services;
- (e) information relating to the implementation of the Guidelines by bus companies should be made open;
- (f) punishment should be imposed on bus companies for non-compliance of the Guidelines, for example, those companies should not be allowed to increase their fares; and
- (g) the Administration should make reference to overseas practices in respect of working conditions of bus captains and review the effectiveness of existing arrangements, and report the study outcome to the Panel.

Mr Ronny TONG shared with Mr LEUNG on item (c) above.

27. STH expressed that he had taken note of the concerns of members in respect of the working hours of bus captains, and assured members that the Administration would take appropriate follow-up actions. He added that franchised bus companies were required to follow the Guidelines and report the implementation to TD regularly. STH supplemented that the Administration would from time to time make reference to the practices of overseas countries in reviewing the working conditions of bus captains.

28. Mr CHAN Han-pan raised the following enquiries:

- (a) apart from the regular report submitted by bus companies on the implementation of the Guidelines, whether the Administration would verify if bus companies had strictly followed the Guidelines, if so, how;
- (b) whether there was any punishment for not adhering to the Guidelines; and
- (c) whether TD had received complaints from bus captains concerning the non-compliance of the Guidelines and if so, what follow up actions had been carried out by TD.

Mr LEE Cheuk-yan raised the same enquiry on item (c) above.

29. In response, C for T replied that:

- (a) apart from requiring bus companies to submit a report every three months on the implementation of the Guidelines, every year, TD would also engage an independent party to conduct a survey on the working hours of bus captains without giving any prior notice to the bus company concerned;
- (b) TD had received individual views from bus captains regarding the implementation of the Guidelines. If non-compliance was identified, TD would require explanations and corresponding adjustments from the bus companies concerned. The department would also remind them of the requirement of full compliance;
- (c) in case of serious non-compliance, the bus companies concerned would be warned for its failure to provide proper and efficient bus services. In this regard, TD would follow up the matter

according to the relevant clauses laid down in the bus franchises;  
and

- (d) as indicated by the report of the survey done in 2011, the compliance situation of the Guidelines was satisfactory. So far, there was no serious non-compliance case which required serious punishment.

30. Mr POON Siu-ping expressed concern on whether there was adequate communication between the Administration and bus captains, particularly on the implementation of the Guidelines. C for T replied that TD had held meetings with bus captains' staff unions and views were exchanged on their working hours. She said that TD welcomed any suggestions or views concerning the working conditions of bus captains and was willing to communicate with staff unions in respect of the implementation of the Guidelines.

31. Mr Christopher CHUNG declared that his brother was a retired bus captain. He requested the Administration to look into how franchised bus companies had been treating their bus captains. He highlighted that bus captains were indeed under enormous working pressure whilst their salary was as low as about \$8,000 to \$9,000. In order to earn more for a living, bus captains had to work overtime. In addition, bus captains were subject to deduction of allowance when they received public complaints. He criticized that franchised bus companies only pursued profit margins by increasing the number of bus routes without recruiting more bus captains; and attributed the prolonged working hours, high working pressure and low salary as reasons for failing to recruit bus captains. Mr WU Chi-wai shared similar views.

32. STH reiterated that the Administration would examine the working hours of bus captains in reviewing the Guidelines. He added that franchised bus companies were regulated by bus franchises, and the Administration also attached importance to the occupational safety of bus captains and road safety.

Measures to solve the traffic congestion problem to ease the pressure on bus captains

33. Some members, including Dr KWOK Ka-ki, Mr WU Chi-wai, Mr Frankie YICK and Mr Christopher CHUNG, urged the Administration to implement effective measures in addressing the traffic congestion problem, and to actively pursue the bus route rationalisation. Mr WU Chi-wai



considered that the Administration should endeavour to solve the difficulties encountered in implementing bus route rationalisation instead of putting the blame on District Councils ("DCs") for rejecting the relevant plans. He asked if the Administration had prepared any concrete schedule in carrying out the relevant work.

34. In response, STH said that the Administration had been pursuing the rationalisation of bus routes. However, it should be noted that suggestions of cancelling bus routes were sometimes met with strong resistance during district consultation. As rationalising bus routes involved the interests of different stakeholders, the Administration would thoroughly discuss the relevant plans with them. He added that following the commissioning of new transport infrastructure, the Administration would study how public transport services could be rationalised. He added that the Administration hoped to adopt a more strategic and macro approach in pursuing bus route rationalisation.

35. Mr Christopher CHUNG pointed out that among the bus routes on the Hong Kong Island, the fares of cross-harbour routes were higher than that of parallel routes. He considered that the fares of those cross-harbour routes should be reduced to enhance their patronage. STH noted his view.

36. The Chairman and Mr Frankie YICK hoped that DCs would cooperate with the Administration and franchised bus companies in the implementation of the bus route rationalisation with a view to improving the overall traffic conditions.

#### Legislative protection for professional drivers

37. Mr WONG Kwok-hing expressed his condolences and sympathy for the victims of the traffic accident. He expressed concern that the OSH Ordinance (Cap. 509) ("OSHO") did not provide protection to professional drivers and asked whether and when the Administration would review OSHO to include them. He also said that although OSHO safeguarded employed drivers' OSH while they were carrying out non-driving work, there were many bus or public light bus drivers who were self-employed. Mr WONG asked whether the Administration would also extend the scope of OSHO to cover self-employed drivers. Mr TANG Ka-piu recalled that in response to a Council question raised by Mr WONG in late 2011, the Secretary for Labour and Welfare had undertaken to review the existing OSH arrangements for professional drivers.

38. DC(OSH) said that Mr WONG's concern had been raised and discussed at a meeting of the Panel on Manpower ("Manpower Panel") in the Fourth Legislative Council. He reported that LWB had submitted a paper to report to the Manpower Panel the progress of reviewing the existing legislation relating to professional drivers in June 2012. DC(OSH) said that the safety of professional drivers was governed by relevant provisions of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) ("RTO") in the context of road safety. Subsequent to the bus accident and in the light of Mr WONG's concern raised at this meeting, he said that LD would examine the matter again by taking into account the investigation report of the bus accident and report the outcome to the Manpower Panel in due course. He noted that the investigation was still in progress, and hence there was not yet a concrete timetable for the review.

39. In respect of the protection for self-employed captains, DC(OSH) said that the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) did not cover self-employed persons. If employment-related legislations were to be amended to include self-employed persons, it would be a major departure from the policy objectives of the legislation and would also have far-reaching implications on a wide range of issues.

40. Mr WONG Kwok-hing was dissatisfied with DC(OSH)'s response that LWB would conduct the review after the investigation report of the bus accident had been finalized. He emphasized that his concern was related to the protection of all professional drivers in Hong Kong and not to a single event. He urged the Administration to address the problem that professional drivers were not protected under OSO and commented that the report submitted to the Manpower Panel in June 2012 had not addressed the problem. DC(OSH) noted the views of Mr WONG and said that lessons might be drawn from the bus accident.

41. Mr TANG Ka-piu and Mr WU Chi-wai shared similar views with Mr WONG Kwok-hing. Mr TANG criticized that there was no legislation, no statistics and no protection in respect of the professional drivers. He elaborated that:

- (a) OSO, which spelt out the employers' role in providing a safe and healthy workplace, excluded professional drivers from protection. As such, employers had no responsibility to consider how prolonged driving would affect the health of professional drivers;

- (b) both LD and Social Welfare Department were unable to provide breakdown of statistics relating to professional drivers on the number of work-related injuries, occupational diseases, and claims under the "Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme" ("TAVAS"); and
- (c) self-employed captains, like the deceased taxi driver in the bus accident, were not protected in traffic accidents. Although they could apply for TAVAS, such application took time and the amount of death grant would be subject to the number of dependants.

Mr TANG urged LD to follow up the above three areas and come up with some proposals for reporting to the Manpower Panel within the current legislative session.

42. In response, DC(OSH) said that professional drivers were protected under various ordinances. Apart from RTO and OSHO mentioned in paragraphs 37 and 38, the Employees' Compensation Ordinance was applicable to employed professional drivers.

#### Other views and concerns

43. Mr Ronny TONG asked whether the Administration would set up an expert panel to examine the health check arrangements and working hours of bus captains. He recalled that an expert panel was set up to review the above items subsequent to the serious traffic accident happened on Tuen Mun Road in 2003. Noting Mr TONG's suggestion, STH undertook that TD would seriously examine the health check arrangements and working hours of bus captains in conjunction with the bus companies no matter whether an expert panel would be set up.

44. Mr TANG Ka-piu expressed concern over the air quality inside the bus compartment. He said that there were anonymous complaints that the ventilation systems of some buses were disabled to reduce electricity consumption. He asked if it was true or not. He also pointed out that given the overall poor air quality in Hong Kong, even if the ventilation system was enabled, the air quality inside bus compartment would not be improved. He opined that the air quality of bus compartment would also affect the health of bus captains.

45. Mr Vincent FUNG, Senior Engineering Support Manager of NWFB, said that the air-conditioning system in buses was an automatic system and

filters were provided for the system. As such, good air quality in bus compartment was always maintained.

46. Mr WU Chi-wai considered that the Administration should study the prevalence of occupational diseases among professional drivers and consider amending the list of disease or physical disability specified in the First Schedule of the Regulation 9(1) of the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations (Cap. 374B), which required an applicant for a driving licence to make a declaration if he was suffering from any specified disease or physical disability. STH agreed to study Mr WU's suggestion.

47. In response to Mr Christopher CHUNG's enquiry, MD/NWFB confirmed that income generated from advertisements in NWFB's buses and leasing of vacant bus depot were included in NWFB's franchise account. Ms Vivien CHAN, Corporate Affairs Director of KMB also said that income generated from advertisements in KMB's buses, which amounted to about \$100 million annually, was included in KMB's franchise account to subsidize bus fares.

48. At the invitation of the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman briefed members on his submission tabled at the meeting [CB(1)234/12-13(01)]. In brief, the Deputy Chairman suggested that the Administration should allocate additional resources to study and formulate policies to motivate professional drivers to undergo regular medical check-ups to safeguard their health as well as the safety of road users. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan expressed support for the suggestion made by the Deputy Chairman.

#### Summing up

49. The Chairman thanked all parties who had attended the meeting. He concluded that members generally expressed concern on the health check arranged by franchised bus companies for bus captains. In addition, members considered that the Administration should review the operation of franchised bus services, bus captains' rest times, working hours and remuneration, as well as measures to improve the existing traffic network. He called on the Administration to take into account the views expressed by members.

**II Any other business**

50. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 10:35 am.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
31 July 2013

**For discussion on  
14 December 2012**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

**Fare Increase Application from  
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

**Purpose**

The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) has submitted an application for a fare increase. Representatives from KMB will brief Members on the details at the panel meeting on 14 December 2012. This paper provides information on the mechanism that the Administration would follow to assess the fare adjustment application, as well as KMB’s service performance since its last fare increase and the focus of its service development in the future.

**Fare Increase Application from KMB**

2. KMB submitted an application on 29 November 2012 for an average fare increase of 8.5%. KMB last increased its fare on 15 May 2011 by an overall average rate of 3.6%.

**Bus Fare Adjustment Arrangement**

3. According to section 13(1) of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230), the scale of fare of franchised bus service is determined by the Executive Council (“ExCo”). As pointed out by the Administration in its Legislative Council Brief issued in January 2006, in assessing franchised bus fare adjustment applications, the Administration would not set any guaranteed minimum level or ceiling of rate of return. Instead, it would take into account a basket of factors which include:

- (a) changes in operating costs and revenue since the last fare adjustment;
- (b) forecasts of future costs, revenue and return;
- (c) the need to provide the operator with a reasonable rate of return.

The Administration would make reference to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of the bus industry in considering the reasonable rate of return;

- (d) public acceptability and affordability. The Administration would make reference to changes in Median Monthly Household Income (“MMHI”) and Composite Consumer Price Index (“CCPI”);
- (e) service performance; and
- (f) a formula for a supportable fare adjustment rate for reference by the Administration:

$$\begin{aligned} &0.5 \times \text{Change in Nominal Wage Index for the Transportation} \\ &\quad \text{Section (“WI”) + 0.5 x Change in CCPI} \\ &\quad - 0.5 \times \text{Productivity Gain} \end{aligned}$$

4. The Administration will make reference to the aforementioned basket of factors, as well as take into account view of Members of the Panel on Transport and the Transport Advisory Committee (“TAC”) before submitting its recommendation to ExCo.

5. It is noteworthy that the formula outcome under paragraph 3(f) above is only for reference by the Administration. The fare level will not be adjusted automatically according to the formula outcome. Separately, to assess the financial performance of the bus operators, our consideration is to ensure that they will have sound financial capability in maintaining quality public bus service.

6. Based on the latest available WI and CCPI<sup>1</sup>, the outcome of the formula is +4.34%<sup>2</sup>. In the mean time, MMHI has since the last fare increase gone up by 7.14%<sup>3</sup> and the change in CCPI is +5.46%<sup>4</sup>. These figures are for illustration only for the time being. When making a recommendation to ExCo,

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<sup>1</sup> Changes in WI for the period of June 2011 to June 2012 and CCPI for the period of May 2011 to October 2012.

<sup>2</sup> Detailed calculation is as follows:

$$0.5 \times 3.22\% + 0.5 \times 5.46\% - 0.5 \times 0\% = +4.34\%$$

As approved by ExCo in 2009, the value of productivity gain in the formula has been set at zero until the next review.

<sup>3</sup> From the second quarter of 2011 to the third quarter of 2012.

<sup>4</sup> From May 2011 to October 2012.

we would report the latest statistics available at the time.

### **Operation of KMB**

7. As at end September 2012, key information of KMB's operation was as follows:

	<b>KMB (a)</b>	<b>All franchised bus companies (b)</b>	<b>(a) over (b)</b>
<b>Number of Routes</b>	375	567	66%
<b>Fleet</b>	3,841 buses	5,770 buses	67%
<b>Staff</b>	About 12,000 persons	About 18,000 persons	67%
<b>Patronage during the first three quarters in 2012 (as compared with the same period in 2011)</b>	2.56 million (+0.1%)	3.80 million (+1.0%)	67%

The average age of KMB's fleet is about 11 years old, which is similar to that of the franchised bus fleet in Hong Kong.

### *Performance of KMB*

8. The Transport Department ("TD") has been monitoring the quality and quantity of KMB's bus service, taking into account objective indicators such as the findings of passenger satisfaction surveys and site surveys, complaint figures and accident rates. The assessment is as follows:

- (a) In terms of safety, KMB's accident rate was 2.85 accidents per million vehicle-km in 2011, vis-à-vis an industry average rate of 4.08 for the same period. Up to end-September 2012, basically all KMB's buses have already been equipped with black boxes to help monitor drivers' performance and investigate accidents when they happen.
- (b) On the environmental front, 82% (about 3,100 buses) of KMB's fleet is of Euro II or above emission standard as at end-September 2012. The



remaining 710 Euro I buses will all be phased out by end 2015, and the Euro II ones by end 2019. To further cut particulate emission, KMB has completed retrofitting diesel particulate filters on all its Euro II and Euro III buses. KMB is working with the Environmental Protection Department on the trial to retrofit these buses with selective catalytic reduction devices to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides. KMB is also testing the use of hybrid and electric buses.

- (c) According to the passenger satisfaction surveys on KMB's service, passengers are generally most satisfied with drivers' compliance with traffic regulations, travelling speed and driving skills, and most dissatisfied with frequency and reliability of services.
- (d) The Transport Complaints Unit of TAC received 2,100 complaints and suggestions in 2011 on KMB (about 55% of all franchised bus-related complaints and suggestions). The figure in 2012 is 2,504 up till end-September (about 57% of all franchised bus-related complaints and suggestions). About half of the complaints and suggestions received from 2011 to end-September 2012 on KMB are on "regularity of service".
- (e) KMB's lost trip rate was 8.0% in 2011, primarily a result of shortage of bus drivers and more congested traffic situation. The Administration has been very concerned about KMB's lost trip situation and has warned KMB to take effective remedial actions in different areas, including bus captain recruitment. With a more aggressive recruitment drive, the lost trip rate has come down notably. The figure was 3.22% in September 2012. TD will continue to closely monitor the situation.

#### *Focus of future service development*

9. With a growing operating cost and competition from other public transport modes, KMB has implemented various measures to enhance efficiency. Key tasks are to improve its bus network and rationalize bus routes to increase cost effectiveness, reduce wastage, alleviate pressure to increase fare, and lower roadside emission.

10. Whether improvement in bus network and route rationalization could be successfully implemented would hinge on the support of districts and the community. TD together with KMB is working hard to map out appropriate proposals.

**Advice Sought**

11. Members are invited to note the above and comment on the fare increase application made by KMB.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
December 2012**



# 香港鐵路職員工會

HONG KONG RAILWAY EMPLOYEES UNION

(香港工會聯合會屬會)

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HKREU 文件 2013 年第 02 號

致立法會交通事務委員會：

## 倒車安全問題

你好，大棠巴士總站（Tai Tong Bus Terminus），位於元朗區十八鄉僑興路近黃泥墩村。由於大棠總站沒有足夠空間讓巴士掉頭，港鐵巴士 K66 線駛進總站時須先轉左，然後倒車才可停靠總站（可以參考 youtube 片 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWDW5iv5aGE>）。

有關地點在數年來巴士倒車時，曾發生交通意外，慶幸沒有嚴重傷人意外發生。就以上地點之公眾安全問題，本會收到多名會員要求改善大棠巴士總站建議，而且已經多次在公司常規會議中提出。本會訴求非常清晰，在未能改善大棠巴士總站設計問題前，應盡快找另一位人員在地面協助引道、提醒行人及其他司機，方可進行巴士倒車。

好可惜，公司每一次回覆都是以很難聘請人員為理由，只能在日間部份時段安排人手協助，非繁忙時段要車長自行睇尾，本會對於港鐵公司這種對公眾安全不負責任的做法感到十分遺憾，完全忽略對公眾安全負責之重要性。巴士倒車之安全問題是公司管理層責無旁貸的事，更不應將責任加諸在巴士車長身上。

既如這樣，本會特致函 貴委員會，希望透過 貴委員會與港鐵公司進行磋商，討論有關港鐵巴士倒車必需對公眾安全負責的問題，要求在未能改善大棠巴士總站設計問題前，必需盡快全日安排人手睇尾，以確保行人及其他司機安全。

祝

身體健康、工作順利



香港鐵路職員工會

主席 梁志剛

電話：

二零一三年一月十六日

副本呈送

勞工界立法會議員 鄧家彪先生

CB(1)442/12-13(01) (16 January 2013) Submission on the safety of reversing vehicles from the Hong Kong Railway Employees Union

To the Panel of Transport of the Legislative Council,

**Safety Issues Regarding the Reversing Vehicles**

Hello, Tai Tong Bus Terminus is located at Tai Tong Shan Road, Shap Pat Heung, Yuen Long District, next to Wong NaiTunTsuen. Since there is not enough space for buses to reverse at the Tai Tong Bus Terminus, MTR bus K66 needs to turn left upon entering the terminus, and then reverse, to stop at the terminus.(please refer to youtube video <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWDW5iv5aGE>).

There have been traffic accidents in the relevant area during the reversing of buses, although luckily none of them has been severe. Regarding public safety in the abovementioned location, this union has received requests from many union members regarding the improvement of the terminus, which have been ventilated during company meetings. This union's requests are very clear—before and until improvements are made to the terminus, there should be someone on the ground assisting and reminding pedestrians and other drivers, to enable the reversing of buses.

Regrettably, the company has only employed a staff to do so during part of the daytime operation hours, citing the difficulty in employing staff as the reason. During the non-peak hours, the bus captains still need to watch out themselves. This union expresses deep regret over the MTR Company's irresponsible practice towards public safety, which has completely neglected its duty towards public safety. The question of reversing of buses is the company's non-delegable duty, and that duty cannot be thrust upon the hands of the bus captains.

As such, this union has written to this Panel, hoping that this Panel would negotiate with MTR on the issue of reversing vehicles. We demand that before improvements are made to the terminus, that there must be staff looking after the [reversing of buses], so that the safety of pedestrians and other drivers can be safeguarded.

We wish you good health and best of luck with work.

Hong Kong Railway Employees Union

Leung Chi Kong

Chairman

16 January 2013

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局

運輸科  
香港添馬添美道 2 號  
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**Transport and  
Housing Bureau**  
**Government Secretariat**  
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本局檔號 Our Ref. TTB(T)L2/1/66  
來函檔號 Your Ref. CB1/PL/TP

13 March 2013

Clerk to Panel on Transport  
(Attn: Ms Sophie Lau)  
Legislative Council  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong

Dear Sophie,

**Panel on Transport**  
**Submission on Transport Matters**

I refer to your letter dated 16 January 2013 on the submission from the Hong Kong Railway Employees Union on the safety of reversing buses in Tai Tong Bus Terminus. Please find our bilingual response in the Appendix. Sorry about the delay.

(Bernadette Lam)  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

Encl.

c.c. MTR Corporation Limited (Attn.: Ms Lilian Yeung)

附件

**港鐵巴士 K66 綫於大棠站的倒車安全事宜**

運輸及房屋局在收到香港鐵路職員工會於 2013 年 1 月 16 日致立法會交通事務委員會的來信後，已轉交港鐵公司跟進。港鐵公司與運輸署的代表於 2013 年 1 月 31 日到大棠站實地視察後，已於一月底開始安排職員每天駐守大棠巴士站，協助巴士車長掉頭。根據港鐵公司的觀察，有關安排運作暢順。

**Appendix****Safety of Reversing Buses of MTR Route K66  
at Tai Tong Bus Terminus**

The Transport and Housing Bureau, after receiving the letter from the Hong Kong Railway Employees Union to the Legislative Council Panel on Transport dated 16 January 2013, has forwarded to the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) for follow up. Representatives from MTRCL and the Transport Department conducted site inspection at the Tai Tong Bus Terminus on 31 January 2013. Starting from late January, MTRCL has arranged staff to station at the Tai Tong Bus Terminus daily to assist bus drivers on reversing buses. According to MTRCL's observation, the arrangement has been working smoothly.



## **CHAPTER 2**

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
Hong Kong Police Force  
Information Services Department**

**Administration of road safety measures**

**Audit Commission  
Hong Kong  
28 March 2013**

*This audit review was carried out under a set of guidelines tabled in the Provisional Legislative Council by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee on 11 February 1998. The guidelines were agreed between the Public Accounts Committee and the Director of Audit and accepted by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.*

Report No. 60 of the Director of Audit contains 8 Chapters which are available on our website at <http://www.aud.gov.hk>

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# ADMINISTRATION OF ROAD SAFETY MEASURES

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# ADMINISTRATION OF ROAD SAFETY MEASURES

## Executive Summary

1. Road traffic accidents can have a devastating impact on the victims and their families. While Hong Kong's traffic fatality rate has declined in recent years and is one of the lowest in the world, there were 15,894 traffic accidents in 2012, resulting in 120 deaths and 20,090 injuries. In recent years, the Transport and Housing Bureau, with the assistance of the Transport Department (TD) and the Hong Kong Police Force (Police), has introduced a number of new measures to tackle improper driving behaviours and promote safer vehicle operation. The Audit Commission (Audit) has conducted a review of the administration of these road safety measures.

### Measures to tackle drink driving

2. *Implementation of random breath tests.* Alcohol affects the central nervous system, blunting perception and coordination and impairing one's ability to detect risk. Studies have shown that drivers who have consumed alcohol have a much higher risk of involvement in accidents than those who have not consumed alcohol. In 2008, the Road Traffic Ordinance was amended to empower the Police to conduct random breath tests on drivers without the need for reasonable suspicion that they have consumed alcohol, with effect from February 2009. Audit examination revealed that from February 2009 to December 2012, 42% of the Police's random breath tests were conducted during the daytime, with an average arrest rate per test of 0.11% which was significantly lower than the 0.75% during the nighttime. In Audit's view, a risk-based tasking of the tests is important to ensure the cost-effective use of the limited enforcement resources. Given that the tests would also cause inconvenience to the motorists, there is a need to administer the tests judiciously (paras. 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.11).

3. *Enforcement of the three-tier penalty legislation.* According to medical evidence, the risk of causing an accident increases with the increase of blood alcohol

## Executive Summary

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level in a driver. In December 2010, the law was amended to provide a three-tier penalty system in proportion to drivers' alcohol concentration levels. A driver will be charged with a drink driving offence if he fails both a screening breath test conducted at roadside and an evidential breath test at a police station. From January to October 2012, 744 drivers were arrested for failing the screening breath tests. However, 182 of them were released and 215 were charged with a lighter offence as their alcohol concentrations had dropped to lower levels by the time the evidential breath tests were taken. Audit sample check revealed that additional travelling time was incurred for conducting the evidential breath tests because some police stations for reporting arrests were not equipped with test devices and there were breakdowns of the test devices in some cases (paras. 2.15, 2.16 and 2.18 to 2.20).

### Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping

4. Speeding and red light jumping are common traffic offences in Hong Kong that could result in grave consequences. In 2012, there were 266,250 and 55,815 prosecutions relating to speeding and red light jumping offences respectively. With their 24-hour surveillance functions, the speed enforcement camera system and red light camera system are the key enforcement tools (paras. 3.2 and 3.8).

5. *Operation of enforcement camera systems.* The deterrent effect of the present speed enforcement camera system is localised as some drivers may increase speed after passing the system. In 2007, the Administration commenced studying the feasibility of using an average speed camera system to influence driver behaviour over a greater distance, like on highways. The system has been used in other countries since 1999. However, as of February 2013, the Administration only planned to launch a trial of the system in 2013-14. As regards the red light camera system, Audit noted that of the 22,871 red light jumping cases detected from October to December 2012, 2,109 (9%) could not be pursued because the images of the offending vehicles were blocked by other vehicles. Moreover, for both enforcement camera systems, the photographs taken only showed the offending vehicles' identity but not that of the offending drivers. There were cases that the registered owners of the vehicles failed to identify the offending drivers. As the effectiveness of both enforcement camera systems as enforcement tools depends on the prosecution evidence they can provide, there is a need to find measures to further improve the systems, drawing on overseas experience where appropriate (paras. 3.9 to 3.14 and 3.17).



### Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

6. Public light buses (PLBs), taxis and franchised buses are an integral part of the public transport system. From 2007 to 2011, the accident involvement rates of these vehicles were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (paras. 4.2, 4.37, 4.44 and 4.45).

7. *Measures for PLBs.* The Administration has introduced a package of measures to enhance the safety operation of PLBs including the passenger seat belt legislation in 2004 and measures for regulating the travelling speed of PLBs in 2012. For the passenger seat belt requirements, PLBs in use before the 2004 legislation are exempted. As at 31 December 2012, of the 4,350 PLBs, 1,815 (42%) were not fitted with seat belts and 2,535 (58%) were fitted with seat belts. To protect passenger safety and to enable PLB passengers to form consistent habits of wearing seat belts, the TD needs to work towards applying the seat belt requirement to all PLBs. PLB passengers are required by law to wear a seat belt if available. However, as reflected by the number of summonses issued against PLB passenger seat belt offence, there was little improvement in the seat belt wearing rate from 2007 to 2012. There is a need to step up enforcement and publicity efforts on promoting the wearing of passenger seat belts on PLBs (paras. 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.16, 4.19 and 4.32).

8. *Measures for taxis.* Besides the passenger seat belt legislation in 2001, in April 2003, the Administration informed the Legislative Council Panel on Transport of a proposal to improve the quality of taxi services. The proposal included a mandatory pre-service training programme to improve safe driving knowledge and attitude of prospective taxi drivers. However, the proposal had not been taken forward thereafter. Audit noted from the Police's enforcement statistics that the total number of speeding offences committed by taxi drivers had increased by 23% from 25,338 in 2007 to 31,258 in 2012. In terms of the number of speeding offences per 1,000 vehicles over the period 2007 to 2012, the speeding problem of taxis was more serious than that of PLBs and franchised buses. The situation calls for additional measures to enhance the safety operation of taxis (paras. 4.38 to 4.41).

9. *Measures for franchised buses.* To enhance the safety operation of franchised buses, the maximum speed of a franchised bus is restricted by law to 70 kilometres per hour. On the request of the TD, the franchised bus operators have also enhanced their safety arrangements including requiring their drivers aged

## Executive Summary

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50 or above to undergo annual health checks. Between June and November 2012, there were three serious franchised bus traffic accidents in which the bus drivers concerned were reported to have lost consciousness at the times of the accidents. In November 2012, the Administration undertook to review the arrangements of health check for franchised bus drivers. Based on Internet research, Audit has found that the Mainland and a number of overseas countries have stipulated in their laws more stringent health check requirements for taxi and bus drivers than the existing legislative requirements in Hong Kong which cover all drivers (paras. 4.45 to 4.48 and 4.50).

### Accuracy of traffic accident data

10. *Traffic accident locations.* The Police is responsible for investigating traffic accidents and inputting accident data into its computerised database which is linked with that of the TD. The TD uses computer sorting of traffic accident data to help compile a list of accident black spots. The traffic accident location is identified using a grid reference system. Due to inaccurate input of grid references, the TD has to spend extra time and resources to rectify the problem. There is also a risk that the timeliness of accident black spot data could be compromised. In Audit's view, prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that the grid references for traffic accident locations are correctly input in the first place (paras. 5.2 to 5.4 and 5.13).

11. *Traffic accident contributory factors.* The TD relies on the traffic accident contributory factors input by the Police for identifying problems of road environment, road users and driving behaviour, and formulating strategies to tackle specific types of accidents. In a sample check of the accident contributory factors input for 50 traffic accident cases, Audit found that 13% of the input factors were inaccurate and there was no record of supervisory check for the 50 cases. There is a need to tighten management control in this regard (paras. 5.17, 5.20 and 5.21).

### Publicity and education programmes

12. The Road Safety Council organises publicity and education programmes to disseminate road safety messages. A variety of publicity and advertising means are employed including the broadcast of announcements in the public interest (APIs) on television. In 2011 and 2012, the broadcast of an API for combating drug

## Executive Summary

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driving was shelved and another one for promoting safe cycling was temporarily withheld respectively after receiving complaints about their contents. There is a need to draw lessons from these cases to prevent recurrence of similar problems (paras. 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 and 6.6).

### Audit recommendations

13. **Audit recommendations are made in the respective sections of this Audit Report. Only the key ones are highlighted in this Executive Summary. Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should:**

#### *Measures to tackle drink driving*

- (a) **conduct an overall review of the random breath test operations taking into account the observations made in this Audit Report (para. 2.13(b));**
- (b) **streamline the breath test procedures with a view to improving the effectiveness in enforcing the three-tier penalty legislation (para. 2.25);**
- (c) **complete the current testing of the mobile evidential breath test device as soon as possible and make an early decision on the way forward in providing suitable and adequate equipment for implementing the drink driving breath tests (para. 2.25(a));**

#### *Measures to promote safer vehicle operation*

- (d) **in conjunction with the Road Safety Council, step up the enforcement and publicity efforts on promoting the wearing of passenger seat belts on PLBs (para. 4.32);**

#### *Accuracy of traffic accident data*

- (e) **tighten up procedures and supervisory control to ensure the correct input of grid references for traffic accident locations (para. 5.14(a));**

## Executive Summary

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- (f) **tighten management control to improve the accuracy of accident contributory factors input (para. 5.22); and**

### *Publicity and education programmes*

- (g) **in conjunction with the Road Safety Council, tighten controls to ensure that road safety API contents are critically checked (para. 6.8).**

14. **Audit has also *recommended* that the Commissioner for Transport should:**

### *Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping*

- (a) **in conjunction with the Commissioner of Police, expedite action on the trial scheme of the average speed camera system (para. 3.18(a));**
- (b) **in conjunction with the Commissioner of Police, explore measures to improve the effectiveness of the present enforcement camera systems, drawing on overseas experience where appropriate (para. 3.18(b));**

### *Measures to promote safer vehicle operation*

- (c) **in conjunction with the Director of Environmental Protection, make greater efforts to encourage owners of diesel PLBs to participate in the upcoming incentive scheme for the early replacement of their vehicles with cleaner models fitted with passenger seat belts (para. 4.31(a));**
- (d) **explore other measures to encourage owners of the liquefied petroleum gas fuelled PLBs without passenger seat belts to retrofit their vehicles with seat belts (para. 4.31(b));**
- (e) **consider the need for introducing additional measures to enhance the safety operation of taxis (para. 4.42(a)); and**

## **Executive Summary**

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- (f) **take into account the health check requirements on taxi and bus drivers adopted by the Mainland and other countries in the ongoing review of measures to ensure the road safety of franchised buses and other major road-based public transport modes (para. 4.52(a)).**

### **Response from the Administration**

- 15. The Administration agrees with the audit recommendations.



## PART 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 This PART describes the background to the audit and outlines the audit objectives and scope.

### *Background*

1.2 Road traffic accidents can have a devastating impact on the victims and their families, regardless of whether they are drivers, passengers or pedestrians. While Hong Kong's traffic fatality rate has declined in recent years and is one of the lowest in the world, the Government has continued to promote road safety through a three-pronged approach: traffic engineering and management measures, legislation and enforcement, and publicity and education.

1.3 The Transport and Housing Bureau has overall policy responsibilities on road safety matters. The Transport Department (TD) assists the Bureau in introducing road traffic legislation and formulating road safety measures. The Hong Kong Police Force (Police) is responsible for enforcing road traffic laws. Both the TD and Police have input to educate the public on road safety. Moreover, the Road Safety Council, established in 1983, is a government advisory body (consisting of government officials and community members from various professions appointed by the Secretary for Transport and Housing) to coordinate road safety activities in Hong Kong (Note 1).

1.4 For 2012-13, the Police's estimated expenditure on its Road Safety Programme was \$1,405 million which mainly covered the staff cost to support traffic enforcement. The TD's expenditure on road safety could not be readily ascertained as such work formed parts of three wider Programme areas, i.e. the Planning and Development Programme, the Licensing of Vehicles and Drivers Programme and the District Traffic and Transport Services Programme. The

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**Note 1:** *The Road Safety Council is chaired by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Operations) with members drawn from seven government bureaux and departments (including the Transport and Housing Bureau, the TD and the Information Services Department) and six non-governmental organisations (including the transport associations). It is supported by two committees, viz. the Road Safety Campaign Committee and Road Safety Research Committee.*

## **Introduction**

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2012-13 estimated expenditures for these Programmes were \$299 million, \$270 million and \$382 million respectively.


### **Traffic accident trends**

1.5 Hong Kong recorded a drop in traffic accident fatalities (from 160 in 2007 to 120 in 2012) and serious injuries (from 2,533 in 2007 to 2,521 in 2012) in recent years. However, the number of accidents increased by 4% from 15,315 in 2007 to 15,894 in 2012 and the number of slight injuries increased by 4% from 16,932 to 17,569 over the same period (see Figure 1).



Figure 1

**Traffic accident and casualty trend  
(2007 to 2012)**



Source: TD records

Remarks: According to the TD's classification, "Deaths" refer to those who sustained injuries and died within 30 days of an accident. "Serious injuries" refer to those hospitalised for more than 12 hours. Injuries causing death 30 or more days after an accident are also included in this category. "Slight injuries" refer to those requiring roadside attention and hospitalisation for less than 12 hours.

## Introduction

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
1.6 The occurrence of traffic accidents could be attributed to many different factors. According to the TD's records, on average, driver contributory factors (Note 2) accounted for 79% of the traffic accidents during the six years from 2007 to 2012. To illustrate the accident involvements of different vehicle types, the TD uses two commonly adopted measures i.e. traffic accident involvement rates per 1,000 vehicles and accident involvement rates per million vehicle-kilometres. The involvement rates for franchised buses, public light buses (PLBs) and taxis were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (see Figures 2 and 3).

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**Note 2:** *Examples of driver contributory factors are driving too close to vehicle in front, driving inattentively, exceeding speed limit and disobeying traffic signal/light.*

Figure 2

**Accident involvement rates per 1,000 vehicles  
(2007 to 2012)**




Legend: ◆ Franchised buses  
● PLBs  
■ Taxis  
◆ All motor vehicles

Source: TD records

Remarks: The accident involvement rates are calculated using the number of vehicles as at mid-year. As at mid-2012, there were 5,837 franchised buses, 4,344 PLBs, 18,128 taxis and 639,705 units of all types of licensed motor vehicles.

Figure 3

Accident involvement rates per million vehicle-kilometres  
(2007 to 2011)



Legend:   
◆ Franchised buses   
● PLBs   
■ Taxis   
◆ All motor vehicles

Source: TD records

Remarks: For 2012, the accident involvement rate for franchised buses was 4.28 per million vehicle-kilometres. As at March 2013, the TD had not compiled the 2012 accident involvement rates per million vehicle-kilometres for other types of vehicles. In 2011, the vehicle-kilometres travelled were 511 million for franchised buses, 367 million for PLBs, 2,305 million for taxis and 12,344 million for all motor vehicles.

## New road safety measures in recent years

1.7 As part of its efforts to enhance road safety, the Government has introduced the following new measures to tackle improper driving behaviours and enhance the safety of PLB operation in recent years:

- (a) ***Measures to tackle drink driving.*** In 2008, the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) was amended to empower the Police to conduct random breath tests on the alcohol levels of drivers not involved in traffic accidents (starting from February 2009). In December 2010, a three-tier penalty system (i.e. heavier penalty for a higher alcohol level) took effect as a further deterrent to drink driving;
- (b) ***Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping.*** In 2008 and 2012, the TD obtained \$47 million and \$48 million funding for expanding the enforcement camera systems for the Police to tackle the problems of speeding and red light jumping respectively;
- (c) ***Measures to tackle drug driving.*** Under the Road Traffic (Amendment) Ordinance 2011 (which took effect in March 2012), the Police is empowered to conduct preliminary drug tests on drivers who are suspected of drug driving, or are involved in a traffic accident, or have committed a traffic offence; and
- (d) ***Measures to enhance the safety of PLB operation.*** Since 2005, PLBs have been required to install speed display devices (Note 3) as a vehicle licence condition. With effect from May 2008, any misuse or malfunctioning of the devices would constitute an offence. Under the Road Traffic (Amendment) Ordinance 2012, the following regulations on PLB operation have been introduced (Note 4):
  - (i) imposing a cap on the maximum speed (80 kilometres per hour (km/hr)) at which a PLB may travel;

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**Note 3:** *The devices are primarily used to facilitate monitoring by PLB passengers and caution PLB drivers against speeding.*

**Note 4:** *All measures took effect from April 2012 except items (iii) and (iv), the implementation dates of which are to be specified by the Transport and Housing Bureau.*

## Introduction

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- (ii) requiring every PLB to be fitted with a speed limiter approved by the TD;
- (iii) requiring new PLBs to be fitted with an electronic data recording device (Note 5);
- (iv) requiring applicants of PLB driving licences to attend and complete a pre-service course before issue of the licence; and
- (v) requiring every PLB driver to display a driver identity plate in the PLB when it is in passenger service.

## Audit review

1.8 In 1998 and 2006, the Audit Commission (Audit) conducted two audit reviews on road safety. The results were reported in Chapter 10 of the Director of Audit's Report No. 30 of June 1998 and in Chapter 6 of the Director of Audit's Report No. 46 of March 2006 respectively.

1.9 In the light of the road safety measures introduced in recent years (see para. 1.7), Audit has conducted a review to examine the administration of these measures (Note 6). Particular reference is made to vehicles with higher accident involvement rates (see para. 1.6). The review has focused on the following areas:

- (a) measures to tackle drink driving (PART 2);
- (b) measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping (PART 3);
- (c) measures to promote safer vehicle operation (PART 4);

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**Note 5:** *The device records the speed and manoeuvring data of a vehicle. It facilitates traffic accident investigation and deters drivers from improper driving.*

**Note 6:** *In view of the small number (three cases) of drug driving related accidents in 2012, this review did not cover the new measures to tackle drug driving (see para. 1.7(c)). This review also did not cover traffic engineering measures, relating to the infrastructure and maintenance works of the Highways Department for enhancing road safety.*

- (d) accuracy of traffic accident data (PART 5); and
- (e) publicity and education programmes (PART 6).

Audit has found room for improvement in the above areas and has made a number of recommendations to address the issues.

### **General response from the Administration**

1.10 The Commissioner for Transport, the Commissioner of Police, the Secretary for Transport and Housing and the Director of Information Services agree with the audit recommendations.

1.11 The Commissioner for Transport has said that:

- (a) there has been a marked decrease in traffic accident fatalities from 160 in 2007 to 120 in 2012. Compared with other major cities in the world, Hong Kong's road traffic fatality rate is among the lowest. The number of serious injuries has also dropped from 2,533 in 2007 to 2,521 in 2012. This is a result of the concerted efforts of all parties and the adoption of three-pronged approach for enhancing road safety in Hong Kong, viz. development of comprehensive legislation and effective enhancement, provision of a safe and efficient transport infrastructure and traffic management system, and focused publicity and education; and
- (b) the TD will not be complacent. It will continue to implement various measures to enhance road safety and collaborate with all parties to implement measures to combat all types of inappropriate driving behaviour.

### **Acknowledgement**

1.12 Audit would like to acknowledge with gratitude the full cooperation of the staff of the TD, the Police and the Information Services Department (ISD) during the course of the audit review.

## PART 2: MEASURES TO TACKLE DRINK DRIVING

2.1 This PART examines the measures taken to tackle drink driving, focusing on:

- (a) implementation of random breath tests (paras. 2.4 to 2.14); and
- (b) enforcement of the three-tier penalty legislation (paras. 2.15 to 2.26).

### Breath tests on drink driving

2.2 Alcohol affects the central nervous system, blunting perception and coordination and impairing one's ability to detect risk. Studies have shown that drivers who have consumed alcohol have a much higher risk of involvement in accidents than those who have not consumed alcohol. Since 1995, it has been an offence under the Road Traffic Ordinance for a driver to exceed a prescribed limit of alcohol in his blood, breath or urine. The law provides the Police with the power to conduct breath tests on a driver who is suspected of having consumed alcohol when driving a vehicle; or has committed a traffic offence when the vehicle is in motion; or has been involved in an accident.

2.3 The breath test procedure is made up of two parts:

- (a) **Screening breath test.** A screening breath test is conducted at the scene. If a driver fails this test, he may be put under arrest for undergoing an evidential breath test; and
- (b) **Evidential breath test.** An evidential breath test is conducted in a police station/evidential breath test centre (see Note 12 to para. 2.21). If a driver fails this test, he will be charged with a drink driving offence.

### Implementation of random breath tests

2.4 In 2008, the law was further amended to empower the Police to conduct breath tests on drivers without the need for reasonable suspicion that they have consumed alcohol. The drivers are selected at random and a pre-screening test (also



known as the random breath test — Note 7) is performed on roadside. If a driver fails the random breath test, he is required to undergo the screening breath test and evidential breath test as appropriate.

2.5 From February 2009 (the effective date of the random breath test legislation) to December 2012, the Police conducted a total of 416,557 random breath tests and 1,993 drivers were arrested as a result. As can be seen from Table 1, the percentage of arrests over the period declined from 0.7% in 2009 to 0.4% in 2012. It appears that fewer people drank and drove than before.

Table 1

**Arrests made as a result of random breath tests  
(February 2009 to December 2012)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of arrests</b>	<b>Number of random breath tests conducted</b>	<b>Percentage of arrests</b>
	<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>	<b>(c) = (a) ÷ (b) × 100%</b>
2009 (from February)	269	39,994	0.7%
2010	572	105,490	0.5%
2011	603	133,900	0.5%
2012	549	137,173	0.4%
Overall	1,993	416,557	0.5%

Source: Police records

### ***Timing of random breath test operation***

2.6 In January 2011, the Police briefed the Legislative Council Panel on Transport on the results of the random breath test operations. Among other things, the Police informed the Panel that:

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**Note 7:** *The random breath test takes about 10 seconds to complete which is shorter than the four-minute completion time for a screening test.*

## Measures to tackle drink driving

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- (a) comparing with the situation before the introduction of the random breath tests, accidents involving drink driving decreased by 62% in 2009 and 68% in 2010;
- (b) as a vast majority of drink driving accidents occurred between 9:00 pm and 3:00 am, 60% of the random breath test operations (Note 8) were scheduled between 9:00 pm and 6:00 am; and
- (c) to enhance the deterrent effect of the random breath test operations, tests would be conducted on drivers who were stopped for having committed traffic offences in addition to the then prevailing practice of performing such tests at police roadblocks.

2.7 In response to a Panel Member's request, in June 2011, the Police provided the Panel with a breakdown of the 715 arrests made as a result of the random breath tests from February 2009 to October 2010. The breakdown showed that 90% arrests were made between 9:01 pm and 6:00 am (another indication that this was a high risk period — see para. 2.6(b)).


2.8 ***Audit examination.*** From February 2009 to December 2012, there were a total of 905 drink driving related accidents, and 1,993 arrests made as a result of 416,557 random breath tests. Audit analysed these data by time of day. The results are shown in Figures 4 and 5.

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**Note 8:** *In a random breath test operation, the Police uses a roadblock to stop drivers for conducting the tests. The operation duration and the number of tests conducted vary from operation to operation.*

Figure 4

Analysis of drink driving related accidents by time of day  
(February 2009 to December 2012)




Source: Audit analysis of Police data

Figure 5

Analysis of arrests and random breath tests by time of day  
(February 2009 to December 2012)

$\begin{array}{l} \leftarrow 176,658 \text{ tests (42\%)} + 239,899 \text{ tests (58\%)} = 416,557 \text{ tests (100\%)} \\ \leftarrow 197 \text{ arrests (10\%)} + 1,796 \text{ arrests (90\%)} = 1,993 \text{ arrests (100\%)} \end{array}$



Source: Audit analysis of Police data

2.9 Figure 4 shows that 24% of the drink driving related accidents occurred between 6:01 am and 6:00 pm (daytime), and 76% occurred between 6:01 pm and 6:00 am (nighttime). Figure 5 shows that 10% of the drink driving related arrests were made between 6:01 am and 6:00 pm, suggesting that fewer people drank and drove during the daytime than the nighttime. However, 42% of the random breath

tests were conducted during the daytime when both the drink driving related accidents and arrests were on the low side. Figure 5 also shows that, 39% ( $37,653 + 95,355 + 30,202 = 163,210$ ) of the 416,557 random breath tests were conducted between 9:01 pm and 6:00 am which were less than the 60% (operations) reported to the Panel on Transport in January 2011 (see para. 2.6(b) and Note 9).

2.10 In February 2013, in response to Audit's enquiry, the Police said that:

- (a) the number of the random breath test operations reported to the Panel on Transport was not the same as the number of breath tests conducted, and the duration of each operation conducted might not be directly proportional to the number of breath tests conducted. Specifically, operations conducted during the mid-night period might result in a lower number of breath tests conducted as compared with those mounted during the daytime due to the much lighter traffic flows, whereas in each daytime operation, because of more traffic flows more tests would likely be conducted;
- (b) no statistics using the random breath test operation parameters (e.g. locations in the periods concerned) had been maintained. The number reported to the Panel on Transport was a general observation of the enforcement situation;
- (c) the thrust of random breath test operations was to deter irresponsible drink driving behaviour. Carrying out the operation during the daytime and when approaching the hours of darkness had created greater deterrent effect by increasing the awareness of drivers; and
- (d) drink driving enforcement was only one of its enforcement commitments, and equally important was the need to prevent speeding, handle traffic accidents, and maintain smooth traffic flow. The multitude of policing commitments required most of the police officers to be deployed intensively between 6:00 am and 11:00 pm every day to cope with heavy traffic flow, which affected the Police's capacity to dedicate extra resources to combating drink driving specifically during the nighttime.

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**Note 9:** *For the period February 2009 to December 2010 (i.e. before the Panel meeting of January 2011), 37% of the random breath tests were conducted between 9:01 pm and 6:00 am.*

## Measures to tackle drink driving

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2.11 Audit appreciates that there is a need for conducting sufficient random breath tests during the daytime to deter irresponsible drink driving behaviour. However, a risk-based tasking of the test operations is important to ensure the cost-effective use of the limited enforcement resources. For the period February 2009 to December 2012, the average arrest rate per test conducted was 0.11% ( $197 \div 176,658 \times 100\%$ ) during the daytime which was significantly lower than the 0.75% ( $1,796 \div 239,899 \times 100\%$ ) during the nighttime. Given that the tests would also cause inconvenience to the motorists, there is a need to administer the tests judiciously.

2.12 With the random breath tests in operation for almost four years, it is opportune to conduct an overall review with a view to capturing learning points for future improvement, taking into account the observations made in this Audit Report.

## Audit recommendations

2.13 **Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should:**

- (a) **regularly compile and analyse the statistics on the random breath test operations, the drink driving related accident and arrest patterns for the strategic planning of the operations; and**
- (b) **conduct an overall review of the random breath test operations taking into account the observations made in this Audit Report.**

## Response from the Administration

2.14 The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations. He has said that:

- (a) the Police has been compiling detailed statistics on random breath tests, but given the system limitation, it is unable to capture the locations and the timing for each random breath test operation except the timing for each pre-screening test. The Police will explore to include the dates, times and locations of the random breath test operations in the new Communal Information System, so that pattern and record data could easily be retrieved for strategic planning of operations as well as for analysis purposes;

- (b) at the moment, the planning of random breath test operations is based on the prevailing circumstances and the professional judgement of frontline commanders. The Regional Traffic Formations are already applying a risk-based approach in deciding random breath test locations by considering the routes to bars/pubs area, drink driving related accident locations and number of public complaints;
- (c) from February 2009 to December 2012, the Police conducted over 410,000 random breath tests on drivers, which amount to about 22% of the total number of driving licence holders (over 1,900,000). The number of traffic accidents involving drink driving had decreased markedly by nearly 70% when compared to 2008. It can be considered as evidence of the success of random breath test operations; and
- (d) the Police will conduct a review with a view to providing a set of guiding principles for frontline commanders to make reference for the deployment of random breath tests at strategic locations. Nonetheless, it should be reiterated that the element of “randomness” is to be maintained in order to maximise the deterrent effect of random breath tests and to prevent opportunists from predicting the deployment patterns to dodge the tests. Regional Traffic Formations will also be reminded to review their own random breath test locations on a regular basis. The Police will also ensure that the respective Regional Traffic Formations regularly examine their policing priorities and deploy resources accordingly.

### Enforcement of the three-tier penalty legislation

2.15 According to medical evidence, the risk of causing an accident increases with the increase of blood alcohol level in a driver. From time to time, there were calls for increased penalties on drink driving so that sentences handed down by the court would better reflect the seriousness of injuries caused by accidents involving drink driving. In December 2010, the law was amended to provide a three-tier penalty system in proportion to drivers' alcohol concentration levels. Under the penalty system, convicted drivers are disqualified from driving for a minimum period according to a sliding scale, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2**

**Penalty for different levels of alcohol concentration**

	<b>Prescribed limits of alcohol concentration (micrograms per 100 millilitres of breath (<math>\mu\text{g}/100\text{ ml}</math>))</b>	<b>Minimum driving disqualification period</b>	
		<b>First conviction</b>	<b>Subsequent convictions</b>
Tier 1	Exceeding 22 $\mu\text{g}/100\text{ ml}$ but less than 35 $\mu\text{g}/100\text{ ml}$	6 months	2 years
Tier 2	Exceeding Tier 1 but less than 66 $\mu\text{g}/100\text{ ml}$	1 year	3 years
Tier 3	Exceeding Tier 2	2 years	5 years

*Source: Police records*

### *Timeliness of evidential breath tests*

2.16 As mentioned in paragraph 2.3, if a driver fails a screening breath test at the scene of an accident or an enforcement operation, he will be put under arrest for undergoing an evidential breath test in a police station/evidential breath test centre. If he fails the evidential breath test, he will be charged with a drink driving offence.



As the alcohol level usually decreases with time due to body metabolism (Note 10), it is important that the evidential breath test is carried out as soon as possible after apprehending the drink driving suspect. With the introduction of the three-tier penalty system based on drivers' alcohol levels, it has become even more critical to complete the evidential breath test within the shortest possible time so as to minimise the impact of the drop in alcohol level on the test result.

2.17 In the 1998 review, Audit raised concern about the long time interval (averaging 70 minutes) between screening and evidential breath tests. In the 2006 review, Audit found that the average time interval had been shortened to 50 minutes. In response, the Police said that it would continue to look for new enforcement tools with a view to improving operational efficiency.

2.18 **Audit examination.** In this review, Audit selected the drink driving arrests (totalling 744 cases — Note 11) made from January to October 2012 for examining the time interval between screening and evidential breath tests. Audit found that the time intervals for the 744 arrest cases averaged 44 minutes (ranging from 15 minutes to 90 minutes). According to the screening breath test results, 254 drivers (34% of the 744 cases) were suspected of having Tier 1 alcohol level, 351 (47%) Tier 2 alcohol level and 139 (19%) Tier 3 alcohol level.

2.19 However, by the time the evidential breath tests were taken, the alcohol concentrations of 182 drivers (24% of 744 cases) had dropped below the Tier 1 level and hence they were released. In addition, 215 drivers (29% of 744 cases) were charged with a lighter offence as their alcohol concentrations had also dropped to lower tiers (see Table 3 for details).

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**Note 10:** *According to medical research overseas, after consuming alcohol, blood alcohol level will initially increase due to absorption through the stomach. Thereafter, blood alcohol level will decrease due to body metabolism.*

**Note 11:** *The 744 arrests were made as a result of random breath tests and other enforcement operations (such as for drivers involved in traffic accidents — see para. 2.2). In addition to the 744 cases, there were 47 arrests for which no evidential breath tests were conducted for various reasons (such as blood tests were conducted instead).*

Table 3

**Comparison of alcohol levels between screening  
and evidential breath tests  
(January to October 2012)**

Screening breath test		Evidential breath test			
Alcohol level	Number of cases	Below Tier 1	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
		Number of cases			
Tier 1	254	173	79	2	—
Tier 2	351	9	146	194	2
Tier 3	139	—	—	69	70
Total	744	182	225	265	72
<b>397 cases released or charged with a lighter offence:</b>		<b>182</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>—</b>

215 cases

Source: Audit analysis of Police records

Remarks: Only the shaded cases had alcohol levels dropped to lower tiers during the evidential breath tests.

2.20 It is unsatisfactory that 182 (24%) of the 744 drink driving arrest cases were released and 215 (29%) were charged with a lighter offence. Of these cases (totalling 397), Audit selected 45 cases for further review. Audit found that the time intervals between the screening and evidential breath tests for 37 of these 45 cases (i.e. ranging from 46 minutes to 89 minutes) were longer than the overall average of 44 minutes for the 744 arrest cases. Audit examined the relevant files to ascertain the reasons for the longer time taken. The results are summarised as follows:

- (a) for 15 (41%) cases, the police stations (where the drink driving suspects were taken to for reporting of arrests) were not equipped with an evidential breath test device. Additional travelling time was incurred for taking the suspects to other police stations equipped with such devices for taking evidential breath tests;

- (b) for 7 (18%) cases, the drink driving suspects were taken to police stations with evidential breath test devices for reporting of arrests. However, because of the breakdowns of the test devices, additional travelling time was incurred for taking the suspects to other police stations for evidential breath tests; and
- (c) for the remaining 15 (41%) cases, the reason for the long time taken could not be ascertained from the files.

2.21 ***Provision of test devices.*** In the 2006 review, Audit reported that further travelling time would be needed if the police station was not equipped with an evidential breath test device (similar observation to para. 2.20(a)). In 2008, the Police increased the number of evidential breath test devices to 28, up from 26. However, as at January 2013, 18 (43%) of the 42 police stations (Note 12) were not equipped with such test devices. Audit noted that in January 2011, the Police acquired for testing two mobile evidential breath test devices (which could obviate the need for taking evidential breath test at police stations). As at January 2013, the test was still ongoing. In Audit's view, the Police needs to complete the testing as soon as possible and make an early decision on the way forward in providing suitable and adequate equipment for enforcing the drink driving legislation.

2.22 ***Arrest procedures.*** At present, the Police General Orders (Note 13) require a drink driving suspect to be taken to the police station covering the area where the arrest is made (which may not be equipped with an evidential breath test device) for reporting the arrest. However, Audit notes that the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) only requires a police officer to deliver an arrested person into the custody of the officer-in-charge of a police station (i.e. no statutory requirement on which police station for reporting the arrest). To improve the operational efficiency in enforcing the drink driving legislation, the Police needs to study the feasibility of modifying the Police General Order requirement such that the

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**Note 12:** *In addition, there were four evidential breath test centres provided with such test devices but they could not be used for reporting of arrests. According to the Police, these centres were strategically located to support different police stations without such devices.*

**Note 13:** *According to the Police General Orders, where an arrest is made in connection with a crime, whether at the time of complaint or later, the person arrested shall be brought before the officer-in-charge of the police station covering the area in which the arrest was made.*

## Measures to tackle drink driving

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reporting of arrests of drink driving suspects may be made at the nearest police station with an evidential breath test device.

**2.23 *Maintenance of test devices.*** Regarding the delays in evidential breath test caused by the breakdowns of test devices in some police stations (see para. 2.20(b)), Audit noted that in 2012, the Police acquired 11 new evidential breath test devices to replace the old ones which were purchased before 2000. While the downtime risk has been reduced with the replacement of some of the old devices, the Police still needs to closely monitor the maintenance programme to ensure that all test devices are properly kept in a workable condition.

**2.24 *Time target.*** In the 1998 review, Audit recommended the Police to set a time target for monitoring the evidential breath test. In June 1998, the Police required case officers to submit explanations to the Police Headquarters if the time intervals between screening and evidential breath tests exceeded 90 minutes. While the average time taken had subsequently been shortened (see para. 2.17), the Police had not reviewed the time target set for submitting an explanation. As such, no explanation had been provided to the Police Headquarters for the long time taken in the 37 cases with the drink driving suspects released or charged with a lighter offence (see para. 2.20).

## Audit recommendations

**2.25** **Audit has recommended that the Commissioner of Police should streamline the breath test procedures with a view to improving the effectiveness in enforcing the three-tier penalty legislation. In particular, action should be taken to:**

- (a) **complete the current testing of the mobile evidential breath test device as soon as possible and make an early decision on the way forward in providing suitable and adequate equipment for implementing the drink driving breath tests;**
- (b) **closely monitor the maintenance programme to ensure that all evidential breath test devices are properly kept in a workable condition;**

- (c) **study the feasibility of modifying the Police General Order requirement to streamline the arrest procedures of drink driving suspects for conducting evidential breath tests; and**
- (d) **review and revise the target for monitoring the timeliness of evidential breath tests.**

## **Response from the Administration**

2.26 The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations. He has said that:

- (a) as Hong Kong has adopted one of the highest standards of proof in the world in adducing evidence to prove drink driving offences, the Police has been following a cautious approach to satisfy the stringent judicial requirements. With the assistance from a local university, a comprehensive test on a mobile evidential breath test device commenced on 11 March 2013. The Police will continue to develop and adopt the mobile evidential breath test technology to enhance its effectiveness in combating drink driving behaviour;
- (b) evidential breath test devices are checked and calibrated by the contractor every three months. The Traffic Formations will have to conduct routine checks on evidential breath test devices on a weekly basis. A replacement exercise of the old evidential breath test devices will soon commence to further reduce the downtime;
- (c) the Police will study the feasibility to streamline the arrest procedures by bringing a drink driving arrested person to the nearest police station with an evidential breath test device. The Police will also consider gradually increasing the number of evidential breath test devices installed in police stations; and
- (d) the timeliness of the evidential breath tests had been closely monitored by the Police and a comprehensive review on the target time will be conducted. The Traffic Formations will be required to closely monitor each “drop-out” case.

## **PART 3: MEASURES TO TACKLE SPEEDING AND RED LIGHT JUMPING**

3.1 This PART examines the enforcement measures taken to tackle speeding and red light jumping, focusing on:


- (a) operation of enforcement camera systems (paras. 3.8 to 3.19); and
- (b) monitoring of speeding enforcement operations (paras. 3.20 to 3.24).

### ***Penalties for speeding and red light jumping***

3.2 Speeding and red light jumping are common traffic offences in Hong Kong that could result in grave consequences not only on the drivers and passengers of the offending vehicles but also other road users. Figure 6 shows the number of prosecutions relating to speeding and red light jumping offences from 2007 to 2012.

Figure 6

Prosecutions relating to speeding and red light jumping offences  
(2007 to 2012)



Legend: —▲— Speeding offence  
—■— Red light jumping offence

Source: Police records

## Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping

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3.3 Under the law, the penalties for driving in excess of speed limit include fines and recording of driving-offence points (Note 14) as shown in Table 4.

**Table 4**  
**Penalties for speeding offence**

Driving in excess of speed limit by	Fixed penalty	Driving-offence points
15 km/hr or less	\$320	—
More than 15 km/hr to 30 km/hr	\$450	3
More than 30 km/hr to 45 km/hr	\$600	5
More than 45 km/hr (Note)	\$1,000	10

*Source: Fixed Penalty (Criminal Proceedings) Regulations (Cap. 240A) and Road Traffic (Driving-offence Points) Ordinance (Cap. 375)*

*Note: The law also provides that such an offending driver may be summonsed to appear in court. On conviction, he is liable to a maximum fine of \$4,000 and disqualification immediately from driving for a period of not less than six months unless the court, for special reasons, orders otherwise.*

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**Note 14:** *The driving-offence points system was put into operation in 1984 to deter habitual traffic offenders and to improve the standard of driving in order to reduce the accident toll. A driver incurring ten or more points within a period of two years is required by law to attend a driving improvement course at his own cost. A driver incurring 15 or more points within a period of two years shall be summonsed and may be disqualified from driving by the court. The period of disqualification upon first conviction is three months and will be increased to six months for any subsequent convictions.*



3.4 For red light jumping, the offending drivers are liable to a fixed penalty of \$600 and the recording of five driving-offence points. If a driver holding a probationary driving licence commits a red light jumping offence, he will be summonsed and is liable to:

- (a) a maximum fine of \$5,000 and three months' imprisonment upon first conviction; and
- (b) a maximum fine of \$10,000 and six months' imprisonment upon subsequent convictions.

### ***Enforcement tools***

3.5 The Police's enforcement efforts against speeding and red light jumping are aided by the following tools:

- (a) ***Portable speed detecting radars (with camera) and laser guns.*** These portable devices (introduced since 1991 and 1993 respectively) require manual operation. A team of at least two police officers is required for each operation which only lasts for a period of time;
- (b) ***Speed enforcement camera system.*** Since 1999, an automated speed enforcement camera system has been introduced to put selected road sections under 24-hour surveillance. The current system consists of digital cameras and radar units operating on a rotational basis at camera housings installed at various strategic locations. The photographs (showing the registration marks of the offending vehicles), together with other violation data captured by the cameras, will be downloaded onto a central computer system for identification of the offending vehicles and vehicle owners concerned; and
- (c) ***Red light camera system.*** The system (first introduced in 1993) operates with cameras housed on top of camera poles planted on the footpaths of selected roads at a certain distance upstream of signalised junctions, and detection devices laid on the carriageways near the stop lines. The photographs of the offending vehicles and other violation data will be processed by a central computer system for identification of the offending vehicles and vehicle owners concerned.

## Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping

3.6 Since 1999, the speed enforcement camera system has been expanded twice with a total funding of \$73 million approved by the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council.

3.7 From 1999 to 2010, the red light camera system was expanded three times with a total funding of \$153 million. In April 2012, the Finance Committee approved a funding of \$48 million for the implementation of the phase four expansion of the red light camera system in 2014. Table 5 summarises the number of enforcement tools as at December 2012.

**Table 5**  
**Speeding and red light jumping enforcement tools**  
**(December 2012)**

<b>Enforcement tool</b>	<b>Number of devices/cameras (a)</b>	<b>Number of housings (b)</b>	<b>Camera to housing ratio (a):(b)</b>
<b><i>Speeding enforcement tools</i></b>			
Laser gun	52	N.A.	N.A.
Portable radar (with camera)	16	N.A.	N.A.
Speed enforcement camera system	20	120	1:6 (Note 1)
<b><i>Red light jumping enforcement tool</i></b>			
Red light camera system	155	155	1:1 (Note 2)

*Source: Police records*

*Note 1: In response to a recommendation of the 2006 Audit Report, the Administration increased the camera to housing ratio of the speed enforcement camera system from 1:8.5 to 1:6.*

*Note 2: Since 2004, the Administration has progressively increased the camera to housing ratio of the red light camera system from 1:4 to 1:1.*

### Operation of enforcement camera systems

3.8 With their 24-hour surveillance functions, the speed enforcement camera system and red light camera system are the key enforcement tools. In terms of prosecution cases in 2012, 154,411 (58% of the total 266,250 — Note 15) speeding cases were detected by the speed enforcement camera system and 52,404 (94% of the total 55,815) red light jumping cases by the red light camera system. However, Audit has found that there are limitations in these enforcement camera systems (as detailed in paras. 3.9 to 3.17).

#### *Limitations of speed enforcement camera system*

3.9 The present speed enforcement camera system and its advance warning signs installed at strategic locations are effective to deter speeding when drivers approach the relevant sections of roads. However, some drivers may increase speed after passing the camera system. This has resulted in the deterrent effect of the camera system being localised.

3.10 According to the Police's records, a technology called average speed camera system has been used in other countries since 1999 to influence driver behaviour over a greater distance, like on highways. The system takes time-stamped photographs of all the vehicles at both the entry and exit points of an expressway and calculates the time taken by each vehicle to travel between the two points to ascertain whether there is a violation of speed limit. The use of such systems in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Europe and the Mainland had resulted in significant reduction in traffic accidents and an increased speed limit compliance rate.

3.11 In 2007, the TD (in consultation with relevant stakeholders such as the Police) commenced studying the feasibility of using the average speed camera system in Hong Kong. In late 2010, the Administration began to consider a trial of the system to ascertain its applicability in Hong Kong. Since then, actions have been taken to map out the trial scheme in greater details and a consultant was engaged by the TD in 2012 to carry out a preliminary design. As of February 2013,

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**Note 15:** *The remaining 42% cases mainly resulted from enforcement operations using speed detecting radars and laser guns.*

## **Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping**

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
the Administration planned to seek funding from the Finance Committee by mid-2013 with a view to launching the trial scheme in 2013-14. In Audit's view, the Administration needs to expedite action on the trial scheme.

### ***Images of offending vehicles blocked by other vehicles***

3.12 As mentioned in paragraph 3.5(c), a red light camera is installed in a housing on top of a camera pole planted on the footpath of a road at a certain distance upstream of a signalised junction. The image of an offending vehicle on the offside lane (captured by a rear facing camera) may sometimes be blocked by other vehicle on the kerbside lane of the carriageway (see Photograph 1 for an example). In an examination of the Police's enforcement statistics from October to December 2012, Audit noted that 2,109 (9%) of the 22,871 red light jumping cases detected by the red light camera system could not be pursued because the images of the offending vehicles were blocked by other vehicles. It is a cause for concern that sanctions for the 2,109 cases during the three-month period (a fixed penalty of \$600 and the recording of five driving-offence points each — see para. 3.4) could not be imposed on the offending drivers to deter their dangerous driving behaviour.

**Photograph 1**

**Image of red light jumping vehicle blocked**



*Source: Police records*

### ***Problem in identifying offending driver***

3.13 At present, both the speed enforcement camera system and red light camera system take photographs of the rear side of offending vehicles. The key considerations for doing so are as follows:

- (a) for red light jumping offence, the photograph has to show that the offending vehicle is travelling when the red light is on. Only a rear facing camera can provide such evidence; and
- (b) in order to obtain good quality photographs even when blinded by sunlight or overcast by taller vehicles, the flashes of the speed enforcement camera system and red light camera system are always on even when taking photographs in daylight. To reduce the interference of the flash on the drivers, both systems do not take frontal photographs of the offending vehicles.

## Measures to tackle speeding and red light jumping

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3.14 The limitation of taking rear side photograph of an offending vehicle is that it only shows the vehicle's identity (i.e. its registration mark) but not the offending driver's identity. As such, the Police has to issue a notice to the vehicle owner requiring him to identify the offending driver within 21 days from the date of the notice. However, there had been cases that the registered owners of the vehicles had failed to identify the offending drivers. In addition, in the absence of photographic evidence, there is a risk that an offending driver could attempt to avoid incurring driving-offence points by arranging another driver to accept responsibility.

3.15 *Overseas experience.* Based on Internet research, Audit found that among the overseas jurisdictions using driving-offence points as part of the penalties for speeding and red light jumping offences similar to Hong Kong, some local authorities in the United States and the UK (Note 16) had adopted advanced technologies to overcome the limitations of the rear facing cameras. They used multiple cameras systems with less dazzling flash to take both the frontal and rear photographs of the offending vehicles for identifying the offending drivers.

3.16 In response to Audit's enquiry in March 2013, the TD has said that:

- (a) the multiple cameras system is likely to be more costly (i.e. may incur double cost) for trying to recover some of the 9% on average violation images blocked by other vehicles (see para. 3.12). The additional resource required would be more cost effectively deployed to other sites to enhance the overall deterrent effect against red light jumping;
- (b) from previous experience, many sites identified for installing enforcement cameras had to be given up because there was not enough space for building the foundations for the cameras due to the congested underground utilities and road condition in Hong Kong; and
- (c) it is a criminal offence to shift responsibility of traffic law violation (see para. 3.14) and offenders would have to face serious consequences. There is no evidence to indicate that such occurrence is frequent.

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**Note 16:** *Examples are Arizona and California in the United States, and Central London in the UK.*

3.17 In Audit's view, as the effectiveness of the speed enforcement camera system and the red light camera system as enforcement tools depends on the prosecution evidence they can provide, the TD and the Police should find measures to further improve the systems, drawing on overseas experience where appropriate. There is a need to take into account the latest technology development in future expansion/replacement projects of the speed enforcement camera system and the red light camera system.

### Audit recommendations

3.18 Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner for Transport, in conjunction with the Commissioner of Police, should:

- (a) expedite action on the trial scheme of the average speed camera system;
- (b) explore measures to improve the effectiveness of the present enforcement camera systems, drawing on overseas experience where appropriate; and
- (c) take into account the latest technology development in future expansion/replacement projects of the speed enforcement camera system and the red light camera system.

### Response from the Administration

3.19 The Commissioner for Transport and the Commissioner of Police agree with the audit recommendations. The Commissioner for Transport has said that the TD will continue to:

- (a) explore new technology to improve the present enforcement camera systems drawing on overseas experience; and
- (b) take account of new technology in future speed enforcement camera system and red light camera system projects.

### Monitoring of speeding enforcement operations

3.20 As mentioned in paragraph 3.5(b), the camera housings for the speed enforcement camera system are installed at various strategic locations. These locations are selected by the TD, in consultation with the Police, based on the following criteria:

- (a) accident records with particular emphasis on accidents caused by vehicle speeding;
- (b) prevalence of speeding activities observed by the Police;
- (c) the need for an even distribution of the camera housings to provide an area-wide deterrent effect;
- (d) strategic or trunk roads with higher traffic speed and traffic flows; and
- (e) geological and environmental factors surrounding the sites.

3.21 The Police has not issued specific guidelines on the deployment of the 20 speed enforcement cameras among the 120 camera housings (see Table 5 in para. 3.7). The authority of the camera deployment is vested with the five Regional Traffic Formations so that they can have effective and coordinated deployment of all kinds of speeding enforcement tools under their control. Table 6 summarises the distribution of these tools among the five Traffic Formations.



**Table 6**

**Distribution of speeding enforcement tools by Traffic Formations  
(December 2012)**

<b>Regional Traffic Formation</b>	<b>Number of portable speeding enforcement devices</b>	<b>Number of cameras</b>	<b>Number of housing locations</b>
Hong Kong Island	11	3	17
Kowloon East	11	2	10
Kowloon West	10	2	8
New Territories North	12	8	43
New Territories South	15	5	42

*Source: Police records*

3.22 According to the Police, the Regional Traffic Formations will review the deployment of all kinds of speeding enforcement tools under their command on a regular basis, taking into consideration a number of factors such as accident trends and prevailing speeding situation. As accident trends and speeding pattern could change over time, it is important that management information is compiled regularly to monitor the up-to-date situation. Audit found that not all the Regional Traffic Formations had done so and for those which had, the level of details also differed, as follows:

- (a) the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon East Traffic Formations had monthly reports showing the deployment of their speed enforcement cameras by locations and duration, and the speeding cases detected by locations. The New Territories North Traffic Formation had weekly reports but only showing the deployment of its speed enforcement cameras by locations and duration. The remaining two Traffic Formations had not compiled similar management reports; and
- (b) as regards other portable speeding enforcement devices, all five Traffic Formations had not compiled management reports on their deployment and the detection results by locations.

### Audit recommendations

3.23 Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should require all Regional Traffic Formations to:

- (a) compile sufficient management information regularly to monitor the prevailing speeding situation; and
- (b) make good use of such information for the effective deployment of their enforcement resources in tackling speeding offences.

### Response from the Administration

3.24 The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations. He has said that:

- (a) respective Traffic Formations will compile management information to assist in the planning of speed enforcement camera deployment. However, they need to retain discretion in their deployment of various speed detection devices in combating speeding offences;
- (b) the Police will revise its speeding enforcement policy to provide the guiding principles on the deployment and rotation of speed enforcement cameras; and
- (c) in the long run, it is suggested to have one speed enforcement camera per camera housing in order to deter speeding offences, subject to the provision of adequate resources and manpower.

## **PART 4 : MEASURES TO PROMOTE SAFER VEHICLE OPERATION**

4.1 This PART examines the following measures taken to promote safer vehicle operation:

- (a) measures for PLBs (paras. 4.2 to 4.36);
- (b) measures for taxis (paras. 4.37 to 4.43); and
- (c) measures for franchised buses (paras. 4.44 to 4.53).

### **Measures for public light buses**

4.2 PLBs provide essential daily services to commuters. In 2012, PLBs carried, on average, some 1.9 million passengers daily, accounting for about 16% of all passengers using public transport. As at December 2012, there were 4,350 PLBs. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 in paragraph 1.6, the accident involvement rates for PLBs (e.g. 245.6 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012) were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (e.g. 33.1 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012).

### ***Safety seat belt***

4.3 According to a paper released by the World Health Organisation in September 2012, the wearing of a seat belt would reduce the risk of fatalities in traffic accidents by 40% to 50% for front seat passengers and 25% to 75% for rear seat passengers. In Hong Kong, the legal requirement for installing seat belt was first introduced in 1983 covering drivers and front seat passengers of private cars. The requirement was subsequently extended to cover drivers of all vehicles and passengers of some vehicles (including PLBs). The respective vehicle occupants are required to wear the seat belts if available. Appendix A is a summary of the seat belt requirements for different vehicle types.

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

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4.4 ***Exempted PLBs.*** The seat belt law only applies to PLBs manufactured or registered on or after its effective date in August 2004. PLBs not fitted with the passenger seat belts but already in use before the effective date are exempted. As at 31 December 2012, of the 4,350 PLBs, 1,815 (42%) were not fitted with seat belts and 2,535 (58%) were fitted with seat belts. The high proportion (42%) of PLBs operating without passenger seat belts is a cause for concern. This is because the accident involvement rates for PLBs were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (see Figures 2 and 3 in para. 1.6).

### ***Retrofitting exempted PLBs with seat belts***

4.5 To encourage the exempted PLBs to be retrofitted with passenger seat belts, in September 2006, the TD issued the relevant specifications and drawings as guidelines for retrofitting approved types of safety seat belts. In addition, the Administration has, since 2002, launched three incentive schemes (Note 17) to encourage owners of old diesel PLBs (among other diesel commercial vehicles) to replace their PLBs with cleaner (e.g. liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fuelled) models. Those replaced in or after August 2004 were fitted with passenger seat belts.

4.6 In its investigation report published in December 2010 (Note 18), the Ombudsman's Office recommended the Administration to consider extending the passenger seat belt requirement to the exempted PLBs. In February 2011, the Administration informed the Panel on Transport that the PLB trade opposed to the proposed requirement and raised the following concerns:

- (a) when the law on seat belts was passed in 2002, the clear understanding then was that seat belts would be required only on newly registered PLBs.

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**Note 17:** *The 2002 scheme (which ended in 2005) provided a grant of \$60,000 or \$80,000 for replacing a diesel PLB with a LPG or electric PLB respectively. The 2007 scheme (which ended in March 2010) provided a grant that ranged from \$40,000 to \$80,000 for replacing old diesel PLBs with cleaner models. The 2010 scheme which provides a grant ranging from \$77,000 to \$92,000 for the replacement of old diesel PLBs, will end in June 2013.*

**Note 18:** *In the report, the Ombudsman expressed concern (among other things) that if relying on attrition and replacement of the exempted PLBs, the passengers would continue to face a higher risk for at least another eight years.*

Any retrofitting requirement would effectively label PLBs as an unsafe transport mode;

- (b) the retrofitting cost was high (about \$80,000 to \$100,000, including the cost for floor refurbishment). The estimated cost had not yet included revenue foregone due to the vehicle downtime during retrofitting works; and
- (c) given that the Government had introduced or would introduce a number of safety measures targeting at PLBs (see para. 1.7(d)), any further measure was unfair to the trade, and would create serious financial hardship for the operators.

The Administration undertook to, in consultation with the PLB trade, look into the feasibility of requiring retrofitting of PLBs which were registered after a certain date (such that PLBs which were too old and due to be replaced soon would be exempted) with a reasonable grace period for compliance.

4.7 According to the TD's records:

- (a) up to 31 December 2012, only 83 PLBs had been retrofitted with seat belts on a voluntary basis; and
- (b) on average, PLB owners would replace their vehicles after serving 12.7 years (the oldest one was replaced at 20). Ageing analysis showed that of the 1,815 PLBs without passenger seat belts as at 31 December 2012, 1,007 (55%) were 8 to 11 years old. It is likely that these PLBs would still be running on the streets in the coming years.


To protect passenger safety and to enable PLB passengers to form consistent habits of wearing seat belts, the TD needs to work towards applying the seat belt requirement to all PLBs.

### ***Recent developments***

4.8 ***New measure.*** In November 2012, the TD introduced a new measure to require the use of PLBs with seat belts for operating some of the scheduled routes and fixed fares services (commonly known as the green minibuses — GMBs). According to the TD's records, as at 31 December 2012, 3,070 (71%) of the

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

4,350 PLBs were providing GMB services. The remaining 1,280 (29%) PLBs, known as red minibuses (RMBs), were providing non-scheduled and unregulated fare services. A breakdown of the PLBs by their service modes, fuel types and seat belt installations is shown in Figure 7.



Source: TD records

4.9 GMB operators are required to apply to the TD for a passenger service licence for operating the scheduled routes (Note 19). At the GMB Operators Selection Board (Note 20) meeting held in May 2010, it was suggested that GMBs deployed for the provision of new GMB routes should be fitted with passenger seat

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**Note 19:** According to the Road Traffic (Public Service Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374D), the licence may be issued and extended for periods up to five years each.

**Note 20:** The Board chaired by the TD comprises representatives of the Transport Advisory Committee, Transport and Housing Bureau, Home Affairs Department and Independent Commission Against Corruption.

belts. In view of the difficult operating environment faced by the GMB trade, the TD did not implement the suggestion in 2011. Until November 2012 when applications were invited for operating four GMB routes, the TD laid down a requirement that all PLBs providing such services must have passenger seat belts and high back seats installed.

4.10 Audit noted that the new seat belt requirement only applied to one new route and three existing routes for which the incumbent operators did not apply to extend their licences. As at 31 December 2012, there were 482 GMB routes (with 3,070 GMBs in operation, of which 1,218 were without passenger seat belts) not covered by the new requirement. In response to Audit's enquiries in February and March 2013 regarding the application of the same seat belt requirement to these routes when the relevant GMB operators apply for extension of their licences (Note 21), the TD has said that:

- (a) when the Administration amended the Road Traffic Ordinance for mandating provision of passenger seat belts on PLBs in 2004, the legislative intent was to require new vehicles registered after 1 August 2004 to be installed with passenger seat belts. In considering whether to impose a new licensing condition requiring seat belts to be retrofitted on PLBs when GMB operators seek to renew their passenger service licences, the TD will have to take into account:
  - (i) the operating condition of the PLB trade;
  - (ii) the physical conditions of the vehicle chassis, the remaining serviceable life of the vehicles concerned, the costs of retrofitting; and
  - (iii) the improvements brought about by other measures introduced to enhance the safety of PLB operation; and
- (b) since the Environmental Protection Department has proposed to phase out old diesel commercial vehicles with financial incentives while putting in

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**Note 21:** *The conditions for operating the GMB services are determined by the TD. According to the law (see Note 19 to para. 4.9), the TD has the discretion to approve or reject GMB operators' application for extension of their licences. It follows that the TD is not obliged to approve the application for extension based on existing conditions (i.e. without seat belt requirement).*

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

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place more stringent regulatory measures (see para. 4.11), the TD believes it would be more cost-effective to take into consideration the participation rate of PLBs in the upcoming incentive scheme and the community consensus on the timing by which old diesel commercial vehicles are to be phased out before considering the imposition of a new licensing condition on existing GMB routes.

4.11 ***Policy Address.*** In his Policy Address of January 2013, the Chief Executive indicated that the Government would seek to phase out the heavily polluting pre-Euro and Euro I to III diesel commercial vehicles with greater financial incentives while putting in place more stringent regulatory measures. As shown in Figure 7 in paragraph 4.8, there were 834 diesel PLBs (288 RMBs and 546 GMBs) without passenger seat belts in operation as at 31 December 2012. For protecting both the environment and passenger safety, the TD needs to make greater efforts, in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Department, to encourage owners of these diesel PLBs to participate in the upcoming incentive scheme for the early replacement of their vehicles with cleaner models fitted with passenger seat belts.

4.12 As regards the 981 LPG fuelled PLBs (309 RMBs and 672 GMBs) without passenger seat belts (see Figure 7), they are not covered by the new air pollution control measures announced in the 2013 Policy Address. The TD needs to explore other measures to encourage the owners concerned to retrofit their vehicles with passenger seat belts.

### ***Wearing passenger seat belt***

4.13 In the 2006 review, Audit found that the seat belt wearing by PLB passengers was less than satisfactory. In response to Audit's recommendations, the Road Safety Council commissioned a survey in November 2006 to assess the effectiveness of its publicity campaign and to ascertain the reasons for the low passenger seat belt wearing rate in PLBs. The key findings and proposed actions of the survey report (published in May 2007) are summarised below:

- (a) 96% of the respondents were aware of the presence of a law on wearing seat belt on PLBs. Although 88% of the respondents agreed that the message on wearing seat belts on PLBs had been brought out in the publicity through the broadcast of an announcement in the public



interest (API — Note 22), the storyline of which was not seen to be novel and unique. Moreover, only 28% and 22% of the respondents were able to cite the correct maximum fine and years of imprisonment respectively;

- (b) 54% of the respondents considered that the Police's enforcement was effective. However, 21% considered the Police's enforcement was not effective, as there was no prosecution by the Police even when passengers were found not wearing seat belts. Another 17% said that it was hard for the Police to spot seat belt wearing outside the PLBs; and
- (c) it was proposed that the Government should:
  - (i) enhance civic education among the general public on seat belt wearing;
  - (ii) improve the message of the API by correcting the misconception that seat belt wearing was troublesome and increase the frequency of broadcast of the API; and
  - (iii) strengthen the law enforcement and prosecution.

4.14 **Publicity.** In the light of the survey findings, the Road Safety Council procured stickers for placing at the back of every seat in PLBs to ensure passengers on board could read the message of wearing seat belts during their journeys. In April 2008, the stickers were distributed to the PLB operators through the TD. While not included as its major publicity theme from 2008 to 2012, the Road Safety Council had continued to spread the message of wearing seat belts on PLBs including the broadcast of the 2004 API on television (TV) and radio, and distribution of road safety bulletins and leaflets to the PLB operators and the public through the TD and the Police. These bulletins and leaflets were also posted on the websites of the Road Safety Council and the TD.

4.15 **Enforcement action.** The Police's enforcement actions against seat belt offence are mainly carried out during routine patrols by way of issuing summonses to the non-compliant passengers. Since 2005, the Police has also staged special operations on a territory-wide basis targeting seat belt offence of PLB passengers. Each operation lasts for 24 hours and focuses on education, publicity and

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**Note 22:** *The API was produced by the Road Safety Council through the ISD in 2004.*


## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

enforcement. From 2007 to 2012, two to three such operations were conducted each year. In addition, the Police has launched two territory-wide enforcement operations (one for combating malpractices of commercial vehicles and the other for PLBs) which also covered the PLB passenger seat belt offence since 2006 and 2009 respectively. In 2012, the Police carried out nine such enforcement operations. Besides, each Regional Traffic Formation also had its own ad-hoc operations mounted from time to time against the PLB seat belt offence.

4.16 **Latest position.** Notwithstanding the above publicity and enforcement efforts, there was little improvement in the seat belt wearing rate as reflected by the number of summonses issued against PLB passenger seat belt offence from 2007 to 2012 (see Figure 8).

Figure 8

### Summonses issued against PLB passenger seat belt offence (2007 to 2012)




Source: Police records

4.17 In February 2013, Audit staff took 30 PLB trips (21 GMBs and 9 RMBs, all fitted with seat belts) covering Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories and observed that 91% of the passengers did not wear seat belts. The results are shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9

Seat belt wearing rate found in 30 PLB trips  
(February 2013)



Legend: ■ Passengers not wearing seat belts  
■ Passengers wearing seat belts

Source: Audit field inspections

4.18 The unsatisfactory seat belt wearing situation calls for greater efforts towards applying the seat belt requirement to all PLBs, as well as greater publicity and enforcement efforts to change the attitude and behaviour of the PLB passengers. As regards publicity, consideration should be given to measures such as improving the storyline of the API (see para. 4.13(a) and (c)(ii)). As regards enforcement, Audit noted that for the Police's territory-wide special operations targeting on seat belt offence of PLB passengers in 2011 and 2012 (see para. 4.15), a total of 1,280 passengers were found not wearing seat belts on PLBs. However, the Police issued warnings instead of summonses in 128 (10%) cases. Consideration should be given to taking more effective actions to convey a clear message that the Government is taking the matter seriously.

### *Other measures to enhance safety of PLB operation*

4.19 In addition to the passenger seat belt requirement (see Appendix A) to enhance the safety of PLB operation, the Administration has introduced a package of measures to deter malpractices and speeding behaviour of some PLB drivers, and to achieve better regulation of the travelling speed of PLBs. These include:

- (a) a measure introduced in May 2008 for penalising any misuse or malfunctioning of speed display device; and
- (b) measures introduced in April 2012 for imposing a maximum speed limit of 80 km/hr, mandatory installation of a speed limiter for all PLBs (capping the speed at 80 km/hr) and an electronic data recording device (EDRD) for newly registered PLBs, and mandating attendance at a pre-service course for new PLB drivers.

4.20 ***Penalties for offences.*** The penalties for contravening the speeding related new regulations are summarised as follows:

- (a) ***Misuse or malfunctioning of speed display device.*** The offender is liable to a fine of \$10,000 and imprisonment for six months;
- (b) ***Exceeding speed limit of 80 km/hr.*** The offending driver is liable to a fine of \$4,000 and incurring 3 to 10 driving-offence points; and
- (c) ***Malfunctioning or interference with the speed limiter.*** The offender is liable to a fine of \$10,000 and imprisonment for six months.

4.21 ***Enforcement power.*** If a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that a PLB has been involved in the speed limiter offence (e.g. detected speed over the 80 km/hr limit), he is empowered to:

- (a) direct the driver to drive the PLB to a vehicle examination centre; and
- (b) detain the vehicle for examination at a vehicle examination centre for not more than 72 hours.

4.22 In April 2012, the Police issued guidelines to assist its frontline staff in understanding the new measures and set out the required actions to be taken against the contravening PLBs. Depending on the extent of the detected speed of a PLB over the 80 km/hr limit, the police officer shall either refer the case to the TD for arranging vehicle examination or detain the PLB for examination at the Police vehicle examination centre. If for any reason the PLB is not detained, the police officer concerned shall record his reason.

### ***Enforcement action against speed limiter offence***

4.23 From April to October 2012, the Police took enforcement actions against 540 PLB speeding cases and 11 speed limiter offence cases. Table 7 is an analysis of the 540 speeding cases by the extent of the detected speeds above the road speed limits.

**Table 7**

**Analysis of PLB speeding cases  
(April to October 2012)**

<b>Speed in excess of road speed limit by</b>	<b>Number of PLBs</b>
(a) 15 km/hr or less	317
(b) 16 km/hr to 30 km/hr	221
(c) 31 km/hr to 45 km/hr	2
Total	540

*Source: Police records*

4.24 The Police has carried out the above analysis on a regular basis for all types of speeding vehicles. However, the analysis could not show whether the speeding PLBs had exceeded the 80 km/hr limit for which enforcement action should also be taken in respect of suspected speed limiter offence (see paras. 4.21

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and 4.22). For the two cases in item (c) of Table 7 (Note 23), Audit requested the Police to confirm the detected speeds and the follow-up actions taken.

4.25 In January 2013, the Police informed Audit that:

- (a) the PLBs in both cases had exceeded the 80 km/hr limit. However, enforcement action against suspected speed limiter offence as laid down in the Police's 2012 guidelines (see para. 4.22) had only been taken in one case; and
- (b) the officer concerned had been reminded to strictly comply with the guidelines to prevent recurrence of similar omission in future.

4.26 In Audit's view, the Police needs to review other PLB speeding cases to see if there is any breach of the 80 km/hr limit similar to that in paragraph 4.25(a) for taking necessary follow-up action against suspected speed limiter offence. To facilitate management monitoring of such enforcement action in future, the Police also needs to enhance its analysis of the PLB speeding cases (see para. 4.24) to highlight those exceeding the 80 km/hr limit.

### *Follow-up action on suspected offences detected*

4.27 Audit noted that the TD had on an ad-hoc basis conducted surveys (through contractors) to collect operational information of PLBs. In its surveys of 2010 and 2012, suspected offences were detected as shown in Table 8.

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**Note 23:** *As the speed limits for most roads in Hong Kong are 50 km/hr or above, the PLBs in these cases (with speeds exceeding the road speed limits by 31 km/hr or more) were likely to be travelling above the 80 km/hr limit.*

**Table 8****Suspected offences detected in TD's surveys**

<b>Survey</b>	<b>Number of suspected speeding offences</b>	<b>Number of suspected speed display device offences</b>
2010 (January to February)	N.A. (Note)	33
2012 (September)	17	6

*Source: TD records*

*Note: The 80 km/hr limit for PLB only came into effect in 2012.*

*Remarks: A total of 1,334 and 141 PLBs were surveyed in 2010 and 2012 respectively.*

4.28 Audit noted that there was room for improvement in taking follow-up actions on these suspected offences detected as follows:

- (a) for the 33 suspected cases of speed display device offences identified in the 2010 survey, the TD had not required examination of the PLBs concerned. Instead, the TD reminded the PLB operators to properly maintain the speed display devices;
- (b) for the 6 suspected cases of speed display device offences and 7 of the 17 suspected speeding cases (Note 24) identified in the 2012 survey, the TD issued orders for examining the PLBs concerned (Note 25). However, the orders allowed the owners/drivers concerned to take their PLBs to the TD for examination within six to ten days from the dates of

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**Note 24:** *According to the TD, vehicle examination of the remaining ten cases was not considered necessary.*

**Note 25:** *It is a requirement of the Road Traffic Ordinance to serve notice for vehicle examination but the notice period is not stipulated.*

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the orders. In the event, no irregularities were found in the vehicle examinations for all 13 cases. As the prior notice would give time for the PLB owners/drivers to fix their problems before the vehicle examination, the TD needs to seek the Police's assistance to ensure that PLBs involved in suspected offences of speed limiter and speed display device are examined in a timely manner (e.g. detaining suspected PLBs for examination in warranted cases); and

- (c) for the 17 suspected speeding cases identified in the 2012 survey, the TD referred them to the Police for necessary action in December 2012 (three months after the survey in September 2012). In January 2013, the Police informed Audit that no prosecution action could be taken on the 17 cases referred by the TD because there was difficulty to collect sufficient evidence after the long lapse of time.

### *Pre-service training course not yet implemented*

4.29 In March 2012, the Administration informed the Legislative Council House Committee that a lead time of six to nine months (after the enactment of the new legislation in April 2012) was required to implement the pre-service course for PLB licence applicants (see para. 4.19(b)).

4.30 However, up to January 2013, the TD was still drafting relevant documents for inviting the interested training institutes to apply for provision of the pre-service training course. According to the TD, the pre-service course might be implemented in 2013 subject to the selection and designation of suitable pre-service training institute. In Audit's view, there is a need to expedite action in this regard.

## Audit recommendations

### *Safety seat belt*

4.31 **Audit has recommended that the Commissioner for Transport should:**

- (a) **in conjunction with the Director of Environmental Protection, make greater efforts to encourage owners of diesel PLBs to participate in the upcoming incentive scheme for the early replacement of their**



vehicles with cleaner models fitted with passenger seat belts for protecting both the environment and passenger safety; and

- (b) explore other measures to encourage owners of the LPG fuelled PLBs without passenger seat belts to retrofit their vehicles with seat belts.

4.32 Audit has also *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should, in conjunction with the Road Safety Council, step up the enforcement and publicity efforts on promoting the wearing of passenger seat belts on PLBs.

### *Other measures to enhance safety of PLB operation*

4.33 Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should:

- (a) review the PLB speeding cases from April to October 2012 to see if there is any suspected speed limiter offence and take necessary follow-up action accordingly; and
- (b) enhance the analysis of PLB speeding cases to highlight those exceeding the 80 km/hr limit for monitoring the enforcement action against suspected speed limiter offence cases.

4.34 Audit has also *recommended* that the Commissioner for Transport should:

- (a) seek the Police's assistance to ensure that PLBs involved in suspected offences of speed limiter and speed display device are examined in a timely manner;
- (b) promptly refer suspected speeding related offence cases to the Police for necessary follow-up action; and
- (c) expedite action on the implementation of the pre-service training course for PLB driving licence applicants.

### Response from the Administration

4.35 The Commissioner for Transport agrees with the audit recommendations in paragraphs 4.31 and 4.34. She has said that the TD will:

- (a) continue to encourage the GMB operators to retrofit their PLBs with passenger seat belts in particular when they apply for extension of their licences, and encourage the RMB operators to retrofit their PLBs with passenger seat belts as far as practicable; and
- (b) expedite action on the implementation of the pre-service training course for PLB driving licence applicants with all concerned parties.

4.36 The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations in paragraphs 4.32, 4.33 and 4.34(a) and (b). He has said that:

- (a) all the Regional Traffic Formations have been notified to report PLB speeding cases from April to October 2012 for follow-up action; and
- (b) a new monthly reporting mechanism has been devised for the Traffic Formations to follow for the purpose of better monitoring of the enforcement action.

### Measures for taxis

4.37 In 2012, taxis carried, on average, about one million passengers daily, accounting for about 8% of all passengers using public transport. As at December 2012, there were 18,131 taxis. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 in paragraph 1.6, the accident involvement rates for taxis (e.g. 233.9 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012) were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (e.g. 33.1 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012).

4.38 In 2001, the Administration introduced passenger seat belt requirement to enhance the safety of taxi operation. Most taxis have been fitted with seat belts (see Note 2 to Appendix A).

### *Pre-service training programme not implemented*

4.39 In April 2003, the Administration informed the Panel on Transport of a proposal to improve the quality of taxi services. The proposal included a mandatory pre-service training programme to improve safe driving knowledge and attitude of prospective taxi drivers. However, the proposal has not been taken forward. The key events are summarised below:

- (a) in 1998, after a review of the taxi licensing system, a working group of the Transport Advisory Committee recommended, inter alia, implementing a mandatory taxi driver pre-service training programme to raise the standards and performance of taxi drivers;
- (b) the TD subsequently studied the practices in 18 overseas countries/cities and Mainland cities and found that 15 of them required taxi driver applicants to attend mandatory taxi driver pre-service training; and
- (c) in April 2003, the Administration informed the Panel on Transport of a proposal to improve the quality of taxi services, as follows:
  - (i) applicants for taxi driving licence should be required to attend a mandatory taxi driver pre-service training programme;
  - (ii) the scope of the taxi licence test should be expanded to cover proper driving attitude, map reading skills, Putonghua and English listening tests; and

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

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- (iii) persons who had held a valid full private car or light goods vehicle driving licence for at least one year, in lieu of three years, should be allowed to apply for a taxi driving licence.

The Panel Chairman conveyed the general support of the trade on the proposal and called for its early implementation. In response, the Administration undertook to finalise the proposal taking into account the views of all relevant parties. However, the proposal has not been taken forward thereafter and the Panel has not been informed of such change (Note 26).

### *Speeding problem of taxis*


4.40 Audit noted from the Police's enforcement statistics that the total number of speeding offences committed by taxi drivers had increased by 23% from 25,338 in 2007 to 31,258 in 2012. In terms of the number of speeding offences per 1,000 vehicles over the period 2007 to 2012, the speeding problem of taxis was more serious than that of PLBs and franchised buses (see Figure 10).

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**Note 26:** *According to the TD, the proposed pre-service training programme was bundled with the proposal to relax the eligibility requirement for applying for a taxi driving licence (see para. 4.39(c)(iii)) in order to increase the supply of taxi drivers. With the subsequent improvement in taxi driver supply because of economic changes, the proposal (including the pre-service training programme) was shelved.*

Figure 10

Number of speeding offences per 1,000 vehicles



Source: Audit analysis of Police and TD records

4.41 The speeding problem and the consistently higher accident involvement rate for taxis as mentioned above call for additional measures to enhance their safety operation. Such measures may include mandatory attendance at pre-service training, imposing a maximum speed and the installation of EDRD, speed display device and speed limiter similar to those implemented for PLBs. As can be seen from Figure 10, the speeding problem of PLBs had been eased with the implementation of these measures.

### Audit recommendations

- 4.42      **Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner for Transport should:**
- (a)      **consider the need for introducing additional measures to enhance the safety operation of taxis; and**
  - (b)      **keep the Panel on Transport apprised of any subsequent change in the implementation of a planned road safety measure.**

### Response from the Administration

4.43      The Commissioner for Transport agrees with the audit recommendations. She has said that the TD will:

- (a)      consider practicable measures to enhance the safe operation of taxis where appropriate; and
- (b)      continue to keep the Panel on Transport apprised of any subsequent change in the implementation of a planned road safety measure.

## Measures for franchised buses

4.44 Franchised buses are an integral part of the public transport system. In 2012, they carried, on average, some 3.8 million passengers daily, accounting for about 32% of all passengers using public transport. As at December 2012, there were 5,743 franchised buses. Their services are regulated and monitored by the TD in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) and the Road Traffic Ordinance.

4.45 As shown in Figures 2 and 3 in paragraph 1.6, the accident involvement rates for franchised buses (e.g. 379.8 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012) were consistently higher than the average for all motor vehicles (e.g. 33.1 per 1,000 vehicles in 2012). Over the years, a number of measures have been put in place to enhance the safety operation of franchised buses, as follows:

- (a) **Statutory measure.** Under the Road Traffic Ordinance, the maximum speed of a franchised bus is restricted to 70 km/hr for roads with general speed limit of over 70 km/hr; and
- (b) **Non-statutory measures.** As requested by the TD, the franchised bus operators have enhanced their safety arrangements by:
  - (i) requiring bus drivers aged 50 or above to undergo annual health checks (Note 27);
  - (ii) arranging basic training for new bus drivers and refresher training for incumbent drivers;

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**Note 27:** *Items covered are currently determined by the individual bus operators but the scope is similar. They include chest examinations as well as eyesight, hearing, diabetes, blood pressure, blood and urine test. For bus drivers aged 60 or more, an electrocardiogram is also required. However, the bus operators are not required to submit the health check results to the TD.*

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

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- (iii) reporting every three months on their implementation of the TD's guidelines on working hours of bus drivers (Note 28);
- (iv) installing speed limiters and black boxes on their buses (Note 29); and
- (v) providing seat belts at exposed seats (Note 30) of all new buses purchased after 2003, retrofitting seat belts at the front row on the upper deck of post-1997 design buses and installing additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of the pre-1997 design buses.

For item (iii) above, the TD engages an independent party to conduct annual survey on the working hours of bus drivers for verification purpose. According to the survey results of 2011, the compliance situation was generally satisfactory (Note 31).

4.46 ***Recent accidents.*** Between June and November 2012, there were three serious franchised bus traffic accidents in which the bus drivers concerned were reported to have lost consciousness at the times of the accidents. As at January 2013, the Police investigations or judicial proceedings of the three accidents were still in progress. Table 9 is a summary of background information of these accidents.

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**Note 28:** *The guidelines stipulate that bus drivers should have a break of not less than 10 hours between successive working days, maximum duty should not exceed 14 hours and driving duty should not exceed 11 hours in a day. There should be a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and total service breaks of at least 20 minutes within that 6-hour duty while 12 minutes of which should be within the first 4-hour duty. There should also be a meal break of 1 hour for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a day.*

**Note 29:** *A black box is an electronic device that records the operational data of a vehicle similar to the EDRD of a PLB (see Note 5 to para. 1.7(d)(iii)). As at December 2012, all the franchised buses had been fitted with speed limiters and black boxes.*

**Note 30:** *Exposed seats are forward-facing seats which are not immediately behind another forward-facing seat or an internal partition/panel.*

**Note 31:** *As at January 2013, the 2012 survey (which started in September 2012) had not yet been completed.*



Table 9

**Background information of three franchised bus traffic accidents**

Date	Location	Brief description of accident
June 2012	Tuen Mun	A bus rammed into a group of people at a bus stop killing one person and injuring five.
August 2012	Tsuen Wan	A bus rammed into a shopping mall injuring five people.
November 2012	Chai Wan	A bus lost control when travelling downhill hitting two private cars in front and then rammed into a taxi and another bus on the opposite vehicle lane. Three people were killed and 57 injured.

Source: Audit summary of media reports

***Health check requirement***

4.47 The Chai Wan accident has aroused major public concern. In late November 2012, the Administration reported to the Panel on Transport about its follow-up action on the accident. The Administration undertook to:

- (a) review, in conjunction with the franchised bus operators, the arrangements of health check for bus drivers to enhance road safety of franchised buses; and
- (b) in the light of any inadequacies in the existing legislation or policies as may be identified in the Police's investigation, review in detail the matters so as to ensure the road safety of franchised buses and other major road-based public transport modes.

4.48 ***Existing legislative requirements for all drivers.*** The Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations (Cap. 374B) stipulate that:

- (a) an applicant for a driving licence shall, on new application or reissue or renewal, make a declaration in the application form if he is suffering from

## Measures to promote safer vehicle operation

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any disease or physical disability listed in the Regulations (Note 32). The TD shall reject the application from an applicant with such disease or disability;

- (b) an applicant aged 70 years or more shall, on new application or renewal, produce a medical examination certificate to prove that he is medically fit to drive; and
- (c) a driving licence holder is required to inform the TD after he becomes aware that he is suffering from the listed disease or disability. The TD may cancel the licence after making the necessary inquiry which shows that he is unfit to drive.

4.49 On top of the above statutory requirements, the franchised bus operators have health check programmes for their drivers aged 50 or above, as requested by the TD (see para. 4.45(b)(i)). However, there is no similar health check programme for PLB and taxi drivers.

4.50 ***The Mainland and overseas practices.*** Based on Internet research, Audit has found that the Mainland and a number of overseas countries have stipulated in their laws more stringent health check requirements for taxi and bus drivers which would be of reference value to the Administration's ongoing review (see para. 4.47). For example:

- (a) in the Mainland, Australia (New South Wales), Canada (British Columbia), Singapore and the UK (Note 33), applicants for bus and taxi driving licences are required to submit medical examination certificates when applying for licences;
- (b) in the Mainland, Australia (New South Wales) and Canada (British Columbia), bus drivers are required to submit medical examination certificates periodically irrespective of their age;

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**Note 32:** *Examples include epilepsy, uncontrolled diabetes mellitus and liability to sudden attack of disabling giddiness or fainting due to hypertension or any other causes.*

**Note 33:** *The health check requirements apply to applicants for bus driving licence in the UK and applicants for taxi driving licence in London area.*

- (c) in the UK, bus drivers and taxi drivers (London area) are required to submit medical examination certificates periodically after they have reached the age of 45; and
- (d) in Singapore, bus and taxi drivers are required to submit medical examination certificates periodically after they have reached the age of 50.

Details of the Mainland and overseas practices are shown at Appendix B.

4.51 ***Problem in accessing drivers' medical records.*** According to the law which applies to all drivers, the TD may cancel a driving licence if the driver is unfit to drive (see para. 4.48(c)). Audit noted that from 2009 to 2012, the Police's traffic accident investigation revealed 55 cases where the drivers concerned might have been suffering from impaired health and hence unfit to drive. The Police had referred all these cases to the TD for follow-up actions. Audit sample checked 20 of the 55 cases and found that the TD could not obtain the drivers' consent to access their medical records in five cases (Note 34). Under the circumstances, the TD issued refraining orders to bar the drivers concerned (Note 35) from renewing their licences or applying for other vehicle driving licences. However, according to the TD's records, their licences would only expire between 2017 and 2019 (i.e. four to six years later).

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**Note 34:** *For the other 15 cases, the TD had cancelled the licences in two cases (after obtaining confirmation that the drivers were unfit to drive) and was following up with the hospitals/clinics in nine cases. No further action was necessary for the remaining four cases as either the driver licences had expired or there were medical reports confirming the drivers' fitness to drive.*

**Note 35:** *The five drivers comprised two taxi drivers, two private car drivers and one PLB driver.*

## **Audit recommendations**

- 4.52      **Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner for Transport should:**
- (a)      **take into account the health check requirements on taxi and bus drivers adopted by the Mainland and other countries in the ongoing review of measures to ensure the road safety of franchised buses and other major road-based public transport modes; and**
  - (b)      **explore measures to address the problem of obtaining drivers' consent to access their medical records in case they are suspected to be suffering from impaired health.**

## **Response from the Administration**

4.53      The Commissioner for Transport agrees with the audit recommendations. She has said that the TD will take into account privacy concern in consultation with relevant authorities when exploring measures to tackle the issue mentioned in paragraph 4.51.

## **PART 5: ACCURACY OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT DATA**

5.1 This PART examines the accuracy of traffic accident data collected and maintained by the Police, focusing on data concerning:

- (a) traffic accident locations (paras. 5.4 to 5.16); and
- (b) traffic accident contributory factors (paras. 5.17 to 5.23).

### **Traffic accident investigation**

5.2 The Police is responsible for investigating traffic accidents. The main objective of the investigation is to identify the cause of the accident and find out if the parties involved have contravened any traffic law for taking necessary enforcement actions. The Police requires its investigation officers to keep their investigation findings and results in individual physical files and input accident data into a computerised case management database (known as the Traffic Operations and Management System — TOMS) within 48 hours of the accidents. The data may be amended as necessary until the case is closed.

5.3 The Police's TOMS is linked with the TD's database (known as the Transport Information System — TIS (Note 36)) for the electronic transfer of traffic accident data. The TD uses the traffic accident data in the TIS to identify locations of accident black spots and accident trends for in-depth investigation and analysis. The data also serve as an important source of information for formulation of road safety strategies, publicity/education programme and on-going review of road safety legislation among other road safety initiatives.

### **Traffic accident locations**

5.4 The TD uses computer sorting of traffic accident data to help compile a list of accident black spots. The traffic accident location is identified using a grid

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**Note 36:** *Before 2008, the TD's database was known as the Traffic Accident Data System. For simplicity both systems are referred to as the TIS in this Audit Report.*

## Accuracy of traffic accident data

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reference system (Note 37). Locations meeting the following threshold criteria will be identified as accident black spots and prioritised for conducting investigation with a view to devising preventive and remedial measures:

- (a) six or more pedestrian injury accidents in a year;
- (b) nine or more injury accidents of any description in a year; or
- (c) two or more fatal accidents within five years.

The accident black spot list is updated quarterly. As at 30 September 2012, there were 91 locations on the black spot list.

### *Inaccurate grid references*

5.5 Inaccurate grid references could adversely affect the accuracy of the accident black spot list compiled by the TD in the following two ways:

- (a) a non-accident prone site would be wrongly listed as a traffic accident black spot if the same grid reference was used for accidents occurring on different locations of a road; and
- (b) a location with frequent accidents would be omitted from the accident black spot list if the grid references used for reporting the accidents were wrong on some occasions.

5.6 In the 2006 review, Audit found that the Police incorrectly input the same grid reference for 20 accidents occurring on different locations of a highway. The Police explained then that the grid references of new roads were often not input to the TIS immediately. For cases of grid reference not available at the time of data input, some police investigation officers had to use nearby grid references. In response, the TD said that the grid reference database of the TIS was updated regularly to include new roads once the maps were available. To help improve the

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**Note 37:** *For an accident occurring at the junction of two roads, the TD's computer system can alternatively use the two road names input by the Police to identify the accident location. However, the same cannot be done for an accident not occurring at the junction of two roads and such case will be sorted by the computer according to the input grid reference.*

accuracy in the input of grid reference, the TD agreed to upgrade the TIS to a more user-friendly map-based system.

5.7 Since the launch of the map-based TIS in October 2008, police investigation officers have been provided with online access from their computer terminals to the TIS's map. By clicking the recorded location of an accident on the map, a grid reference would be automatically generated for them.

5.8 ***TD's checking.*** To minimise the risks of inaccurate grid references mentioned in paragraph 5.5, the TD has since 2008 carried out selective checks on grid references input by the Police. Notwithstanding the launch of the map-based TIS, the TD still identified inconsistencies between the grid references and the description of the locations input by the Police.

5.9 In a meeting of April 2010, the TD informed the Police that about 40% of the input grid references were found to be inconsistent with the descriptions of the accident locations. It was subsequently agreed that the use of portable Global Positioning System (GPS) device would be a long-term solution. In October 2010 and March 2011, the TD provided a total of 105 GPS devices to the Police to facilitate the recording of grid references by police investigation officers when conducting investigations at the scene of traffic accidents.

5.10 ***Latest position.*** In this review, Audit found that the problem of inaccurate grid references still persisted. Out of the 27,755 accidents which occurred from April 2011 (after the provision of the GPS devices) to December 2012, the TD had checked 9,815 (Note 38) grid references input by the Police, by end of December 2012. The TD found that the grid references of 7,314 (i.e. 26% of 27,755) cases were inaccurate. Audit analysed the physical distances between the accident locations based on the inaccurate and the TD's amended grid references for the 7,314 cases. Those cases with distances over 50 metres (totalling 4,417) are

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**Note 38:** *Of the 27,755 accidents, the TD mainly focused its checking on 11,321 accidents that occurred at main roads. This was because 8,038 accidents that occurred at road junctions had been sorted by the TD's computer without using grid references (see Note 37 to para. 5.4). For 8,396 accidents occurring at minor roads and areas such as carparks, the TD did not consider them to be accident prone. In March 2013, the TD informed Audit that it had completed checking on the remaining 1,506 (11,321 less 9,815) cases and found that 950 had inaccurate grid references.*

## Accuracy of traffic accident data

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summarised in Table 10. In seven of the 1,028 cases with distances over 1,000 metres, the locations based on the inaccurate grid references were actually outside Hong Kong.

**Table 10**  
**Analysis of grid reference errors**  
**(31 December 2012)**

<b>Distance between the accident locations based on the inaccurate and the TD's amended grid references</b>	<b>Number of cases</b>
Over 50 metres but not more than 100 metres	839
Over 100 metres but not more than 200 metres	826
Over 200 metres but not more than 500 metres	1,064
Over 500 metres but not more than 1,000 metres	660
Over 1,000 metres	1,028
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,417</b>

*Source: Audit analysis of TD checking results*

5.11 Audit also noted that, as a result of the inaccurate grid references input by the Police, seven locations were incorrectly reported to have more than 11 accidents each in 2011-12 (i.e. meeting the accident black spot criteria — see para. 5.4). In fact, the TD's checking revealed that the accidents occurred at different locations for all the seven cases.

5.12 In response to Audit's enquiries in February and March 2013, the Police has said that:



- (a) the Police learnt of the 7,314 inaccurate grid reference cases (see para. 5.10) from Audit in February 2013. Through the monthly referral system, the TD had informed the Police of 205 inaccurate grid reference cases in 2011, and 157 inaccurate grid reference cases in 2012;
- (b) the seven cases with grid references outside Hong Kong mentioned in paragraph 5.10 were caused by inputting the Northing and Easting components of the grid references in reverse order. There was no deliberate malpractice on the part of the officers concerned; and
- (c) while the Police had already made effort to tighten up the procedures and supervisory controls for the input of grid references, there were system problems and difficulties experienced by the frontline officers in inputting grid references that needed to be addressed:
  - (i) there were cases where the TIS rejected the verified grid references and police officers were unable to enter further data. This phenomenon is common in roads built in the past several years; and
  - (ii) the map of the TIS had not been kept up-to-date. As such, grid references of accident locations on new roads might not be accepted by the TIS (Note 39).

5.13 The persistent problem of inaccurate grid reference input is unsatisfactory. The TD has to spend extra time and resources to rectify the problem. There is also a risk that the timeliness of accident black spot data could be compromised. In Audit's view, prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that the grid references for locations of traffic accidents are correctly input in the first place.

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**Note 39:** *The grid reference system was overlaid by the TD onto the TIS map to enable the recognition of grid references. If there is no such overlay for a location on the map, the TIS cannot recognise its grid reference, meaning that the grid reference input by the Police will be rejected.*

## **Audit recommendations**

- 5.14      **Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should:**
- (a)      **tighten up procedures and supervisory control to ensure the correct input of grid references for traffic accident locations; and**
  - (b)      **in conjunction with the Commissioner for Transport:**
    - (i)      **take measures to address any difficulties encountered by police investigation officers in inputting grid references; and**
    - (ii)     **consider enhancing the TOMS/TIS by incorporating a validation check control in the TOMS/TIS, so that police investigation officers would be alerted to any out of the range error at the time of data input.**

## **Response from the Administration**

5.15      The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations. He has said that:

- (a)      the Police and the TD have already agreed to have meetings to rectify difficulties faced by police officers in inputting grid references into the TIS; and
- (b)      the Police will continue to implement measures to tighten up procedures and supervisory functions for the input of data into the TOMS and TIS in an effort to reduce errors made by inputting officers. Supervisors at Sergeant, Inspector and Chief Inspector ranks will be required to double check the data of a specified percentage of cases.

5.16      The Commissioner for Transport agrees with the audit recommendations in paragraph 5.14(b). She has said that the TD will provide necessary assistance to the Police to improve the administrative procedures and implement system enhancement as appropriate.

## Traffic accident contributory factors

5.17 The TD relies on the traffic accident contributory factors input by the Police into the TIS for identifying problems of road environment, road users and driving behaviour, and formulating strategies to tackle specific types of accidents.

5.18 In the 1998 review, Audit's sample check revealed an error rate of 25% in the input of accident contributory factors. The inaccuracies arose because of input errors or failure to update data upon further investigations. In response to Audit's recommendations, the Police subsequently launched a more user-friendly TOMS, provided training on data input to investigation officers and developed a file re-submission system which required double checking of the data input before closing an investigation case.

5.19 In the 2006 review, Audit's sample check revealed an error rate of 13% in the input of accident contributory factors. Audit also found that the different contributory factor lists used for the TOMS and TIS could be improved by standardising the factor descriptions and consolidating similar factors. In response to Audit's recommendations, the Police and the TD subsequently streamlined the contributory factor lists of the TOMS and TIS (Note 40). The Police also incorporated a supervisory checking function in the TOMS and provided training to staff concerned.

5.20 **Audit examination.** In this review, Audit examined 50 traffic accident investigation case files (Note 41) and the related 280 accident contributory factors input to the TIS. Audit found that 37 (13%) of the input factors in 34 cases were inaccurate, as follows:

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**Note 40:** *The TIS list was shortened from 126 factors to 90 factors while the TOMS list was shortened from 45 factors to 44 factors. The TOMS list is shorter than the TIS list because the former mainly covers driver factors whereas the latter has a more detailed coverage of driver, vehicle, environment and casualty factors. The TOMS has a designated section of data fields for police investigation officers to input information for transfer to the TIS (including the 90 TIS accident contributory factors).*

**Note 41:** *The 50 case files covered all five Regional Traffic Formations (see para. 3.21).*

- (a) in seven cases, mechanical defect was input as the accident contributory factor. While subsequent vehicle examination reports showed that no mechanical defect was involved, the TIS record was not amended (similar to the observation mentioned in para. 5.18); and
- (b) for the remaining 27 cases, Audit found that the contributory factors input could not be supported by the evidence recorded in the case file. For example, mechanical defect was input as the accident contributory factor in 10 cases but there was no mentioning of such defect in the supporting documents (such as witness statements). In one accident involving a moving bus and a stationary bus at a bus terminus, lost control of the stationary bus was input as one of the contributory factors for the accident. However, there was no record to show how the stationary bus without a driver had lost control.

5.21 In view of the recurrence of the data input problem, Audit reviewed the internal control measures implemented by the Police (i.e. the file re-submission system and TOMS supervisory checking function — see paras. 5.18 and 5.19). Audit found that there were limitation and implementation problem of these measures, as follows:

- (a) ***File re-submission system.*** The system ensured that invalid data in the TIS (as identified and rejected by the TD) were checked and re-submitted to the TIS correctly by police investigation officers and their supervisors. As the TD did not have access to the Police's case file, the TD's validation check could only reveal discrepancies among the input data in the TIS but not the discrepancies with the underlying records of the case file (such as those mentioned in para. 5.20); and
- (b) ***TOMS supervisory checking function.*** The function facilitated the supervisory officers to conduct on-line checking of the accuracy of data input to the TOMS (but not those for conversion to the TIS — see Note 40 to para. 5.19). Moreover, the Police has not specified the required percentage of supervisory check. For the 50 accident investigation case files examined by Audit (see para. 5.20), there was no record of such supervisory check.

## **Audit recommendations**

**5.22**      **Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should tighten the Police's management control to improve the accuracy of accident contributory factors input to the TOMS by:**

- (a)      reminding supervisory staff to critically check the accuracy of data input to the TOMS against the records kept in the case files;**
- (b)      extending the TOMS supervisory checking functions to cover data for transfer to TIS;**
- (c)      specifying the required percentage of supervisory check and regularly monitoring its compliance; and**
- (d)      requiring supervisory staff to maintain record of their supervisory checks (such as keeping printouts of TOMS/TIS data checked) in relevant case files for management review.**

## **Response from the Administration**

**5.23**      **The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendations. He has said that:**

- (a)      supervisory officers will keep the TOMS/TIS printouts in the files they have checked to facilitate the checking process. Records of checks made will be kept in a register designed for that purpose and also in the case file;**
- (b)      the list containing input errors currently circulated by the TD to the team officer-in-charge will in future be copied to respective Superintendents of Police of the Regional Traffic Formations to ensure proper monitoring of the error rate and of the correction process; and**
- (c)      supervisors at Sergeant, Inspector and Chief Inspector ranks will be required to double check the data input of a specified percentage of cases.**

## **PART 6: PUBLICITY AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES**

6.1 This PART examines the following issues relating to the management of road safety publicity and education programmes:

- (a) production of APIs (paras. 6.4 to 6.9); and
- (b) publicity on bicycle safety fittings (paras. 6.10 to 6.18).

### **The Road Safety Council's role**

6.2 The Road Safety Council organises publicity and education programmes through its Road Safety Campaign Committee (RSCC) to disseminate road safety messages and educate different road user groups (see Note 1 to para. 1.3). These programmes are primarily financed by government provision. In 2011-12, the Council received \$4.7 million funding from the Transport and Housing Bureau and \$260,000 from various commercial sponsors of its road safety activities.

6.3 Taking into account the traffic accident trends and public concerns, the Road Safety Council determines the major publicity themes for each financial year. For example, in 2012-13, anti-drug driving, elderly pedestrian safety and cycling safety were the Council's main publicity themes. Most of the road safety publicity campaigns are sustained throughout the year and employ a variety of publicity and advertising means including the broadcast of APIs on TV and radio, exhibitions, community involvement activities and a host of printed materials.

### **Production of announcements in the public interest**

6.4 According to a survey commissioned by the Road Safety Council in 2005, TV topped the mediums through which road safety messages were effectively received by respondents. With the assistance of the ISD, the Road Safety Council produces one to three TV APIs each year to disseminate road safety messages.

6.5 In 2011 and 2012, the broadcast of an API for combating drug driving was shelved and another one for promoting safe cycling was temporarily withheld respectively after receiving complaints about their contents. The key events and circumstances leading to the shelving of the two APIs are summarised below (see Cases 1 and 2).

**Case 1**

**API for combating drug driving**

1. In September 2010, the ISD on behalf of the Road Safety Council awarded a contract for the production of a set of TV and radio APIs, and the design of a poster and a leaflet to publicise the adverse effect of drug abuse on driving. The contract sum was \$406,000 (i.e. \$353,000 for the TV API and \$53,000 for the other items).
2. The TV API had been broadcast for two months from late January 2011 to early April 2011 when a local magazine alleged that the API had infringed the copyrights of a UK anti-drug driving video. After viewing the UK video, the ISD ceased broadcasting the TV API, sought explanation from the contractor on the similarities between the two videos and gathered more background information from the copyright owner of the UK video. While the contractor replied that the creative concept was his own, the UK copyright owner informed the ISD that his lawyer believed that there was a clear infringement of his copyrights.
3. After consulting the Intellectual Property Department in June and September 2011, the ISD tried a number of times to obtain more information from the contractor about the production of the TV API, but to no avail.
4. In March 2012, the ISD obtained an offer from the UK copyright owner to grant a licence for the broadcast of the API subject to the charging of a licence fee. While the ISD reminded the contractor of his contractual obligation to provide material that was free of copyright issues and to indemnify the Government against all claims, the contractor refused to pay the fee, maintaining that the API was his creation.
5. In April 2012, after obtaining legal advice, it was decided that no legal action would be taken against the contractor. In June 2012, the contractor's name was removed from the ISD's list of service providers for API production.

*Source: Police and ISD records*

### Case 2

#### API for promoting cyclists' safety on public roads

1. In August 2011, the ISD on behalf of the Road Safety Council awarded a contract for the production of a set of TV and radio APIs, and the design of a poster, a leaflet and a banner to publicise cyclists' safety on public roads. The contract sum was \$450,000 (i.e. \$405,000 for the TV API and \$45,000 for the other items).
2. The contractor was instructed to convey in the TV API key messages of joint efforts to prevent bicycle accidents, i.e. drivers should pay attention to cyclists on the road and keep a distance from them while cyclists are obliged to obey all traffic laws and are encouraged to wear helmets and safety gears.
3. On 16 September 2011 (two days before the shooting), the contractor invited the ISD by e-mail to approve the bicycle and vehicles to be used for the shooting. The side view photograph of the bicycle attached to the e-mail did not clearly show whether it was fitted with a bell and a rear reflector as required under the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A). After consulting the TD and the Police, the ISD advised the contractor that the proposed bicycle and vehicles were acceptable and that there would not be any government officers attending the shooting.
4. The bicycle finally used in the API production was not fitted with a bell and a rear reflector (contrary to the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations). However, the omission was not detected when the API rough cut and final cut were circulated to the TD and the Police (among other RSCC members) for comments in October 2011 and January 2012 respectively.
5. The TV API featuring an improperly fitted bicycle had been broadcast for six months from mid-January 2012 to July 2012 when the TD and the Road Safety Council secretariat received complaints and media enquiry concerning the bicycle. The RSCC then agreed to withhold the broadcast of the API temporarily for exploring possible remedy. In January 2013, the ISD was exploring the possibility of modifying the API.

*Source: TD, Police and ISD records*



6.6 The problems in the API contents of the above two cases not only frustrated the Government's efforts to disseminate road safety messages to the public but also affected the image of the Government. There is a need to draw lessons from these cases to prevent recurrence of similar problems. In this connection, Audit has the following observations:

- (a) **Copyright issues.** There are clear provisions in the API quotation and contract documents about a contractor's obligations on the copyright issues and his liability to indemnify the Government against all claims. While these provisions serve to protect the Government's interest in the event of a legal claim against the Government, it is prudent to step up the review of API and other materials to be produced by contractors to identify early any possible copyright infringement issues. Consideration may be given to conducting Internet search for planned road safety APIs (Note 42) to see if there are similar materials being used by major overseas road safety authorities that could give rise to copyright infringement issues. The ISD may also explore the feasibility of introducing performance-based payment such that the contractor would only receive full contract payment after the successful launch of the API; and
- (b) **Relevant bureaux/departments' input in API production.** According to the ISD's Good Practice Guide on Publicity Campaigns, relevant bureaux/departments are to attend the shooting session of TV APIs. However, no government officers attended the shooting of the API on safe cycling. In the light of this incident, the ISD has indicated that it would make a special effort to ensure that the API storyboard and script are cleared by relevant bureaux/departments and would insist that their appropriate experts are present during the shooting session. The ISD would refuse to proceed with the shooting session where appropriate if these conditions are not met.

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**Note 42:** *The checking should be conducted as early as practicable (e.g. after the presentation of the creative proposals by the selected service provider) and during the review of the API rough cut.*

## **Audit recommendations**

**6.7      Audit has *recommended* that the Director of Information Services should:**

- (a)      step up the review of API and other materials to be produced by contractors to identify early any possible copyright infringement issues; and**
- (b)      explore the feasibility of introducing performance-based contract payment to encourage compliance with the copyright requirement in API production.**

**6.8      Audit has also *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police should, in conjunction with the Road Safety Council, tighten controls to ensure that road safety API contents are critically checked.**

## **Response from the Administration**

**6.9      The Director of Information Services and the Commissioner of Police agree with the audit recommendations in paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8 respectively.**

## Publicity on bicycle safety fittings

6.10 According to the TD's statistics, cycling accident casualties were on an upward trend, i.e. an increase of 48% from 1,648 in 2007 to 2,443 in 2011. For the three years from 2010-11 to 2012-13, the Road Safety Council included cycling safety as one of the main publicity themes. The budget for cycling safety campaign activities was increased from \$100,000 in 2010-11 to \$650,000 in 2012-13.

6.11 As mentioned in Case 2 in paragraph 6.5, the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations require that bicycles for use on roads should be fitted with a bell and a rear reflector. Other statutorily required safety fittings include a braking system, and a white front light and red rear light when running on a road during the hours of darkness or in poor visibility conditions.

6.12 The above statutory requirements have been promulgated by the Road Safety Council, the Police and the TD as part of their cycling safety publicity and education programmes as follows:

- (a) in various leaflets/pamphlets for publicising safe cycling and on the Road Safety Council's website, cyclists have been advised to make sure their bicycle bells, lights, reflectors and brakes are functioning properly before riding. The Police has regularly distributed the leaflets/pamphlets to schools, bicycle shops and during on-street publicity activities (particularly in the New Territories where the use of bicycles for commuting and recreation is common). In 2009, the Road Safety Council distributed 3,000 free bicycle bells at its publicity functions; and
- (b) in one of the videos on "Safe cycling: rules and tips" released by the TD in May 2012, cyclists have been advised to make sure their bicycle bells, lights, reflectors and brakes are functioning properly before riding (Note 43). A similar message is also carried in a pamphlet "Cycling safety" which is available on the TD's website. In the TD's Internet-based Cycling Information Centre launched in December 2011,

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**Note 43:** *The video has been posted in the YouTube and websites of the Road Safety Council and the TD, distributed to schools, and broadcast at the TD's licensing offices, Hong Kong Sports Institute and several Leisure and Cultural Services Department venues.*

## Publicity and education programmes

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the relevant sections of the law concerning the bicycle safety fittings are cited.

6.13 To assess the extent to which bicycles used on roads are fitted with the statutorily required bell and rear reflector (Note 44), in January 2013, Audit staff inspected bicycles running/parked on the streets of the New Territories. As shown in Table 11, 104 (35%) of the 294 bicycles inspected were without a bell and 204 (69%) were not fitted with a rear reflector, contrary to the law. Photographs 2 and 3 show bicycles running/parked on streets without a rear reflector.

**Table 11**

### **Audit findings on bicycles in cycle parking areas outside railway stations**

Railway station	Number of bicycles		
	Inspected	Without bell	Without rear reflector
Sheung Shui Station	39	12	25
Tai Po Station	50	19	39
Tai Wai Station	20	1	18
Yuen Long Station	50	17	28
Tin Shui Wai Station	50	19	33
Siu Hong Station	35	17	24
Tung Chung Station	50	19	37
Total	294	104 (35%)	204 (69%)

*Source: Audit field inspections in January 2013*

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**Note 44:** *The other two required safety fittings were not covered because the working condition of the braking system could not be assessed by visual inspections and the fitting of front and rear lights was not required during the daytime.*

**Photograph 2**


**Bicycle without a rear reflector running on the street**



*Source: Photograph taken by Audit in Sheung Shui*

**Photograph 3**

**Bicycles without a rear reflector in a cycle parking area**



*Source: Photograph taken by Audit in Tin Shui Wai*

## Publicity and education programmes

6.14 Audit staff also visited nine bicycle shops on Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories and found that many bicycles for sale/hire had similar problems. As shown in Table 12, 186 (67%) of the 278 bicycles inspected were without a bell and 216 (78%) were not fitted with a rear reflector. Photographs 4 and 5 are some examples.

**Table 12**  
**Audit findings on bicycles for sale/hire**

Shop	Location	Bicycles for sale		
		Inspected (Number)	Without bell (Number)	Without rear reflector (Number)
A	North District	23	23	18
B	Shatin	20	20	20
C	Kowloon	25	25	20
D	Kowloon	77	77	33
E	Hong Kong Island	29	25	21
	Sub-total	174	170 (98%) (Note)	112 (64%)
Shop	Location	Bicycles for hire		
		Inspected (Number)	Without bell (Number)	Without rear reflector (Number)
F	Tai Po	22	2	22
G	Shatin	30	7	30
H	Shatin	32	5	32
I	Shatin	20	2	20
	Sub-total	104	16 (15%)	104 (100%)
Total		278	186 (67%)	216 (78%)

Source: Audit field inspections in January 2013

Note: While 98% of the bicycles on display for sale were not fitted with a bell, Table 11 in paragraph 6.13 shows that only 35% of the bicycles in the cycle parking areas were found not fitted with a bell, suggesting that some bicycles could have been fitted with a bell at the time of purchase or afterwards.

**Photograph 4**

**Bicycles for sale not fitted with a rear reflector**



*Source: Photograph taken by Audit*

**Photograph 5**

**Bicycles for hire not fitted with a rear reflector**



*Source: Photograph taken by Audit*



## Publicity and education programmes

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6.15 In January and February 2013, Audit made enquiries at 12 shops selling bicycles (including Shops A to E in Table 12) about the safety fittings that should be installed to a bicycle. 3 (25% of the 12) shopkeepers and 10 (83%) shopkeepers failed to advise that the fitting of a bell and a rear reflector respectively was a statutory requirement.

6.16 The above audit findings suggest that the statutory requirements on the safety fittings of bicycle might not be well understood. Audit considers that there is a need to step up publicity to promote the public awareness of the safety and statutory requirements, paying particular attention to shops from which the general public buy/rent their bicycles.

### Audit recommendation

6.17 Audit has *recommended* that the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner for Transport should, in conjunction with the Road Safety Council, step up publicity to promote the public awareness of the statutory requirements for bicycle safety fittings, paying particular attention to shops from which the general public buy/rent their bicycles.

### Response from the Administration

6.18 The Commissioner of Police agrees with the audit recommendation.



**Appendix A**  
(paras. 4.3, 4.19  
and 4.38 refer)

### Summary of seat belt requirements

Vehicle type	Driver and front seat passenger	Middle front seat passenger	Rear seat passenger
Private car	Seat belt must be worn if fitted (1983)	Seat belt must be worn if fitted (1996)	Seat belt must be worn if fitted (1996) (Note 1)
Taxi	Seat belt must be worn if fitted (1989)		Seat belt must be worn if fitted (2001) (Note 2)
PLB			Seat belt must be worn if fitted (2004)
Private light bus			N.A. (Note 3)
Goods vehicle	Seat belt must be worn if fitted (1990)		N.A.
Bus	Seat belt for driver must be worn if fitted (1997)	N.A.	N.A. (Note 4)

*Source: Road Traffic (Safety Equipment) Regulations (Cap. 374F)*

*Note 1: According to the TD, of the 454,697 licensed private cars as at 31 December 2012, 15,710 (3%) were registered before the relevant statutory requirement took effect in 1996 and hence exempted from the seat belt requirement.*

*Note 2: Of the 18,131 licensed taxis as at 31 December 2012, 2,073 (11%) were registered before the relevant statutory requirement took effect in 2001. According to the TD, most of these exempted taxis had been fitted with passenger seat belts when they were imported into Hong Kong (though the exact figure is not available).*


*Note 3: With effect from May 2009, newly registered private light buses for carrying school children are required by law to be fitted with safer seats and restraining barriers. According to the TD, as at 31 December 2012, of the 2,439 licensed private light buses, 1,468 (60%) were for carrying school children. In 2012, the accident involvement rate per 1,000 vehicles for private light buses was 5.4 as against 33.1 for all motor vehicles (see Figure 2 in para. 1.6).*

*Note 4: In 2007, the TD informed the Panel on Transport that its research showed no overseas countries required the fitting of seat belts on passenger seats of buses designated for urban use or for carrying standing passengers. As for franchised buses, the measures for protecting passenger safety provided by the operators upon the TD's request are detailed in paragraph 4.45(b).*

*Remarks: The year in bracket indicates when the relevant seat belt law became effective.*

**Appendix B**  
(para. 4.50 refers)

**Health check requirements in the Mainland and overseas countries**



Source: Audit research

Note 1: The health check requirement for bus drivers between the age of 50 and 70 is imposed by franchised bus operators as requested by the TD. It is not a statutory requirement.

Note 2: Drivers are required to submit medical certificates annually after they have reached the age of 66.

Note 3: The health check requirements apply to applicants for bus driving licences in the UK and applicants for taxi driving licences in London area.

## Acronyms and abbreviations

API	Announcement in the public interest
Audit	Audit Commission
EDRD	Electronic data recording device
GMBs	Green minibuses
GPS	Global Positioning System
ISD	Information Services Department
km/hr	Kilometres per hour
LPG	Liquefied petroleum gas
PLBs	Public light buses
Police	Hong Kong Police Force
RMBs	Red minibuses
RSCC	Road Safety Campaign Committee
TD	Transport Department
TIS	Transport Information System
TOMS	Traffic Operations and Management System
TV	Television
UK	United Kingdom
$\mu\text{g}/100\text{ ml}$	Micrograms per 100 millilitres

本署檔號 Our Ref.: TD RS 4-35/1C Pt. 2

來函檔號 Your Ref.: CB(4)/PAC/R60

16 May 2013

Ms Mary So  
Clerk  
Public Accounts Committee  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central  
Hong Kong

Dear Ms So,

**Public Accounts Committee**  
**Consideration of Chapter 2 of the Director of Audit's Report No. 60**  
**Administration of road safety measures**

Thank you for your letter of 7 May 2013. We provide the following responses in respect of the issues raised –


- (a) Of the 120 road traffic fatalities in Hong Kong in 2012, 15 were involved in traffic accidents happened on expressways which represents 12.5% of fatalities on all roads. In terms of fatality rates per million veh-km, the rate for expressways was about 0.004, which was substantially lower than that of all roads which was about 0.01. The 120 road traffic fatalities contributed to about 8% of fatalities of all external causes in 2012. Typical examples of other types of external causes include suicide, falls, accidental poisoning, fire accidents and homicide etc.
- (b) Not many major cities in overseas countries publish statistics on accident involvement rates separately for public transport. Within limited time, we could only obtain relevant figures for some major cities in the United Kingdom (Annex 1). Whilst there are differences in vehicle classification and the mode of public transport operation, we consider it more appropriate to

compare the rates of London with those of Hong Kong as the public transport system and usage and the development density are more comparable. It is apparent that our rates are generally on the lower side when comparing with those of London.

- (c) For franchised buses, because of the large number of passengers carried and the presence of standing passengers, a significant proportion of accidents involves injury of passengers even there is no collision. This type of accidents typically involves passengers losing balance inside the bus compartment due to various reasons, such as not holding the handrail tightly or falling down when boarding or alighting. These are classified as non-collision type accidents. Of the 2 217 franchised buses involved in road traffic accidents in 2012, 1 294 (58%) were non-collision type accidents. The rates per million veh-km of franchised bus involved in all accidents, non-collision type accidents, and collision type accidents from 2007 to 2012 are given respectively in Annex 2. A chart comparing the involvement rates in collision type accidents for selected transport modes is also shown in Annex 3. It can be seen that the involvement rates of franchised bus in collision type accidents were comparable to that of all motor vehicles. The factors contributing to occurrence of collision type accidents of franchised buses are similar to those of other vehicle types, except that there was much higher percentage of the factor “failing to ensure the safety of passenger”, as illustrated in Annex 4. We are mindful of the high proportion of non-collision type accidents of franchised buses. We have jointly taken effort with the franchised bus companies to promote bus passenger safety through education and publicity channels such as Announcement of Public Interest on TV and radio, on-bus TV broadcasting as well as display of “holding onto handrails” and “no standing on stairway” posters and sticker notices inside bus compartments. Most of the franchised buses currently in service are equipped with some, if not all, of the features like low-floor (wheelchair-accessible), continuous railing and handrails at exit door and priority seats for passengers in need. In addition, there are standard provisions on new buses for a safer bus journey including non-slippery bus floor material, high contrast step-edge and closing door buzzer and warning lamp at exits.

- (d) The practices in addressing the privacy concern arising from the use of average speed camera system (ASCS) in Australia, New Zealand, Norway and European Union (EU) are summarized in Annex 5.
- (e) We estimate that \$3.2 million will be spent on studying the feasibility and the design of the average speed camera system in Hong Kong, and \$11.3 million will be spent on the procurement and installation of the ASCS for the trial scheme at the Shenzhen Bay Bridge of the Hong Kong Shenzhen Western Corridor.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ingrid Yeung', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

(Mrs Ingrid Yeung)  
Commissioner for Transport

c.c. Secretary for Transport and Housing (Fax : 2537 6519)  
Commissioner of Police (Fax : 2520 1210)  
Director of Information Services (Fax : 2537 9560)  
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Fax : 2147 5239)  
Director of Audit (Fax : 2583 9063)

**Vehicle involvement rates (in million veh-km) for  
selected classes of motor vehicle in 2011**

Mode	Hong Kong	City of London	Manchester	Birmingham
Public bus	3.11 <sup>(1)</sup>	7.73 <sup>(2)</sup>	2.64 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.23 <sup>(2)</sup>
Franchised bus	4.19	-	-	-
Taxi and private car <sup>(3)</sup>	1.51	1.99	1.02	0.77
Taxi <sup>(3)</sup>	1.85	-	-	-

Notes:


- (1) The involvement rate for public bus includes franchised buses and non-franchised buses.
- (2) Figures refer to the involvement rates for all buses.
- (3) Only figures including taxis and private cars are available from London, Manchester and Birmingham. The vehicle involvement rate of taxi in Hong Kong is also listed out as reference.

**Involvement rates (in million veh-km) of franchised bus in Hong Kong,  
2007-2012**

Year	All franchised bus accident involvement rates	Involvement rate of franchised bus in non-collision type accidents only	Involvement rate of franchised bus in collision type accidents only
2007	4.07	2.32	1.75
2008	3.83	2.22	1.61
2009	3.63	2.23	1.40
2010	3.84	2.30	1.54
2011	4.19	2.43	1.76
2012	4.27	2.49	1.78



**Involvement rates (in million veh-km) in collision type accidents of selected classes of vehicle in Hong Kong, 2007-2011**



**Involvements of franchised buses and other motor vehicles in collision type accidents in 2012 by driver contributory factors**

Driver contributory factor	Franchised buses		Other motor vehicles	
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
With driver factor				
Driving inattentively	93	(10.1)	2 724	(16.0)
Driving too close to vehicle in front	62	(6.7)	1 294	(7.6)
Careless lane changing	36	(3.9)	855	(5.0)
Turning right/left negligently	19	(2.1)	486	(2.8)
Starting negligently	11	(1.2)	150	(0.9)
Failing to ensure the safety of passenger	10	(1.1)	11	(0.1)
To avoid collision or otherwise : swerving/stopping suddenly	5	(0.5)	294	(1.7)
Emerging from side road negligently	5	(0.5)	121	(0.7)
Lost control of vehicle	4	(0.4)	340	(2.0)
Disobey traffic signal/light	4	(0.4)	196	(1.1)
Driving too close to vehicle alongside	4	(0.4)	46	(0.3)
Driving too close to kerb	4	(0.4)	34	(0.2)
Reversing negligently	3	(0.3)	347	(2.0)
Overtaking on offside/nearside negligently	3	(0.3)	148	(0.9)
Opened door negligently (driver)	2	(0.2)	33	(0.2)
Furious/dangerous driving	2	(0.2)	14	(0.1)
Sudden illness, or mental defect	2	(0.2)	6	(0.0)
Disobey give way sign (slow)	1	(0.1)	108	(0.6)
Disobey stop sign (halt)	1	(0.1)	43	(0.3)
Driving a dangerous vehicle	1	(0.1)	21	(0.1)
Disobey double white lines	1	(0.1)	16	(0.1)
Stopping negligently	1	(0.1)	7	(0.0)
Failing to keep to nearside of road	1	(0.1)	4	(0.0)
Other driver factor	86	(9.3)	1 516	(8.9)
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>361</i>	<i>(39.1)</i>	<i>8 814</i>	<i>(51.7)</i>
With no driver factor	562	(60.9)	8 246	(48.3)
Total	923	(100)	17 060	(100)

**Overseas practices in addressing privacy concern arising from  
the use of average speed camera system**

- (i) In Australia, the legislation that regulates the use of traffic cameras make it clear that the images (whether or not they contain any personal information) can only be used for speeding or other traffic offences, or for another purpose that is authorized by law. The images recorded by the ASCS do not identify a driver or other vehicle occupants but the licence plates. All images are encrypted at time of capture, and protected by a digital signature for proving the authenticity of the evidence. The encryption and decryption keys are only made available to authorized persons.
- (ii) In New Zealand, cameras should not be able to inadvertently capture images within someone's private property, nor capture any other personal information because the legislation protects individuals from having their private property exposed by other parties. The cameras of ASCS are employed to observe solely the traffic on the roads.
- (iii) In Norway, the Data Protection Agency is authorized to inspect the ASCS on how personal data was handled in order to ascertain whether it was stored and deleted in accordance with the regulations. The camera boxes and central servers would be reviewed to verify that all personal data in connection with ASCS operations never leaves the boxes containing the cameras and is deleted as soon as the speed is determined. The same applies to data from violation vehicles after the maximum number of days (30) of storage.
- (iv) In EU countries currently using ASCS, data of vehicles not exceeding speed limits are automatically erased by the systems for privacy reasons. Data protection should not therefore constitute a major legal obstacle for the deployment of ASCS. However legislation varies from country to country, and since data from all vehicles entering a section of road equipped with ASCS are collected and processed in a first step before being erased, it has been made clear that the whole process should comply with the legislation of individual country.

**From:** panel\_t/LEGCO

**To:**

**Date:** Monday, December 16, 2013 03:43PM

**Subject:** Fw: 就 運輸署監管九巴服務 題問

To: "panel\_t@legco.gov.hk" <panel\_t@legco.gov.hk>

From: So K.Y. <>

Date: 11/23/2013 08:02AM

Subject: 就 運輸署監管九巴服務 題問

致 交通事務委員會 主席:

本人曾在2012年11月15日發電郵至運輸署,反映九巴89X第一城鐵路站位置,每逢繁忙時間(特別是早上時間),89X前往觀塘方向排隊人龍,需要在單車徑上排隊,來往單車,均需要切線躲避.九巴曾在2013年年頭對巴士站做過改善工程,但到今天2013年11月15日及20日,本人依然見到乘客需在單車徑上排隊候車.相關內容可見以下影片內.

<https://mega.co.nz/#F!nABCUAxa!bDiZfnMVCaAaikjzJd6l9g>

<https://mega.co.nz/#F!LIiIBbR!HITNKGcQA6okRG0nPtTxOw>

另外,本人於2013年6月27日發電郵至運輸署,指出89X, 74X, 89P, 80X, 112, 102, 215X等路線,見到車頭擋風玻璃位置有乘客站立而該巴士繼續行車,該行為是否合法? 運輸署在回覆中指出(運輸署檔號: TDNR/1-70/1/43C), 根據香港法例第230A條《公共巴士服務規例》,巴士移動時,乘客不得站立在通道上劃上橫線以外的範圍.本署理解在早晚繁忙時段,一些乘客可能在巴士車廂已擠擁的情況下仍然上車而要站立在橫線以外的範圍.就此,本署已提醒巴士公司,巴士車長及相關站長必須勸籲乘客上車後應盡量進入車廂後方位置.若果乘客站立的位置影響行車安全時,車長亦會對乘客發出適當的指示.本署已再次要求巴士公司派員於繁忙時段監察個別路線的乘客登車情況.但到今日為止,我每日都見過不少乘客,依然站立在車頭位置而該巴士繼續行車.

再者, 運輸署職員,CAROL LY CHEUNG (carolcheung@td.gov.hk)在2011年6月24日回覆本人內題及:『就處理市民的投訴,本署已提示各員工,如需要較長時間來處理較繁複的投訴,應於收到有關投訴後十個工作天內,給予有關投訴人初步回覆,然後在二十一個工作天內再提供詳細的回覆.』但運輸署在回覆本人電郵時,每每都超過10+21工作天的時間,到本人追問才敷衍回覆.

本人曾在2013年7月8日發電郵至運輸署,指出:

『2013年7月4日中午12時40分,本人曾至電運輸署署長電話2829-5200,接聽電話當然又是自稱運輸署署長秘書陳太,本人反映對黃依凡小姐於2013年7月3日電郵回覆極之不滿,想找運輸署署長楊太.

陳太表示運輸署署長正在開會,有咩野佢會記低.但我表示曾經好多次都留言都無人覆我,唔係仲叫我留言嘛? 運輸署真係除左EVA WONG外,即時有沒有其他人可以在運輸署署長開會時解決我問題.

陳太唔知係度同我發爛咋,就話我態度差,佢唔想同我講,話佢要收線.之後我再打2829-5200,完全沒有人再接聽電話(我估佢可能趕著去食飯或吞POP).

根據2011年6月24日,運輸署職員,CAROL LY CHEUNG (carolcheung@td.gov.hk)題及:『就處理市民的投訴,本署已提示各員工,如需要較長時間來處理較繁複的投訴,應於收到有關投訴後十個工作天內,給予有關投訴人初步回覆,然後在二十一個工作天內再提供詳細的回覆.』

運輸署到7月上旬才回覆本人5月14日投訴,發爛咋理應是我,現在變成投訴者及受害者,還要受不做事的人的氣,敢請問運輸署署長,是不是容許運輸署員工,不做事仲可以聲大夾惡呢?

之後我打2829-5202,搵LAW小姐,接聽我秘書小姐當然又話LAW小姐係到開會,我將之前比陳太CUT線經歷簡單講一次,秘書小姐記低左我電話,話會搵人覆我,轉眼已幾日,當然又係無人覆我.』

及

『從運輸署以上回覆中,每次出外調查數據,巴士平均載客率近乎都不多於60%,以一般巴士130人,即平均每架巴士,企位不應該出現乘客,咁唔知你地有無係早上繁忙時間,係獅子山隧道出九龍位置,大老山隧道出九龍位置,城門隧道去荃灣位置,放工繁忙時間,係獅子山隧道返沙田位置,大老山隧道返新界位置,城門隧道返沙田位置,見過D巴士的載客率呢?我真係好懷疑你地提供的載客率有篤數成份係到.』

但到今日,運輸署在2013年8月20及10月15日回覆中,並未在回答本人以上2個問題.

本人在2013年7月8日發運輸署電郵內指出:『1996年至今17年時間,運輸署因為一間私營公司,調配及營運需要,容許其晚間停泊於公共地方.7月4日我曾至電黃依凡小姐討論,該泊位是否有收取租金問題?如果有,租金是否合乎市場價格,如果無,咁算唔算運輸署向九巴作利益輸送呢?要知道,九巴小瀝源車廠離威爾斯親王醫院門外巴士站不足10分鐘路程,究竟有咩調配及營運需要呢?要是如黃依凡小姐題及,九巴泊位不足,那是否代表九巴根本無能力持有咁多條巴士線呢?17年不是一個短時間,運輸署仲要利用公共資源,要再等九巴幾多年,先會考慮收回該位置呢?當然,最重要是我個人都有調配及營運需要,可否叫運輸署夜間係威爾斯親王醫院門外巴士站,提供泊位停車呢?如果運輸署覺得不可行,那即是此動作只禮待九巴,不禮待其他人士,那即是對我不公平呢!』運輸署2013年8月20日回覆指,由於適合停泊巴士的地方不足,基於調配及營運需要,本署批准部份巴士在停止服務後會停泊在一些巴士總站.為了紓緩巴士公司加價的壓力,本署沒有向巴士公司收取費用.

運輸署有權控制香港停泊位置分佈,甚至乎為一間沒有能力提供泊位的公司提供泊位,但運輸署是否有權決定該車位是否需要收費及收費多少呢?另外,運輸署指為了紓緩巴士公司加價的壓力而不收費,但九巴這幾年已加費不少,而『紓緩巴士公司加價的壓力』,究竟是以多少錢來計算,如果是用市值來計算還可能說得過去,但如果用HK\$1,用兩個泊位17年,又是否真正可以『紓緩巴士公司加價的壓力』呢?

PS: 運輸署檔案編號: 1-394842157 (有關九巴第281A號線班次事宜)

市民

蘇先生

CB(1)667/13-14(01) (3 January 2014) Submission on the monitoring of KMB services by the Transport Department from a member of the public

To: "panel\_t@legco.gov.hk" <panel\_t@legco.gov.hk>

From: So K.Y. <>

Date: 11/23/2013 08:02AM

Subject: Question regarding the Transport Department's Overseeing of KMB

I sent an email to the Transport Department on November 15, 2012, reflecting the situation regarding the KMB 89X bus stop located in front of the First City Railway Station. During peak hours (particularly in the morning), passengers who wish to ride the 89X bus heading to Kwun Tung would often have to queue at the bicycle lane. Bicycles going either direction would have to cut the line to avoid [the queue]. KMB has done improvement works to the bus stop, but as 15 November 2015 and 20 November 2015, I still saw that passengers had to queue up at the bicycle lane. This could be seen in the following videos:

<https://mega.co.nz/#F!nABCUAxa!bDiZfnMVCaAaikjzJd6l9g>

<https://mega.co.nz/#F!LIllBbR!HITNKGcQA6okRG0nPtTxOw>

Furthermore, I have sent an email to the Transport Department on 27 June 2013, pointing out that for the bus routes 89X, 74X, 89P, 80X, 112, 102, 215X, etc, I saw there were passengers standing at the windshield area, but the bus drivers continued to drive, and asked if this was legal. The Transport Department pointed out in its reply (Transport Department file no. TDNR/1-70/1/43C), that according to Public Bus Services Regulations Cap. 230A, passengers are not allowed to stand on areas outside of the lines on the aisle while the bus is moving. This Department recognizes that in the peak morning hours, some passengers may try to get on the bus even though the carriage is already crowded, and may have to stand outside of the lines on the aisle. Therefore, this Department has already reminded the bus companies that bus captains and station captains should remind passengers to try to stand near the end of the carriage. If the position to which the passenger is standing at affects safety of the vehicle, the bus captain will also issue appropriate instructions to the passengers. This Department has again requested the franchised bus companies to send staff to monitor boarding of passengers at individual bus route during peak hours. However, even until

today, I see many passengers standing in front of the bus everyday, and yet the bus captain continued driving.

Moreover, in Transport Department staff CAROL LY Cheung's ([carolcheung@td.gov.hk](mailto:carolcheung@td.gov.hk)) reply to me on 24 June 2011, she stated that "regarding complaints from the public, this Department has reminded all staff members that, if he/she needs more time to deal with more complicated requests or complaints, he/she should give a preliminary response within 10 days of receipt of the response, and then give a detailed response within 21 days." However, when the Transport Department replied to my emails, they often take more than 10+21 working days, and will often not reply until I chase them up.

...

Citizen

Mr. So



# 新世界第一巴士公司 職工會

## 改善巴士業界 營運情況之建議書 〈第三版〉

2014 年 3 月 30 日



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# 前言

在香港，有人認為巴士行業已步向夕陽<sup>1</sup>。但這是否代表各持分者要對巴士服務放棄呢？踏入二零一二年，社會對巴士業界有新一輪的關注，由脫班問題到「鬼巴士」的出現，再到多宗嚴重的交通意外，都引起社會上熱烈的討論和關注。那麼，巴士行業所面對的問題責任又屬於誰人呢？社會上又有另一些意見要求加強對車長進行身體檢查，如新增動態心電圖檢查等。但這些意見又是對是錯呢？

這份建議書的目的，將分析現時巴士行業所面對的困境與巴士公司現存的問題。其次將針對不同的問題作出建議，希望利用不同的方法去改善巴士公司的營運情況及改變巴士車長的工作環境與條件。巴士車長每天都接送過萬名乘客，他們的工作環境與健康情況是值得關注和探討的。我們相信，只有改善巴士公司的經營環境與情況才有空間讓巴士公司改善車長的工作環境。因此，本報告將從這個方向作出討論，希望改善巴士公司經營環境的同時，有空間讓車長有一個更理想的工作環境。





## 「治大國，若烹小鮮」

再版的原因有很多，在此不再說明。自第一版完成以來，巴士行業一直在變化和前進，但大環境始終未有改變。這行業就好像走在十字路口般，向那一個方向走，對大家而言始終是一個問號。巴士服務在日常生活中擔當重要而不可欠缺的角色，能否有效營運涉及到公眾利益。再版的主要原因是希望加入更多案例、例子，以客觀及宏觀的方式去豐富這建議書。

過去一年，巴士行業面對更加嚴峻的經濟環境，同時申訴專員主動對巴士營運及一系列數據進行調查，亦進一步引起公眾對巴士營運商及運輸處的關注和不滿。申訴專員相關的資料早在第一版作出討論，但是次再版希望更加深入討論有關「班次」的真與假，從一個宏觀的方向作出討論，從而完善現在制度及規則上的不足。希望再版作出深入的討論，一方面回應申訴專員所作出的調查，同時希望查找不足，進一步回應市民的訴求。

除此之外，九巴在去年積極進行「區域性重組」，其中以北區為試點，整合該區的資源，以科學的方式去重組巴士路線<sup>17</sup>。無可否認，路線重組透過資源整合以改善現有服務，提升競爭力，對巴士公司而言不利而無一害，而政府亦大力鼓吹「區域性重組」，不論施政報告還是電視廣告，都有相關的內容。但是「區域性重組」是否理想地幫助巴士公司提升服

務質素及營運效率，還是單純只為削減服務而「重組」呢？這一點在再版中希望作出探討，同時就過去相關的改動作出討論，希望利用客觀的環境作出解構。分析整個計劃的利弊。

老子《道德經》第六十章中雲：治大國，若烹小鮮。管理一個國家還是鄉村的地方也好，就好比烹調一樣，菜既不能太鹹，也不能太淡，要調好作料才行；治國如同做菜，既不能操之過急，也不能鬆弛懈怠，只有恰到好處，才能把事情辦好。香港的交通與運輸政策有著異曲同工的相似情況。就是必需要照顧不同人士的需要，定立出合適而長遠的政策，不可以忽略任何人的需要與現實環境的局限，正好比烹調一樣，菜既不能太鹹，也不能太淡。要解決現今巴士業界的困局，就必要審視現今的運輸政策，查找不足，只有制定合適的方針，提出一個大家願意看見的願見，才能急市民所急，回應社會上大眾對運輸交通的訴求。這一份建議書是第一步，隨社會急速發展，變革之路將更長。希望是次再版能提供更多的觀點、例子以進一步說明巴士業界所面對的困難和境況。正如最近一部電視節目〈食為奴〉，主角高天寶以一道菜開解當時深受「滿漢不和」而煩惱的康熙皇帝，而後者亦因此而關懷，更說出治大國，若烹小鮮這一典故。再版的一大目標就是解決眼下交通運輸的問題，改善業界同仁所面對的困難，這樣才可以令市民大眾開懷歡笑。

Douglas Lau

March, 2014



## 不公平競爭

巴士服務是直接由運輸署監管的，對於巴士行業面對的問題，運輸署是責無旁貸的。運輸署一方面擔任官方監管者的角色，另一方面卻製造不公平的競爭，令整個巴士行業的經營環境舉步維艱。早在八十年代，屯門及元朗著手興建輕便鐵路，港英政府設立了「輕鐵專區」，將當時在屯門區內行走的巴士路線如 59B 號線等共八條巴士路線取消<sup>2</sup>，這樣，輕便鐵路便沒有來自巴士的競爭。直到二零一二年，屯門區和元朗區仍沒有任何行走區內的專利巴士路線。

自二千年，政府發表了長遠鐵路發展的策略後，便一直以鐵路發展為運輸政策的大方向，過去十年，將軍澳支線、西部鐵路等已先後落成，而西港島線、南港島線等項目亦相繼動工。的而且確，鐵路是環保而且極具效率的集體運輸交通工具，但這又是否代表要大力限制巴士公司的營運與發展呢？自二零零三年開始，政府大刀闊斧地限制了巴士公司車隊的數目。巴士車隊是巴士公司最重要的資產，亦是整個巴士行業不可或缺的一部分。政府以交通負擔過重、空氣污染等理由限制了各家公司巴士的數目，以新世界第一巴士公司為例，在二零零二年，共擁有八百三十五部巴士<sup>3</sup>，但到二零一一年，已減少到七百零七部巴士<sup>4</sup>，營運車隊減少了約十五百分點(15%)。雖然在這九年時間，有不少新鐵路項目落成，但這些限制與削減又是否合理呢？還顧現時的香港鐵路有限公司，

在二零一一年起，由中國北車集團長春軌道客車股份有限公司購入多列新製的列車<sup>5</sup>，先後為多條路線如觀塘線、荃灣線等加班<sup>6</sup>，反觀個別巴士路線若有需要加班，必先從其他路線抽調資源加班，而抽調其他路線加班，只會令乘客的乘車權與選擇權受損。除此之外，政府限制巴士公司車隊數目，直接打擊巴士公司在市場上的競爭力。巴士服務的供應受到限制，這只會導致巴士公司出現虧蝕、欠缺足夠巴士營運及後備車輛不足的情況，形成惡性循環，巴士公司一方面需要加價以達到收支平衡，另一方面又沒有足夠資金改善服務與員工的福利，形成三輸的局面，這都是運輸署做成不公平競爭的惡果。

欠缺點對點路線下，巴士公司更難有生存空間。點對點路線對於乘客有極大的吸引力。方便、直接、快捷都是其吸引的地方。例如九巴 263 號線、城巴 5X 號線及新巴 18P 號線等便是成功的例子。但是，近幾年又有多少點對點的路線出現呢？近年較受歡迎的點對點路線是二零一零年開辦的 798 號線，此路線來往將軍澳與沙田之間。除了上述的例子，還有沒有相類似的例子呢？除了一些特別路線外，全日行走的點對點常規路線又有多少呢？自政府在千禧年發表以鐵路為骨幹的運輸政策後，一直都宣稱點對點巴士路線違犯這個方針，即使受歡迎的 798 號線亦需先行將路線 796B 取消才能成事。而 798 的出現亦經過多個區議會熱烈的討論，一波三折才成功通車<sup>7</sup>。我們相信，點對點路線不但對乘客有利，亦可提升巴士公司的營運效率，百利而無一害，但是運輸署願意讓步嗎？好



像將軍澳往來荃灣的路線，地區人士爭取多年，運輸署仍沒有任何喜訊。甚至於近年的突破路線 798 都經歷漫漫長路才能通行。對於開通往來沙田將軍澳的直接路線，有前西貢區區議員透露運輸署一直以市民利用現有轉乘優惠已足以應付需求為理由而不批准這點對點路線的通行。而新巴亦需要將個別路線取消才能成事。而路線 798 開通後，早上與晚上的繁忙時間更出現滿座的情況。由此可見，點對點路線有其存在價值，亦有益於廣大市民及有助巴士公司改善營運效率。除此之外，我們亦應鼓勵巴士公司利用重組路線的方式，將資源用得更有效率。



路線 798（將軍澳<>沙田 / 火炭）



路線 263（屯門<>沙田）



協調不力亦是導致今天困局的成因。各家巴士公司在經營上，擁有一些與鐵路相互競爭而又出現嚴重虧蝕的路線，例如過海路線 690、692，一些長途路線如九巴的 263M 線等。巴士公司近年來都透過路線重組去取消或合併一些嚴重虧蝕的路線，轉而將資源投放在載客量較高的路線上。前文所引述有關 796B 與 798 的例子便是近年來較成功的一個。路線重組與削減往往需要各區區議會的同意才能成事。在二零零八年被取消的 70 號路線便是近年來的經典故事。在運輸署、九巴、多個區議會多年來的角力才成功換取該路線被取消。無可否認，將一條路線取消定必引起居民的強烈反對，區議會有反彈亦是正常而又合理。但是，在重組過程中，運輸署又有沒有承擔的勇氣，讓不同的重組方案得以落實呢？路線重組涉及巴士公司、區議會、運輸署三方面。三者沒有良好的溝通是沒有辦法讓重組得到落實，往往運輸署未有在巴士公司與區議會之間顯示出承擔的勇氣與堅持，讓重組的方案得以優化和落實，若這些方案得到通過和落實，將有助巴士公司「止血」。而且，運輸署亦將不同的公共運輸機構放置在對立的位置上，讓巴士公司一方面要應對來自鐵路網絡的威脅，另一方面又要應對不同公共交通營運者的競爭。以將軍澳往來土瓜灣的交通服務為例，將軍澳早期發展只有路線 93K 前往土瓜灣一帶，直到一九九六年才有繁忙時間特別路線 297P 經將軍澳隧道前往紅磡。到一九九八年尾，路線 297P 獲准改為全日服務並更改路線編號為 297。在同年運輸署亦批准小巴 105 號線開辦，由康盛花園前往土瓜灣。



路線 297 與小巴路線 105 性質相近，通車的時間同樣在一九九八<sup>8</sup>，這樣巴士便有專線小巴作其競爭對手。時至今日，小巴路線 105 時有指路線出現虧蝕而需要申請加價。這惡性競爭的出現，不但令巴士公司進一步面對更大的競爭，另一方面又令到其他的經營者未能賺取合理的回報而需要加價，令到各方面都有負面影響。相近的例子尚有，但在此不再討論了。運輸署在協調巴士公司與區議會之間不力，又容許將不同的營運商放置在對立面上，做成惡性競爭的出現，最後苦的都只是市民大眾。若果重組得到落實，資源用得其所，巴士公司的經營環境定必改善。這樣才有資源去改善車長的工作環境與工作時間。

還有一點，運輸署整體的運輸政策是失敗的。運輸一直都以鐵路為骨幹的運輸政策為大方針，但是為何路面上的私家車數目仍是居高不下呢？二零零二年，已登記的私家車數目為 384, 864<sup>9</sup>，到二零一一年已達到 471, 685<sup>9</sup>，這麼多的私家車在路面上行走，不但做成環境污染，而且加重了路面的負擔。但是，運輸署又有沒有規管私家車的數目呢？相反，巴士作為集體運輸交通工具的一份子，卻處處受到打壓。運輸署是否有需要全盤審視整個運輸政策呢？例如讓每個公共營運商的角色更加清晰，將資源用得其所。

## 經營問題

巴士公司內部亦存在不少問題。前線員工每天需駕駛不同的車輛及多條路線(俗稱跳飛機)。「跳飛機」令車長心理壓力負擔重，影響心理質素。除此之外，巴士公司本身因應不同理由而經常更改行車時間表，車長上班地點及下班地點經常更改，導致前線車長非常困擾，影響家庭運作與協調。由於本港大多數家庭的父親和母親都需要出外工作，車長無法照顧家中小童，引起不同的家庭問題，而家庭不和諧影響生活質素，帶來長遠影響。除此之外，有部份員工未能在公司申請「無薪事假」，巴士公司不但沒有體恤員工，而且更為員工帶來家庭上的負面影響。員工在家庭生活上遇到突發事情時，未能向公司申請「無薪事假」，不但對員工的情緒帶來負面影響，而且引起家庭不和，對員工與整體家庭生活帶來衝擊。例如員工家人有病入院，而公司卻不容許員工申請「無薪事假」照顧患病家人，員工只會心急如焚，對他們的情緒、家庭生活帶來影響，這樣只會影響服務質素。近期，平等機會委員會亦張貼廣告，希望各私人企業、機構能體恤員工，有助挽留人才。車長是巴士公司不可缺少的人才，若車長士氣低落，家庭生活不健康，只會推高車長的流失率，而欠缺足夠的車長駕駛巴士只會令服務質素下降。

而巴士公司在編排時間表的時候，部份路線未有足夠的行車時間讓車長行車，車長到達總站後便需即時開車，令車長需作長時間駕駛，嚴重影響車長的健康與精神情況。面對車輛不足，而需求又龐大的路線，



巴士公司往往犧牲車長每車次之間的休息時間去維持現有服務，做成車長沉重的壓力。

巴士公司為了節省資源，在員工的薪酬、福利上作出不公平的分配。以個別巴士公司為例，新入職的車長一方面沒有雙薪、子女教育津貼等，在醫療保險上，到診所就診的次數較早年入職的員工為少，嚴重影響員工的健康。除此之外，新入職的員工薪酬普遍偏低，以前線車長為例，新入職的車長底薪每月約九千元左右，而新入職的站長底薪每月約八千元左右，導致前線員工士氣低落，巴士公司亦難以聘請員工。當中以站長最欠缺人手，有些樞紐總站，例如灣仔碼頭總站只安排一名站長值勤，工作量極為沉重。而部分總站更取消站長當值，嚴重影響服務質素。每當突然事故發生亦欠缺足夠的外勤人員作處理，對整個巴士服務帶來一定影響。長時間的工作與沉重的工作壓力，令巴士公司員工的流失率高企，影響實際巴士服務的表現，如車長不足而令到脫班的情況出現。長此下去，形成一個惡性循環。前線員工的薪酬與福利較市場遜色，此舉更容易更會導致前線員工士氣低落，最終影響整體服務表現。自最低工資實施後，各行各業都面對人手緊張的情況，巴士公司亦不能幸免。作為香港主要的運輸機構，巴士公司有責任聘請足夠的員工，同時亦需留意外勤人員的數量是否充裕，否則遇上突發事件便難以派員即時處理，亦難以維持正常的巴士服務，最終只會令乘客的利益受到損害。而前線員工士氣低落，最終令到流失率上升，這絕非一個理想的情況，長期欠缺足



夠的人手只會令上述的情況形成一個惡性循環，這並不是大家樂意看見到的。

巴士公司對合約員工以行政手段令員工帶病上班，做成安全隱憂。新入職的員工以合約制聘請，巴士公司往往以員工的出勤表現作為考慮續約的其中一項因素，員工往往為了得到公司續約，帶病亦不敢就診及取病假休息，對安全做成隱憂。車長每天在巴士上面對大量乘客，而巴士本身採用密封式設計，乘客帶病乘車往往輕易將病毒傳播開去，長時間駕駛的車長便成為高危的感染人士。因此，巴士公司以出勤表現作為員工的續約的考慮因素實在有不合理的地方。

工程部欠缺員工亦成一大問題。工程部負責日常車輛維修及安全檢查的工作。市民往往認為工程部只是後勤支援的部門，但巴士是否在安全、正常的情況下行車亦需依賴工程部進行維修及檢查。但隨著巴士公司擁有車隊數量大減，而出車數量又要維持服務水平的話，巴士停放在車廠維修的時間便相應被縮減。加上工程部門欠缺足夠的人手進行維修，部分維修工程亦未必能妥善完成。在這兩方面都被削減的情況下，維修質素相應下降，在街上行走的巴士便容易出現損壞或因為車廠欠缺巴士而出現失班次或脫班的情況，導致巴士服務受到一定影響。因此，工程部門所存在的問題亦需要加以探討及作出改善。

車長、站長、工程部技工等前線員工是每間巴士公司寶貴而重要的人力資源。要維持正常、優質的服務有賴他們的努力與付出。但巴士公



司卻因為節省成本而對員工有不公平的對待，這是不合理的。本會相信，只有用心對待每一位員工，才能有效維持日常的服務。這些問題是巴士公司需要一一正視和改善的。人力資源在巴士公司是不可或缺的，若果巴士公司不願意改善現時員工的薪酬福利，解決不公平的地方，長遠只會做成更高的流失率。每當欠缺員工上班當值，便會令到巴士班次欠車長駕駛，應對突發事情時又欠缺人手處理。同時巴士公司若不對薪酬福利作出檢討，亦難以吸引及聘請足夠的員工駕駛巴士與外勤員工應付突發事情及作出適當的車務調動。維修人員不足與質素下降亦做成車輛容易損壞與欠缺巴士出廠行駛的情況出現。加上，現職員工面對不公平對待，出現同工不同酬的情況，又需要面對大量乘客，壓力大增。當遇到乘客無理投訴車長或投訴外勤員工時，又需向公司解釋，大大加重心理負擔，做成流失率高企不下，影響日常服務，做成三輸的局面。因此，巴士公司必需正視人手短缺與不足的問題，致力解決因人力資源不足而出現的問題。若長期人手不足，只會加重員工的工作負擔，前線員工亦因此而士氣低落，這些都是大家不願意看見的。不論那一個工種都需要有足夠的人手去維持巴士服務，這一點是十分重要的。巴士公司亦不應以節省資源為目標而減少人手的增聘，同時適時對薪酬、福利進行檢討，才能在競爭激烈的勞動市場增聘足夠的人手去維持日常的巴士服務。若問題得不到正視，將衍生更多問題，最後不論是前線員工、巴士公司本身以至乘客都會是輸家。

## 監管不力

運輸署是官方的監管機構，但他們又有沒有做好其監管巴士公司的角色呢？市民近年對巴士服務抱有怨言，但問題又出在那裡呢？市民大眾經常指巴士脫班，出現「鬼巴士」<sup>10</sup> 又是甚麼一回事呢？事實上，運輸署對脫班的定義十分清楚和簡單，只要編定的巴士沒有開出已等同脫班，脫班的原因有很多，如欠缺車長開車、交通阻塞、車輛故障等。大家可參考以下圖例：

	到站時間	原開時間	路線	實開時間	實開車號	備註
51	11:56	12:00	2	✓	LK 438	C 112 柯打來
52	12:04	12:10	2	×	LU 3721	尖碼壞車
53	12:13	12:20	2	12:15	NG 1562	
54	/	12:30	2	×	×	欠車長停開
55	12:33	12:40	2	12:35	MU 4857	
56	12:52	12:50	2	12:55	MV 9453	
57	13:20	13:00	2	×	MT 2384	(旺角交阻) 私對站
58	13:00	13:10	2	✓	NC 5256	對站私來
59	13:28	13:20	2	13:30	MT1969	文明里起載往 SOU
60	13:28	13:30	2	✓	MG 971	

這是模擬九巴路線 2 號(尖沙嘴碼頭 <> 蘇屋邨)平日在尖沙嘴碼頭的班次記錄。圖中第 52、54、57 的班次因不同的原因而沒有開出。而相應正常與遲開的班次亦當作正常開出並不計算脫班。換句話說，第 56 班車即使遲開亦計算為正常開出的班次而非「脫班」。大家還可以留意，第 59 班車安排在油麻地文明里開短途班次疏導乘客亦計算為一正常班次。按照運輸署的定義，只有三班車屬於脫班，但誤點的班次並不計算在內，而實際上只有三個班次是正常開出的。



當然，脫班的問題主要涉及人手、車輛及道路問題等三個原因。而前兩者是巴士公司需要正視及處理的。而在這些問題上，運輸署又有沒有做好監管者的角色呢？「鬼巴士」實際是基於運輸署的定義上走進其灰色地帶，安排車輛行走數個站的短途班次以填補因不同原因而沒有正常開出的班次，從而令「脫班」的比率下降。但這些短途班次能否達到接載乘客的功效呢？從以下圖例可加深了解：

	到站時間	原開時間	路線	實開時間	實開車號	備註
81	18:12	18:00	5C	18:15	HU 8803	土瓜灣交阻
82	18:30	18:05	5C	×	HR 9800	私對站
83	/	18:10	5C	×	×	欠車長
84	18:30	18:15	5C	18:32	JZ 748	土瓜灣交阻
85	18:55	18:20	5C	×	KC 8237	私對站

加班：

	到站時間	原開時間	路線	實開時間	實開車號	備註
E1	/	/	5C	19:45	LG 419	短途車，蒲崗村道載
E2	/	/	5C	20:15	LG 261	短途車，蒲崗村道載

這是路線 5C（尖沙嘴碼頭 <> 慈雲山<中>）平日在尖沙嘴碼頭晚上繁忙時間的班次模擬記錄。路線 5C 路經土瓜灣，這一帶的交通十分繁忙，因此誤點及脫班亦相對嚴重。正常班次亦較難維持。而一些「特別」短途車，巴士由蒲崗村道載客返回慈雲山<中>，途經 7 個巴士站。但是，有多少乘客在蒲崗村道等候路線 5C 返回慈雲山呢？路線 5C 大部分乘客由土瓜灣一帶返回慈雲山，蒲崗村道後的站位以下車的乘客為主，而上述兩班「特別」短途車亦會按運輸署的準則去計算為正常班次，從而填補晚上六時所失的班次。這樣脫班的情況便有機會得到改善。事實上，

短途班次是有助疏導乘客的。例如香港區路線 8P，晚上有大量乘客由銅鑼灣崇光站候車返回小西灣，由灣仔碼頭開出的班次是不能接載所有乘客的。因此，外勤人員如站長會安排車輛到銅鑼灣崇光站接載乘客。這樣有助疏導大量乘客，亦可達到巴士通勤的功用。對於沒有實際作用的短途班次是運輸署需要正視及認真處理的。本會認同具實際需要的短途班次是用助於疏導乘客的，同時對於一些無助疏導乘客的短途班次是反對的。同時對於修改脫班的定義及要求持開放態度。巴士作為集體運輸交通工具，有責任接載乘客及按運輸署的要求提供服務。但同時面對脫班的問題，運輸署一方面需要做好監管的角色，同時需要與巴士公司做好溝通，制定合理的巴士服務予廣大市民。

除此之外，對於某些巴士公司以虧蝕為由申請加價，我們認為運輸署除了監管巴士公司的服務外，對於巴士公司的財政又有沒有需要作出進一步的監管呢？無可否認，九巴在市場上的佔有率由 2010 年的 26% 減至 2011 年的 25.1%，同期香港鐵路有限公司在市場上的佔有率由 2010 年的 44.3% 升至 2011 年的 45.4%<sup>13</sup>。這此起彼落的情況的確解釋到九巴申請加價的部分原因。但是九巴在 2011 年有過百部巴士待發牌行走<sup>11</sup>，有部分巴士更等待一年才開始獲發行車牌照。這些舉動又是否引致虧蝕的原因呢？除此之外，社會上對九巴玩弄「數字遊戲」早已表達不滿<sup>12</sup>，而運輸署又是否監管不善呢？又有沒有空間作更多的改善呢？


備註：有關班次的資料乃純粹虛構，並非巴士公司或運輸署的官方資料。  
唯「鬼巴士」的情況則根據報導而設計，目的旨在指出「鬼巴士」的問題。



## 巴士不見了

申訴專員公署於二零一四年一月發表針對巴士公司監察機制的調查報告。申訴專員公署指出由於有關專營巴士的投訴大增，因此主動展開調查<sup>18</sup>。報告內容與前交相近。但為了更貼切的指出現時巴士班次所存在的問題，在此將作更深入的討論。正如申訴專員公署報告所表示，巴士公司會將詳細的行車時間表交予運輸署。而詳細的營運數據亦需交予運輸署作監督服務之用。本會早已指出運輸署有需要對「脫班」的定義及要求作出修改。但需先了解現時巴士公司實際運作情況。

假設某路線 3A 編定每天有 100 班車由 A 總站往 J 總站，其間經 B-I 共 8 個車站。




但是由於人手短缺、壞車等因素，是日 3A 線有 6 班車未能開出，而上述 6 班車已計算成脫班。加上晚上交通異常繁忙，導致有 2 班車未能依時由 A 總站開出，這 2 班車便直接由 A 總站不載客往 J 總站，上述班次亦計算為脫班。總結這一天，3A 線有 8 班車脫班。換句話說，3A 線的脫班率達 8%。但是，巴士公司為了填補失去的班次，於晚上加派巴士行走 3A 線，由原本一小時 3 班車提升服務至一小時 9 班車，填補是日的班次。由於有 6 班車額外開出，因此 3A 線的脫班率只有 2%。

正如申訴專員指出，脫班率計算的基準是以一整天為單位。巴士公

司為了令班次達到運輸署的要求，往往抽調巴士行走額外的班次以填補因不同原因而出現的脫班。這樣交予運輸署的營運紀錄所顯示的「脫班率」為 2%，但實際情況卻未能有效地反映出來。這樣做的確可以達到運輸署的要求，但有一定數量的乘客會因上述脫班而受到一定影響。


除此之外，巴士班次亦會因不同情況如交通擠塞等原因，而安排部分班次往中途站載客而非由總站開出。



如上圖所示，由於交通擠塞的關係，其中一班車調整在中途站 D 載去總站 J，而這班次亦計算為正常班次。根據申訴專員的報告指出市民並不接受這些班次為正常班次。這些「短途車」有沒有作用，早在本建議書提出討論。事實上，有部分巴士路線如港島區 8P、新界區 89D、過海線 968 等在總站開出數個站已經滿座，而往後的車站尚有大量乘客候車，安排「短途車」可有助疏導乘客，理應計算為正常班次。但是，巴士公司亦會安排「短途車」填補班次或該等班次並沒有實際作用則需另作別論。早在申訴專員發表報告前，本建議書已經提出「短途車」有其實際作用及現時所存在的漏洞。因此，著眼點應放在巴士公司有否利用這漏洞去隱瞞實際的脫班情況及檢討現時的標準以倒塞漏洞。



除了「短途車」外，業內尚有「掉頭」的情況。巴士班次亦會因不同情況如交通擠塞等原因，而安排部分班次「掉頭」。



部分班次因交通擠塞而較原定時間遲回到 J 總站，即使可排巴士不載客回 A 總站亦難以依時開出，往往這些班次便會被安排「掉頭」，即不載客往中途站 D 載回總站 J。根據現時準則，上述理應為兩個班次，這個安排則只會計算為一班車開出。上述的運作情況是申訴專員未有提及，而當中所存在的漏洞亦已在前文提及。這些「掉頭」班次本身是類似「短途車」的情況出現，因此處理及監察情況亦大同小異。

綜合脫班的各個原因，正如申訴專員所言，車長人手短缺、巴士損壞等是可控制的因素。無可否認，人手短缺是巴士公司面對的一大挑戰。巴士公司一方面要面對要有車長人手不足，同時亦因為數年後新鐵路落成而不敢大幅增加人手，形成兩難局面。除此之外，被分類為「其他」的脫班原因亦需要正視。當然這些要運輸署加多監督及深入了解當中的原因。除此之外，申訴專員亦提及到巴士「遲到」的情況亦有惡化。巴士「遲到」的成因有很多，如途中有乘客身體不適、交通擠塞等原因。無可否認，香港的交通情況日益繁忙，不論申訴專員還是本建議書都分別提出本港交通擠塞的情況是極影響巴士運作的因素。

事實上，現今市民對巴士服務的要求越來越高，同時普遍對巴士服務亦有所不滿。這一點透過申訴專員公署報告所指出的投訴數字已可見得。誠然，巴士脫班各方面都有責任，在此本建議書有下列建議：

- 1.) 從新制定巴士「脫班」的定義及計算班次的方式。如以「時段制」計算班次，防止巴士公司以填補班次方式去減低真實的失班情況。
- 2.) 加重對巴士公司的罰則，如公開「脫班率」高企的路線。讓公眾能加以監察巴士服務。
- 3.) 與巴士公司商討修改行車時間表及加快路線重組的進度，以整合資源的方式定立更合適的巴士服務。
- 4.) 檢討現有運輸政策及制定長遠解決交通擠塞的方案。

更詳細的建議將在下一個章節作出討論。



## 加強監管與政策檢討

運輸署在監管與政策制定上亦應下多點功夫，一方面監管巴士公司的服務質素，同時亦需要對現時的政策進行長遠檢討與規劃，這樣公共交通才可以發揮最大的效果，亦避免浪費資源的情況出現。

誠然，「脫班」、「鬼巴士」的問題是需要運輸署正視及加強監管的。無可否認，欠車長上班、車輛損壞等問題是巴士公司可控制的。但對於因為交通情況而出現的脫班問題是需要各持分者努力解決的。本港車輛不跌反升是客觀的因素去解釋為何路面如此繁忙<sup>9</sup>。巴士公司一方面又要維持正常服務，一方面又要面對繁忙的路面，行車班次亦因此而不穩定。每當巴士公司更改行車時間表以求令班次更準確時，方法不外乎增加班次或縮減班次以增加行車時間。前者需要額外的資源與車輛才能做到，但運輸署在一九九九年開始已對巴士車輛數目加以限制<sup>14</sup>，試問又如何做到呢？倒頭來巴士公司只有將部分班次「拉疏」以換取更多的行車時間，讓班次更加穩定。例如把部分班次由七分鐘改為十二分鐘等以換取更多的行車時間。

我們相信，「脫班」、「鬼巴士」的問題雙方都有責任，巴士公司一方面需在招聘的工作上加倍努力，改善現有人力資源政策以達致聘請足夠的人手去維持服務水平。而運輸署需要考慮調整現有的準則與標準，以配合巴士服務的需要與發展，同時亦應審視現有的交通情況，利用可行

的方法去解決交通擠塞問題，如發展電子道路收費系統、增設巴士專用路段如部分幹道增設巴士專線，如彼岸的澳門將中區主要道路亞美打利庇盧大馬路(新馬路)部分時間劃為公交專用道路。讓巴士等公共交通車輛有行駛的優先權。而政府亦可在繁忙市中心地區收回停車場，從以減少進入繁忙市中心地區的车辆數目，銅鑼灣的時代廣場停車場便是首屈一指需收回的停車場了。

當然運輸署亦需定期抽查各家巴士公司的營運數據，了解「脫班」的實際情況，與巴士公司作好溝通，一方面做好監管的角色，另一方面設立扣分制度，以巴士公司的營運數據作一個指標，去決定是否將部分路線重新公開競投或引入新的競爭者。短期內可考慮修改個別巴士路線的行車時間表，以反映實制的行車時間及營運情況。雖然這些都是一些短期治標不治本的方法，但相信可舒緩現時因交通擠塞而導致的班次失準等問題。

除此之外，我們建議運輸署亦需全面介入巴士公司的財務情況，調查巴士公司在經營上是否出現問題還是利用會計技巧營造虧蝕的情況。全面調查有助解決巴士公司的財政問題，同時透過對話協助巴士公司改善現有經營環境，將加價的壓力減到最低，達到雙贏局面。

全面檢討本港的運輸政策已刻不容緩，不能單純以鐵路為本的方針去解決本港的交通問題。以下節錄自一名大學生就有關經濟學上討論「壟斷」的引文，其下列例子亦曾與在香港公開大學任教經濟學的林遵武博



士作討論：

The other example also be seen in the MTRC. MTRC had merged with the KCR in 2008. After that, MTR is the monopoly of the railway market in Hong Kong. The cost of running the railway will decrease. Now, there is one management team, etc. **The competitive strength in transport market will be increased.** So, the monopoly in some case is better than the competitive market. **Futhermore, the government policy is another factor makes the MTR becoming monopoly.**

Source: Lau Kai Him (November, 2011).

An assignment for Foundation of Social Sciences: Economics, ECON A121F.

香港鐵路有限公司(港鐵)自 2008 年成立已將本港的鐵路市場壟斷，在公共交通市場上的競爭力大爭。同時，因為政策上的傾斜令港鐵成為壟斷機構。政府在二千年發表鐵路發展策略已表示鐵路是環保又具效益的交通工具，以鐵路為骨幹的運輸政策便被製作出台<sup>15</sup>。無可否認，鐵路的確環保又具效益，但這是否代表巴士需要得到極大限制呢？

巴士公司不但在市場上的競爭力下降，又在政策上受到打壓，經營環境嚴峻。巴士一方面應發揮鐵路接駁的角色，另一方面一些直接方便的點對點路線是受歡迎的，前文例子路線 798 已是成功的案例。糾正不公平競爭是首要的工作，有效率的重組與重開點對點路線及有限度增加巴士數目是需要即時展開研究的。而最重要是需要全面檢討香港整個運輸政策，不應獨立將每一個公共交通機構分割檢討。除此之外，。政府



作為港地鐵的大股東，一方面製造不公平競爭，另一方面又從港鐵身上賺取分紅，實有與民爭利之嫌。因此，建議運輸及房屋局全面檢討香港整個運輸政策，配合未來人口增長加以協調，從而讓資源用得其所。參考鄰國新加坡，以鐵路配合巴士的運輸政策，讓資源用得其所，才是利民的好政策<sup>16</sup>。



參考外國經驗，加以配合才可達到雙贏

上圖為行走於新加坡的巴士



## 個案研究：區域性重組

「區域性重組」在二零一三年初由運輸及房屋局提出<sup>19</sup>，目的是以一個地區而非個別路線作為基礎，檢視及重組巴士服務，以確保善用資源，希望能減少甚至取消使用量嚴重偏低的路線，而所騰出的資源可投放到新的或需求高的路線，讓地區在整體上能得到更好、更快及網絡更佳的巴士服務。而巴士公司，特別是九巴便積極作出回應，包括增設相關的部門，亦在北區推展「區域性重組」作為試點<sup>20</sup>。

路線重組早在十二年前，即二零零二年將軍澳支線通車開始，巴士公司面對大量鐵路項目的同時，就需要進行路線重組以維持其競爭力。每一年，巴士公司都會提交〈巴士路線發展計劃〉予十八區區議會進行討論，詳述來年路線的改動，如增減巴士數目、增加班次等，其方式是以每條路線為單位進行討論。如本建議書提及的692、70等路線便常見於計劃上。路線重組必然涉及多方面的利益，如地區人士、區議員、巴士公司以至運輸署的工作等，往往令重組難以在議會上通過。就如前文提及的70號巴士便是經典例子之一。重組進度慢，巴士公司維持經營虧本路線，最後需加價維持公司財政穩健，輸的始終都是市民。而「區域性重組」便是以一整個區的模式全面進行重組，當中涉及資源整合及再分配 (Resource Allocation)，一方面加快重組進度，另一方面提供更合適的服務，提高巴士公司的競爭力。

無可否認，巴士重組是其中一個方向協助巴士營運商提供更好的服

務同時，亦能舒緩加價壓力，但當中又有沒有陷阱呢？巴士重組涉及資源整合及再分配，換句話說有部分路線會被取消，而有部分路線則會更改行車路線，同時亦會有新路線投入服務。而乘客亦需利用轉車站轉換其他巴士前往目的地。看似一個三贏的方案又是否如童話般理想？政府推出了「區域性重組」的電影廣告<sup>21</sup>，當中有一個片段是指新鐵路落成，巴士減少以重組。那麼「區域性重組」是否單純為削減巴士服務為目標而非資源整合及再分配呢？新鐵路落成的確會令巴士乘客減少，但巴士重組的目標始終是提供更方便的服務而非削減，甚或將原有資源減少。每一個重組計劃最重要是區議會及巴士公司之間有緊密的溝通，而運輸署作為兩者之間的溝通橋樑亦需盡其責任去為每一個方案達成三贏，這才是市民希望所見的。

### 北區的經驗

北區是全港首個以「區域性」模式進行巴士路線重組的地區，對任何持分者都是一次大膽的嘗試。北區的重組帶出了兩個巴士營運的新方向：

- 1.) 點對點路線有助提升巴士路線的競爭力，這一點在本計劃書完成之初已多次作討論。北區新開設的點對點路線如277E(上水往來藍田鐵路站)、270B(西九龍往上水)等，上述路線不但成功分流超負荷的鐵路系統，亦加強巴士公司本身的競爭力。誠然，上述新路線的開辦涉及到資源重整及從新分配，如巴士公司取消70X線以騰出資源開辦277E等特快點對點路線<sup>22</sup>。



2.) 採用轉車站模式。轉車站於一九九一年在城門隧道出現<sup>23</sup>。直到今天新界東來往新界西的乘客依舊使用轉車站前往不同的地方，其他的轉車站如大欖隧道轉車站及新落成的屯門公路轉車站亦為市民及巴士公司帶來多方面的好處。北區重組的方式便是在上水及華明兩個地方設立轉車站，讓乘客在轉車站內轉乘其他北區區內接駁路線如70K、273A等前往目的地。設立轉車站後部分路線被縮短至轉車站，如73、73A等，乘客只能在轉車站轉乘其他區內接駁路線前往目的地<sup>22</sup>。路線縮短可被視為節省資源的做法，巴士所行經的路程減少，節省了時間及燃油的使用。但是，這一個模式始終對現有乘客帶來一定的影響，如何令乘客影響減到最低是巴士公司以至政府部門需注意到的地方。

「區域性重組」的核心是透過資源重整令巴士服務更貼近市民的需要，提升巴士在整體市場上的競爭力。但是，「區域性重組」是否令巴士公司增加收入的大方向呢？現今巴士服務面對龐大的競爭，不但鐵路，還有小巴以至居民巴士的競爭，現時要達到收支平衡已十分困難。相信「區域性重組」是協助巴士公司重回財政健康的第一步。除此之外，「區域性重組」要取得成功，市民以至議會的參與是不可或缺的。市民是巴士服務的使用者，他們的意見及意願對能否順利進行重組起關鍵性作用。巴士公司一方面提出不同的方案予市民大眾進行討論，另一方面亦需從善如流，貼心關懷地區的聲音。地區團體以至各政黨的意見到寶貴的，如最近路線63X因應屯門公路轉車站而進行重組，民間亦有不同聲音及意見

去完善方案<sup>24</sup>，相信只有提供貼心的服務才可以保持巴士服務的優勢與競爭力。

### 沒有最好，只有更好

單是北區已用上八個月的時間，相信完重整整個巴士網絡需要更長的時間。巴士資源重整、整合是中期令巴士公司財政穩健的措施。亦是改善現有交通運輸及舒緩空氣污染的一個重要的方向。每一個重組的方案沒有可以盡善盡美，但相信在運輸署的配合下，加強與市民及地區人士緊密磋商，「區域性重組」定必能如期展開，達至三贏的局面。只有更優質的巴士網絡，保持巴士的競爭力才可以讓市民受惠，同時亦可舒緩巴士公司加價的壓力。



重組成功與否還看時間證明



# 延伸閱讀—交通擠塞與管理

前文早已提及香港受到交通擠塞所影響，巴士等陸路公共交通工具受到很大影響。但是，香港的擠塞情況去到那一個地步呢？可從下列數字可看個明白。

年份	登記私家車數目	增長率
2012	454,697	18.68%
2008	383,141	13.04%
2003	338,930	N. A.

表一：車輛增長數目 <sup>25</sup>

	香港	九龍	新界
2012	20.8KM/H	23.9 KM/H	40.4 KM/H
2008	21.5 KM/H	24.7 KM/H	44.2 KM/H
2003	21.7 KM/H	27.6 KM/H	42.8 KM/H

表二：各區平均車速 <sup>26, 27, 28</sup>

	行車線長度	變化
2010	5884 KM	2.62% (150KM)
2008	5734 KM	4.25% (234 KM)
2005	5500 KM	NA

表三：道路長度 <sup>29</sup>

綜合三個圖表，私家車數目按每四至五以接近超過 10% 的幅度增加，同時平均車速卻不斷下降，當中以九龍區最為嚴重，換句話說，香港的擠塞情況每年更加嚴重。除此之外，道路的長度亦未見有顯著增長，一些具策略性的幹道卻未能上馬展開工程，如加士居道天橋重建、中九龍走廊(T2 主幹道)已討論多年，至今仍未上馬。試問運輸署如何解決本港日益嚴重的擠塞問題？但為何私家車會是罪魁禍首呢？

	專利巴士*	輕型貨車	的士
2012	5,743	71,699	18,131
2008	5,794	68,967	18,115
2003	6,183	67,977	18,114

表四：其他車輛數目 25

\* 專利巴士是指：新巴、九巴、龍運巴士、城巴(1)、城巴(2)及大嶼山巴士

過去十年來，巴士的數目不斷減少，一方面削弱巴士公司的競爭力，其次亦令乘客乘車的機會減少。相對私家車無止境地增長，而巴士作為大眾運輸交通工具卻被削弱其功能，作為政策執行的主要部門，運輸署是責無旁貸的。路面交通日益惡化，巴士公司資源有限，要提供有效率的服務實在十分困難。這一點正正是要令巴士營運商面對的一個巨大挑戰。正如申訴專員所指，巴士公司面對交通擠塞亦難以控制。而擠塞亦令巴士車長作長時間駕駛而加重其工作壓力。面對乘客日益提高的服務水平，巴士公司亦面對嚴苛的經營環境，形成一個又一個的「死結」。



無疑，透過路線重組可將資源重整，有助減少巴士資源浪費，部分巴士透過行駛高速公路等，避開繁忙，擠塞的路段。如路線 101 為過海主力路線，自 1979 海底隧道通車以來已客似雲來，但面對港島區與海底隧道擠塞的交通情況，行車時間往往費時失事。巴士公司為加強競爭力與提升服務，於 2013 年下旬開辦 101X 特快服務<sup>30</sup>，改經告士打道及東九龍走廊等主要幹道，不但加快行車時間，同時減少巴士駛入德輔道中等中環中心區域，有助改善空氣污染之餘，乘客亦得以受惠於加快的行車時間。短期可考慮增加巴士專線等方式加快巴士行車速度，相關建議已在上一個章節說明。

本港的擠塞問題日益嚴重已是燃眉之急的困局。私家車無止鏡的增長，主幹道又未能上馬動工，這都令本港的交通情況日益惡化。抑制汽車增長是首要的任務。如增加汽車牌照收費及引入電子道路收費計劃是現行可做的行政措施。長遠而言必需盡快為部分基建工程上馬開展，如 T2 主幹道等工程有助長遠疏導交通。否則即使巴士重組完成，卻面對沒完沒了的惡劣交通，受難的只會是市民大眾。現在問題是我們的政府有沒有決心踏出第一步，去認真解決交通擠塞的問題而非以借重組為名，削減巴士為實的鴛鴦政策。就正如三條過海隧道平均流量已討論多時，不同的方案亦層出台，但是為何久久仍未能這個問題呢？決心與決斷是需要的，政府不能讓交通擠塞的問題無止境地惡化，這對市民大眾帶來很多不便及負面影響，對環境亦做成破壞。盡快踏出第一步是十分重要的。

## 延伸閱讀——港鐵超載

香港政府在一九九九年發表了香港長遠運輸策略<sup>31</sup>，表明了建立以鐵路為骨幹的客運系統。並估計鐵路在全港的公共交通載客人次比例由1997年的33%上升至2016年的40%-50%。政府其後在二千年年發表鐵路發展策略，建議興建六條支線以應付2016年的需求<sup>32</sup>。當中除西鐵已完工外，西港島線、沙中線及廣深港高鐵亦先後上馬動工外，但其他如北港島線、北環線等仍在檢討當中<sup>33</sup>。無疑鐵路有效率地疏導龐大客運量，而且亦較巴士環保。自二千年鐵路策略出台後，使用鐵路的人數不斷上升。2012年，使用港鐵服務的人次高達260,890千人次，佔本港公共交通載客比率46.4%<sup>34</sup>，即接近政府於1999年所定立的目標。但這又是否代表一切理想般地達到政府所想？

跟據運輸及房屋局向立法會提交的文件顯示<sup>35</sup>，以每平方米站立四人計算，將軍澳線早上載客率達100.6%，即已經達到飽和，超載的情況。將軍澳線是過海路線，東九龍區如觀塘及將軍澳區以至西貢區的居民依賴上述路線前往港島區工作，隨著將軍澳區人口上升，估計情況只會惡化。除此之外，鐵路系統亦經常發生故障，跟據非正式統計，截止2014年3月9日，鐵路系統在2014年的故障次數為24次，平均每2.83日出現一次意外<sup>36</sup>。一些重大事故如2013年12月將軍澳線全面停駛等，更令整個社區的交通陷入癱瘓。鐵路系統不但負荷過重，而且事故頻生，以鐵路為骨幹的運輸策略是否合適呢？



政府很大程度上忽略了巴士作為通勤的重要角色。除削弱巴士在市場上的競爭力外，亦以鐵路發展為優先的大前題下，壓制了巴士開辦一些通勤路線。本港的鐵路系統脆弱，而且出現超負荷的情況，這些從數字上已反映出來。隨著西港島線、南港島線等鐵路開通通車，相信對「過海段」的鐵路服務需求大增，如利用荃灣線過海的人數亦會有所增加，面對今天鐵路系統飽和，新的支線落成很多機會令飽和的系統百上加斤，這些都是需要運輸署以至政府決策局研究解決的大問題。巴士一方面可以為鐵路進行接駁的角色，其次更可協助飽和的鐵路網絡進行分流，如開辦一些長途特快路線，疏導部分乘客，如上提及的 101X 便有助日後分流港島西的乘客前往九龍，避免更多人使用鐵路網絡而做成樽頸。長遠而言，政府需對各國運輸單位進行全面檢討，例如巴士除作為接駁輔助的角色外，又能否承擔部分來自鐵路網絡的乘客，以舒緩現時鐵路系統擠迫的情況。雖然大量鐵路系統即將落成，但如何分流及善用每一種交通工具是需要長遠而有效的規劃。一些具需要及策略性的鐵路未能及時完成，如沙中線過海段<sup>37</sup>將在 2020 年落成，相信未能在短時間內舒緩現時擠迫的情況。在此，政府更加需要檢討以鐵路為骨幹的政策方針是否能滿足實際市民需要，隨著多作鐵路動工或落成，正正就是最好的機會進行檢討，配合「區域性重組」，才可以將每一個公共交通的長處發揮出來，才可以讓市民享受到優質的公共交通服務。因此，政府需把握時機做好大方向的檢討及研究，長遠有效地解決運輸通勤的不足地方。

## 物業發展與相關管理

物業發展有助公共運輸事業增加收入，改善服務。以香港鐵路有限公司為例，他們在建築與發展新項目同時，會有土地作上蓋物業發展，西九龍的多個項目如凱旋門等便深入民心了。但是，社會上對於巴士公司發展土地及物業有反對聲音，表示巴士公司賺取到物業收入後，並沒有將收益用於改善營運與服務之上，當中曼克頓山的物業發展項目便被立法會議員炮轟<sup>12</sup>。參考香港鐵路有限公司在二零一一年的綜合損益表 (Consolidated profit and loss account)，當中單是物業租賃及管理業務一項的收入，截至二零一一年十二月三十一日，達三十二億一千五百萬港元，而物業發展利潤亦達四十九億港元<sup>13</sup>。我們認同巴士公司利用發展物業以賺取收益，但所得的收益應用作改善巴士公司營運之上，如購買更環保的巴士或增加員工薪酬、福利。我們建議利用巴士總站的土地讓巴士公司作發展之用，建成的樓宇可作售賣或租賃，唯所得的收益必需放入巴士公司的營運基金之內，即使專營權到期，亦不得取回未用的資金。這些條款亦必須收納在每間巴士公司的專營權條款內，亦受運輸署的監測，從而讓社會各界人士對巴士公司發展物業項目有信心，同時有助解決本港房屋問題。巴士總站上興建物業相類近的例子如「清水灣道八號」<sup>13</sup>，便是在坪石邨巴士總站上興建，唯發展者是前地鐵公司。

在總站上蓋興建物業涉及補地價及需要城市規劃委員會通過才能實



行，我們認為運輸署應與發展局及地政總署作一協調，在行政手續上提供方便，但巴士公司需按當時的市值補回地價，一方面提供土地誘因讓巴士公司發展物業，另一方面不會讓人有官商勾結的感覺。物業建成後，出售所得的收益全數撥入巴士公司的營運基金內，基金用以改善服務或改善員工福利等。除此之外，政府與巴士公司合作亦是另一個方向，唯所得收益必需撥入營運基金內。這些建議必須訂明在專營權的條款內，讓這筆金錢用得其所。

租賃的概念與出售的做法相近。物業建成後並不作出售而是改為出租，將租金收入扣除成本所得的收益撥入營運基金內。此舉可讓巴士公司有可持續發展的基金，同時在專營權變更的情況下，新的經營者仍可透過租金收入賺取營運基金的資金。我們建議這個租賃的項目可與房委會合作，一方面增加相類近的公屋單位在市場上供應，同時又可以紓緩公共房屋供應的緊張情況。但是，這個項目必需由政府與巴士公司取得共識及就財務安排上達成協議才能成事。這方面又需依賴運輸署這位中間人去協調各方達成共識。同時得出的共識與安排必需收入專營權的條款內，確保資金用得其所。

不論出售還是租賃，我們都希望巴士公司透過物業發展賺取額外收入去成立營運基金，從而改善現有的營運情況，讓巴士公司購買新的環保巴士如電動巴士或混合能源的巴士等。除此之外，巴士公司亦可利用該筆資金改善員工薪酬、福利，減少車長及相關外勤人員的流失率，長

遠改善服務質素與營運環境。營運基金最大的好處更可減輕加價的壓力和次數。

我們明白讓巴士公司擁有物業發展優先權及土地發展的機會，會引起社會各界的回響與反彈。為了讓公眾有信心這筆收益同得其所，及避免發生曼克頓山的問題，因此我們建議成立基金管理委員會，成員包括巴士公司代表、運輸署代表、交通諮詢委員會成員、獨立會計師或核數師、立法會議員、巴士公司員工代表及行政長官委任的獨立人士。委員會的角色在於監管整筆基金是否用得其所，同時防止巴士公司利用基金用作非經營業務之上，如增加董事年終酬金等。除此之外，巴士公司如需動用基金款項如用以改善員工薪酬、購買電動巴士等需得到委員會通過。每年，基金由獨立會計師作審核，並交報告予立法會、巴士公司、運輸署等機構。而這委員會將是法定委員會，並在巴士公司的專營權條款上加入以上規定及清楚列出。同時其擴充權限與所有法定委員會相若。



凱旋門與西九龍上蓋物業  
(前地鐵公司發展)



曼克頓山位於九巴總部後方



## 修改指引與改善薪酬

現時，運輸署對車長的工作指引為每天工作上限十四小時，當中十一小時為行車時間，而三小時是休息時間。車長需相隔十小時才能上班，確保車長有休息時間才上班。因此，建議分兩個階段修改指引，讓車長有更多休息時間，對車長的精神、家庭和健康帶來正面影響。

第一階段的修改，十四小時工作，下班十小時休息的指引暫時保留。由於該指引一直為各家巴士公司採用，因此，未有在此階段作出修改。唯建議十四小時的上限雖不作修改，但休息時間更改為三小時三十分，而行車時間將相應修改為十小時三十分，如此類推。是次修改在於讓車長有更多休息時間，車長養精蓄銳才繼續行車，對於車長和乘客都有正面影響。我們相信增加休息時間予車長是需要的，同時我們亦希望該三十分鐘能反映在每車次間，讓車長完成一個車次後有五分鐘的休息時間。當然，如何劃分這三十分鐘需要員工與巴士公司取得一個共識，但作此修改的底線在於車長的休息時間能有所增加。

第二階段將針對現有指引作出修改，計劃於三年後實施。我們建議三年後車長工時上限為十二小時，換句話說，車長理應有十二小時的工餘休息時間。此舉可保障車長不會疲勞駕駛，亦有充足的休息時間，確保車長的精神和健康情況是適合駕駛巴士的。同時因應上述改動及因應通貨膨脹的情況，我們亦建議車長的底薪下限加至一萬四千元，一方面

我們需要肯定車長在巴士業界所作出的努力，同時因應工時修改而調整薪金，讓車長的收入不會因是項修改而影響收入，為其家庭帶來負面影響。當然巴士公司會視加薪、減工時為增加成本的因素，我們對此是理解的。當然我們鼓勵巴士公司利用營運基金去支付這額外開支，從而減輕加價的壓力。我們相信，車長都是常人，有家庭、健康，長時間的工作對家庭、精神和健康帶來了負面影響，間接令服務質素降低。而且車長休息不足亦是一大安全隱憂，我們必需及早正視這些問題。車長每天需接送大量乘客，若因車長休息不足而出現意外是大家都不願意見到的。因此，長遠修改指引是需要的。（見附表）

除了車長的薪酬需要作出改善，對於外勤人員如站長等職位增加薪酬。站長是對於能否維持班次起關鍵角色。近年，各家巴士公司都有意削減站長的職位，但每每出現突發事情，如火警引起的交通阻塞都需要外勤人員調動及處理。現時站長入職底薪約八千元。我們建議在首階段，即三年內將底薪調升至八千五百元正，三年後底薪達到下限九千元正。薪酬調整對於挽留人才是有幫助的。站長的工作需要時間培訓及適應，有經驗的站長亦十分重要。因此，挽留人才對維持整體服務水平起關鍵作用。

員工福利亦需加以改善，用以增加員工士氣與歸屬感。各家巴士公司都是上市公司，亦是知名的大企業，對於體恤員工，增加福利有助增加員工士氣與歸屬感，更可提升企業形象，一舉兩得。我們建議在審批



員工「無薪假」上需因應不同的個案審批，同時審批上亦應寬鬆處理，讓員工感到公司是有體諒員工的心。除此之外，每逢假期節日如除夕等日子，巴士公司對員工的需求特別殷切，我們建議設特別獎金吸引員工上班，同時安排補假予節日上班的員工，好讓員工犧牲了家庭時間後作為一個補償。當然，這些日子一年只有數天，但巴士公司需體恤員工在節日當中仍緊守崗位，因此安排全年其中一天的補假予員工是合情合理。最後，對於外勤人員的升遷制度需做到公平、開放的原則。讓外勤人員可有目標在巴士公司工作，進一步吸引更多員工留下來工作，亦可將經驗用於實戰之上，對維持服務水平百利而無一害。這更可增加員工對公司的向心力，有助提高士氣。

除此之外，運輸署亦需做好監管的角色，確保巴士公司依據指引安排車長的工作，確保車長有充足的休息和精神上班。作為官方的監管機構，更需多加留意，不能坐以待斃，待意外發生才檢討的話為時已晚了。因此，在執行指引的同時，運輸署亦需做好監管者的角色，防患未然。



專營巴士每天需要接載大量乘客，  
車長有否充足休息是十分重要的。

附表：兩階段修改指引

階段	行車時間	工時所包括 的休息時間	總工作時數	基本底薪
第一階段	10.5 小時	3.5 小時	14 小時	不變*
第二階段	8.5 小時 #	3.5 小時 #	12 小時	14,000

備註：

\*：第一階段雖然建議薪金不變，但巴士公司亦不能因車長的行車時間減少而將薪金、「超時補水」及各項津貼作出調整或刪減，如安全金、車型津貼(九巴適用)等。同時，每年亦需因應通貨膨脹及實際經濟增長調整薪酬。

#：上述建議乃初步構思，詳細的行車時間與休息時間需由巴士公司、員工代表與運輸署討論並得出共識才可實行。但討論的結果如何，每日最高工時為十二小時是必需實行的。當然由於第一階段建議車長在十四小時工作內已包括三小時三十分鐘的休息時間，因此，最高工時即使建議十二小時也可，其休息時間理應不少於三小時三十分鐘。



## Revision of Guideline and Improve the Remuneration

Currently, the Transport Department's guidelines in relation to the work of the bus captains are that their daily working hour cannot exceed 14 hours, in which driving duty in a working day should not exceed 11 hours, and there should be 3 hours of rest time. The break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours, to ensure that the bus captain has rest time before he goes to work. Therefore, it is recommended that the guidelines be revised in two phases to allow the bus captains to have more rest time, which shall have positive impact on the bus mentally, and to their family and health.

Phase 1 of the revision, 14 hours of work, 10 hours rest after work should be temporarily retained. As the guidelines have been adopted by various bus operators, no changes have been made at this stage. Nonetheless, it is suggested that although the proposed 14-hour limit has not been changed, the rest time should be changed to 3 hours and 30 minutes. The corresponding travel time should then be revised to 10 hours and 30 minutes, and so on. The change is to allow the bus captains to have more rest time, so that the bus captains maintain their capacity to continue driving and have a positive impact on the bus captains and passengers. We believe that it is necessary to increase the rest time of the bus captain. At the same time, we also hope that the 30 minutes can be reflected between bus trips and the bus captains would be given a 5 minute rest period. Of course, how to divide these 30 minutes requires consensus between the employees and the bus operator, but the bottom line for this change is that the bus captains' rest time can be increased.

Phase 2 will revise the existing guidelines and such plan shall be implemented in 3 years' time. We recommend that, in 3 years' time, the bus captains' working hours should not exceed 12 hours. In other words, the bus captains should have a 12-hour rest period. This will ensure that the bus captain will not be fatigued and that there will be plenty of rest time, in order to ensure that the mental and physical health of the bus captains are fit to drive the buses. At the same time, in response to the above changes and inflation, we also proposed that the bus captain's basic salary should be increased to \$14,000. On the one hand, we need to appreciate the bus captains' efforts in the bus industry, and at the same time, adjust the salaries in response to the change of working hours, so that the bus captain's income will not be affected by the revisions, resulting in a negative impact on his family. Of course, bus operators will see pay rises and reduction in working hours as a factor of increased costs. We understand this. Of course, we encourage bus operators to use operational funds to cover this additional expenditure, thereby alleviating the pressure of fare increase. We believe that the captains are ordinary people who have families and health. Working long hours has negatively impacted on family, mentally and on health and indirectly reduces the quality of service. Moreover, lack of rest of the bus captains is also a major safety concern. We must face these issues as soon as possible. The bus captains have to transport a large number of passengers every day. Accidents caused by bus captains, who lack rest, are the least thing that everyone would like to see. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the guidelines in the long run. (See Schedule)

In addition to the bus captains' salaries which require to be improved, salaries for field personnel such as terminus officers should also be increased. Terminus officers are the key personnel who determine whether the scheduled bus trips can be maintained. In recent years, various bus operators have been trying to cut down the position of terminus officers. However, when emergencies arise, such as the traffic congestion caused by fire, it requires the handling and arrangement of field personnel. Currently, the basic salary for a terminus officer is around

\$8,000. We propose that the basic salary be increased to \$8,500 in the Phase 1, that is, within three years, and that the basic salary should reach the **lower limit** of \$9,000 after three years. Adjustment in remuneration could help retaining talents. The job of terminus officers require a considerable time of training and adaptation, and an experienced terminus officer is very important. Therefore, the retention of talent has an extremely crucial role in maintaining overall level of service.

Fringe benefits of employees also need to be improved to increase staff morale and sense of belonging. Each bus operator is a listed company and is also a well-known big company. To be sympathetic to the employees, improving fringe benefit would help improving staff morale and sense of belonging, and it will also enhance corporate image, so it serves two purposes. We recommend that when reviewing the “no pay leave” of employees, it should be based on the fact of the case, and approval should handle loosely, so that employees could feel that the Company is being considerate. In addition, on holiday days such as New Year's Eve and other days, bus operators have a particularly keen demand for employees. We propose to set up special bonuses to attract employees to work, and to arrange compensation leave for employees who sacrificed family time and went to work as compensation. Of course, these days only appear a few days a year, but bus operators need to be sympathetic to employees who are still taking up their duties during the holiday season. Therefore, it is reasonable to arrange a day of compensation leave for the employees. Finally, the promotion system for field personnel needs to be fair and open. Let the field personnel to have a goal to work in the bus operators and further attract more staff to be retained, and they can also use experience for real combat, and do no harm to maintain the level of service. This can also increase the employee's cohesiveness towards the Company and help boost morale.

Other than that, the Transport Department should also perform its monitoring role properly, to ensure that the bus operators adhere to the guidelines when arranging work for the bus captains and to ensure that the bus captains have adequate rest and is mentally prepared to go to work. As an official regulator, it should even be more aware not to just sit and wait, as it would be too late to evaluate when an accident occurs. Therefore, while implementing the guidelines, the Transport Department should perform its monitoring role properly, to be better safe than sorry.



franchised bus need to carry a large amount of passengers every day, it is very important it is very important that the bus captains get enough rest.

#### Annex: Guidelines on 2-phases revision

Phase	Driving time	Rest time included in working time	Total working hour	Basic salary
Phase 1	10.5 hours	3.5 hours	14 hours	Remained unchanged *
Phase 2	8.5 hours	2.5 hours #	12 hours	14,000

#### Remarks:


\*: In Phase 1 although the salary is proposed to be remain unchanged, the bus operators cannot adjust or delete their salaries, "overtime pay" and various allowances due to the reduction of driving time of the bus captains, such as safety bonus and bus-type allowance (applies to KMB) etc. At the same time, it is also necessary to adjust the remuneration each year in response to inflation and real economic growth.

#: The above proposal is a preliminary concept. Detailed driving time and rest time must be discussed and agreed between the bus operators, employee representatives and the Transport Department before implementation. Regardless of the result of the discussion, the maximum daily working hour of 12 hours has been fixed. Of course, as the Phase 1 of the proposal suggests 3 hours and 30 minutes break should be included in the 14 hours of work, therefore, the maximum daily working hour could be suggested to be 12 hours, and the rest time should not be less than 3 hours and 30 minutes.

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## 票價穩定基金

相信大家都會認同，國際油價對巴士公司的經營帶來很多不穩定因素。同時，石油價格是巴士公司一大支出，因此，國際油價對巴士公司的影響極大。的確，國際油價會因不同的因素而大幅波動，這些因素是巴士公司不能控制的。而油價亦是令票價出現壓力的一大因素。因此，本會建議政府主導成立票價穩定基金，參考國際油價與巴士公司訂出參考油價，如 100 美元。當該季度的平均油價高於 100 美元時，政府便需向基金注資，補貼因油價帶來的額外支出。當油價滑落後，巴士公司支出減少便需將額外所賺取的盈利撥回基金內，以便日後使用。本會這基金由政府與巴士公司共同商討如果運作與油價的水平。本會希望透過票價穩定基金去減輕由國際油價的升跌而帶來的加價壓力。





## 結語

歸根究底，運輸署採用不公平的競爭，令到巴士公司在經營上舉步維艱，巴士公司唯有節省開支，壓縮成本，令以上的問題出現。本會建議運輸署取消不公平的運輸政策，容許巴士公司開設點對點的巴士路線，以改善巴士公司營運情況，增加收入。除此之外亦應容許巴士公司增加巴士數目，配合巴士公司的營運需要。以上兩點並不足以解決巴士公司的財政困難，因此，我們建議政府容許巴士公司在總站興建上蓋物業，將賺取的收入放入營運基金內，利用基金改善服務，亦可減輕加價壓力。除此之外，修改車長的工作指引亦有助車長有足夠的休息與健康的體魄工作。同時運輸署亦有需要加強對巴士公司的監管，修改過時的指引，配合時代發展。同時亦需全面介入巴士公司的財務報表，根據各家巴士公司的綜合損益表(Consolidated profit and loss account) 調查巴士公司的帳目有否出現問題，從而將加價的關口捉緊，亦需與巴士公司加強溝通，尋求方法去改善經營環境。最重要的是運輸及房屋局需適時全盤審視整個運輸政策，一方面需要配合未來新市鎮發展與人口增長的需求，同時亦應將資源用得其所，讓市民享用到優質、便利及廉價的公共交通服務，減輕市民的交通費負擔才是大家樂意看見的。我們相信，只要各方面願意付出努力，香港的巴士服務定必得到改善，市民有車可乘，巴士公司有利可圖，員工眾志成城工作，提供優質巴士服務才是大家所希望的。

## 任重道遠

香港的公共交通得了很嚴重的病，鐵路系統超負荷、路面日益繁忙的交通情況都令市民花更多的時間在交通運輸之上。去年不但有申訴專員主動調查巴士班次的問題外，有更多的聲音表達了對現有鐵路系統超負荷的不滿。當路面日益擠塞的時候，市民大多無奈投降改乘鐵路，令鐵路系統更加擠迫。因此將本建議書修改及豐富內容實在可謂「任重道遠」。

修定行車時間表、「區域性重組」、交通管理及全面檢討運輸政策與方向是再版中加強了討論的地方。修定行車時間表是短時間內改善巴士服務的「止痛藥」，但只能治標不能治本。「區域性重組」是一個中期的巴士服務整合計劃，希望透過資源重整、整合去讓巴士資源用得其以應乎往後數十年的交通需求。長遠而言，進行交通管理及全面檢討運輸政策與方向是必需要做的事，一方面部分基建項目應盡快上馬開展，另一方面對私家車數量的管制亦要多加努力。最後，政府雖然主張鐵路為本的運輸政策，但面對超負荷的鐵路系統，一些項目如北港島線等仍在討論層面，政府願意對鐵路規劃進行檢討，為何不全面審視現今的運輸政策呢？

再版希望一方面豐富本建議書的內容，另一方面希望從更多方向指出巴士業界面對的困難與挑戰，希望透過第三版的建議書，提出更多建議及解決方法，進一步協助業界經營外，能找到更切合市民的運輸方向。



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Full vision of an assignment for Foundation of Social Sciences: Economics, ECON A121F:

Intensive market competition is always good is uncertain. In the market economy system, the price and the quantity is determined by the market. Between the market competition, goods will get the equilibrium point to get the maximize of the total benefit of the society. The efficiency of the market is the highest. For example, convenience stores such as seven-eleven is an example of the market competition in days. There are different substitutes in the market such as store, supermarket, etc. The price of the products is determined by the market and it is the efficiency in resources allocation. Books, drinks or foods can be sold to the buyers and the price is as same as the other firm. People are not need to pay a large cost for buying goods and the goods can be sold in the market. So, intensive market competition is good to the social.

However, it does not always good in some case. For example, the CLP is the monopoly of the electricity supplier in Kowloon and N.T. The cost of running generate electricity is very high and need to input many resources. If there is only one provider as monopoly, the cost will lower than many provider. Moreover, if there are many electricity supplier, the environment cost also very high. The marginal cost is bigger than the marginal benefit if the electricity market is in competition. So, in some cases, monopoly is better than market competition. Moreover, only one supplier in some public utilities such as Town Gas or Water Supply can make the society more stable. The other example also be seen in the MTRC. MTRC had merged with the KCR in 2008. After that, MTR is the monopoly of the railway market. The cost of running the railway will decrease. Now, there is one management team, etc. The competitive strength in transport market will be increased. So, the monopoly in some case is better than the competitive market. Furthermore, the government policy is another factor makes the MTR becoming monopoly. But this is not our questions to answer at this moment.

Monopoly is hurting to the market in some example. The market of housing is monopoly in Hong Kong. It is the best example which have not been found in other city. The price and the quantity is controlled by the manufacturers. Moreover, there is no substitutes of house or flat. Some people may pointed out that there are many public houses in Hong Kong. But the supply of the public houses is not enough and people need to find a house or flat for living. Some illegal house was found in several years. People are difficult to buy a house or flat to live because the price is too high for them. So, monopoly of some case is worse than the market competition. You may said there are different firm in the housing market but they are grouping as a cartel. Although grouping a cartel is difficult but in Hong Kong housing market, we can noticed this situation and many peoples are not able to pay for their house. Different manufacturers had grouped a commerce called The Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong. It is an evidence which showed that there is a cartel. So, monopoly is not good at some times or some examples.

Intensive market competition isn't always good. When we go back to the traditional market, there are many shops are selling oranges which came from the China. The price will be determined by the market. The cost of the oranges is \$9 per 5 oranges. All the shop selling \$10 per 5 oranges. The profit of



selling oranges is \$1 per 5 oranges. So, in market competition, profit of seller or supplier is very low. Sometimes may become zero. So, intensive market competition is not always good for market. However, in the case of Apple, it is a monopoly of the smart phone market. It had more profit and had incentive to improve quality and technology. Nowadays, Apple had provided another operation system and new technology in the mobile phone. It had improved our daily life and bring a change to the mobile phone market. The net gain to the society is bigger than the dead-weight loss. So, monopoly is better than the intensive market competition if the net gain to the society is bigger than the dead-weight loss. Therefore, intensive market competition is always good is uncertain.

Lau Kai Him (2011)  
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Published by New World First Bus Company Staff Union

First Edition: December, 2012, Hong Kong  
Revision Edition: January, 2013, Hong Kong  
2<sup>nd</sup> Revision Edition: Late January, 2013, Hong Kong  
3<sup>rd</sup> Edition: March, 2014, Hong Kong

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# 九龍巴士(一九三三) 有限公司加價申請

向立法會交通事務委員會提交資料

2014年4月11日

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# 即使營運環境嚴峻，九巴仍投入大量資源提升服務及安全

## 投入大量資源提升服務



積極招聘車長（由約8,100名增至約8,500名）



相應提升車長薪酬（新入職車長上升約19%）




延長用膳時間和改善車長休息設施




與生產商合作研發以及測試符合九巴規格的電能巴士

## 班次脫班率




## 責任事故發生率

每百萬公里平均發生事故



# 九巴目前面對重大營運挑戰



- 九巴每日平均載客量從2002年高峰的310萬人次降至現時260萬，累積流失50萬人次至鐵路



- 九巴的主要成本持續上升
- 過往三年平均工資調整: +4.5%, +5.4%, +4.6%

70%

- 約70%的九巴路線虧本
- 路線重組需時，正積極擴大重組路線規模




- 塞車嚴重惡化，路面集體運輸平均速度下降，進一步打擊巴士對乘客的吸引力，拖低巴士營運效率







# 九巴的成本變化主要受經濟大環境影響，九巴較難調控

## 2013年九巴的成本結構



之前五項鐵路新/支線工程集中於九龍/新界地區，九巴在多個巴士專營權中流失最多客量至鐵路；龍運網絡相對健康

巴士專營權	客量變化 (%) 2007-2013	近年的鐵路影響
	 5.5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>西鐵綫，九龍南環綫，將軍澳支綫，落馬洲支綫，馬鐵</li> </ul>
	 19.9%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>沒有受鐵路直接影響</li> </ul>

# 過去一年主要成本繼續上升；路線重組需時



工資

- 平均加薪4.6%



通脹

- 最新4.4%



隧道費

- 平均上升2.6%



超低硫柴油

- 維持每桶約124美元的高位，並沒有回落

主要成本  
繼續上升



路線重組

- 完成北區及部分屯門路線重組
- 其他區域諮詢中，路線重組需時

# 營運壓力持續擴大，九巴經過審慎考慮後遞交與通脹相約的加價申請

九巴2013年的除稅後虧損：  
港幣2,120萬元

龍運巴士因網絡仍然健康所以不需申請加價

2014年展望：

- 工資上升
- 通脹上升

## 遞交加價申請

- 申請加幅為4.3%
- 九巴迫切需要額外資源保持良好服務

營運壓力持續擴大

積極開拓廣告收益去補貼票價收入，2010至2013年的車身、車廂、巴士電視、候車亭燈箱廣告收入，每年逾1億元都用作補貼票價

車身廣告



車廂廣告



車廂內多媒體廣告



候車亭燈箱廣告



- 2013年錄得 \$1.16億元廣告收入，較2012年增加逾3.6%
- 九巴廣告收益全數計入其專營賬戶，補貼票價，以紓緩虧損



# 九巴需要資源持續提升服務、買新巴士以及維持工資於合理水平

未來增購新型環保巴士



提升轉車站環境和設施



九巴有約12,000員工，  
薪酬、待遇需符市場  
水平，以挽留人才

運輸行業招聘前線員  
工非常困難

研發及測試電動巴士



員工薪酬維持市場水平



增加及提升員工設施



CB(1)1278/13-14(02) (11 April 2014) Administration's paper on fare increase application from the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (power-point presentation materials)

## **Page 1**

**Title: Despite the precarious operational environment, KMB invests a large amount of resources to upgrade services and safety**

**Left boxes:** Investing a large amount of resources to upgrade services:

- Enthusiastically recruiting bus captains (from around 8,100 to 8,500)
- Proportionally increasing bus captains' remuneration (19% increase for new bus captains)
- Extension of meal times and improvement of bus captain resting facilities
- Along with manufacturers, develop and test for electronic buses that fit KMB's specifications

**Top right bar chart: Frequency of delayed trips**

- 2012: 4.6%
  - 2013: 2.8%
  - 2014 (Jan-Feb): 2.1%
- [Arrows]: Decreased by half

**Bottom right bar chart: Accident rate per 1million km travelled**

- 2012: 0.6
  - 2013: 0.5
  - 2014: 0.43
- [Arrows]: -28%

## **Page 2: KMB currently faces huge operational challenges**

- KMB has lost 500k passengers per day to railways, from 3.1m in 2002 to 2.6m now
- KMB's main operational costs continue to rise- for the past 3 years, the average increase in wages have been: +4.5%, +5.4%, +4.6%
- Around 70% of the bus routes are making losses – the rerouting of bus routes need time, and [KMB is] enthusiastically enlarging the scale of rerouting
- Severe deterioration of traffic congestion. The average speed of collective transport on the road surface has declined, further lessening the bus's appeal to passengers, and driving down operation efficiency.

To: "panel\_t@legco.gov.hk" <panel\_t@legco.gov.hk>  
From: Lucas  
Date: 04/16/2014 12:20PM  
Subject: Fwd: 投訴九巴

開始轉寄郵件：

寄件人: Lucas  
日期: 16 April, 2014 12:14:40 pm HKT  
收件人: "[complaints@legco.gov.hk](mailto:complaints@legco.gov.hk)" <[complaints@legco.gov.hk](mailto:complaints@legco.gov.hk)>  
標題: Fwd: 投訴九巴

開始轉寄郵件：

寄件人: Lucas  
日期: 16 April, 2014 10:05:03 am HKT  
收件人: "[kowloonbus@kmb.hk](mailto:kowloonbus@kmb.hk)" <[kowloonbus@kmb.hk](mailto:kowloonbus@kmb.hk)>  
標題: Fwd: 投訴九巴

開始轉寄郵件：

寄件人: Lucas  
日期: 16 April, 2014 9:45:55 am HKT  
收件人: "[tdenq@td.gov.hk](mailto:tdenq@td.gov.hk)" <[tdenq@td.gov.hk](mailto:tdenq@td.gov.hk)>  
標題: 投訴九巴

今早，我乘坐九巴43X,編號HM4239,司機李松彬。我向他要求在高速公路(塞車位置)停車，因為上層有乘客企立。但司機一直沒有任何回應，繼續在高速公路行車，十分危險！此外，由於司機沒有任何回應；而其他乘客也對我作出言語上的侮辱！我深感憤怒！  
黃先生



[Translation]

Sent from: Lucas

Date: 16 April 2014 12:14:40pm HKT

To: [complaints@legco.gov.hk](mailto:complaints@legco.gov.hk)

Subject: FWD: KMB complaints

Sent from Lucas

Date 16 April 2015 10:05:03 am HKT

To: [Kowloonbus@kmb.hk](mailto:Kowloonbus@kmb.hk)

Subject: FWD: KMB Complaints

Sent from: Lucas

Date: 16 April 2014 9:45:55am HKT

To: [tdeng@td.gov.hk](mailto:tdeng@td.gov.hk)

Subject: FWD: KMB Complaints

This morning, I took the KMB bus 43X, license number HM4239, the bus captain's name was "LEE Chong Bun" (transliteration). I asked him to stop the bus on the highway (during congestion), because there was a passenger standing on the upper deck. But the bus captain did not respond and continued to drive on the highway. This was very dangerous!

Further, because the bus captain did not respond, and other passengers on the bus verbally insulted me!

I am deeply frustrated!

Mr. Wong

**For discussion on  
11 April 2014**

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **Fare Increase Application from The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

#### **Purpose**

The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) has submitted an application for a fare increase. Representatives from KMB will brief Members on the details at the panel meeting on 11 April 2014. This paper provides information on the mechanism that the Government would follow to assess bus fare adjustment applications, as well as KMB’s service performance since its last fare increase and the focus of its service development in the future.

#### **Fare Increase Application from KMB**

2. KMB submitted an application on 29 November 2013 for an average fare increase of 4.3%. KMB last increased its fare on 17 March 2013 by an overall average rate of 4.9%. KMB will explain the reasons for it to seek a fare increase at the panel meeting.

#### **Bus Fare Adjustment Arrangement**

3. According to section 13(1) of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230), the scale of fare of franchised bus service is determined by the Executive Council (“ExCo”). As pointed out by the Government in its Legislative Council Brief issued in January 2006, in assessing franchised bus fare adjustment applications, the Government would not set any guaranteed minimum level or ceiling of rate of return. Instead, it would take into account relevant factors which include:

- (a) changes in operating costs and revenue since the last fare adjustment;
- (b) forecasts of future costs, revenue and return;

- (c) the need to provide the operator with a reasonable rate of return. The Government would make reference to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of the bus industry in considering the reasonable rate of return;
- (d) public acceptability and affordability. The Government would make reference to changes in Median Monthly Household Income (“MMHI”) and Composite Consumer Price Index (“CCPI”);
- (e) service performance; and
- (f) a formula for a supportable fare adjustment rate for reference:

$$\begin{aligned} &0.5 \times \text{Change in Nominal Wage Index for the Transportation} \\ &\quad \text{Section (“WI”) + 0.5 x Change in CCPI} \\ &\quad - 0.5 \times \text{Productivity Gain} \end{aligned}$$

4. The Government will make reference to the aforementioned relevant factors, as well as take into account view of Members of the Panel on Transport and the Transport Advisory Committee (“TAC”) before submitting its recommendation to ExCo.

5. It is noteworthy that the formula outcome under paragraph 3(f) above is only for reference. The fare level will not be adjusted automatically according to it. Separately, to assess the financial performance of the bus operators, our consideration is to ensure that they will have sound financial capability in maintaining quality public bus service.

6. Based on the latest available WI and CCPI<sup>1</sup>, the outcome of the formula is +3.99%<sup>2</sup>. In the meantime, the change in MMHI from the last fare increase in March 2013 to the fourth quarter of 2013 is +1.82% (figure for the first quarter of 2014 has yet to be published) and the change in CCPI up to February 2014 (figure as of March has yet to be published) is +4.21%. These figures are for illustration only for the time being. When making a recommendation to ExCo, we would report to it the latest statistics available at the time.

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<sup>1</sup> Change in WI for the period of March 2013 to December 2013 and change in CCPI for the period of March 2013 to February 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Detailed calculation is as follows:

$$0.5 \times 3.77\% + 0.5 \times 4.21\% - 0.5 \times 0\% = +3.99\%$$

As approved by ExCo in 2009, the value of productivity gain in the formula has been set at zero until the next review.

## **Operation of KMB**

7. As at end-December 2013, key information of KMB's operation was as follows:

	<b>KMB (a)</b>	<b>All franchised bus companies (b)</b>	<b>(a) over (b)</b>
<b>Number of Routes</b>	371	559	66%
<b>Fleet</b>	3,844 buses	5,791 buses	66%
<b>Staff</b>	About 12,200 persons	About 18,300 persons	67%
<b>Average Daily Patronage in 2013 (as compared with 2012)</b>	2.61 million (+1.3 %)	3.91 million (+2.0 %)	67%

The average age of KMB's fleet is about 11 years old, which is similar to that of the franchised bus fleet in Hong Kong.

## *Performance of KMB*

8. The Transport Department ("TD") has been monitoring the quality and quantity of KMB's bus service, taking into account objective indicators such as the findings of passenger satisfaction surveys and site surveys, complaint figures and accident rates. The assessment is as follows:

- (a) In terms of safety, KMB's accident rate was 3.18 accidents per million vehicle-km in 2013, vis-à-vis an industry average rate of 4.43 for the same period. All KMB's buses have already been equipped with black boxes to help monitor drivers' performance and investigate accidents when they happen.
- (b) On the environmental front, 89% (3,421 buses) of KMB's fleet was of Euro II or above emission standard as at end-December 2013. The remaining 423 Euro I buses will all be phased out by end-2015, and the Euro II ones by end-2019. To further cut particulate emission, KMB has completed retrofitting diesel particulate filters on all its Euro II and Euro III buses. KMB has also been working with the Environmental

Protection Department to retrofit eligible Euro II and III buses with selective catalytic reduction devices so as to meet the Euro IV nitrogen oxides emission standard. Meanwhile, KMB will conduct trials using three hybrid buses and 18 electric buses (including eight supercapacitor buses and ten battery-electric buses) so as to assess their operational efficiency and performance under local conditions in Hong Kong. The trials of hybrid buses and electric buses will commence in the second half of 2014, and will last for two years.

- (c) According to the passenger satisfaction surveys on KMB's service, passengers are generally most satisfied with drivers' compliance with traffic regulations, travelling speed and driving skills. They are most dissatisfied with frequency and reliability of services.
- (d) The Transport Complaints Unit of TAC received 3,631 complaints and suggestions relating to KMB in 2012 (making up about 58% of all franchised bus-related complaints and suggestions). The figure in 2013 is 4,196 (making up about 57% of all franchised bus-related complaints and suggestions). About half of the complaints and suggestions received on KMB in these two years are on "regularity of service".
- (e) The Government has all along been very concerned about the reliability of KMB services and has demanded KMB to take effective actions in bus captain recruitment and make adjustments to scheduled journey time having regard to prevailing traffic condition. With these efforts, the lost trip rate of KMB dropped to 2.8% in 2013. TD will continue to closely monitor the situation and will review the current monitoring mechanism with a view to enhancing the quality of franchised bus services.<sup>3</sup>

#### *Focus of future service development*

9. With a growing operating cost and competition from other public transport modes, KMB has implemented various measures to enhance efficiency. Key tasks are to increase its bus network efficiency and rationalise bus routes to increase cost effectiveness, reduce wastage, and lower roadside emission. Through effective route rationalisation, fare increase pressure arising from the

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<sup>3</sup> On 23 January, the Ombudsman released the report on its direct investigation into TD's mechanism for monitoring the frequencies of franchised bus services and put up a number of recommendations to enhance the mechanism. TD is now formulating practicable enhancement measures.

cost effectiveness of the operation may also be somewhat alleviated.

10. The Government and franchised bus companies have pursued bus route rationalisation more vigorously since 2013. In addition to the ongoing annual route development programmes (“RDPs”), bus routes are rationalised through the “Area Approach”. Under this approach, the entire district, instead of individual routes, is used as the basis for reviewing and re-organising bus services in a holistic manner. Bus routes which are under-utilised will be cancelled or amalgamated, and new routes will be introduced to meet new demand. Meanwhile, feeder and external routes as well as interchange arrangements will be strengthened, and bus companies will be encouraged to offer interchange concessions as far as possible. These arrangements can enable bus services to better meet the needs of local residents in overall terms, while alleviating traffic congestion and reducing roadside air pollution. They can help bring a win-win situation to the community. TD and franchised bus companies will make reference to the “Guidelines on Service Improvement and Reduction in Bus Route Development Programmes” in formulating rationalisation proposals. Rationalisation proposals under the “Area Approach” for North District and Tuen Mun have been implemented by phases since August and September 2013 respectively and their operation has generally been satisfactory. Drawing on the experience in these two districts, the Government and KMB will continue to rationalise bus services under the “Area Approach”. The bus services of Yuen Long/Tin Shui Wai, Tai Po, Tsing Yi and Sha Tin/Ma On Shan will be rationalised this year. The proposals have been included in the 2014-2015 RDPs, and will be implemented after consultation with the district councils. The consultation has started since January 2014.

### **Advice Sought**

11. Members are invited to note the above and comment on the fare increase application made by KMB.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
April 2014**

**立法會**  
***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(1)1621/13-14(05)

Ref. : CB1/PL/TP

**Panel on Transport**  
**Meeting on 23 June 2014**

**Background brief on**  
**franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and**  
**cross-harbour bus network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973)**

**Purpose**

This paper provides background information on the franchises of Citybus Limited ("Citybus") (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network) ("Franchise 1") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) ("NLB"). It also summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by members of the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") on the subject in the past discussions.

**Background**

2. At present, there are five franchised bus companies operating six bus franchises. They are The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited, Citybus (which operates two franchises, Franchise 1 and another for the Airport and North Lantau bus network ("Franchise 2")), New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), New Lantau Bus Company (1973) ("NLB") and Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW").

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("the Ordinance") (Cap. 230), the Chief Executive in Council ("CE-in-Council") may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding ten years. If the CE-in-Council thinks fit, the CE-in-Council may grant a new franchise to an existing grantee for a period not exceeding ten years to begin immediately upon the expiry of the existing franchise. Section 6 also provides that an existing grantee may request an extension of its franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

4. According to the Administration, the Government's key consideration in awarding or extending a bus franchise is the provision of a proper and efficient public bus service. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise shall, at all times during the franchise period, maintain to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") a proper and efficient public bus service.

5. The current franchise of Citybus (Franchise 1) commenced on 1 July 2006 and will expire at 0400 hours on 1 June 2016, and that of NLB commenced on 1 April 2007 and will expire at 0400 hours on 1 March 2017.

### **Past discussions on bus franchises by Members**

6. Members expressed the following major concerns while discussing matters relating to the granting/renewal of bus franchises.

#### Fare concessions

7. Members had all along been concerned about the bus fares and requested the bus companies to offer more fare concessions to better meet passengers' needs.

8. When discussing the granting of the franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB at its meetings on 17 November 2005, 25 November 2005 and 16 December 2005, Panel members requested for removing the advance payment arrangement of the fare reduction initiatives of the above companies, and increase the extent of the proposed fare reduction so as to benefit more passengers. Members also urged the Administration to take the opportunity to request bus companies to provide concessionary fares to the elderly and persons with disabilities. The advance payment arrangement was subsequently removed by the bus companies concerned and the fare reduction initiatives were modified.

9. When the Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) in 2011 and 2012, members urged that the Administration should add some fare-related requirements while discussing the franchise renewal with bus companies. These fare-related requirements included fare reduction or concession schemes, more bus-bus interchange schemes; introducing inter-company bus-bus interchange schemes; fare discounts/monthly tickets for frequent users; more section fares; and fare concessions for persons with disabilities, the elderly and students.



### Enhancing standard of bus service

10. At the Council meetings of 29 May 2013, 4 December 2013, 18 December 2013 and 11 June 2014, Members raised concern over the performance of franchised bus service and urged the Administration to take the opportunity of franchise renewal to require service improvement by bus companies, for example, provision of real-time bus service information to passengers, provision of more low-floor buses and improvement of lost trip rate.

#### *Provision of real-time bus service information to passengers*

11. According to the Administration, Transport Department ("TD") had all along encouraged franchised bus companies to make use of information technology in providing passengers with service information. The relevant clauses had been updated in the new franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) commencing in 2013 to enhance the regulatory power of C for T over the type, form and manner through which service information was provided by bus companies to passengers. Revised franchise clauses specifically required the provision of service information by bus companies at their websites in accordance with the requirements of C for T. Furthermore, these companies had committed to provide passenger information and enquiry system via the internet and smart phone applications, and to further enhance the system as necessary in future. The Government planned to include similar clauses and request the franchisees to make similar service commitments in the other three franchises when they expire in 2016/2017.

#### *Low-floor buses*

12. In respect of Members' concern over the number of low-floor buses to facilitate wheelchair users, the Administration advised that since 2001, franchised bus companies had been acquiring wheelchair-accessible low-floor models when purchasing new buses or replacing existing buses whenever possible, with the only exception of NLB. This was because low-floor buses were not suitable for operation on some roads with steep gradient and sharp bends in South Lantau. NLB could therefore only procure as far as possible wheelchair-accessible low-floor buses for use on bus routes not covering roads with steep gradient. All buses operated by LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) were now accessible by wheelchair users.

#### *Lost trips of franchised buses*

13. On the lost trips of franchised buses, the Administration advised that the major reasons for lost trips in franchised bus service included shortage of bus

captains, shortage of buses due to repair and maintenance, mechanical breakdown of vehicles and road congestion or traffic accidents, etc. TD had all along been closely monitoring and following up on deviation from service schedules and lost trips. Under section 18 of the Ordinance and the current franchise clauses, a franchised bus company should keep, to the satisfaction of C for T, proper records in respect of bus operation, including the number of buses in use on each route; the number of journeys and total kilometres travelled per day; and the number of lost trips due to accidents, vehicle breakdown as well as vehicle and staff shortages. According to the Administration, the bus company should furnish copies of the records to C for T at such times and in such form and manner (e.g. computer output) as C for T might require. Currently, TD could directly access the above operational information electronically via computer terminals. If lost trips of individual routes were identified at a particular location and during a certain time period, TD would take follow-up actions. This arrangement, together with site inspections by TD, allowed effective monitoring of the situation.

14. The Administration advised that with TD's directive for improvement and franchised bus companies' active implementation of rectification measures, the lost trip situation had improved considerably since mid-2012.

#### Occupational safety and health of bus captains

15. Members were also concerned about the occupational safety and health of bus captains and requested the bus companies to provide more rest time for them. In response to a question raised at the Council meeting of 12 February 2014 regarding the working environment for bus captains, the Administration advised that TD met with the franchised bus companies from time to time and discussed with them bus services and related matters, such as route planning, service frequency, service level, operational safety and working environment of bus captains. TD also met with the representatives of bus captain unions to understand and discuss issues of their concern. They were mainly on work arrangements, measures for improving operational safety, working environment of bus captains, etc. TD, together with franchised bus companies, had taken appropriate and feasible follow-up actions on the comments and requests raised by bus captain unions. Examples include the provision of mobile toilets or facilities such as microwave ovens and refrigerators for use by staff at a number of bus termini.

### Environmental improvement measures

16. Regarding members's concern about the environmental improvement initiatives of bus companies when the Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) in 2011 and 2012, the Administration advised that all the above bus companies had agreed to include new/amended clauses in the franchises to, as far as reasonably practicable, acquire the most environmentally friendly buses (including zero emission buses) and adopt products that are technologically proven and commercially available to reduce emissions, having regard to the feasibility as well as affordability for the passengers and operators.

17. The Administration further advised that to further help improve roadside air quality, the above bus companies agreed to make commitments on the deployment of low emission buses for operation at pilot low emission zones in Causeway Bay, Central and Mongkok delineated by the Environmental Protection Department, with the target of having only low emission buses in these pilot low emission zones by 2015.

### **Latest position**

18. The Administration will brief the Panel on the franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise 1) and NLB at the Panel meeting to be held on 23 June 2014.

19. A list of relevant papers is in the **Appendix**.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
19 June 2014

**Franchises of of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973)**

**List of relevant papers**

<b>Date of meeting of Panel on Transport</b>	<b>Minutes/Paper</b>	<b>LC Paper No.</b>
17 November 2005	Administration's paper	CB(1)309/05-06(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)549/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf</a>
25 November 2005	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)694/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf</a>
16 December 2005	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)713/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf</a>
January 2006	Legislative Council brief	ETWB(T) CR 2/5591/99 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf</a>
11 July 2011	Administration's paper	CB(1)2647/10-11(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting of Panel on Transport	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)220/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf</a>
7 November 2011	Administration's paper	CB(1)227/11-12(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1363/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf</a>
5 December 2011	Administration's paper	CB(1)464/11-12(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1482/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf</a>
9 March 2012	Administration's paper	CB(1)1157/11-12(05) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf</a>
	Background brief	CB(1)1161/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting of Panel on Transport	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
	Administration's follow-up paper	CB(1)1481/11-12(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)2490/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf</a>
29 May 2013	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on bus route rationalisation	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm</a>
4 December 2013	Hon WU Chi-wai raised a question on improvement to the services provided for bus passengers	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm</a>
18 December 2013	Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan raised a question on franchised bus services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm</a>
12 February 2014	Hon WONG Kwok-hing raised a question on facilities at bus termini	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm</a>
11 June 2014	Hon MA Fung-kwok raised a question on lost trips of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm</a>

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
19 June 2014

CB(1)17/14-15(01)

香港職工會聯盟秘書長  
立法會議員李卓人辦事處



General Secretary, H.K. Confederation of Trade Unions  
Legislative Councillor Lee Cheuk Yan's Office

中華人民共和國  
香港特別行政區立法會  
交通事務委員會  
陳鑑林主席

陳主席:

**跟進「巴士司機職業安全」議程**

本人早前在 2014 年 3 月 25 日的會議上，提出「巴士司機的職業安全」的議程並要求政府當局向事務委員會匯報提供上述休息時間及其他安全措施的進展。(立法會 CB(1)1461/13-14(01)號文件 - 待議事項一覽表)

直至現在依然未獲安排到議程上討論，本人希望閣下可以盡快將議程排到會議上。以盡快解決巴士司機職業安全的問題。

立法會議員  
李卓人 謹啟

二零一四年九月十七日

副本送呈:  
九巴員工協會  
龍運巴士員工協會  
城巴有限公司職工會  
新世界第一巴士公司職工會  
旅遊巴士司機工會  
巴士業職工會聯盟

(註：請將回覆傳真至 2384 0261)

[Translation]

**Re: The motion of “Bus Captain’s Safety at work”**

I have, at the meeting on 25 March 2014, suggested the motion “Bus Captain’s Safety at work” and requested that the Government report to the Panel on Transport the development regarding relevant resting hours and other safety procedures. (Legco Document CB (1) 1461/13-14(01) Schedule to Agenda)

There has been no arrangement for the motion to be discussed even until now. I hope that you can place the motion before the Legislative Council meetings as soon as possible in order to swiftly resolve the safety issues faced by bus captains.

Sincerely

LEE Cheuk-Yan

Legislative Council Member

17 September 2014

CC:

KMB Staff Association

Long Win Bus Federation of Staff Association

Citybus Limited Employees Union

New World First Bus Company Employees Union

Coach Drivers Union

The Federation of Bus Industry Trade Unions

(NB: Please send replies by Fax to 2384 0261)



For information

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **Bus Networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited**

#### **Public Consultation on Requirements of New Franchises**

### **Purpose**

The Government invited the public to offer views on the requirements of the new franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) (“Citybus (Franchise 1)”) and New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited (“NLB”). This paper briefs Members the views received during public consultation.

### **Background**

2. The current franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB will expire on 1 June 2016 and 1 March 2017 respectively. At the meeting of this Panel held on 23 June 2014, the Government informed Members of the plan to engage the two grantees for discussion on granting of new franchises, and invited Members to offer views on the requirements of the new franchises. The Panel noted the Government’s plan to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchises.

### **Public Consultation**

3. Public consultation took place between 25 June and 16 September 2014. The consultation document was uploaded to the websites of GovHK, the Transport and Housing Bureau, the Transport Department (“TD”) and the Public Affairs Forum of the Home Affairs Bureau. Press releases on the public consultation were issued on 24 June and 2 September 2014. Moreover, TD invited views from members of the Traffic and Transport Committees (“TTC”) of the 18 District Councils (“DCs”). Five DCs<sup>1</sup> discussed the matter at their TTC meetings. TD had sent representatives to those meetings to listen to members’ views.

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<sup>1</sup> These are the Southern, Central and Western, Eastern, Islands and Sai Kung DCs.

4. A total of 47 submissions were received during public consultation. 18 of them were from political parties, members of the Legislative Council and DCs, as well as various organisations. The remaining 29 submissions were from individuals. Comments received during the exercise mainly fall under the following three areas:

- (a) **Service quality** – to suggest grantees to enhance the provision of passenger information improve passenger facilities and provide safe bus services. A greater number of comments are on the provision of real time bus arrival information.
- (b) **Fare concessions** – to suggest grantees to provide various fare concessions. Most of the comments are on the provision of bus-bus interchange schemes and various types of sectional fares.
- (c) **Government regulation** – to suggest the Government to strengthen the regulation on bus services. A greater number of comments are on the strengthening of the monitoring on service frequency.

5. The major comments received during public consultation are set out at **Annex**.

### **Next step**

6. Now that public consultation has completed, we have started to prepare for the discussion with the two grantees on the new franchises. Owing to rising operating costs (a major proportion being staff costs), fluctuation of fuel prices and keen competition from other public transport services, the grantees must continue to actively rationalise their existing services so as to avoid wastage of resources. They also have to explore new service areas to keep their operation sustainable. In view of the above, we will not underestimate the difficulty of the discussion. While we would strive for the franchise terms that can meet the demand and expectation of the public as far as possible, we would also take into account the actual operating environment. We aim to conclude the discussion in the first half of 2015 and shall report the result to this Panel afterwards.

7. Members are invited to note this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**December 2014**

**Bus Networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and  
Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and  
New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited**

**Major Views on the Requirements of the New Franchises  
Received During Public Consultation**

**A. Service quality**

1. Passenger information
  - (a) to provide real time bus arrival information and traffic information at bus stops as well as via the Internet and mobile devices;
  - (b) to provide more route information at bus stops and inside bus compartments; and
  - (c) to provide bus stop relocation notifications for persons with visual impairment.
2. Passenger facilities
  - (a) to use buses with higher capacity or newer buses;
  - (b) to allow carriage of bicycles on board, and provide parking space inside bus compartments and at bus stops;
  - (c) to provide barrier-free facilities and bus stop announcement system, and use low-floor buses;
  - (d) to provide free Wi-Fi service inside bus compartments;
  - (e) to improve the luggage racks inside compartments of the buses of New Lantau Bus; and
  - (f) to provide better passenger waiting environment.
3. Bus safety
  - (a) to introduce monitoring mechanism to strengthen monitoring on the driving attitude of bus captains;
  - (b) to improve on-board safety facilities (including handrails and seat belts); and
  - (c) to improve the management on, for example, safety equipment.
4. Bus operations
  - (a) to improve the environment at bus termini and deploy more bus regulators to adjust and manage bus services;
  - (b) cross-harbour bus routes jointly operated by two grantees to be operated by one grantee; and
  - (c) to give boarding priority to the elderly.

**B. Fare concessions**

1. to provide more bus-bus interchange (“BBI”) schemes, including inter-company BBI schemes;
2. to provide more or increase the types of sectional fares, including reducing the sectional fares of cross-harbour routes, providing two-way sectional fares or distance-based fares; and
3. to provide fare concessions for certain passenger groups (such as residents of Lantau Island and the elderly).

**C. Government regulation**

1. Enhancement of government regulation
  - (a) to strengthen the monitoring on service frequency and introduce a penalty system; and
  - (b) to conduct a mid-term review on the franchise.
2. Franchise arrangement
  - (a) to consider various franchise arrangements, including direct negotiation and open tendering, for healthy competition.

**D. Environmental initiatives**


1. to expedite bus fleet replacement and use more environmentally-friendly buses (such as hybrid or electric buses); and
2. to suitably adjust the temperature inside bus compartments to avoid energy wastage.

**E. Bus captains**

1. to enhance training for bus captains; and
2. to improve rest time arrangement for bus captains.

**F. Public participation**

1. to enhance public participation in franchise matters;
2. to provide more information on the bus operating plans to the public; and
3. to encourage grantees to further publicise their passenger liaison groups.



# 汽車交通運輸業總工會

## 對《公共交通策略研究》——「專營巴士服務」之意見書

對於特區政府準備開展《公共交通策略研究》（下稱「研究」），從而系統地檢視香港整體公共交通服務的佈局，本會（汽車交通運輸業總工會）是十分歡迎的。另一方面，本會也是十分支持立法會交通事務委員會在 2015 年 2 月 9 日召開特別會議，聽取運輸行業（專營巴士）對「研究」的看法。為此，本會在收集會員的意見及經過探討後，提出下述意見。主要有：

### 一、 官員偽善的表現：

一直以來，運輸當局的官員在進行香港的公共交通規劃時，都抱著好大喜功的心態，過急和過度地開展多個鐵路項目。舉例來說，在五個鐵路項目，即西港島線、廣深港高速鐵路香港段、南港島線（東段）觀塘延線及沙田至中環線（沙中線）於未來數年裡相繼落成投入使用之際，運輸當局在 2014 年 9 月公布《鐵路發展策略 2014》，著意落實在 2018 年至 2026 年之間落實七個新鐵路項目，即北環線及古洞站、屯門南延線、東九龍線、東涌西延線、洪水橋站、南港島線（西段）和北港島線，使香港鐵路網絡將會覆蓋約七成半人口居住及八成半就業機會的地區。

由此來說，其他陸路交通工具的營運空間便會大幅縮減，而專營巴士員工的生計更會受到很大衝擊。舉例來說，港鐵西港島延線 2014 年年底通車後，區內不少市民已經改為乘搭港鐵。有關數據顯示，單是香港大學站和堅尼地城站每天便有 13 萬人次左右使用，而區內巴士路線的整體乘客量下跌大約 35%，部分路線的繁忙時段載客率更大跌 55 個百分點。雖然巴士公司表示不會因此裁員，但是

現職巴士員工往往會感到工作前景黯淡，而其他社會人士也亦不願意投身到專營巴士行業之中。

對於這個問題，本會不但多番要求運輸當局在合理發展鐵路網絡的同時，也要採取有效疏導措施，以保障業界司機的生計和提供良好的就業機會。可惜的是，運輸當局對此置若罔聞。直至目前，運輸當局在製造鐵路網絡幾乎覆蓋香港所有地區的既定事實後，才惺惺作態地表示「鐵路網絡的擴展對其他公共交通服務而言，的確造成一些影響」，並將「就重鐵以外的公共交通服務原有的角色定位作出檢視和優化其發展」，其所謂的誠意實在令人生疑。

## 二、 錯誤評計形勢：

雖然香港每天使用公共交通工具約為 1,200 萬人次，但是鐵路網絡在運輸當局的大力支援和政策傾斜之下，佔據愈來愈大的市場份額。不僅如此，鐵路公司更加採取一大堆「進取」的競爭手法，如提供免費接駁巴士服務、興建直達半山區的高速電梯、向乘客提供月票和日票優惠、讓乘客免費轉乘巴士、興建鐵路上蓋物業來「製造」客源等等，從而更好地保持其在市場上的優勢。

在香港公共交通運輸市場的開拓空間已是十分有限的情況下，當運輸當局的極力扶持和鐵路公司採用種種手法來進行競爭時，專營巴士便會處於劣勢。舉例來說，有研究發現，單是西港島線和南港島線通車後，估計有 61 條港島線和 16 條過海線巴士服務將受到影響，而且每天流失的乘客量可能高達 18.8 萬人次。屆時，專營巴士公司將無可避免地大規模裁減人手，令巴士員工面臨著嚴峻的就業難題。由此可以看出，鐵路網絡的發展與專營巴士之間乃是彼此相互競爭的關係，無法達致運輸當局所說的促進各公共交通服務繼續優勢互補的境界。

## 三、 不公平競爭：

承接上點，雖然鐵路幹線和專營巴士都是提供公共交通服務，但是香港鐵路網絡向來都是政府動用龐大公帑來建造和營運，而政府因此當之無愧地成為港鐵有限公司的最大股東。不僅如此，政府在發展鐵路幹線時，也不斷運作既有的公

共資源和採用有利於鐵路的各項政策，官為地將包括專營巴士在內的其他公共交通工具排擠為輔助交通工具，令它們只能提供接駁服務，從而讓鐵路順理成章地成為「一鐵獨大」的客運系統骨幹。至於專營巴士公司方面，雖然大部份都由大型上市財團擁有，但是它們屬於私人營運性質，其財力和政策優勢自然是無法與運輸當局撐腰的港鐵公司抗衡。對於受僱於專營巴士的基層勞工，他們在唇亡齒寒之下，生計只會愈形困頓。

#### 四、 避談鐵路的問題：

從成本效益的角度來說，在香港現有的十條鐵路線中，有數條路線於最繁忙路段的繁忙時間平均載客率只有四成多。換言之，也就是這些鐵路線在非繁忙時間平均載客率更低於這個比率，因此很可能存在著虧本經營的可能性。這種現象不禁令人想起，投資近 500 億元興建的西鐵線在啟用初期因乘客量只達預計的一半，即僅有 10 萬人次，因此每天要浪費納稅人 500 萬元的事例。對此，運輸當局不得不承認，新增鐵路要由鐵路營運者來自負營虧，而不是由廣大納稅人為虧損的鐵路線付帳。可惜的是，運輸當局在立法會交通事務委員會在 2014 年 11 月 25 日舉行會議的參考資料中則完全迴避了這些問題，其誠意同樣令人生疑。

#### 五、 忽略實際操作問題：

運輸當局在制定香港《邁步前進：香港長遠運輸策略》時，提出五項政策綱領，並且將之包裝得美輪美奐。然而，由於運輸當局一直沒有採取以人為本的方式，關注和協調專營巴士員工的運作及為創造一個理想的工作環境，結果使廣大專營巴士員工遇到很多工作上的難題。在具體內容方面，主要有：

1. 從巴士司機的日常駕駛工作來說，他們每天都要經過很多交通燈號。然而，運輸當局一直不肯接納業界的意見，改善現時的交通燈號管理措施，如加設交通燈號倒計器或閃動裝置等。
2. 由於很多巴士站沒有劃上雙黃線或設立「不准停車」交通標誌，使其他類別的車輛經常停泊在巴士站前端或後面，嚴重影響巴士車長的駕駛工作。

3. 由於運輸當局在不少地區都沒有設立足夠的泊車位，使很多駕駛者被迫要將車輛停放在道路兩旁和佔用大量的道路空間，而這種情況在大型節假日裡和旅遊景區尤為嚴重，導致巴士車長遇到操作難題。
4. 雖然政府鼓勵和資助傷健人士使用公共交通服務，尤其是專營巴士，但是運輸當局並沒有專營巴士公司協調和增加行車時間，無形中削減車長的休息時間和增加他們的工作壓力。
5. 由於運輸當局長年以來都未能處理好規劃的工作，使一些新市鎮，如大嶼山東涌在因人流激增的情況下，仍然沒有改用雙層巴士來疏導人潮。
6. 運輸當局沒有很好地發揮監管的作用，使專營巴士公司不斷地推行「奪命更」和「跨區接更」的措施，使受影響車長不但工作時間被拉長，而且工作壓力亦倍增。
7. 專營巴士公司為了壓縮成本而減少班次，不但使受影響車長要被迫專作後備，而且擔任駕駛工作的車長亦因脫班情況日趨嚴重而遭到乘客的責難，故加重他們的心理負擔。
8. 受到休息室、茶水間和洗手間等配套設施嚴重不足的影響，巴士車長在僅有的休息和用膳時間裡，幾乎要花費所有時間來應付各項需要，沒有足夠時間休息和應付沉重的駕駛工作。
9. 專營巴士公司管理層沒有正視自身編制和行政混亂而引起乘客投訴的問題，反而將之推到車長的身上，結果引起車長的很大怨氣。
10. 專營巴士公司管理層經常把車長的休息時間安排在完成駕駛工作之後，不但剝奪法例賦予員工們應有的權益，而且損害廣大車長的身體健康。
11. 專營巴士公司管理層近年來不斷地收緊車長看病的次數，使很多車長在生計的壓力下，只能抱病工作，而不敢請假休息。
12. 雖然專營巴士公司員工流失和難以聘用新人的情況下，減少使用一些高壓的管理手法，但是採取剋扣安全獎、發出警告信、留廠待命、放無薪假、甚至解僱等高壓手法仍然時有發生，令員工感到頗大的工作壓力。



13. 雖然巴士行業近年已經出現較少新人入行的問題，但是巴士公司仍使用合約方式來聘用員工，結果造成新入職員工流失情況嚴重的現象，不利於專營巴士提高服務質素和長遠發展。

## 六、 環保工作片面：

雖然運輸當局在制定香港長遠整體運輸策略的綱領中，提及會落實更環保的運輸措施，但是究其內容，無非是實行多些規管，如減少車輛排放廢氣、噪音限制、密封引擎、引進節省燃料的汽車等，而沒有從實際操作方面來考慮問題，從而減低損耗和提升環保質素。舉例來說，大嶼山東涌屬於新開發的市鎮，但是運輸當局沒有在此推行環保的運輸措施，如增加使用電能巴士和設置相應的配套設施。與此同時，運輸當局也沒有在大嶼山興建環島幹線，從而減少現時車輛被迫在崎嶇的山路行駛時的廢氣排放和燃料及機件損耗。在沒有處理好交通燈號管理下，使專營巴士在提供服務時不能順暢地運作，而是要經常在燈號前停車，結果造成增加廢氣排放和路面損耗等不利環保的後果。此外，更為重要的一點是，本會認為在鐵路網絡幾乎涵蓋香港每一個地區之際，專營巴士會流失大量客源，以致他們所提供的公共交通服務效益大幅降低。從環保角度來說，這顯然造成社會資源的嚴重浪費。



汽車交通運輸業總工會

2015年2月9日

## **[Translation of only sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Further Submissions on Public Transport Strategy Study Franchise Bus Service from Motor Transport Workers General Union]**

### **2. Erroneous Assessment of the Situation:**

Although there are 12 million people using public transport in Hong Kong every day, the railway network is taking an increasingly larger share of the market under the support of the transport authorities and tilt of the policies. Not only that, the railway company has adopted a whole set of "aggressive" competition methods, such as providing free shuttle bus services, constructing high-speed elevators that reach the Mid-levels, providing passengers with monthly and daily ticket discounts, allowing providing free interchange buses for passengers and building properties on top of railway stations to "create" source of customers and so on, so as to better maintain their market advantages. Given the limited space available for the expansion of public transport market in Hong Kong, franchised buses will be at a disadvantage when transport authorities are strongly supporting the railway company and the railway company is adopting various methods to compete. For example, there are studies showing that after the opening of the West Island Line and the South Island Line alone, it is estimated that 61 Hong Kong Island bus routes and 16 cross-harbour bus routes would be affected, and the daily loss of passengers may be as high as 188,000 persons. At that time, there will inevitably be a large scale reduction of manpower by the franchised bus operators. This will cause employees to face severe difficulties in employment. It can be seen from this that the development of the railway network and franchised buses are competing with each other and cannot achieve the realm of what the transport authorities have said to promote the complementary advantages of public transport services.

### **3. Unfair Competition**

On the other hand, although the railway network and franchised buses are all providing public transport services, it has been the case that huge amounts of public funds have been used to build and operate the railways network, and the government has thus become the largest shareholder of the MTR Corporation. Not only that, when the government develops the railway network, it also constantly exploits existing public resources and adopts various policies that are conducive to the railway networks. Officials will crowd out other public transportation including franchised buses as auxiliary public transports, and only connection services can be provided, so that railways logically become the backbone of the "railway dominated" passenger service system. As regards franchised bus companies, although most of them are owned by sizable listed consortia, they are privately operated. Their financial and political advantages are naturally unable to compete with the MTR Corporation supported by the transport authorities. For the grass-roots workers who are employed by franchised bus operators, their livelihoods will only get worse as they share a common lot.

## **5. Ignored practice Operational Problems:**

When formulating Hong Kong's "Hong Kong Moving Ahead: A transport strategy for the future", the transport authorities put forward five policy guidelines and have them nicely packaged. However, as the transport authorities have not adopted a people-oriented approach, i.e. to pay attention to and to coordinate the operation of the employees of the franchised bus operators and to create a pleasant working environment. As a result, the employees of the franchised bus operators encountered many difficulties during their work. The specific contents are set out as follows:

1. From the perspective of the daily driving duty of the bus captains, they have to pass through many traffic lights every day. However, the transport authorities have been reluctant to accept the views of the industry and improve the existing traffic signal management measures, such as adding traffic signal counters or flashing devices.
2. As many bus stops do not have double yellow lines or "no parking" traffic signs set up, other types of vehicles are often parked at the front or rear of bus stops, which is seriously affecting the driving duty of bus captains.
3. Since the transport authorities did not establish sufficient parking spaces in many areas, many drivers were forced to park their vehicles on both sides of the road, which occupy a large amount of road space. This situation was particularly serious during major holidays and at tourist attractions, which causes the bus captains to encounter operational difficulties.
4. Although the Government encourages and subsidizes people with disability to use public transport services, especially franchised buses, the transport authorities did not coordinate with the franchised bus operators or increase travel time, which virtually eliminating the bus captains' rest time and increasing their work pressure.
5. As over the years the transport authorities have not been able to handle the planning work well, some new towns, such as Tung Chung in Lantau Island, still have not switched to double-decker buses to divert the crowds in view of the surge in traffic.
6. The transport authorities have not been mastering its monitoring role, therefore, the franchised bus operators continued to implement measures for "killing shifts" and "cross-district shifts" so that not only the working hours of the affected bus captains

were stretched, but their work pressure has also doubled.

7. The franchised bus operators have reduced frequency of bus trips in order to reduce costs. Not only do the affected bus captains have to be forced to work as a reserved, but the bus captains who were in service were also censured by passengers due to the more frequent and serious off-duty situation, thus aggravated their psychological burden.
8. Affected by the severe shortage of ancillary facilities such as lounges, pantry and toilets, bus captains spend almost all of their time in meeting their needs during their rest breaks and meal breaks. They do not have enough time to rest and deal with the burdensome driving duties.
9. The management of franchised bus operators did not face the problem of passenger complaints caused by confusion in their own arrangement and administration. Instead, they blame the bus captains, which cause great resentment from the bus captains.
10. The management of the franchised bus operators often arranges the bus captains' rest time to be at the time after they have completed their driving duties. This does not only deprive the rights of the employees that they are entitled to, but it also impairs the physical health of the bus captains.
11. In recent years, the management of franchised bus operators has constantly tightened the number that a bus captain may visit doctors. As a result, under the pressure of livelihood, many bus captains can only work while they are sick and do not dare to take time off to rest.
12. During the time when the franchised bus operators have high turnover and difficulties in recruiting new blood, they have reduced the use of some high pressure management techniques. However, high pressure management such as deducting safety bonuses, issuing warning letters, holding back bus captains to standby at the depot, asking bus captains to take no pay leave and even firing them still happen every now and then, which cause great work pressure to the employees.
13. Although in recent years, the bus industry has experienced fewer newcomers to the industry, the bus operators still employ employees by contract. As a result, it creates the phenomenon of serious turnover of new employees, and this is not conducive in improving the quality of service and long-term development of the franchised buses.

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## Comments on the Scope of the Public Transport Strategy Study (PTSS) for Legco's Panel for Transport

by Julian Kwong 2015 02 05

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We read with great interest Government's Legco paper on the forthcoming PTSS. While this study is considered timely and necessary, we wish to point out that the proposed scope does not cover a number of important topics.

### Safety Performance and Risks of Public Transport

Over the years, measures have been introduced to increase the safety performance of public transport. Nevertheless, many pressing safety issues are yet to be addressed. Based on published accident statistics, roughly one quarter of buses, public light buses and taxis are involved in injury accidents every year and the rate has increased by 30% for taxis and buses in the last ten years. The safety of public transport concerns not only passengers inside the vehicle, but also waiting passengers and third parties including pedestrians. The reputation of aggressive driving behaviour among a certain proportion of taxi and minibus or bus drivers is not unfounded. We estimate that in comparison with private cars, taxis and particularly public light buses have a much higher rate of injuring pedestrians for the same distance of travel, despite these being driven by professional drivers. In addition, every year there are many hundreds of casualties involving bus passengers losing balance and many would have gone unreported. Elderly passengers are particularly vulnerable when taking buses, yet their population is growing rapidly. Certain passenger seats entail significantly higher risk for severe casualties, notably upper front rows of double decker buses due to lack of crumple zones and rear seats of minibuses in case of rear-front collisions. Compliance rate of seat belt wearing is low for buses and minibuses and not all these vehicles using high speed roads are equipped with seat belts. Many major roads in Hong Kong alongside steep hillside or cliffs are not equipped with safety barriers, resulting in a very high risk of catastrophic accident if a bus runs off the road and rolls over.

### Opportunities and Strategy for Better Safety

With the advent of new measures or practices, the PTSS should examine all opportunities afresh to improve safety and quality of service. Some examples are:

- Black box and GPS driver monitoring system – systematic monitoring of driving parameters such as speed, acceleration, braking etc to reduce the risk of all types of accidents. Such system would be operated in conjunction with new protocols e.g. speed restriction on high risk road sections and urban streets, gentler acceleration/deceleration values etc.
- ISO39001 "Road Traffic Safety Management" - a new member of ISO launched in 2012 to target at transport fleets of public transport operators and the logistic industries. This would follow the steps of other ISO quality assurance systems in the future to help deliver far more responsible transport operation from the road safety perspective.
- Blind spot monitoring system – sensors, CCTV cameras, improved mirrors and intelligent technologies to better manage the safety of turning and reversing.
- Easy to read digital speedometer and intelligent reminder system – to enable better

awareness among public transport drivers.

- Energy absorbing bollards- an example of emerging products to protect both waiting bus passengers and occupants of errant vehicles at bus stops alongside high speed traffic.

### **Role of Walking and Cycling**

Public transport should not be considered as the ultimate solution for passenger transport demands. In fact, most public transport users will continue their trip on foot and possibly on a bicycle. Attempts to over-rely on motorized public transport will invariably generate undesirable side-effects such as air pollution, accidents and congestion. Pleasant and safe walking environment will encourage pedestrians to walk longer, thereby enabling more efficient public transport while walking is a healthy exercise. In spite of ongoing greening and provision of pedestrian infrastructures, Hong Kong is much lagging behind modern Europe in terms of lower urban speed limits and area-wide traffic calming which are crucial for an attractive and safe pedestrian environment. While a better pedestrian environment could well be reviewed separately, the PTSS should at least address the interface between public transport and walking or cycling.

### **Quality Public Transport Facilities**

Bus and minibus stands are at best basic and at worst unacceptable in terms of aesthetics and the information they provide. While good quality bus shelters have been introduced by bus operators, these also serve a primary purpose for advertising. As a result, these are not necessarily designed with safety in mind along major routes as waiting passengers are exposed to high speed traffic. On the other hand, individual operators having their own shacks with a diversity of “furniture” occupying valuable space at public transport termini. The ability of public transport operators to convey timely and quality passenger information during incidents is also called into question. Without Government’s intervention, operators will continue to invest little into passenger facilities and services.

### **Recommendations to Legco**

We consider that the above topics are core issues for our future public transport system. Their omission will undermine the completeness of the PTSS. We therefore recommend Legco’s Panel for Transport to urge Government to incorporate into the PTSS study Brief these missing topics, namely:

1. Safety performance and future safety strategy for public transport
2. Integration of public transport with walking and cycling
3. Strategy for quality public transport facilities



Hong Kong, 28 January 2015

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Legislative Council Secretariat  
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**Views on 'Public Transport Strategy Study' – Franchised bus services**

Chairman and members,

As a District Councilor, I would like to take this opportunity to reflect the views of my constituents on the subject study and would be grateful if the panel and Transport and Housing Bureau can consider the following positively.

**Real Time Information**

Our residents are highly frustrated with the unpredictability of franchised bus service arrivals. Road congestion can delay equipment and result in varying waiting times up to 40 minutes for some services covering Pokfulam. We have repeatedly suggested to the Transport Department to make it compulsory on the operators to install GPS locators on all services, to start with for all services with headways of 10 minutes or more.

This information should be streamed over the internet in real time and made available in an open source format and free of copyright and displayed in the bus, at digital displays in the bus stops and via mobile applications available free of charge to passengers. Bus franchise agreement set out rights and obligations for private companies to provide public transport services. They should also include terms on public transport information. Open data will not only improve competition, it will also enhance the overall quality of public transport service experience for the community.

**Routes rationalisation**

Bus routes rationalisation is a sensitive issue. In general, we support bus routes rationalisation, particularly for routes that pass through congested zones, if and only if there has been sufficient consultation beforehand and reasonable alternative solutions are made available to existing passengers.

Yours faithfully

Paul Zimmerman



**For discussion  
on 20 March 2015**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

**Public Transport Strategy Study – Topical Study  
Franchised Bus Service**

**PURPOSE**

Eight topical issues will be covered by the Topical Study under the Public Transport Strategy Study (“PTSS”). The Topical Study on franchised bus service has been completed. It covers three areas, namely route rationalisation, enhanced monitoring of the lost trip situation, and priority use of roads by franchised buses. This paper reports to Members the outcome of the study.

**BACKGROUND**

2. Public transport services are closely related to the daily life of the public. Every day, over 90% of total passenger trips (over 12 million in total) are made through the public transport system in Hong Kong. Given that Hong Kong is a small and densely-populated city with limited road space, and the public are concerned about the impact of road traffic on air quality, we will continue to adopt a public transport-oriented policy and use the railway as the backbone of the public transport system for our city. However, the railway is not hegemonic. The Government’s objective is to provide quality and diversified public transport services to the community. Road-based public transport services will continue to play an important role. Among these services, franchised buses have high capacity and can be deployed more flexibly. They can adjust their service patterns to meet changes in demand within a relatively short period. Hence, they will continue to be the mass carrier serving areas without direct railway access as well as providing feeder service connecting the railway network and inter-district service. Although several new railway<sup>1</sup> will be opened in the coming few years, it is expected that franchised bus service will continue to account for about 30% of the total patronage of all public transport services.

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<sup>1</sup> South Island Line (East), Kwun Tong Line Extension, Shatin to Central Link, and Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link.

3. In tandem with the further development of the heavy rail network, we consider it necessary to examine the overall strategic arrangements of the public transport system so as to enhance the complementarity amongst the various public transport services. This is to ensure that the public can enjoy efficient services with reasonable modal choices on the one hand, and public transport operators can enjoy sustainability on the other hand. To this end, the Government would commence the PTSS. As explained in our work plan presented to the Legislative Council (“LegCo”) Panel on Transport in November 2014, the PTSS comprises two parts, namely the Role and Positioning Review (“RPR”) and the Topical Study. The RPR will review the roles and positioning of various public transport services, while the Topical Study will look into important topics that are of concern to LegCo members, the public and the public transport trades. The workflow of the two parts is recapped at **Annex 1**.

4. With regard to franchised bus service, the Government has granted six bus franchises<sup>2</sup>. Every day, the franchised bus companies are deploying about 5 800 buses to operate 74 000 trips and serve about 4 million passengers. The Topical Study would explore how to improve operational efficiency, service regularity and quality of franchised bus service through route rationalisation, enhanced monitoring of the lost trip situation and confirmation of the policy to further implement bus priority measures. This is to enhance the competitiveness of franchised bus service and maintain its long-term and sustainable development. Subsequently, we will, with the assistance of a consultant and having regard to the implications for other public transport services, explore under the RPR whether it is feasible and desirable to introduce different types of new services (e.g. point-to-point express routes, seat-only service, premium service with additional facilities (such as Wi-Fi)) to attract new passengers. We will also explore whether it is feasible and desirable to install real-time bus arrival information systems for service improvement. During the process, we will carefully evaluate the long-term operational and financial implications of the proposals for the franchised bus trade, and the implications for the other public transport trades. We will also assess passenger demand for these new services

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<sup>2</sup> The franchises are operated by the Kowloon Motors Bus Company (1933) Limited, Citybus Limited (with two franchises, namely the franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network and franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network), New World First Bus Services Limited, New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Ltd, and Long Win Bus Company Ltd.

## **Bus Route Rationalisation**

5. Enhancing franchised bus service is an on-going task of the Transport Department ("TD"). Bus route rationalisation is an important part of it. As an annual exercise, franchised bus companies would submit their route development programmes ("RDPs") to TD. The RDPs would include proposals to introduce new services (such as express service), improve frequency and extend operating hours, as well as to reduce frequency, truncate routes, and cancel or amalgamate routes, having regard to the latest situation. The objective is to better utilise resources, enhance network efficiency, improve service quality, alleviate traffic congestion and reduce roadside air pollution. In considering rationalisation proposals, TD will take into account factors such as changes in population and passenger demand as well as infrastructural development. Reference would also be made to the established guidelines on service rationalisation (at [Annex 2](#)). District councils will be consulted in the process.

6. Bus route rationalisation is one of the policy initiatives announced by Chief Executive in his 2013 Policy Address. Since then, TD and franchised bus companies have pursued route rationalisation with greater vigour. In addition to the annual RDP, the "Area Approach" has been adopted to review bus service holistically for a district as a whole, rather than on a route-by-route basis. Routes with persistently low patronage would be rationalised. Resources so saved would be used to strengthen existing services with increased demand or introduce new services, and to enhance feeder services or provide more interchange concessions, with a view to maximising the overall benefits to the district.

7. In 2013, TD and the franchised bus companies applied the Area Approach in Tuen Mun and North District for the first time. With this experience, Area Approach rationalisation was carried out in Shatin, Tai Po, Tsing Yi and Yuen Long in 2014. Through the RDP and Area Approach rationalisation in 2013 and 2014, a total of 22 routes of low patronage were cancelled or amalgamated, 8 routes were truncated, frequency of 104 routes was reduced in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, 11 new routes were introduced and frequency of 154 routes was increased to meet the passenger demand. The volume of bus traffic en route major trunk roads in Central, Causeway and Mong Kok was reduced by more than 2 000 trips, which could help alleviate roadside air pollution. During 2013 and 2014, about 245 buses were saved through route rationalisation. Over 90% of which has been re-deployed for new service or enhancement of existing service.

8. To tie in with Area Approach rationalisation, TD and the bus companies have set up new or enhanced existing Bus-Bus Interchanges (“BBIs”) on Tuen Man Highway, on Tsing Sha Highway and at the Tai Lam Tunnel Toll Plaza. Passengers can make use of 56 routes at these three BBIs for trips to/from the New Territories and Kowloon/Hong Kong Island. They can enjoy BBI fare concessions ranging between \$4 to about \$24 per trip when making an interchange. Moreover, better facilities (such as bus arrival time display system, free Wi-Fi, large bus route map and chairs) have been provided. At the Tai Lam Tunnel Toll Plaza BBI, the franchised bus company has set up a one-stop kiosk providing octopus add-value service, EPS cash withdrawal and payment services. These three BBIs have been well-received by passengers, with over 46 000 passenger trips being made daily on average. With reference to the experience of these BBIs, TD will explore the possibility of setting up BBIs in other suitable locations. More attractive interchange route packages and fare concessions will be introduced and better hardware facilities will be provided.

9. Moreover, prior to the completion of new railway projects, TD will assess the changes of passenger demand and travelling pattern after the opening of the new railway and the impact on other road-based public transport services. TD will then prepare public transport re-organisation plan (“PT Plan”) to enhance the coordination among various public transport services and their complementarity. To tie in with the partial opening of the West Island Line (“WIL”) in end-2014, TD has started to implement the PT Plan by phases. So far, one new feeder bus route<sup>3</sup> connecting to the new railway stations has been introduced to replace a bus route with overlapping service area<sup>4</sup>. In view of the notable drop of patronage after the opening of the Kennedy Station and HKU Station, TD and the franchised bus companies have adjusted the frequency of 19 routes. Upon the full opening of the WIL, TD will implement the remaining proposals under the PT Plan by phases having regard to the actual situation. Such proposals include rationalising 27 bus routes (10 of which will be amalgamated and two will be truncated) and adjusting service frequency in view of the actual change of patronage. Similarly, TD will assess the impact of the opening of the Kwun Tong Line Extension, South Island Line (East) and Shatin to Central Link on other public transport services and will prepare PT Plans.

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<sup>3</sup> Citybus Route No. 43M (Tin Wan – Shek Tong Tsui). Moreover, three green minibus feeder routes connecting new railway stations have been introduced.

<sup>4</sup> Citybus Route No. M47 (Wah Fu (North) – Central (Hong Kong Station)).

10. The successful implementation of bus route rationalisation proposals requires the support of the community. To this end, TD has made use of various means (such as producing promotional videos/audio clips, feature videos, posters, booklets and pamphlets) to explain the concept of route rationalisation and solicit understanding and support. Before rolling out the rationalisation proposals, TD would consult the district councils concerned, conduct promotional campaigns, and arrange small group briefings to explain the details of the rationalisation proposals. TD would also closely monitor the implementation of rationalisation proposals and make suitable adjustment as necessary to suit passenger needs.

11. As Area Approach rationalisation for various districts in the New Territories have basically been finalised or implemented, TD will focus its attention on the urban area in Kowloon in the coming year. When TD and the franchised bus companies have prepared the rationalisation proposals, they will consult the district councils concerned and solicit local support as per the established practice to enhance bus service quality and operational efficiency.

## **Bus Services**

12. The Government has all along been attaching great importance on the regularity of franchised bus services. Under the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230 of Laws of Hong Kong), the franchised bus companies are required to operate bus service in accordance with the routing, timetable, frequency and bus allocation as stipulated in the Schedule of Service approved by TD. TD has been closely monitoring the level of franchised bus service through reviewing the operational records of franchised bus companies, conducting regular surveys, and acting on passengers' complaints and suggestions.

13. The Government was very concerned about the relatively high lost trip rates between 2010 and 2012. To this end, TD and the franchised bus companies had carried out follow-up actions, including analysing the reasons for lost trips. The bus companies were also required to make improvements on factors within their control and take appropriate measures as far as possible to deal with other external factors. With the efforts of TD and the franchised bus companies, the overall lost trip rate has dropped from 4.2% in 2012 to 2.6% in 2013, and 2.4% in the first three quarters of 2014.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Owing to the Occupy Movement, the overall lost trip rate for the fourth quarter of 2014 was 5.2%.

14. Notwithstanding, TD shares the view that there is room for improvement on the mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus service. In response to the Ombudsman's recommendations of its investigation on TD's mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services in 2014, TD has already implemented a number of measures to enhance its monitoring mechanism since early this year.

15. Regarding the definition of "lost trips", TD has all along been maintaining statistics of lost trip rates to examine and analyse the situation so as to formulate improvement measures. Previously, lost trip rates had been calculated on a daily basis to reflect the overall level of service delivery. In response to the Ombudsman's recommendation, TD and the franchised bus companies have introduced the following four different periods for calculation of lost trip rates starting from this year-

Peak periods

- (a) Morning peak period: from the first departure to 9:59 am;
- (b) Evening peak period: from 4:00 pm to 7:59 pm;

Off-peak periods

- (c) Inter-peak period: from 10:00 am to 3:59 pm; and
- (d) After evening peak period: from 8:00 pm to the last departure.

16. The four periods above have been set primarily with reference to the travelling patterns of passengers during the morning and evening peak periods, as well as their expectations over the level of bus service during the respective periods. Based on the new method of calculation, any difference between the number of journeys for a bus route actually recorded during a particular period and the number specified in the Schedule of Service for that route will be regarded as lost trips<sup>6</sup>. The new method will enhance the public's understanding of service performance during peak and off-peak periods. It also enables TD and the franchised bus companies to obtain a more accurate picture of the lost trip situation for specific periods for appropriate follow-up action. As at end-January this year, the overall lost trip rate in Hong Kong was about 1.2% under the old calculation method. It was 1.8% under the new calculation method (2.1% for peak periods and 1.5% for off-peak periods). Details are at **Annex 3**.

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<sup>6</sup> Under the new calculation method, excess trips made in one period cannot compensate for lost trips in another period.

17. Details on measures taken by the TD in response to the other recommendations put forward by the Ombudsman are at **Annex 4**.

### **Priority use of roads by franchised bus**

18. As one of the road users, franchised buses need to share road space with other transport modes. Hence, traffic congestion would inevitably affect its service reliability. Under the public transport-oriented policy, according priority use of roads to public transport services is an established policy. Yet, the implementation would have to have due regard to the actual road situation.

19. Major bus priority measures already being implemented include-

- (a) designation of bus-only lanes;
- (b) designation of bus-only lane changing position;
- (c) setting up bus stops at pick-up and drop of restricted zones; and
- (d) changing road junction design and adjusting road traffic light signal control.

At present, there are a total of over 23 kilometres of bus-only lanes and 16 designated bus gates in Hong Kong. Details are at **Annex 5**.

20. The Government has been adopting a three-pronged approach in tackling road traffic congestion. They are the improvement of traffic infrastructure, expansion and improvement of the public transport system, and management of the use of roads. The Government will continue to implement these measures, review their effectiveness and explore areas for improvement. Yet, the Government would often encounter various challenges in implementing measures to help ease traffic congestion. For instance, as Hong Kong is a small and densely populated city, planning of new roads would be subject to constraints. Various stakeholders would also hold differing views on traffic management proposals. In light of these challenges, the current measures may not be able to yield the intended effect fully. Hence, it is necessary for the Government to consider other measures. To this end, the Transport Advisory Committee ("TAC") was invited by the Government to conduct a study on road traffic congestion. In December 2014, TAC submitted the Report on Study of Road Traffic Congestion in Hong Kong to the Government. The Report analysed the various causes of road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and recommended a number of short, medium and long-term measures. We are studying

TAC's recommendations in detail and will respond at an appropriate juncture. When conducting the RPR, we will explore how to further promote the priority use of roads by public transport services in the context of the implementation of measures to alleviate traffic congestion and in the light of actual road situations.

21. It is worth noting that the implementation of bus priority measures would reduce the number of lanes for use by other vehicles on the same road section. The travelling speed of other vehicles may reduce as a result. When planning for bus priority measures, TD must carefully assess the feasibility and desirability of implementing such measures on the individual road sections concerned so as to ensure that the overall traffic network would not be overly affected. TD would also carry out consultation before their implementation of the measures.

22. The reliability of bus service is naturally constrained by road traffic situation. TD and the franchise bus companies will adjust the number of buses and frequency of individual routes in the light of actual road conditions. Meanwhile, TD will continue to actively encourage the franchised bus companies to make use of information technology to enhance the accuracy of bus information. For instance, some operators have started to use real-time bus arrival information systems to provide more information so that passengers can better plan their journeys according to their own needs. Overall speaking, the system is technically reliable. Yet, as the system involves a comparatively higher capital investment and operating cost, the bus companies have indicated that they would need to carefully weigh the need of passenger and actual operating benefits under different operating environment when considering whether the use of the system should be further promoted. Notwithstanding, the Government will continue to urge the bus companies to make use of the real-time bus arrival information system more proactively. This topic will be further studied in the RPR.

## **Conclusion**

23. In view of the rising expectation of passengers on the quality of bus service, the Government and the franchised bus companies will continue the efforts to rationalise bus route, monitor the frequency of bus service, and actively explore and implement bus priority measures. The objective is to provide quality and reliable services to the public and ensure the long-term and sustainable development of franchised bus sector.




24. As mentioned in paragraphs 4, 20 and 22 above, we will make reference to the outcome of this Topical Study and carefully examine in the context of RPR the role and positioning of franchised bus service and whether service adjustment should be made. Possible topics to be covered include the feasibility and desirability of introducing new premium service and using the real time bus arrival information system.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**March 2015**

**Annex 1**

**Work flow of the two parts under the  
Public Transport Strategy Study (PTSS)**



\* We will report the outcome of individual issues covered by the Topical Study to the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council (LegCo) starting from the first quarter of 2015.

# The RPR will commence after the LegCo has approved the manpower resources required under the established procedures in due course.

**Annex 2**

**Guidelines on Service Improvement and Reduction  
in Bus Route Development Programmes**

**Service Improvement**

**(I) Frequency Improvement**

If the occupancy rate of any bus route reaches 100% during any half-hour of the peak period and 85% during that one hour, or reaches 60% during the busiest one hour of the off-peak period, the Transport Department (TD) will consider the deployment of more vehicles to enhance the service level. In increasing the vehicle allocation, priority will be given to redeploying vehicles saved from other rationalisation items.

**(II) New Bus Service**

If the frequency improvement alone is not sufficient to meet demand and no practical alternatives are available, we will give consideration to the provision of new bus service, with priority to serve areas that are beyond the catchment area of existing railways or railway feeders. In approving any new bus service, we will also consider the impact of such new service on the traffic condition on major roads, and will as far as possible refrain from providing long haul bus routes or routes that operate via busy districts such as Mong Kok, Tsim Sha Tsui, Central, Wan Chai, Causeway Bay etc.

**Service Reduction**

In pursuance of our policy objective of providing a safe, efficient and reliable transport system in a sustainable environment, franchised bus routes with low utilisation would be rationalised from time to time to enhance bus operation efficiency while meeting passenger demand and matching local operating environment, reducing traffic congestion and roadside emission. These guidelines set out the situations whereby rationalisation measures such as adjustment to service frequency and timetable, route cancellation / amalgamation, route truncation, etc. would be pursue

### **(III) Reduction of Bus Trips along Busy Corridors**

In view of concentration of activities in the urban areas leading to serious environmental and traffic concerns, TD is committed to reducing the number of bus trips along busy corridors and bus stoppings through various measures of service cancellation / reduction and route rationalisation. If it is inevitable for new routes or enhanced bus services to operate via these busy corridors, the bus operators will have to reduce the same number of trips plying through the same corridor from other routes in order not to aggravate the traffic and environmental conditions in these busy corridors.

### **(IV) Frequency Reduction**

If the average occupancy rate of an individual route is below 85% during the peakiest half-hour of the peak period, or below 30% during the off-peak period, TD will consider reducing bus deployment for the route. Railway feeder routes, socially essential routes (such as bus routes serving remote areas or where the majority of the passengers are elderly) with no alternatives available, and routes with peak headways at 15 minutes or more will be considered on individual merits.

### **(V) Route Cancellation / Amalgamation**

If the utilisation of a low-frequency route does not improve (i.e. a bus route with average occupancy rate lower than 50% during peak hour, despite its headways having already been reduced to 15 minutes and 30 minutes during peak hours and off-peak hours respectively), TD will consider proposing cancellation of the route or amalgamation of the route with other route(s) in consultation with the bus operators.

### **(VI) Route Truncation**

To optimise the use of resources, TD will review with relevant bus operators the feasibility of truncating routes, in particular those where majority of the passengers will have alighted en route. In formulating truncation proposals, TD will consider whether the number of affected passengers is excessive (i.e. the occupancy rate of not more than 20% to 30% at the proposed truncated section during the peakiest hour); whether enough roadside space is available to accommodate the affected passengers for interchange; and whether terminal space for the changed route is available.

### **Factors to be Considered in Bus Service Rationalisation**

In formulating rationalisation proposals, in particular those where drastic measures are to be adopted, TD would give due consideration to ensure that the interests of passengers would be taken care of and to minimise impact on them as far as possible. Factors that will be taken into account include:

- (a) nature of the services proposed to be cancelled: For services the utilisation rates of which have been consistently low but are socially essential (i.e. those serving remote areas or where majority of the passengers are elderly) and without reasonable alternatives, TD would consider other means to improve the service performance, such as through the use of vehicles with smaller carrying capacities, provision of alternatives such as introduction of replacement green minibus services, etc;
- (b) availability of reasonable alternatives: In proposing service cancellation, measures have to be taken to ensure that reasonable alternatives for the affected passengers are provided as far as possible. Factors such as the availability of spare capacity of alternative services in taking up the diverted passengers, the number and convenience of interchanges involved, the total journey time (including interchange and on-vehicle time) as compared with the existing services, etc, would be assessed carefully to ensure the reasonableness of the alternative services;
- (c) fare of the best available alternative service: The total journey fare as compared with the fare of the existing service would be assessed. Positive consideration to route cancellation will be given if the total journey fare is not higher than that of the service being considered for cancellation. The relevant bus operators would also be requested to consider the provision of fare concessions, such as interchange discounts, section fares, special discounts to elderly, and other incentives wherever appropriate and feasible, to provide attraction to the affected passengers to facilitate the implementation of the rationalisation proposals;

- (d) transport operational considerations: The proposed service rationalisation should not cause undue hardship to passengers or operational problems. Factors such as the number of passengers requiring interchanges, the availability of space for interchange activities, etc. would be carefully assessed. The deployment of the saved vehicles to improve services within the same district would also be spelt out where appropriate;
- (e) impact of the proposed service rationalisation on bus captains: Factors to be considered include the number of bus captains that would be affected by the proposed service rationalisation, and whether the excess bus captains could be absorbed through natural wastage or other means without causing any major staff issues; and
- (f) environmental benefits arising from the service rationalisation: Environmental benefits such as the reduction in emission, reduction of bus trips in busy corridors, etc. would be spelt out in the consultation documents for the public to take note of.

**Annex 3**

**Lost trip rates of franchised bus operators in January 2015**

	<b>Morning peak period</b>	<b>Evening peak period</b>	<b>Inter- peak period</b>	<b>After evening peak period</b>	<b>Overall rate in Hong Kong</b>
<b>KMB</b>	1.4%	2.6%	1.5%	1.5%	<b>1.7%</b>
<b>Citybus (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network)</b>	1.3%	1.5%	1.1%	1.5%	<b>1.3%</b>
<b>Citybus (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)</b>	0.5%	1.3%	1.1%	0.7%	<b>0.9%</b>
<b>NWFB</b>	3.6%	3.7%	2.6%	1.5%	<b>2.9%</b>
<b>LW</b>	1.5%	1.4%	0.8%	0.6%	<b>1.1%</b>
<b>NLB</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	<b>0%</b>
<b>Overall rate in Hong Kong</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>

**Note:**

- Morning peak period: from the first departure to 9:59 am.
- Evening peak period: from 4:00 pm to 7:59 pm.
- Inter-peak period: from 10:00 am to 3:59 pm.
- After evening peak period: from 8:00 pm to the last departure.

**Legend:**

KMB	Kowloon Motors Bus Company (1933) Ltd
NWFB	New World First Bus Services Limited
LW	Long Win Bus Company Ltd
NLB	New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Ltd

## **Annex 4**

### **Measures in monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services**

In response to the Ombudsman's recommendations on the mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus service, other measures implemented by TD are as follows-

#### **(a) Causes of lost trips**

2. Previously, the causes for lost trips were grouped under six categories, namely "Vehicle Breakdown", "Vehicle Shortage", "Driver Shortage", "Traffic Congestion", "Accidents" and "Other Reasons". Among the six categories, "Vehicle Breakdown", "Vehicle Shortage" and "Driver Shortage" are within the control of the franchised bus companies, while the remaining ones are outside the control of them. As the "Other Reasons" was a rather common reason for lost trips, TD has refined its definition by further separating it into four categories to allow more in-depth analysis on the causes of lost trips. The four categories are-

- (a) "Inclement Weather": when the Red Rainstorm Signal, Black Rainstorm Signal or Storm Signal No. 8 or above is hoisted by the Hong Kong Observatory;
- (b) "Planned Public Events": when public events (e.g. carnivals, festivals/celebrations, marathons, horseracing and public demonstrations, etc.) which require special traffic and transport arrangements are held;
- (c) "Redeployment of Buses": when contingency or additional service has to be provided to meet passengers demand arising from railway incidents and to cater for lost trips of less frequent routes; and
- (d) "Others Reasons".

3. Under the new arrangement, the causes for lost trips are grouped under nine categories. A more detailed categorisation can help TD and the franchised bus operators to have a more accurate picture on the causes of lost trips and take efficient and appropriate measures to resolve the problem.

4. As regards the causes which are under the franchised bus companies' control (i.e. "Vehicle Breakdown", "Vehicle Shortage" and "Driver Shortage"), the franchised bus companies have the responsibility to take appropriate preventive measures. As breakdown of vehicles would lead to vehicle shortage, TD and the franchised bus companies have



reviewed the causes which would lead to vehicle breakdown. The major causes include-

- (a) engine failure due to the failure of battery, engine appliances, starters and generators;
- (b) over-heat or water leakage of heat exchangers, or failure of its water level warning signals; and
- (c) gearbox failure.

5. In light of the above reasons, the franchised bus companies have implemented a number of preventive measures since April 2014. For example, they would regularly conduct slow-charging of battery to increase battery stability; use higher-quality soft silicon hoses; conduct pressurised test on cooling systems during daily bus check; and improve the signaling system of the gearbox to reduce signal errors due to overheating or aging of signaling lines. TD will continue to monitor the lost trip situation caused by shortage of buses and mechanical failure. TD will also monitor and analyse the causes of vehicle breakdown with reference to cases of emergency repairs, and explore with the franchised bus companies suitable improvement measures in a timely manner.

6. As for the manpower situation of bus drivers, the franchised bus companies have actively recruited, provided trainings for and improved communications with bus drivers and improved their working environment. Since the beginning of this year, the bus companies are required to submit monthly reports about the manpower situation of bus driver using a standardised form to TD. Should there be any sign of manpower shortage, the franchised bus company will be urged to implement improvement measures as soon as possible.

### **Sanction regime**

7. In response to the Ombudsman's recommendations, TD has reviewed the sanction regime in respect of bus lost trips. There has all along been a rigorous and fair statutory mechanism and administrative arrangements in place for the close monitoring of franchised bus service. As far as the statutory mechanism under the Public Bus Services Ordinance is concerned, if a franchised bus company fails to comply with the Ordinance or franchise requirements or fails to provide a proper and efficient service, the Chief Executive-in-Council may impose penalty on the company concerned. The Chief Executive-in-Council may also revoke its operating right on individual routes or the entire franchise.

8. As for the administrative arrangements, TD will normally follow up on a bus company's non-compliance regarding service delivery as required by the department by setting out clearly what the improvements the bus company is required to make in writing. If the company fails to provide a reasonable explanation or make improvement, TD will remind the company in writing again the need for compliance to requirements and to implement improvement measures within a specified period of time. Depending on the persistence and severity of each case, TD may issue warning letters in respect of lost trips of individual routes or the overall lost trip situation, and require the company to make improvement by a specified deadline. If the warning is not heeded, TD may consider triggering the statutory mechanism by making a submission to the Chief Executive-in-Council as mentioned in paragraph 7 above. The circumstances warranting the issue and the number of such warning letters will be taken into consideration when a franchise is due for renewal. Past experience suggests that the above mechanism has been working well. The franchised bus companies would take letters or warning letters from TD seriously and take active follow-up actions on those letters.

9. To ensure that the franchised bus companies are taking mitigation measures and improving services more promptly, a written notice will be served to its board of directors when TD issues a warning letter to a franchised bus company. Moreover, the Government will take into account whether any warning letters have been issued as well as the number of such letters issued when processing a fare increase application submitted by a bus company.

**Annex 5**

**Bus-only lanes and designated bus gates**

**Bus-only lanes**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>		
Caine Road westbound (between Upper Albert Road and Breezy Path)	<u>Mon - Fri</u> 07:00 – 19:00 <u>Sat</u> 07:00 – 13:00  <u>Except Sundays</u> <u>&amp; Public</u> <u>Holidays</u>	1
Connaught Road West eastbound (between Des Voeux Road West and Morrison Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 21:00	0.3
Des Voeux Road Central eastbound (between Pedder Street and Ice House Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Des Voeux Road Central eastbound (between Ice House Street and Murray Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.3
Des Voeux Road Central westbound (between Bank Street and Jubilee Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.6
Pok Fu Lam Road westbound (between Mount Davis Road and Pok Fu Lam Road Playground)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
Queensway westbound (between Murray Road and Jackson Road)	<u>Mon - Sat</u> 07:00 – 09:00	0.2
Gloucester Road westbound (between O'Brien Road and Fenwick Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.2
Cross-Harbour Tunnel Egress to Central westbound (between Tunnel Exit and Canal Road Flyover)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Canal Road Flyover underneath southbound (between Hennessy Road and Yiu Wa Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.2
Morrison Hill Road southbound (between Sports Road and Queen's Road East)	<u>Weekdays</u> 16:00 – 19:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.1
Hennessy Road westbound (between Jardine Bazaar and Lee Garden Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.1
Hennessy Road westbound (between Tang Lung Street and Canal Road East)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.1
Hennessy Road westbound (between Tin Lok Lane and Tonnochy Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 09:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.1

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
Hennessy Road westbound (between Fleming Road and Luard Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 09:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.3
Shau Kei Wan Road westbound (between Tai On Street and Tai Hong Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Fu Yee Road southbound (between Cheerful Garden and Siu Sai Wan Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 09:00	0.1
King's Road eastbound (between Ngan Mok Street and Fortress Hill Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.8
King's Road eastbound (between North Point Road and Tin Chiu Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.7
King's Road eastbound (between Man Hong Street and Java Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.5
Nam On Street eastbound (between Nam On Lane and Shau Kei Wan Bus Terminus)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Wong Chuk Hang Road westbound (between Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza and Wong Chuk Hang Road near Gramtham Hospital)	<u>Weekdays</u> 16:00 – 19:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.2

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
Wong Chuk Hang Road eastbound (near Gramtham Hospital and Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 09:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.5
Wong Chuk Hang Road upramp to Aberdeen Tunnel northbound (between Shouson Hill Road and Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 09:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>	0.5
Wong Chuk Hang Road eastbound (near Nam Long Shan Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Nam Long Shan Road southbound (between Wong Chuk Hang Road and Bus Terminus)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.3
<b>Kowloon</b>		
Nathan Road southbound (between Playing Field Road and Bute Street)	<u>Daily</u> 07:00 – 19:00	0.3
Nathan Road southbound (between Mong Kok Road and Dundas Street)	<u>Daily</u> 07:00 – 19:00	0.4
Nathan Road northbound (between Dundas Street and Nelson Street)	<u>Daily</u> 07:00 – 19:00	0.3
The slip road from Hong Chong Road southbound to Cross-Harbour Tunnel	<u>Daily</u> 07:00 – 10:00	0.2
To Kwa Wan Road southbound (between San Ma Tau Street and Chi Kiang Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 08:00 – 10:00, 17:00 – 19:00	0.5

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
To Kwa Wan Road northbound (between Shek Tong Street and Sheung Heung Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 08:00 – 10:00, 17:00 – 19:00	0.7
New Clear Water Bay Road northbound (outside United Christian College)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Nam Cheong Street southbound (between Ap Liu Street and Yu Chau Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Yen Chow Street northbound (between Yee Kuk Street and Lai Chi Kok Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Lei Yue Mun Road southbound (from Block 1 to Block 8 of Sceneway Garden)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.2
Hammer Hill Road southbound (between Choi Hung Road Roundabout and Prince Edward Road East)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.3
Choi Hung Road eastbound (between Prince Edward Road East & 65 metres south of Lok Sin Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.1
Prince Edward Road East westbound (near Rhythm Garden)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Lung Cheung Road eastbound (near Wong Tai Sin MTR Station)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.3

<b>Location</b>	<b>Operation hours</b>	<b>Approximate Length (km)</b>
Hong Chong Road southbound (outside Cross-Harbour Tunnel Administrative Building)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.3
Hong Chong Road northbound (near Cross-Harbour Tunnel Toll Plaza)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.1
Junction Road southbound (from Carpenter Road to Prince Edward Road West)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00, 16:00 – 19:00	0.1
Nam Cheong Street southbound (from Woh Chai Street to Berwick Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.1
West Kowloon Corridor eastbound (from Pei Ho Street to Tai Kok Tsui Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:30 – 09:00  <u>Except</u> <u>Sundays and</u> <u>Public Holidays</u>	0.4
Lai Chi Kok Road westbound (between Mei Lai Road and Kwai Chung Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.1
Cheung Sha Wan Road eastbound (between Kwai Chung Road and Mei Lai Road)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 24:00	0.2
Nathan Road southbound (from near Shantung Street to near Hamilton Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 19:00	0.3
Shing Tak Street (between Ma Tau Chung Road and Fu Ning Street)	<u>Weekdays</u> 24 hours	0.3



Location	Operation hours	Approximate Length (km)
<b>New Territories</b>		
Che Kung Miu Road westbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00, 16:00 – 19:00	0.3
Hung Mui Kuk Road southbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00, 16:00 – 19:00	1
Lion Rock Tunnel Road westbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00, 16:00 – 19:00	0.8
Siu Lek Yuen Road southbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 08:00 – 10:00	0.1
Tate's Cairn Highways southbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00	0.2
Tai Po Road - Yuen Chau Tsai eastbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:00 – 10:00	0.1
Tuen Mun Road eastbound	<u>Weekdays</u> 07:30 – 09:00	9
Tuen Mun Road southbound near Lam Tei	24 hours	0.5
Tuen Mun Road northbound near Lam Tei	24 hours	0.2
Sam Shing Street westbound	24 hours	0.1
Kwai Chung Road southbound (fronting Fung King House of Lai King Estate)	24 hours	0.2

Location	Operation hours	Approximate Length (km)
Lai King Hill Road northbound (opposite Ching Lai Commercial Centre of Ching Lai Court)	24 hours	0.1
Fung Shue Wo Road eastbound (entry road to Tsing Yi Pier PTI)	24 hours	0.1
Tsing Yi Heung Sze Wui Road northbound (from Tsing Yi Bridge roundabout to Chung Mei Road)	24 hours	0.1
Castle Peak Road westbound (between Yuen Long Hong Lok Road and Kik Yeung Road Road)	24 hours	0.1

### **Designated bus gates**

Location	Operation hours
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>	
Gloucester Road Westbound near Canal Road Flyover upramp	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Canal Road Flyover exit to Cross Harbour Tunnel	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Hung Hing Road Eastbound to Cross Harbour Tunnel portal	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
<b>Kowloon</b>	
The slip road linking Lung Cheung Road Westbound and Waterloo Road Northbound	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Chatham Road North Westbound to Hong Chong Road Southbound	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours

Location	Operation hours
Nam Cheong Street Southbound to Tai Po Road	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Cherry Street Eastbound to Argyle Street	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
<b>New Territories</b>	
Hang Tai Road (Slip road to Ma On Shan Road)	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Tin Sam Street Right Turn to Hung Mui Kuk Road	<u>Daily</u> 07:00 – 10:00, 16:00 - 19:00  <u>Except Public Holidays</u>
San Wan Road near Landmark North	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Fanling Station Road near Fanling Station Playground	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
On Po Road near Junction with On Tai Road	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
On Chee Road near junction with On Po Road	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Access Road from Siu Sheung Road to Yuen Long Highway	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Hung Tin Road near Hung Shui Kiu Bus Depot Connection Road Eastbound	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours
Hung Tin Road near Hung Shui Kiu Bus Depot Connection Road Westbound	<u>Daily</u> 24 hours

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局

運輸科  
香港添馬添美道 2 號  
政府總部東翼



CB(4)959/14-15(01)

Transport and  
Housing Bureau  
Government Secretariat

Transport Branch  
East Wing, Central Government Offices,  
2 Tim Mei Avenue,  
Tamar, Hong Kong

本局檔號 OUR REF.:  
來函檔號 YOUR REF.: CB1/PL/TP

電話 Tel. No.: 3509 8155  
傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

22 April 2015

[English translation for reference only]

Ms Sophie LAU  
Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms LAU,

**Follow-ups of Panel on Transport –  
Rest Time Arrangements for Bus Captains and  
Facilities at Bus Termini**

I am writing to provide information for the Panel's reference in response to Hon LEE Cheuk-yan's request for an update on the progress of the provision of rest time and implementation of other safety measures for bus captains and Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip's request for information on the provision of rest place and toilet facilities at bus termini.

**Rest Time Arrangements for Franchised Bus Captains**

To ensure that bus captains have sufficient rest time, the Transport Department ("TD") promulgated the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks ("the Guidelines") (see **Annex**) for the franchised bus companies in 1983. The TD would review and revise the Guidelines from time to time. The arrangements under the existing Guidelines were implemented in full since the third quarter of 2012. In 2013, the TD reviewed the Guidelines again with the franchised bus companies and has listened to the views of bus captain unions. According to the review outcome, the arrangements under the Guidelines for bus captains' working hours, rest times and meal breaks are generally appropriate. The bus captain unions accepted the review outcome.

To ensure compliance with the Guidelines in arranging shifts, the franchised bus companies are required to submit quarterly reports to the TD on the implementation of the Guidelines. The TD also engages independent contractors to carry out annual compliance surveys on working hours, rest times and meal breaks of bus captains. The franchised bus companies' reports and the TD's survey findings both indicate that the shift arrangements for bus captains are largely in compliance with the Guidelines. The TD will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the Guidelines.

### **Safety Measures for Franchised Bus Captains**

At present, all franchised bus companies are providing various kinds of trainings for bus captains to enhance their awareness of safe driving and of their own health condition. In addition, the TD has promoted safe driving and drivers' awareness of their health condition through various channels. These include organising "Road Safety Seminars for Franchised Bus Drivers", "Safe Driving and Health Campaign for Commercial Vehicle Drivers", disseminating messages about safe driving and awareness of health condition through announcements of public interest on the radio and other media, and providing free health checks for professional drivers (including franchised bus captains).

Meanwhile, all franchised bus companies, as per TD's request, have since 2007 required their bus captains aged 50 or over to undergo health checks every year. The items covered in the checks differ between franchised bus companies, but usually include chest examinations as well as eyesight, hearing, diabetes, blood pressure, blood and urine tests. For bus captains aged 60 or over, an electrocardiogram ("ECG") is also required. In 2012/13, the TD and the franchised bus companies reviewed the health check arrangements for bus captains. After the review, the franchised bus companies have implemented the following measures since August 2013:

- (1) on top of requiring bus captains aged 50 or over to undergo annual health checks, bus captains aged below 50 who have ever suffered from any of the following illnesses are required to declare the illness(es) and undergo health checks (including ECG) every year:
  - (i) stroke;
  - (ii) cardio-vascular diseases;
  - (iii) diabetes mellitus (on medication); and
  - (iv) hypertension (on medication);
- (2) on top of requiring bus captains aged 60 or above to undergo an ECG, all bus captains will have to undergo ECG at 50, 54 and 57 years old.

The above measures have been implemented for some time and are working well on the whole. Bus captains generally agree that these measures help them better understand their physical conditions at an early juncture. Furthermore, the franchised bus companies have issued guidelines to remind bus captains not to continue driving if feeling unwell while on duty. The working manuals also remind bus captains to ensure physical and mental fitness and to seek medical consultation promptly in case of sickness.

### **Facilities at Bus Termini**

There are currently about 280 bus termini<sup>1</sup> in Hong Kong. Since 2006, toilets and rest facilities are part of the basic facilities of all new termini. In the past few years, the franchised bus companies have continued providing toilets and rest facilities in existing bus termini to meet the needs of bus captains. Today, over 94% of the bus termini are provided with toilets or with access to toilets within a walking distance of about three minutes. Toilets are basically available within about four to seven minutes of walking distance<sup>2</sup> for the remaining bus termini. Moreover, close to 90% of the bus termini are provided rest facilities for use by bus captains. For those bus termini which do not have rest facilities or toilets for use by bus captains, it is mainly due to physical constraints of the site (e.g. the bus termini are located beside a narrow pavement or there is a lack of power supply) or views of residents living nearby. The bus companies will continue exploring possible ways to overcome the physical constraints so as to provide toilets for those bus termini without toilet access within a walking distance of three minutes and rest facilities for bus captains at bus termini without such facilities.

I should be grateful if you could kindly relay the above information to Members of the LegCo Panel.

Yours sincerely,

[signed]

(Peggy NG)

for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport (Attn.: Mr. Reginald CHAN)

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<sup>1</sup> These are terminating points serving at least one whole-day franchised bus route and at which the bus captains must stop over and take a break.

<sup>2</sup> There is another bus terminus at which toilet facilities are not available within four to seven minutes of walking distance. Toilets could not be provided in nearby areas as the bus terminus is located beside a narrow pavement adjacent to a school and residential development. Nevertheless, the terminus is serving only a bus route involving a journey of less than 20 minutes. The bus captains may make use of facilities at the terminus at the other end of the route.

## Annex

### **Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks issued by the Transport Department (Revised in October 2010)**

- Guideline A – Bus captains should have a **rest time**<sup>3</sup> of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, they should have **rest times** totalling 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. **The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest time.**
- Guideline B – Maximum duty (including all **rest times**) in a **working** day should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C – Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all **rest times** each of 30 minutes or more) in a **working** day should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D – The break between successive working days should not be less than **10** hours.
- Guideline E – Bus captains working for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a working day should have a meal break. Bus companies should complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by the third quarter of 2011, and further improvement to no less than one hour in one year thereafter.**

*Note: Improvements introduced in the revised Guidelines issued in October 2010 are marked in **bold**.*

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<sup>3</sup> Meal break is also regarded as rest time.

CB(4)1028/14-15(01)



中華人民共和國香港特別行政區

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China

**范國威**

立法會議員辦事處

Office of Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai, Member of Legislative Council

檔案編號 Our Ref. : GF-LC-2015-0152(T)

傳真(3979 1777)

立法會交通事務委員會主席

田北辰議員

田主席：

**要求就專營巴士公司派更制度及職前培訓安排召開特別會議**

近日有傳媒報導，指九巴本月起實施新政策，要求車長在行駛慣常路線以外，加插跨區路線，例如要求原本在屯門車廠掛「私家車」牌駕車到銅鑼灣載客的车長，改為先到長沙灣車站，掛上其他路線牌載客至北角，再改掛「私家車」牌到銅鑼灣站繼續駕駛原來路線。新政策本意為提高九巴行車效率，但九巴只給予車長一天時間熟習新路線，導致有車長駛錯路線，影響專營巴士服務質素。

此外，專營巴士公司亦普遍使用俗稱「跳飛機」的派更制度，要求車長到站休息後，立即由另一位車長繼續駕駛其巴士，以「人停車不停」的車務調動方式運作，導致車長不單要走更多不同路線，更要駕駛不同型號的巴士，令車長服務質素日趨下降，加上專營巴士公司近年紛紛削減新入職車長的培訓期，令車長沒有足夠時間熟集各類型車款，導致出現本月初有車長因不熟悉新型號巴士的手掣位置，而遭乘客投訴的情況。

故此，本人現特來函要求事務委員會盡快召開特別會議，跟進專營巴士司機派更制度及職前培訓安排，並邀請專營巴士公司代表及工會代表出席，讓公眾及本事務委員會聽取其對有關議題的意見，同時要求相關政府部門出席。本人盼望閣下能予以考慮並作出適當跟進。如有任何查詢，煩請隨時與我聯絡。順祝

台安！



立法會議員 范國威 謹啟

2015年5月20日

副本送：交通事務委員會秘書 總議會秘書(1)2 劉素儀女士 (傳真：2978 7569)

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CB(4)1028 14-15 (01) (16 June 2015): Letter dated 20 May 2015 from Hon Gary FAN Kwok wai on the duty schedule system and pre-employment training arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies

Chairman Tin:

**Re meeting on the duty schedule system and pre-employment training  
arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies**

According to recent media reports, from September this year, KMB has added cross-district bus routes on top of the usual bus routes that are driven by bus captains. For example, a bus captain who starts his bus route in Causeway way would depart from the TuenMun depot, putting a “private” sign on the bus until he reaches Causeway Bay, where he would start taking passengers. Now, he would have to depart from the Cheung Sha Wan station, put on a different bus route sign and drive to North Point [the cross-district bus route], and then start his original bus route in Causeway Bay, putting on a “private sign” when he goes from North Point to Causeway Bay. This new policy was originally intended to improve KMB operational efficiency, but KMB has only given bus captains 1 day to master the new bus route, and as a result some bus captains have made mistakes in driving these new routes, affecting the quality of bus service.

Moreover, franchised bus companies generally adopt a so-called “hopscotch” system, having bus captains stop at certain bus stations for rest, and having other bus captains continue driving the same bus, adopting an operational system where “the person stops, but the bus does not”. This has led bus captains to have to drive different bus routes, and even different bus models, causing the gradual decrease in service quality provided by bus captains. This is compounded by the fact that franchised bus companies have been cutting down the training hours provided to bus captains, and as a result bus captains do not have enough time to master the different bus models. This has caused an incident earlier this month where a bus captain was not acquainted with the switches of the new bus models, causing one of the passengers to file a complaint.

As such, I am writing to request for the Panel on Transport to hold a special meeting to follow up on the shift system and the training provided by franchised bus companies; and to invite franchised bus companies and union representatives to be present, so as to let the public and the Panel to hear their suggestions on the relevant topics. I also propose to invite the relevant government departments. I hope that you can consider the above and make appropriate follow-up. If you have any queries, please contact me at any time.

[Greetings]

Legislative Councillor  
Hon Gary FAN Kwokwai

20 May 2015

cc. Ms. Lau So Yee, Secretary for the Panel of Transport (Fax 2978 7569)

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(02)

Ref. : CB4/PL/TP

**Panel on Transport**  
**Meeting on 17 July 2015**

**Background brief on**  
**franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and**  
**Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973)**

**Purpose**

This paper provides background information on the franchises of Citybus Limited ("Citybus") (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) ("Franchise 1") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) ("NLB"). It also summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by members of the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") on the subject in the past discussions.

**Background**

2. At present, there are five grantees operating six bus franchises. They are The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited, Citybus (which operates two franchises, i.e. Franchise 1 and another for the Airport and North Lantau bus network, New World First Bus Services Limited, NLB and Long Win Bus Company Limited.

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) ("the Ordinance"), the Chief Executive in Council ("CE-in-Council") may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding ten years. If the CE-in-Council thinks fit, the CE-in-Council may grant a new franchise to an existing grantee for a period not exceeding ten years to begin immediately upon the expiry of the existing franchise. Section 6 also provides that an existing grantee may request an extension of its franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

4. According to the Administration, the Government's key consideration in awarding or extending a bus franchise is the provision of a proper and efficient public bus service. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise shall, at all times during the franchise period, maintain to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") a proper and efficient public bus service. According to the established practice, a grantee who is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service, and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for being granted a new franchise for a period of 10 years.

### **Expiry of franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB**

5. The current franchise of Citybus (Franchise 1) commenced on 1 July 2006 and will expire on 1 June 2016, and that of NLB commenced on 1 April 2007 and will expire on 1 March 2017. The Administration advised the Panel in June 2014 that the two grantees have indicated interests to apply for new 10-year franchises. According to the Administration, based on the assessment of the service performance and operational efficiency, safety and service enhancement measures, public opinions on bus services and financial performance, the C for T was of the view that Citybus (under its Franchise 1) and NLB had all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service and were willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of bus service. Taking all things into account, the Government informed the Panel in June 2014 that it planned to commence the discussion with Citybus and NLB for new 10-year franchises to ensure the continuation of public bus service which would be essential to the passengers. According to the Administration, the new franchises would take effect immediately upon expiry of the current ones in 2016 and 2017 respectively. This arrangement would facilitate a smooth transition between the current and new franchises without service disruption.

### **Discussions by Members on franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB**

6. The Panel was consulted on 23 June 2014 on the new franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB. Members expressed the following major concerns while discussing the matter.

#### Lost trip rate of Citybus

7. Having noted the annual average lost trip rate of 1.8% for Citybus (Franchise 1), Panel members urged the Administration to closely monitor the problem and called on the Transport Department ("TD") to review its

mechanism for monitoring the frequencies of bus services. Some members suggested that electronic display panels should be installed at bus terminus to provide better information on bus frequencies and to facilitate monitoring of the lost trip problem.

8. The Administration advised that it attached great importance on the service performance of bus companies. Under the current franchise, the annual average lost trip rate of Citybus of 1.8% was lower than the average of about 3% for the industry during the same period. The Administration added that in response to the Ombudsman's recommendations, TD was studying with bus companies the feasibility of calculating the lost trip rate for different time periods of the day.

9. When the Panel discussed the Topical Study under Public Transport Strategy Study on franchised bus service on 20 March 2015, the Administration advised that TD and franchised bus companies had introduced the following four different periods for calculation of lost trip rates starting from 2015 –

Peak periods

- (a) Morning peak period: from the first departure to 9:59 am;
- (b) Evening peak period: from 4:00 pm to 7:59 pm;

Off-peak periods

- (c) Inter-peak period: from 10:00 am to 3:59 pm; and
- (d) After evening peak period: from 8:00 pm to the last departure.

10. Based on the new method of calculation, any difference between the number of journeys for a bus route actually recorded during a particular period and the number specified in the Schedule of Service for that route would be regarded as lost trips<sup>1</sup>. According to the Administration, the new method would enhance the public's understanding of service performance during peak and off-peak periods. It also enabled TD and the franchised bus companies to obtain a more accurate picture of the lost trip situation for specific periods for appropriate follow-up action.

Adequacy of bus services provided by NLB on Lantau Island

11. A number of members expressed concern that the bus service provided by NLB for local residents was far from sufficient, particularly during weekends and public holidays.

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<sup>1</sup> Under the new calculation method, excess trips made in one period cannot compensate for lost trips in another period.

12. The Administration advised that according to the latest five-year Forward Planning Programme submitted by NLB, the company planned to acquire a total of about 54 new buses (amounting to around 50% of its bus fleet) to replace its old buses and to meet the rising passenger demand.

#### Bus-bus interchange concessions

13. The Panel also considered that bus-bus interchange concessions should be provided to passengers and passed the following motion at the meeting on 23 June 2014 -

"That this Panel requests that while the Government grants new franchises to any bus companies, the companies concerned must provide interchange concessions at designated bus-bus interchanges in the form of a free ride offered to passengers on the second leg journey upon interchange to bus routes with same fares."

14. The Administration advised that it had always been encouraging bus companies to offer more bus-bus interchange concessions as the circumstances would permit. It would bear in mind members' view on the matter during the negotiation with the relevant bus companies.

#### Driving safety of buses of NLB

15. In reply to a question raised by a Member at the Council meeting of 29 April 2015 regarding the driving safety of buses of NLB subsequent to an accident happened in early April 2015<sup>2</sup>, the Secretary for Transport and Housing ("STH") said that all newly-recruited bus captains of NLB would receive training for three to five days provided by NLB to learn and familiarize themselves with the bus operation, road conditions of bus routes and the location of bus stops en route. Moreover, NLB would arrange bus captains to attend road safety courses and seminars so as to enhance their road safety awareness.

16. STH further said that NLB had installed an electronic tachograph (commonly known as "black box") on its whole fleet to record the operational data of vehicles to help monitor the bus captains' behaviour and investigate accidents. Over the past three years, NLB was involved in about 50 traffic accidents, accounting for less than 0.8% of the total franchised bus traffic accidents (NLB fleet makes up of about 2% of the total franchised bus fleet); and its accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre is lower than that of the overall rate of franchised buses.

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<sup>2</sup> In the accident, a bus of NLB nearly fell off the hill when it was travelling down a slope on its way from Tung Chung to Tai O. It was suspected that the failure of the braking system of the bus had caused the accident.

17. STH added that apart from employing regular bus captains, the NLB would employ part-time bus captains to meet the needs of daily manpower deployment and additional passenger demand on some specific dates and hours. The employment of part-time bus captains could help reduce the need for regular bus captains to work overtime and could give them sufficient rest time, thereby enhancing driving safety.

### **Public consultation**

18. In December 2014, the Administration advised the Panel that a public consultation exercise had been carried out to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchises<sup>3</sup>. Comments received during the exercise mainly fell under the following three areas:

- (a) **Service quality** – to suggest grantees to enhance the provision of passenger information improve passenger facilities and provide safe bus services. A greater number of comments were on the provision of real time bus arrival information.
- (b) **Fare concessions** – to suggest grantees to provide various fare concessions. Most of the comments were on the provision of bus-bus interchange schemes and various types of sectional fares.
- (c) **Government regulation** – to suggest the Government to strengthen the regulation on bus services. A greater number of comments were on the strengthening of the monitoring on service frequency.

19. The Administration added that owing to rising operating costs (a major proportion being staff costs), fluctuation of fuel prices and keen competition from other public transport services, the grantees must continue to actively rationalize their existing services so as to avoid wastage of resources. They also had to explore new service areas to keep their operation sustainable. While the Administration would strive for the franchise terms that could meet the demand and expectation of the public as far as possible, it would also take into account the actual operating environment. The Administration aimed to conclude the discussion in the first half of 2015 and would report the result to the Panel afterwards.

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<sup>3</sup> LC Paper No. CB(4)301/14-15(01)

### **Relevant questions raised at Council meetings**

20. During the Fifth Legislative Council, a total of seven questions relating to bus service and bus franchises were raised at the Council meetings of 29 May, 4 and 18 December 2013, 12 February, 11 June 2014, and 29 April and 24 June 2015. The hyperlinks to the questions and the Administration's responses, together with other relevant papers, are in the **Appendix**.

### **Latest position**

21. The Administration will report to the Panel relating to the franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB at the Panel meeting to be held on 17 July 2015.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
13 July 2015

**Franchises of of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973)**

**List of relevant papers**

**(A) Panel on Transport**

<b>Date of meeting</b>	<b>Minutes/Paper</b>	<b>LC Paper No.</b>
17 and 25 November 2005  16 December 2005	Administration's paper on "Application for New Franchises by Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross Harbour Routes), New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited and Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited"	CB(1)309/05-06(02)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting on 17 November 2005 (Item I)	CB(1)549/05-06  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting on 25 November 2005 (Item V)	CB(1)694/05-06  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf</a>
	Minutes of the meeting on 16 December 2005 (Item V)	CB(1)713/05-06  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf</a>



Date of meeting	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
January 2006	Legislative Council brief	ETWB(T) CR 2/5591/99  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf</a>
23 June 2014	Administration's paper on franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited	CB(1)1621/13-14(04)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf</a>
	Background brief on franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat	CB(1)1621/13-14(05)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-5-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-5-e.pdf</a>
	Minutes of meeting	CB(1)79/14-15  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf</a>
-	Information paper on the requirements of the new franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited provided by Transport and Housing Bureau and Transport Department in December 2014	CB(1)301/14-15(01)  <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-301-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-301-1-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
20 March 2015	Administration's paper on Public Transport Strategy Study - Franchised bus service	CB(4)655/14-15(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf</a>

**(B) Questions raised at Council meetings**

Date of meeting	Subject	Link
29 May 2013	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on bus route rationalisation	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm</a>
4 December 2013	Hon WU Chi-wai raised a question on improvement to the services provided for bus passengers	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm</a>
18 December 2013	Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan raised a question on franchised bus services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm</a>
12 February 2014	Hon WONG Kwok-hing raised a question on facilities at bus termini	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm</a>
11 June 2014	Hon MA Fung-kwok raised a question on lost trips of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm</a>
29 April 2015	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on driving safety of New Lantau Bus	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280671.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280671.htm</a>

Date of meeting	Subject	Link
24 June 2015	Hon WONG Kwok-hing raised a question on fare payment system of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/24/P201506240416.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/24/P201506240416.htm</a>

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
13 July 2015

For discussion  
on 17 July 2015

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **New Franchises for the Bus Networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited**

#### **PURPOSE**

The current franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) (“Citybus (Franchise 1)”) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited (“NLB”) will expire on 1 June 2016 and 1 March 2017 respectively. At the meeting of this Panel on 23 June 2014, the Government informed Members of the plan to engage the two grantees for discussion on the granting of new franchises. The discussion has largely been completed. This paper reports to Members the outcome.

#### **BACKGROUND**

2. Under the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) (Cap. 230), the Executive Council may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate public bus service for a period not exceeding 10 years. A grantee is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport (“the Commissioner”) during the franchise period. According to the established practice, a grantee which is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for the granting of a franchise for a period of 10 years.

3. As indicated at the 23 June 2014 Panel meeting (Discussion Paper No. CB(1)1621/13-14(04)), the Commissioner was of the view that Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB had all along been providing proper and efficient bus service and were willing to continue to invest for further service enhancement.

Meanwhile, the two grantees indicated interests to apply for new 10-year franchises upon the expiry of the existing ones. Members did not have difficulty with the Government's plan to engage the two grantees for discussion on the granting of the new franchises, and made suggestions in respect of the requirements on service quality, passenger information, fare concessions and regulation on bus service. Between June and September 2014, the Government conducted public consultation to gauge the views from stakeholders on the requirements of the new franchises. The major views collected were related to the same four areas covered by the Members. Details can be found in our information note of December 2014 to this Panel (No. CB(4)301/14-15(01)). Appropriate follow-up actions have been taken on the suggestions and the details are at **Annex 1**.

## **DISCUSSION ON THE NEW FRANCHISES**

4. The Government has commenced discussion with the two grantees on the new franchises earlier this year. In doing so, we are mindful that the operating environment of the bus industry in the foreseeable future will be rather challenging owing to uncertainties such as keen competition from other public transport services, rising operating costs and fluctuation of fuel prices. Since the opening of the West Island Line, the overall patronage of Citybus (Franchise 1) has reduced by around 7%. The patronage of those bus routes overlapping with or interchanging for railway service has reduced by around 20%. With the opening of more new railway lines<sup>1</sup> in the coming few years, franchised bus service will be under further pressure. Meanwhile, it is anticipated that the two grantees will have to make a substantial investment of a total of around \$770 million for bus fleet replacement between 2015 and 2019. The Government has thus adopted a prudent and pragmatic approach in the discussion to ensure that improvement can be made on the requirements of the new franchises on the one hand, and franchised bus service can still basically maintain its long-term financial viability on the other hand. Separately, Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB have not increased their bus fares since 2008. The two grantees have together offered fare concessions amounting to \$179 million under the passenger reward arrangement since the commencement of their current franchises in 2006/2007.

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<sup>1</sup> They include South Island Line (East), Kwun Tong Line Extension and Shatin to Central Link.

5. Franchised bus service is regulated by the Ordinance. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the Government may grant a franchise for the operation of bus service. Generally speaking, generic and long-lasting requirements would be set out as franchise clauses, while specific initiatives or objectives required to be achieved within a certain timeframe would be set out in terms of commitments. According to this established practice, the Government would request a grantee to take on board franchise clauses and commitments of the most recently granted franchises, and would introduce new franchise clauses and commitments as appropriate, having regard to the changing circumstances as well as the operating situation of an individual grantee and passenger demand.

#### **INCORPORATING FRANCHISE CLAUSES AND COMMITMENTS OF THE MOST RECENTLY GRANTED FRANCHISES**

6. The most recently granted franchises are those of New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network) (“Citybus (Franchise 2)”) granted in 2012. Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB have agreed to fully take on board the new franchise clauses and service/facility commitments in these three franchises. Such clauses and commitments are mainly about enhancing service quality, providing passenger information, improving environment, and strengthening government regulation. Details are at Annex 2.

#### **NEW FRANCHISE CLAUSES AND COMMITMENTS**

7. Apart from the above, the two grantees have agreed to include new franchise clauses and make commitments on specific initiatives in three areas, namely provision of passenger information, government regulation and fare concessions.

##### Real time bus arrival information

8. Amongst the views collected during public consultation, quite a number of respondents suggested that the grantees should provide real time bus arrival information at bus stops as well as via the Internet and mobile devices. To this end, the two grantees have agreed to make a commitment to roll out real time bus information system in phases within two years after the new franchises commence. Passengers will then be able to access the departure time at bus termini and the estimated arrival time at bus stops for all 105 bus routes and supplementary routes (involving 920 buses)<sup>2</sup> operated by the grantees through mobile platforms (including computers and mobile applications). The two grantees have also agreed to install a total of about 100 display panels at major bus stops with shelters and electricity supply in phases to show the estimated arrival time of bus routes. These comprise about 35% of bus stops of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB's bus termini at Yat Tung Estate Public Transport Terminus and Yuen Long Station (North) Public Transport Interchange. The installation of the display panels is expected to be completed by end-2020 for Citybus (Franchise 1) and mid-2017 for NLB. The number of beneficiaries should come to over 200 000 daily. The ultimate goal is to complete such installation at all bus stops with shelter and electricity supply by phases, having regard to technical feasibility and financial viability.

### Fare Concessions

9. At present, Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB are providing a total of 186 fare concession schemes (including section fares, bus-bus interchange concessions and concessionary day passes), covering over 90% of their routes with 130 000 beneficiaries daily. When discussing with the two grantees on introducing new fare concessions, we have focused on the concessions that can meet the specific needs of individual districts and respond to long-standing requests from local passengers. In the course of the discussion, we have also taken into account the implications of such new concessions on the grantees' financial viability and on bus fares in general.

10. After discussion, Citybus (Franchise 1) has agreed to provide 31 additional fare concession schemes, involving 42 routes of Citybus (Franchise 1) as well as 17 routes of NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) (details at **Annex 3**). The new fare concessions are mainly in response to the long-standing requests

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<sup>2</sup> Upon a full roll-out in the Citybus (Franchise 1)'s network, the real time bus information system will be extended to the bus routes of NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2).

from passengers to strengthen interchanges between routes serving Eastern District/Southern District and other routes operating on Hong Kong Island; cross harbour routes from the New Territories and routes serving Hong Kong Island and Kowloon West; as well as routes serving Hong Kong Island and airport bus routes. It is anticipated that passengers can enjoy fare concessions ranging from \$1.2 to \$8.8 per trip.

11. In response to the passengers' concern about the holiday fares of some South Lantau routes, NLB has agreed to offer fare concessions to frequent passengers of 10 major bus routes serving South Lantau (details at **Annex 3**). Free tickets will be provided to passengers who have taken a certain number of rides of the same route in a calendar month. Such tickets can be used on weekdays or holidays. It is expected that over 90% of the frequent passengers of the 10 major bus routes serving South Lantau can be benefited.

#### **Regulation on bus service**

12. New franchise clauses will be included to strengthen regulation on bus service. The current franchises require the grantees to conduct tendering for material contracts. If tendering has not been conducted, the grantees must obtain their board of directors' approval before awarding the contract. To enhance the transparency of grantees' procurement of material contracts, the two grantees have agreed to conduct open tendering for such contracts under the new franchises. If it is not practicable to conduct open tendering, prior approval from their board of directors must be obtained. In addition, to encourage the grantees' prompt response to passengers' complaints and comments, a new franchise clause will be included to require the grantees to formulate service pledges on providing responses and to publish their performance of such pledges from time to time.

#### **NEXT STEP**

13. The discussion with Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB has progressed well and will be completed soon. If everything goes smoothly, new franchises are expected to be granted in the third quarter of 2015.



14. We will also continue to explore other service enhancement initiatives with the grantees through regular channels. The short-term focus will be to explore with the three grantees operating cross harbour bus routes (i.e. Citybus (Franchise 1), NWFB and Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited) on the proposal to narrow the fare differential between cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes. The key considerations are to avoid mismatch of bus resources, traffic congestion as well as the associated road-side air pollution. Details are at **Annex 4**. Our target is to strive for launching a small-scale trial scheme within one year.

15. Members are invited to note the above report and offer views.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**July 2015**

## **Annex 1**

### **Follow-up on the views of the public**

Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB, together with the Transport Department (“TD”), have taken appropriate follow-up actions on the key views collected during the public engagement exercise through introducing new franchise clauses or commitments on specific initiatives. These views include:

#### **I. Passenger information**

- (a) to provide real time bus arrival information and traffic information at bus stops as well as via the Internet and mobile devices;
- (b) to provide more route information at bus stops and inside bus compartments; and
- (c) to provide more information on the bus operating plans to the public.

#### **II. Passenger facilities**

- (a) to provide barrier-free facilities and bus stop announcement system, and use low-floor buses;
- (b) to allow carriage of foldable bicycles on board;
- (c) to provide a better passenger waiting environment (e.g. to provide bus shelters and seats);
- (d) to use more environmentally-friendly buses; and
- (e) to improve on-board safety facilities (e.g. handrails).

#### **III. Fare concessions**

- (a) to provide more bus-bus interchange schemes; and
- (b) to provide fare concessions for certain passenger groups (such as residents of Lantau Island and the elderly).

2. For the other views relating to bus captains’ training and rest time arrangements, monitoring of service regularity and daily operational arrangements, TD will continue to follow up with the grantees through established channels to enhance service quality.

## **Annex 2**

### **Incorporating the most recently granted franchise clauses and commitments**

#### **Bus service**

- The new franchise will empower the Commissioner to require the grantees to provide facilities and installation so as to enhance bus safety and provide barrier-free and elderly-friendly environment. Specific initiatives are as follows:
  - (a) adopting bus design with barrier-free and friendly features for the elderly and people with disabilities when setting specifications for new buses. Major ones include low-floor and wheelchair accessible designs, provision of wheelchair parking spaces and the associated safety restraint system, designated priority seats for persons in need, enhanced railing design, easily reached pushed buttons, bus stop announcement system, and large electronic destination and route number display panels;
  - (b) providing facilities and installation to enhance safety, such as facilities and installation that can prevent or reduce potential fire hazards;
  - (c) allowing foldable bicycles, which are properly folded and would not cause any hazard to other passengers, to be carried on board; and
  - (d) providing passenger seating facilities at bus stops with newly built passenger shelters as far as practicable.

#### **Bus service regulation**

- The new franchise will enhance the regulatory power of the Commissioner over the type, form and manner of information to be provided by the grantee to passengers, in order to provide more information for passengers.
- The new franchise will strengthen regulation over the financial and accounting arrangements of the grantees. For example, to specify more clearly in the franchises the calculation of depreciation of fixed assets.

### Environmental improvement

- The new franchise will require the grantees, as far as reasonably practicable, to acquire the most environmentally friendly buses in terms of exhaust emissions that are technologically proven and commercially available, with the ultimate objective of switching to zero emission buses. To further improve roadside air quality, the two grantees are also required to deploy low emission buses (buses of emission standards of EURO IV or above) for operation at low emission zones in Central, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok as delineated by the Environmental Protection Department.

### **Annex 3**

#### **Routes involved in the fare concession schemes**

#### **(1) Routes involved in the fare concession schemes as committed by Citybus (Franchise 1)**

##### **(a) 42 routes of Citybus (Franchise 1)**

<b>Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
1	Happy Valley (Upper) – Felix Villas
5B	Kennedy Town – Causeway Bay (Circular)
5X	Kennedy Town – Causeway Bay (Whitfield Road)
8X	Siu Sai Wan (Island Resort) – Happy Valley (Lower)
10	North Point Ferry – Kennedy Town
11	Central (Central Ferry Piers) – Jardine’s Lookout (Circular)
19	Siu Sai Wan (Island Resort) – Tai Hang Road
25A	Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre Extension) – Braemar Hill (Circular)
70	Central (Exchange Square) – Wah Kwai
70P	Shek Pai Wan Estate Public Transport Interchange – Central (Exchange Square)
72	Wah Kwai – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
72A	Sham Wan Road Public Transport Terminus – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
77	Tin Wan Estate – Shau Kei Wan
95C	Ap Lei Chau Estate – Chi Fu Fa Yuen (Circular)
96	Lei Tung Estate – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
98	Lei Tung Estate – Aberdeen (Chengtu Road)
99	South Horizons – Shau Kei Wan
511	Central (Central Ferry Piers) – Jardine’s Lookout (Circular)
592	South Horizons – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
780	Chai Wan (East) – Central (Central Ferry Piers)
780P	Chai Wan (Hing Wah Estate) – Central (Central Ferry Piers)
788	Siu Sai Wan (Island Resort) – Central (Macau Ferry)

<b>Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
930	Tsuen Wan (Discovery Park Bus Terminus) – Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange
930A	Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange – Tsuen Wan (Discovery Park Bus Terminus)/Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange
962	Tuen Mun (Lung Mun Oasis) – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
962A	Tuen Mun (Yuet Wu Villa) – Admiralty (Cotton Tree Drive slip road outside Lippo Centre)
962B	Tuen Mun (Chi Lok Fa Yuen) – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
962C	Quarry Bay – Tuen Mun (Lung Mun Oasis)
962P	Tuen Mun (Lung Mun Oasis) – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
962S	Tuen Mun (Chi Lok Fa Yuen) – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
962X	Tuen Mun (Lung Mun Oasis) – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
X962	Central – Tuen Mun (Lung Mun Oasis)
967	Tin Shui Wai North (Tin Yan Estate) – Admiralty (West)
967X	Causeway Bay (Leighton Centre/Moreton Terrace) – Tin Shui Wai North (Tin Yan Estate)
969	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
969A	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Admiralty (Lippo Centre)/Hennessy Road (West of Fleming Road)
969B	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre/Kingswood Villas (Locwood Court) – Wan Chai (Hennessy Road)
969C	Quarry Bay – Tin Shui Wan (Tin Chung Court)
969P	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Causeway Bay (Moreton Terrace)
969X	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Causeway Bay (Leighton Centre)
973	Tsim Sha Tsui (Mody Road) – Stanley
B3X	Tuen Mun Town Centre – Shenzhen Bay Port

- (b) 17 routes involved in the inter-company bus-bus interchange schemes with NWFB and Citybus(Franchise 2)

<b>Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
2A	Yiu Tung Estate – Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange
2X	Shau Kei Wan – Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange
8	Chai Wan (Heng Fa Chuen) – Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange
8P	Siu Sai Wan (Island Resort) – Wan Chai North Temporary Public Transport Interchange
18P	Kennedy Town (Belcher Bay Temporary Bus Terminus) – North Point (Healthy Street Central)
18X	Shau Kei Wan – Kennedy Town (Belcher Bay Temporary Bus Terminus )
78	Wong Chuk Hang – Wah Kwai Estate (Circular)
590	South Horizons – Central (Exchange Square)
694	Siu Sai Wan – Tiu Keng Leng Public Transport Interchange
720	Sai Wan Ho (Grand Promenade) Public Transport Terminus – Central (Macau Ferry)
720A	Sai Wan Ho (Grand Promenade) Public Transport Terminus – Admiralty (Circular)
720P	Taikoo Shing – Central (Gilman Street)
970	Cyberport – So Uk
970X	Aberdeen – So Uk
971	Shek Pai Wan Estate Public Transport Interchange – Hoi Lai Estate
A11	North Point Ferry Pier – Airport (Ground Transportation Centre)
A12	Siu Sai Wan(Island Resort) – Airport (Ground Transportation Centre)

**(2) Routes involved in the fare concession schemes as committed by NLB**

<b>Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
1	Mui Wo – Tai O
2	Mui Wo – Ngong Ping
3M	Mui Wo – Tung Chung Temporary Bus Terminus
4	Mui Wo – Tong Fuk
11	Tai O – Tung Chung Temporary Bus Terminus
21	Tai O – Ngong Ping
23	Ngong Ping – Tung Chung Temporary Bus Terminus
A35	Mui Wo – Airport (Passenger Terminal Building)
N1	Mui Wo – Tai O
N35	Mui Wo – Airport (Passenger Terminal Building)



## **Annex 4**

### **Reasons as to why the study on narrowing the fare differential between cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes should be carried out prudently**

At present, there is a fare differential between cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes. This helps differentiate cross harbour and non-cross harbour routes from a functional point of view. The frequency and time needed for picking up and setting down passengers for cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour can be reduced, thereby reducing traffic flow and mitigating traffic congestion resulting from frequent bus stopping. Narrowing the fare differential between the two types of routes may allow passengers to enjoy a wider choice of routes and with increased service frequency. Yet, it may lead to mismatch of bus resources, traffic congestion and the associated road-side air pollution. This is because:

- (1) Narrowing the fare differential between cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes may encourage passengers to use cross harbour routes after crossing harbour more often. This, however, would not result in a reduction of the number of buses deployed on non-cross harbour routes. Take cross harbour routes using the Cross Harbour Tunnel to Central and Western District as an example: if the fare of cross harbour routes is reduced after crossing the harbour, passengers using non-cross harbour routes to Central and Western District should have more service choices. This may seem to give ground to reduce the frequency of west bound service (i.e. service to Central and Western District) of non-cross harbour routes. Yet, bus service operates in two bounds. If the frequency of west bound service is reduced, the frequency of east bound service would consequentially be affected. This being the case, to maintain the original frequency of both bounds of service, the number of buses deployed for non-cross harbour routes cannot be reduced; and
- (2) if the fare of cross harbour routes after crossing the harbour is reduced, these routes may need to stop more frequently to pick up and set down passengers. This would lengthen journey time.

To maintain the existing frequency, more buses would need to be deployed on the road. This would increase the possibility of traffic congestion and adversely affect road-side air quality.

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10 September 2015

Ms Sophie Lau  
Clerk to the Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central  
Hong Kong

( Fax no.: 2978 7569 )

Dear Ms Lau,

We refer to the enquiries on bus route rationalisation and manpower of bus captains raised by Members of the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council at the Panel meeting on 20 March. We are writing to provide supplementary information for Members' reference.

Rationalisation of bus routes is an on-going task of the Transport Department ("TD"). Since 2013, the TD and franchised bus companies have stepped up their efforts in pursuing route rationalisation. In addition to the regular annual Bus Route Planning Programmes, an "Area Approach" has been adopted to holistically review bus services on a district basis. Under this approach, bus services for a district are reviewed as a whole, rather than on a route-by-route basis, with a view to maximising the overall benefits to the district. Rationalisation was implemented through Area Approach in the North District, Tuen Mun, Yuen Long, Shatin, Tsing Yi and Tai Po in 2013 and 2014.

The TD has observed that the number of complaints received is generally higher during the initial implementation of rationalisation as passengers need time to acquaint with and adapt to the service changes. The numbers of complaints concerning districts with more rationalisation items (namely Tuen Mun, the North District and Yuen Long) is also greater than those from other districts. To allow affected passengers to plan their trips ahead having regard to service changes, the TD and franchised bus companies

would extensively publicise the details of service changes before they are rolled out. The TD would also closely monitor patronage data and complaints upon implementation, and fine tune the detailed arrangements as necessary. The respective numbers of complaints received concerning the aforesaid six districts during the phased implementation of Area Approach rationalisation are at Annex A. For the three areas with more rationalisation items, i.e. Tuen Mun, North District and Yuen Long, their respective monthly complaint figures had come down gradually within the first six months of implementation of the rationalisation proposals. The TD has investigated the complaints, taken appropriate follow-up actions as necessary and explained to the complainants.

In 2013 and 2014, a total of 22 bus routes with low patronage were cancelled or amalgamated, and eight routes were truncated. The frequency of 104 routes was reduced. The volume of bus traffic en route major trunk roads in Central, Causeway and Mong Kok has been reduced by more than 2 000 trips in total per day. The rationalisation efforts have helped relieve traffic congestion and alleviate roadside air pollution. However, given that a number of the rationalisation items involve cross-district routes, and that the road traffic and roadside air quality of a district may be affected by such factors as road situation and social and commercial activities at individual locations, it is difficult to single out the impact of route rationalisation on the travel time of buses and air quality of individual districts.

Nonetheless, the TD has noted that after rationalisation of bus routes to simplify the routeing, there is a reduction in the journey time for some bus routes and such reduction is of a varying extent. For instance, after rationalisation, the journey time of Route No. 78K operating in the North District has been shortened from around 45 minutes to 40 minutes (a reduction by 11%) upon omission of Pak Wo Road and Tai Ping Bus Terminus during peak hours. Also, with the splitting of Route No. 277X (from the North District to Kwun Tong) into separate routes during morning peak hours, the journey time from Luen Wo Hui to Lam Tin Station has been shortened from around 75 minutes to 66 minutes (a reduction by 12%). The above examples show that route rationalisation does help enhance service efficiency and improve the overall traffic condition. As for air quality, the Environmental Protection Department ("EPD") has been monitoring changes in roadside air quality. Comparing EPD's air quality monitoring data of 2014 against those of 2009, the concentration of roadside respirable suspended particulates (PM10) has reduced by an average of 18%, whereas the roadside level of nitrogen dioxide has fallen by 7%. Route rationalisation should have helped improve the roadside air quality.

Regarding the manpower of bus captains, the franchised bus companies have taken a more proactive approach in recruiting and training bus captains. They have also strengthened communication with serving bus captains and improved their working environment. The TD will continue to monitor the

situation through reviewing monthly manpower reports submitted by the franchised bus companies. Should there be any sign of manpower shortage, the TD will urge the franchised bus company concerned to take improvement measures promptly. Please refer to **Annex B** for monthly figures on the turnover of full-time and part-time bus captains in 2014.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )

*for* Secretary for Transport and Housing

Encl.

c.c. : Commissioner for Transport ( Attn : Miss Rachel Kwan )

**Number of complaints concerning Area Approach rationalisation**

<b>District</b>	<b>Implementation period of Area Approach rationalisation<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Number of rationalisation items</b>	<b>Number of complaints concerning rationalisation</b>
North	August 2013 to March 2014	23	250
Tuen Mun	September 2013 to March 2014	19	119
Tsing Yi	August 2014 to March 2015	10	45
Shatin	August 2014 to July 2015 <sup>2</sup>	12	54
Yuen Long	September 2014 to June 2015 <sup>2</sup>	19	248
Tai Po	September 2014 to March 2015	16	25

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<sup>1</sup> Items under Area Approach rationalisation are usually implemented in phases within a certain period of time.

<sup>2</sup> Some items for the Shatin District will be implemented when the population at Shui Chuen O public housing increases further. The remaining item for the Yuen Long District will be implemented in the third quarter of 2015.

**Manpower situation of franchised bus captains in 2014**

	<b>Full-time bus captains</b>			<b>Part-time bus captains</b>		
	<b>Total number of bus captains</b>	<b>Number of recruits</b>	<b>Number of leavers</b>	<b>Total number of bus captains</b>	<b>Number of recruits</b>	<b>Number of leavers</b>
January	12 181	104	141	999	23	10
February	12 173	87	98	1 019	28	6
March	12 140	125	154	1 051	43	13
April	12 134	120	119	1 095	51	9
May	12 132	106	110	1 143	52	7
June	12 131	118	111	1 183	50	8
July	12 133	123	124	1 230	60	14
August	12 123	128	140	1 280	60	10
September	12 157	134	97	1 329	59	14
October	12 151	137	143	1 370	51	11
November	12 179	141	112	1 409	64	23
December	12 200	124	105	1 429	34	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>N.A.</b>	<b>1 447</b>	<b>1 454</b>	<b>N.A.</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>146</b>

## Press Releases

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LCQ12: Performance of franchised buses

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Following is a question by the Hon Albert Chan and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Professor Anthony Cheung Bing-leung, in the Legislative Council today (November 18):

Question:

In recent years, I have received complaints from quite a number of members of the public that quite a number of franchised buses look very dilapidated and have poor performance. For example, some buses run upslope at a speed of less than 20 kilometres per hour (km/h) only, which is far below the general speed limit (i.e. 50 km/h) on roads. They are concerned whether it is safe to ride on these buses. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether it knows, in respect of the fleet of each franchised bus company, (i) the current average age of the buses and (ii) the respective numbers of buses aged 10 years or below and those aged above 10 years;

(2) whether it knows the reasons for some buses running upslope at a speed of less than 20 km/h only; whether it has assessed if the horsepower of these buses meets the relevant requirements; if it has assessed and the outcome is in the affirmative, of the reasons for the authorities to allow these buses to run upslope at a low speed; if the assessment outcome is in the negative, the reasons for the authorities to allow these buses to run on roads; and

(3) whether it will adopt measures to urge franchised bus companies to introduce buses of greater horsepower for plying routes with more upslope and downslope road sections, so as to shorten the bus journey time and enhance the protection of the safety of bus passengers; if it will, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

The Government attaches great importance to the road safety of vehicles. The existing legislative requirements on the construction and maintenance of vehicles are imposed on such basis. My reply to various parts of Hon Albert Chan's question is as follows:

(1) It is the prevailing arrangements for a franchised bus to be retired before it turns 18 years old. At present, the bus fleet of individual franchised bus companies generally has an average age ranging from around 6 years to over 11 years. Please refer to Annex for details. With the bus replacement cycle entering its peak during 2016 to 2019, it is anticipated that about 35 per cent of buses in the existing fleets (i.e. around 2 000 buses) will be phased out during this period. The average age of bus fleet will further decrease accordingly.

(2) and (3) Currently, the Transport Department (TD) has a set of established arrangements to regulate the performance, repairing and maintenance of franchised buses. Every new franchised bus model has to undergo a type approval process. Its design and construction must comply with the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) so as to ensure that such vehicles are roadworthy (including when they go uphill and downhill). Actual vehicle speed may, however, vary according to



road conditions. For instance, a bus may ascend slower along an uphill road if there are frequent bus stops. Nevertheless, it is uncommon to see buses going uphill at a speed slower than 20 km/h.

Apart from the type approval process, each franchised bus has to undergo an annual examination to ensure proper functioning of its mechanical parts. Meanwhile, the franchised bus operators have to carry out regular maintenance and proper repair as required by the TD to ensure that the buses are in safe and good conditions for various road conditions. The TD also conducts surprise inspections to supervise the proper maintenance of franchised buses. Overall speaking, the TD is satisfied with the existing maintenance condition of franchised buses.

Our law has not prescribed any minimum speed for vehicles driving uphill or downhill. Yet, a vehicle should not without good reason be moving so slowly to the extent the other road users are being put at risk. A heavy-duty vehicle (such as a bus) generally climbs uphill at a slower speed under loaded situations. As mentioned above, the driving speed of a bus will be subject to factors such as road conditions (e.g. whether the bus has to frequently stop and then restart on an uphill road, the distance between stops, as well as road gradient and curvature, etc.). With passenger safety being the paramount consideration, a franchised bus captain will need to exercise judgements based on road conditions and control his/her driving speed appropriately.

Franchised bus companies will take into account the overall operational and development needs of their bus networks when procuring new buses. They will draw up technical specifications of new buses and acquire appropriate bus models having regard to factors such as the nature of the bus routes concerned, conditions of the road segments and patronage. The TD encourages franchised bus companies to acquire buses which are not only safe, but are also with better performance so that the vehicles can satisfy the general aspiration of passengers with respect to vehicle performance on uphill roads. In doing so, the fare level should be kept at a generally stable level. Franchised bus companies also deploy suitable buses to provide appropriate services having regard to the operational conditions of individual routes in different periods.

Ends/Wednesday, November 18, 2015  
Issued at HKT 12:00

NNNN

**(Translation)**

Secretary General  
(Attn.: Ms. Sophie LAU)  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

6 August 2015

Dear Ms. LAU,

Thank you for your letter dated 27 May enclosing the Hon. Gary FAN's letter of 20 May to Chairman of the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council regarding the training and duty schedule arrangements for bus captains of franchised buses.

The Government has all along been attaching great importance to the safe operation of franchised buses. The Transport Department ("TD") and franchised bus companies have put in place appropriate measures in respect of training and rest time arrangements for bus captains.

According to the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations, all bus captains must pass TD's driving test and hold a valid driving licence for "Public Bus" or "Public Bus - Franchised" for driving franchised buses. Holders of such driving licences have already met TD's basic driving skill requirements.

The franchised bus companies provide various types of training for newly-recruited and serving bus captains based on their respective daily operational needs. Depending on whether he/she is a holder of a driving licence for buses, a new recruit will receive driving training for a minimum of 13 to 28 days. Over the last ten years, none of the franchised bus companies have shortened the duration of the training for newly-recruited bus captains. The training for the new recruits includes classroom lessons and on-site practice in such areas as driving skills, incident handling, customer service and familiarisation of different bus models and bus routes. After completing the training, bus captains will

normally be familiar with several bus routes and bus models. Serving bus captains are required to receive enhancement training lasting several days on a regular basis, and attend refresher training where necessary. If a bus captain is assigned to serve a new route or drive a new bus model, the bus company will arrange training for him/her as necessary.

To ensure that bus captains have sufficient rest time, the franchised bus companies currently arrange their duty schedules in accordance with the *Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks* promulgated by the TD. Moreover, having regard to actual operational needs and passenger demand, the bus companies will flexibly deploy their bus captains and buses. Whenever such flexible deployment is required, the bus companies will endeavor to help their bus captains get prepared.

In response to the reports in May 2015 that there were bus captains who did not know the bus routes and bus models that they were driving well, the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) conducted an investigation and took follow-up actions. KMB has also reviewed the training arrangement for its bus captains and strengthened the training to further familiarise bus captains with the bus routes and bus models. The training arrangements are as follows –

- (a) **Providing additional assistance to serving bus captains :**  
Upon completion of the training programme on routes, a serving bus captain may request an inspector or a senior “buddy” to travel on board to provide assistance when he/she drives on the new route for the first time. Also, KMB will arrange a serving bus captain to drive the bus route that he/she is trained for in the first month after the training; and
- (b) **Strengthening support for newly-recruited bus captains :**  
In the past, when a new recruit formally started carrying out driving duty, KMB would arrange a “buddy” to travel on board for half a day on the first day, second day, and within the seventh to ninth working days respectively. Starting from June 2015, KMB has enhanced its support to the newly-recruited bus captains. The “buddy” will provide assistance to the new recruit on board for the whole day on the first working day. Depending on the performance of the new recruit on the first day, the half-day on-board assistance to be provided on the second day and within the seventh to ninth working days may be extended to whole-day assistance

if necessary.

The TD will continue to closely monitor the daily operation and safety of the franchised bus companies to ensure that franchised bus services are provided to the public in a proper, effective and safe manner.

Yours sincerely,

( Peggy NG )

*for* Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.: Commissioner for Transport (Attn.: Miss Rachel KWAN)

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(04)

Ref. : CB4/PL/TP

**Panel on Transport**  
**Meeting on 15 January 2016**

**Background brief on the franchise for the bus network of  
the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited**

**Purpose**

This paper provides background information on the franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited ("KMB"). It also summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by the Legislative Council ("LegCo") Members on the subject in the past discussions.

**Background**

Service of KMB

2. According to the Administration<sup>1</sup>, franchised buses are the largest road-based carriers and account for 31% of the total daily public transport volume in 2014. Bus services in Kowloon and the New Territories are largely provided by KMB. At the end of 2014, KMB was operating 309 bus routes in Kowloon and the New Territories and 61 cross-harbour routes (51 of which were run jointly with another operator). KMB had a licensed fleet of 3 852 buses, of which 2 988 were wheelchair-accessible low-floor vehicles. KMB recorded 955 million passenger trips in 2014 (a daily average of 2.62 million passenger trips) covering 284.73 million kilometres of roads.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Chapter 13 – Transport of the yearbook "Hong Kong 2014"

### Bus franchises

3. According to the Administration<sup>2</sup>, there are five grantees operating six bus franchises in Hong Kong. The five grantees are KMB, Citybus Limited, New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB"). Citybus Limited is operating two franchises, one for the Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network ("Citybus (Franchise 1)") and the other for the Airport and North Lantau bus network ("Citybus (Franchise 2)").

4. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("the Ordinance") (Cap. 230), the Chief Executive in Council may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Section 6 of the Ordinance stipulates that a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding ten years<sup>3</sup>. Under section 12 of the Ordinance, a grantee of a bus franchise is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") at all times during the franchise period.

5. The Administration's key consideration in granting or extending a bus franchise is whether a grantee is capable of providing a proper and efficient public bus service. According to the established practice, a grantee who is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service, and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for being granted a new franchise for a period of ten years. As franchised bus operation is capital and investment intensive, a longer franchise period (say, ten years) would facilitate a grantee's long-term planning and service development.

6. The current franchise of KMB commenced on 1 August 2007 and will expire at 0400 hours on 1 July 2017.

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<sup>2</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on "Franchises of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited" issued in June 2014 [LC Paper No. CB(1)1621/13-14(04)]

<sup>3</sup> If the Administration has yet to decide on the long-term arrangements for a franchise, the Chief Executive in Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding two years as a buffer. Meanwhile, a grantee may request and the Chief Executive in Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

## **Past discussions on bus franchises by Members**

7. Members expressed the following major concerns while discussing matters relating to the granting/renewal of bus franchises.

### Fare concessions

8. Members of the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") had all along been concerned about the bus fares and requested the bus companies to offer more fare concessions to better meet passengers' needs.

9. When the Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) in 2011 and 2012, members urged that the Administration should add some fare-related requirements while discussing the franchise renewal with bus companies. These fare-related requirements included fare reduction or concession schemes; more bus-bus interchange schemes; introducing inter-company bus-bus interchange schemes; fare discounts/monthly tickets for frequent users; more section fares; and fare concessions for persons with disabilities, the elderly and students.

10. The Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB at its meetings on 23 June 2014 and 17 July 2015. During deliberations, members suggested providing fare concessions to passengers under the proposed new franchises. They also considered that bus-bus interchange concessions should be provided to passengers and passed the following motion at the meeting on 23 June 2014 –

"That this Panel requests that while the Government grants new franchises to any bus companies, the companies concerned must provide interchange concessions at designated bus-bus interchanges in the form of a free ride offered to passengers on the second leg journey upon interchange to bus routes with same fares."

### Enhancing standard of bus service

11. During the Fifth LegCo, Members raised concern over the performance of franchised bus service at the Panel meetings, special Finance Committee meetings as well as the Council meetings. They urged the Administration to take the opportunity of franchise renewal to require service improvement by bus companies, including provision of

real-time bus service information to passengers, provision of priority seats and barrier-free facilities, improvements in bus lost trips as well as bus service frequencies during peak periods.

*Provision of real-time bus service information to passengers*

12. According to the Administration<sup>4</sup>, the Transport Department ("TD") had all along encouraged franchised bus companies to make use of information technology in providing passengers with service information. The relevant clauses had been updated in the new franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) commencing in 2013 to enhance the regulatory power of C for T over the type, form and manner through which service information was provided by bus companies to passengers. Revised franchise clauses specifically required the provision of service information by bus companies at their websites in accordance with the requirements of C for T. Furthermore, these companies had committed to provide passenger information and enquiry system via the internet and smartphone applications, and to further enhance the system as necessary in future. The Administration planned to include similar clauses and request the franchisees to make similar service commitments in the other three franchises, i.e. Citybus (Franchise 1), NLB and KMB, when they expired in 2016/2017.

13. In addition, the Administration<sup>5</sup> also advised that franchised bus companies were providing information on service hours, frequencies, termini, en route stops, full and section fares, etc. of individual bus routes for passengers through their websites and smartphone applications. Furthermore, KMB and LW had started to provide passengers with real time arrival information through their websites and smartphone applications since early 2015. Real time arrival information was available for over 360 routes (or around 70% of the companies' routes) so far, and the service would be extended to the remaining routes progressively. Besides, the majority of the bus service information display panels at public transport interchanges/bus termini as well as all panels at bus-bus interchanges and bus shelters were provided by KMB and LW. Franchised bus companies would continue to install information display panels at appropriate locations.

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<sup>4</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ20: Franchised bus services" issued on 18 December 2013

<sup>5</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ21: Bus service information" issued on 2 December 2015



*Provision of priority seats and barrier-free facilities*

14. In response to Members' concern, the Administration<sup>6</sup> explained that major public transport modes, such as franchised buses, had designated priority seats for priority use by people in need, including the elderly, people with disabilities, pregnant women and commuters travelling with young children. As regards franchised buses, except for a small number of single-deck buses with only two priority seats, all franchised buses had four priority seats near the exit door.

15. Furthermore, an additional clause had been included in the three franchises, i.e. NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2), commencing in mid-2013 to empower TD to require bus companies to enhance safety facilities and design. This included purchasing new buses with barrier-free and elderly-friendly design. The Administration would incorporate a similar provision to promote barrier-free facilities in the other three bus franchises, i.e. Citybus (Franchise 1), NLB and KMB, after the current ones expired in 2016/2017.

16. According to the Administration in July 2014, different public transport modes had put in place suitable barrier-free facilities inside their compartments and at stations/platforms/piers based on the actual situation. For franchised buses, about 75% of the bus fleet comprised low-floor buses. Except for those buses running along road sections with steep gradient and sharp bend on Lantau Island, all buses newly purchased would be of a low-floor design to replace the old ones which were not low-floor. The replacement was expected to be completed within three years. Major barrier-free facilities provided by franchised buses included wheelchair parking space.

*Improvement in bus lost trips*

17. Members expressed grave concern over the problem of bus lost trips. According to the Administration<sup>7</sup>, TD had reviewed the sanction regime in respect of bus lost trips in response to the Ombudsman's recommendations of its investigation on TD's mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services in 2014. As far as the statutory mechanism under the Ordinance was concerned, if a franchised bus company failed to comply with the Ordinance or franchise requirements

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<sup>6</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ5: Priority seats and barrier-free facilities provided by public transport modes" issued on 9 July 2014

<sup>7</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on "Public Transport Strategy Study – Franchised Bus Service" issued in March 2015 [LC Paper No. CB(4)655/14-15(04)]

or failed to provide a proper and efficient service, the Chief Executive in Council might impose penalty on the company concerned. The Chief Executive in Council might also revoke its operating right on individual routes or the entire franchise.

18. As for the administrative arrangements, TD would normally follow up the matter with the franchised bus companies in writing or by issuing warning letters. The circumstances warranting the issue and the number of such warning letters would be taken into consideration when a franchise was due for renewal. Past experience suggested that the above mechanism had been working well. The franchised bus companies would take letters or warning letters from TD seriously and take active follow-up actions on those letters.

#### *Improvement in bus service frequencies during peak periods*

19. In response to Members' suggestion about improving bus service frequencies of certain routes during peak periods, the Administration<sup>8</sup> advised that when adjusting bus service frequencies, TD and bus companies would make reference to TD's Guidelines on Service Improvement and Reduction in Bus Route Programme ("the Guidelines") released in 2010 after consultation with LegCo. According to the Guidelines, a reference indicator for frequency improvement was that the occupancy rate of the route reached 100% during the busiest half-hour of the peak period and 85% during that one hour, or reached 60% during the busiest one hour of the off-peak period. Meanwhile, the maximum carrying capacity was a sum of the total number of seats and number of standees on the lower deck under an average passenger density level of six persons per square metre. Generally speaking, the number of seats accounted for 70% and number of places for standees accounted for 30% of the maximum carrying capacity of a double-decked bus. In other words, passengers would generally have to stand only when the patronage was above 70%.

#### Occupational safety and health of bus captains

20. Members were concerned about the occupational safety and health of bus captains and requested the bus companies to provide more rest time for them. According to the Administration<sup>9</sup>, TD met with the

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<sup>8</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ1: Bus services during peak periods issued on 22 October 2014

<sup>9</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ5: Facilities at bus termini" issued on 12 February 2014

franchised bus companies from time to time and discussed with them bus services and related matters, such as route planning, service frequency, service level, operational safety and working environment of bus captains. TD also met with the representatives of bus captain unions to understand and discuss issues of their concern. They were mainly on work arrangements, measures for improving operational safety, working environment of bus captains, etc. TD, together with franchised bus companies, had taken appropriate and feasible follow-up actions on the comments and requests raised by bus captain unions. Examples included the provision of mobile toilets or facilities such as microwave ovens and refrigerators for use by staff at a number of bus termini.

21. In addition, according to the information provided by the Administration<sup>10</sup>, the franchised bus companies would ensure bus captains to have sufficient rest time by arranging their duty schedules in accordance with the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks promulgated by TD. Moreover, having regard to actual operational needs and passenger demand, the bus companies would flexibly deploy their bus captains and buses. Whenever such flexible deployment was required, the bus companies would endeavor to help their bus captains get prepared.

#### Environmental improvement measures

22. Regarding members' concern about the environmental improvement initiatives of bus companies when the Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) in 2011 and 2012, the Administration advised that all the above bus companies had agreed to include new/amended clauses in the franchises to, as far as reasonably practicable, acquire the most environmentally friendly buses (including zero emission buses) and adopt products that were technologically proven and commercially available to reduce emissions, having regard to the feasibility as well as affordability for the passengers and operators. The Administration further advised that to further help improve roadside air quality, the above bus companies agreed to make commitments on the deployment of low emission buses for operation at pilot low emission zones in Causeway Bay, Central and Mongkok delineated by the Environmental Protection Department, with the target of having only low emission buses in these pilot low emission

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<sup>10</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on its response to the letter from Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai on the duty schedule system and pre-employment training arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies issued in August 2015 [LC Paper No. CB(4)1397/14-15(01)]

zones by 2015.

23. At the Panel meeting on 20 March 2015, members also expressed concern on the emission of franchised buses. In response, the Administration explained that it had all along been encouraging the franchised bus companies to deploy more environment-friendly buses with a view to reducing the emission. For franchises commencing in 2013, the franchised bus companies were required to procure new buses which were the most environment-friendly.

### **Latest developments**

24. The Administration plans to consult the Panel on the way of handling the expiry of the franchise for the bus network of KMB in 2017, and invite members' views on the requirements of the new franchise at its meeting to be held on 15 January 2016.

### **Relevant papers**

25. A list of relevant papers is at **Appendix**.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
11 January 2016

## Appendix

### Franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited

#### List of relevant papers

Date of meeting	Panel/Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
17.11.2005	Panel on Transport ("TP")	Administration's paper	CB(1)309/05-06(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)549/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf</a>
25.11.2005	TP	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)694/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf</a>
16.12.2005	TP	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)713/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf</a>
--	--	Legislative Council brief	ETWB(T) CR 2/5591/99 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf</a>
1.3.2006	Council Meeting	Minutes of meeting	CB(3) 426/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/counmtg/minutes/cm060301.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/counmtg/minutes/cm060301.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
11.7.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)2647/10-11(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)220/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf</a>
7.11.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)227/11-12(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1363/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf</a>
5.12.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)464/11-12(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1482/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf</a>
9.3.2012	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)1157/11-12(05) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf</a>
		Background brief	CB(1)1161/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Administration's follow-up paper	CB(1)1481/11-12(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)2490/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf</a>
29.5.2013	Council Meeting	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on bus route rationalization	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm</a>
4.12.2013	Council Meeting	Hon WU Chi-wai raised a question on improvement to the services provided for bus passengers	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm</a>
18.12.2013	Council Meeting	Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan raised a question on franchised bus services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm</a>
12.2.2014	Council Meeting	Hon WONG Kwok-hing raised a question on facilities at bus termini	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm</a>
14.5.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee raised a question on public transport services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201405/14/P201405130964.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201405/14/P201405130964.htm</a>
11.6.2014	Council Meeting	Hon MA Fung-kwok raised a question on lost trips of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm</a>
23.6.2014	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)1621/13-14(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)79/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf</a>
9.7.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun raised a question on priority seats and barrier-free facilities provided by public transport modes	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201407/09/P201407090695.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201407/09/P201407090695.htm</a>
22.10.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun raised a question on bus services during peak periods	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/22/P201410220465.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/22/P201410220465.htm</a>
9.2.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)238/14-15(06) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20141125cb1-238-6-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20141125cb1-238-6-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)1040/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150209.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150209.pdf</a>
20.3.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(4)655/14-15(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)1293/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150320.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150320.pdf</a>



Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
1.4.2015	Finance Committee (Special meeting)	Replies to initial written questions raised by Finance Committee Members in examining the Estimates of Expenditure 2015-16 (Session No.: 12) (Questions Serial Nos. 0819, 0821, 4800, 6126 and 6139)	<a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/fc/fc/w_q/thb-t-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/fc/fc/w_q/thb-t-e.pdf</a>
17.7.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(4)1306/14-15(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150717cb4-1306-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150717cb4-1306-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)228/15-16 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150717.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150717.pdf</a>
2.12.2015	Council Meeting	Hon TANG Ka-piu raised a question on bus service information	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201512/02/P201512020538.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201512/02/P201512020538.htm</a>

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
11 January 2016

**For discussion  
on 15 January 2016**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**New Franchise for**  
**Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

**PURPOSE**

This paper informs Members of the Government's plan to engage The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise for its bus network upon expiry of the current one on 1 July 2017. Members' views are invited on the requirements of the new franchise.

**BACKGROUND**

2. At present, there are five grantees operating six bus franchises<sup>1</sup> in Hong Kong. The current franchise of KMB commenced on 1 August 2007 and will expire on 1 July 2017. KMB has indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise upon the expiry of the existing one.

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("the Ordinance") (Cap. 230), the Executive Council may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding 10 years<sup>2</sup>. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("the Commissioner") at all times during the franchise period.

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<sup>1</sup> The five grantees are KMB, Citybus Limited, New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited. Citybus Limited is operating two franchises, one for the Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network and the other for the Airport and North Lantau bus network.

<sup>2</sup> If the Government has yet to decide on the long-term arrangements for a franchise, the Executive Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding two years as a buffer. Meanwhile, a grantee may request and the Executive Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

4. The Government's key consideration in granting a bus franchise is whether an operator is capable of providing a proper and efficient public bus service. According to the established practice, an incumbent operator which is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service, and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for being granted a new franchise for a period of 10 years. As franchised bus operation is capital and investment intensive, a longer franchise period (say, 10 years) would facilitate a grantee's long-term planning and service development. These include –

- (a) operating certain loss-making but socially desirable routes on broader considerations over the long term;
- (b) securing more favourable terms on financing to reduce operating costs and hence pressure to increase fare;
- (c) being more resilient to business risks brought about by short-term market volatility; and
- (d) providing a more stable working environment for its staff as bus industry is also labour intensive.

The aforesaid factors are conducive to ensuring the provision of a proper and efficient service to passengers.

5. To evaluate whether a grantee is providing a proper and efficient service, the Transport Department ("TD") has all along been reviewing the grantee's performance regularly through passenger satisfaction surveys, site surveys, vehicle inspections, examination of regular returns and feedback from the public, etc. The assessment on the performance of KMB is set out in paragraphs 6 to 13 below.

## **ASSESSMENT**

### **(A) Service Performance and Operational Efficiency**

6. As at end September 2015, KMB was operating 374 bus routes using 3 874 buses. Between August 2007 (commencement of its existing franchise) and September 2015 –

- (a) the average lost trips rate<sup>3</sup> of KMB was 4.0%, higher than the overall industry average of 3.4% during the same period. In view of relatively higher lost trip rates in 2011 (8.0%) and 2012 (4.6%), KMB has implemented a series of improvement measures. The implementation of such measures had brought the lost trip rate down to 2.8% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014<sup>4</sup>. In the first three quarters of 2015, KMB's lost trip rate was at a low level of 1.4%, which was slightly better than the industry average of 1.5%;
- (b) the average number of complaints against KMB per million passengers received by the Transport Complaints Unit under the Transport Advisory Committee was 2.69, lower than the overall industry average of 3.44 during the same period;
- (c) the average number of KMB buses involved in accidents per million vehicle-kilometre travelled was 2.95, lower than the overall industry average of 4.16 during the same period; and
- (d) on the environment front, KMB's fleet has met the prevailing EURO emission standards at those times when they were purchased (currently set at EURO V emission standards). In addition, with funding support from the Government, KMB launched a trial involving three hybrid buses in late 2014 and will start another trial involving 18 single-deck electric buses (including eight supercapacitor buses and 10 battery-electric buses) progressively starting from the first quarter of 2016. Both trials will last for two years.

7. The average daily patronage of KMB decreased from about 2 762 000 passenger journeys in 2007 to about 2 632 000 passenger journeys in the first three quarters of 2015, representing a drop of about 5%. In tandem with the patronage drop, its fleet size decreased by about 4%, from 4 027 buses to 3 874 buses during the same period. Under the Ordinance, a grantee has to submit its five-year Forward Planning Programme ("FPP") on an annual basis. FPP includes proposals for service improvement and rationalisation, as well as vehicle purchase and replacement programme. Since 2013, KMB has pursued proposals of service rationalisation with greater

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<sup>3</sup> This refers to the percentage of trips not meeting the number as agreed with TD over the total number of trips.

<sup>4</sup> The Occupy Movement protest which happened in the fourth quarter of 2014 had impacted on the service and frequency of franchised bus service. We have excluded the data of that quarter in the calculation of lost trip rates to eliminate such impact.

vigour. An “Area Approach” is adopted to review its bus service holistically for a district as a whole, with a view to maximising the overall benefits for the district. Between August 2007 and September 2015, KMB acquired a total of about 1 510 new buses<sup>5</sup>, implemented 247 service improvement<sup>6</sup> items and 304 service rationalisation<sup>7</sup> items to enhance service and network efficiency. According to its latest FPP (covering the period of 2016 to 2020), KMB plans to further acquire a total of about 1 680 new buses (amounting to around 40% of its bus fleet) to replace its old buses and further improve its bus service. As at September 2015, close to 90% of KMB’s fleet are low-floor buses for the convenience of wheelchair passengers. KMB is expected to operate with a fully low-floor bus fleet by mid-2017.

## **(B) Safety and Service Enhancement Measures**

8. KMB has all along been taking measures to further enhance safety. For example, KMB has –

- (a) fully implemented a new set of working hour and rest time arrangements for the bus captains since the fourth quarter of 2012. This provides the bus captains with longer rest time when they are on duty. For example, the time that a bus captain spends at a terminal point preparing for the next departure will not be regarded as rest time. The break between successive working days is increased from not be less than 9.5 hours to not less than 10 hours;
- (b) strengthened bus captains’ driving skills, improved their driving attitude and enhanced their safety awareness by providing enhancement, refresher and remedial training courses on safe driving;
- (c) required bus captains aged 50 years or above to undergo annual health checks. Those aged 60 or more have to undergo an electrocardiogram (“ECG”) as well. With effect from August 2013, bus captains of 50, 54 and 57 years old also have to undergo an ECG during their annual health checks; and

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<sup>5</sup> These include the replacement of old buses and purchase of new additional buses.

<sup>6</sup> Service improvement items mainly include introduction of new routes, frequency enhancement, extension of service hours and extension of routeing.

<sup>7</sup> Service rationalisation items mainly include route cancellation, frequency reduction, route truncation and re-routeing.

- (d) completed the retrofit of black boxes and speed limiters on all buses to facilitate the monitoring of bus captains' driving performance.

9. To further enhance service standards, KMB has implemented a number of measures for continuous improvement on service quality during the current franchise period. They include :

- (a) provision of real-time bus arrival information through mobile phone application and website, as well as by showing the information on display panels at major bus stops and bus interchanges (see also paragraph (b)(i) below);
- (b) enhancement of passenger facilities at bus termini/stops and bus interchanges, including :
  - (i) as at September 2015, installation of a total of 182 display panels to at major bus termini/stops and bus interchanges<sup>8</sup> to show the estimated bus departure time or real-time arrival information;
  - (ii) provision of conspicuous bus route maps, seats and free Wi-Fi at major bus termini/stops and bus interchanges;
  - (iii) set up customer service centres at nine major locations<sup>9</sup>; and
- (c) installation of bus stop announcement system inside the compartment of all its buses.

10. As at end September 2015, KMB was offering 171 bus-bus interchange ("BBI") concession schemes. Of these, 143 schemes were offered solely by KMB. The remaining 28 scheme were jointly offered by KMB and another franchised bus company. These concession schemes cover 283 routes (amounting to about half of all bus routes in Hong Kong). In general, with the

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<sup>8</sup> They include Tuen Mun Road Bus Interchange, Tai Lam Tunnel Bus Interchange and Tsing Sha Highway Bus Interchange.

<sup>9</sup> They include customer service centres at Cross Harbour Tunnel Bus Interchange, Tsim Sha Tsui Star Ferry Pier Public Transport Interchange ("PTI"), Mei Foo PTI, Lam Tin Station Bus Terminus ("BT"), Tuen Mun Town Centre (Tuen Mun Heung Sze Wui Road) BT, Sha Tin Central BT, Tsuen Wan Station PTI, Tin Shui Wai Tin Heng Estate PTI and Tai Lam Tunnel Bus Interchange (Yuen Long bound).

BBI concession, passengers may take the trip of lower fare free of charge. Separately, since August 2012, KMB has been participating in the Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities funded by the Government. Under the scheme, elderly passengers and eligible persons with disabilities may ride on KMB's routes at a concessionary fare of \$2 per trip<sup>10</sup>.

### **(C) Public Opinions on Bus Services**

11. TD and the operators conduct regular passenger satisfaction surveys to gauge passengers' opinions on their bus service. The findings of the passenger satisfaction surveys are used as the basis for TD and the bus operators to monitor service performance, keep track of passenger satisfaction, and identify areas for improvement.

12. Further, TD commissioned a consultancy firm to conduct an independent survey in November 2015 to collect passengers' overall opinions on KMB's bus service. The results show that 85% of the respondents are satisfied with the overall service quality. Survey findings are summarised at **Annex A**.

### **(D) Financial Performance**

13. According to the franchise requirements, all grantees have to publish a booklet of "Fuller Disclosure" annually to present their operational and financial information over the past year. Information on the financial performance of KMB during its current franchise period is at **Annex B**.

## **NEW FRANCHISE**

14. Based on the assessment in paragraphs 6 to 13 above, the Commissioner is of the view that KMB has all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service and is willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of the bus service. Meanwhile, KMB has indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise as mentioned in paragraph 2 above. Taking all things into account, the Government plans to discuss with KMB on a new 10-year franchise so that KMB can continue to operate its existing bus network. The new franchise will take effect immediately upon expiry of the current one in 2017. We shall also invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchise (see paragraph 16 below).

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<sup>10</sup> Excluding racecourse routes.

15. Although KMB has in-principle indicated an interest to continue to provide franchised bus service, the operating environment of the bus industry in the foreseeable future will continue to be rather difficult owing to rising operating costs (especially staff costs) and keen competition from other public transport modes. The market share of franchised buses will shrink in the coming few years upon the completion and opening of new railway lines<sup>11</sup>. A grantee has to actively rationalise its existing service to reduce wastage and explore new service areas in response to public demand so as to maintain the overall sustainability of its operation. The Government would strive for the most favourable franchise terms for the public as far as possible in a pragmatic manner. We aim to conclude the discussion with KMB within 2016 and will brief this Panel.

## **PUBLIC CONSULTATION**

16. The Government plans to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchise for the bus network of KMB in the first quarter of 2016. The relevant information will be uploaded to the websites of the Transport and Housing Bureau and TD as well as the Public Affairs Forum website of the Home Affairs Bureau for reference by and comments from the public. Besides, TD will invite views from the Traffic and Transport Committees of all District Councils.

## **ADVICE SOUGHT**

17. Members are invited to note the Government's plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new franchise, and are welcome to offer views on the requirements of the new franchise.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
January 2016**

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<sup>11</sup> Including the Kwun Tong Line Extension, South Island Line (East) and Shatin-Central Link.



**Transport Department**

**Passenger Opinion Survey for**

**The Kowloon Motor Bus Company**

**(1933) Limited**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

**Conducted and Prepared by**



米嘉道資訊策略有限公司  
Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd.

*December 2015*

## **Background & Objective**

In order to collect views on the performance of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB"), the Transport Department has commissioned the Mercado Solutions Associates Limited ("MSA") to conduct passenger opinion survey via telephone in November 2015.

## **The Survey**

The target population is the regular passengers aged 12 or above who take KMB at least once a week. In order to ensure the findings of the survey are representative, a random sample of household telephone numbers were selected. Within the selected households, all individuals aged 12 or above who used the service of KMB at least once a week were listed. After that, one target respondent of the selected household would be randomly picked by a random selection process.

The questionnaire includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers or staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 2,600 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 11 and 30 November 2015, representing an overall response rate of 82.1%.

## **Survey Results**

1. Overall speaking, 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very

satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.

2. 85.5% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 13.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 90.8% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 8.3% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 81.2% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.6% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 63.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of KMB. The percentage was higher than the 35.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 87.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 89.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers or staff of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 9.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 73.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of KMB on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 19.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 6.8% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

**Financial performance of KMB under the current franchise**

<b>Accounting Year</b>	<b>Average Daily Patronage (passenger journeys)</b>	<b>Total Revenue (\$ million)</b>	<b>Total Cost (\$ million)</b>	<b>Profit / Loss after Tax (\$ million)</b>
2007	2,762,000	6,008	5,769	239
2008	2,695,000	6,163	6,060	104
2009	2,644,000	5,964	5,534	431
2010	2,594,000	5,991	5,695	296
2011	2,565,000	6,091	6,053	38
2012	2,576,000	6,178	6,221	-43
2013	2,610,000	6,388	6,401	-12
2014	2,617,000	6,534	6,329	205



[Translation]

Date: Friday, February 05, 2016 09:29am

Subject: Passenger broke through the glass door of KMB Bus 5M and fell off the bus – the incident was all caused by the bus company.

Secretary Mr. Cheung, Secretary Mr. Yau, Members of the Legislative Council, Members of the District Council, Hello,

There have been many newspapers reporting the incident on 2 February where a passenger broke through the glass door of the KMB Bus 5M and consequently fell out of the Bus:

Apple Daily: Danger either caused by 220 pounds of force or prior crack in the door

*[link]*

Ming Pao: Elderly man fell on and broke through glass door of a bus. Falling off the bus leading to risk of death.

*[link]*

There are actually a lot of bus companies that require bus captains to drive dangerously. They require bus captains to allow passengers to board a bus even when the bus is outside of the yellow line, and even when the bus captains point to the danger involved, the staff members of the bus company at the bus stations still insist that passengers board the buses in those situations without concern for passengers' safety, leading them to fall and break through the glass doors of buses. I was involved in such an incident on 30 September when riding the E34B.

*[link]*

I had addressed the above incident last year, but the Transport Department has not responded. This sort of situation still occurs from 6:30pm to 8pm every day. Will this issue only be addressed when it results in death?

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局  
運輸科

香港添馬添美道2號  
政府總部東翼



CB(4)595/15-16(01)  
**TRANSPORT AND HOUSING BUREAU**  
**GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT**  
TRANSPORT BRANCH

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12 February 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
(Attn.: Ms Sophie LAU)

[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms LAU,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**New franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus**  
**Company (1933) Limited**

Thank you for your letter of 26 January 2016, enclosing with it the views from Hon Charles MOK on the new franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”).

The franchised bus companies are gradually rolling out their real-time bus service information systems for disseminating information to passengers via smartphones applications (“apps”), websites as well as display panels at bus stops so as to facilitate passengers in knowing their waiting time and planning their journeys. KMB and Long Win Bus Company Limited have started to provide passengers with real-time bus service information through their websites and smartphone apps since early 2015. The system is already available for over 420 main and supplementary routes (or around 80% of routes operated by the companies) operated by these operators and will be extended to the remaining routes progressively. Citybus Limited has also been providing real-time bus service information for its nine airport bus routes through its website and smartphone app. For greater convenience of passengers, the Transport Department (“TD”) is exploring with the franchised bus companies the addition of a new function to TD’s “Hong Kong eTransport” smartphone

app by hyperlinking to the real-time bus service information of routes of individual franchised bus companies. After finalising the implementation arrangements, members of the public will be able to access the estimated bus arrival time in addition to service information of bus routes operated by the different franchised bus companies through “Hong Kong eTransport”.

The franchised bus companies have been developing real-time bus service information systems and maintaining their daily operation for the purpose of enhancing the quality of bus services. Any relevant franchise requirements shall also be for the same purpose. The franchised bus companies have put in substantial resources in developing and operating the systems. The real-time arrival data are their private property and pertain to their commercial operation. The franchised bus companies have thus advised that they have no intention to make available their data for use by other app developers free of charge at present.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )

for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.:

Commissioner for Transport

( Attn.: Miss Rachel Kwan )



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來函檔號 YOUR REF.:

電話 Tel. No.: 3509 8155  
傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

9 March 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
( Attn : Ms Sophie Lau )

[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Follow-up Actions of Meeting on 15 January 2016**

**New Franchise for the Bus Network of  
the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

At the meeting on 15 January 2016, Members requested the Government to provide supplementary information relative to the captioned agenda item. Our reply is set out below.

**Fare revenue and non-fare box revenue**

The Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) (“the Ordinance”) provides that both fare revenue (i.e. fares charged for the carriage of passengers, baggage and goods) and non-fare box revenue (covering any other revenue, including revenue from advertisements, derived from the use of fixed assets) of franchised bus companies are considered as operating receipts and shall be included in the franchise accounts. The existing bus franchises also state that the operating receipts of franchised bus services include fare revenue and non-fare box revenue. This condition will be retained in the new franchise for the bus network of the

Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”).

In processing fare adjustment applications from franchised bus companies, the Government will refer to a basket of factors (which include changes in the companies’ operating receipts and costs) in accordance with the Fare Adjustment Arrangement for Franchised Buses. Since both fare revenue and non-fare box revenue earned from franchised bus services are operating receipts of bus companies, they will be taken into account as we process the fare adjustment applications. In fact, the Government has been encouraging franchised bus companies to increase their non-fare box revenue so as to relieve the pressure for fare adjustments.

### **Facilities for use by bus captains**

Franchised bus companies are already subject to requirements on the provision of facilities including toilets and regulator kiosks under their existing franchises. Among some 280 bus termini<sup>1</sup> across the territory at present, nearly 90% are provided with rest facilities while close to 95% have toilets or with access to toilets within a walking distance of three minutes. Newly constructed bus termini will be equipped with toilets and rest facilities where practicable. For those bus termini which do not have rest facilities or toilets for use by bus captains, it is mainly due to physical constraints of the site (e.g. the bus termini are located beside a narrow pavement or there is a lack of power supply) or views of residents living nearby. The bus companies will continue exploring possible ways to overcome the physical constraints so as to provide such facilities as far as practicable.

### **Arrangement of duty schedules for bus captains**

According to the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks (“the Guidelines”) issued by the Transport Department (“TD”), the maximum duty (including all rest times) of a bus captain on a working day should not exceed 14 hours and the break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours. Franchised bus companies can arrange duty schedules for bus captains having regard to the Guidelines to meet their operational needs, such as arranging two separate shifts on a single day, or a night shift on the first day to be followed by a morning shift on the next day.

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<sup>1</sup> These are terminating points serving at least one whole-day franchised bus route and at which bus captains must stop over and take a break.

According to KMB's operation record for December 2015 (involving around 200 000 shifts) provided to TD, about 80-90% of bus captains performed one shift on average while the rest were on duty for two peak periods on a single day. Moreover, KMB has advised that when arranging duty schedules for bus captains, it would avoid assigning a bus captain who has performed night shift duty on the first day to take up morning shift duty on the next day. In December 2015, around 0.0002% of the shifts (37 shifts) were night shifts with a morning shift on the following day.

### **Calculation of lost trip rate**

TD has been monitoring the lost trip situation of franchised buses. It reviews and analyses the causes of lost trips so as to formulate improvement measures. In light of the travelling patterns of passengers during the morning and evening peak periods and their expectations over the level of bus service during the respective periods, TD and franchised bus companies have been calculating the lost trip rates of four different periods since 2015 having regard to The Ombudsman's direct investigation report released in 2014 on TD's mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services. These four periods are the morning peak period, evening peak period, inter-peak period and after evening peak period. The overall lost trip rate is the average of the rates of these four periods. Any lost trips during a particular period could not be compensated by excess trips made in another period. TD and franchised bus companies can better understand the performance of franchised bus services in different periods with this method. We note that the lost trip situation of KMB has improved. In 2015, KMB's lost trip rate was at a low level of 1.3%, which is slightly better than the industry average of 1.4%. Nevertheless, TD will continue to closely monitor lost trip situations and take follow up actions.

### **Number of beneficiaries under the Government Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities since its launch**

Please refer to Annex for information provided by the Labour and Welfare Bureau on the fare revenue reimbursed by the Government to franchised bus companies in each financial year since the launch of the scheme.

We should be grateful if you can relay the above supplementary information to Members of the Panel on Transport for their reference.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.:

Commissioner for Transport ( Attn : Miss Rachel Kwan )

**Fare Revenue Reimbursed by the Government to Franchised Bus Companies Participating in the Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities**

<b>Franchised bus companies</b>	<b>2012-13 (\$'000)</b>	<b>2013-14 (\$'000)</b>	<b>2014-15 (\$'000)</b>
Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited*	95,090	237,125	274,556
New World First Bus Services Limited*	17,949	40,826	42,991
Citybus Limited*	23,076	51,680	55,328
Long Win Bus Company Limited*	2,776	6,680	7,968
New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited#	325	4,414	5,118
<b>Total</b>	<b>139,216</b>	<b>340,725</b>	<b>385,961</b>

\* Joined the Scheme on 5 August 2012

# Joined the Scheme on 3 March 2013

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16 March 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central  
Hong Kong  
( Attn.: Ms Sophie Lau )

[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Safety of Glass Panes of Doors on Franchised Buses**

Thank you for your letter of 18 February 2016, enclosing with it the views from Hon Tang Ka-piu on the safety of glass panes of doors on franchised buses.

The Government has all along been attaching great importance to the operational safety of franchised buses. Under the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) (“the Ordinance”), every new model of buses, like any other vehicles, has to be type approved by the Transport Department (“TD”). Also, each bus has to undergo TD’s pre-registration examination before it can run on the road. The Specification of Safety Glass Notice (Cap. 374H), a subsidiary legislation made under the Ordinance, stipulates that the glass used in a motor vehicle, including a bus, shall be glass that meet the relevant requirements of Economic Commission of Europe Regulation (ECE 43) (“ECE standards”). Specifically, the glass that conforms to ECE standards has to pass a ball-impact test (i.e. the glass can sustain the impact of a hard object with a mass of 0.227 kg from a drop height of 2.5 m and should not be brittle and cracked) and a fragmentation test (i.e. the glass will be broken into small pieces and the ends of the fragments will not be knife-edged). Every glass pane that conforms to

ECE standards is imprinted with a permanent marking to facilitate clear identification and inspection.

In view of the two incidents occurred in this February involving shattered glass panes of the doors of buses of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) limited (“KMB”), TD and franchised bus companies have implemented the following four measures to further safeguard the safety of passengers:

- (a) TD has immediately inspected the doors of all buses plying the same routes to see if the doors are functioning properly and ascertain if there are signs of structural damage and cracks on the glass panes. In response to TD’s request, KMB has also conducted inspection of all of its 228 buses which are of the same models as the two buses concerned. The two inspection exercises have been completed with no abnormalities identified. Although there is a marking of compliance with ECE standards on the glass panes of the doors of the buses involved in the incidents, TD is studying the possibility of engaging an expert(s) to carry out tests in Hong Kong on the quality of the glass of the doors concerned to further look into the causes of the incidents.
- (b) TD has set up a working group with representatives from franchised bus companies and bus manufacturers to review the safety of bus doors and follow up on measures to enhance safety. The working group held its first meeting in mid-February. Noting that bus doors opening inwards have already been fitted with handles, the working group is of the view that franchised bus companies and bus manufacturers should actively explore the addition of horizontal bars on doors opening outwards to give added protection to passengers. Pending the confirmation of technical feasibility by bus manufacturers and bus door manufacturers, franchised bus companies will work out the timetable for the retrofit works.
- (c) Franchised bus companies have enhanced the training for their bus captains. Among other things, bus captains are reminded to control bus speed properly having regard to road conditions, avoid sudden braking and abrupt turning of the steering wheel, reduce bus speed well ahead of turning and select the proper carriage lane, as well as not to move forward until they are certain that the road ahead is safe and clear. Bus captains are also reminded to make use of the rear view mirror and video recording device on board more often to keep in view the situation in the bus compartment, and not to start the bus until all passengers have finished embarking and alighting the bus, held the handrail or sat down properly so as to avoid accidents.

- (d) The Government and franchised bus companies will continue to remind passengers to hold the handrail by announcements of public interests on television as well as on-bus video and sound clips in order to enhance the public's awareness of safety when taking the bus.

TD will continue to proactively follow up on the investigation of the two incidents. It will also work with franchised bus companies through the working group on the various improvement measures with a view to safeguarding passenger safety.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )

*for* Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport ( Attn.: Mr Reginald Chan )



CB(4)779/15-16(01)



中華人民共和國香港特別行政區

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China

**范國威**

立法會議員辦事處

Office of Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai, Member of Legislative Council

檔案編號 Our Ref.: GF-LC-2016-0178(T)

香港中區立法會道一號  
立法會綜合大樓  
立法會交通事務委員會主席  
田北辰議員

田主席：

**要求討論九巴大量聘用兼職車長事宜**

近日有傳媒報導，由於九巴專營權接近屆滿，為免車長人手不足以致脫班率上升，故大量聘用兼職車長，以期順利延續新專營權。惟有市民關注九巴對新聘的兼職車長的監管及培訓工作是否足夠，及會否影響服務質素及行車安全。

有意見認為九巴大量聘用兼職車長，與全職車長流失率高有關，而過去九巴已多次被公眾質疑對新聘車長的培訓工作不足，及全職車長工時長、待遇差等問題，導致服務質素每況愈下，情況令人憂慮。鑒於交通事務委員會計劃於本年5月討論延續九巴新專營權的議程，本人現特來函要求事務委員會盡快討論九巴大量聘用兼職車長事宜，盼望閣下能予以考慮並作出適當跟進。如有任何查詢，煩請隨時與我聯絡。順祝

台安！



立法會議員 范國威 謹啟

2016年3月18日

副本送：

交通事務委員會秘書 總議會秘書(1)2 劉素儀女士 (傳真：2978 7569)

To:

Michael Tien of the Legislative Council

Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council

Legislative Council Complex

1 Legislative Council Road

**Request to discuss the impact of employing large pool of part-time bus drivers by KMB**

There have been many reports recently to the effect that since KMB's franchise term is coming to an end, in order to prevent the lost -trip rate from rising due to a lack of bus captains, KMB has hired a large pool of part-time bus captains to manage a smooth transition into the new franchise. Some residents have become concerned that the training and monitoring by KMB of its part-time drivers is insufficient, and whether this may affect the quality of service and safety of operation.

There are comments that KMB's employment of a large pool of part-time bus drivers is connected to the significant loss of full-time bus drivers, and KMB has in the past repeatedly been the subject of complaint that it provides insufficient training to its new bus drivers, that the working hours of bus drivers are long, and that bus drivers are subject to poor treatment, leading to a decrease in service quality – this situation is worrying. In light of the Panel On Transport's proposal to discuss the continuation of a new franchise for KMB in May, I hereby request that the Panel On Transport discuss the issue of KMB's employment of a large pool of part-time bus drivers as soon as possible and hope that appropriate considerations and follow-up measures can be taken. If you have any further questions, please contact me at any time.

Sincerely,

Gary FAN Kwok Wai

Legislative Council Member

18 March 2016

CC: Secretariat to Panel on Transport; Secretariat to Legislative Council ( 1 ) MS Lau So Yi  
( transliteration ) (Fax:2978 7569)

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19 May 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central  
Hong Kong  
( Attn. : Ms Sophie Lau )

[ Fax no.: 2978 7569 ]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

**Recruitment of Part-time Bus Captains  
by the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

Thank you for your letter of 18 March 2016, enclosing with it the comments of Hon Gary Fan on the recruitment of part-time bus captains by the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”).

Bus operation is a labour-intensive service industry. Franchised bus companies have to be adequately staffed in order to be able to provide proper and efficient services. The specific details of employment arrangements are determined by individual franchised bus companies having regard to factors such as operational needs and market situation. It is a common practice of all five franchised bus companies in Hong Kong to recruit part-time bus captains to support their operations. This can help meet service needs flexibly (such as to provide more frequent bus service by more manpower on busy days and during peak periods) while managing pressure on bus fares. Given the tight manpower situation of the local transportation sector, the number of newly-recruited full-time and part-time bus captains and their ratio are also constrained by the demand and supply situation of the labour market. For KMB, its total number of bus captains (including both full-time and part-time ones) stood at some 8 900 as at end-2015. This represents an increase of around 11% over a period of five years. Among them, around 87% were full-time bus captains. This percentage

is comparable to the industry's overall situation. The turnover rate of KMB's full-time bus captains (including retirees) was about 13% in 2015. This is again comparable to the industry's overall situation. The improvement in KMB's lost trip rate suggests that more manpower is clearly conducive to the provision of more reliable services by the operator.

According to the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations, all bus captains of franchised buses must pass the driving test of the Transport Department ("TD") and hold a valid driving licence for "Public Bus" or "Public Bus – Franchised" for driving franchised buses. Holders of such driving licences have already met TD's basic driving skills requirements. The franchised bus companies provide various types of training for newly-recruited and serving bus captains based on their respective daily operational needs. Depending on whether the new recruit is a holder of a "Public Bus" or "Public Bus – Franchised" driving licence, the major franchised bus companies will provide driving training to the new recruit for a minimum of 13 to 28 days. Over the last ten years, the duration of the training for newly-recruited bus captains has not been shortened. For KMB, all of its newly-recruited full-time and part-time bus captains must undergo pre-service training which includes on-road training for familiarisation of the new recruit with the routes and bus models concerned as well as training on defensive driving skills. On completion of training, a bus captain must also pass an assessment before he/she can perform duties on the road. Starting from June 2015, KMB has further enhanced its support for the newly-recruited full-time and part-time bus captains. A "buddy" bus captain will provide assistance to the new recruit on board for the whole day on the first working day. Depending on the performance of the new recruit on the first day, the half-day on-board assistance to be provided on the second day and within the seventh to ninth working days may be extended to whole-day assistance as necessary.

To ensure that bus captains have sufficient rest time, TD has promulgated the *Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks* ("the Guidelines") (see [Annex](#)) for franchised bus companies to take into account when arranging duty schedules for full-time and part-time bus captains. To ensure compliance of the Guidelines by franchised bus companies in arranging duty schedules, each franchised bus company has to submit quarterly reports to TD on the implementation of the Guidelines. TD also engages independent contractors to carry out annual surveys on the working hours, rest time and meal break arrangements of bus captains. The reports submitted by KMB and TD's survey findings both indicate that KMB has generally complied with the Guidelines in arranging duty schedules. TD will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the Guidelines and take follow-up actions where necessary.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )

*for* Secretary for Transport and Housing

C.C.

Commissioner for Transport ( Attn. : Miss Rachel Kwan )

**Guidelines on Bus Captain  
Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks  
issued by the Transport Department**

*(Revised in October 2010)*

- Guideline A** – Bus captains should have a rest time<sup>1</sup> of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, they should have rest times totalling 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest time.
- Guideline B** – Maximum duty (including all rest times) in a working day should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C** – Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all rest times each of 30 minutes or more) in a working day should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D** – The break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours.
- Guideline E** – Bus captains working for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a working day should have a meal break. Bus companies should complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by the third quarter of 2011, and further improvement to no less than one hour in one year thereafter.

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<sup>1</sup> Meal break is regarded as rest time.

2016 年 6 月 16 日

致

香港中區立法會道 1 號  
立法會綜合大樓立法會秘書處  
立法會交通事務委員會主席  
田北辰議員

九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司巴士網絡的新專營權事宜- 新專營權公眾諮詢結果報告

為響應上述公眾諮詢，我們於 2016 年 4 月 18 日向政府提交一份意見書，針對巴士安全的持續改善，內容包括安全管理系統及一系列具體課題。

政府提交立法會交通事務委員會的文件 CB(4)1124/15-16(05)《九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司巴士網絡的新專營權事宜- 新專營權公眾諮詢結果報告提供的文件》只有兩點關於安全的簡單敘述，分別為「更嚴格監察巴士車長的駕駛行為」及「改善車廂內的安全設施」。我們認為這樣遠遠未能確實反映諮詢意見書涵蓋的觀點。

由於巴士安全是非常重要的課題，我們在此將諮詢意見書的原文（只有英文版）直接提交立法會交通事務委員會作為參考。

此致，

鄭子憲  
道路安全研究小組主席  
(已簽署)

16 June 2016

The Chairman  
LegCo's Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council Secretariat,  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong

Attention : Hon. Tien Pak-sun Michael

Dear Legislative Council Members,

Administration's Paper on New Franchise for Bus Network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited - Report on The Public Consultation on the New Franchise

In response to the above public consultation, we submitted a document to Government on 18 April 2016. Our comments focus on continuous safety improvement for bus operation. The contents cover a safety management system in conjunction with a series of specific topics.

The document submitted by Government to LegCo's Panel on Transport CB(4)1124/15-16(05) "Administration's paper on new franchise for bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited - report on the public consultation on the new franchise" only consists of a short paragraph on safety with two simplified points, namely "to monitor bus captains' driving behaviour more closely" and "to improve safety facilities on buses". These clearly fail to reflect the much broader issues we raised.

Bus safety is a very important topic. For this reason we consider that it is necessary to submit our original document directly to LegCo's Panel on Transport for reference.

Yours faithfully,

Julian TH Kwong  
(signed)  
Chairman, Community for Road Safety



## **New Franchise for Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited Comments**

### **Overview**

This paper provides recommendations to further improve the safety performance of Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (KMB) under the new franchise.

Cl. 4 of the consultation document by Government states that “The Government’s key consideration in granting or extending a bus franchise is whether a grantee is capable of providing a proper and efficient bus service”.

We believe that “Safety” must also be included as a primary objective.

It is agreeable that KMB has been providing generally satisfactory service and has become increasingly serious with safety. There are many good aspects of KMB’s operation e.g. modern bus fleets, maintenance standard, drivers’ training program. Cl. 8 of the consultation document cited KMB’s efforts to improve safety with respect to drivers’ rest time, health checks, speed limiters and black boxes. While these are all relevant and appreciated, many casualties could still be reasonably preventable. It is important not to miss the opportunities to further enhance KMB’s safety performance with the new franchise.

### **Road Safety is of Paramount Importance**

Cl. 6 (c) of the document indicates that KMB’s accident rate was 2.95 accidents per million veh-km which is lower than 4.16 of the overall industry performance. While this indicates better overall performance of KMB, we consider it grossly inadequate to look at a single parameter i.e. accident rate per million veh-km, to conclude on KMB’s safety performance. Due to the scale of its operation, KMB accounts for more than half of the bus-related casualties. This justifies a major effort to further bring down the casualty toll.

It will be necessary to analyse the number and rates of KMB buses involved in fatal and serious accidents, pedestrian accidents, multi-casualty accidents etc from a much wider perspective. It is also important to identify and address any major safety risks involving KMB’s operation.

### ***Rear-front and Junction Collisions***

Given the prevalence of bus routes using high speed roads and expressways, KMB buses are particularly susceptible to rear-front collisions involving multiple casualties. During the three year period 2011 to 2013, there were over 40 multi-casualty crashes each with 5 or more casualties involving KMB buses. Historically, a single event with more than 100 casualties has been recorded. Such collisions could lead to very severe casualties especially for passengers taking up certain seats e.g. upper floor front row. Furthermore these events often put enormous strain on the emergency and medical service. Nevertheless, such events would only be classified as a single accident and therefore their severity cannot be reflected in the accident rate. In July 2015 alone, there were at least three multi-casualty collisions involving KMB buses resulting in 45 casualties.



source of photo: Oriental Daily

*Aftermath of a rear-front collision on an expressway*

### ***Passengers losing balance***

Our estimate from accident data is that some 1,000 KMB occupants are injured every year. Some of these are due to collisions and some are due to passengers losing balance. The number of KMB passenger casualties due to losing balance or boarding/alighting a bus is in the order of 300-400 per year and the number of serious injuries is in the order of 40 to 50 with fatalities in the order of one per year. Furthermore, it is likely that many casualties went unreported. Presumably elderly persons are most susceptible to these accidents, yet Hong Kong is expecting an ever growing population of elderly in the decades to come. These accidents need to be addressed systematically with meaningful targets of reduction.

### ***Pedestrian Collisions***

Our initial estimate also suggests that 70 to 80 pedestrians were knocked down by KMB buses every year. About 30% of these pedestrians sustained severe injuries. Over the three year period 2011 to 2013, twelve pedestrians died after being knocked down by KMB buses when crossing the road while a few died as a result of KMB buses crashing onto footpaths or losing control after a primary collision. Overall, pedestrians account for more than half of the fatal collisions involving a KMB bus. Irrespective of the circumstances of happenings and responsibility, this is not a trivial issue and certainly an area for improvement.

### ***Overturning Accidents***

Overturning of double decker bus could result in large number of fatalities and severe casualties. Such scenarios involving KMB buses continue to happen. This is unacceptable even though some of these happened with buses not in service for the general public.

- 9 November 2009 Tseung Kwan O
- 11 March 2011 Yuen Long
- 12 June 2015 Lung Cheung Road
- 8 February 2016 Yuen Long

### ***Roadside Risks***

Other than actual accidents, the safety of a bus carrying up to 130 passengers needs to be addressed from the perspective of risk. In this context we have been raising alert of the risk of buses falling off steep side slopes on highways. Our site inspections suggest that many steep side slopes, e.g. those along Clear Water Bay Road or Hiram's Highway, are not guarded or only lightly guarded by weak

safety barriers. These are grossly inadequate to stop a runaway bus from falling off the slopes. The consequences of a bus skidding or losing control at these locations would be disastrous with massive fatalities and casualties. Given the lack of recognition of this problem and very slow pace of road improvements, it would be up to the bus companies to compensate for the risks through education of their drivers and very stringent speed control when passing these highly risky road sections.



*These rigid concrete bus stop canopies could destroy the entire upper deck of an errant double decker bus. Interim measures would include protocols requiring bus drivers to slow down as they exit from the high speed road*

### **Recommendations**

We recommend that past accident data and potential safety risks of bus operation are studied in detail, with a view of identifying opportunities for improvements under the new franchises. Government should take the lead to emphasize the importance of road safety of bus operation. The franchise requirements should incorporate these aspects in addition to proper and efficient service. Consideration could be given to rewarding the bus companies for achieving predefined goals, such as reduction of certain accident types by 20% per year.

## **Bus Safety – Road Safety Management System**

As pointed out earlier, there is every reason to address safety performance of bus companies from the perspective of both accident data and risks. It follows that a modern approach should be introduced. One of the most important recent developments for fleet safety management worldwide is ISO 39001 “Road Traffic Safety Management”. This quality assurance system encourages fleet operators to be far more accountable and proactive in reducing accidents and risks.

### **Recommendations**

- Under the new franchise requirements encourage the bus companies to adopt a more advanced road safety management system towards the ISO 39001 standard.
- Government shall collaborate with the bus companies to study bus accidents and risks in details, with the view of setting targets of accident reduction.

## **Bus Safety – Driving Standard**

It would be fair to say that many public bus drivers are professionals and are performing reasonably well. However, this does not necessarily imply that risks have been minimised. Furthermore, a certain proportion of bus drivers do behave aggressively and dangerously contributing to undue risks. Cl. 8(d)

of the consultation document states that KMB has completed retrofit of speed limiters and black box. There is vast potential of using black box in buses but it is not clear how these are being used.

We wish to point out that the legal urban speed limit of 50km/h cannot be taken as the golden rule. Buses weigh 18 to 24 tonnes and have capacity in excess of 100 passengers. They need much longer braking distance and sharp braking to avoid a collision will risk injuries to passengers. In busy urban streets and risky road sections over steep side-slopes, speeds would need to be reduced to levels commensurate with safety risks.

As an example, buses overtaking a stopped vehicle can legally travel at 50km/h on a typical multi-lane urban street despite constrained sightlines and frequent crossing pedestrians. Such speeds are very risky and suggest a lack of understanding and regulation on the part of bus companies and Government. Providing an efficient service can never be an excuse for inappropriate speeds.

#### *Recommendations*

- Incorporate into franchise requirement the need to set up a comprehensive standard and driver monitoring system using the installed black boxes. Monitoring systems should be automated with streamlined procedures to educate and retrain drivers.
- Key monitoring controls are:
  - Acceleration and deceleration characteristics (refer to extract below from the British Columbia Transit Infrastructure Design Guidelines) – crucial to problem of passengers losing balance.
  - Speed through risky hilly roads – e.g. 25-40km/h through known hazardous sections or points– crucial to prevention of disastrous events.
  - Speed through urban areas e.g. 20-35km/h generally on busy urban streets – crucial to pedestrian and general safety.
  - Speed passing stopped vehicles/buses on urban streets – e.g. 20-30km/h with adequate lateral separation to minimize risk with pedestrians coming out from gaps.
  - Speed through bus terminus – e.g 15km/h or lower in compact bus termini.
  - Tailgating
  - Driving behind and around bicycles
- Through systematic and targeted safety training, drivers should be trained to understand typical accidents scenarios and specific risks.

#### **4.4 Vehicle Performance**

Buses generally have lower **acceleration** and deceleration rates compared to passenger vehicles. The acceleration and deceleration rates of transit vehicles should be taken into consideration in the design of public road and transit facilities for passenger comfort and safety. This is further discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

The Canadian Transit Handbook (Canadian Urban Transit Association and Transportation Association of Canada) suggests the desirable rates as shown in Table 4.3. The maximum deceleration rate for emergency situations should only be considered for extreme conditions, such as to avoid a collision.

*Table 4.3 Desirable Acceleration and Deceleration Rates for Bus*

Maximum Rate	Standard Bus (m/s <sup>2</sup> )	Articulated Bus (m/s <sup>2</sup> )
Acceleration	0.9	0.7 - 0.9
Deceleration (normal service)	1.1	1.1
Deceleration (emergency condition)	2.7	2.7

*Extract from the British Columbia Transit Infrastructure Design Guidelines*

## Bus Safety – Bus fleets

KMB has been investing in new modern buses. It is well agreeable that these buses are comfortable and well designed. However, attention is still required for safety risks including:

- Upper deck front seats – in the absence of any reasonable deformation zone, front row bus passengers could be crushed despite the use of safety belts. This is particularly important with the number of KMB buses using high speed roads.
- Straight stairways – passengers are prone to falling down the stairway during acceleration.
- Seat belts – Not all higher risk seats and not all buses are equipped with seat belts.
- Adjustable arm rests – these are prone to causing injuries for passengers losing balance when hitting the installations.
- Any sharp pointing objects – these are prone to causing injuries for passengers losing balance when hitting them.
- Bus door safety- this subject is given attention after recent incidents involving bus passengers breaking the glass door and falling off.

### *Recommendations*

- Incorporate into franchise requirements issues to be studied and improved with timetable.

## Bus Safety – Bus Stops

KMB has been providing bus shelters and in return given the privilege of advertising at bus stops. While bus shelters are generally welcome, the safety of bus stops needs far more attention. As an example, waiting passengers along bus stops on Lung Cheung Road are left exposed to heavy and fast moving vehicles. A single runaway vehicle will result in massive casualties.

### *Recommendations*

- Incorporate into franchise requirement that bus companies will collaborate with Government to reduce the risk for waiting passengers at bus stops.



**立法會**  
***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(4)1124/15-16(06)

Ref. : CB4/PL/TP

**Panel on Transport**  
**Meeting on 21 June 2016**

**Updated background brief on the franchise for the bus network of  
the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited**

**Purpose**

This paper provides updated background information on the franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited ("KMB"). It also summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by the Legislative Council ("LegCo") Members on the subject in the past discussions.

**Background**

Service of KMB

2. According to the Administration<sup>1</sup>, franchised buses are the largest road-based carriers and account for 31% of the total daily public transport volume in 2014. Bus services in Kowloon and the New Territories are largely provided by KMB. At the end of 2014, KMB was operating 309 bus routes in Kowloon and the New Territories and 61 cross-harbour routes (51 of which were run jointly with another operator). KMB had a licensed fleet of 3 852 buses, of which 2 988 were wheelchair-accessible low-floor vehicles. KMB recorded 955 million passenger trips in 2014 (a daily average of 2.62 million passenger trips) covering 284.73 million kilometres of roads.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Chapter 13 – Transport of the yearbook "Hong Kong 2014"



### Bus franchises

3. According to the Administration<sup>2</sup>, there are five grantees operating six bus franchises in Hong Kong. The five grantees are KMB, Citybus Limited, New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB"). Citybus Limited is operating two franchises, one for the Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network ("Citybus (Franchise 1)") and the other for the Airport and North Lantau bus network ("Citybus (Franchise 2)").

4. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance ("the Ordinance") (Cap. 230), the Chief Executive in Council may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding ten years<sup>3</sup>. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") at all times during the franchise period.

5. The Administration's key consideration in granting a bus franchise is whether an operator is capable of providing a proper and efficient public bus service. According to the established practice, an incumbent operator which is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service, and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for being granted a new franchise for a period of ten years. As franchised bus operation is capital and investment intensive, a longer franchise period (say, ten years) would facilitate a grantee's long-term planning and service development.

6. The current franchise of KMB commenced on 1 August 2007 and will expire on 1 July 2017. According to the Administration, KMB has indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise upon the expiry

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<sup>2</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on "New Franchise for Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited" issued in January 2016 [LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(03)]

<sup>3</sup> If the Administration has yet to decide on the long-term arrangements for a franchise, the Chief Executive in Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding two years as a buffer. Meanwhile, a grantee may request and the Chief Executive in Council may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

of the existing one. Also, the Administration<sup>4</sup> had invited views from the public on the requirements of the new franchise for the bus network of KMB between 26 January and 18 April 2016.

### **Past discussions on bus franchises by Members**

7. Members expressed the following major concerns while discussing matters relating to the granting/renewal of bus franchises.

#### Fare concessions

8. Members of the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") had all along been concerned about the bus fares and requested the bus companies to offer more fare concessions to better meet passengers' needs.

9. The Panel discussed the granting of the existing franchises of Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB at its meetings on 23 June 2014 and 17 July 2015. During deliberations, members suggested providing fare concessions to passengers under the proposed new franchises. They also considered that bus-bus interchange concessions should be provided to passengers and passed the following motion at the meeting on 23 June 2014 –

"That this Panel requests that while the Government grants new franchises to any bus companies, the companies concerned must provide interchange concessions at designated bus-bus interchanges in the form of a free ride offered to passengers on the second leg journey upon interchange to bus routes with same fares."

10. At the Panel meeting on 15 January 2016, members discussed the franchise for the bus network of KMB. They suggested that KMB should offer more fare concessions under the new franchise and opined that the Administration should coordinate the efforts of different public transport operators to provide inter-company fare concessions. Also, they passed a motion urging the Administration to review and relax the criteria for approving fare concessions provided by franchised bus companies so that franchised buses and railway could compete on equal footing.

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<sup>4</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "Consultation on new franchise for Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited to end on April 18" issued on 5 April 2016



### Financial performance

11. When discussing the franchise for the bus network of KMB at the Panel meeting on 15 January 2016, members expressed concern whether the Administration would specify in the new franchise the definition of fare revenue and non-fare box revenue; and whether the Administration would consider the above two kinds of revenue when assessing fare increase applications from franchised bus companies. They also urged the Administration to review whether non-fare box revenue relating to the provision of franchised bus services, especially advertising income relating to RoadShow Holdings Limited, would be included in franchise accounts to safeguard the interests of passengers.

### Enhancing standard of bus service

12. During the Fifth LegCo, Members raised concern over the performance of franchised bus service at the Panel meetings, special Finance Committee meetings as well as the Council meetings. They urged the Administration to take the opportunity of franchise renewal to require service improvement by bus companies, including provision of real-time bus service information to passengers, provision of priority seats and barrier-free facilities, improvements in bus lost trips as well as bus service frequencies during peak periods.

### *Provision of real-time bus service information to passengers*

13. According to the Administration<sup>5</sup>, the Transport Department ("TD") had all along encouraged franchised bus companies to make use of information technology in providing passengers with service information. The relevant clauses had been updated in the new franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) commencing in 2013 to enhance the regulatory power of C for T over the type, form and manner through which service information was provided by bus companies to passengers. Revised franchise clauses specifically required the provision of service information by bus companies at their websites in accordance with the requirements of C for T. Furthermore, these companies had committed to provide passenger information and enquiry system via the internet and smartphone applications, and to further enhance the system as necessary in future. The Administration planned to include similar clauses and request the franchisees to make

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<sup>5</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ20: Franchised bus services" issued on 18 December 2013

similar service commitments in the other three franchises, i.e. Citybus (Franchise 1), NLB and KMB, when they were due to expire in 2016/2017.

14. In addition, the Administration<sup>6</sup> also advised that franchised bus companies were providing information on service hours, frequencies, termini, en route stops, full and section fares, etc. of individual bus routes for passengers through their websites and smartphone applications. Furthermore, KMB and LW had started to provide passengers with real time arrival information through their websites and smartphone applications since early 2015. Real time arrival information was available for over 360 routes (or around 70% of the companies' routes) so far, and the service would be extended to the remaining routes progressively.

15. Besides, most of the bus service information display panels at public transport interchanges/bus termini as well as all panels at bus-bus interchanges and bus shelters were provided by KMB and LW. According to the 2016 Policy Agenda, the Administration would provide subsidy to franchised bus companies for their installation of real-time arrival information display panels at sheltered bus stops with electrical installation on a matching basis<sup>7</sup>. The Administration estimates that the installation of 550 display panels would be completed within the first phase of about three years.

#### *Provision of priority seats and barrier-free facilities*

16. In response to Members' concern, the Administration<sup>8</sup> explained that major public transport modes, such as franchised buses, had designated priority seats for priority use by people in need, including the elderly, people with disabilities, pregnant women and commuters travelling with young children. As regards franchised buses, except for a small number of single-deck buses with only two priority seats, all franchised buses had four priority seats near the exit door.

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<sup>6</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ21: Bus service information" issued on 2 December 2015

<sup>7</sup> This means that for every display panel (inclusive of protective case and data receiver) which a franchised bus company has committed to install, the Administration will provide funding for the installation of another display panel.

<sup>8</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ5: Priority seats and barrier-free facilities provided by public transport modes" issued on 9 July 2014

17. Furthermore, an additional clause had been included in the three franchises, i.e. NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2), commencing in mid-2013 to empower TD to require bus companies to enhance safety facilities and design. This included purchasing new buses with barrier-free and elderly-friendly design. The Administration would incorporate a similar provision to promote barrier-free facilities in the other three bus franchises, i.e. Citybus (Franchise 1), NLB and KMB, after the current ones expired in 2016/2017.

18. According to the information provided by the Administration<sup>9</sup> in April 2016, among the 5 865 licensed franchised buses that are operating in Hong Kong, about 5 340 or 91% of them are wheelchair-accessible with low-floor. The Administration estimates that all franchised buses (except those operated by NLB in South Lantau<sup>10</sup>) will be replaced by low-floor wheelchair-accessible buses by 2017 according to the current bus replacement programmes.

#### *Improvement in bus lost trips*

19. Members expressed grave concern over the problem of bus lost trips. According to the Administration<sup>11</sup>, TD had reviewed the sanction regime in respect of bus lost trips in response to the Ombudsman's recommendations of its investigation on TD's mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services in 2014. As far as the statutory mechanism under the Ordinance was concerned, if a franchised bus company failed to comply with the Ordinance or franchise requirements or failed to provide a proper and efficient service, the Chief Executive in Council might impose penalty on the company concerned. The Chief Executive in Council might also revoke its operating right on individual routes or the entire franchise.

20. As for the administrative arrangements, TD would normally follow up the matter with the franchised bus companies in writing or by issuing warning letters. The circumstances warranting the issue and the number of such warning letters would be taken into consideration when a

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<sup>9</sup> Source: Replies to initial written questions raised by the Finance Committee members in examining the Estimates of Expenditure 2016-2017 (Session No.: 14) (Question Serial No. 6542)

<sup>10</sup> This is because there are technical limitations over the use of low-floor buses on some road sections with steep gradient and sharp bends in South Lantau.

<sup>11</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on "Public Transport Strategy Study – Franchised Bus Service" issued in March 2015 [LC Paper No. CB(4)655/14-15(04)]

franchise was due for renewal. Past experience suggested that the above mechanism had been working well. The franchised bus companies would take letters or warning letters from TD seriously and take active follow-up actions on those letters.

*Improvement in bus service frequencies during peak periods*

21. In response to Members' suggestion about improving bus service frequencies of certain routes during peak periods, the Administration<sup>12</sup> advised that when adjusting bus service frequencies, TD and bus companies would make reference to TD's Guidelines on Service Improvement and Reduction in Bus Route Programme ("the Guidelines") released in 2010 after consultation with LegCo. According to the Guidelines, a reference indicator for frequency improvement was that the occupancy rate of the route reached 100% during the busiest half-hour of the peak period and 85% during that one hour, or reached 60% during the busiest one hour of the off-peak period. Meanwhile, the maximum carrying capacity was a sum of the total number of seats and number of standees on the lower deck under an average passenger density level of six persons per square metre. Generally speaking, the number of seats accounted for 70% and number of places for standees accounted for 30% of the maximum carrying capacity of a double-decked bus. In other words, passengers would generally have to stand only when the patronage was above 70%.

Occupational safety and health of bus captains

22. Members were concerned about the occupational safety and health of bus captains and requested the bus companies to provide more rest time for them. According to the Administration<sup>13</sup>, TD met with the franchised bus companies from time to time and discussed with them bus services and related matters, such as route planning, service frequency, service level, operational safety and working environment of bus captains. TD also met with the representatives of bus captain unions to understand and discuss issues of their concern. They were mainly on work arrangements, measures for improving operational safety, working environment of bus captains, etc. TD, together with franchised bus companies, had taken appropriate and feasible follow-up actions on the

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<sup>12</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ1: Bus services during peak periods issued on 22 October 2014

<sup>13</sup> Source: The Administration's press release on "LCQ5: Facilities at bus termini" issued on 12 February 2014

comments and requests raised by bus captain unions. Examples included the provision of mobile toilets or facilities such as microwave ovens and refrigerators for use by staff at a number of bus termini.

23. In addition, according to the information provided by the Administration<sup>14</sup>, the franchised bus companies would ensure bus captains to have sufficient rest time by arranging their duty schedules in accordance with the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks promulgated by TD. Moreover, having regard to actual operational needs and passenger demand, the bus companies would flexibly deploy their bus captains and buses. Whenever such flexible deployment was required, the bus companies would endeavour to help their bus captains get prepared.

#### Environmental improvement measures

24. At the Panel meetings on 20 March 2015 and 15 January 2016, members expressed concern on the emission of franchised buses and urged the Administration to expedite the bus replacement programme for further improvement to roadside air quality. In response, the Administration explained that it had all along been encouraging the franchised bus companies to deploy more environment-friendly buses with a view to reducing the emission. For franchises commencing in 2013, the franchised bus companies were required to procure new buses which were the most environment-friendly. Further, the Administration explained that with funding support from the Environmental Protection Department, KMB would progressively launch trials involving hybrid and electric buses. Separately, KMB planned to acquire a total of 1 680 new buses, which would be of the most environmentally-friendly models that were technology proven and commercially available, to replace its old buses.

#### **Latest developments**

25. The Administration plans to brief members on the views collected during the public engagement exercise on the new franchise, as mentioned in paragraph 6, at the Panel meeting to be held on 21 June 2016.

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<sup>14</sup> Source: The Administration's paper on its response to the letter from Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai on the duty schedule system and pre-employment training arrangements for drivers of franchised bus companies issued in August 2015 [LC Paper No. CB(4)1397/14-15(01)]

**Relevant papers**

26. A list of relevant papers is at **Appendix**.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
17 June 2016

## Appendix

### Franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited

#### List of relevant papers

Date of meeting	Panel/Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
17.11.2005	Panel on Transport ("TP")	Administration's paper	CB(1)309/05-06(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1117cb1-309-2e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)549/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051117.pdf</a>
25.11.2005	TP	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)694/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051125.pdf</a>
16.12.2005	TP	Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)713/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp051216.pdf</a>
--	--	Legislative Council brief	ETWB(T) CR 2/5591/99 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/tp/papers/etwb_t_cr_2_5591_99e.pdf</a>
1.3.2006	Council Meeting	Minutes of meeting	CB(3) 426/05-06 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/counmtg/minutes/cm060301.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/counmtg/minutes/cm060301.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
11.7.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)2647/10-11(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0711cb1-2647-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)220/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20110711.pdf</a>
7.11.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)227/11-12(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1107cb1-227-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1363/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111107.pdf</a>
5.12.2011	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)464/11-12(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1205cb1-464-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)1482/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20111205.pdf</a>
9.3.2012	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)1157/11-12(05) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1157-5-e.pdf</a>
		Background brief	CB(1)1161/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1161-e.pdf</a>



Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Administration's follow-up paper	CB(1)1481/11-12(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0309cb1-1481-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)2490/11-12 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20120309.pdf</a>
29.5.2013	Council Meeting	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on bus route rationalization	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201305/29/P201305280641.htm</a>
4.12.2013	Council Meeting	Hon WU Chi-wai raised a question on improvement to the services provided for bus passengers	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/04/P201312040450.htm</a>
18.12.2013	Council Meeting	Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan raised a question on franchised bus services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201312/18/P201312180270.htm</a>
12.2.2014	Council Meeting	Hon WONG Kwok-hing raised a question on facilities at bus termini	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/12/P201402120303.htm</a>
14.5.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee raised a question on public transport services	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201405/14/P201405130964.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201405/14/P201405130964.htm</a>
11.6.2014	Council Meeting	Hon MA Fung-kwok raised a question on lost trips of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110345.htm</a>
23.6.2014	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)1621/13-14(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0623cb1-1621-4-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(1)79/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20140623.pdf</a>
9.7.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun raised a question on priority seats and barrier-free facilities provided by public transport modes	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201407/09/P201407090695.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201407/09/P201407090695.htm</a>
22.10.2014	Council Meeting	Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun raised a question on bus services during peak periods	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/22/P201410220465.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/22/P201410220465.htm</a>
9.2.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(1)238/14-15(06) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20141125cb1-238-6-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20141125cb1-238-6-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)1040/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150209.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150209.pdf</a>
20.3.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(4)655/14-15(04) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150320cb4-655-4-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)1293/14-15 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150320.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150320.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
1.4.2015	Finance Committee (Special meeting)	Replies to initial written questions raised by Finance Committee Members in examining the Estimates of Expenditure 2015-16 (Session No.: 12) (Questions Serial Nos. 0819, 0821, 4800, 6126 and 6139)	<a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/fc/fc/w_q/thb-t-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/fc/fc/w_q/thb-t-e.pdf</a>
17.7.2015	TP	Administration's paper	CB(4)1306/14-15(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150717cb4-1306-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20150717cb4-1306-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of the meeting	CB(4)228/15-16 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150717.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20150717.pdf</a>
2.12.2015	Council Meeting	Hon TANG Ka-piu raised a question on bus service information	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201512/02/P201512020538.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201512/02/P201512020538.htm</a>
6.1.2016	Council Meeting	Hon WU Chi-wai raised a question on bus service information	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201601/06/P201601060325.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201601/06/P201601060325.htm</a>
15.1.2016	TP	Administration's paper	CB(4)457/15-16(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20160115cb4-457-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20160115cb4-457-3-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's follow-up paper	CB(4)697/15-16(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20160115cb4-697-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20160115cb4-697-1-e.pdf</a>

<b>Date of meeting</b>	<b>Panel/ Committee</b>	<b>Minutes/Paper</b>	<b>LC Paper No.</b>
20.4.2016	Council Meeting	Hon Alice MAK Mei-kuen raised a question on bus route rationalization	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201604/20/P201604200171.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201604/20/P201604200171.htm</a>

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
17 June 2016

**For discussion  
on 21 June 2016**

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **New Franchise for Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

#### **Report on the Public Consultation on the New Franchise**

#### **Purpose**

The Government invited the public to offer views on the requirements of the new franchise for the bus network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”). This paper briefs Members on the views received.

#### **Background**

2. The current franchise of the bus network of KMB will expire on 1 July 2017. At the meeting of this Panel on 15 January 2016, Members had no objection to the Government’s plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new franchise. Members also noted the Government’s plan to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchise.

#### **Public Consultation**

3. Public consultation took place between 26 January and 18 April 2016. The consultation document was uploaded to the websites of GovHK, Transport and Housing Bureau, Transport Department (“TD”) and Public Affairs Forum of the Home Affairs Bureau. Press releases inviting views from the public were issued on 26 January and 5 April 2016. Moreover, TD invited views from members of the Traffic and Transport Committees (“TTC”) of all District Councils (“DCs”) and at their invitation, attended the meetings of two TTCs<sup>1</sup>.

4. A total of 135 submissions were received during public consultation. 27 of them were from DCs, different political parties, individual members of the Legislative Council and DCs, as well as various groups. The remaining 108

<sup>1</sup> They are TTCs of Sham Shui Po and Tsuen Wan DCs.

submissions were from individual members of the public. The major comments received during public consultation are summarised at **Annex**. They fall under the following five major categories:

- (a) **Service quality** – to suggest that KMB improve passenger facilities at major bus stops, provide free Wi-Fi in buses and enhance reliability of real-time bus arrival information. Comments on the audio-visual broad casting system installed on board were also received.
- (b) **Fare arrangements** – to suggest that KMB provide more fare concessions of various kinds.
- (c) **Staff management** – to suggest that KMB provide more guidelines and training for its bus captains on improving their driving behaviour and attitude towards passengers, and improve the welfare and rest facilities for its frontline staff.
- (d) **Environmental initiatives** – to suggest that KMB use buses that are more environmentally-friendly and better maintain its buses to reduce exhaust and noise emissions.
- (e) **Government regulation** – to suggest that the Government strengthen regulation over KMB's bus service and monitoring of the financial arrangements in respect of non-fare box revenue.

## **Next Step**

5. The discussion with KMB on the new franchise will soon commence. During the discussion, we will take into full consideration comments canvassed through the consultation. It is worth noting that the operating environment of the bus industry in the foreseeable future will continue to be rather difficult. Competition from other public transport services will continue and may even intensify. Staff cost will continue to rise (the average annual increase in the salaries of KMB's staff since the commencement of the current franchise in August 2007 is about 3.6% and the cumulative increase comes to 32%). Moreover, the market share of franchised buses will shrink in the coming few years upon the opening of new railway lines<sup>2</sup>. Currently, about 60% of KMB's routes are loss-making and only about 40% is profitable. In face of

<sup>2</sup> They include the Kwun Tong Line Extension, South Island Line (East) and Shatin-Central Link.

these challenges, KMB has to actively rationalise its existing service to reduce wastage and explore new service areas in response to passenger demand in order to maintain the overall sustainability of its operation. The Government would do its utmost to seek the best possible franchise terms for the public, in a pragmatic manner. We aim to conclude the discussion with KMB within 2016 and will brief this Panel on the outcome.

6. Members are invited to note this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**June 2016**

**Major Comments Received during Public Consultation**

**A. Service quality**

**1. Passenger facilities**

- (a) to enhance the passenger waiting environment at bus stops, termini and major bus-bus interchanges (“BBIs”) (such as by provision of seating facilities and free Wi-Fi, provision of directional signs with better design, and improvement of ventilation and appearance);
- (b) to provide free Wi-Fi in buses;
- (c) to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the bus stop announcement system;
- (d) to provide suitable facilities to allow carriage of bicycles on buses<sup>1</sup>;
- (e) to make the bus ride more comfortable (such as by the use of passenger seats with better design, improvement of ventilation system to cater for temperature changes and avoidance of blocking of natural lighting by bus body advertisement);
- (f) to procure more buses and buses of larger carrying capacity;
- (g) to provide an option to turn off the volume of the audio-visual broadcasting system (the “AV System”) on buses and improve the content and quality of the programmes/airtime for advertisements. There were also comments that the AV System should not be retained<sup>2</sup>; and

<sup>1</sup> KMB already allows carriage of foldable bicycles on buses as long as such bicycles are properly folded and will not cause hazard to other passengers.

<sup>2</sup> In view of the comments received during public consultation, TD is actively working with KMB on improvement measures to be taken. The outcome will be made public. According to the Public Bus Services Ordinance and franchise conditions, revenue from advertisements shall be regarded as non-fare box revenue and shall be included in the franchise account. Non-fare box revenue helps relieve the pressure for fare increase. At present, a quiet zone has to be designated at the rear end of the lower deck of a bus. The sound volume of the AV System should be set to a level close to the ambient level, with a difference of no more than 2dB. There is also restriction over the airtime allocated for advertisements. A bus company is required to arrange regular checks on the sound volume of the AV System and submit reports to TD. TD also arranges spot checks from time to time. In addition, a bus company has to collect passengers’ views on the AV System regularly and make improvement as necessary.



- (h) to use barrier-free and elderly friendly bus facilities (including low-floor buses).

2. Passenger information

- (a) to enhance reliability of real-time bus arrival information and provide more information (such as vehicle registration number);
- (b) to provide more real-time information (such as information on traffic conditions and weather through display panels at bus stops and on buses);
- (c) to open up bus arrival data to third parties for development of software and applications<sup>3</sup>;
- (d) to provide more details about the BBI schemes; and
- (e) to provide information about the number of vacant seats on upper deck<sup>4</sup>.

3. Bus operation

- (a) to deploy buses more flexibly to maintain service during service disruption and temporary suspension;
- (b) to provide more bus interchanges; and
- (c) to convert jointly-operated cross-harbour routes into solely-operated ones.

4. Bus safety

- (a) to monitor bus captains' driving behavior more closely; and
- (b) to improve safety facilities on buses (such as by installation of additional horizontal bars on exit doors and at front windows on upper deck, as well as the use of stronger materials to build the bus

<sup>3</sup> Same as other public transport services, franchised bus service is provided by the operators in accordance with commercial principles. The development and operation of real-time bus service information systems by the bus companies is for the purpose of service enhancement. As in the case of other service-related facilities, the bus companies have put in substantial resources in developing and operating the systems. The data are private property of the bus companies and pertain to their commercial operation. Disclosure of data for use by third parties free of charge would require consent of the bus companies.

<sup>4</sup> KMB is studying the feasibility to provide information on the number of vacant seats on upper deck.

body).

## **B. Fare-related arrangements**

### **1. More fare concessions**

- (a) to provide more BBI schemes;
  - (b) to provide more section fares;
  - (c) to introduce new fare reduction schemes (such as monthly pass, discount for same day return, fare saver, and concessionary fares for specific passenger groups (such as students and passengers aged 60 to 64));
  - (d) to narrow the fare differential between the section fare of cross-harbour routes after crossing the harbour and that of parallel local routes<sup>5</sup>;
- 2. to introduce a distance-based fare system or two-way section fares; and
  - 3. to review the fare adjustment arrangement and passenger reward arrangement, and set up a fare stabilisation fund.

## **C. Staff management**

- 1. to provide more guidelines and training for bus captains to improve their driving behaviour and attitude towards passengers; and
- 2. to improve staff welfare and rest time arrangements, and provide more rest facilities for frontline staff.

## **D. Environmental initiatives**

- 1. to expedite the replacement of buses and use buses which are more environmentally-friendly (such as hybrid or electric buses);
- 2. to ensure that compartment temperature is properly adjusted; and

<sup>5</sup> TD is exploring with the three bus companies operating cross-harbour routes (i.e. KMB, Citybus Limited and New World First Bus Services Limited) a proposal to narrow the fare differential between cross-harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes. The target is to launch a small-scale trial scheme on some cross-harbour routes in the fourth quarter of this year.

3. to do a better job on vehicle maintenance for the bus fleet.

## **E. Government regulation**

1. comments are received on franchise arrangements (including views which object or support the discussion with KMB on a new franchise; suggest opening all or part of KMB's bus network to bring in competition<sup>6</sup>; suggest a shorter or longer franchise period, and suggest a more detailed assessment on KMB's performance).
2. Financial monitoring
  - (a) to require advertisement revenue be included in the franchise account and better regulation of related-party transactions;
  - (b) to require profits generated from sale of property/land be included in the franchise account; and
  - (c) to require fuel expenses be shown in the franchise account.
3. Bus service performance
  - (a) to introduce a penalty and reward system in respect of service performance;
  - (b) to strengthen regulation of service frequency; and
  - (c) to allow pets on buses.

## **F. Grantee's public engagement measures**

1. to improve communication with passengers or set up task groups to allow public participation in route planning and daily monitoring of bus

<sup>6</sup> The TTC of Shatin DC passed a motion to urge the Government to seriously consider opening up the bus franchise and introducing competition with a view to enhancing service quality and setting more competitive fares. In this regard, as we pointed out in our paper to the Legislative Council in January 2016, the Commissioner for Transport was of the view that KMB had all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service based on its service performance and operational efficiency, safety and service enhancement measures, public opinions on bus service and financial performance; KMB was also willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of the bus service and indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise. Taking all factors into account, the Government is prepared to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise so that KMB can continue to operate its existing bus network.

operation; and

2. to respond to public complaints and enquiries more expeditiously.

屯門區議會  
新界屯門屯喜路一號  
屯門政府合署二樓



TUEN MUN DISTRICT COUNCIL  
2/F, TUEN MUN GOVERNMENT OFFICES,  
1 TUEN HI ROAD,  
TUEN MUN, N.T.

本處檔號 Our Ref.: HAD TM DC 13/10/TTC/16

CB(4)1228/15-16(01)

來函檔號 Your Ref.:

電話 Tel.: 2451 3054

傳真 Fax.: 2451 1598

傳真文件 (共7頁)

(傳真: 2845 2444)

香港中區  
立法會道 1 號  
立法會綜合大樓  
立法會秘書處  
立法會秘書長  
陳維安先生

陳先生:


**檢討巴士載客量與企位的準則**  
**(屯門區議會交通及運輸委員會文件2016年第28號)**

屯門區議會轄下交通及運輸委員會（下稱「委員會」）於本年5月13日的會議上，曾就上述議題進行討論。

委員表達的意見主要包括：(i) 希望政府跟隨國際標準，禁止駛經高速公路的巴士設有企位；(ii) 香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通（車輛構造及保養）規例》有關巴士乘客數目的相關法例已經過時，政府應檢討巴士企位的政策；(iii) 查詢政府容許設立巴士企位的理據，以及如何保障站立而沒有佩帶安全帶的乘客於高速公路上的安全；以及(iv) 關注當發生嚴重交通意外時，站在車門附近的乘客有機會因而被拋出車外，建議政府逐步減少企位。

經討論後，委員會認為有關事宜涉及修訂法例，故議決去信立法會和負責運輸政策的運輸及房屋局，以反映委員會的意見。

隨函夾附有關議題的討論文件及委員會 5 月 13 日的會議記錄（擬稿）摘錄，以供參閱。敬請考慮本委員會的意見，並盼早日賜覆。如有查詢，請與本人（電話：2451 7778）或屯門區議會秘書處魏芷茵女士（電話：2451 3054）聯絡。



屯門區議會

交通及運輸委員會主席蘇炤成

2016 年 6 月 28 日

連附件：

1. 屯門區議會交通及運輸委員會文件 2016 年第 28 號
2. 九龍巴士（一九三三）有限公司及龍運巴士有限公司的書面回應
3. 屯門區議會交通及運輸委員會第三次會議記錄（擬稿）摘錄

## 檢討巴士載客量與企位的準則

### 背景

1. 正如我們早前所提交的討論文件，港鐵為更注重交通運輸和乘客的安全，除輕鐵外，已率先將企位改為每平方米只可站立4人。
2. 可惜在巴士方面，運輸署一直沒有提供有關的企位數量準則。我們只知每架巴士可容納的企位，但不知如何計算。例如九巴的最新型號12.8米長的雙層巴士，總載客量近146人，坐位98，企位為48，只知巴士長度和座位數目，卻無法得知企位密度。
3. 巴士在繁忙時間非常擠迫，乘客往往更被迫站在巴士門邊。究竟是否企位密度太高？
4. 此外，運輸署和巴士公司往往以繁忙時間必須每半小時達100%載客率及一小時內載客率達85%等，來決定增加班次與否。若巴士的企位密度定得太密，跟輕鐵一樣，每平方米計算可企6至7人，那巴士即使非常擠迫，也不致超載和需要加班次。

### 查詢和建議

1. 運輸署和巴士公司以何準則訂定巴士企位人數？是以巴士的載重量為依歸，還是與港鐵的計算法相同？
2. 要求巴士公司的企位密度準則與西鐵、地鐵的準則相同，即每平方米只可企4人。事實，屯門對外長途巴士需行走屯門高速公路，乘客生命安全更容易受威脅而企立空間亦應更寬鬆，不應過份擠迫！
3. 為何邨巴不可設企位，是安全問題？那為何雙層或單層巴士就可設企位，難道就沒有安全問題？是否雙重標準？是否罔顧巴士乘客的人命安全？

文件提交人：

楊智恒 江鳳儀 甄紹南

二零一六年四月二十六日

**附件****屯門區議會****2016-2017 年交通及運輸委員會第三次會議****九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司之回應****有關檢討巴士載客量與企位的準則事宜**

本公司所有購置的巴士，均須通過運輸署的「車輛類型評定測試」，方可獲准投入服務。「車輛類型評定測試」中會根據香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通(車輛構造及保養)規例》，為各巴士型號訂定乘客數目，包括上、下層的座位數目，以及下層的企位數目；本公司會根據「車輛類型評定測試」的結果，以及按照第 374A 章《道路交通(車輛構造及保養)規例》，相應作出巴士車廂內的座位及企位安排。

2016 年 5 月 4 日





龍運巴士有限公司

圖文傳真

致	: 屯門區議會 交通及運輸委員會秘書處	發件人	: 蔡瑩(車務)潘振剛
收件人	: 魏正茵女士	日期	: 5-5-2016
來函檔號	: HAD TMDC 13/10/TTC/16	本函檔號	: 188/GP-F/16
傳真號碼	: 2451 1598	頁數	: 1 (包括此頁)

如未能收到整份文件，請即致電 2708 5676，聯絡 潘小姐。

屯門區議會  
交通及運輸委員會  
有關檢討巴士載客量與企位的準則事宜

謝謝 屯門區議會轉達楊智恒議員、江鳳儀議員及甄紹南議員的提問，就上述事宜表達意見。現回覆如下：

本公司所有購置的巴士，均須通過運輸署的「車輛類型評定測試」，方可獲准投入服務。「車輛類型評定測試」，中會根據香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通(車輛構造及保養)規例》，為各巴士型號訂定乘客數目，包括上、下層的座位數目，以及下層的企位數目；本公司會根據「車輛類型評定測試」的結果，以及按照第 374A 章《道路交通(車輛構造及保養)規例》，相應作出巴士車廂內的座位及企位安排。

最後，再次多謝 屯門區議會轉達楊智恒議員、江鳳儀議員及甄紹南議員寶貴的意見。

龍運巴士有限公司  
經理(車務) 潘振剛謹覆

DC/dc

屯門區議會  
2016-2017 年交通及運輸委員會  
第三次會議記錄（擬稿）摘錄

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日期：2016 年 5 月 13 日（星期五）

時間：上午 9 時 36 分

地點：屯門區議會會議室

**(F) 檢討巴士載客量與企位的準則**

（交通及運輸委員會文件 2016 年第 28 號）

（九巴及龍運的書面回應）

53. 主席表示，九巴及龍運於會前分別提交了書面回應，秘書處已於 5 月 5 日將有關的書面回應分發予各委員。

54. 文件提交人表示，縱使現時巴士車廂擠迫，但按照運輸署計算乘客量的方式（即最繁忙時段半小時的乘客量），很多路線未能符合增加班次的要求。現時巴士下層有 40 多個企位，他查詢署方該數字的計算準則（例如以每平方米站立多少乘客），以及署方會否參考港鐵車廂的準則更改至每平方米 4 人。

55. 委員提出以下意見及查詢：

- (i) 指出過去交委會亦有討論過此議題，亦曾向運輸署署長反映，並表示十分支持此文件。他續指出香港容許駛經高速公路的巴士設有企位其實十分危險，擠迫的車廂亦容易令人誤會發生非禮事件。他衷心希望署方跟隨國際標準，禁止駛經高速公路的巴士設有企位；
- (ii) 指出巴士公司在書面回應中提到，現時巴士企位數目符合香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通（車輛構造及保養）規例》的標準，但實際上相關法例只有限制乘客數目不可超過上限。委員關注計算企位數目的方法及程序，以及署方能否作出調整，例如巴士公司會否提交方案至運輸署，還是署方已有法例指引不同巴士類型可設置的企位數目；
- (iii) 指出交委會已討論此議題多年及認同取消巴士企位的建議。他亦指出有座位的屋邨巴士受居民歡迎，政府應跟隨國際標準，全面禁止巴士設有企位。此外，於 50 及 60 年代未有雙層巴士，而且屯門及元朗區同屬一個巴士網絡，交通服務較少，但現時的情況已經不同，故應取消巴士企位；

- (iv) 表示樂見有委員再提交文件討論此議題。巴士公司書面回應提到的香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通（車輛構造及保養）規例》制定了巴士的乘客數目，但該法例或於幾十年前訂立，可能沒有考慮新界高速公路的因素而未能確保站立乘客的安全。如果當發生並非由於司機駕駛態度引起的意外，擔心保險未能保障乘客；
- (v) 認同有關法例已經過時，署方應檢討巴士企位的政策。新界人口增加故對交通服務的需求上升，但署方沒有增加巴士班次，又沒有增加屋邨巴士牌照回應市民需要；
- (vi) 查詢署方容許巴士企位的理據，以及如何保障站立而且沒有佩帶安全帶的乘客於高速公路的安全；以及
- (vii) 指出坐位乘客需要佩帶安全帶，企位乘客反而沒有佩帶安全帶，只靠緊握扶手。巴士於高速公路行走，當發生嚴重交通意外時，站在車門附近的乘客有機會因而被拋出車外，建議署方逐步減少企位。

56. 主席表示，他支持文件提出的建議，但有關事宜涉及修訂法例，建議去信立法會跟進。

57. 有委員認為應一併去信制定運輸政策的運房局。有委員認同去信運房局比運輸署合適。另有委員表示，因應居民於交通工具上需要更多空間，政府應檢討有關法例，支持去信立法會及運房局。

58. 有委員表示，建議去信的內容應包括：(a) 屯門公路是一條高速公路，故不應容許巴士設有企位；以及(b) 巴士載客量的計算方式與港鐵不同，應修訂法例以減低企位數目。此舉更可使巴士的載客量上升，增加提升班次的機會。

59. 主席總結表示，交委會議決去信立法會及運房局，要求修訂法例以取消巴士企位。

秘書處



**TUEN MUN DISTRICT COUNCIL**  
2/F, TUEN MUN GOVERNMENT OFFICES,  
1 TUEN HI ROAD,  
TUEN MUN, N.T.

*Our Ref:* HAD TM DC 13/10/TTC/16

*Your Ref:*

CB(4)1228/15-16(01)

*Tel.:*

2451 3054

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2451 1598

*Fax Document (7 pages in total)*

*(Fax: 2845 2444)*

Mr. Kenneth CHEN Wei-on  
Secretary General of the Legislative Council  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong

Dear Mr. Chen,

**Criteria for reviewing carrying and standing capacity of buses**

**(Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council - Paper No. 28/2016)**

Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") discussed the above topic at its meeting held on 13 May this year.

The opinions expressed by the members mainly include: (i) it was hoped that the Government would follow the international standards by prohibiting the setup of places for standees on buses travelling on highways; (ii) given the obsolete legislation associated with the number of bus passengers under the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A of the Laws of Hong Kong), the Government should conduct a review on the policy on the standing capacity of buses; (iii) enquiries were raised about the rationale for the Government's permission for standees on buses, as well as the ways to ensure the safety of standing passengers without seat belts on highways; and (iv) the members were concerned that passengers standing near the doors might possibly be thrown out of buses in the event of a serious traffic accident, and thus recommended the Government to gradually reduce the standing capacity of buses.

After discussion, the Committee considered that relevant matters might involve amendments to legislation. Therefore, the Committee resolved to write to the Legislative Council and the Transport and Housing Bureau, the authority in charge of transport policy, so as to reflect the views of the Committee.

A copy of discussion papers on the subject matter and an extract from the minutes of the Committee's meeting held on 13 May (draft) are enclosed for your reference. It is hoped that the opinions from the Committee would be taken into consideration, and we are looking forward to your reply at your earliest convenience. For enquiries, please contact me (Tel: 2451 7778) or Ms. NGAI Tsz-yan from Tuen Mun District Council Secretariat (Tel: 2451 3054).

*[signed]*

Chairman of Traffic and Transport  
Committee of Tuen Mun District Council  
SO Shiu-shing

28 June 2016

Attachments:

1. Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council - Paper No. 28/2016
2. Written responses from the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited and Long Win Bus Company Limited
3. Extract from the minutes of the third meeting of Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council (draft)

## **Criteria for reviewing carrying and standing capacity of buses**

### **Background**

1. As stated in the discussion papers submitted earlier, the MTR has attached greater importance to traffic and passenger safety. Except for the LRT, it takes the lead to adopt the standard of accommodating four standing passengers per square metre.
2. Nevertheless, it is a pity that the Transport Department has been failing to provide the relevant standards on standing capacity of buses. We only know the number of standing passenger that each bus can accommodate, but have no idea about how it is calculated. Taking KMB's latest 12.8-metre double-decker model, with a total passenger capacity of nearly 146 (98 seats along with places for 48 standees), as an example, we only get informed of the length and seating capacity of each bus, but know nothing about the density of standees.
3. Buses are very crowded during peak hours and passengers are often forced to stand near the doors. Is the density of standees too high?
4. In addition, the Transport Department and bus companies often decide to increase the frequency of bus services solely on the ground that the occupancy rates of such routes have met the relevant standard, i.e. 100% during the busiest half-hour of peak periods and 85% during that one hour. If the permissible density of standees is set too high, and a density of 6 to 7 standing passengers per square metre, just like the case of LRT, remains acceptable, there would not be any overloading case, nor is there any need to improve the frequency of bus services, even if the buses are very crowded.

### **Enquiries and suggestions**

1. What criteria do the Transport Department and bus companies apply in setting the number of standees on buses? Are these numbers based on the loading capacity of buses or calculated on the same basis adopted by the MTR?
2. We request the bus companies to set the permissible density of standees based on the criteria applied by the West Rail and the MTR, i.e. accommodating four standing passengers per square metre. Indeed, long-haul bus routes running from Tuen Mun are required to go through Tuen Mun Road, which makes passengers on board more vulnerable to life-threatening threats. Moreover, the places for standees should be more spacious and not be too crowded!
3. Why is no standee permitted on residents' coaches? Is it associated with safety issue? Then why is standee allowed on a double-decker or single-decker bus? Can we say that no safety concern is involved? Is there any double standard? Do the Transport Department and bus companies disregard the personal safety of bus passengers?

#### **Presenters:**

**YEUNG Chi-hang   KONG Fung-yi   YAN Siu-nam**

26 April 2016

**Annex**

**Tuen Mun District Council**

**The third meeting of Traffic and Transport Committee in 2016-2017**

**Response from the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

**Matters related to criteria for reviewing carrying and standing capacity of buses**

All buses purchased by the Company must pass the "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" of the Transport Department before being put into service. The "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" will, based on the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A of the Laws of Hong Kong), set the number of passengers for each bus model, including the number of seats on the upper and lower decks, as well as the number of standees on the lower deck; the Company will make corresponding arrangements in terms of number of seats and standees in bus compartments, based on the results of the "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" and in accordance with the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A).

4 May 2016



## Long Win Bus Company Limited

Fax

To:	Secretariat of Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council	From:	POON Chun-kong Assistant Manager (Bus operation)
Recipient:	Ms. NGAI Tsz-yan	Date:	5-5-2016
Your Ref.:	HAD TMDC13/10/TTC/16	Our Ref.:	188/OP-F/16
Fax number:	2451 1598	Number of page(s)	1 (including this page)

If you cannot receive the entire document, please contact Miss Poon immediately at 2708 5676.

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**Traffic and Transport Committee of Tuen Mun District Council**  
**Matters related to criteria for reviewing carrying and standing capacity of buses**

I would like to thank Tuen Mun District Council for conveying the questions and views raised by district councilors Mr. YEUNG Chi-hang, Ms. KONG Fung-yi and Mr. YAN Siu-nam on the above matters. Our replies are as follows:

All buses purchased by the Company must pass the "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" of the Transport Department before being put into service. The "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" will, based on the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A of the Laws of Hong Kong), set the number of passengers for each bus model, including the number of seats on the upper and lower decks, as well as the number of standees on the lower deck; the Company will make corresponding arrangements in terms of number of seats and standees in bus compartments, based on the results of the "Vehicle Type Approval and Examination" and in accordance with the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A).

Finally, I would like to thank Tuen Mun District Council once again for conveying the valuable opinions from district councilors Mr. YEUNG Chi-hang, Ms. KONG Fung-yi and Mr. YAN Siu-nam.

Long Win Bus Company Limited  
Assistant Manager (Bus operation)  
POON Chun-kong

DC/dc



Tuen Mun District Council  
Extract from the minutes of the third meeting of  
Traffic and Transport Committee (TTC) in 2016-2017 (draft)

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Date: 13 May 2016 (Friday)

Time: 9:36 a.m.

Venue: Tuen Mun District Council Conference Room

**(F) Criteria for reviewing carrying and standing capacity of buses**  
**(Traffic and Transport Committee - Paper No. 28/2016)**  
**(Written responses from KMB and LWB)**

53. The Chairman stated that KMB and LWB had separately submitted written responses before the meeting. The Secretariat had distributed the relevant written responses to all members on 5 May.

54. Presenters stated that even though the bus compartments were crowded nowadays, many routes failed to meet the requirements for frequency improvement, according to the Transport Department's means of calculating bus patronage (i.e. occupancy rates during the busiest half-hour of peak periods). At present, there were places for more than 40 standees on the lower deck of buses. He asked the Department about the calculation basis for such number (for example, how many standees should be accommodated per square metre), and whether the Department would make reference to the standard of accommodating four standees per square metre adopted by the MTR.

55. Members raised the following views and enquiries:

- (i) One of the members pointed out that this issue had also been discussed by the TTC previously and reflected to the Commissioner for Transport, and he expressed his strong support for this document. He continued to state that it was very dangerous for allowing standees on buses travelling on highways in Hong Kong, and misreported indecent assault cases might easily take place in congested compartments. He sincerely hoped that the Department would follow the international standard by abolishing places for standees on buses travelling on highways;
- (ii) One of the members pointed out that the bus companies had mentioned in their written responses that the current standing capacity was in compliance with the standards of the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A of the Laws of Hong Kong). However, in fact, the relevant legislation merely restricted that the number of passengers could not exceed the upper limit. Members were concerned about the methods and procedures for calculating the standing capacity, and whether the Department could make any adjustment. For example, whether the bus companies would submit proposals to the Transport Department, or whether the Department had set up guidelines in respect of the permissible standing capacity of different bus types;
- (iii) One of the members pointed out that the TTC had discussed this issue for many years, and concurred with the recommendation of abolishing places for bus standees. He also pointed out that no-standee residents' coaches were well-received by the community, and the Government should follow the international standard by entirely abolishing places for bus standees. In addition, there were no double-decker buses in the 1950s and 1960s, and Tuen Mun and Yuen Long Districts were affiliated to the same bus network with insufficient transportation services. However, since the current situation was different, places for bus standees should be abolished;

- (iv) It was happy to see that some members had submitted further documents for the discussion of this issue. The bus companies had mentioned in their written responses that the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A of the Laws of Hong Kong) regulated the number of bus passengers. Nevertheless, the said legislation was enacted several decades ago, and might not be able to give full consideration to the safety of standing passengers travelling on highways in the New Territories. If there was any accident not induced by drivers' driving attitude, it was worried that the insurance coverage could not protect the passengers;\
  - (v) It was recognized that relevant legislation was obsolete, and the Department should conduct a review on the policy on the standing capacity of buses. Despite the increasing demand in transportation services induced by population growth in the New Territories, the Department had neither improved the frequency of bus services nor increased the number of licences of residents' coach service to meet the needs of the public;
  - (vi) Enquiries were raised about the rationale for the Department's permission for standees on buses and the ways to ensure the safety of standing passengers without seat belts on highways; and
  - (vii) It was pointed out that seated passengers were required to wear seat belts, but on the contrary, standing passengers were not provided with seat belts and could only rely on handrails. Whenever a serious traffic accident occurred on highways, passengers standing near the doors might possibly be thrown out of the buses. Hence, it was recommended that the Department should gradually reduce the standing capacity of buses.
56. The Chairman stated that he supported the recommendations put forward by the document. However, relevant matters might involve amendments to legislation and he advised to write to the Legislative Council for follow up.
57. Some members considered that the Committee should also write to the Transport and Housing Bureau, the authority in charge of transport policy. Some members agreed that it would be more appropriate to write to the Transport and Housing Bureau, rather than the Transport Department. There were also members stating that given residents' demands for extra room in public transport vehicles, the Government should conduct a review on relevant legislation, and therefore they supported the decision to write to the Legislative Council and the Transport and Housing Bureau.
58. Some members stated that the proposed letters should include the following particulars: (a) since Tuen Mun Road was a highway, places for standees should not be set up for buses travelling thereon; and (b) as the calculation basis of passenger capacity of buses was different from that of the MTR, the Government should introduce legislative amendments to reduce the number of standees. This would increase the occupancy rates of buses and enhance the likelihood of improvement in service frequency.
59. The Chairman concluded that the TTC resolved to write to the Legislative Council and the Transport and Housing Bureau for requesting legislative amendments to abolish the places for bus standees. Secretariat

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**工聯會**

陳婉嫻

Chan Yuen Han

黃國健

Wong Kwok Kin

王國興

Wong Kwok Hing

麥美娟

Mak Mei Kuen

鄧家彪

Tang Ka Piu

郭偉強

Kwok Wai Keung

CB(4)1045/15-16(01)

**立法會議員聯合辦事處**

Joint Office of the HKFTU's Legislative Councillors

香港特別行政區

立法會交通事務委員會主席

田北辰議員, EBS, JP

(經立法會交通事務委員會秘書劉素儀女士轉交)

田主席：

**要求討論保障專營巴士車長安全事宜**

近期接連出現專營巴士車長在工作期間被乘客襲擊的案件，令人擔心社會出現襲擊前線人員的風氣。事實上，政府當局和專營巴士公司均有責任保障車長的安全，但近日接二連三發生巴士車長遇襲的事件，正反映現時對巴士車長安全的保障有不足之處。

保障巴士車長在一個安全的環境下工作甚為重要。因此，本人要求委員會盡快討論有關保障專營巴士車長安全的事宜，要求當局交代過去兩年車長被乘客辱罵及毆打的個案數字、就相關罪行的檢控和定罪情況為何、會否考慮對相關法例和其罰則進行檢討、以及確保巴士車長安全的宣傳教育工作為何，有勞安排，不勝感激。如有查詢，煩請致電 2537-9618 聯絡本人助理姚先生。

順祝

鈞安

立法會議員

鄧家彪

2016年05月19日



[Translation]

**Request to discuss the protection of bus captains' safety**

There have been numerous incidents recently whereby bus captains of franchised bus companies, whilst on working duty, have been subject to the assault of passengers. It is worrying that a culture has developed for people to attack frontline staff. As a matter of fact, the Government and franchised bus companies both have a duty to protect the safety of bus captains, but the series of incidents that have occurred recently show that such protection measures are insufficient.

It is crucial to protect the working environment of bus captains. As such, I request that the Panel on Transport discuss the issue of protecting the safety of bus captains as soon as possible, and request that the Panel on Transport provide statistics and record of all incidents in the past 2 years where the bus captains have been insulted or assaulted by passengers. I request information to be provided on whether these cases have been prosecuted, why or why not, what the resulting offence is, whether there are proposals to revise the current legal mechanism for dealing with such matters, and what measures have been taken to promote education of the safety of bus captains. Thank you for your help, I am most grateful. If you have further questions, please call 25379618 to contact my assistant Mr. Yau (transliteration).

TANG Ka Piu

Legislative Council Member

19 May 2016

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局  
運輸科

香港添馬添美道2號  
政府總部東翼



TRANSPORT AND HOUSING BUREAU  
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT  
TRANSPORT BRANCH

East Wing, Central Government Offices,  
2 Tim Mei Avenue,  
Tamar, Hong Kong

本局檔號 OUR REF.:

來函檔號 YOUR REF.: CB4/PL/TP

電話 Tel. No.: 3509 8155

傳真 Fax No.: 2104 7274

14 July 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
( Attn.: Ms Sophie Lau )

[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Personal Safety of Franchised Bus Captains at Work**

Thank you for your letter of 27 May 2016, enclosing with it the views of Hon Tang Ka-piu on the personal safety of franchised bus captains at work.

We note that there were cases of franchised bus captains being assaulted whilst on duty recently. The Government attaches great importance to all cases of violence. Assaulting another person is a criminal offence. Irrespective of the location at which an assault takes place and the parties involved, the Government strongly condemns and will not tolerate such acts. The law enforcement agencies will take enforcement action to maintain law and order. In case of a bus captain being assaulted, the law enforcement agencies will consider taking out prosecution against the suspect(s) having regard to the facts of the case. The offender may be sentenced to imprisonment upon conviction. In addition, to ensure safe driving and smooth delivery of service, the conduct of bus passengers is also regulated by law. The Security Bureau advises that the Police will launch investigations into all incidents involving assault and take follow-up actions appropriately, regardless of the victim's

occupation or background. The Police do not maintain figures on cases of assault on bus captains, nor do they keep the respective prosecution and conviction statistics.

On the other hand, employers have the responsibility to provide a safe working environment for their employees. In particular, franchised bus companies should step up protection of their bus captains who interact closely with members of the public and passengers on a daily basis. The franchised bus companies have already been assisting their frontline staff through measures such as provision of training for bus captains and bus regulators on customer handling skills, stepping up publicity and education using the on-board announcement systems, etc. Moreover, the franchised bus companies have started to install closed circuit television (“CCTV”) systems at bus termini and inside bus compartments to monitor service operation and the situation inside bus compartments. If necessary, the companies will assist in investigation by offering witness statements and CCTV footage to the Police, and provide assistance on the legal side to their frontline staff.

The Transport Department will continue to monitor the working environment of franchised bus captains. The Department will also impress upon the franchised bus companies that it should take appropriate and effective measures to assist frontline staff so as to enhance the personal safety of bus captains at work.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )

*for* Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.:

Secretary for Security	( Attn.: Mr Michael Yeung )
Commissioner for Transport	( Attn.: Miss Rachel Kwan )
Commissioner of Police	( Attn.: Mr Michael Yip )

## Press Releases

LCQ12: Maintenance and repair of franchised buses  
\*\*\*\*\*

Following is a question by the Hon Chan Han-pan and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Mr Frank Chan Fan, in the Legislative Council today (July 12):

Question:

Some members of the public have recently relayed to me that they have often witnessed incidents in which some franchised buses broke down or even caught fire while in service. Regarding breakdown of franchised buses, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether it knows, in each of the past five years, the respective numbers of buses under the fleets of various franchised bus companies (i.e. (i) The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited, (ii) Citybus Limited, (iii) New World First Bus Services Limited, (iv) Long Win Bus Company Limited and (v) New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited) (bus companies), as well as the respective numbers of incidents in which such buses broke down or even caught fire while in service, with a breakdown by years of service of buses (set out in tables of the same format as the table below);

Year:

Bus company	Number of buses	Number of incidents by years of service of buses				Number of incidents
		five years or below	6-10 years	11-15 years	16 years or above	
(i)						
(ii)						
(iii)						
(iv)						
(v)						

(2) whether it knows the details of the regular bus maintenance and repair work carried out by the various bus companies, including the frequencies of and procedures for inspection of various components; whether the Transport Department (TD) has (i) formulated codes or guidelines on the roadworthiness of buses, and (ii) put in place any mechanism to monitor the compliance with such codes or guidelines by the various bus companies; if TD has put in place such mechanism, whether cases of breaches of the codes or guidelines were found in the past five years;

(3) whether bus companies are currently required to report bus breakdown incidents to TD; if so, whether TD has stepped up its monitoring of the bus maintenance and repair work carried out by those bus companies with higher incident rates; and

(4) whether it knows if the various bus companies have put in place any retirement mechanism for their buses; if the bus companies have, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; the latest progress of the bus replacement programmes of the various bus companies, and the number of buses intended to be replaced in the coming five years; the differences between buses of the latest model and buses of older models in terms of safety standards?

Reply:



President,

The Government attaches great importance to the operational safety of franchised buses. Franchised bus companies shall maintain their fleets properly so as to ensure that they operate safely and are in good working conditions. The Transport Department (TD) performs a monitoring role and follows up with the franchised bus companies on matters concerning the maintenance and repair of the bus fleets as and when necessary. My reply to the various parts of the Hon Chan Han-pan's question is as follows:

(1) The average number of breakdown of buses per million vehicle-kilometre under the fleets of individual franchisees over the past five years (2012 to 2016) is set out at Annex. A breakdown refers to an incident (other than a traffic accident) in which passengers have to alight from a bus because its mechanical parts cannot function properly, and that the passengers cannot reach their destination by the same bus. The information is compiled from the monthly statistical reports submitted by the franchised bus companies to TD. Since these reports do not contain the particulars of individual vehicles involved, TD is unable to provide the breakdown statistics by the years of service of the buses. Only about 0.07 per cent of all such incidents caused fire.

(2) to (4) There were a total of 5 916 franchised buses under all franchised bus companies in Hong Kong as at end-2016. According to the Road Traffic Ordinance, all in-service franchised buses are required to pass annual examinations conducted by TD to assure their operational safety and roadworthiness before their vehicle licences are renewed. The annual examination covers items including the performance of the braking system, steering system, suspension system, lighting, seats, glass, compressed air system, emergency exit and the emission of black smoke to ensure that the bus is operationally fit for the carriage of passengers. Apart from the aforesaid annual examinations, all in-service franchised buses also undergo routine inspection conducted by the respective franchised bus companies on a monthly basis. Items covered in the monthly inspections include the braking system, steering system, engine, axle, suspension system, electrical and power systems as well as air-conditioning system of a bus. TD has also drawn up specific requirements, such as replacement frequency and performance level, for the critical parts and components of individual systems (e.g. the braking system and axle) for the franchised bus companies to follow when they carry out maintenance and repair work. Franchised bus companies are also required to submit monthly statistical reports on the number of breakdown of buses to TD for monitoring purpose. Where necessary, TD will request submission of additional records, or direct the franchised bus company concerned to conduct in-depth investigation into individual cases of breakdown, so as to facilitate appropriate follow-up action.

In addition, TD conducts spot checks on in-service franchised buses and the relevant maintenance records to monitor the quality of bus maintenance and repair. On average, TD conducts spot checks on 14 franchised buses each working day (totalling around 3 400 buses a year). TD may adjust the number of spot checks for buses of individual franchised bus companies having regard to factors such as the fleet size, number of breakdown cases and results of previous spot checks of the company concerned. If a spot check reveals any problem with individual buses, TD will request the franchised bus company concerned to take immediate action and properly repair the bus concerned before putting it into service again. In case any serious mechanical problem is found during a spot check, TD may institute prosecution pursuant to the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations. Offenders shall be liable to a maximum penalty of a fine of \$10,000 or imprisonment for six months. Records show that there were 12 such successful convictions in the past five years (2012 to 2016).

These cases involved malfunctioning of the braking system, defective tyres, and failure of the suspension system.

Meanwhile, TD reviews the outcome of bus examination and the quality of maintenance work in regular meetings with franchised bus companies. It also takes follow-up actions to enhance bus safety where appropriate. Overall speaking, TD is satisfied with the existing maintenance and repair work carried out by the franchised bus companies for their fleets.

As regards the retirement arrangement of buses, a franchised bus at present shall retire from service before its age reaches 18 years old. The bus replacement cycle for franchised bus companies is in its peak in recent years (i.e. from 2014 to 2017), with a total of more than 2 650 buses being replaced within this period. Among them, the Long Win Bus Company Limited (LW) and Citybus Limited (Franchise for the Airport and North Lantau Bus Network) are pursuing a major replacement programme, under which these two franchisees are replacing about 30 per cent and about 75 per cent of their respective fleets. In the coming five years (i.e. from 2018 to 2022), the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited, Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network), New World First Bus Services Limited, LW and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited (NLB) are planning to replace 1 225, 19, 118, three and 35 buses respectively.

On the safety standard of buses, all franchised buses have to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that their design and construction comply with the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations. The buses shall also pass a pre-registration examination before they can run on the road to ensure operational safety. In general, the new buses procured by the franchised bus companies nowadays come with a host of safety features, such as tachograph (commonly known as "blackbox"), speed limiter, break-glass hammer, fire barrier for the engine compartment and automatic fire alarms, as well as the use of fire-retardant materials for components (such as seats) inside the bus compartments. Where appropriate, franchised bus companies also plan to gradually introduce automatic fire suppression system, which can extinguish small fire in the engine compartment or contain the spread of fire therein, so as to further enhance the operational safety.

It is noteworthy that apart from upgrading the safety features, franchised bus operators have also been enhancing the facilities inside bus compartment and the environmental performance of their fleets in keeping with the times. For instance, with the gradual replacement of buses by each operator, all EURO I buses were phased out last year while all EURO II buses are expected to retire by 2019. Meanwhile, except for some NLB buses which are constrained by topographical conditions of their routes, the buses of all franchised buses will be low-floor models by the end of this year for the convenience of passengers with impaired mobility and wheelchair passengers. Some new buses procured by individual operators recently also come with charging facilities for mobile electronic devices and free Wi-Fi access, with a view to providing better services to passengers.

Ends/Wednesday, July 12, 2017  
Issued at HKT 14:30

NNNN

**Number of breakdown of buses of individual franchisees  
in the past five years**

Franchise	Number of franchised buses as at December 31, 2016	Average number of breakdown of buses per million vehicle-kilometre				
		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
KMB	3 916	21.1	22.4	22.3	21.2	17.4
CTB(F1)	767	44.2	43.9	41.3	37.1	31.6
CTB(F2)	179	21.9	23.2	19.9	18.9	21.3
NWFB	691	57.0	58.4	59.1	55.2	52.6
LW	242	17.7	18.4	21.4	19.7	20.8
NLB	121	11.1	9.1	10.1	8.2	12.6

Note: A breakdown refers to an incident (other than a traffic accident) in which passengers have to alight from a bus because its mechanical parts cannot function properly, and that the passengers cannot reach their destination by the same bus. Different franchises have different operating areas and routeings. Generally speaking, the overall performance of buses will be affected if the bus routes travel on roads with more uneven terrain or uphill/downhill sections.

- KMB - The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited
- CTB(F1) - Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network)
- CTB(F2) - Citybus Limited (Franchise for the Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)
- NWFB - New World First Bus Services Limited
- LW - Long Win Bus Company Limited
- NLB - New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited



## **1. Introduction**

1.1 In September 2014, the Government announced the Railway Development Strategy 2014 ("RDS-2014") which reaffirms the policy of using railway as the backbone of the public transport system and maps out the development and planning blueprint of the heavy rail network up to 2031. Seven new railway projects<sup>1</sup> are scheduled to be completed by 2031 with an estimated cost of HK\$110 billion.

1.2 In parallel with planned development of the heavy rail network, the Government considers it necessary to carry out a systematic review on the overall strategic arrangements of the public transport system. To this end, the Government conducts the Public Transport Strategy Study ("PTSS") which examines the respective roles and positioning of public transport services other than heavy rail to enhance their development. The PTSS also looks into some important topical issues of the public transport sectors in detail, as well as examining how to enhance the complementarity amongst the various public transport services.<sup>2</sup> This is to ensure that the public can enjoy efficient services with reasonable modal choices, and that the public transport operators can enjoy sustainability within their respective niche area.

1.3 An important aspect of PTSS is to examine the ways of promoting franchised bus route rationalisation for enhancing network efficiency, and, having regard to the implications for other public transport services, to explore whether it is feasible and desirable for franchised buses to attract more passengers by introducing different types of new services such as point-to-point

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<sup>1</sup> The seven new railway projects are the Northern Link & Kwu Tung Station, Tuen Mun South Extension, East Kowloon Line, Tung Chung West Extension, Hung Shui Kiu Station, South Island Line (West) and North Island Line. Upon the completion of the seven construction projects, Hong Kong's railway network will lengthen from 270 km in 2021 to over 300 km by 2031. The number of stations will increase from 99 to 114 as well.

<sup>2</sup> The public transport services studied cover franchised buses, public light buses, taxis, non-franchised buses, light rail, trams and ferries.

express routes and seat-only service, and to explore whether it is feasible and desirable to install real-time bus arrival information systems for service improvement.

1.4 As part of PTSS, franchised bus services will be discussed at the meeting of the Panel on Transport to be held on 9 February 2015. In order to facilitate the discussion, the Research Office has prepared this information note on the operation of franchised bus services in Seoul and Singapore. Seoul is selected because it is recognised as a successful case study of enhancing franchised bus services through implementing traffic management measures such as bus route rationalisation and improvement of transport infrastructure facilities and management systems. Singapore is chosen because it has implemented a number of measures to enhance bus services and network efficiency, including bus route rationalisation and installation of more integrated transport hubs.

## **2. Seoul**

2.1 The Seoul Metropolitan Government overhauled its bus transport system in 2004. At that time, bus services were not popular with travelling public due to infrequent services and long/circuitous route. Also contributed was increased private car ownership amid increasing affluence of local people. Faced with worsening problems of traffic congestion and air pollution, the Seoul Metropolitan Government decided to carry out a comprehensive reform of its bus services in 2004 after a series of public transport management and planning studies. The strategy comprised three essential elements, namely (a) bus route rationalisation, (b) improvement of transport infrastructure facilities and management systems, and (c) introduction of distance-based fare charging system. Based on the 2004 reform, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has introduced further transport enhancement measures in the ensuing years to improve the bus services.

### Bus route rationalisation

2.2 Prior to the 2004 reform, many bus routes in Seoul were either too long or circuitous resulting in excessive travelling time and traffic congestion. In addition, there were a number of overlapping bus routes which reduced the

operating efficiency of the transport network and added to the problems of traffic congestion and air pollution. Against this, the Seoul Metropolitan Government commissioned a consultant to undertake a large-scale study and then consulted the academics, district representatives and the public on the findings and recommendations of the consultancy study. An entire redesign of the city's bus route network ensued in an effort to better structure and integrate more than 400 different bus routes.

2.3 Under the new design, bus services are grouped into four types and colour-coded to make them easily distinguishable. Blue buses are long-distance express buses connecting outlying suburbs with each other and with the city centre. Red buses are long-distance express buses connecting the satellite cities with the city centre. Green buses travel around the metropolitan area to provide connecting services to subway stations. Yellow buses circle downtown area and stop at stations for blue buses and major railway stations, as well as business, tourist and shopping areas. The above arrangement serves to reduce overlapping bus routes, thereby enhancing bus operation efficiency and reducing travel time<sup>3</sup>.

## Improvement of transport infrastructure facilities and management systems

### *Enhancement of transit interchanges*

2.4 The provision of more transit interchanges was set out in the 2004 bus reform as one of the main measures for achieving more efficient use of bus resources, relieving congestion and reducing the need for long-haul point-to-point bus routes. The Seoul Metropolitan Government has invested in improving the transit interchanges and hubs to facilitate smooth and safe transfers not only between bus services but also across modes.

2.5 Seoul's transit interchanges now have air conditioning and are co-located with retail and commercial developments. This enables commuters to transfer in a comfortable and seamless manner and makes it convenient for them to shop when they interchange between public transport modes. Bicycle racks are also available to commuters who ride their bikes back home.

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<sup>3</sup> In a further effort to improve the quality of the bus fleet, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has financed the purchase of (a) low-floor buses running on compressed natural gas to cut down on air pollution and to reinforce the services for the handicapped, and (b) articulating buses to increase the carrying capacity per ride.

### *Introduction of median exclusive bus lanes*

2.6 Before the 2004 bus reform, the Seoul Metropolitan Government had already introduced roadside bus-only lanes to speed up public transport that would be otherwise held up by traffic congestion. However, roadside bus-only lane could not function properly due to illegal parking and stopping, as well as conflicts with vehicles entering and exiting the side streets. In response, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has included the introduction of median exclusive bus lanes as part of its 2004 reform package to improve the speed, punctuality and operation efficiency of bus services.

2.7 In Seoul, exclusive bus lanes have been constructed in the centre of a busy street as red colour polymer concrete pavements. The median exclusive bus lane locations are selected by taking into account the number of lanes, degree of overlapping with subway lines, concentration of traffic demands, inflow and outflow of traffic volume, and bus traffic volume per hour. Particularly, median exclusive bus lanes are installed where more than three lanes in each direction are available with hectic traffic demand so as to connect Seoul with surrounding cities.

### *Establishment of the Bus Management System*

2.8 To coordinate bus services on a comprehensive and system-wide basis, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has established a new Bus Management System ("BMS") using advanced intelligent transport system technology. Global positioning system ("GPS") terminals installed in every bus allow a central bus control centre to monitor all bus locations and speeds, adjust the number of buses travelling on any given route, communicate with bus drivers, and provide real-time information to passengers waiting at bus stops or checking bus schedules on the Internet.

2.9 The new BMS facilitates the provision of more dependable, on-time bus service and better, real-time information for passengers. It also helps optimize service distribution by adjusting bus assignments and scheduling to conform better to the different travel demands on different parts of the extensive bus network. For example, extra buses are able to be put into

service during peak hours for popular transit routes in order to reduce crowding and shorten waiting time.

#### *Launch of the Transportation Operation and Information Service system*

2.10 The Seoul Metropolitan Government has launched the Transportation Operation and Information Service ("TOPIS") system to monitor real-time traffic conditions of arterial roads and intersections. In particular, the TOPIS system collects information from GPS, wireless communications and terminals installed in buses to help coordinate the bus routes and manage ridership effectively. Specifically, it co-ordinates traffic volume, bus routes and traffic bottleneck areas, as well as providing real-time information to passengers, drivers, bus companies and other related organizations. The TOPIS system lets passengers waiting at bus stops know when to expect the next bus based on real-time positioning of buses and traffic flow on the roads. In addition, based on real-time information on how buses are running, the TOPIS system efficiently manages the interval between buses and takes timely action in case of an accident.

#### *Implementation of the Bus Signal Priority system*

2.11 The Bus Signal Priority ("BSP") system, which has been deployed in many cities around the world, is a traffic signal enhancement strategy. The strategy facilitates efficient movement of buses through signalized intersections which allows an approaching bus to have priority on using the limited intersection capacity over other vehicles entering the intersection. The Seoul Metropolitan Government has implemented the BSP system to permit the optimization of traffic signals to speed up buses.

#### Introduction of distance-based fare charging system

2.12 Transfers between modes generally attract separate fares for each mode. The Seoul Metropolitan Government has introduced a unified fare structure that integrates both bus and rail services. The entire trip is calculated as one fare and all fares are calculated based on the distance travelled. A multi-purpose, stored value smart card system (called "T-Money") has been introduced to facilitate this inter-modal ridership.



2.13 Upon the introduction of distance-based fare charging system, the commuters are found to pay about 30% less on average for using public transportation service. Even if a passenger travels a long distance with multiple transfers, the system is designed to charge less than the old way of charging per each ride.

### Benefits of the franchised bus service reform

2.14 The bus reform introduced in 2004, coupled with the subsequent enhancement measures, has helped improve the operation of bus services in a number of areas, including:

- (a) increasing bus speed from 11 km per hour to 22 km per hour;
- (b) boosting the number of bus passengers by six times;
- (c) enhancing the reliability of bus services by five times; and
- (d) improving the punctuality of bus services, attributable to increased speed in the median exclusive bus lanes and scientific bus management with the use of the TOPIS system.<sup>4</sup>

## **3. Singapore**

3.1 In Singapore, the franchised bus services<sup>5</sup> are intended to complement the mass rapid transit ("MRT") system and bring commuters closer to their destination. The Land Transport Authority ("LTA"), being a central bus network planner, aims to put in place an efficient, integrated and sustainable bus system which focuses on improving journey quality for commuters, thereby reducing reliance on private transport that causes the problems of traffic congestion and pollution.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Source: UN-Habitat (2013).

<sup>5</sup> Franchised bus services are operated by two private companies, namely the SBS Transit Ltd and the SMRT Buses Ltd.

<sup>6</sup> LTA works with the Public Transport Council ("PTC") and the latter is an independent body established in 1987 to monitor the quality and affordability of bus services. Together, they have established the Quality of Service Standard that all public bus operators must abide by.

3.2 Over the years, Singapore has implemented a comprehensive package of public transport measures to enhance bus services and network efficiency, featuring (a) bus route rationalisation, (b) provision of government funding for purchasing more buses to improve service frequency, reliability and comfort levels, (c) installation of more integrated transport hubs and bus hubs, (d) implementation of bus priority measures and (e) offer of real-time bus information for commuters.

#### Bus route restructuring

3.3 To provide quality bus services and enhance network efficiency, LTA took over the role of bus planning from the operators in 2010 and published the Bus Route Master Plan for public consultation. The Master Plan mapped out detailed bus routes, service specifications and infrastructure facilities for the bus network over the next three to five years. Under the Master Plan, LTA adopted three key principles for the planning of the bus routes:

- (a) improving journey quality, including greater transfer convenience, better service reliability and where possible, shorter journey times;
- (b) having better integration between bus and rail, with buses feeding the MRT network directly and quickly for a more effective hub-and-spoke model; and
- (c) maintaining the overall financial viability of the bus system.

3.4 During the public consultation exercise, LTA met with communities across the country to collect their views on how to improve the efficiency of the bus network. One common feedback was that services covering long distances were unreliable. LTA proposed to split a long bus route into two shorter complementary routes, notwithstanding the trade-off of requiring commuters who used it for longer inter-town travel to make a transfer. As a remedial measure, LTA suggested the installation of more user-friendly transit interchanges. After seeking the approval from PTC, LTA went ahead with the proposal and phased in the changes to the bus routes progressively starting from end-2010 to allow more time for commuters and bus operators to adjust.

### *Provision of more choices for bus users*

3.5 In recent years, LTA has allowed bus operators the flexibility of making use of service and fare differentiation to cater for the needs of diverse commuter segment. A case in point is the introduction of premium bus service scheme for commuters who are prepared to pay a higher fare for having better bus service, e.g. a more direct journey with a more comfortable ride and guaranteed seats. The provision of premium bus services is positioned to bridge the gap between personalised services (i.e. cars and taxis) and basic bus/rail services. To encourage greater market participation and innovation by private bus operators, there are minimal regulations in bus routes, fares and service frequency for such premium bus services. Another example is the launch of the more expensive Fast Forward bus services with fewer stops and flexible routing to avoid traffic congestion. Commuters travelling on Fast Forward buses can save up to 20% in travel time during the morning and evening peak hours.

### Implementation of the Bus Services Enhancement Programme

3.6 Under the *Land Transport Master Plan 2013*, LTA plans to increase the length of the rail network by 55% from 178 km in 2012 to the targeted length of 278 km in ten years' time. As new rail lines take time to build, LTA launched the Bus Service Enhancement Programme ("BSEP") in 2012 to address commuters' concerns, particularly bus crowding and frequency. Under BSEP, a total of S\$1.1 billion (HK\$6.7 billion) has been earmarked for purchasing 1 000 new buses and introducing 80 new bus route services between 2012 and 2017 to enhance connectivity and improve bus service levels.

3.7 The first phase of BSEP, comprising the purchase of 550 new buses and the offer of 40 new bus route services, was completed at end-2014. The second and final phase will involve purchasing 450 more buses during 2015-2017, and increasing available resources for an additional 40 expanded bus route services.<sup>7</sup> Upon the full implementation of BSEP by 2017 and with new purchase made by private bus operators, the total capacity of the bus system will increase by about 35%, or about 1 400 buses, in five years.

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<sup>7</sup> Most of these new bus routes will be feeder or short trunk services to serve new areas of developments such as Sengkang and Punggol.

3.8 Under BSEP, the public bus operators are required to improve bus frequencies, especially during peak periods. It is stipulated that 90% of all bus services must operate within 10-12 minute intervals. In particular, more feeder bus services are required to run at scheduled intervals of 10 minutes or less.

#### Installation of more integrated transport hubs and bus hubs

3.9 LTA is committed to providing more and better connections for commuters by installing more integrated transport hubs where air-conditioned bus interchanges and rail stations are co-located with retail and commercial activities. The provision of integrated transport hubs allows transfers to be done more comfortably and provide added convenience as commuters can do some shopping before transferring to their connecting MRT or bus. All bus interchanges are barrier-free and have wheelchair-accessible facilities.

3.10 Seven integrated transport hubs are currently built, which are located at Bedok<sup>8</sup>, Boon Lay, Ang Mo Kio, Clementi, Sengkang, Serangoon and Toa Payoh. Six more will be provided at Bukit Panjang, Hougang, Joo Koon, Jurong East, Marina South and Yishun in tandem with re-development in the respective areas over the next 10 years.

3.11 In addition, LTA has developed bus hubs to create more waiting and boarding space for commuter comfort and reduce the average time each bus needs to dwell at the bus stops. These bus hubs are installed with real-time bus arrival/departure information panels to help passengers better manage their travel time.

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<sup>8</sup> The Bedok Integrated Transport Hub was opened in November 2014. The 1.6 hectare interchange is one of the largest bus interchanges in Singapore with 29 bus services calling at it. The new interchange is expected to benefit about 40 000 commuters daily.

## Provision of bus priority measures

### *Implementation of bus lane scheme*

3.12 One of the key bus priority measures in Singapore is the implementation of bus lane scheme<sup>9</sup> to give priority to buses on the road, enabling them to enter and exit stops more smoothly and provide faster rides for commuters. After several rounds of extension, the length of bus lanes increased to 150 km in 2014 from 120 km in 2008.

3.13 In a measure to ensure that the bus lane scheme remain effective in improving travel time for buses, LTA has made use of traffic wardens and on-board bus lane enforcement cameras. The traffic wardens are deployed at various hotspot areas to record the vehicle licence plate number of motorists who infringe bus lanes. These locations are usually the ones where most of the scheduled buses were obstructed.

3.14 In addition, about 90 buses across 12 SBS Transit<sup>10</sup> bus services that ply along routes with bus lanes are fitted with video cameras to record bus lane infringements (**Figure 1**). This system requires little intervention by the driver as the video is set to continuously monitor the road in front of the bus. The video camera also allows LTA officers to assess the circumstances more accurately if motorists are caught on video infringing bus lanes. As for the penalty, motorists who drive on bus lanes during restricted hours are fined S\$130 (HK\$795).

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<sup>9</sup> Aside from buses, only emergency service, police vehicles and bicycles are allowed on bus lanes. There are two types of bus lane in Singapore: (a) normal bus lanes (operating from 7:30 am to 9:30 am and from 5 pm to 8 pm between Monday and Friday) and (b) full-day bus lanes (operating from 7:30 am to 8 pm between Monday and Saturday).

<sup>10</sup> The SBS Transit is a public transport operator providing both bus and rail services. It has established a strong presence in the bus services market with a total fleet of close to 3 000 buses and a 75% market share.

**Figure 1 — Video camera to detect bus lane infringement**



Source: Land Transport Authority.

### *Provision of the Mandatory Give-Way to Buses scheme*

3.15 The Mandatory Give-Way to Buses scheme<sup>11</sup> is also an important measure implemented to improve the speed and reliability of bus services. The operation of this scheme is similar conceptually to a zebra crossing, except that it is meant for buses. When nearing a bus stop under the scheme, motorists will first see triangular give way markings on the road (**Figure 2**). These markings indicate that motorists approaching these bus stops need to slow down and watch out for buses pulling out of the bus bay. Motorists come to a complete stop before the give way line and give way to buses exiting the bus bay at the location. Motorists may continue their journey once the bus has successfully exited the bus bay.<sup>12</sup> As for the penal provision, motorists who do not give way to buses exiting from bus bays, where the new road markings are drawn or if they stay in the yellow box marked "Give Way to Buses" are liable to a fine of S\$130 (HK\$795). According to LTA, after implementing the bus priority measures, bus average speeds have been increased from 16-19 km per hour to 20-25 km per hour.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Signal priority is also given for buses approaching some major junctions by extending the green-time for them.

<sup>12</sup> As of November 2014, there were a total of some 320 bus stops under this scheme. LTA is tasked with reviewing and implementing the scheme in phases to benefit more commuters.

<sup>13</sup> Source: Land Transport Authority (2015).

**Figure 2 — Illustration of bus stop with Mandatory Give-Way to Buses scheme**



Source: Land Transport Authority.

### *Offer of real-time bus information for commuters*

3.16 Commuters need accurate information to plan their journeys. For example, if a commuter knows one bus is running late, he or she may choose to hop on another bus going in the same direction. LTA has worked with the public bus operators to ensure that commuters can see departure times of all bus services departing from interchanges. Currently, bus arrival times can be shown on bus arrival information display panels at over 100 bus stops across the city. Furthermore, LTA is working on a project on the feasibility of providing information on the level of crowding on buses so that commuters can make more informed choices for their journeys.

3.17 LTA has also launched MyTransport.SG, a portal that consolidates information and e-services for land transport users. Within MyTransport.SG, MyTransport.SG Mobile provides commuters information on public transport services on mobile devices, including real-time bus arrival information that is also shown on display panels at the bus stops across the city. Commuters may also make use of the Journey Planner to plan their journeys using public transportation. The portal's interactive map covers bus and rail trips that can be made across the city.

### Introduction of distance-based fare charging system

3.18 LTA has introduced the distance-based fare charging system to give commuters a more equitable fare structure based on distance travelled



regardless of the mode of public transport used (between bus and MRT, and between buses) and the number of valid transfers made. With distance-based fares, commuters pay the same fare whether they travel directly to their destination, or make transfers during the journey. Commuters have the flexibility to decide on the best route to reach their destination.

### Improvement of reliability through operations

3.19 In addition to the above measures implemented for improving the operating environment of franchised bus operators, LTA works with PTC to put in place the Quality of Service ("QoS") Standards to safeguard commuters' interest in terms of bus service provision. Currently, the QoS standards comprise the following two categories:

- (a) Operating Performance Standards which measure minimum daily or monthly operational deliverables, either at the bus network or route levels. They cover the aspects of bus reliability, loading and safety; and
- (b) Service Provision Standards which measure overall bus route planning and provision of services. They cover the aspects of service availability, integration and information.

3.20 In cases of non-compliance with the QoS standards, PTC is empowered to impose financial penalty on franchised bus operators to keep service lapses to the minimum. The penalty quantum ranges from S\$2,000 (HK\$12,240) per day per bus service to S\$100,000 (HK\$612,000) per month per standard (see [Appendix](#) for the Operating Performance Standards and the Service Provision Standards for bus services, and the penalty framework for non-compliance with QoS Standards.) Based on the latest publicly available information, both the SBS Transit Ltd and the SMRT Buses Ltd<sup>14</sup> fully complied with all the QoS standards between December 2012 and May 2014.

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<sup>14</sup> It operates a fleet of more than 1 050 buses, serving mainly in housing estates in northern and north-western Singapore.



Table 1 — Quality of Service Standards for bus services

Operating Performance Standards	
Reliability	
Scheduled bus trips operated on each bus service	At least 96% monthly.
Bus service should adhere to not more than five minutes of its scheduled headway (frequency) upon departure at the bus interchanges and terminals	Not less than 85% daily.
Bus breakdown rate on all bus services	Less than 1.5% monthly.
Loading	
Bus loading during weekday peak periods on each bus service	Not exceeding 95% daily.
Safety	
Accident rate on all bus services	Less than 0.75 per 100 000 bus-km per month.
Service Provision Standards	
Availability of up-to-date information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide hotline and information on internet website for convenient trip planning.</li> <li>• To display information at all bus interchanges/terminals with passenger boarding activities.</li> <li>• To display information at all bus stops with display facilities.</li> <li>• To provide timetables at bus stops for bus services with long headway (i.e. headway of 20 minutes or more, for more than 20% of the bus trips).</li> </ul>

Table 1 — Quality of Service Standards for bus services (cont'd)

<b>Availability</b>	
Access to any bus service	To run at least one bus service within 400 m radius of any development subject to minimum demand.
Provision of direct bus service connections	To run direct bus services: (a) between a public housing estate and a nearby bus interchange or MRT station; (b) between major employment/activity centres and a nearby bus interchange or MRT station; and (c) between public housing districts and downtown.
Bus service operating hours	At least 18 hours daily, unless otherwise stipulated by PTC.
Bus service scheduled headways (frequencies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 80% of bus services to operate at headway of not more than 10 minutes during weekday (excluding public holidays) peak periods, unless otherwise stipulated by PTC.</li> <li>• At least 90% of feeder bus services to operate at headway of not more than 10 minutes during weekday (excluding public holidays) peak periods, unless otherwise stipulated by PTC.</li> <li>• At least 85% of bus services to operate at headway of not more than 20 minutes during off-peak periods, unless otherwise stipulated by PTC.</li> <li>• 100% of bus services to operate at headway of not more than 30 minutes, unless otherwise stipulated by PTC.</li> </ul>
<b>Integration</b>	
Bus service integration in public housing districts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least one bus service to depart from the bus interchange/terminal at 6 am or earlier, daily.</li> <li>• At least one bus service to depart from the bus interchange/terminal at 12 midnight or after the last train service, whichever is later, daily.</li> </ul>

Source: Public Transport Council.

**Table 2 — Penalty framework for Non-Compliance with the Quality of Service Standards**

<b>Service Provision Standards</b>	
<b>Standards</b>	<b>Financial penalty<sup>(1)</sup></b>
<b>Operator-based (Monthly) standards</b>	
All Service Provision Standards	S\$100,000 (HK\$612,000) per month on each non-compliant standard.
<b>Operating Performance Standards</b>	
<b>Route-based (Daily) Standards</b>	
Standard on headway adherence Standard on loading	S\$20,000 (HK\$122,400) for each non-compliant day on each non-compliant route.
<b>Route-based (Monthly) Standards</b>	
Standard on percentage of scheduled trips operated	S\$20,000 (HK\$122,400) per month on each non-compliant route.
<b>Operator-based (Monthly) Standards</b>	
Standard on bus breakdown rate Standard on accident rate	S\$100,000 (HK\$612,000) per month on each non-compliant standard.

Note: (1) All such sums collected by PTC shall go into the government's consolidated fund.

Source: Public Transport Council.

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3 February 2015  
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**郭家麒醫生**

立法會議員



**Dr. Hon. Kwok Ka Ki**

Legislative Councillor

香港  
立法會  
交通事務委員會主席  
陳恒鎮議員

陳恒鎮 主席：

**要求就近日深水埗巴士車禍事件召開特別會議**

9月22日晚上，一輛巴士在深水埗欽州街懷疑因收掣不及剷上行人路，事件造成3死29人傷。事件令大眾關注巴士司機的工時及待遇、以及上址一帶的交通安全問題。亦有意見指，運輸署應檢討《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》，將目前每日最長工作時間的14小時調低，以確保司機能平衡工作與休息時間。

就此，本人希望能於短期內召開特別會議，並邀請運輸及房屋局局長、相關政府部門及團體代表出席，討論是項議題。如有需要，請與本人聯絡。

交通事務委員會委員

郭家麒

二零一七年九月二十五日

[Translation]

CB(4) 1624/16-17(01)

The Legislative Councillor, the Hon. Ben Chan Han-pan,  
Legislative Council,  
Legislative Council Panel on Transport,  
Hong Kong

Chairman Mr Chan Han-pan,

**Request for a special meeting to be held regarding the Sham Shui Po Bus Incident**

On the evening of 22 September 2018, three people were killed and 29 injured in a crash in Yen Chow Street, Sham Shui Po when a double-decker bus mounted a pavement and ploughed into the pedestrian sidewalk. The incident was allegedly caused by the bus captain failing to brake in time. The incident has provoked public concern over bus captains' working hours and treatment, as well as general concern on traffic safety in the aforementioned area. There have also been suggestions to the effect that the Transport Department should lower the maximum working hours of 14 hours under the "Guidelines on Bus Captain. Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks", to make sure that bus captains can maintain a balance in work and rest.

As such, I hope to call upon a special meeting in due course, and to invite the Commissioner of the THB, relevant government departments and parties to discuss on related topics. Please contact me if necessary.

Member of the Panel on Transport  
Dr. Kwok Ka-ki

25 September 2017





中華人民共和國香港特別行政區  
劉國勳議員辦事處



立法會



北區區議會



本函檔號：LKF(LC)2017102

立法會  
交通事務委員會主席  
陳恒鏞議員

陳議員：

關於：要求規管車長工時事宜

9月22日發生在深水埗欽州街的嚴重交通事故造成3死30傷的悲劇。據悉，涉事城巴車長在事發前連續數天每天工作13小時，傷者及死者家屬質疑其駕駛專注力不足，疲勞駕駛可能是造成事故的主要原因。

根據運輸署為專營巴士公司制訂的《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》，車長每日最高工作時間14小時，最高駕駛時間為11小時。但反觀其他發達國家和地區，香港的情況明顯落後：歐盟規定巴士司機每周最長駕駛時間為56小時，每天不多於9小時；美國則規定巴士司機每天駕駛時間最高為10小時。

事件發生後，當局本應從中吸取教訓，主動去檢視現行規管中的不足之處，修例改善有關情況。但運輸署助理署長僅表示，若現時有工會要求重新檢討《指引》，署方樂意去再次檢視。

就此本人希望政府儘快主動就檢視《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》的各項規定，避免再有類似情況發生；故要求立法會復會後，儘快在交通事務委員會中討論上述事宜。

立法會議員 劉國勳  
2017年9月26日

CB(4)1624/16-17(02)

[Translation]

[Letterhead of the Hon. LAU Kwok Fan's Office]

To: Hon. Mr. CHAN Han-Pan, JP

Member of Legislative Council

Panel on Transport

Legislative Council

Dear Hon. Mr. Chan JP,

**Re: Request to Manage Working Hours of Bus Captains**

There was a tragic and serious accident on Yam Chow Street in Sham Shui Po on 22 September leading to 3 deaths and 30 injuries. Sources show that the Bus Captain involved had been working for 13 hours every day on consecutive days. The family members of the deceased and injured suspect that the Bus Captain was driving under fatigue and lost concentration, which may have been a major cause of the accident.

According to the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” issued by the Transport Department, the working hours for bus captains should not exceed a maximum of 14 hours a day, and the maximum driving hours should not exceed 11 hours. However, when carrying a comparative assessment against other developed countries and areas, it is clear that Hong Kong has fallen behind: The EU requires that bus captains cannot drive for more than 56 hours a week and not more than 9 hours per day while the US sets the maximum driving hours for bus captains at 10 hours per day.

After the accident, the Transport Department should take an active approach to assess the insufficiencies of the present Guidelines, and to revise them to improve the situation. However, the Assistant Commissioner for Transport/Management & Licensing of the Transport Department stated that if there are unions requesting for a revision of the guidelines, it would be happy to revisit them.

I therefore ask that the Government actively revise each provision of the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” as soon as possible, to prevent similar accidents from re-occurring. Accordingly, I ask that the Panel on Transport address this matter as soon as the Legislative Council resumes.

[Signature]

Hon. Mr Lau Kwok Fan

Legislative Council Member

26 September 2017

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劉素儀女士

[傳真號碼：2840 0716]

劉女士：

### 九月二十二日在深水埗發生的專營巴士致命交通意外及 專營巴士車長作息時間安排

感謝貴秘書處於2017年9月28日的來函，夾附郭家麒議員及劉國勳議員就專營巴士車長作息時間安排的意見，我們現作回覆。

在9月22日黃昏時分，深水埗近長沙灣道與欽州街交界發生了一宗涉及一輛城巴有限公司（「城巴」）專營巴士的致命交通意外，涉事專營巴士行駛城巴路線E21A號，由東涌（逸東）開往愛民邨。在該宗交通意外中，共有3人死亡，另有30人受傷，警方目前正就這宗交通意外進行調查。

政府非常重視專營巴士的營運安全，並對發生意外深感難過。自意外發生後，巴士車長的作息時間安排備受社會關注。在這方面而言，專營巴士公司須確保巴士車長的編更安排符合由運輸署制定的「巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引」（下稱「《指引》」）（見附件）。

運輸署要求專營巴士公司編排車長更份時遵行《指引》，並須每季向運輸署提交執行指引的報告；而運輸署每年亦會委聘獨立承辦商，就車長的工作時間、休息時間及用膳時間進行實地調查，評估各專營巴士公司有否在實際工作環境遵照《指引》。在符合《指引》的前提下，專營巴士車長的具體工作安排（包括工作時數、薪酬及津貼、編更制度等）則由資方及職方協商。事實上，專營巴士公司作為負責任的企業，除了需要保障巴士營運安全外，亦應確保巴士車長的職業安全 and 健康受到保障，生活和工作取得平衡。

運輸署、專營巴士公司及巴士車長工會代表過往曾不時對《指引》作出檢視。現行版本是在2010年年中經檢討及諮詢立法會交通事務委員會後頒布施行，及後運輸署亦不時與持份者溝通和聽取各方意見。為了積極回應公眾的關注和疑慮，政府正對《指引》的內容作出仔細檢視。運輸署正安排與巴士車長工會及專營巴士公司會晤，聽取他們對檢討現行《指引》的意見和關注事項。在進行檢討時，政府會考慮不同持份者的意見和關注，當中會特別注重：

- (一) 專營巴士的營運安全及服務可靠性；
- (二) 巴士車長的駕駛安全與健康生活模式，尤其是工作和休息時間安排兩者間的平衡，及如何避免車長持續長時間執行駕駛職務；
- (三) 專營巴士營辦商在日常運作方面（例如調配人手及車輛）的靈活性，以應付不同時段的乘客需求；
- (四) 專營巴士業界及車長工會對修訂《指引》的意見；
- (五) 修訂《指引》對專營巴士業界整體營運狀況的影響；及
- (六) 如修訂《指引》須增聘人手以維持現有服務，如何在盡早施行的同時，給予巴士公司適度空間，作出相應過渡安排（例如招聘及培訓車長、重新訂定巴士的調度、重編更份安排等）。

- 3 -

我們已安排於本月內與專營巴士公司和工會見面，開展檢討工作，並謀求早日取得成果，屆時會再次向公眾交代詳情。在這段期間，政府期望專營巴士公司可改善車長的工作與作息的安排，以乘客的福祉為最大依歸，亦再次呼籲職業司機注重道路安全，小心駕駛。

運輸及房屋局局長

(梁思灝



代行)

二零一七年十月九日

副本送：運輸署署長 (經辦人：關翠蘭女士)

附件

**巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引**  
**(2010年10月修訂)**

- 指引A** — 車長工作6小時後最少應有30分鐘休息時間；在6小時的更次內應有合共20分鐘的小休，其中不少於12分鐘應安排在首4小時的工作時間內提供。車長在總站準備開出下一班巴士和監察乘客上車的時間，不應視為休息時間。
- 指引B** — 一個工作日內最長的工作時間（包括所有休息時間）不應超逾14小時。
- 指引C** — 一個工作日內的駕駛時間（即最長的工作時間減去所有每次最少30分鐘的休息時間）不應超逾11小時。
- 指引D** — 兩個相連工作日之間的休息時間不應少於10小時。
- 指引E** — 車長一個工作日內的工作時間不少於8小時便應獲提供用膳時間。巴士公司應在2011年第3季或之前提供不少於45分鐘的用膳時間，然後再在隨後一年進一步改善至不少於1小時。

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LC Paper No. CB(4)1652/16-17(01)  
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9 October 2017

Ms Sophie Lau  
Clerk to Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central  
Hong Kong

[Fax No.: 2840 0716]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Fatal traffic accident involving a franchised bus in Sham Shui Po on 22 September and the arrangements for working hours and rest time of franchised bus captains**

Thank you for the letter from the Secretariat of 28 September 2017, enclosing the views of Hon Kwok Ka-ki and Hon Lau Kwok-fan on the arrangements for working hours and rest time of franchised bus captains. Our reply is set out below.

A fatal traffic accident involving a franchised bus of Citybus Limited happened at the junction of Cheung Sha Wan Road and Yen Chow Street in Sham Shui Po in the evening of 22 September. The franchised bus concerned operated on Citybus Route No. E21A travelling from Tung Chung (Yat Tung) to Oi Man Estate. The traffic accident resulted in 3 fatalities and 30 injuries, while investigation by the Police is in progress.

The Government attaches great importance to the safety of franchised bus operation and is deeply saddened by the accident. Since the accident, the arrangements in respect of the rest time and working hours of bus captains have attracted public concerns. On this, franchised bus companies shall ensure that the duty rosters of bus captains are in compliance with the *Guidelines on Bus*



*Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks* (hereinafter referred to as "the Guidelines") (see Annex) promulgated by the Transport Department ("TD").

As a requirement by TD, franchised bus companies must comply with the Guidelines when arranging duty rosters for their bus captains and submit reports on the implementation of the Guidelines to TD quarterly. TD also engages independent contractors to carry out annual field surveys on the working hours, rest time and meal breaks of bus captains so as to assess the level of compliance with the Guidelines by the franchised bus companies in the actual working environment. As long as the Guidelines are fulfilled, the specific employment arrangements for bus captains (including working hours, salaries and allowances, duty rosters, etc.) are subject to agreement between the management and staff. In fact, as responsible enterprises, franchised bus companies should ensure not only the safety of bus operation, but also the occupational safety and health of their bus captains as well as their work-life balance.

The Guidelines are subject to review by TD in conjunction with franchised bus operators and representatives of staff unions for bus captains from time to time. The current version of the Guidelines was promulgated for implementation in mid-2010 after a review and consultation with the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council, while TD has continued to communicate with the stakeholders and listened to the views from various parties since then. To proactively address the public concerns and doubts on the matter, the Government is conducting a thorough review of the contents of the Guidelines. TD is arranging meetings with staff unions for bus captains and franchised bus companies to listen to their views and concerns on the review on the existing Guidelines. In the course of the review, the Government will take into account the views and concerns of various stakeholders, with specific attention to the following aspects –

- (1) the operational safety and service reliability of franchised buses;
- (2) the driving safety and healthy lifestyle of franchised bus captains, especially in terms of balance between working hours and rest time as well as avoiding long hours of driving duties for a prolonged period by bus captains;
- (3) the flexibility of franchised bus operators in their daily operations (such as staff deployment and vehicle allocation) for meeting passenger demand during different periods of the day;
- (4) the views of the franchised bus sector and staff unions for bus captains on revising the Guidelines;

- (5) the implications of revising the Guidelines to the overall operating status of the franchised bus sector; and
- (6) if revising the Guidelines will necessitate the employment of additional staff by franchised bus operators for sustaining their existing services, consideration will be given to how to implement the revision as soon as practicable, while affording franchised bus companies appropriate buffer for making transitional arrangements (such as recruitment and training of bus captains, re-arranging the allocation of buses and re-arranging duty rosters).

We have arranged to meet with the franchised bus companies and staff unions within this month for commencing the review exercise. We will strive to achieve fruitful outcome at the soonest and brief the public on the details by then. In the meantime, the Government hopes that the franchised bus companies can enhance the duty rosters and the arrangements on working hours and rest time of bus captains, bearing in mind that the well-being of passengers should always come first. Once again, we would also appeal to all professional drivers to give due regard to road safety and to drive safely.

Yours sincerely,



( Louis Leung )

for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.: Commissioner for Transport (Attn.: Miss Rachel Kwan)

**Annex****Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks**  
**(Revised in October 2010)**

- Guideline A** – Bus captains should have a rest time of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, they should have rest times totalling 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest time.
- Guideline B** – Maximum duty (including all rest times) in a working day should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C** – Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty less all rest times each of 30 minutes or more) in a working day should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D** – The break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours.
- Guideline E** – Bus captains working for a duty of not less than 8 hours in a working day should have a meal break. Bus companies should complete the improvement of meal breaks to no less than 45 minutes by the third quarter of 2011, and further improvement to no less than 1 hour in 1 year thereafter.

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For information on  
15 February 2018

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**The Bus Accident in Tai Po on 10 February 2018**

**Purpose**

On 10 February 2018, a traffic accident involving a bus of Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) took place in Tai Po. Please refer to **Annex 1** for information about the accident. This paper briefs Members on:

- (a) the accident investigation and follow-up actions;
- (b) existing regulation and training of franchised bus captains; and
- (c) road safety measures at the subject road section.

**Accident Investigation and Follow-up Actions**

2. The Regional Crime Unit, New Territories North of the Police is now conducting an in-depth investigation into the accident. KMB has pledged to fully cooperate with the Police in the criminal investigation. It will also conduct an independent internal investigation into the accident and submit a report to the Transport Department (“TD”) in a month’s time. Upon receiving the accident report from KMB, the TD will carefully scrutinise its contents and take follow-up actions. Moreover, the TD will also review the road safety issues of the subject road section, including speed limit and traffic signs, etc., in a comprehensive manner.

3. The Chief Executive has announced that an independent committee chaired by a judge will be set up to comprehensively review the operation and monitoring of franchised buses so as to ensure that public bus services of Hong Kong are safe and reliable. The preparatory work for setting up the independent committee is being undertaken in full swing. Details of the committee such as the terms of reference and membership, etc. will be announced as soon as possible.

## **Existing Regulation and Training of Franchised Bus Captains**

4. According to the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations (Cap. 374B), all franchised bus captains must pass the driving tests set by the TD and hold valid driving licences before they are allowed to drive franchised buses. In processing the applications for new bus captains (including both full-time and part-time bus captains), franchised bus companies will check the applicants' Certificate of "Previous Conviction Issued under Section 75(5) of Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) of Laws of Hong Kong"<sup>1</sup>. The bus companies will take into account records of the applicants therein as well as other factors in considering whether their applications should be accepted.

5. If the franchised bus companies accept the applications but the applicants do not possess valid franchised bus driving licences, the franchised bus companies will provide driving training and arrange driving tests to be set by the TD for them to obtain the valid driving licences. Franchised bus companies provide various types of training for newly-recruited bus captains, including driving skills, incident handling, customer service, and classroom and on-site training on different bus models and routes.

6. Franchised bus companies also provide serving bus captains with valid driving licences with regular driving enhancement trainings. These cover training on specified routes and bus models, customer service, refresher training on defensive driving techniques, etc. The aim is to enhance bus captains' road safety awareness, driving skills and attitudes, etc. Franchised bus companies will arrange relevant training for bus captains if they are assigned to serve a new route or drive a new bus model.

<sup>1</sup> The Certificate contains the following information –

- (a) Previous conviction record under Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap 374) in the past ten years.
- (b) Payment record under Fixed Penalty (Criminal Proceedings) Ordinance (Cap 240) in the past five years.
- (c) Record of driving-offence points under Section 3(2) of Road Traffic (Driving-Offence Points) Ordinance (Cap 375) in the past five years.

7. Franchised bus companies also monitor the driving attitude and behaviour of bus captains on a regular basis. Electronic tachograph, commonly known as "black box", has been installed on the whole fleet to monitor the driving behaviour and habits of bus captains. Franchised bus companies conduct random checks on the operational data recorded in black boxes, deploy plain-clothed staff to conduct on-board monitoring on bus captains on-duty, and conduct breath alcohol tests before their driving duty. If it is found that the bus captains have the need for enhancement on driving attitude and behaviour, franchised bus companies will provide driving improvement course or supplementary driving training for the bus captains to reinforce their driving skills, enhance their safety awareness and foster good driving behaviour. If serving bus captains are involved in traffic accidents or violate traffic laws in driving duty, bus companies will take appropriate disciplinary actions against the bus captains or even dismiss them depending on the nature and severity of the incidents.

8. The TD requested all franchised bus companies to further strengthen their internal monitoring systems to monitor bus captains' safe driving and service performance in late 2017. Franchised bus companies were requested to organise and submit on a regular basis to the TD the results of random check on the operational data recorded in black boxes and the corresponding follow-up actions; records of on-board monitoring by plain-clothed staff and the corresponding follow-up actions; records of bus captains' traffic offences and the corresponding follow-up actions; as well as records of breath alcohol tests conducted on bus captains. Moreover, the TD will continue to collaborate with the Hong Kong Police Force ("HKPF") in holding "Road Safety Seminars" for franchised bus captains at which the HKPF is invited to give tips on safe driving, analyse major accident black spots in different districts and causes of bus accidents, in order to enhance the road safety awareness and promote good driving behaviour among bus captains.

## **Road safety measures at the subject road section**

9. The accident happened on Tai Po Road (between Chek Nai Ping and Tai Po Mei Tsuen), and the subject road section is approximately 0.5 km long (the location of the subject road section is at **Annex 2**). This section of Tai Po Road currently has a speed limit of 70 km/hour. There are warning traffic signs including “Reduce Speed Now”, “Bend to Right Ahead” and “Sharp Deviation of Route”, etc. and road markings along the road to remind motorists to take heed of road conditions. “Slow” road markings are painted at suitable locations to warn motorists to reduce speed prior to entering the road section and thereafter keep operating at slow speed. Crash barriers are also installed at road bend to enhance road safety. According to the record of the TD and the HKPF, from 2013 to 2017, four traffic accidents occurred at the subject road section. Three were slight accidents, while one was a serious accident involving a motorcycle.

10. Some of the traffic signs and road facilities at the subject road section were damaged after the accident. The Highways Department has promptly taken follow-up actions to repair and reinstate the facilities. In the aftermath of this serious traffic accident, the TD will comprehensively review the road environment and relevant traffic management measures of the subject road section, including studying whether the speed limit should be changed, and whether the warning traffic signs and road markings should be enhanced to further promote road safety. At present, the HKPF have been taking enforcement actions on the subject road section from time to time with the use of mobile vehicle speed detection equipment. The TD and the HKPF will explore the feasibility of installing fixed speed enforcement cameras at the subject road section.



## **Advice sought**

11. Members are invited to note the content of this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**

**Transport Department**

**February 2018**

**Information on the bus accident in Tai Po on 10 February 2018****(I) Information of the bus route**

Bus company and route number	KMB route no. 872
Originating/terminating points	Sha Tin Racecourse / Tai Po Centre
Place of accident	Tai Po Road - Tai Po Kau towards Tai Po near Tai Po Mei
Accident time	About 6:15 p.m.

**(II) Information of the bus captain**

Employment mode	Part-time bus captain
Years of service with KMB	3 years and 11 months
Duty time elapsed at the time of accident	3 hours and 11 minutes
Training and experience in serving the subject route	Have received training and experience for serving the subject route

**(III) Information of the vehicle**

Age of the bus	12.8 years
Date of the last monthly vehicle examination	18 January 2018
Date of the last annual vehicle examination	21 to 28 March 2017



大埔尾  
TAI PO MEI

# Chek Nai Ping

**SLOW**  
 慢速

500m

防撞欄  
ash Barrier

大埔公路 (赤泥坪至大埔尾村)  
Tai Po Road 1: 1200 (A3)  
(Chek Nai Ping to Tai Po Mei Village)

847

	Length over 車長過
1000cc or less 1000cc以下	1000cc or less 1000cc以下
Over 1000cc 超過1000cc	Over 1000cc 超過1000cc

政府總部  
運輸及房屋局

運輸科  
香港添馬添美道 2 號  
政府總部東翼



Transport and  
Housing Bureau  
Government Secretariat  
Transport Branch  
East Wing, Central Government Offices,  
2 Tim Mei Avenue,  
Tamar, Hong Kong

本局檔號 Our Ref.

來函檔號 Your Ref.

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香港中區  
立法會道 1 號  
立法會綜合大樓  
立法會秘書處  
交通事務委員會秘書  
胡日輝先生

[傳真號碼：2840 0269]

胡先生：

**立法會交通事務委員會 2018 年 2 月 15 日特別會議**

**補充資料**

就委員在上述特別會議上要求政府提供的資料，現回覆如下。

**九巴車長交通違例事項**

根據九龍巴士（一九三三）有限公司（「九巴」）提供的資料，於 2015 年 2 月 16 日至 2018 年 2 月 15 日的三年期間，九巴車長在執勤期間所觸犯各類涉及違例駕駛記分的交通違例事項及數目如下：

違反交通燈號的指示	830宗
不小心駕駛	540宗
其他違例事項	18宗

而九巴所採取的跟進行動的類別及數目如下：

訓示/指導/提醒	14次
書面訓示	25次
口頭警告	1次
書面警告	730次
最後書面警告 <sup>1</sup>	553次
轉職至非駕駛之工作	1次
停止僱用	7次
跟進中/採取行動前已離職	57次

車長觸犯不小心駕駛罪行後，九巴亦會安排輔助訓練及派出便衣人員乘車監察車長表現。

#### 有關 2003 年屯門公路意外的心理輔導服務

就 2003 年 7 月 10 日屯門公路西行車路發生嚴重交通意外後為有需要人士提供心理輔導服務的時間，社會福

<sup>1</sup> 九巴向車長發出最後書面警告後，會附加通常為六個月的守行為期。如車長在守行為期間違反交通事項，九巴會考慮作出停止僱用之處分。

利署表示並沒有備存相關資料。一般而言，傷者的心理治療所需的時間視乎心理創傷的嚴重程度及傷者的心理素質。如果傷者受傷前的心理狀況不佳，而心理創傷亦嚴重，心理治療需時 3 至 4 年。其他情況通常需 1 至 2 年。至於死者的家人的心理治療，一般是數個月至數年。

### 調配單層或雙層巴士準則

一般而言，專營巴士公司會按照乘客量的需求，調配不同巴士行走不同路線。而根據巴士路線發展計劃中有關改善及減少服務的指引，如個別路線在繁忙時段最繁忙半小時內的平均載客率低於 85%；或在非繁忙時段內的平均載客率低於 30%，運輸署會考慮減少有關路線的巴士數目。然而，接駁鐵路的路線、切合社會需求的路線（例如行走偏遠地區或乘客主要為長者的巴士路線），而又沒有替代服務可供選擇，或繁忙時段班次已定於 15 分鐘或以上的巴士路線則會按個別情況考慮，包括調配單層巴士代替雙層巴士行走，以便更有效地運用巴士車輛資源，及提升巴士網絡的整體效率。除上述考慮外，現時亦有個別巴士路線因途經路段的淨空高度限制，而必須使用單層巴士行走。

### 九巴員工最高薪金及車長底薪

根據九巴提供的資料，在 1998 年和 2018 年九巴員工的最高薪金及九巴車長的底薪如下：

	車長底薪	員工最高薪金
1998 年	每月約\$3,600	年度總酬金 \$900 - 950 萬 <sup>2</sup>
2018 年 3 月	每月\$15,366 至 \$17,471	每月\$457,330

運輸及房屋局局長

( 蔡志傑



代行)

2018年4月13日

副本送：運輸署署長

(經辦人：黃志光先生)

社會福利署署長

(經辦人：盧燕芬女士)

<sup>2</sup> 根據1998年九龍巴士控股有限公司年報的資料。

[Translation]

[Letterhead of the Transport and Housing Bureau, Government Secretariat  
Transport Branch]

Mr. Wu Yat Fai [Transliteration]

Clerk to the Panel on Transport

Legislative Council Secretariat

Legislative Council Complex

1 Legislative Council Road

Central

Hong Kong

Dear Mr Wu,

**Re: Special meeting on 15 February 2018 of the Panel on Transport**

**Supplemental Information**

In relation to the Panel's request for information from the Government in the captioned special meeting, the response is as follow:-

**Matters relating to violation of driving offences by KMB Bus Captains**

According to the information supplied by KMB (1933) Company Limited ("KMB"), in the 3 year period between 16 February 2015 to 15 February 2018, the statistics of KMB bus captains violating the driving offence points system are as follow:-

Failing to comply with traffic signals	830 cases
Careless driving	540 cases
Other offences	18 cases

The follow-up actions taken by KMB are as follow:-



Instructing/Guiding/Reminding	14 times
Written instructions	25 times
Verbal warning	1 time
Written warning	730 times
Final written warning	553 times
Transfer to non-driving occupation	1 time
Cessation of employment	7 times
Discontinuation of employment during or before follow-up actions	57 times

Once a bus captain offends a careless driving offence, KMB will arrange for supplemental training and will arrange individuals in plain-clothes to ride buses and monitor the bus captains' performance.

#### **Regarding the psychological counseling services provided after the 2003 accident on Tuen Mun Road**

Regarding the psychological counseling services provided to those in need after the serious accident that occurred on the Tuen Mun Road westbound lane on 10 July 2003, the Social Welfare Department states that it had not saved the relevant information. Usually, the length of psychological counselling for victims depends on the degree of psychological damage and the victim's psychological state. If a victim's psychological was sub-par prior to the accident, and the psychological damage resulting from the accident is serious, psychological counselling may take from 3-4 years. For other situations, psychological counselling could take from 1-2 years. As to the psychological counselling for family members of the deceased, this typically takes several months to several years.

#### **Basis for arrangement of single and double decker buses**

Typically, franchise bus companies will route different buses depending on passenger demand. The Transport Department will consider decreasing the number of buses for certain routes with reference to those provisions relevant to the improvement or decrease of services in the guidelines for planning and developing bus routes. For example, those routes which have a passenger rate of less than 85% even in peak hours; or some routes which have an average passenger rate of 30% during non-peak hours.

The routes connecting to the rail, and those routes which suit the needs of society (for example those routes that go to outskirt areas or routes that primarily serve the elderly), and which do not have available substitute transport services, or those routes where buses are set with a frequency of every 15 minutes on peak hours, will be subject to individual consideration. This includes the substitution of double decker buses with single decker buses, to enhance the efficiency in utilization of resources, and to increase the efficiency of the bus network overall. Apart from the above considerations, there are also bus routes that require the use of single decker buses due to certain height restrictions on road.

### **Maximum salary of KMB staff and base salary of KMB bus captains**

According to the information provided by KMB, the maximum salary of KMB staff and the base salary of bus captains are as follow:-

	Base salary of bus captains	Maximum salary of KMB staff
1998	\$3,600 per month	\$9,000,000 – 9,500,000 per annum
March 2018	\$15,366 - \$17,471 per month	\$457,330 per annum


Mr. Choi Chi Kit (Transliteration) acting on behalf of  
Secretary for Transport and Housing

14 April 2018

CC: commissioner for Transport (Agent: Mr. Wong Chi Kwong (transliteration))

CC: Director of Social Welfare (Agent: Ms. Lo Yin Fun (transliteration))

# 深水埗城巴奪命 司機日踩14小時達運署上限 兩巴工會促減車長最高工時



運輸署「巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引」\*

- A 車長工作6小時後，最少應有30分鐘休息；在6小時更次內應有合共20分鐘小休，其中不少於12分鐘應安排在首4小時的工作時間內。車長在總站準備開出下一班巴士和監察乘客上車的時間，不應視為休息時間。
- B 一個工作日內最長的工作時間(包括所有休息時間)不應超過14小時。
- C 一個工作日內的駕駛時間(即最長的工作時間減去所有每次最少30分鐘休息時間)，不應超過11小時。
- D 兩個相連工作日之間的休息時間不應少於10小時。
- E 一個工作日內工作不少於8小時，便應獲用膳時間不少於1小時。

\*2010年修訂版 資料來源：運輸署

【明報專訊】深水埗欽州街前晚巴士剷上行人路的交通意外造成3死30傷，涉事車長近日每天工作14小時，逼近運輸署車長工時指引的上限。城巴承認，公司一直有人手不足問題，而涉事車長事發當日返完通宵更後「返早些幫手」。有立法會議員關注，現時車長每日工時上限可達14小時，對行車安全有影響，促請政府檢討指引。兩家巴士公司工會促請運輸署，將最高工時指引調低兩小時至12小時，以保障車長及公眾的安全。

另外，車禍至今釀成3死30傷，至昨晚傷者中仍有1人危殆、3人嚴重、11人情況穩定，另外15人已出院。意外中，一對在路上準備過路的夫妻，同被捲入車底，一死一傷，陰陽永隔；亦有家庭經濟支柱的傷者對事件猶有餘悸，擔心影響日後工作能力。

城巴否認司機追更 認「返早些幫手」

城巴營運總監鍾澤文昨帶同果籃，與職員分頭到各傷者入住的醫院探望。鍾表示，城巴準備了應急金錢給死者家屬，並設立保險熱線。他確認涉事被捕車長返通宵更，有些日子「返早些幫手」，案發前一晚亦是通宵更，但沒有「追更」。

他表示，城巴一直存在人手不足問題，但有依足運輸署的工作指引編排人手，確保員工有超過10小時休息，稍後會與運輸署再商討是否需要更改巴士司機休息指引。

城巴工會曾爭取 運輸署無理會

現時運輸署的《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》規定，一個工作日內最長的工作時間不應超過14小時（見表），2012年的立法會，時任運輸及房屋局長張炳良曾承諾會檢討指引，但至今未有見任何修改。運輸署回應指，各專營巴士公司須每季向運輸署提交執行《指引》的報告，署方每年亦會委聘獨立承辦商，就車長的工作時間、休息時間及用膳時間進行調查。

城巴職工會副會長許漢傑表示，一直要求運輸署修改指引至每日上限12小時，但不得要領，而公司的底薪偏低，日做8小時，連同津貼車長月入只約1.4萬元，故不少同事需要加班工作，賺取超時補水才能養活家庭。

九巴員工協會副理事長郭偉光指，業界薪酬一直偏低，九巴加班情況同樣普遍，同事會提早上班或爭取在休息時數「加走（即加班多走幾程車）」，加班工作賺取額外收入，他認為公司需要增加員工薪酬，同時減低員工超時工作的需要，亦要求運輸署修改指引至12小時。

有城巴司機表示，試過「直踩」13小時，坦言很辛苦，途中只可在站頭稍作回氣，即使辛苦亦不能拒絕駕駛13小時的編更安排，而車長是多勞多得，不少人為生計願駕駛更長時間，有司機居住天水圍等偏遠地方，來回中環上班放工至少2小時，他聽聞有人僅睡4小時便要開工，情況嚴重。

立法會交通事務委員會主席陳恒鑌表示，巴士車身龐大，要兼顧路面的情況多，指引制定的14小時最高工時太長，有需要檢討，期望新一屆政府可以做到成績，巴士公司亦應該減少員工超時工作的情況。立法會議員胡志偉表示，14小時工作時數超過職業司機可負荷，必須檢討。因車長需照顧過百名乘客安全、路況，又要追趕班次數量，壓力巨大，會要求交通事務委員會召開特別會議跟進。

警方調查方面，警務處長盧偉聰昨表示，警方會向巴士公司檢取涉事巴士的拍攝紀錄，亦會尋找目擊證人及為受傷市民錄口供，警方會循涉事巴士司機的駕駛態度、有無涉及人為疏忽兩方向調查，亦會調查巴士有否衝燈超速、零件是否運作正常等，而由於調查時間尚短，暫時未有定論。

■明報報料熱線： [inews@mingpao.com](mailto:inews@mingpao.com) / 9181 4676

[Translation]

**Deadly Citybus accident in Sham Shui Po Bus captain drove for 14 hours straight meeting the maximum working hours stipulated by Transport Department Two bus unions urges to reduce maximum working hours of bus captains**

[Mingpao Archive] A bus drove onto the pedestrian road on Yen Chow Street in Sham Shui Po yesterday evening, causing 3 deaths and 30 injuries. The bus captain in concern had driven for 14 hours per day in the recent days, which borders on the maximum working hours specified in the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” issued by the Transport Department. Citybus admitted that the company has persistently suffered from a lack of manpower, and that the bus captain involved in the accident had worked an all-night shift before commencing his second shift “a little bit earlier to help out”. Some members of the legislative council are concerned that the present maximum working hours of 14 hours for bus captains would affect driving safety, and have urged the Government to evaluate the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks”. Two unions of bus companies have urged the Transport Department to reduce the maximum working hours to 12 hours under the Guidance, to ensure the safety of bus captains and the public.

Further, of the 3 deaths and 30 injuries caused by the accident, 1 injured passenger is in critical condition, 3 suffering from serious injuries, 11 in stable condition, and 15 have already been released by the hospitals as of yesterday evening. In the accident, a couple who were about to cross the road had been dragged under the bus, killing one and injuring another; and there are breadwinners of families that have been injured who are still in shock over the incident and are concerned that this may affect their working abilities in the future.

Citybus denies that the bus captain was carrying on back-to-back shifts, admits that bus captain “commenced work earlier to help out”

Mr. Chung Chak Man (transliteration), the Chief Operating Officer of Citybus, visited the victims at the hospital last night with his colleagues, bringing fruit baskets. Mr. Chung stated that Citybus has arranged for emergency funds for family members of the deceased, and has set up an insurance hotline. He confirmed that the bus captain in concern had worked an overnight shift, and had on some days commenced work earlier to help out. On the night before the accident, the bus captain was working an overnight shift, but did not work on back-to-back shifts.

He stated that Citybus has always suffered from a lack of manpower, but has complied with the Working Guidelines issued by the Transport Department in managing manpower to ensure that staff members have more than 10 hours of rest. It will discuss whether it is necessary to revise the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” with the Transport Department in due course.

Citybus Union has previously made submissions, but were ignored by Transport Department

The present “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” issued by the Transport Department require that the maximum working hours per day cannot exceed 14 hours (see chart). In the 2012 Legislative Council term, the then Secretary for Transport and Housing Mr Anthony Cheung Bing-leung had previously stated that he would evaluate the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks”, but no such revision has been made until today. The Transport Department responded that each franchise bus company must submit quarterly reports to the Transport Department regarding its compliance with the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks”, and the Transport Department hires independent contractors to inspect the working hours, rest hours and meal times of bus captains on an annual basis.

Mr. Hui Hon Kit (transliteration), Vice-President of the Citybus Limited Employees Union stated that requests have persistently been made for the Transport Department to revise the Guidelines to a maximum number of 12 working hours per day, but to no avail. The company’s base salary errs on the low end: a bus captain’s monthly salary amounts to approximately HK\$14,000 for 8 hour working days and including the stipend provided to bus captains. As such, many staff members need to work on multiple duties and work overtime in order to provide for their families.

Mr. Kwok Wai Kwong (transliteration), Vice-Chairman of the KMB Staff Union states that the salary for the industry is low, and it is common for bus captains to work multiple shifts and to commence work early or work during supposed rests times, to earn additional income. He takes the view that the company needs to increase the salaries of staff members, whilst at the same time reducing the need for staff members to work over time. Additionally, he requests that the Transport Department revise the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” to a working hours of 12 hours maximum.

Some bus captains at Citybus stated that they have worked for 13 hours straight, which was very tough, resting only briefly at several stops in the route. They say tat they cannot turn down the 13 hours arrangement no matter how tough it is, and that as bus captains earn more if they work harder, many would rather drive longer hours in order to make a living. Some bus captains live in Tin Shui Wai or other outskirt areas and it takes at least 2 hours to get to work in Central. They have heard of some bus captains who only have 4 hours of sleep before going to work. The situation is serious.

Mr. Chan Han-pan, the Chairman of the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council states that given the large body of the bus, there are a myriad of factors and situations to consider on-road. In light of this, the 14 hours maximum limit on working hours as stipulated in the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” is too long and needs to be evaluated. He hopes that the next government can show some progress and bus companies should also reduce the over-time situations amongst staff members. Mr. Wu Chi Wai (transliteration), member of the legislative council, states that the 14 hour working hours limit exceeds what bus captains can withstand, and needs to be revised. Because bus captains need to care of the safety of hundreds of passengers, the road conditions, and needs to catch

up with frequency of shifts, they are under immense stress. The Panel on Transport is requested to convene a special meeting to follow-up on such matters.

In terms of the police investigations, Mr. Lo Wai-Chung, Stephen Commissioner of Police stated yesterday evening that the police will seek photographic records of the bus in concern from the bus company, and search for any eye-witnesses or other injured persons to record interview statements. The police will investigate the bus captains' driving behaviour and whether there are issues of negligence, as well as whether the bus was speeding, disobeying traffic signals, and whether the bus mechanism was functioning normally. Due to the short period of on-going investigation, no conclusion can be reached at the present stage.

Mingpao hotline: [inews@mingpao.com](mailto:inews@mingpao.com) / 9181 4676

**Name (名稱):**

Independent Review Committee on Hong Kong's Franchised Bus Service  
香港專營巴士服務獨立檢討委員會

**Terms of Reference (職權範圍):**

From the point of view of safety, in the light of the fatal accident on 10 February 2018 and other recent serious incidents involving franchised buses in Hong Kong:

從安全角度而言，鑑於香港專營巴士涉及二零一八年二月十日發生的致命意外以及其他近期發生的嚴重事故：

- (a) to examine the operation and management of bus franchises under the current legislative, franchise and other contractual requirements;

審視巴士專營權在現行法律、專營權及其他合約規定下的運作及管理模式；

- (b) to examine the present regulatory and monitoring system for franchised buses; and

審視現行對專營巴士的監管及監察制度；以及

- (c) in relation to the above, to make recommendations to the Chief Executive on safety-related measures with a view to sustaining a safe and reliable franchised bus service in Hong Kong.

就上述事宜向行政長官提出與安全相關的建議，以維持香港的專營巴士服務安全可靠。

The Committee may invite submissions from interested parties and from the public on the above matters and should use its best endeavours to submit its report within nine months. Issues relating to the causes and liability of persons involved in the fatal accident on 10 February 2018



will be investigated by the Police and fall outside the Committee's terms of reference.

委員會可邀請有關人士、團體及公眾就上述事宜提交意見書，並盡其所能在九個月內提交報告。關於二零一八年二月十日發生的致命意外的成因及所涉人士的法律責任等事宜會由警方進行調查，該等事宜不屬委員會的職權範圍。

**Transcript prepared by the Secretariat of the Committee  
of part of the discussion of the Traffic and Transport Committee  
of the Sha Tin District Council at its 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting in 2018**

*Agenda item 8 - Question to be Raised by Mr YIU Ka-chun  
on the Fatal Bus Crash on Tai Po Road on 10 February*

**Source of audio recording of the meeting:**

[https://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/st/tc\\_chi/meetings/committees/dc\\_committees\\_meetings\\_audio.php?meeting\\_id=13846](https://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/st/tc_chi/meetings/committees/dc_committees_meetings_audio.php?meeting_id=13846)

**Relevant part of the audio recording:** 17:02 – 17:43

**Transcript:**

容溟舟議員：...而其中一個...指引有一個叫「特別更」嘅安排。我地有一個擔心就係「特別更」嘅同事係可能中場要休息，但係我地見到你只能夠提供呢...係巴士站裡面提供休息室。你未必能夠有一個適當嘅地方俾佢可能係瞓下、抖下或者盛，即係亦都有你地嘅同事去表達就係：「其實我地真係無地方去架...我地睇場戲，或者我地係個商場到行來行去。」咁呢個就有違反左...有違呢個休息個安排，咁呢度你地去如何處理呢...呢個情況？

**Translation:**

*District Councillor Michael Yung:* ...and there is the new arrangement of “special shifts” in the guidelines. We are worried that staff working special shifts may have to take a break when working a shift, but we can see that you [Note from Secretariat: refers to Kowloon Motor Bus] can only provide lounge facilities in bus stops. You may not have a suitable place for them to take a nap, have a rest, etc. In fact, some of your staff have indicated that “in fact we do not have any place to go...we can only go to see a movie or walk around in shopping malls”. This is not in line with the resting arrangements and how will you handle this?

**Franchises of  
New World First Bus Services Limited,  
Long Win Bus Company Limited and  
Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)**

## **PURPOSE**

The current franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) and Citybus Limited (“Citybus”) in respect of its franchise for the Airport and North Lantau bus network (“Franchise 2”) are due to expire in 2013. The Administration plans to start negotiation with NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) in the fourth quarter of this year for renewing their franchises to take effect immediately upon the expiry of their existing franchises, in order to ensure the continuous provision of proper and efficient public bus services for the travelling public. This paper sets out the relevant information and invites views from the public on the requirements of the new franchises

## **BACKGROUND**

### **Bus Franchises**

2. At present, there are five franchised bus companies operating six bus franchises. They are The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”), Citybus (which operates two franchises, one for Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour routes (“Franchise 1”) and another for the Airport and North Lantau bus network (“Franchise 2”), NWFB, New Lantau Bus Company (1973) (“NLB”) and LW.

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) (Cap. 230), the Chief Executive in Council (“CE-in-Council”) may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding 10 years. If the CE-in-Council thinks fit, the CE-in-Council may grant a new franchise to an existing grantee for a period not exceeding 10 years to begin immediately upon the expiry of the existing franchise. Section 6 also provides that an existing grantee may request an extension of its franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.

4. The Government's key consideration in awarding or extending a bus franchise is the provision of a proper and efficient public bus service. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise shall, at all times during the franchise period, maintain to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") a proper and efficient public bus service.

### **Expiry of Franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2)**

5. The current franchises of LW<sup>1</sup> and Citybus<sup>1</sup> (Franchise 2) commenced on 1 June 2003 and will expire on 1 May 2013. NWFB<sup>1</sup>'s current franchise commenced on 1 August 2003 and will expire on 1 July 2013. The three franchised bus companies have indicated an interest to renew their franchises for another 10 years to take effect upon the expiry of their current ones.

6. According to the established practice, bus companies who have proved themselves to be capable of providing proper and efficient services, and are willing to further invest in their franchised bus operations are granted new franchises for a period of 10 years. The certainty of a ten-year franchise would facilitate long-term planning and development of bus services including the operation of loss-making but socially desirable routes. It would also enable bus companies to secure financing on more favourable terms thus reducing operating cost. A ten-year franchise should embody room for weathering short-term volatility of business risks. As a labour-intensive service industry, a ten-year franchise is also conducive to a more stable working environment for the staff of the franchised bus companies, and therefore the provision of proper and efficient services to the travelling public.

7. To assess whether the franchised bus companies have been providing proper and efficient services, the Transport Department ("TD") has been conducting regular reviews of their performance through passenger satisfaction surveys, site surveys, vehicle inspections, examination of regular returns and public feedback. The assessments of the performance of the three franchised bus companies are highlighted below.

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<sup>1</sup> The main operating areas for LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) are in North Lantau and the Airport. The main operating areas for NWFB are on Hong Kong Island.

## ASSESSMENTS

### (A) Service Performance and Operational Efficiency

#### *NWFB*

8. As at end 2010, NWFB was operating 92 bus routes using 704 buses, and carrying about 470,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips<sup>2</sup> against the total number of trips was about 2.2% (ranging from 1.79% to 2.86%). During the same period, the annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the Transport Complaints Unit (“TCU”) was about 2.45 (ranging from 1.91 to 2.9). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was 5.74 per annum (ranging from 4.5 to 6.85)<sup>3</sup> over the same eight-year period. On the environment front, the percentage of buses in the fleet meeting the Euro emission standards<sup>4</sup> increased from 91.5% in 2003 to 98.4% in 2010.

9. Overall speaking, the operational and network efficiency of NWFB has improved, with the number of buses reduced from 732 in 2003 to 704 in 2010. Since 2003, NWFB has implemented 402 service improvement<sup>5</sup> and 211 service rationalisation<sup>6</sup> items. NWFB submits its 5-year Forward Planning Programme (“FPP”) on an annual basis with proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), NWFB planned to acquire a total of about 250 new buses, mainly for replacement of its old buses.

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<sup>2</sup> Lost trips refer to trips not meeting the schedules as agreed with TD.

<sup>3</sup> The number of NWFB buses involved in accidents per million vehicle-km per annum was relatively high since its bus routes were operating in urban areas which were more congested and vulnerable to traffic accidents.

<sup>4</sup> Euro emission standards define the acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of new vehicles sold in European Union member states. With reference to the prevailing Euro emission standards and the vehicle supply situation in Hong Kong, the Environmental Protection Department specifies, and updates from time to time, the requirement on newly registered heavy duty vehicles (including franchised buses) under the Air Pollution Control (Vehicle Design Standards) (Emission) Regulation (Cap. 311J). The emission requirements are updated on an on-going basis. Buses meeting Euro emission standards are either Euro I, II, III, IV or V buses.

<sup>5</sup> Service improvement measures mainly include introduction of new routes, frequency enhancement, extension of service hours and extension of routes.

<sup>6</sup> Service rationalisation measures mainly include route cancellation, frequency reduction, route truncation and re-routeing.

## **LW**

10. As at end 2010, LW was operating 19 bus routes with 165 buses, and carrying about 81,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips against the total number of trips was about 0.6% (ranging from 0.31% to 1.22%). The annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the TCU was 2.02 (ranging from 1.31 to 2.8). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was 1.15 per annum (ranging from 0.78 to 1.51) over the same eight-year period. On the environment front, the percentage of buses in the fleet meeting the Euro emission standards increased from 93.8% in 2003 to 100% in 2010.

11. The total number of buses for LW increased from 145 in 2003 to 165 in 2010 to meet the increase in passenger demand arising from the increase in population in Tung Chung new town and the travel demand to and from the Airport. Since 2003, LW has implemented 98 service improvement and 19 service rationalisation items. The number of daily passengers carried by LW increased from about 52,800 in 2003 to about 81,000 in 2010. LW submits its 5-year FPP on an annual basis with proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), LW planned to acquire a total of about 100 new buses (i.e. around 60% of its bus fleet) to replace its old buses and to further improve its service.

## ***Citybus (Franchise 2)***

12. As at end 2010, Citybus (Franchise 2) was operating 18 bus routes using 172 buses, and carrying about 62,000 passengers daily. From 2003 to 2010, the annual average percentage of lost trips against the total number of trips was about 0.6% (ranging from 0.34% to 0.94%). The annual average number of complaints per million passengers received by the TCU was 3.78 (ranging from 2.71 to 5.01). On safety, the overall number of bus accidents per million vehicle-km was about 1.92 per annum (ranging from 1.4 to 2.27) over the same eight-year period. All the buses in the fleet have met the Euro emission standards since the commencement of the existing franchise in 2003.

13. The total number of buses for Citybus (Franchise 2) increased from 164 in 2003 to 172 in 2010 to meet the increase in passenger demand. Since 2003, Citybus (Franchise 2) has implemented 51 service improvement and 41 service rationalisation items. The number of daily passengers carried by Citybus (Franchise 2) increased from about 41,500 in 2003 to about 62,000 in 2010. Citybus (Franchise 2) submits its 5-year FPP on an annual basis with

proposals for service improvement and rationalisation to enhance its service and network efficiency. It also includes a vehicle purchasing and replacement programme. According to its FPP (2011 to 2015), Citybus (Franchise 2) planned to acquire a total of about 130 new buses (i.e. over 75% of its fleet size) to replace the old buses.

## **(B) Safety and Service Enhancement Measures**

14. NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have been taking measures to further enhance safety. For example, all of them have implemented incentive schemes such as safety bonus and safe driving awards to nurture a safe driving culture among the drivers. Furthermore, NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) have implemented a new set of working hour and rest time arrangement for bus captains since its promulgation by TD in October 2010 to provide the bus captains with longer rest times during duty hours. LW will implement the same in August this year. All the three companies have also adopted measures to strengthen their bus captains' driving skills, driving attitude and safety awareness by providing enhancement, refresher and remedial training courses on safe driving. To facilitate better monitoring of the bus captains' performance, LW has completed the retrofitting of black boxes on all its buses in 2007, while NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) will start retrofitting their fleets with black boxes in 2012<sup>7</sup>.

15. To further enhance service standards and quality, the three franchised bus companies have made continuous improvement on the provision of passenger information including customer service centres, route information panels at bus termini and stops. Passengers can also search for the most up-to-date bus service information on the companies' websites.

16. The three franchised bus companies have been offering bus-bus interchange ("BBI") schemes with fare concessions. As at end 2010, NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) were providing 80, 8 and 39 BBI schemes respectively, either on their own or jointly with other companies. The BBI schemes provided by LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) at the Toll Plaza of Tsing Ma Control Area and Tung Chung new town are particularly well received by the locals. All the three companies have been offering a \$2 flat fare concession scheme for the elderly on the majority of their routes on Sundays and public holidays since January 2006<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Due to unforeseen liquidation of the supplier, installation of black boxes on the fleets of NWFB and Citybus (Franchise 2) has been delayed.

<sup>8</sup> For Octopus card holders only and excluding NWFB's racecourse routes, as well as the airport "A" routes of LW and Citybus (Franchise 2).

### **(C) Public Opinion on Bus Services**

17. At present, passenger satisfaction surveys are conducted to gauge passengers' opinions on the service performance of the three franchised bus companies. The findings of the passenger satisfaction surveys are used as the basis for TD and each franchised bus company to monitor its overall performance, keep track of passenger satisfaction and identify areas for improvements.

18. In addition, TD commissioned independent opinion surveys on the passengers' general feedback on the services provided by the three franchised bus companies in June 2011. The results show that 86%, 87% and 90% of the respondents are satisfied with the overall quality of services provided by NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) respectively. The summary of the survey findings on the three companies is at Annexes A to C.

### **RENEWAL OF FRANCHISES**

19. On the basis of the above assessments, C for T is of the view that NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have been providing proper and efficient bus services and have demonstrated their willingness to invest for further improvements. Nonetheless, the bus companies have expressed concern about the increase in operating costs (especially the rising staff costs and volatility of fuel prices) and keen competition from new railways. It is expected that the market share of franchised buses will continue to shrink with the commissioning of the West Island Line (in 2014), South Island Line (East) (in 2015), Kwun Tong Line Extension (in 2015), and the Shatin-Central Link (by two phases - in 2018 and 2020).

20. Since the enactment of the Ordinance in 1975, a total of four public tender exercises for new franchises were carried out between 1991 and 1998. Three of them were conducted for the purpose of bringing in new operators in view of the unsatisfactory performance of the then China Motor Bus Company Ltd. The other one was to facilitate the provision of a bus network to meet the demand arising from new developments in North Lantau and the new Airport at Chek Lap Kok. The established practice is that new franchises for a period of 5 or 6 years were granted for operation of new bus networks or to newcomers in the franchised bus industry, so as to observe the performance of the operators before consideration is given to granting longer franchises to them. This arrangement applied to Citybus (Franchise 2), LW in 1996 and NWFB in 1998



when their franchises were first granted.

21. For operators who have proved themselves to be capable of providing proper and efficient services, and are willing to further invest in their franchised bus operations, they have been granted new franchises for a period of 10 years. This arrangement applied to Citybus (Franchise 2), LW and NWFB when new franchises were granted to them to commence in 2003. This also applied to KMB, NLB and Citybus (Franchise 1) since 1997. Given that NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) have continued to provide proper and efficient services, they would have legitimate expectation that they would be granted new franchises, or have their existing franchises extended under the Ordinance, upon the expiry of their current franchises.

22. In order to ensure continuous provision of essential public bus services for the travelling public, the Administration plans to negotiate with the three franchised bus companies respectively new ten-year franchises to take effect immediately upon the expiry of their existing franchises in 2013. In the course of negotiating new franchises, the Administration would seek to update the terms and requirements so as to keep abreast of the times. Furthermore, we shall ask for the inclusion of provisions to enhance the level of services and their performance on environmental improvement, as well as fare concessions. We aim to conclude the negotiations by early 2012.

## **PUBLIC CONSULTATION**

23. We would like to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchises. Any views should be addressed in writing to the Bus and Railway Branch of Transport Department **on or before 30 September 2011** by the following means:

By Mail: 40/F., Immigration Tower,  
7 Gloucester Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong  
By Fax: 2802 2679  
By Email: franchise-renewal@td.gov.hk

Please state "Bus Franchise Requirements" on the envelope or in the submission.

## **ENQUIRIES**

24. Any enquiry on this paper should be addressed to:

Ms Candy KWOK  
Senior Transport Officer  
40/F., Immigration Tower,  
Gloucester Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong  
Tel: 2829 5499

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
July 2011**

## Transport Department

# **Passenger Opinion Survey for New World First Bus Services Limited**

## **- Summary of Survey Results -**

**Conducted and Prepared by**



**Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd.**  
米嘉道資訊策略有限公司

*July 2011*

## **Background & Objectives**

In order to collect views on the performance of the New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), the Transport Department has commissioned the Mercado Solutions Associates Limited (“MSA”) to conduct passenger opinion survey via telephone in June 2011.

## **The Survey**

The target population is the regular passengers aged 12 or above who take NWFB at least once a week. In order to ensure the findings of the survey are representative, a random sample of household telephone numbers were selected. Within the selected households, all individuals aged 12 or above who used the service of NWFB at least once a week were listed. After that, one target respondent of the selected household would be randomly picked by a random selection process.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 504 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 16 and 23 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 66%.

## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 86.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 13.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 77.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of NWFB. The percentage was higher than the 21.8% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 85.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 78.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 64.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of NWFB. The percentage was higher than the 34.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of NWFB. The percentage was much higher than the 10.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 48.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of NWFB on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 26.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 26.0% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

Transport Department

**Passenger Opinion Survey for  
Long Win Company Limited**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

Conducted and Prepared by



Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd

*July 2011*

## Background & Objectives

In order to collect views on the performance of Long Win Company Limited ("LW"), the Transport Department has commissioned the Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd ("OZZO") to conduct on-board face-to-face interview surveys on LW buses in June 2011.

## The Survey

The target population is passengers aged 12 or above who take LW buses. The required sample size was allocated to different LW routes according to ridership. Target respondents were picked by a random process with reference to the seating position on board the buses.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 503 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 18 and 27 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 75%.

## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by LW. The percentage was much higher than the 11.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 84.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 14.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 90.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 6.8% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 75.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/ satisfied with the passenger information provided by LW. The percentage was much higher than the 16.3% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 56.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of LW. The percentage was higher than the 41.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 84.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 12.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of LW. The percentage was much higher than the 8.2% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 59.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of LW on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 7.4% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 32.4% of the respondents indicated "No comment".



Transport Department

**Passenger Opinion Survey for  
Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport  
and North Lantau Bus Network)**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

Conducted and Prepared by



Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd

*July 2011*

## Background & Objectives

In order to collect views on the performance of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network) ("Citybus Limited (Franchise 2)"), the Transport Department has commissioned the Ozzo Technology (HK) Ltd (OZZO) to conduct the on-board face-to-face interview surveys on Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) buses in June 2011.

## The Survey

The target population is passengers aged 12 or above who take Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) buses. The required sample size was allocated to different Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) routes according to ridership. Target respondents were picked by a random process with reference to the seating position on board the buses.

The questionnaire survey includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers and staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 505 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 18 and 27 June 2011, representing an overall response rate of 77%.

## Survey Results

1. Overall speaking, 90.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 7.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
2. 85.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 12.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 86.9% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 9.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 72.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 19.6% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 68.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was higher than the 26.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 89.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 6.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers and staff of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2). The percentage was much higher than the 5.1% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 53.4% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of Citybus Limited (Franchise 2) on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 5.7% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 40.2% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

For information  
on 5 December 2011

## **LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON TRANSPORT**

### **Franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)**

#### **Purpose**

This paper provides a summary of the views received by the Administration on the requirements of the proposed new franchises for New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) and Citybus Limited (“Citybus”) in respect of its franchise for the Airport and North Lantau bus network (“Franchise 2”) to be renewed upon the expiry of their current ones in 2013.

#### **Views on the requirements of the new franchises**

2. To solicit views on the requirements of the new franchises, the Administration consulted this Panel and the Transport Advisory Committee in July 2011. Views from members of the public, as well as members of the Traffic and Transport Committees of all the District Councils were invited during the period between mid-July and end September 2011. Further views were also received at the meeting arranged by this Panel at the last meeting held on 7 November. As requested by this Panel, a list of the major views on the requirements of the new franchises for the three bus companies received by the Administration is provided at the Annex.

3. The Administration has fully noted the views on the franchise requirements as set out at the Annex. In the course of negotiating the new franchises with the three bus companies, the Administration would endeavour to pursue the requirements to better meet public needs and expectations.

#### **Advice Sought**

4. Members are invited to note the content of this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
November 2011**

**Major Views on the Requirements of the New Franchises  
for NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2)**

**Introduction**

The Administration received a total of 120 submissions from individuals and organizations during the public consultation period from 18 July to 30 September 2011. A meeting was arranged by the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council on 7 November 2011, which was attended by 26 deputations. In addition, 21 written submissions were received. The areas which have attracted the most proposals on franchise requirements are as follows :

- (a) fare-related requirements covering fare reduction proposals, various fare concession schemes and review of the fare adjustment arrangement;
- (b) environmental requirements, mostly on the use of the most environment-friendly buses or early replacement of existing diesel buses; and
- (c) service-related requirements including better and more efficient bus services, the provision of enhanced on-board facilities and information for passengers.

**Summary of Major Views Received**

**A. Fare initiatives to reduce transport costs of passengers**

- (1) fare reduction or concession schemes;
- (2) more bus-bus interchange schemes;
- (3) introducing inter-company bus-bus interchange schemes;
- (4) fare discounts/monthly tickets for airport workers;
- (5) more section fares; and
- (6) fare concessions for persons with disabilities, the elderly and students.

**B. Environmental initiatives**

- (1) Use of environment-friendly buses
  - (a) replacing existing diesel buses with the most environment-friendly buses such as hybrid or electric buses;

- (b) retrofitting emission reduction devices on buses;
  - (c) trial and use of electric buses or other environment-friendly buses;  
and
  - (d) enhancing inspection and maintenance of buses.
- (2) Rationalisation of bus services for environmental reasons
- (a) deploying low emission buses along busy corridors;
  - (b) reducing duplication of bus routes;
  - (c) rationalizing bus routes that duplicate railways;
  - (d) reducing services during off-peak periods;
  - (e) rationalising the service of low-patronage bus routes;
  - (f) deploying single-deck buses to low-patronage bus routes ;
  - (g) replacing bus routes with low-patronage by public light buses; and
  - (h) reducing number of bus stops.
- (3) Government to introduce incentive schemes to encourage bus companies to pursue environmental initiatives (such as direct financial assistance, higher permitted returns).

### C. Service improvements

- (1) Enhancing on-bus facilities and environment for passengers
- (a) providing barrier-free facilities for the elderly and persons with disabilities, including –
    - (i) wheelchair spaces;
    - (ii) low-floor bus;
    - (iii) access and aisle arrangement;
    - (iv) priority seats;
    - (v) enlarged display of route information;
    - (vi) bus stop announcement system;
    - (vii) more hand rails etc;
  - (b) carriage of bicycles on franchised buses;
  - (c) deploying better quality buses on airport routes;
  - (d) enhancing comfort and cleanliness of buses;
  - (e) improving passenger facilities; and
  - (f) improving air quality and temperature inside buses.
- (2) Enhancing information to passengers
- (a) providing more route information at bus termini and stops;
  - (b) better use of information technology;
  - (c) providing bus arrival time information;
  - (d) providing Wi-Fi on buses; and
  - (e) improving the content and regulating the sound volume of the multi-media on board.

- (3) Improving the level of bus services of new routes to better meet passenger demand
  - (a) improving frequencies and peak-hour capacity;
  - (b) introducing new routes to Lantau/the airport;
  - (c) more direct routeing of the bus routes within the airport island; and
  - (d) extending the operating hours of the airport external routes.
- (4) Enhancing bus safety including
  - (a) use of black box;
  - (b) installing speed display inside buses;
  - (c) developing a speed policy for buses operating at different road sections; and
  - (d) preventing passengers falling inside bus compartments, etc.

D. Government's regulatory measures

- (1) better monitoring of bus companies' service frequencies and handling of complaints;
- (2) introducing mid-term review to ensure proper and efficient bus services;
- (3) introducing penalty system for poor performance;
- (4) enhancing public participation in bus planning and operational matters;
- (5) reviewing the bus fare adjustment arrangement;
- (6) reviewing the fare scales and structure;
- (7) reviewing the passenger reward arrangement;
- (8) introducing measures to help reduce operating costs of or improve the operating environment for bus companies; and
- (9) reviewing bus franchising arrangement.

E. Others

- (1) enhancing facilities at bus termini for and improving rest time of bus captains;
  - (2) improving training for bus captains;
  - (3) requiring the bus companies to improve communication with bus captains; and
  - (4) requiring the bus companies to employ persons with disability.
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For discussion  
on 1 March 2012

**LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL  
PANEL ON TRANSPORT**

**Franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited,  
Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited  
(Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network)**

**Purpose**

This paper informs Members of the latest position of the negotiations with New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”), Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) and Citybus Limited (“Citybus”) in respect of its franchise for the Airport and North Lantau bus network (“Franchise 2”) on the proposed granting of new franchises upon the expiry of their current ones in 2013.

**Consultation with the Public and the Transport Panel**

2. To solicit views on the requirements of the new franchises, the Administration consulted this Panel and the Transport Advisory Committee in July 2011. Views from members of the public, as well as members of the Traffic and Transport Committees of all the District Councils were also invited during the period between mid-July and end September 2011. A total of 120 submissions were received during this period. Further views were also received at the Panel meeting held on 7 November 2011, which was attended by 26 deputations. In addition, 21 written submissions were received.

3. At the meeting of this Panel held on 5 December 2011, we presented a summary of the major views on the requirements of the new franchises received hitherto by the Administration. Members asked the Administration to make further efforts on issues including the provision of fare concessions (including section fares, bus-bus interchange schemes (“BBIs”) and monthly passes) as well as facilities and barrier-free features for the elderly passengers and persons with disabilities. The Chairman also followed up by writing to the Administration on 7 December 2011.

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## **Negotiations on the New Franchises**

4. Through public consultation and the thorough discussions at this Panel, we are fully aware of the views of the public on the requirements of the new franchises. The three areas which have attracted the most attention during public consultation and the discussions at this Panel are fare concessions; enhancement in facilities and information for passengers; and environmental improvement measures. We have been pursuing the proposed requirements with the franchised bus companies during the negotiations.

### Fare Concessions

5. To meet public aspirations for more fare concessions, we have conducted follow-up discussions with NWFB, LW and CTB(F2) -

- (a) to introduce more new BBIs, including inter-company BBIs;
- (b) to introduce new section fares and to reduce section fares on suitable routes; and
- (c) to introduce more fare concessions, including provision of monthly passes on suitable routes.

6. We have been making reasonable progress in our negotiations with each of the three bus companies in drawing up concrete commitments on fare concessions to be offered by the bus companies. The bus companies are actively considering proposals on more BBIs, as well as new or lower section fares on suitable routes. In negotiating the fare initiatives, we have placed particular emphasis on proposals that can better meet specific needs of local passengers in the major service areas of the three bus companies, including, the needs of Tung Chung residents, airport workers, as well as Hong Kong Island and Tseung Kwan O residents.

7. In the process of negotiating for more fare concessions, our main objective is to secure those concessions which would benefit more passengers, whilst taking into account the overall financial viability and resource requirements of the bus companies and thus the resultant impact on the general fares on all passengers. In particular, while we have asked the bus companies to consider the feasibility of offering monthly tickets to regular users, they have expressed grave concerns on the proposal because of the huge financial implications and pressure on possible fare increases. Currently, many bus

routes are already loss-making. As substantial discounts<sup>1</sup> have to be provided for monthly tickets to make them attractive to regular passengers, the offering of monthly tickets would lead to further reduction of fare revenues, thereby aggravating the difficult operating environment of the bus companies. There is also concern about whether it is fair to have all other passengers subsidizing a particular group of passengers. Based on the views received by the Administration in this exercise to renew the franchises, monthly tickets are requested mainly to meet the needs of the airport workers. In this connection, we are actively pursuing with the two bus companies with main operating areas in North Lantau and the Airport, i.e. LW and CTB(F2), to introduce more new BBIs and section fares to benefit the airport workers.

### Enhancing Standard of Bus Services

8. In respect of enhancement of bus safety and services, we have made good progress in the negotiations. We have asked to include a new clause in the franchises to empower the Commissioner for Transport (“the Commissioner”) to require the bus companies to provide service and safety enhancement facilities or design features on their buses. These include barrier-free and elderly-friendly facilities on buses, as well as facilities or design features that would enhance the general service and safety standard of buses.

9. To give practical effect to the new clause in the franchises, the three bus companies would be required to make commitments, among others, on the following main initiatives -

- (a) adopting bus design with barrier-free and elderly-friendly features when setting specifications for new buses. The major barrier-free features and facilities include low-floor and wheelchair accessible designs, provision of wheelchair parking spaces and the associated safety restraint system, designated priority seats for persons in need, enhanced railing design, easily reached pushed buttons, bus stop announcement system, large electronic destination and route number display panels;
- (b) allowing foldable bicycles, which are properly folded and packed, and would not cause hazards to other passengers, to be carried on franchised buses ; and

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<sup>1</sup> Monthly tickets normally allow the ticket-holders unlimited rides on relevant route(s) at a fixed price within the one-month validity period, and would generally be priced lower than the total single-journey fares paid by the relevant regular bus passenger, i.e. providing discounts for regular bus passengers.

- (c) providing higher quality buses (e.g. with more comfortable seat design) on airport routes (operated by LW and CTB(F2) currently).

10. In respect of enhancing the provision of information for passengers, we are seeking to amend and update the relevant clauses in the current franchises so as to enhance the Commissioner's regulatory power over the type, form and manner of information to be provided by the bus companies to passengers. We are making good progress in our discussions with the bus companies. At the same time, we are also asking the bus companies to make specific commitments on provision of enhanced passenger information including more and better route information, bus service enquiry system through web browsers, installation of electronic display panels at major termini and on-board buses, etc.

#### Environmental Improvement Initiatives

11. In relation to environmental improvement, the bus companies have been requested to include new/amended clauses in the franchises to undertake, as far as reasonably practicable, to use the most environmentally friendly buses (including zero emission buses), and to adopt products that are technologically proven and commercially available to reduce emissions.

12. To further improve roadside air quality, we are also discussing with the bus companies to make commitments on the deployment of low emission buses (buses of emission standards of Euro IV or above) for operation at pilot low emission zones delineated by the Environmental Protection Department.

#### Other Initiatives

13. In addition, we shall include new and amended clauses in the franchises to enhance regulation over the operational matters (e.g. submission of system audit reports to ensure integrity of information submitted to the Transport Department) as well as the financial and accounting arrangements (e.g. requirements to strengthen transparency on related party transactions) of the franchised bus operations, so as to better ensure the provision of proper and efficient public bus services.

#### **Conclusion**

14. Whilst the Administration has endeavoured to secure more fare concessions and service enhancement initiatives to better meet public needs and expectations, it is also necessary to consider the possible impact on the bus fares

as a whole, and the need to ensure the financial sustainability of the bus companies to enable them to continue to provide proper, affordable, reliable and efficient bus services and to further invest in their bus operations. The bus companies are constantly pointing out the difficult operating environment with expected increase in operating costs (especially the rising staff costs and volatility of fuel prices). Moreover, keen competition posed by new railways to be commissioned in the coming years<sup>2</sup> would also have an adverse impact on the market share of franchises buses.

15. On the whole, the Administration is making good progress in the negotiations with the bus companies on the requirements of the new franchises. We shall continue with the negotiations, and aim to conclude the negotiations by mid-2012.

### **Advice Sought**

16. Members are invited to note the content of this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**February 2012**

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<sup>2</sup> It is expected that the market share of franchised buses will continue to shrink with the commissioning of West Island Line (in 2014), South Island Line (East) (in 2015), Kwun Tong Line Extension (in 2015), and the Shatin-Central Link (by two phases in 2018 and 2020).

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(1)220/11-12  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB1/PL/TP/1

**Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of meeting held on  
Monday, 11 July 2011, at 8:30 am  
in the Chamber of the Legislative Council Building**

**Members present** : Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo (Chairman)  
Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming, GBS, JP (Deputy Chairman)  
Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, SBS, S.B.St.J., JP  
Hon LAU Kong-wah, JP  
Hon Miriam LAU Kin-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, SBS, JP  
Hon LI Fung-ying, SBS, JP  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon Ronny TONG Ka-wah, SC  
Hon KAM Nai-wai, MH  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan  
Hon WONG Sing-chi  
Hon IP Wai-ming, MH  
Hon Tanya CHAN  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip

**Member attending** : Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP

**Members absent** : Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, SBS, JP  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung

**Public officers attending : Agenda item III**

Mr Patrick CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 3

Miss Petty LAI  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and  
Housing (Transport) 6

Miss Cinderella LAW Fung-ping  
Assistant Commissioner/Administration & Licensing  
Transport Department

Mr Reginald CHAN  
Chief Transport Officer (VALID Project)  
Transport Department

**Agenda item IV**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mrs Hedy CHU POON Kit-man  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 4

Mr Albert SU Yau-on  
Assistant Commissioner / Management & Paratransit  
(Acting)  
Transport Department

Mr Kenneth MOK Ying-kit  
Chief Transport Officer / Planning / Ferry  
Transport Department

**Agenda item V**

Ms Rebecca PUN  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 2

Ms Carolina YIP  
Deputy Commissioner for Transport / Transport  
Services & Management

Ms Macella LEE  
Principal Transport Officer / Bus and Railway 3

**Attendance by  
invitation** : **Agenda item IV**

Fortune Ferry Company Limited

Mr CHAN Kam-hung  
Director

Mr Henry YOUNG  
Clerk

Peng Chau Kai To Limited

Mr Kent WONG  
Manager

Tsui Wah Ferry Service (Hong Kong) Limited

Ms Monita LEUNG  
Manager

**Clerk in attendance:** Ms Joanne MAK  
Chief Council Secretary (1)2

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Sarah YUEN  
Senior Council Secretary (1)2

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (1)2

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Action

As the Chairman was attending another meeting, the Deputy  
Chairman took over as the Chair.

**I Confirmation of minutes**

(LC Paper No. CB(1)2544/10-11 - Minutes of meeting on 15 April 2011)

2. The minutes of the meeting held on 15 April 2011 were confirmed.

**II Information papers issued since last meeting**

(LC Paper No. CB(1) - Further submission from a member of the public on improvements that should be introduced to the public transport arrangements at Central Piers  
2615/10-11(01)

LC Paper No. CB(1) - Submission from a member of the public complaining about the service of MTR bus route K52)  
2665/10-11(01)

3. Members noted the above papers issued since the last regular meeting.

**III Issue of certificate of particulars of motor vehicles**

(LC Paper No. CB(1) - Administration's paper on issue of certificate of particulars of motor vehicles)  
2647/10-11(01)

4. The Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 3 (DS(T)3) briefed members on the proposal (the Proposal) to improve the issuing mechanism of the Certificate of Particulars of Motor Vehicles (the Certificate). Members noted that to enhance privacy protection and ensure that the personal data of registered owners contained in the register of vehicles (the Register) maintained by the Transport Department (TD) would be properly used, the Administration intended to strengthen the existing administrative measures, and codify them in the laws to provide a proper statutory footing to facilitate enforcement.

*(The Chairman arrived and took over the chair at this juncture.)*

Justification and implications of the Proposal

5. Noting that many applications for the Certificate in 2010 had been made from property agents and media or news agencies, Mr Jeffrey LAM



enquired whether in working out the Proposal, the Administration had taken into consideration the Proposal's implications on the operation of the above sectors, which had a need for the particulars concerned, and had consulted the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (the Commissioner).

6. DS(T)3 responded that while aware of the public's right to know and the need of certain sectors for the particulars concerned, after making reference to overseas practices and consulting the Commissioner on the principles on collection and use of personal data, namely, that collection of personal data from the public should be conducted in a lawful and fair manner, and that personal data collected should be used for the purposes for which they were collected or a directly related purpose, the Administration saw a need to ensure that the data collected for maintaining the Register should be for the purpose of facilitating the handling of traffic and transport related matters only, and that further measures should be introduced to strengthen the protection of privacy of the personal data of registered owners. The Administration had already taken care to ensure that parties which had a genuine need for the particulars could still apply to TD for provision of such details under the improved mechanism.

7. While agreeing that certain restrictions should be imposed on applications for the Certificate to prevent abuse, Mr Jeffrey LAM was keen to ensure that the operation of the trades concerned would not be affected by the Proposal, and hence enquired whether the Proposal could be relaxed in certain areas as appropriate. DS(T)3 responded that the Administration would, with an open mind, actively consider all constructive and feasible comments on the Proposal received during consultation. He further assured members that if found necessary after implementation of the Proposal, the Administration could amend the list of proposed scenarios (the list of proposed scenarios) under which persons who were not registered owners might obtain personal particulars of registered owners without the consent of the registered owners concerned through making declaration to the Commissioner for Transport (C for T) (Annex C to the Administration's paper for this item (LC Paper No. CB(1)2647/10-11(01))).

8. Ms Miriam LAU agreed that to prevent abuse, such as use of the particulars concerned for marketing purposes, there was a need to tighten to a certain extent the issuing mechanism of the Certificate. She, however, was keen to ensure that all reasonable applications for the particulars would be covered in the list of proposed scenarios and, highlighting the proposed scenario of "legal proceedings involving the vehicle", expressed concern that the example quoted to explain the scenario might be too narrow, so that applications for vehicle particulars for the purpose of ascertaining the

ownership might in future not be approved.

9. The Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 6 responded that the above example had in fact been quoted to address the concerns expressed by the Law Society of Hong Kong (LS) when it was previously consulted on the Proposal. The Administration would, in response to Ms Miriam LAU's views above and other views collected during public consultation on the Proposal, consult LS and the Department of Justice again to ensure that all reasonable applications for the Certificate would be entertained after implementation of the Proposal. Noting the response, Ms Miriam LAU opined that the scope of scenarios (D) and (E) in the list of proposed scenarios should also be widened in recognition that they were both related to reasonable legal actions.

#### Other views and concerns

10. Mr Jeffrey LAM asked whether restrictions would be imposed on how the vehicle particulars requested should be used when providing them to the applicants and, if so, whether there would be sanctions for non-compliance. He further opined that, to strike a balance between the public's right to know and privacy protection, the Certificate might provide only insensitive particulars of motor vehicles.

11. DS(T)3 responded that among the 18 items of particulars contained in the Register, 15 were related to the vehicle (vehicle particulars) and only three were particulars pertaining to the registered vehicle owner (personal particulars) including his name, residential address and identity document. The Administration would release such personal particulars in the Certificate if the information was required for certifying the identity of the owner in specified scenarios. As to sanctions, the Administration had already proposed to introduce a sanction provision such that it should be an offence for a Certificate applicant to use the personal particulars of the registered vehicle owner for purposes other than that declared, and that upon conviction, the applicant would be liable to a fine at level 2, i.e. a fine between \$2,001 and \$5,000 (inclusive), and to six months' imprisonment. In response to Mr Jeffrey LAM on whether investigations and prosecutions had been conducted in the past, DS(T)3 confirmed that no applicant had been prosecuted for making of false statement since the introduction of administrative measures in 2003 to clearly put across the message to applicants that the information on the Certificate should only be used for traffic and transport related purposes.

12. Noting that the Administration would launch a two-month public consultation to collect views from the public and relevant stakeholders on the

Proposal, the Chairman urged the Administration to carefully examine the views solicited, so as to strike a balance between the interests of the public and those of relevant stakeholders. In response to him, the Administration confirmed that the relevant legislative proposals would be introduced in the 2011-2012 session.

#### IV Outlying island ferry services

LC Paper No. 2647/10-11(02)	CB(1) - Administration's paper on outlying island ferry services
LC Paper No. 2647/10-11(03)	CB(1) - Chairman's letter dated 8 June 2011 on fare increases for outlying island ferry services to the Administration
LC Paper No. 2275/10-11(07)	CB(1) - Administration's paper on fare increases for outlying island ferry services
LC Paper No. 2275/10-11(08)	CB(1) - Referral from the Complaints Division dated 6 May 2011
LC Paper No. 2275/10-11(09)	CB(1) - Follow-up memo regarding the referral from the Complaints Division dated 6 May 2011
LC Paper No. CB(1)2302/10-11	- Paper on the development of major outlying island licensed ferry services prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (Updated background brief))

#### Meeting with deputations/ the Administration

##### *Fortune Ferry Company Limited*

13. Mr CHAN Kam-hung complained that he had been applying for the provision of a ticket booth for his company at the pier for a long time but to no avail, and passengers who wished to use their service did not know where to buy the tickets. Moreover, while the Government was providing about \$120 million for the implementation of a number of helping measures for six major outlying island ferry services (the \$120-million subsidy), the subsidy was not available for his company. He considered the above arrangement unfair, and questioned how the Administration decided on which ferry services to assist.

*Peng Chau Kai To Limited*

14. Mr Kent WONG made the following points on behalf of Peng Chau Kai To Limited and other small ferry operators –

- (a) It was undesirable that the Administration was only willing to provide assistance to the six major outlying island ferry trunk routes and even with the \$120-million subsidy made available to them, there were still fare increases. . As for small operators, although the ferry service for Po Toi Island was the only means of transport for the islanders concerned, the operator of the service could not get benefit from the subsidy, and even had to hire a barge for use as pier;
- (b) It was unfair that the Administration had turned down such humble requests for assistance from small ferry operators as exemption of the vessel licence fee or the annual vessel survey fee, and that they had to rely on fare increases where necessary to sustain the viability of their services. When his company applied for fare increase two years before, he was asked to consider public affordability, and the time taken to process fare increase applications was long, spanning at least one year; and
- (c) There was a need to ensure small ferry operators' financial viability and sustainability. In this regard, it should be noted that waiver of fuel duty could not help them because they were already using duty-free fuel. Instead, the Administration should help ensure that oil companies would not always increase the oil prices at a pace more quickly than reducing them.

*Tsui Wah Ferry Service (Hong Kong) Limited (Tsui Wah)*

15. Ms Monita LEUNG echoed Peng Chau Kai To Limited's views, and added that the Administration should provide greater assistance to such small ferry operators as Tsui Wah to enable them to survive because many of the islands they served, such as Po Toi Island and Tung Ping Chau, did not have electricity supply at the piers, and the operators had to provide lighting for the piers concerned. She also considered it unfair that ferry service between Aberdeen and Lamma Island did not receive any government subsidy and Tsui Wah also had to purchase a pontoon for use at the landing steps for the service. Meanwhile, their application for electricity supply for this pontoon

had been filed for three years without any progress and Tsui Wah had to purchase an electricity generator to supply electricity for the pontoon.

16. The Chairman and members thanked the deputations for attending the meeting to express their views. Members noted that the following ferry operators who did not send representatives to attend the meeting had also provided submissions for members' reference –

- (a) Submission from Hong Kong & Kowloon Ferry Holdings Limited (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2670/10-11(01));
- (b) Submission from Discovery Bay Transportation Services Limited (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2678/10-11(01)); and
- (c) Submission from New World First Ferry Services Limited (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2678/10-11(02)).

#### Discussion

*Further views from deputations on operational difficulties and additional helping measures required*

17. Mr Jeffrey LAM noted that because of the shrinking island populations, there was difficulty in securing operators to provide outlying island ferry services despite repeated discussion of the operational problems of the services, and that five measures as elaborated in paragraph 2 of the Administration's paper for this item (LC Paper No. CB(1)2647/10-11(02)) had been taken by the Government to enable ferry operators to reduce operating costs and increase non-fare box revenue (the five measures). He therefore opined that additional measures, such as adjustment of the service level in consultation with the operators and islanders, would be necessary for sustaining the services at a satisfactory level, and asked the deputations to give views on additional measures required.

18. Ms Monita LEUNG responded that the exemption of vessel licence fees or the annual vessel survey fee could better provide relief to small ferry operators because there were no piers for the six "kai-to" services operated by Tsui Wah. As such, Tsui Wah could not benefit from subletting ferry pier areas for commercial concession to generate non-fare box revenue to cross-subsidize ferry operation; or the measures of streamlining pier area subletting approval procedures.

19. At Mr Albert CHAN's invitation to give views on the difficulties faced by ferry operators, Mr Kent WONG made the following points –

- (a) It was undesirable that, instead of formulating a long-term comprehensive ferry policy to ensure the sustainability of ferry services, the Government had only been introducing ad hoc helping measures from time to time;
- (b) The Government had not listened to operators' views on the need to boost island populations to increase patronage of outlying island ferry services, and had instead maintained the ferry fare differential between holidays and weekdays. As a result, passengers originally using ferry service for trips to Lantau Island had switched to use the Tung Chung Line (TCL) instead, leading to a significant drop in the patronage of the "Central-Mui Wo" route after the commissioning of TCL;
- (c) The existing helping measures could offer little help to small operators. If sufficient assistance was not provided to help them survive, their services might be replaced by illegal ferry services to the detriment of public safety; and
- (d) The Administration should provide greater assistance to small ferry operators because they were seeking assistance to alleviate pressure on fare increases. Moreover, if a service was the only means of transport for the islanders, the Administration should help sustain the service for the sake of ensuring fairness to all islanders even though their number was small.

*Concerns about the unfair treatment of small ferry operators*

20. Mr WONG Kwok-hing considered it unfair that the Administration had treated big and small ferry operators differently, and had turned a blind eye to the latter's requests for assistance, so that the small operators could not benefit from the \$120-million subsidy. In response to him on why the subsidy could not be used to improve the pier facilities of small ferry operators, the Under Secretary for Transport and Housing (USTH) explained that the Administration had considered it appropriate to provide the \$120-million subsidy to the six major outlying island ferry services only because, not only were these services the only means of transport for the islanders concerned but the number of these islanders was also significantly greater than that of the islanders served by small operators. On the other hand, since the number of islanders served by small operators was small, or

that other alternative services were available, it might not be justified to make available the subsidy to small operators although the Administration appreciated the operational problems faced by them.

21. Mr WONG Kwok-hing urged the Administration to undertake to review the above highlighted unfair treatment of ferry operators, and to help improve small operators' pier facilities although the number of islanders they served was small. USTH responded that small ferry operators could also benefit from some of the existing helping measures. For example, the measure of "reimbursing pier rentals and exempting vessel licence fees for ferry services under the Elderly Concessionary Fares Scheme". Moreover, there was a need to observe the principle that public transport services should be operated by the private sector on commercial principles. Mr Kent WONG, however, pointed out that the administrative costs incurred from providing concessionary fares for the elderly might be higher than pier rentals.

*Views and proposals on the necessary helping measures*

*- General*

22. Ms Miriam LAU pointed out that, as gathered from the depositions and the submissions, ferry operators, big or small, faced operational difficulties due to the unique nature of ferry operation, which was greatly affected by not only high fuel cost but also the high costs incurred in obtaining licence and surveying vessels. As such, exemption of vessel licence fees or the annual vessel survey fee would in general greatly help ferry operators survive although for small operators, there was also a need to help them improve pier facilities which at present were grossly inadequate, and to improve the vessels used to encourage more people to visit the more remote islands. The assistance for big operators should also be enhanced in recognition that they still had to increase fares by over 10% despite the \$120-million subsidy. Medium operators too, required assistance to maintain the service level. She therefore requested the Administration to at least exempt vessel licence fees or the vessel survey fee for all ferry operators, and to consider the establishment of a fuel price stabilization fund. Mr Paul TSE added that the Administration should also consider introducing fuel surcharge as in the case of air fares.

23. While agreeing to examine the views expressed by members at this meeting, USTH explained that the establishment of a fuel price stabilization fund might be infeasible considering the great fluctuation in fuel price and the implications of providing assistance in this way. As to exemption of vessel licence fees or the annual vessel survey fee, since the fees were sources of

public revenue, the Administration would need to exercise care in considering the proposal.

*- Purchase of vessels for operation by contractors*

24. Mr KAM Nai-wai urged the Administration to consider relaxing the principle that public transport services should be operated by the private sector on commercial principles and, during the new three-year licence period from 2011 to 2014, examine the option of maintaining outlying island ferry services by purchasing vessels for operation by contractors as in many overseas countries. He considered the option justified because residents of the New Territories had already been benefitting from the construction of railways to serve them as a result of the Government's transport policy tilted in favour of railways, so that substantial funding had been made for the construction of the West Island Line (WIL), and that the development right of a plot of land in Wong Chuk Hang had been granted to MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) to subsidize the construction of the South Island Line. In his view, not only would the above option help keep outlying ferry services and fares at an optimal level to ensure fairness to islanders but it could also ensure the use of more environment-friendly vessels.

25. USTH responded that the above option had already been considered during the review of outlying island ferry services completed in mid-2010 (the 2010 Review). However, considering that a huge capital expenditure at around \$1.7 billion would be incurred for the Government to purchase vessels for operation of ferry services, and that this option would not reduce pressure on fare increases because the fare level would still be affected by fuel, maintenance and staff cost increases, the Administration considered the option infeasible. Moreover, after introducing new helping measures as a result of the 2010 Review, operators were already willing to operate the services concerned with enhancement to the service level. Mr KAM Nai-wai, however, opined that \$1.7 billion was only one-tenth of the funding used to subsidize the construction of WIL. The Chairman echoed his view.

26. Mr WONG Sing-chi maintained that the Administration should consider the option of purchasing vessels for operation by contractors because the Government had the responsibility to ensure the provision of satisfactory ferry service for outlying islands at affordable fares, especially as it was the only means of transport for many of the islanders concerned and, if ferry service could not be sustained for them, bridges or tunnels would need to be constructed to ensure accessibility, and the cost incurred would far exceed the \$1.7 billion required for purchasing vessels for operation of ferry services. In response, USTH reiterated the need to observe the principle that public



transport services should be operated by the private sector on commercial principles. However, ferry services were unique in that they were the only means of transport for some of the outlying islands. In the 2010 review, the Government had recommended that further helping measures be provided to the six major trunk routes and that about \$120 million had been approved by the Legislative Council Finance Commitment for their implementation. Ferry service was therefore already enjoying more assistance from the Government than other public transport services.

27. In response to Mr WONG Sing-chi, USTH further explained that since other ferry service routes had alternative transport means, to ensure prudent use of public funds the Administration considered it more desirable for them to be operated according to commercial principles. Moreover, the Work Incentive Transport Subsidy Scheme could help islanders meet travelling expenses. Pointing out that the Government was heavily subsidizing the development of the rail network, Mr WONG considered it unreasonable that the Administration was unwilling to purchase vessels for the operation of outlying island ferry services. Mr Albert CHAN shared his view, adding that it was also unreasonable that although MTRCL was a listed company, the Government was heavily subsidizing it in various forms.

*- Other proposals on how to enhance assistance for ferry operators*

28. Mr WONG Kwok-hing considered it regrettable that despite the provision of the \$120-million subsidy to the six major outlying island ferry services, the operators concerned had still increased their fares by over 10%. To avoid the above scenario from arising, he opined that the licence period concerned should be set at ten years instead of only three years, which might be too short for recovery of the investment required, and not conducive to attracting tenants to hire pier areas. USTH responded that although the validity period of all licences was three years, C for T might, at the request of the licensee, during any period while the licence was in force, extend the licence for a further period not exceeding three years at any one time up to an aggregate period of ten years. As such, ferry operators should be able to carry out long-term planning to achieve a fair return.

29. Mr Paul TSE opined that, to keep ferry fares affordable, the Administration should make efforts to facilitate subletting of pier areas for commercial concession or advertising, so as to help ferry operators increase non-fare box revenue to cross-subsidize ferry operation. However, as he understood, such efforts had not been effective due to the lack of co-ordination among relevant government bureaux/departments (B/Ds). As a result, although the Government had spent a lot on promoting tourism and

subsidizing construction of tourist attractions such as theme parks, it had still failed to promote tourism on these beautiful islands by ensuring the service and fare levels of the ferry services concerned were optimal. He therefore urged the Administration to make better efforts in this regard, and to actively respond to requests for assistance from ferry operators.

30. USTH thanked Mr Paul TSE for his views, and responded that the Transport and Housing Bureau (THB) had in the past mainly focused on ensuring the provision of sustainable public transport services for islanders at affordable fares but not promoting tourism. Mr TSE's views on tourism could be conveyed to the relevant B/Ds for consideration. He further advised that THB had already been making concerted efforts with relevant B/Ds to facilitate the subletting of pier areas as far as practicable though in certain cases the progress might still not be satisfactory.

31. Noting the above response, Ms Miriam LAU pointed out that the problems facing ferry operation had been discussed for years. As such, there was a need for greater determination on the part of the Administration and closer co-operation among B/Ds concerned to genuinely facilitate subletting of pier areas to make ferry service more sustainable. This was because, if the processing of subletting applications took too long, there would be difficulty in entering rental agreements. To speed up the process, she proposed that ferry operators should be authorized to make the relevant subletting decisions, and only complicated cases required application for approval. Moreover, the applications should also be processed by the various B/Ds concerned expeditiously.

32. Ms Miriam LAU called upon the Administration to take actions as necessary to mitigate the likely impacts of the recent implementation of the trawl ban in Hong Kong on ferry services. According to Ms LAU, the trawl ban might cause many affected fishermen to switch to operation of harbour sightseeing tours also operated by certain ferry operators to generate non-fare box revenue. Some of the affected fishermen might even engage in operating illegal ferry service. Since such illegal operators were not regulated and hence could enjoy greater flexibility, existing ferry operators might not be able to compete with them. The Administration noted her views.

#### *The way forward*

33. Ms Miriam LAU saw a need for the Administration to formulate a long-term comprehensive ferry policy to ensure the sustainability of ferry services, instead of introducing ad hoc helping measures from time to time.

Mr Albert CHAN echoed her view, stressing the need for a comprehensive policy review to address the ferry operation problem, which in his view had resulted from the failure of the Government to respond to changes of the times, so that while ferry fares had increased significantly during the past 20 years, the service level had been deteriorating, thereby significantly affecting the development of tourism and economy of the islands. He also considered it undesirable that as different from the past, ferry services were at present separately operated by different operators, so that the operators could not use revenues from the more profitable services to cross-subsidize the continuation of loss-making but socially desirable services for remote islands. The Administration noted the members' views.

34. Summing up, the Chairman expressed disappointment that little progress had been made in solving the problems of ferry operation, and that judging by USTH's responses made at this meeting, the Administration had not made any attempt or demonstrated any determination to tackle the problems in an innovative way, such as by enhancing assistance to operators and purchasing vessels for operation by contractors. Highlighting the consensus of members on the need to tackle the ferry operation problem seriously, he directed that the issue of "outlying island ferry services" be revisited within this legislative term, and urged the Administration to actively consider the views expressed at this meeting when working out new initiatives to address the problem for report to the Panel.

**V Franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited (Franchise for airport and North Lantau bus network)**

LC Paper No.	CB(1) -	Administration's paper on franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and Citybus Limited (Franchise for airport and North Lantau bus network)
2647/10-11(04)		
LC Paper No.	CB(1) -	Submission from 中西區長者友善工作小組
2670/10-11(02)		
LC Paper No.	CB(1) -	Submission from Half Fare in Public Transport for People with Disabilities
2678/10-11(03)		
LC Paper No.	CB(1) -	Submission from 民主黨南區黨團)
2709/10-11(02)		

35. Stressing that satisfactory provision of public bus services was essential to the travelling public, the Chairman, Mr KAM Nai-wai and Mr Ronny TONG expressed regrets that USTH was not attending discussion of this item. In particular, pointing out that the Secretary for Transport and Housing (STH)'s attendance of Panel meetings was already unsatisfactory, the Chairman considered it undesirable that even USTH would not attend discussion of this item. At Mr KAM's request, the Chairman instructed the Clerk to write to STH to express grave dissatisfaction of the Panel that neither she nor USTH was present at the Panel meeting to listen to the Panel's views on the requirements of the new franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB), Long Win Bus Company Limited (LW) and Citybus Limited (Citybus) (the three franchised bus companies) in respect of Citybus's franchise for the Airport and North Lantau bus network.

*(Post-meeting note: The said letter was sent to STH on 14 July 2011.)*

36. The Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 2 (DS(T)2) then briefed members on the Administration's plan to renew the above franchises, which were due to expire in 2013; and invited members' views on the requirements of the new franchises.

37. Before inviting views from members, the Chairman drew members' attention to the following submissions on this agenda item –

- (a) Submission from 中西區長者友善工作小組 (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2670/10-11(02));
- (b) Submission from Half Fare in Public Transport for People with Disabilities (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2678/10-11(03)); and
- (c) Submission from 民主黨南區黨團 tabled at the meeting (LC Paper No. CB(1)2709/10-11(02)).

38. Summarizing the views expressed in the submissions, the Chairman pointed out that the community groups concerned had requested that various improvements be made to bus services, in particular the provision of fare concessions and necessary facilities for the elderly and disabled passengers, by including new clauses in the new franchises stipulating specific requirements for the bus companies to enhance services and provide fare concessions. Members shared the above views of the community groups, and urged the Administration to take the opportunity of negotiating the new

ten-year franchises with the three franchised bus companies to press for various improvements to bus services.

Improvements to facilities

39. Mr Ronny TONG enquired about the Government's policy on ensuring provision of the necessary facilities for the elderly and disabled passengers to encourage them to use public transport services. The Deputy Commissioner for Transport/Transport Services & Management (DC for T/TS&M) responded that the Government had already been regularly meeting relevant organizations to seek their views on improvements in this regard. As a result, bus companies had been required to select low floor buses when purchasing new buses, and to increase and paint handrails yellow to facilitate use by the elderly and the visually impaired. Mr TONG opined that to ensure compliance, such requirements should be written into the relevant bus franchises. While agreeing to consider Mr TONG's proposal, DC for T/TS&M explained that requirements on facilities to be provided on buses had already been imposed in the vehicle type approval process and the forward planning programme through legislation and there might not be the need to impose such requirements in bus franchises.

40. Mr KAM Nai-wai referred to the submission from 中西區長者友善工作小組 (LC Paper No. CB(1) 2670/10-11(02)), and considered it undesirable that, although the proposals therein on elderly-friendly bus design, such as provision of more handrails, use of larger typeface to indicate fares, designation of priority seats for the elderly, etc., had been forwarded to the Administration for consideration a year before, no progress had been made in taking forward the proposals. DS(T)2 responded that TD had already been following up the proposals. DC for T/TS&M added that as a result of TD's discussion with bus companies on the proposal on designation of seats for the elderly on the bus, stickers with the message "priority seats" had already been posted beside certain seats on the bus as a preliminary measure in recognition that this could be done quickly. In the long run, a different colour would be used for the priority seats but since the works involved would need to be conducted in bus depots, time would be required for implementation. Bus companies, however, had already been urged to complete the works as soon as practicable. In response to Mr WONG Sing-chi, DS(T)2 further responded that the Administration would attach great importance to the adoption of elderly-friendly bus design during the relevant franchise negotiations.

Provision of fare concessions

41. Mr Ronny TONG, Mr KAM Nai-wai, Ms Miriam LAU and Mr IP Wai-ming stressed the need to ensure the provision of fare concessions for the elderly and the disabled by including this as an important issue in the relevant franchise negotiations. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration would listen to the views from all sectors, and ask the three franchised bus companies to provide fare concessions as far as possible during the franchise negotiations. Mr TONG opined that the Administration should more actively pursue this, and should seriously consider establishing a fund using public money for providing fare concessions for the elderly and the disabled, as in overseas jurisdictions.

42. Ms Miriam LAU shared Mr Ronny TONG's views above and, pointing out that the provision of half-fare concessions for disabled passengers had long been called for and there was consensus on it, proposed that instead of asking bus companies to provide the concessions, the three franchised bus companies should be requested to undertake to provide administrative support for provision of the concessions, with the necessary funding provided by the Government as a welfare initiative as in many overseas jurisdictions. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration would attach great importance to the provision of fare concessions during the relevant franchise negotiations. Mr WONG Sing-chi and Mr CHAN Hak-kan considered the Administration's response inadequate, and asked the Administration to confirm whether the above undertaking would be incorporated in the proposed new franchises for negotiation with the three franchised bus companies. DS(T)2 reiterated that the Administration would attach great importance to the provision of fare concessions for disabled passengers during the relevant franchise negotiations.

43. Miss Tanya CHAN questioned whether the Administration had any bargaining power to ensure that the three franchised bus companies would provide fare concessions through the relevant franchise negotiations. She further opined that other bus companies should also be asked to provide fare concessions. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration would seek to secure the best possible bus services for the travelling public. She however declined to comment on the Administration's bargaining power, as this would be related to the Administration's negotiation strategy.

44. Mr Albert CHAN opined that during the franchise negotiations, the Administration should make it its policy stance that provision of fare concessions would be a condition of the new franchises that could not be compromised, in recognition that the provision of bus fare concessions for the

elderly, disabled passengers and students had been discussed for years without avail because none of the bureaux concerned was willing to shoulder the relevant responsibility.

#### Enhancement of performance in environmental improvement

45. Highlighting the need to gear up environmental protection, Mr WONG Sing-chi recalled that the Chief Executive (CE) had mentioned in his 2010-2011 Policy Address that when existing bus franchises expired, new clauses would be added to require bus companies to more actively use the most environmentally-friendly zero-emission buses. Pointing out that bus was a major pollution source, he enquired whether the above initiative highlighted by CE would be covered in the relevant franchise negotiations. Miss Tanya CHAN shared his concerns, and enquired how the Administration would follow up the findings of passenger satisfaction surveys on the service performance of the three franchised bus companies, in particular that on their performance on environmental improvement, which as she reckoned was unsatisfactory. DS(T)2 responded that during the franchise negotiations, the Administration would follow up with the three franchised bus companies regarding CE's policy initiative on the use of the most environmental friendly or zero-emission buses, taking into account the feasibility and affordability for bus operators and passengers

46. Mr CHAN Hak-kan also considered it necessary for the Administration to take the opportunity of the relevant franchise negotiations to pursue the above initiative highlighted by CE and to incorporate more environmental protection requirements in the new franchises to improve air quality in Hong Kong. This was because, although the Panel on Environmental Affairs had been following up the initiative, little progress had been made due to bus companies' reluctance. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration had already been discussing with bus companies on the launch of a trial soon to ascertain the feasibility of retrofitting Euro II and Euro III franchised buses with selective catalytic reduction devices. Subject to satisfactory trial results, the Government would fund the retrofit of the devices on all Euro II and Euro III buses. In recognition that air quality was a great public concern, TD would also work with the Environmental Protection Department to follow up various transport-related environmental protection initiatives highlighted by CE in his Policy Address.

#### Views on how to monitor and improve the performance of bus companies

47. While not opposing to the granting of ten- year franchises to provide certainty and hence facilitate long-term planning and development of bus

services, Mr KAM Nai-wai opined that requirements for conduct of short-term and medium-term reviews should be included in the franchises, so as to enable the Administration to terminate the franchises if the bus companies concerned could not meet the performance targets. DS(T)2 responded that there were already clauses in the existing bus franchises on mid-term review. In fact, the Administration had been monitoring bus companies' performance on an ongoing basis to facilitate the taking of follow-up actions in a timely manner. The Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) also provided a mechanism for handling unsatisfactory performance, even to the extent of terminating the franchise where necessary. However, this would be the last resort given the importance of ensuring the continuous provision of quality bus services.

48. Mr IP Wai-ming was disappointed to note that, as revealed in the paper for this item (LC Paper No. CB(1)2647/10-11(04)), the Administration had no intention to include bus companies' performance in labour relations as a factor for assessing their overall performance although labour relations would affect bus companies' operation and hence service level, especially as the labour unions of KMB and LW had yet to agree with the management concerned on a number of staff matters, such as the use of hourly-paid drivers, the rate of salary increase, outsourcing of cleaning services, etc.

49. DC for T/TS&M responded that drivers' wages were matters governed by the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57). To ensure road safety, THB and TD would ensure bus companies would look after drivers' well-being by providing sufficient rest breaks, regarding which there were already guidelines agreed with the bus companies for compliance. On the recent increased use of part-time drivers, TD understood from the relevant bus companies that this was only an interim measure taken to tackle the recent difficulties in recruiting full-time bus drivers. TD would monitor developments in this regard. TD had also, in conjunction with the bus companies concerned, visited different bus termini to ensure that proper facilities for drivers were available to provide them with a satisfactory working environment.

50. Mr IP Wai-ming stressed the need for bus service to improve (by highlighting complaints from airport staff about the frequency of Citybus's external routes, which linked airport supporting area and/or Tung Chung New Town to major locations in Hong Kong and Kowloon), and to increase with the number of airport staff, since airport staff and other passengers had difficulty in boarding buses plying these routes, in particular those serving Tai Po, and the buses concerned were always overcrowded. DC for T/TS&M responded that TD had already been monitoring the adequacy of individual



bus routes in the context of the annual Franchised Bus Route Development Programme.

51. Mr WONG Sing-chi opined that, to tackle the existing problem of duplication of the services provided by different bus companies in certain districts, the Administration should play a co-ordinating role to ensure bus companies would introduce more Bus-Bus Interchange (BBI) Schemes to facilitate the travelling public. In particular, the requirement to introduce BBI Schemes should be incorporated in the new franchises concerned. Mr CHAN Hak-kan shared his views. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration would encourage and arrange for introduction of BBI Schemes involving the three franchised bus companies where practicable. TD would also examine the issue with other franchised bus companies.

52. The Chairman said that to allow sufficient time for discussion, he would extend the meeting by 15 minutes.

53. Mr Albert CHAN recalled that during the franchise negotiations regarding the three franchised bus companies in 2003, he had stated opposition to renewing NWFB's and LW's franchises due to the lack of transparency of the two bus companies' financial situation. He expressed regrets that no improvement in this regard had been made, and there were still no financial details of the bus companies in LC Paper No. CB(1)2647/10-11(04). In his view, to enable members to properly examine whether to renew the franchises concerned, the Administration should provide information on the bus companies' financial and business situations, so that members could ascertain whether the bus companies were making excessive profits or suffering from loss, or were minimizing costs by exploiting staff.

54. DS(T)2 responded that the franchised bus companies were required under their franchises to publish their audited accounts relating to franchised bus services for the information of the public, and make fuller disclosure annually. As such, bus companies' financial information including their profit and loss statements, and relevant operational details should be available to the public. Mr Albert CHAN considered it regrettable that the Administration had failed to realize its responsibility to provide financial information of the bus companies, and requested it to provide information on the financial and business situations of the bus routes operated by each of the three franchised bus companies during their current franchises. DC for T/TS&M mentioned that as a result of the last franchise renewal exercise, a provision had been added to the franchises to require the three franchised bus companies to provide relevant information on an annual basis.

Admin

The way forward

55. Mr KAM Nai-wai suggested that a further meeting be held early next session to discuss and receive public views on the required improvements for bus services. Mr WONG Sing-chi echoed his views, and stressed the need to provide a proper forum for District Councils, community groups and members of the public to give views on this important issue. DS(T)2 responded that the Administration would consult the relevant sectors, before conducting the relevant franchise negotiations on the basis of views gathered. Ms Miriam LAU was glad to note the above plan of the Administration to consult the public to ensure the incorporation of views on improvements in the relevant franchises as appropriate. In her view, many of the improvements already proposed were feasible and should be taken on board.

56. Summing up, the Chairman pointed out that the responses made by the Administration at this meeting had failed to satisfy members, especially as neither STH nor USTH had attended the discussion. He urged the Administration to, at the meeting to be scheduled to revisit the item, positively respond to the views and concerns expressed at this meeting, and provide details on the tactics it planned to adopt to grasp the opportunity of the franchise negotiations to press for fare concessions and service improvements, so as to ensure such aspirations for improvements would really be incorporated in the new franchises.

57. Mr Albert CHAN opined that aspirations for service improvements should be made a prerequisite for the relevant franchise negotiations to commence. If the three franchised bus companies were unwilling to conduct the negotiations on such premises, public tender exercises for new franchises should be carried out for the purpose of bringing in new operators. The Chairman indicated agreement with him, and said that to ensure that the franchise negotiations, which would commence in the fourth quarter of 2011, would be conducted on such premises, the Panel meeting to revisit the item should be held first thing in the 2011-2012 legislative session, preferably in October 2011. He further urged the Administration not to commit anything before the planned meeting could be held to collate public views on the necessary improvements.

**VI Any other business**

58. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 10:45 am.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
1 November 2011

**立法會**  
***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(1)1363/11-12  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB1/PL/TP/1

**Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of meeting held on  
Monday, 7 November 2011, at 4:30 pm  
in Conference Room 1 of the Legislative Council Complex**

- Members present :** Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo (Chairman)  
Hon LAU Kong-wah, JP  
Hon Miriam LAU Kin-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, SBS, JP  
Hon LI Fung-ying, SBS, JP  
Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, SBS, JP  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon Ronny TONG Ka-wah, SC  
Hon KAM Nai-wai, MH  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan  
Hon WONG Sing-chi  
Hon IP Wai-ming, MH  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung  
Hon Tanya CHAN  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip
- Members absent :** Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming, GBS, JP (Deputy Chairman)  
Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, SBS, S.B.St.J., JP  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP

**Public Officers attending : Agenda item IV**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Ms Rebecca PUN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing

Ms Carolina YIP, JP  
Deputy Commissioner/Transport Services &  
Management  
Transport Department

Ms Macella LEE  
Principal Transport Officer/Bus and Railway 3  
Transport Department

**Agenda item V**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Patrick CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)3

Miss Erica NG  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and  
Housing (Transport) 2

Mr CHING Kam-cheong, JP  
Deputy Commissioner/Planning & Technical  
Services  
Transport Department

Mr LEUNG Tak-fai  
Assistant Commissioner/Technical Service  
Transport Department

**Attendance by  
invitation : Agenda item IV**

Public Transport Think Tank of Hong Kong

Mr CHAN Tik-yiu  
Chairman

中西區長者友善工作小組

Ms TAI Shui-ching  
Representative

Individual

Mr Nigel LAM

Bike Racks on Buses@hk

Mr CHAN Ka-leung  
Convenor

Hong Kong Cycling Alliance

Mr LEUNG Wang-hei  
Transport Officer

Individual

Mr CHAI Man-hon  
Southern District Council Member

The Staffs & Workers Union of Hong Kong  
Civil Airlines

Mr CHEUNG Shu-wang  
Chairman

民航（HAECO）分會

Mr TING Sung-ki  
Chairman

Hong Kong Airport Ramp Services Employees Union

Mr LI Wing-foo  
Chairman

殘疾人士爭取交通半費優惠聯席

Mr Allen CHAN  
Convenor

Individual

Mr Martin OEI  
Political Commentator

Neighborhood and Worker's Service Centre

Miss Vincci WONG  
Labour Organizer

Rehabilitation Alliance Hong Kong

Mr LAU Kwok-lam  
Project Officer

Leslie Chan Community Services Office

Mr Leslie CHAN

Individual

Mr HO Man-kit  
Sai Kung District Council Member

Individual

Mr Patrick LAI

Dynamic Islands

Mr Michael MO Kwan-tai  
Committee Member

天水圍北交通關注組

Mr KONG Kin-shing  
Representative

Community Development Alliance

Mr CHAN Yu-cheung  
Project Worker

North District Employment Concern Group

Ms Venny KWOK  
Convenor

Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong Diocesan  
Pastoral Centre for Workers (New Territories)

Mr Augustine YU Siu-po  
Program Officer

Hong Kong Blind Union

Mr Billy WONG  
Vice-president

Individual

Ms LI Shee-lin

Public Transport Research Team

Mr Leo KUNG  
Committee Member



Hong Kong Federation of the Blind

Ms CHEUNG Siu-mei  
Member

Mr SHING Li-lim  
Executive director

Same Rate Different Fare Victims Union

Mr Michael TSUI  
Convenor

**Clerk in attendance :** Ms Joanne MAK  
Chief Council Secretary (1)2

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (1)2

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (1)2

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Action

**I Confirmation of minutes of meeting**

(LC Paper No. CB(1)210/11-12 - Minutes of meeting on  
13 October 2011)

The minutes of the meeting held on 13 October 2011 were confirmed.

**II Information papers issued since the last regular meeting on  
11 July 2011**

(LC Paper CB(1)2854/10-11(01)	No. -	Administration's response to the submission from a member of the public on improvements that should be introduced to the public transport arrangements at Central Piers
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LC Paper CB(1)2854/10-11(02)	No. -	Correspondence between a member of the public and the
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LC Paper CB(1)2854/10-11(03)	No. - Administration regarding a complaint about the driving attitude of a driver of green minibus route no. 56 Submission from a member of the public complaining about a station supervisor of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited
LC Paper CB(1)2919/10-11(01)	No. - Submission on provision of cycle tracks and cycle parking facilities in the vicinity of the new Legislative Council Complex
LC Paper CB(1)2977/10-11(01)	No. - Correspondence between a member of the public and the Administration regarding new bus stops for the new Legislative Council/ Government Complex
LC Paper CB(1)3006/10-11(01)	No. - Submission from a member of the public on tram waiting kiosk at Queensway
LC Paper CB(1)3006/10-11(02)	No. - Submission from a member of the public on air conditioning in buses
LC Paper CB(1)158/11-12(01)	No. - E-mail from a member of the public complaining about the queue jumping problem at Tung Chung Bus Terminus (Bus route no. S1)
LC Paper CB(1)159/11-12(01)	No. - Net Revenue Statement for 2010-2011 submitted by Western Harbour Tunnel Company Limited
LC Paper CB(1)159/11-12(02)	No. - Net Revenue Statement for 2010-2011 submitted by Route 3 (Country Park Section) Company Limited
LC Paper CB(1)170/11-12(01)	No. - Memorandum referring to the Panel the views and concerns raised by Sha Tin District Council members on

<p>LC Paper CB(1)170/11-12(02)</p>	<p>provision of bus route between Ma On Shan and Western/Sheung Wan via Route 8</p> <p>No. - Memorandum referring to the Panel the views and concerns raised by Kwai Tsing District Council members on provision of a lift for the footbridge near On Pok House on Tsing King Road</p>
<p>LC Paper CB(1)170/11-12(03)</p>	<p>No. - Memorandum referring to the Panel the views and concerns raised by Kwai Tsing District Council members on installation of a lift outside Ching Mui House, Cheung Ching Estate</p>
<p>LC Paper CB(1)209/11-12(01)</p>	<p>No. - Submission from a member of the public on the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge related infrastructure projects in Hong Kong</p>
<p>LC Paper CB(1)238/11-12(01)</p>	<p>No. - Information paper provided by the Administration on replacement of the Tunnel Lighting System in the Aberdeen Tunnel</p>
<p>LC Paper CB(1)238/11-12(02)</p>	<p>No. - Information paper provided by the Administration on replacement of four specialised vehicles providing towing services for the Tsing Ma Control Area, North Lantau Highway and Penny's Bay</p>
<p>LC Paper No. CB(1)254/11-12</p>	<p>- Letter from Hong Kong Construction Association (HKCA) (request for presenting to Panel members the findings of the Visionary Transport Infrastructure Study 2030 commissioned by</p>

LC	Paper	No. -	HKCA)
CB(1)249/11-12(01)			Supplementary information provided by the Administration on latest progress of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge infrastructure projects in Hong Kong)

2. Members noted the above papers issued since the last meeting.

### **III Items for discussion at the next meeting scheduled for 5 December 2011**

(LC	Paper	No. -	List of outstanding items for discussion
CB(1)227/11-12(01)			
LC	Paper	No. -	List of follow-up actions)
CB(1)227/11-12(02)			

3. Members agreed to discuss the following items at the next regular meeting on 5 December 2011 –

- (a) Elderly-friendly bus design; and
- (b) Application of latest surveying technologies in major highway projects.

*(Post-meeting note: At the request of the Administration and with the concurrence of the Chairman, the item on "Application of latest surveying technologies in major highway projects" was subsequently replaced by an urgent item on "Star Ferry fare increase application".)*

### **IV Franchises of New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB), Long Win Bus Company Limited (LW) and Citybus Limited (Citybus) (Franchise for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network) (Franchise 2)**

(LC	Paper	No. -	Administration's paper on franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2)
CB(1)227/11-12(03)			
LC	Paper	No. -	Administration's paper on franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2)
CB(1)2647/10-11(04)			

LC Paper No. CB(1)193/11-12 - Paper on franchises of NWFB, LW and Citybus (Franchise 2) prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (Background brief))

Meeting with deputations/the Administration

*Public Transport Think Tank of Hong Kong*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(01))

4. Mr CHAN Tik-yiu presented the views of Public Transport Think Tank of Hong Kong as detailed in its submission, including -

- (a) the three franchised bus companies (NWFB, LW and Citybus) should provide more route information at bus termini and stops so that passengers waiting for buses would be aware of the road traffic situation, particularly when the bus arrival time was affected by traffic congestion or other reasons;
- (b) the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (KMB) and LW should introduce inter-company bus-bus interchange (BBI) schemes as they were subsidiaries of the same parent company;
- (c) bus stop announcement system should be installed for the bus fleet of NWFB; and
- (d) better quality buses should be deployed for airport routes.

*中西區長者友善工作小組*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(10))

5. Ms TAI Shui-ching briefed members on the Group's submission. She pointed out that the three franchised bus companies should be required to provide barrier-free facilities for the elderly, such as facilities to ensure safe boarding and alighting, priority seats with different colours to make them more eye-catching and visible, widened gangway and improved provision of passenger information for the elderly. Ms TAI suggested that elderly-friendly bus guidelines should be provided for by legislation and franchised bus companies should be required to comply with the guidelines on a mandatory basis. She added that a forum should be put in place for the elderly to give views on the improvements required for franchised bus

services, and the franchisees concerned should be required to take into account such views.

*Mr Nigel LAM*

6. Pointing out that the Government was committed to adhering to the climate change strategy and implementing environmental protection measures, Mr Nigel LAM opined that the Government should consider –

- (a) including terms and conditions in the new bus franchises to stipulate the greenhouse gas emission reduction measures;
- (b) setting a maximum level of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emission for each bus route and award the bus franchises to the bus companies with the lowest CO<sub>2</sub> emission generated by buses of their routes;
- (c) establishing a low-emission zone (LEZ) on Lantau Island, restricting the use of fossil fuel vehicles and encouraging the use of electric or other zero emission vehicles within the zone; and
- (d) promoting use of electric vehicles.

*Bike Racks on Buses@hk*

*(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(02))*

7. Mr CHAN Ka-leung briefed members on the salient points of his submission. He pointed out that some cycle tracks were located far away from residential areas. However, the bus companies had not provided necessary facilities to enable carriage of bicycles on buses. He suggested that the relevant bus companies should be required to provide facilities such as cycle racks, and to allow carriage of folding bicycles on buses. He also suggested installation of facilitates for hanging bicycles outside the bus.

*Hong Kong Cycling Alliance*

*(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(03))*

8. Mr LEUNG Wang-hei echoed Mr CHAN Ka-leung's views above. He also considered that the Government should require the bus companies to review their policies on carriage of bicycles on buses every three years and involve public participation in the review.

*The Staffs & Workers Union of Hong Kong Civil Airlines*

9. Mr CHEUNG Shu-wang stated that the Union had conducted a survey in October 2011 to study the views of airport staff on transportation for work. The survey had shown that the majority of the respondents travelled on buses and many of them considered that the bus fares were too high. They hoped that the transport network and frequency of bus services on the airport island could be improved. In addition, BBI schemes and fare discounts/monthly tickets should be introduced for airport staff.

*民航 (HAECO) 分會*

10. Mr TING Sung-ki echoed Mr CHEUNG Shu-wang's views above. He pointed out that the introduction of minimum wage policy had reduced the wage differences between airport staff and staff who worked in urban areas, and hence discouraged people working in the airport owing to the high transport expenses and long travelling time to work. To attract more people working in the airport, he suggested that the relevant bus companies should –

- (a) offer fare discount/monthly tickets to airport staff;
- (b) review the airport routes, in particular their bus frequency and bus stop locations. In this connection, emphasis should be put on facilitating travelling of those staff working on night shifts and those who lived in remote areas; and
- (c) introduce interchange schemes with other public transport, such as the Mass Transit Railway (MTR). An example would be MTR's Airport Express and airbus "A" routes, which were expensive with low patronage.

*Hong Kong Airport Ramp Services Employees Union*

11. Mr LI Wing-foo considered that many airport routes were too long and, due to inadequate seats, passengers (including airport staff travelling to work) often had to stand for a long time to arrive at the airport. Mr LI hoped that more direct routing could be arranged within the airport island and the operating hours of the airport external bus routes could be extended. In addition, BBI schemes should be introduced to reduce the transport expenses of airport staff.

*殘疾人士爭取交通半費優惠聯席  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(04))*

12. Mr Allen CHAN briefed members on the Alliance's submission. He pointed out that as proposed in the Chief Executive's 2011-2012 Policy Address, public resources would be used to facilitate the provision of fare concessions to eligible people with disabilities (PwDs) to travel on the franchised buses anytime at a concessionary fare of \$2 a trip. The Alliance was disappointed that such fare concessions were not provided by the franchised bus companies. The Alliance considered that the Government should specify, in the new franchises, the requirement that the relevant bus companies should provide fare concessions to PwDs, and consider awarding the franchises to those companies which were willing to employ PwDs.

*Mr Martin OEI, Political Commentator  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)284/11-12(04))*

13. Mr Martin OEI presented his views as detailed in his submission, which included the following points –

- (a) in view of the hilly terrains and low patronage of some bus routes in Hong Kong Mid Level, part of the double-deck NWFB buses servicing this area should be replaced by a new kind of public transport, namely maxicab, which should be allowed to provide 20 or 24 seats; and
- (b) all or part of the bus routes operated by LW in the New Territories should be opened for tendering in view of their unsatisfactory performance.

*Neighborhood and Worker's Service Centre*

14. Miss Vincci WONG made the following points:

- (a) the franchised bus companies should fulfil their social responsibility and provide fare concessions for the elderly and PwD passengers and more BBI schemes;
- (b) to cope with the transport demands of Kwai Chung Estate residents, a bus stop at Kwai Chung Estate should be set up for route numbers A31 and E32. In addition, the destination of route no. 930 operated by Citybus from Kwai Chung Estate



should be extended from the existing Admiralty to Causeway Bay; and

- (c) in consideration of the increasing transport fares in recent years, a work incentive transport subsidy scheme on individual and household bases should be implemented. In the long run, the fare adjustment mechanism should be reviewed and there should be reduction of bus fares.

*Rehabilitation Alliance Hong Kong*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(11))

15. Mr LAU Kwok-lam briefed members on the Alliance's submission which included the following points:

- (a) the relevant bus companies should be required in the new franchises to offer half-fare concessions to PwD passengers; and
- (b) conditions and terms on provision of barrier-free facilities for PwD passengers should be included in the new franchises.

*Leslie Chan Community Services Office*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(05))

16. Mr Leslie CHAN highlighted the following views of the Services Office –

- (a) folding bicycles should be allowed to be carried on buses on North Lantau routes. In the long run, larger size of franchised buses (13.7 to 15 metres in length) should be used to accommodate bicycles on board;
- (b) WiFi services should be provided on North Lantau routes to facilitate internet surfing by tourists; and
- (c) more BBI schemes should be introduced for passengers who needed to interchange between different bus routes operated by LW and KMB during their journeys.

*Mr Patrick LAI*

17. Mr Patrick LAI welcomed the Administration's initiatives to provide fare concessions for PwDs. He, however, shared other deputations' views that the relevant bus companies should meet the relevant cost by their own profits instead of resorting to public resources to fund the relevant initiatives.

*Dynamic Islands*

18. Mr Michael MO pointed out that the number of lost trips for bus routes operated by Citybus and LW remained high particularly during peak hours, and the bus frequency should be enhanced to meet the needs of airport staff. He suggested that the relevant bus companies should provide bus arrival information at bus stops, improve the cleanliness of buses, and introduce more BBI schemes particularly during night time. To increase the competitiveness of bus services, Mr MO also suggested that the bus franchises for bus routes in North Lantau should be opened to more bus operators.

*天水圍北交通關注組*

19. Mr KONG Kin-shing considered the transport expenses for work for Tin Shui Wai residents very high. Sharing other deputations' views, he considered that bus companies should provide concessionary fares to the elderly and PwD passengers. In addition, he suggested that the bus companies should allocate a portion of their profits made for setting up a fund to stabilize bus fares.

*Community Development Alliance*

20. Mr CHAN Yu-cheung considered the transport fares in Hong Kong high particularly for those who lived in remote areas. He requested the Administration to review the current fare adjustment arrangement for franchised buses. He also pointed out that the relevant bus franchises should specify the adoption of elderly-friendly design for buses and introduction of monthly tickets.

*North District Employment Concern Group*

21. Ms Venny KWOK appreciated the point-to-point bus services provided by the relevant bus companies. She, however, echoed other deputations' views that the franchised bus companies should use their own

resources to provide fare concessions and introduce monthly tickets to alleviate the burden of travelling expenses on the public, especially the grassroots.

*Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong Diocesan Pastoral Centre for Workers (New Territories)*

22. Mr Augustine YU questioned whether the Administration had made sufficient efforts in the past decade in monitoring bus services and ensuring that they met the needs of the public. He also expressed dissatisfaction with the Administration's new initiative of using public resources in the provision of bus fare concessions for the elderly and PwD passengers. He considered that the relevant bus companies should provide such fare concessions and meet the relevant costs by their profits.

*Hong Kong Blind Union*

23. Mr Billy WONG also considered that the relevant bus companies had the social responsibility to provide fare concessions for PwDs and the Administration should take into account the companies' performance in their employment of PwDs when considering franchise renewal with them. He added that although some barrier-free facilities were currently provided on buses, such facilities were not adequate. He suggested that voice announcement should also be made available outside the bus to facilitate blind persons identifying the buses they were waiting for. He hoped that relevant terms on the requirement to provide barrier-free facilities could be incorporated into the new franchises.

*Ms LI Shee-lin*

24. Ms LI Shee-lin made the following points –

- (a) the current situation of different bus companies charging different fares of similar/same routes should be improved;
- (b) to address the problem of lost trips during peak hours in Hong Kong South, bus frequency should be enhanced. In addition, more bus captains should be deployed at busy bus stops to facilitate better arrangement of bus services;
- (c) provision of bus service information display panel at bus stops and on-board bus stop announcement display panels should be enhanced;

- (d) BBI schemes and sectional fares should be introduced for all bus routes; and
- (e) bus services between Southern District and Eastern District should be improved.

*Public Transport Research Team*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(07))

25. Mr Leo KUNG highlighted the following views of the Research Team –

- (a) the franchise for NWFB should be opened for tendering in order to bring about improvements to bus services and fare concessions. Alternatively, the Administration could renew the franchise for NWFB for a duration ending on the same expiry dates of other bus service franchises, so as to facilitate the Administration to review all bus franchises and bus routes in one go;
- (b) more direct routings to the airport should be provided under the franchises for LW and Citybus (Franchise 2);
- (c) inter-company BBI schemes should be introduced at the Lantau Link Toll Plaza bus stop; and
- (d) the relevant bus companies should consult the District Councils concerned and passenger liaison groups in their planning and development of their services.

*Hong Kong Federation of The Blind*  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(08))

26. Mr SHING Li-lim briefed members on the silent points of the Federation's submission. He called on the Administration to specify in the new franchises the requirement to provide adequate barrier-free facilities for PwDs, as follows –

- (a) voice announcement (on bus arrival and bus route number) should be made available to facilitate the blind to get on the correct bus; and

- (b) two wheelchair zones (one fixed and one flexible) should be set up on each bus to facilitate disabled couples getting on the same bus.

27. Mr SHING added that the bus companies should be required to submit a concrete plan and timetable for providing the above facilities for consideration by the Administration. He also opined that the Administration should invite PwDs to participate in the process of tender assessment, if any.

*Same Rate Different Fare Victims Union  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(09))*

28. Mr Michael TSUI briefed members on the Union's submission. In gist, the Union disagreed to the proposal to renew the franchises for all bus companies as the current approach of providing bus services by means of franchise was not satisfactory. He considered that the existing bus fare adjustment arrangement had led to the problem of similar bus routes charging different bus fares. He suggested that the Administration should look into the problem and take remedial actions.

*Mr CHAI Man-hon, Southern District Council Member  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)284/11-12(03))*

29. Mr CHAI Man-hon briefed members on his submission. He opined that the Administration should adopt the suggestions of various bus service improvements as put forward by deputations. He also opined that the Administration should review its long-term policy on public transport, such as the operational mode of buses and public light buses. He also hoped that the Legislative Council should make sustained efforts in ensuring the provision of quality public bus services.

*Mr HO Man-kit, Sai Kung District Council Member  
(LC Paper No. CB(1)232/11-12(06))*

30. Mr HO Man-kit opined that franchise of NWFB in Tseung Kwan O (TKO) South should not be renewed in view of its provision of poor bus services. He said that the population of TKO South had been increasing rapidly in the past decade but NWFB had neither increased the bus frequency nor bus routes. Worse still, it had scaled down its bus services. He also pointed out that because the franchise in respect of bus services for TKO South was granted to NWFB, route number 296D, which was currently operated by KMB, was not allowed to extend its services to Tiu

Keng Leng to meet the service demands of TKO South residents. He opined that the current bus franchise of TKO South should be opened for retendering.

31. Members noted that the following organizations which did not attend the meeting had also provided submissions for members' reference –

- (a) Hong Kong Federation of Handicapped Youth (LC Paper No. CB(1)233/11-12(01);
- (b) "反九聯盟" (LC Paper No. CB(1)233/11-12(02));
- (c) Clear The Air (LC Papers Nos. CB(1)233/11-12(03) and (04));
- (d) The Civic Party (LC Paper No. CB(1)233/11-12(05)); and
- (e) Clean Air Network (LC Paper No. CB(1)233/11-12(06)).

## Discussion

### *Provision of environment-friendly buses*

32. Pointing out that the Administration had initiated to fund the cost of procuring hybrid buses and electric buses for use by franchised bus companies respectively in the 2010-2011 Policy Address and 2011-2012 Policy Address to improve roadside air quality, Mr CHAN Hak-kan said that franchised bus companies had a corporate responsibility to protect the environment by using more environment-friendly buses. He also considered that the Administration should specify in the new franchises the types of environment-friendly bus which the bus companies should switch to when replacing their existing buses, and the proportion of those environment-friendly buses to be used by the bus companies.

33. The Under Secretary for Transport and Housing (USTH) responded that the ultimate policy objective of the Government was to have zero emission buses running throughout the territory. When the current bus franchises expired in the coming few years, the Government would impose additional requirements in the franchises for the bus companies to switch to zero emission buses or the most environment-friendly buses when replacing existing ones, taking into account the feasibility and affordability for bus operators and passengers. He added that since the technology of developing zero emission buses such as hybrid buses or electric buses was

not yet mature, testing of their performance in different road conditions had yet to be carried out, particularly on climbing lanes.

*Bus services for airport staff*

34. Mr WONG Kwok-hing enquired about the Administration's follow up actions in response to the views put forward by 民航(HAECO)分會 on the insufficient bus services provided during mid-night for airport staff. He added that as a result of that, airport staff needed to travel across districts at night and had to bear expensive transport costs.

35. Sharing similar views of Mr WONG, Mr IP Wai-ming hoped that the Administration could require the relevant bus companies to offer fare concessions/monthly tickets for airport staff and enhance the current BBI schemes. He cited an example of a bus route no. A43, which provided services between Fanling and the airport. Although BBI scheme had been implemented, passengers still had to bear the full fare of certain part of the relevant bus route.

36. USTH responded that some bus companies were offering fare concessions for airport staff for some airport routes. He said that the Administration would continue to encourage and negotiate with the franchised bus companies for the offer of additional fare discounts including enhanced BBI schemes. He added that any concrete proposals on enhancing bus service standards for the consideration by Transport Department (TD) were welcome.

*Facilities for needy persons*

37. Mr WONG Kwok-hing questioned whether the Administration would follow up the requests made by deputations for the installation of voice announcement system to facilitate blind persons getting on the buses they wanted; and for mandatory implementation of the elderly-friendly bus design guidelines by bus companies. USTH undertook that TD would discuss the requests with the bus operators.

*Way forward*

38. Ms LI Fung-ying pointed out that the requests for provision of concessionary fares and barrier-free facilities for the elderly and PwD passengers were not new and had long been called for. However, the Administration had only responded that it would encourage or liaise with the bus companies on these requests. She enquired about the

Administration's concrete actions to take forward the proposals, such as whether the Administration would introduce new terms and conditions into the new franchises to stipulate that the franchised bus companies would have to provide low-floor buses, enhance the working hours and rest time for bus captains, and adopt guidelines (such as the elderly-friendly bus design guidelines) in the provision of bus services. She further asked which suggestions of service improvements that the deputations had made would be included for negotiation with the relevant bus companies for adoption.

39. USTH reiterated that the Administration would take the opportunity of renewing bus franchises to negotiate with the relevant bus companies for provision of better bus services and fare concessions. He undertook that the views of the public would be fully reflected in the course of negotiating with relevant bus companies. He further said that some improvements had been implemented without waiting for the franchise renewal. He pointed out that, e.g. TD had already requested the franchised bus companies in 2010 to implement measures to improve the working hours and rest time for bus captains and it was noted that improvements in this regard had been made.

Admin

40. Sharing Ms LI Fung-ying's views, the Chairman requested the Administration to provide a paper on the specific requirements that the Administration was going to liaise with the bus companies for inclusion in the new franchises to enhance services and fare concessions for further discussion by the Panel. He added that in considering about the specific requirements to be imposed on the bus companies, the Administration should take into account the various suggestions, such as provision of facilities for the elderly and PwD passengers, use of low-floor buses, enhancing rest time for bus captains, provision of sectional fare and monthly-ticket scheme, etc, that had been made by the Panel in the past. The Chairman directed that this item should be further discussed at the next meeting on 5 December 2011.

## V **Cycling safety**

(LC	Paper	No. -	Administration's	paper	on
CB(1)227/11-12(04)			cycling	safety	
LC Paper No. CB(1)194/11-12		-	Paper on	promotion of cycling	
			safety	prepared by the	
			Legislative Council Secretariat		
			(Updated background brief))		



41. USTH briefed members on the Administration's paper on measures to promote cycling safety. Members noted the powerpoint slides tabled at the meeting on measures to promote cycling safety (LC Paper No. CB(1)284/11-12(07)).

Cycle tracks and ancillary facilities

42. Mr CHAN Hak-kan pointed out that some residents living in the New Territories regarded cycling as a supplementary transport mode to provide short-distance travel for interchange to other suitable transport modes to save costs. However, the Administration had not made sufficient efforts in improving the design of cycle tracks and providing adequate cycling ancillary facilities such as cycle parking spaces. Mr CHAN enquired about the Administration's measures to provide safer and better cycling facilities. Pointing out that the conditions of cycle parking area outside some railway stations were poor, Mr CHAN also asked whether the Administration had considered contracting out the management of such area to non-governmental organizations.

43. The Deputy Commissioner/Planning & Technical Services of Transport Department (DC/P&TS) responded that TD had planned to increase cycle parking facilities at major public transport hubs (such as railway stations), and to provide 1 000 additional bicycle parking spaces by 2013 through retrofitting and replacing existing cycle parking spaces at major transport hubs. TD was also planning to conduct trials at the Fanling and Sheung Shui MTR stations on new "double-deck" parking systems which would further increase cycle parking provision. Interdepartmental clearance operations were also undertaken to remove illegally parked bicycles.

44. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung expressed concern about the adequacy of bicycle parking spaces to meet demands and asked about the total number of bicycle parking spaces in Hong Kong. DC/P&TS responded that there were at present 41 440 bicycle parking spaces throughout the territory and an average of 62 000 cycling trips on Sunday. He added that while the Administration did not have information on the total number of bicycles throughout the territory, TD was conducting a Travel Characteristics Study (TCS), which would obtain information about the ownership of bicycles by Hong Kong people.

Admin

45. In response to Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung's further enquiry on the total number of motorcycles and the number of motorcycle parking spaces, USTH undertook to ascertain whether such information was available and if

so, to provide it after the meeting.

46. The Chairman considered that the Administration should give thought to installation of wide-angle fish-eye type projection lens at turning junctions to enhance cycling safety on cycle tracks. He considered that the facility would be effective in reducing bicycle accidents and cyclist casualties.

#### Cycling on public roads

47. Miss Tanya CHAN expressed concern that some cyclists were cycling dangerously on public roads, which not only created pressure on other road users but would also increase the risk of traffic accidents. She enquired what actions the Administration had taken to tackle the problem.

48. USTH said that the Administration did not encourage the use of bicycle as a transport mode in urban areas, as the road traffic in urban areas was heavy. He advised that mountain bike trails and well-designed cycle tracks were available in the New Territories for cycling by members of the public. He added that the Administration was taking steps to promote public awareness of the importance of cycling safety.

49. USTH supplemented that cyclists riding on public roads had to observe the relevant traffic law and regulations to ensure road safety. In fact, the Road Safety Council had included promotion of cycling safety as one of the priority issues for its 2011-2012 work plan, which would include publicity campaigns by means of television announcements in the public interest, leaflets, posters and roadside banners, etc, to remind cyclists not to ride within the blind spots of motor vehicles and to remind motorists to respect cyclists' right for the shared use of roads. TD was also developing a "Cycling Information Centre" website to disseminate information on cycling safety.

#### Concerns about the need to mandate wearing of cycle helmets

50. Pointing out that there had been a rising trend in both the numbers of bicycle accidents and cyclist casualties and a quite number of fatal accidents involved head injuries, Mr CHAN Hak-kan queried why the Administration did not require cyclists to wear cycle helmets on a mandatory basis.

51. USTH responded that TD had examined overseas practices on the use of safety equipment for cyclists. The study revealed that the majority of the overseas jurisdictions including the United States and many European

countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark did not require the mandatory wearing of cycle helmets. Their approach was to encourage cyclists to wear helmets voluntarily through education and publicity campaigns. He also pointed out that for the few jurisdictions that had helmet laws, relevant studies revealed that the laws had discouraged cycling activities and resulted in no obvious reduction in the number of head injuries in cycling. He pointed out that the impact of legislative control on the public and public acceptance, in particular regarding enforcement and prosecution, were important factors for consideration. He added that the Administration would keep in view the situation and review the matter as appropriate. DC/P&TS supplemented that the TCS conducted by TD would also obtain public views on mandatory wearing helmets on cycle tracks and public roads.

52. In response to Mr CHAN Hak-kan's suggestion of requiring at least young cyclists to wear helmets on a mandatory basis, USTH said that such an approach should take into consideration public acceptance, in particular regarding enforcement and prosecution. He pointed out that the public's views towards young children's legal responsibility in case of non-compliance would need to be considered.

53. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung said that although the Administration regarded cycling as a recreational and leisure activity, many people in fact used bicycles as a means for commuting. Mr LEUNG enquired whether the Administration would consider requiring cyclists who used bicycles for commuting to wear helmets on a mandatory basis.

54. USTH responded that there might be enforcement problems as it would be difficult to differentiate persons cycling for recreational purposes from those cycling for commuting and also because some people cycled for both purposes. He pointed out that statistics had revealed that the majority of bicycle accidents were caused by poor technical skills of cyclists. As such, the Administration considered that public education and publicity should be the most effective means to promote cycling safety.

55. The Chairman echoed Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung's views. Expressing concern that simply encouraging cyclists to wear helmets voluntarily through education and publicity campaigns might not be effective, the Chairman called for the early enactment of legislation to require the mandatory use of helmets by cyclists riding on public roads.

56. USTH reiterated that the impact of legislative control on the public and public acceptance were important in considering whether to enact legislation on wearing helmets by cyclists. He pointed out that the statistics on fatal bicycle accidents in the past two years did not show that the increase in the number of cyclists wearing helmets had led to a reduction of casualty rate. He further said that there were many causes of fatal bicycle accidents, which included failures to comply with traffic regulations.

57. The Chairman, however, said that although there had been cases of serious accidents in which cyclists wearing helmets had died, he believed that wearing helmets provided a certain degree of protection to cyclists from head injuries. In view of the importance of the matter, the Chairman directed that the subject should be included on the list of outstanding items for discussion and revisited at a Panel meeting before the end of the current session.

## **VI Any other business**

58. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 7:00 pm.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
21 March 2012

**立法會**  
***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(4)228/15-16  
(These minutes have been  
seen by the Administration)

Ref : CB4/PL/TP/1

**Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of meeting held on  
Friday, 17 July 2015, at 10:45 am  
in Conference Room 3 of the Legislative Council Complex**

**Members present :** Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP (Chairman)  
Hon TANG Ka-piu, JP (Deputy Chairman)  
Hon LEE Cheuk-yan  
Hon James TO Kun-sun  
Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, BBS, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip  
Hon Claudia MO  
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, JP  
Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai  
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP  
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH  
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-kwok, SBS, MH, JP  
Hon Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun, BBS, MH, JP  
Hon Tony TSE Wai-chuen, BBS

**Member attending :** Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, BBS, MH, JP

**Members absent** : Hon Ronny TONG Ka-wah, SC  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan, JP  
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH  
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP  
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki

**Public Officers attending** : **Agenda item II**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Andy CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)2

Miss Carrie CHANG  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and  
Housing (Transport) 1

Mr Reginald CHAN  
Assistant Commissioner for Transport/Bus and  
Railway  
Transport Department

Miss Carol CHEUNG  
Principal Transport Officer/Bus and Railway 3  
Transport Department

**Agenda item III**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Andy CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)2

Miss Carrie CHANG  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and  
Housing (Transport) 1

Ms Macella LEE  
Assistant Commissioner/Management and Paratransit  
Transport Department

Mr Dannis LEUNG  
Chief Transport Officer/Planning/Taxi  
Transport Department

**Agenda item IV**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Ms Rebecca PUN Ting-ting, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)<sup>1</sup>

Mr Henry CHAN Chi-yan, JP  
Principal Government Engineer/Railway Development  
Railway Development Office  
Highways Department

Mr Robert CHAN Cheuk-ming  
Chief Engineer/Railway Development 2-2  
Railway Development Office  
Highways Department

Mr Stephen CHAN Wai-chung  
Chief Engineer/NWNT  
Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Hong Kong Project  
Management Office  
Highways Department

Mr David TO Kam-biu, JP  
Deputy Commissioner/Planning & Technical Services  
Transport Department

Mr Chris CHAN Yu-yuen  
Assistant Commissioner/Planning  
Transport Department

Mr Edmond POON Chi-man  
Principal Transport Officer/New Territories  
Transport Department

**Clerk in attendance :** Ms Sophie LAU  
Chief Council Secretary (4)6

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (4)6

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (4)6

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Action

**I. Information papers issued since the last meeting**

- (LC Paper No. CB(4)1187/14-15(01) - Administration's response to the letter from Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming on the directions of conducting the Public Transport Strategy Study
- LC Paper No. CB(4)1190/14-15(01) - Administration's response to the letter from Hon Claudia MO on introducing low-floor public light buses
- LC Paper Nos. CB(4)1193/14-15(01) and (02) - Memoranda referring to the Panel the views and concerns raised by Tai Po District Council members regarding the planning policies of car parking spaces and construction of footbridge network
- LC Paper No. CB(4)1200/14-15(01) - Letter from Hon CHAN Han-pan on the progress of providing hillside escalator links and elevator systems (Chinese version only)



- LC Paper No. CB(4)1203/14-15(01) - Letter from Tuen Mun District Council on the tendering of ferry service between Tuen Mun and Macau)

Members noted the above papers issued since the last meeting.

**II. New franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited**

- (LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(01) - Administration's paper on new franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited

- LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(02) - Paper on new franchises for the bus networks of Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief))

2. Upon invitation, Under Secretary for Transport and Housing ("USTH") briefed members on the outcome of negotiation with Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) ("Citybus (Franchise 1)") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB") on the proposed granting of new franchises to take effect upon expiry of their current ones on 1 June 2016 and 1 March 2017 respectively.

Service performance and financial viability

3. Noting that the business of Citybus (Franchise 1) was affected adversely with the commissioning of the West Island Line ("WIL"), the Chairman expressed concern over the financial viability of the company within the period of the proposed new franchise, and whether it would increase bus fares significantly to maintain its rate of return on assets.
4. Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport)2 ("DS(T)2") said that although the patronage of certain bus routes overlapping with the catchment area of the new railway were affected by the commissioning of WIL, Transport Department ("TD") had worked with the franchisees to rationalise their bus services. As a result, the franchisees had so far reduced a total of some 70 buses through the rationalisation. As part of the WIL rationalisation package, franchisees had also started operating new feeder routes to railway stations to capture new passenger demand. These should have helped Citybus (Franchise 1) improve its financial viability. He added that although there had been no fare increase by Citybus (Franchise 1) for about seven years and that it had been providing fare concessions to passengers, it had so far remained financially viable. Should there be an application for bus fare increase, the Government would prudently consider the application in accordance with established policy and procedures.
5. Mr CHAN Kam-lam considered the service provided by Citybus fairly acceptable. Given Citybus had not increased fares for a long time and additional resources were required for future service enhancement, he asked if the Administration would consider facilitating the long-term development needs of Citybus. On the other hand, he also expressed concern on the constraints imposed by the road networks of Hong Kong Island (particularly the Southern District) on the provision of public transport for those areas.
6. USTH said that given the difficulties with further expanding the road network on the Hong Kong Island, TD would pursue bus route rationalization with greater vigour to utilise road network and bus resources more efficiently. The Public Transport Strategy Study ("PTSS") would also examine the roles and positioning of various public transport services, during which the Government would also explore if there could be initiatives to facilitate the long-term development of bus services in Hong Kong.
7. DS(T)2 supplemented that the Government was receptive to plans by Citybus (Franchise 1) to increase its non-fare box revenue such as advertisement income from the upcoming mobile applications. He added that

all franchisees would be invited to submit tender bids for operating new bus routes serving new development areas to generate new streams of revenue.

8. Mr Frankie YICK was satisfied with the service provided by Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB. While supporting the Administration's work to negotiate with the two bus companies on provision of fare concessions to passengers under the proposed new franchises, he requested the Administration to discuss with NLB the need to strengthen the bus service on the Lantau Island during public holidays. He was concerned over whether the whole NLB bus fleet was fully utilised during public holidays. He also suggested NLB to explore if it would be operationally feasible to offer pre-sale bus tickets eligible for boarding at a specific timeslot such that passengers purchasing the pre-sale tickets would not need to stand in long queues for buses.

9. Assistant Commissioner for Transport/Bus and Railways of TD ("AC/B&R") advised that NLB would deploy about 50 additional buses on weekends and public holidays to meet the additional demand and NLB would make appropriate arrangements to cater for passenger demand according to the actual situation. He undertook to reflect Mr YICK's view to NLB.

10. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan asked whether the two bus companies, in particular Citybus (Franchise 1) which had higher lost trip rate, had pledged to improve their lost trip problem. USTH replied that TD and franchisees had spared no efforts in improving their performance on service reliability. The average lost trip rate of Citybus (Franchise 1) was 4.2% in 2014 (inclusive of figures in Q4 2014 during which traffic condition was affected by the Occupy Movement protest). The corresponding figure from January to May 2015 was 1.8%.

#### Provision of real time bus arrival information

11. The Chairman enquired whether the Administration would mandate other franchised bus companies to provide bus information through mobile application upon renewal of their respective franchises. DS(T)2 replied in the affirmative.

12. Mr WONG Kwok-hing was concerned over the timetable of providing real time bus arrival information by the relevant bus companies and whether such requirement would be laid down in the proposed new franchises. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan also asked about the timetable of installing display panels at bus stops. The Deputy Chairman considered that the Administration should fund the installation of display panels to speed up the installation progress.

13. USTH said that the two grantees had agreed, in the form of a franchise commitment, to roll out real time bus information system in phases within the first two years of commencement of their proposed new franchises. Passengers would first be able to access bus arrival information through their own mobile devices. In addition, upon commencement of their proposed new franchises, the two franchisees would also install display panels at selected major bus termini/stops with electricity supply and shelters to show the estimated arrival time of their bus routes and carry out the installation works in phase. He drew members' attention that the franchisees' financial situation might be affected if they were required to make substantial investment at the start of their new franchises.

14. DS(T)2 added that the ultimate goal of the Administration was to have display panels installed at all bus stops/termini with shelter and electricity supply wherever feasible. He advised that the two grantees would first complete the installation works at the major bus stops/termini with shelters and electricity supply in phases, with priority given to bus stops/termini with higher utilization. The two bus companies expected to complete their installation works at about one-third of bus stops/termini with shelter and electricity supply in the first few years after commencement of the proposed new franchises. He explained that further compressing the installation programme might have the undesirable consequence of pushing up the tender price for the panels and installation works.

15. The Deputy Chairman considered it more appropriate for the Administration to establish the mobile application to facilitate its monitoring of the lost trips of all franchised bus companies. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan also asked whether a central mobile application would be developed to provide bus information of all franchised bus companies.

16. USTH advised that the two grantees had agreed to provide real time bus arrival information to passengers. Each bus company would develop its own mobile applications to provide arrival information of their bus routes. A central mobile application covering bus routes of all franchisees might not have clear advantages over individual mobile applications by the franchisees. It might also be less flexible to cater for addition of new or value-adding functionalities by individual franchisees to improve their delivery of bus arrival information to passengers. AC/B&R supplemented that TD had been monitoring the lost trip of buses on a daily basis. It was able to access the lost trip information of franchised bus companies on existing computer platforms provided by them and connected to TD.

Fares and service of cross harbour routes

17. Noting that the Administration would explore with the grantees separately the possibility of narrowing the fare difference between harbour crossing routes after crossing the harbour and non-harbour crossing routes ("the cross harbour route proposal") along similar routeing, Mr Gary FAN expressed concern whether the proposal would result in reduction of service of non-harbour crossing routes. He also expressed concern on the long journey time of harbour-crossing routes and asked whether the Administration would consider rationalizing them and introducing more point to point express bus service.

18. DS(T)2 said that the franchised bus companies would carry out a trial of the cross harbour route proposal on selected routes in response to a member's suggestion, and its feasibility would still have to be assessed. The trial scheme, while involving only a change to the sectional fare structures of participating routes, would have ramifications on other aspects including bus frequency and resources, traffic congestion as well as the associated road-side air pollution. The proposal would unlikely result in reduction in frequency of the non-harbour crossing routes. A bus route served two directions. In this particular case, cross-harbour routes overlapped with one-direction service (not both-direction service) of non-cross harbour routes. As such, the other direction service of non-cross harbour routes would remain the same in terms of service frequency. To maintain this service frequency, the service frequency for the other direction that overlapping with the cross-harbour routes would need to be maintained. In respect of the long journey time of some harbour-crossing routes, he explained that this would be a separate issue to be looked into holistically from the traffic management perspective. The PTSS would examine whether there could be additional initiatives to enhance bus services.

19. Mr WONG Kwok-hing welcomed the cross harbour route proposal which sought to address the low utilization of cross harbour bus routes running on the Hong Kong Island. He asked about the concrete timetable of implementing the trial scheme. While expressing appreciation of the positive response made by the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited on the trial scheme, he urged Citybus (Franchise 1) and New World First Bus Limited to actively consider the cross harbour route proposal too. The Chairman also urged Citybus to communicate more with the Legislative Council ("LegCo") members on its service.

20. USTH advised that the Administration was liaising with the franchised bus companies on the timing and details of the cross harbour route proposal.

The bus companies aimed to launch a trial scheme in about one year's time on a limited scale.

Other views

21. Mr WONG Kwok-hing requested the Administration to discuss with Citybus and NLB to provide passenger seating facilities at bus termini. USTH advised that the two bus companies had agreed to provide passenger seating facilities at bus stops with newly built passenger shelters as far as practicable.

22. The Deputy Chairman, Mr WONG Kwok-hing, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan and Mr POON Siu-ping expressed concern over the adequacy of resting facilities for bus captains as well as their rest time. Mr WONG and Mr LEE requested that a rest room should be provided at each bus terminus for bus captains. Mr POON asked whether there were concrete targets set for the two grantees regarding the rest time of bus drivers and the specific arrangements of providing training to bus captains at present.

23. USTH said that TD would relay members' concerns to the two bus companies. AC/B&R supplemented that at present, all franchised bus companies had put in place their own arrangements on the provision of training to newly recruited or serving bus captains. In addition, they had to comply with TD's guidelines on the provision of rest time for bus captains and regularly report to TD on the implementation of the guidelines. TD also engaged independent contractors to carry out annual compliance surveys on working hours, rest times and meal breaks of bus captains. He added that TD would follow up with the management of relevant bus companies upon receipt of any views or suggestions on staff matters through different channels, and request the bus companies to make improvements where appropriate.

24. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung suggested establishing a monthly pass which was applicable for all public transport to encourage interchanges. He also considered that the profits earned by the MTR Corporation Limited ("MTRCL") should be used to subsidize the operation of buses and public light buses.

25. The Chairman anticipated that the market share of road transport would be decreasing amidst an expanding railway network. He opined that there should be an authority to coordinate all public transport modes in the long run. In addition, the dividends received by the Government from MTRCL should be used to subsidise road-based transport service.

**III. Public Transport Strategy Study - Outcome of the review on taxi fuel surcharge**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(03) - Administration's paper on Public Transport Strategy Study - taxi fuel surcharge

LC Paper No. CB(1)238/14-15(07) - Paper on public transport strategy in Hong Kong prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief)

LC Paper No. IN14/14-15 - Paper on taxi fuel surcharge in selected places prepared by the Research Office of the Legislative Council Secretariat (information note))

26. At the invitation of the Chairman, USTH explained to members on the findings of the Topical Study under PTSS on the introduction of a taxi fuel surcharge as proposed by the taxi trade. USTH said that the Government had all along been taking into account a number of factors when processing the application for taxi fare adjustment. These factors included components such as overall operating cost, overall revenue, net income as well as public acceptability. In general, the present mechanism was effective. USTH further pointed out that when studying whether a taxi fuel surcharge should be introduced, TD had drawn on the experience of other cities in implementing and not implementing a taxi fuel surcharge. TD had also carried out a survey in the fourth quarter in 2014 to collect views from the stakeholders, including taxi passengers, taxi drivers and some academics, on the proposal to introduce a taxi fuel surcharge. Experience of other places showed that the levy of a taxi fuel surcharge was not common. Views collected also showed that the public views towards the proposal were mixed, with more people opposing it. The imposition of any fuel surcharge would automatically transfer the burden of fuel cost to the passengers. It might cause confusion and give an impression that passengers were subject to a "double fare increase". Besides, the setting of the fuel price level that would trigger the taxi fuel surcharge and the exact surcharge amount would entail complex arrangements and calculations. Consensus amongst all parties would not be easy to come by. In addition, the Administration also noted that short-term sharp fluctuations in international fuel price might lead to a sharp rise or fall of local liquefied petroleum gas ("LPG") price. If a sharp rise of fuel price would warrant a swift imposition

of a surcharge to partially compensate for the increase in fuel expense, it would also need to tackle the question as to whether taxi fare should be lowered swiftly when LPG price dropped sharply to a low level. In suggesting to introduce a fuel surcharge, the taxi trade had not indicated what should be done when there was a sharp drop in fuel price. The Government concluded that it would be undesirable to introduce a taxi fuel surcharge. Changes in operating costs caused by fluctuations in fuel price would continue to be dealt with through the existing taxi fare adjustment mechanism.

### General views

27. The Deputy Chairman, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan, Mr WONG Kwok-hing and Mr Gary FAN expressed concerns towards the Government's decision of not introducing a taxi fuel surcharge. They opined that the fluctuations in fuel price had greatly affected the income of taxi drivers, and considered that taxi fare increase would not benefit taxi drivers as the additional income generated from fare increase would be offset by the increase in taxi rental. Hence, they supported the introduction of a taxi fuel surcharge. Mr Gary FAN asked whether the Administration would enhance the existing taxi fare adjustment mechanism to prohibit taxi owners from increasing taxi rental after taxi fare increase. The Deputy Chairman opined that taxi owners might not have a good reason to increase taxi rental after introducing a taxi fuel surcharge, but they might increase the taxi rental after taxi fare was increased. He noted that under the existing pricing mechanism, taxi drivers were reluctant to drive long-haul routes when the fuel price increased.

28. USTH said that when studying any proposals relating to taxi fare adjustment, the Administration would take into account their implications on passengers, taxi drivers and the trade's development. While the amount of taxi rental was set by taxi owners based on market condition, the Administration noted that taxi owners had not increased taxi rental for a period of time after the last two rounds of taxi fare increase. In addition, it was observed that the income of both taxi drivers and taxi owners had increased since the taxi fare increase was last implemented.

29. In response to the taxi trade's proposal to implement a taxi fuel surcharge, USTH explained that the Administration had studied the experience of other cities regarding the implementation of a taxi fuel surcharge. The Administration noted that some cities had levied a taxi fuel surcharge for a period of time but had stopped the practice afterwards. As for Hong Kong, a fuel surcharge had once been levied in the light of an unstable oil price because of the Gulf War in 1990. When the oil price went down and the Government withdrew the fuel surcharge in 1991, it caused discontent within the taxi trade



and the surcharge was subsequently subsumed into the taxi flagfall charge. USTH said that the trade had not initiated discussion on whether and how metered fare could be reduced when fuel price fell substantially.

30. Mr POON Siu-ping noted that although some cities had cancelled the taxi fuel surcharge after launch, other cities were still implementing the surcharge. Besides, passenger fuel surcharge was also imposed on air travellers. To relieve the burden of operating taxi service, he urged that government departments should coordinate to work out a mechanism with oil companies to adjust fuel prices in a fairer manner in response to the fluctuation of oil prices.

31. USTH responded that the existing taxi fare adjustment mechanism in Hong Kong was a more balanced approach for tackling taxi fuel price fluctuations, with other considerations also being taken into account. The Administration had been monitoring the fuel prices charged by oil companies. If oil prices maintained on the high side for a considerable period of time, the taxi trade could and would likely request for a taxi fare increase. The Government would perform its gate-keeping role when considering the fare increase application, taking into account, among other factors, public acceptability and the operation of the trade.

32. Mr Frankie YICK believed that there was no direct relationship between taxi fare and taxi rental as the latter was more related to market behaviour. He noted that there had been circumstances where taxi owners decreased taxi rental with a view to recruiting taxi drivers. Even though some taxi owners would increase taxi rental after taxi fare increase, he noted that the majority of additional income would go to the taxi drivers. To mitigate the impact of fluctuations in fuel price on taxi drivers and address the recruitment difficulties of taxi drivers, he considered it more important to increase the income level of taxi drivers to one on a par with the median wage index of drivers in the transportation section, which was shared by the taxi trade. He understood the difficulties of implementing a taxi fuel surcharge and hoped that the Administration would explain in detail the matter to the taxi trade.

33. Mr CHAN Kam-lam noted the mixed views within the taxi trade and passengers regarding the proposal to introduce a taxi fare surcharge. He considered that there must be a consensus in the trade and the community before the proposal was to be implemented. However, he considered that the Administration should not rule out the feasibility of the proposal and should consider it again under RPR of PTSS.

34. Mr Albert CHAN noted that after implementing a taxi fuel surcharge, taxi owners could still increase taxi rental. In addition, he observed that the taxi licence premium had increased whereas the income of taxi drivers had decreased in general. To address the operating difficulties of taxi drivers, he suggested the Administration to consider introducing a car ownership scheme and electric taxis with lower fuel cost. He hoped that the policy of issuing taxi licence could be linked with the career of taxi drivers.

35. USTH noted the views of Mr CHAN and pointed out that the income of taxi drivers had increased since the taxi fare increase was last implemented. He said that the Administration would duly consider the measures to ensure the sustainability of the taxi trade when reviewing the role and positioning of taxis under RPR of PTSS.

36. Mr WONG Kwok-hing expressed concern that the business of the taxi trade had been affected by some taxi drivers offering fare discounts to passengers and soliciting business by making use of taxi-call service mobile applications, as well as illegal carriage of passengers by vehicles like private cars or light goods vehicles. He urged the Administration to address the matter. The Administration noted his view and the taxi drivers' request to improve their income.

#### LPG filling stations

37. Mr WONG Kwok-hing said that as one of the measures to relieve the operating cost of taxi drivers, the Administration should consider the request of taxi drivers for increasing the number of dedicated LPG filling stations. Alternatively, dedicated LPG filling nozzles should be provided at each LPG filling station.

38. The Deputy Chairman noted that no dedicated LPG filling station was provided on the Lantau Island, which had led to high operating cost of taxi drivers on Lantau. Noting that the operation contracts of dedicated LPG filling stations would expire between 2021 and 2022, he asked whether the Administration would renew the relevant contracts by providing them land at nil premium and request enhanced service.

39. USTH said that the provision of dedicated LPG filling stations was under the purview of the Environment Bureau ("ENB") and the views of Mr WONG and the Deputy Chairman would be relayed to ENB.

### Taxi premium

40. Mr Gary FAN and Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung attributed the difficulties faced by taxi drivers to the Administration's failure to curb the speculative activities of taxi licences which had resulted in high taxi rental. As a result, taxi drivers had no choice but to propose the taxi fuel surcharge. To curb the speculative activities of taxi licences, Mr FAN asked whether the Administration would make reference to the Victorian government of the Australia which introduced a type of taxi licences available to eligible applicants at a fixed annual fee on the condition that the licence holders must operate the taxis themselves.

41. USTH noted the views of Mr FAN and Mr LEUNG. He said that at present, about 60% of taxi licences were owned by individual persons instead of groups or companies in Hong Kong. How the management model and service quality of taxis could be improved would be studied in the review on the role and positioning of taxis under RPR of PTSS.

#### **IV. Planning of transport infrastructure at Northwest New Territories**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(04) - Administration's paper on planning of transport infrastructure at Northwest New Territories

LC Paper No. CB(4)1306/14-15(05) - Paper on transport services at Northwest New Territories prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief))

42. At the invitation of the Chairman, USTH briefed members on the Administration's planning of transport infrastructure in the Northwest ("NW") New Territories ("NT"), including the issues in relation to the carrying capacity of the West Rail Line ("WRL").

*(At 12:23 pm, the Chairman extended the meeting by 15 minutes to 1:00 pm.)*

### Railway infrastructure

43. Mr WONG Kwok-hing criticized that the Administration's planning of transport infrastructure in NWNT was not forward-looking enough because the

railway development could not meet the transport demand arising from rapid population growth in NWNT. The planned addition of only a Hung Shui Kiu ("HSK") Station and provision of 8-compartment trains, instead of the existing 7-compartment ones, for WRL were far from sufficient to meet the transport demand generated from the HSK NDA. Mr WONG further commented that the transport network connecting the Light Rail, WRL and franchised bus service in NWNT was not convenient. The Light Rail was very full during peak hours and the station design was not safe. In addition, he was disappointed that the Administration did not plan to construct a railway to connect Tung Chung with Tuen Mun when designing the Tuen Mun – Chek Lap Kok Link ("TM-CLKL").

44. In response, USTH said that the Administration did adopt a forward-looking approach to plan the transport infrastructure in NWNT. The Administration was implementing the Shatin to Central Link ("SCL") project which would form the East West Corridor and help alleviate the passenger loading on WRL. With the commissioning of SCL, the number of train compartments per WRL train would be gradually increased and the overall carrying capacity of WRL would be increased by at least 14%.

45. The Chairman said he had made reference of the information given by the Administration and compiled two tables (LC Paper No. CB(4)1349/14-15(01)), setting out the demand and supply of transport service up to 2030 for NWNT. He considered that the expanded capacity of WRL would still fall short of the anticipated demand during rush hours from 2030. In his view, the only solution to the problem was to construct a new railway line. Given the lead time required, he urged the current Government to start planning and should take the chance of developing the East Lantau Metropolis to construct a cross-harbour railway connecting the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and NWNT.

46. USTH noted the views of the Chairman and said that the extent of adequacy of transport service would be subject to the pace of population growth in the NDAs. He also pointed out the discrepancies between the Chairman's tables and the government figures might arise from the Chairman's misunderstanding or incorrect assumptions on the additional population intake in the NDAs in NWNT. For instance, the above-mentioned planning of transport infrastructure for NWNT was to take into account the demand of transport service arising from the additional population intake in the NDAs by 2031. The Government would bid for resources and commence studies timely for improving the carrying capacity of the railways in NWNT beyond 2031.

47. The Deputy Chairman considered the Administration's paper lacked concrete information to support the planned transport infrastructure and illustrate their effectiveness. He asked whether the Administration would submit funding applications for the design and planning of the planned railway projects in NT to LegCo in the remaining period of the current term of the Government.

48. USTH clarified that Annex 2 of the Administration's paper had provided information on the estimated new population to be accommodated in NWNT in future years. He advised that the population in HSK NDA was expected to grow gradually from 2024 to 2037. While the current transport infrastructure plan was devised according to the population plan in NWNT up to 2031, the Administration would study in a timely manner how transport infrastructure should be further developed to meet the traffic demand beyond 2031. USTH added that the railway projects in NWNT were recommended under the "Railway Development Strategy 2014" ("RDS 2014"). The Administration was still considering the funding approach of the projects and how the projects were to be carried out.

49. Mr Albert CHAN was dissatisfied that the Administration had all along been neglecting the transport needs of NWNT residents. He noted that it was the Government's policy to provide a railway station for every 50 000 to 80 000 residents. However, with the huge population intake at the planned HSK NDA, there would only be two additional railway stations. USTH advised that under RDS 2014, three railway projects in NWNT would be implemented.

50. Mr LEUNG Che-cheung also considered the Administration's plan insufficient to meet the traffic demand in NWNT. Noting that the train compartments were already very full during peak hours, he was concerned over the Administration's timetable of planning the transport infrastructure to meet the transport needs by 2031 and the timetable of implementing the Northern Link. USTH advised that the Administration would timely bid for resources as required and commence studies for improving the carrying capacity of the railways in NWNT beyond 2031.

51. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok was disappointed that the Administration had announced that it would not pursue the Tuen Mun to Tsuen Wan Link ("TMTWL") which had been under discussion for years. He urged the Administration to revisit the proposal because the enhanced transport service entailed by TMTWL would provide an impetus to district and economic developments along the coastline areas between Tuen Mun and Tsuen Wan.

52. USTH explained that the provision of transport infrastructure should be considered in line with land use planning. He said that the residential population along the coastline areas between Tuen Mun and Tsuen Wan was expected to grow by about 11% by 2021, but there would not be any significant growth thereafter. As such, the cost-effectiveness of TMTWL, with an estimated construction cost of about \$65 billion, could hardly be established up to this point.

53. While appreciating that the addition of stations along WRL would provide convenience to passengers, Mr Frankie YICK urged the Administration to review the capacity of WRL to accommodate the additional patronage. He asked whether transport infrastructure would be accorded priority in the Administration's planning; and whether the Administration, when planning for transport infrastructure, would consider the impact on economic loss when passengers had to spend longer time on traffic.

54. USTH said that in the past, railway was provided after the development of a NDA. However, under RDS 2014, planning of housing and railway developments were considered at the same time. While planning for a new railway line, the Administration would carefully consider its financial and economic viability. In the case of TMTWL, the Administration had already considered whether alternatives were available or not.

#### Road infrastructure

55. The Deputy Chairman was concerned over whether TM-CLKL would be commissioned in 2018 as planned. Chief Engineer/NWNT of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Hong Kong Project Management Office of the Highways Department ("CE/NWNT-HZMB") advised that according to the current work progress, TM-CLKL would be commissioned in end 2018 as scheduled.

56. Mr LEUNG Che-cheung asked how the Tuen Mun Western Bypass ("TMWB") would connect Yuen Long and the Chek Lap Kok International Airport on Lantau. Noting that the Administration would conduct a feasibility study for Route 11 linking up North Lantau and Yuen Long, he asked about the preliminary alignment of Route 11.

57. CE/NWNT-HZMB advised that under the current recommended alignment, TMWB would connect TM-CLKL in the south and Tsing Tin Road in the north. USTH supplemented that the broad alignments of Route 11 and TMWB were indicated in Annex 3 of the Administration's paper.

**V. Any other business**

Proposed extension of period of work of the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways

(LC Paper No. CB(4)1290/14-15      - Paper on proposed extension of period of work of the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways)

58. Members endorsed the proposal of the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways to extend the period of its work and continue to operate in the 2015-2016 session.

59. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 1:03 pm.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
18 November 2015

## **New Franchise for Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

### **PURPOSE**

The Government will engage The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise for its bus network upon expiry of the current one on 1 July 2017. Members of the public are welcome to provide views on the requirements of the new franchise.

### **BACKGROUND**

2. At present, there are five grantees operating six bus franchises<sup>1</sup> in Hong Kong. The current franchise of KMB commenced on 1 August 2007 and will expire on 1 July 2017. KMB has indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise upon the expiry of the existing one.

3. Under section 5 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) (Cap. 230), the Executive Council (“ExCo”) may grant to a company a franchise conferring the right to operate a public bus service. Under section 6 of the Ordinance, a franchise may be granted for a period not exceeding 10 years<sup>2</sup>. Section 12 of the Ordinance prescribes that a grantee of a bus franchise is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport (“the Commissioner”) at all times during the franchise period.

4. The Government’s key consideration in granting a bus franchise is whether an operator is capable of providing a proper and efficient public bus service. According to the established practice, an incumbent operator which is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service, and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for being

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<sup>1</sup> The five grantees are KMB, Citybus Limited, New World First Bus Services Limited, Long Win Bus Company Limited and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited. Citybus Limited is operating two franchises, one for the Hong Kong Island and cross-harbour bus network and the other for the Airport and North Lantau bus network.

<sup>2</sup> If the Government has yet to decide on the long-term arrangements for a franchise, ExCo may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding two years as a buffer. Meanwhile, a grantee may request and ExCo may extend an existing franchise for a further period not exceeding five years.



granted a new franchise for a period of 10 years. As franchised bus operation is capital and investment intensive, a longer franchise period (say, 10 years) would facilitate a grantee's long-term planning and service development. These include –

- (a) operating certain loss-making but socially desirable routes on broader considerations over the long term;
- (b) securing more favourable terms on financing to reduce operating costs and hence pressure to increase fare;
- (c) being more resilient to business risks brought about by short-term market volatility; and
- (d) providing a more stable working environment for its staff as bus industry is also labour intensive.

The aforesaid factors are conducive to ensuring the provision of a proper and efficient service to passengers.

5. To evaluate whether a grantee is providing a proper and efficient service, the Transport Department (“TD”) has all along been reviewing the grantee's performance regularly through passenger satisfaction surveys, site surveys, vehicle inspections, examination of regular returns and feedback from the public, etc. The assessment on the performance of KMB is set out in paragraphs 6 to 13 below.

## **ASSESSMENT**

### **(A) Service Performance and Operational Efficiency**

6. As at end September 2015, KMB was operating 374 bus routes using 3 874 buses. Between August 2007 (commencement of its existing franchise) and September 2015 –

- (a) the average lost trips rate<sup>3</sup> of KMB was 4.0%, higher than the overall industry average of 3.4% during the same period. In view of relatively higher lost trip rates in 2011 (8.0%) and 2012 (4.6%), KMB has implemented a series of improvement measures.

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<sup>3</sup> This refers to the percentage of trips not meeting the number as agreed with TD over the total number of trips.

The implementation of such measures had brought the lost trip rate down to 2.8% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014<sup>4</sup>. In the first three quarters of 2015, KMB's lost trip rate was at a low level of 1.4%, which was slightly better than the industry average of 1.5%;

- (b) the average number of complaints against KMB per million passengers received by the Transport Complaints Unit under the Transport Advisory Committee was 2.69, lower than the overall industry average of 3.44 during the same period;
- (c) the average number of KMB buses involved in accidents per million vehicle-kilometre travelled was 2.95, lower than the overall industry average of 4.16 during the same period; and
- (d) on the environment front, KMB's fleet has met the prevailing EURO emission standards at those times when they were purchased (currently set at EURO V emission standards). In addition, with funding support from the Government, KMB launched a trial involving three hybrid buses in late 2014 and will start another trial involving 18 single-deck electric buses (including eight supercapacitor buses and 10 battery-electric buses) progressively starting from the first quarter of 2016. Both trials will last for two years.

7. The average daily patronage of KMB decreased from about 2 762 000 passenger journeys in 2007 to about 2 632 000 passenger journeys in the first three quarters of 2015, representing a drop of about 5%. In tandem with the patronage drop, its fleet size decreased by about 4%, from 4 027 buses to 3 874 buses during the same period. Under the Ordinance, a grantee has to submit its five-year Forward Planning Programme ("FPP") on an annual basis. FPP includes proposals for service improvement and rationalisation, as well as vehicle purchase and replacement programme. Since 2013, KMB has pursued proposals of service rationalisation with greater vigour. An "Area Approach" is adopted to review its bus service holistically for a district as a whole, with a view to maximising the overall benefits for the district. Between August 2007 and September 2015, KMB acquired a total of about 1 510 new buses<sup>5</sup>, implemented 247 service improvement<sup>6</sup> items and

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<sup>4</sup> The Occupy Movement protest which happened in the fourth quarter of 2014 had impacted on the service and frequency of franchised bus service. We have excluded the data of that quarter in the calculation of lost trip rates to eliminate such impact.

<sup>5</sup> These include the replacement of old buses and purchase of new additional buses.

304 service rationalisation<sup>7</sup> items to enhance service and network efficiency. According to its latest FPP (covering the period of 2016 to 2020), KMB plans to further acquire a total of about 1 680 new buses (amounting to around 40% of its bus fleet) to replace its old buses and further improve its bus service. As at September 2015, close to 90% of KMB's fleet are low-floor buses for the convenience of wheelchair passengers. KMB is expected to operate with a fully low-floor bus fleet by mid-2017.

## **(B) Safety and Service Enhancement Measures**

8. KMB has all along been taking measures to further enhance safety. For example, KMB has –

- (a) fully implemented a new set of working hour and rest time arrangements for the bus captains since the fourth quarter of 2012. This provides the bus captains with longer rest time when they are on duty. For example, the time that a bus captain spends at a terminal point preparing for the next departure will not be regarded as rest time. The break between successive working days is increased from not less than 9.5 hours to not less than 10 hours;
- (b) strengthened bus captains' driving skills, improved their driving attitude and enhanced their safety awareness by providing enhancement, refresher and remedial training courses on safe driving;
- (c) required bus captains aged 50 years or above to undergo annual health checks. Those aged 60 or more have to undergo an electrocardiogram ("ECG") as well. With effect from August 2013, bus captains of 50, 54 and 57 years old also have to undergo an ECG during their annual health checks; and
- (d) completed the retrofit of black boxes and speed limiters on all buses to facilitate the monitoring of bus captains' driving performance.

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<sup>6</sup> Service improvement items mainly include introduction of new routes, frequency enhancement, extension of service hours and extension of routeing.

<sup>7</sup> Service rationalisation items mainly include route cancellation, frequency reduction, route truncation and re-routeing.

9. To further enhance service standards, KMB has implemented a number of measures for continuous improvement on service quality during the current franchise period. They include :

- (a) provision of real-time bus arrival information through mobile phone application and website, as well as by showing the information on display panels at major bus stops and bus interchanges (see also paragraph (b)(i) below);
- (b) enhancement of passenger facilities at bus termini/stops and bus interchanges, including :
  - (i) as at September 2015, installation of a total of 182 display panels to at major bus termini/stops and bus interchanges<sup>8</sup> to show the estimated bus departure time or real-time arrival information;
  - (ii) provision of conspicuous bus route maps, seats and free Wi-Fi at major bus termini/stops and bus interchanges;
  - (iii) set up customer service centres at nine major locations<sup>9</sup>; and
- (c) installation of bus stop announcement system inside the compartment of all its buses.

10. As at end September 2015, KMB was offering 171 bus-bus interchange (“BBI”) concession schemes. Of these, 143 schemes were offered solely by KMB. The remaining 28 scheme were jointly offered by KMB and another franchised bus company. These concession schemes cover 283 routes (amounting to about half of all bus routes in Hong Kong). Separately, since August 2012, KMB has been participating in the Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities funded by the Government. Under the scheme, elderly passengers and eligible persons with disabilities may ride on KMB’s routes at a concessionary fare of

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<sup>8</sup> They include Tuen Mun Road Bus Interchange, Tai Lam Tunnel Bus Interchange and Tsing Sha Highway Bus Interchange.

<sup>9</sup> They include customer service centres at Cross Harbour Tunnel Bus Interchange, Tsim Sha Tsui Star Ferry Pier Public Transport Interchange (“PTI”), Mei Foo PTI, Lam Tin Station Bus Terminus (“BT”), Tuen Mun Town Centre (Tuen Mun Heung Sze Wui Road) BT, Sha Tin Central BT, Tsuen Wan Station PTI, Tin Shui Wai Tin Heng Estate PTI and Tai Lam Tunnel Bus Interchange (Yuen Long bound).

\$2 per trip<sup>10</sup>.

### **(C) Public Opinions on Bus Services**

11. TD and the operators conduct regular passenger satisfaction surveys to gauge passengers' opinions on their bus service. The findings of the passenger satisfaction surveys are used as the basis for TD and the bus operators to monitor service performance, keep track of passenger satisfaction, and identify areas for improvement.

12. Further, TD commissioned a consultancy firm to conduct an independent survey in November 2015 to collect passengers' overall opinions on KMB's bus service. The results show that 85% of the respondents are satisfied with the overall service quality. Survey findings are summarised at **Annex A**.

### **(D) Financial Performance**

13. According to the franchise requirements, all grantees have to publish a booklet of "Fuller Disclosure" annually to present their operational and financial information over the past year. Information on the financial performance of KMB during its current franchise period is at **Annex B**.

## **NEW FRANCHISE**

14. Based on the assessment in paragraphs 6 to 13 above, the Commissioner is of the view that KMB has all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service and is willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of the bus service. Meanwhile, KMB has indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise as mentioned in paragraph 2 above. Taking all things into account, the Government will discuss with KMB on a new 10-year franchise so that KMB can continue to operate its existing bus network. The new franchise will take effect immediately upon expiry of the current one in 2017.

15. Although KMB has in-principle indicated an interest to continue to provide franchised bus service, the operating environment of the bus industry in the foreseeable future will continue to be rather difficult owing to rising operating costs (especially staff costs) and keen competition from other public transport modes. The market share of franchised buses will shrink in

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<sup>10</sup> Excluding racecourse routes.

the coming few years upon the completion and opening of new railway lines<sup>11</sup>, but the specific impact will depend on the operational strategies of a grantee. A grantee has to actively rationalise its existing service to reduce wastage and explore new service areas in response to public demand so as to maintain the overall sustainability of its operation. The Government would strive for the most favourable franchise terms for the public as far as possible in a pragmatic manner. We aim to conclude the discussion with KMB within 2016.

## **PUBLIC CONSULTATION**

16. We welcome views on the requirements of the new franchise for the bus network of KMB from members of the public. Such views can be submitted to TD in writing **on or before 18 April 2016** :

By Mail :     Bus and Railway Branch  
                 Transport Department  
                 Room 2503, 25/F, AIA Tower  
                 183 Electric Road  
                 North Point

By Fax :       3528 0564

By Email :    bus-franchise@td.gov.hk

Please mark “Requirements on Bus Franchise” on the envelope or in the submission. Please call 3528 0568 for any enquiries on this document.

17. Any person/organisation making a submission may provide personal data on a voluntary basis. Such personal data will only be used for this consultation exercise. Unless otherwise specified, the name of the person/organisation making the submission as well as the views so provided may be made available to the public after the consultation period.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**January 2016**

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<sup>11</sup> Including the Kwun Tong Line Extension, South Island Line (East) and Shatin-Central Link.

**Transport Department**

**Passenger Opinion Survey for**

**The Kowloon Motor Bus Company**

**(1933) Limited**

**- Summary of Survey Results -**

**Conducted and Prepared by**



***December 2015***

## **Background & Objective**

In order to collect views on the performance of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB"), the Transport Department has commissioned the Mercado Solutions Associates Limited ("MSA") to conduct passenger opinion survey via telephone in November 2015.

## **The Survey**

The target population is the regular passengers aged 12 or above who take KMB at least once a week. In order to ensure the findings of the survey are representative, a random sample of household telephone numbers were selected. Within the selected households, all individuals aged 12 or above who used the service of KMB at least once a week were listed. After that, one target respondent of the selected household would be randomly picked by a random selection process.

The questionnaire includes eight core questions covering the following aspects of the service performance:

- (1) Overall quality of service
- (2) Level of comfort of buses
- (3) Facilities on buses
- (4) Passenger information
- (5) Reliability of bus services
- (6) Driving performance of bus drivers
- (7) Service attitude of bus drivers or staff
- (8) Performance of the bus on environmental protection

The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction level on each service aspect in a five-point scale of (i) Very satisfied (ii) Satisfied (iii) Dissatisfied (iv) Very dissatisfied (v) No comment.

In total, 2,600 individuals were successfully interviewed during the survey period between 11 and 30 November 2015, representing an overall response rate of 82.1%.

## **Survey Results**

1. Overall speaking, 85.1% of the respondents indicated that they were very



satisfied/satisfied with the overall quality of the service provided by KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.

2. 85.5% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the level of comfort of the buses of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 13.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
3. 90.8% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the facilities on the buses of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 8.3% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
4. 81.2% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the passenger information provided by KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 14.6% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
5. 63.6% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the reliability of bus services of KMB. The percentage was higher than the 35.5% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
6. 87.7% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the driving performance of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 11.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
7. 89.0% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the service attitude of drivers or staff of KMB. The percentage was much higher than the 9.0% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied.
8. 73.3% of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied/satisfied with the performance of the buses of KMB on environmental protection. The percentage was higher than the 19.9% who were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. For information, 6.8% of the respondents indicated "No comment".

**Financial performance of KMB under the current franchise**

<b>Accounting Year</b>	<b>Average Daily Patronage (passenger journeys)</b>	<b>Total Revenue (\$ million)</b>	<b>Total Cost (\$ million)</b>	<b>Profit / Loss after Tax (\$ million)</b>
2007	2,762,000	6,008	5,769	239
2008	2,695,000	6,163	6,060	104
2009	2,644,000	5,964	5,534	431
2010	2,594,000	5,991	5,695	296
2011	2,565,000	6,091	6,053	38
2012	2,576,000	6,178	6,221	-43
2013	2,610,000	6,388	6,401	-12
2014	2,617,000	6,534	6,329	205

# **立法會**

## ***Legislative Council***

LC Paper No. CB(4)1298/15-16  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB4/PL/TP/1

### **Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of meeting held on  
Friday, 15 January 2016, at 10:15 am  
in Conference Room 3 of the Legislative Council Complex**

**Members present :** Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP (Chairman)  
Hon TANG Ka-piu, JP (Deputy Chairman)  
Hon LEE Cheuk-yan  
Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, BBS, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan, JP  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip  
Hon Claudia MO  
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, JP  
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH  
Hon YIU Si-wing, BBS  
Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai  
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP  
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, BBS, MH, JP  
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki  
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP  
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-kwok, SBS, MH, JP  
Hon Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun, BBS, MH, JP  
Hon Tony TSE Wai-chuen, BBS

**Members absent** : Hon James TO Kun-sun  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-ye, GBS, JP  
Hon WONG Yuk-man  
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP  
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH

**Public Officers attending** : **Agenda item III**

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Andy CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 2

Miss Carrie CHANG  
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and  
Housing (Transport) 1

Miss LAW Fung-ping, JP  
Deputy Commissioner for Transport/Transport  
Services & Management  
Transport Department

Miss Rachel KWAN  
Assistant Commissioner/Bus and Railway  
Transport Department

Miss Carol CHEUNG  
Principal Transport Officer/Bus and Railway 3  
Transport Department

**Agenda item IV**

Professor Anthony CHEUNG, GBS, JP  
Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Joseph LAI Yee-tak, JP  
Permanent Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)

Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP  
Under Secretary for Transport and Housing

Mr Andy CHAN, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 2

Ms Ivy LAW Chui-mei  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 3

Mrs Ingrid YEUNG HO Poi-yan, JP  
Commissioner for Transport

Mr Peter LAU Ka-keung, JP  
Director of Highways

Mr CHAN Pai-ming, JP  
Principal Government Engineer/Railway Development  
Highways Department

**Clerk in attendance:** Ms Sophie LAU  
Chief Council Secretary (4)6

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (4)6

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (4)6

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Action

- I. Information papers issued since the last meeting**  
(LC Paper No. CB(4)379/15-16(01) - Letter from Hon WONG  
and CB(4)488/15-16(01) Kwok-hing on issues  
relating to drivers running  
away after traffic accidents  
and the Administration's  
response

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| LC Paper No. CB(4)388/15-16(01)           | - Administration's response to the letters from Hon TANG Ka-piu on the transport problems at Central and design and use of spiral roundabout  |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)414/15-16(01)           | - Administration's response to the letter from Hon CHAN Han-pan on the progress of providing hillside escalator links and elevator systems  |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)417/15-16(01)           | - Letter from Hon WONG Yuk-man on the review of Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities  |
| LC Paper Nos. CB(4)452/15-16(01) and (02) | - Letters from Hon WONG Kwok-hing and Hon LEUNG Che-cheung on the fatal traffic accident on 18 December 2015 at the intersection of Kam Sheung Road and Tung Wui Road in Yuen Long and the design of the relevant intersection) |

Members noted the above papers issued since the last meeting.

**II. Items for discussion at the next meeting on 26 February 2016**

- |                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| (LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(01) | - List of outstanding items for discussion |
|----------------------------------|--|

- |                                 |                              |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(02) | - List of follow-up actions) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|

2. Members agreed to discuss the following items at the next regular meeting to be held on 26 February 2016 –

- (a) Upgrading of the Transport Information System;
- (b) Local public transport arrangements at the Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge ("HZMB"); and
- (c) Progress update of the discussions with the governments of Guangdong Province and Macao on cross boundary transport arrangements for HZMB.

*(Post-meeting note: The meeting was subsequently rescheduled to 29 February 2016.)*

### **III. Franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(03) - Administration's paper on new franchise for bus network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(04) - Paper on the franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief)

LC Paper Nos. CB(4)347/15-16(01) and CB(4)457/15-16(05) - Letter from Hon Claudia MO requesting to hold a public hearing on the franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited and the Administration's response

LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(06) - Submission from Clean Air Network)

3. At the invitation of the Chairman, Under Secretary for Transport and Housing ("USTH") briefed members on the Administration's plan to engage

The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise for its bus network upon expiry of the current one on 1 July 2017. Apart from canvassing members' views on the requirements of the new franchise, the Administration would also invite views from the public, the Traffic and Transport Committees of all District Councils, as well as the Transport Advisory Committee. After collating the views received, the Administration would update members on the progress of granting of a new franchise for the bus network of KMB in due course.

#### Enhancing the standard of bus service

4. Noting that the average daily patronage of KMB kept decreasing, Mr Tony TSE was concerned whether KMB would continue to strive for improvement in its service quality. Also, he suggested that the Administration and KMB should take into account other factors relating to the quality of bus services, such as cleanliness inside bus compartments and passenger facilities at bus stops.

5. In response, USTH said that KMB had all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service and was willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of the bus service. He added that in the wake of further development of their heavy rail network, the market share of franchised buses had dropped in the past decade and the operating environment of the franchised bus companies in the foreseeable future would continue to be rather difficult owing to, amongst other things, keen competition from other public transport modes. Against this backdrop, the Administration was conducting the Public Transport Strategy Study ("PTSS") to examine the overall strategic arrangements of the public transport system so as to enhance the complementarity of the various public transport services. Deputy Commissioner for Transport/Transport Services & Management ("DC/TS&M") of the Transport Department ("TD") supplemented that the Administration would continue to coordinate with other departments to facilitate KMB in enhancing its quality of service.

6. The Deputy Chairman enquired whether the Administration would comprehensively review the Public Bus Services Ordinance having regard to changes in the franchised bus landscape over the years. He observed that the penalty imposed on a franchised bus operator for substandard service performance in the past was not heavy. In reply, USTH advised that the existing statutory and administrative mechanism for monitoring franchised bus services had been effective, and the franchised bus operators had all along been willing to improve their service performance and operational efficiency. The Administration would nevertheless keep in view the situation. If there would



one day be a need to introduce any legislative amendments to the Public Bus Services Ordinance, the Legislative Council would be consulted accordingly.

*Improvement in lost trips*

7. Mr Christopher CHUNG enquired whether the Administration had adopted any benchmarks to assess the performance of KMB and considered that KMB should continue to enhance its service performance, such as improvement in respect of lost trips. Noting that the major reasons for lost trips included mechanical breakdown of vehicles and traffic congestion, Mr Jeffrey LAM asked whether the Administration would implement any improvement measures to alleviate the problem. He also enquired about the average lost trip rate of KMB. Dr Elizabeth QUAT said that the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong had conducted surveys on the lost trip situation on the first school day in the past two years. Although the overall situation seemed to have improved in 2015, lost trip rates for certain routes remained serious. Mr WU Chi-wai considered that the Administration should request KMB to analyse the major reasons leading to lost trips in the new franchise.

8. In reply, USTH explained that one of the Administration's key considerations when deciding whether to engage an incumbent operator for discussion on a new franchise for its existing bus network was whether the operator was capable of providing a proper and efficient public bus service. The Administration had taken into account a host of indicators as set out in the paper in assessing KMB's service performance. As regards the problem of bus lost trips, he said that with the implementation of a series of improvement measures by the Administration and KMB, the average lost trip rate of KMB had been brought down to 2.8% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014. In the first three quarters of 2015, KMB's average lost trip rate was at a low level of 1.4%, which was slightly better than the industry average of 1.5%. On the broader question of traffic congestion, USTH said that the Administration was following up on the recommendations set out in the Report on the Study of Road Traffic Congestion in Hong Kong by the Transport Advisory Committee which included, amongst others, the proposal to increase fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences and an Electronic Road Pricing Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas. These initiatives should also benefit road-based public transport services upon implementation.

Admin

9. As complaints against lost trips were still serious during rush hours in the morning and evening, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan was concerned whether an operator could make up any lost trips during peak hours by operating additional trips during non-peak hours, and requested the Administration to

provide detailed calculation of the average lost trip rate of bus service for peak and non-peak hours of a day. In view of the lost trip situation, he was concerned whether KMB had had sufficient capacity to operate all of its routes given the size of its bus network.

*(Post-meeting note: The supplementary information provided by the Administration was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(4)697/15-16(01) on 9 March 2016.)*

10. In response, USTH explained that the Administration would introduce measures to alleviate road traffic congestion. DC/TS&M supplemented that the lost trip rates were calculated for the morning peak period, evening peak period, inter-peak day period and after evening peak period. Any lost trips during a particular period could not be compensated by excess trips made in another period. The overall lost trip rate was the percentage of the aggregate negative difference between the number of trips actually operated and the number of scheduled trips in these four periods.

*Introduction of new routes and rationalization of bus routes*

11. Given the growing demand for transport services, in particular in remote districts, Mr CHAN Han-pan urged KMB to introduce more new routes and enhance frequency under the new franchise. Mr CHAN Kam-lam suggested that apart from encouraging KMB to improve its service, the Administration should also play a more facilitative role to complement bus operators' efforts, such as to assist them in identifying more suitable location for bus-bus interchange. He further suggested that the Administration should continue to rationalize bus routes so as to enhance network efficiency and ease traffic congestion. In response, USTH explained that the Administration, together with KMB, would press ahead with the rationalization to enhance bus service and network efficiency.

12. Having regard to the transport needs of the community, Dr KWOK Ka-ki suggested that the Administration should ensure that KMB would continue to operate those routes which were not profitable but socially desirable. In reply, USTH explained that some 60% of the routes operated by all bus operators were operating at a loss, meaning that bus operators had already been operating a handful of socially desirable routes irrespective of their profitability. The Administration would continue to work with KMB to rationalize bus services so as to enhance network efficiency.

*Provision of real-time bus service information to passengers*

13. To further enhance service performance, Mr Christopher CHUNG urged KMB to provide real-time bus service information to passengers. Dr Elizabeth QUAT also suggested that the Administration should require KMB's fleet to be equipped with the Global Positioning System to facilitate the provision of real-time arrival information through the company's website, smartphone application or information display panels.

14. USTH replied that KMB had started to provide passengers with real-time arrival information through its website and smartphone application. It had also installed display panels to provide such information at some bus stops and would continue to do so at other bus stops. Also, he said that the Administration would seek to include requirements, like requesting KMB to make use of information technology in providing passengers with service information, in the context of the new franchise. Further, as announced in the 2016 Policy Address, the Administration would subsidize franchised bus companies in expediting the installation of real-time arrival information display panels and seats at bus stops for the convenience of passengers.

15. Mr YIU Si-wing expressed concern that only 550 real-time arrival information display panels would be installed at the stops within the first phase of around three years. He therefore urged the Administration and KMB to expedite the installation progress. Noting that KMB would provide free Wi-Fi at major bus stops, bus termini and bus interchanges, Mr YIU enquired whether KMB would be requested to further enhance those facilities by providing free Wi-Fi at other bus stops or inside bus compartments under the new franchise.

16. In reply, USTH explained that in planning for installation of real-time arrival information display panels at covered bus stops, franchised bus companies would need to take into account the actual physical constraints of individual locations, such as whether there were any electrical installations at the bus stop. The Administration would invite KMB to consider Mr YIU's views and suggestions when discussing the new franchise. Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 2 supplemented that franchised bus companies should be able to install real-time arrival information display panels at all covered bus stops with electrical installations with the subsidy to be provided by the Government on a matching basis. Besides, the Administration would study how to enhance franchised bus services under PTSS, and the proposal for provision of free Wi-Fi access to passengers would be looked into in that context.

Fare concessions

17. The Chairman expressed concern over the fact that KMB would need to obtain the approval of the Commissioner for Transport before offering fare concessions. He noted that the MTR Corporation Limited ("MTRCL"), however, had full autonomy in the provision of fare concessions. He indicated that he would move a motion urging the Administration to review and relax the criteria for approving fare concessions provided by franchised bus companies so that franchised buses and railway could compete on equal footing.

18. Mr CHAN Han-pan considered that KMB should offer more fare concessions under the new franchise, such as introducing more bus-bus interchange schemes, monthly passes for frequent users and more sectional fares to benefit passengers. Dr Elizabeth QUAT opined that the Administration should coordinate the efforts of different public transport operators to provide inter-company fare concessions.

19. In response, USTH explained that the Administration had been encouraging franchised bus companies to introduce more fare concessions to passengers. Nevertheless, public transport services in Hong Kong were provided by private operators on commercial principles with basically no direct subsidy from the Government. The provision of fare concessions would be the operators' decision taking into account factors such as their operating conditions. DC/TS&M supplemented that TD had not received any applications from franchised bus companies for provision of monthly passes to passengers.

20. As regards the limitations of existing bus-bus interchange schemes and section fares, Mr WU Chi-wai suggested introducing a new fare structure under which a passenger would be charged based on the distance travelled in each trip, regardless of the bus routes selected. In reply, USTH said that the Administration would convey to KMB members' views in the discussion of new franchise.

Admin

21. Mr Albert CHAN requested the Administration to provide information on the annual amount of subsidy received by each franchised bus company from the Government under the Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities since its launch in 2012.

*(Post-meeting note: The supplementary information provided by the Administration was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(4)697/15-16(01) on 9 March 2016.)*

Financial performance

22. Mr WONG Kwok-hing expressed concern whether the Administration would specify in the new franchise the definition of fare revenue and non-fare box revenue; and whether the Administration would consider the above two kinds of revenue when assessing fare increase applications from franchised bus companies. Dr KWOK Ka-ki urged the Administration to review whether non-fare box revenue relating to the provision of franchised bus services, especially advertising income relating to RoadShow Holdings Limited, would be included in franchise accounts for fairness to passengers.

Admin

23. In response, USTH explained that both the law and the franchise had made clear that non-fare box revenue, including revenue from advertisements, of KMB would be considered as operating receipts for inclusion in the franchise accounts. And, the capital gain or losses derived or arising from or connected with disposal of sites acquired from private market by KMB were excluded from KMB's franchise account. Upon Mr WONG's request, the Administration would provide supplementary information.

*(Post-meeting note: The supplementary information provided by the Administration was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(4)697/15-16(01) on 9 March 2016.)*

24. The Deputy Chairman expressed concern that KMB might be tempted to cut costs by means of layoff of long-service staff including bus captains. The morale of KMB's staff would be adversely affected. In response, DC/TS&M explained that although the decision on manpower arrangements rested with the company, TD would closely monitor the service performance of KMB and take follow-up actions as necessary.

Working and rest time arrangements for bus captains

25. Mr WONG Kwok-hing expressed that the Administration and KMB should implement appropriate measures, such as the rest time arrangement for bus captains, to ensure driving safety of franchised buses. He asked whether the Administration would require KMB under the new franchise to provide rest rooms and toilet facilities to bus captains at bus stops and bus termini. Further, he expressed concern about the proportion of KMB bus captains who needed to perform two separate duty shifts per day and those who needed to perform one duty shift per day; and the proportion of KMB bus captains who needed to perform night duty shift on one day and morning duty shift the next day. Noting that there were cases of bus captains required to work during rest time or before and after their scheduled duties, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan urged the

Administration to pay due regard to the situation and ensure KMB's compliance with the TD's relevant guidelines.

Admin

26. In response, DC/TS&M advised that nearly 90% of bus termini were provided with rest facilities whereas over 94% had toilets for bus captains or with access to toilets within a walking distance of three minutes. The Administration and KMB would continue to explore possible ways to overcome the physical constraints of the bus termini so as to provide such facilities as far as practicable. Further, she explained that KMB would arrange the duty schedules of bus captains in accordance with the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks ("the Guidelines") promulgated by TD. TD would continue to monitor KMB's compliance with the Guidelines and maintain regular liaison with the representatives of bus captain unions. Upon Mr WONG's request, the Administration would provide detailed information on these issues.

*(Post-meeting note: The supplementary information provided by the Administration was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(4)697/15-16(01) on 9 March 2016.)*

#### Environmental improvement measures

27. Regarding the environmental improvement initiatives of KMB, Mr Jeffrey LAM enquired about the latest progress of replacing its fleet with the most environmentally-friendly buses. Besides, Mr WU Chi-wai expressed concern on the emission of KMB's fleet. He therefore suggested expediting the bus replacement programme to strive for further improvement to roadside air quality. Owing to some incidents involving electric buses, Mr Albert CHAN urged the Administration and KMB to attach greater importance to operational safety of electric buses.

28. In reply, DC/TS&M explained that with funding support from the Environmental Protection Department, KMB would progressively launch trials involving hybrid and electric buses. Separately, KMB had planned to acquire a total of 1 680 new buses, which would be of the most environmentally-friendly models that were technology proven and commercially available, to replace its old buses.

#### Other views

29. Assuming that public transport services should be a profitable business in a densely populated metropolitan city like Hong Kong, and the policy to use railway as the backbone of the public transport system, Mr LEUNG

Kwok-hung considered that the Government should buy back or acquire all public transport operations, including bus service, to ensure that cheap and efficient services could be provided to all citizens, especially the poor, with the most environmentally-friendly vehicles.

30. Mr WONG Kwok-hing considered that representatives from KMB should attend Panel meetings on issues relating to the new franchise in future so as to listen to members' views and concerns about the operator's service direct. USTH explained that the purpose of the panel meeting was to brief members on the Government's plan to engage the operator for discussion on the granting of a new franchise for the relevant bus network and to canvass members' views on the requirements of the new franchise. Representatives from the operator were not invited to attend according to past practice. This notwithstanding, USTH assured members that the Administration would relay views and concerns expressed at this meeting to KMB in the course of the discussion on the new franchise.

31. Besides, Mr Albert CHAN suggested holding a public hearing on the granting of a new franchise for bus network of KMB. He hoped that at such a meeting, representatives from KMB would be invited.

### Motion

32. The Chairman proposed to move the following motion which was tabled at the meeting:

"本人動議，鑑於專營巴士的票價優惠，例如月票、特惠站及回程優惠等，受到《公共巴士服務條例》第230章第13條和《公共巴士服務規例》第230A章第III部第4條和第5條規管，條文定明專營公司釐定票價優惠必須得到運輸署署長准許，而申請至批准需時極長；另一方面，港鐵享有提供票價優惠的絕對自主權；因此，本人促請政府盡快檢討和放寬對專營巴士票價優惠的審批準則，讓專營巴士在「一鐵獨大」的環境下，有公平的競爭空間繼續服務市民，讓大眾受惠。"

(Translation)

"I move that given that fare concessions offered by franchised buses such as monthly passes, fare savers and return-trip discounts, etc., are subject to regulation under section 13 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) and regulations 4 and 5 of Part III of the Public Bus Services Regulations (Cap. 230A), and that while the relevant provisions stipulate

that a grantee shall get the approval of the Commissioner for Transport in determining fare concessions, it takes exceedingly long time for such submitted application to be approved; yet quite the contrary, the MTR Corporation Limited has full autonomy in the provision of fare concessions; I therefore urge the Government to expeditiously review and relax the criteria for vetting and approving fare concessions in respect of franchised buses to ensure a fair competitive environment for franchised buses to continue to serve the public for the benefit of the community under the 'hegemony of the railway'."

33. Mr WONG Kwok-hing proposed an amendment to the above motion by adding "並促請把巴士票價優惠納入九龍巴士的十年專營權。" after "讓大眾受惠。".

34. Mr Tony TSE enquired how long the Administration would take to approve the applications for fare concessions submitted by franchised bus companies. USTH advised members that such applications would be processed in a timely manner once received.

35. After discussion, the Chairman said that he would first deal with the amendment proposed by Mr WONG Kwok-hing.

36. The Chairman put to vote the amended motion proposed by Mr WONG Kwok-hing as follows:

"本人動議，鑑於專營巴士的票價優惠，例如月票、特惠站及回程優惠等，受到《公共巴士服務條例》第230章第13條和《公共巴士服務規例》第230A章第III部第4條和第5條規管，條文定明專營公司釐定票價優惠必須得到運輸署署長准許，而申請至批准需時極長；另一方面，港鐵享有提供票價優惠的絕對自主權；因此，本人促請政府盡快檢討和放寬對專營巴士票價優惠的審批準則，讓專營巴士在「一鐵獨大」的環境下，有公平的競爭空間繼續服務市民，讓大眾受惠。並促請把巴士票價優惠納入九龍巴士的十年專營權。"

(Translation)

"I move that given that fare concessions offered by franchised buses such as monthly passes, fare savers and return-trip discounts, etc., are subject to regulation under section 13 of the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) and regulations 4 and 5 of Part III of the Public Bus Services



Regulations (Cap. 230A), and that while the relevant provisions stipulate that a grantee shall get the approval of the Commissioner for Transport in determining fare concessions, it takes exceedingly long time for such submitted application to be approved; yet quite the contrary, the MTR Corporation Limited has full autonomy in the provision of fare concessions; I therefore urge the Government to expeditiously review and relax the criteria for vetting and approving fare concessions in respect of franchised buses to ensure a fair competitive environment for franchised buses to continue to serve the public for the benefit of the community under the 'hegemony of the railway'; and urge that bus fare concessions be included in the 10-year franchise of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited."

37. As requested by Mr Albert CHAN, the Chairman ordered a division and the division bell was rung for five minutes. Nine members voted for and two members voted against it. The voting results were as follows:

*For*

Mr TANG Ka-piu

Mr CHAN Kam-lam

Mr WONG Kwok-hing

Mr YIU Si-wing

Mr CHAN Han-pan

Dr Elizabeth QUAT

Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok

Mr Christopher CHUNG

Mr Tony TSE

(9 members)

*Against*

Mr Albert CHAN

Ms Claudia MO

(2 members)

38. The Chairman declared that the amendment motion was carried.

**IV. Briefing by the Secretary for Transport and Housing on the Chief Executive's 2016 Policy Address**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(07)

- Administration's paper on transport-related policy initiatives of the Transport and Housing Bureau under the 2016 Policy Agenda)

39. Upon invitation, Secretary for Transport and Housing ("STH") briefed members on the transport-related policy initiatives of the Transport and Housing Bureau ("THB") featured in the 2016 Policy Address, details of which were set out in the Administration's paper (LC Paper No. CB(4)457/15-16(07)). In brief, STH said that the Government would continue to plan strategic highways and related roads, review public transport services and provide franchised bus companies with a subsidy to help expedite the installation of seats and real-time bus arrival information display panels at bus stops.

*(Post-meeting note: The speaking note of STH was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(4)500/15-16(02) on 18 January 2016.)*

#### Transport studies and planning

40. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok said that the engineering trade supported the Administration's initiative to carry out the study namely "Hong Kong 2030+: Towards A Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030" to plan for Hong Kong in the longer term. He agreed that early planning of major transport infrastructure was required to cope with the needs arising from the long-term land development in Hong Kong.

41. The Deputy Chairman urged the Administration to review whether the recommendations under the third comprehensive transport study ("CTS") had all been implemented and their effectiveness. Mr Gary FAN expressed disappointment that the Administration did not plan to carry out the fourth CTS.

42. STH explained that the third CTS completed in 1999 had mapped out some broad directions with respect to the overall arrangement for the transport system. The Government was of the view that those broad directions, including using railways as the backbone of the passenger transport system, remained valid from the policy perspective. The Government also noted that the public was supportive to railway development when it announced the Railway Development Strategy 2014 ("RDS-2014").

43. Mr Frankie YICK urged the Administration to plan well the transport infrastructure connecting Tseung Kwan O as he anticipated that the planned construction of the East Kowloon Line, which was a new line running in the northern East Kowloon area connecting the Diamond Hill Station of the Kwun Tong Line (and the future Shatin to Central Link) and the Po Lam Station of the Tseung Kwan O Line, still could not meet the transport demand generated from the rapid population growth in Tseung Kwan O.

Measures to alleviate traffic congestion

*Electronic Road Pricing ("ERP") and parking spaces*

44. Mr Frankie YICK hoped that, before considering whether ERP should be implemented or not, the Administration would first assess the traffic situation after the commissioning of the Central—Wan Chai Bypass ("CWB"), the result of strengthening the law enforcement against congestion-related traffic offences; and effect of the implementation of toll adjustment schemes to rationalize the traffic distribution among the three road harbour crossings ("RHCs"). Mr YICK also asked whether the Administration would consider completing the parking policy review prior to increasing the fixed penalty for illegal parking as some commercial vehicles were forced to be parked illegally due to insufficient loading/parking spaces.

45. STH said that the Government was conducting a three-month consultation on the ERP pilot scheme in Central and its adjacent areas ("ERP Pilot Scheme"). After collecting the views through the public engagement exercise, the Government would engage a consultant to conduct an in-depth feasibility study to develop detailed options for the ERP Pilot Scheme for further discussion by the public. He pointed out that the availability of a free-of-charge alternative route was a prerequisite for the implementation of the ERP Pilot Scheme. CWB, which was to be commissioned, would provide an alternative route to motorists whose destinations were not in Central. Its commissioning would also provide a basis for the Government to consider the overall toll adjustment scheme to rationalize the traffic distribution among the three RHCs.

46. STH added that the Police would definitely take law enforcement actions when there were vehicles committing congestion-related traffic offences. He said that the parking policy review to be conducted by TD would accord priority to meeting the parking needs of commercial vehicles.

47. Mr CHAN Kam-lam expressed concern over the serious lack of parking spaces for private cars in Hong Kong. He pointed out that as a result of the same provision standard of parking spaces at public-funded and private housing estates, there was a surplus of parking spaces in some public-funded housing estates whereas shortage of parking spaces in some private housing estates. As such, he urged the Administration to review the provision standard of parking spaces in Hong Kong. He also noted that there were insufficient public parking spaces in urban areas, leading to serious illegal parking problem. The Administration noted Mr CHAN's views.

*Development of transport infrastructure*

48. Dr Elizabeth QUAT expressed disappointment that no measures had been proposed in the Policy Address to relieve the traffic congestion problem in the New Territories East ("NTE") due to growth in population and traffic demand. She requested the Administration to work out measures to address the problem, including exploring the feasibility of constructing a new tunnel connecting Shatin, Wong Tai Sin and the planned Central Kowloon Route.

49. STH said that the Government attached great importance to provision of adequate transport infrastructural facilities to meet the increased traffic demand arisen from growth in population. In this regard, environmental and traffic assessments must be carried out in tandem with any new housing developments. He added that apart from taking forward the new railway lines as recommended under RDS-2014, the Government planned to seek funding approval in the current legislative session to commence the construction of the Tseung Kwan O—Lam Tin Tunnel, which would connect Tseung Kwan O and East Kowloon. The commissioning of Shatin to Central Link would also relieve the traffic congestion problem in NTE. Meanwhile, the Government would continue to carry out road widening works to enhance road capacity.

Bus services

50. The Deputy Chairman expressed support for the Administration's initiative to provide franchised bus companies with a subsidy to help expedite the installation of seats and real-time bus arrival information display panels for the convenience of waiting passengers. He hoped that the Administration, when seeking funding approval from the Legislative Council, would provide details on whether there would be restrictions on display of advertisements on the display panels funded by the Government.

51. Mr WONG Kwok-hing also welcomed the Government's plan to subsidize franchised bus companies to help expedite the installation of seats at bus stops and hoped that priority would be given to bus stops located in public housing estates. He asked about the timetable of the relevant installation works.

52. Commissioner for Transport advised that the Government's target was to subsidize the installation of seats at 3 000 bus stops in total in five years. Seats would be installed at around 1 500 bus stops in the first phase of around three years and at the remaining bus stops thereafter. The concrete timetable would be subject to the installation progress having considered the actual circumstances at each bus stop.

53. Mr LEUNG Che-cheung asked whether the Administration would consider gradually replacing the current buses running short-haul routes with electric buses to reduce roadside emission. STH advised that THB had been liaising closely with the Environment Bureau to promote green transport to reduce roadside emission. While it was the Government's target to encourage the use of electric vehicles in public transport such as franchised bus service, the implementation was subject to the availability of models suitable for Hong Kong's operational characteristics and service requirements.

#### Railway development

54. The Deputy Chairman and Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok were concerned over the implementation progress of railway projects recommended under RDS-2014, which provided a framework for planning the expansion of Hong Kong's railway network up to 2031. Ir Dr LO urged that the relevant planning work should be commenced as soon as possible.

55. STH advised that the Government was taking forward the detailed planning work for the first batch of railway projects, i.e. the Northern Link (and Kwu Tung Station), Tuen Mun South Extension and East Kowloon Line as recommended under RDS-2014. He added that in the past year, the Government in particular Highways Department ("HyD") was busy dealing with issues relating to the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link project ("the XRL project"), which had affected the progress of taking forward the new railway projects to a certain extent. STH said that when RDS-2014 was announced, the Government had proposed the indicative implementation programme for individual railway projects. Nevertheless, the taking forward of individual projects would be subject to the outcome of detailed engineering, environmental and financial studies, as well as updated assessment of passenger transport demand and availability of resources at the time.

56. Director of Highways ("DHy") supplemented that HyD was updating the planning parameters for the abovesaid railway projects in response to the planning changes in adjacent areas and would continue to welcome public views on the implementation of the projects.

57. The Chairman noted that the Administration would examine the possibility of further developing the East Lantau Metropolis by constructing an artificial island near Kau Yi Chau. In the long run, the Metropolis would become the third core business district and a community with a population of 400 000 to 700 000. It would link up Hong Kong Island, Lantau and the New Territories West. He also noted that one of the recommendations made in the

report of the Lantau Development Advisory Committee in January 2016 was similar to the proposal previously suggested by him, i.e. construction of the fifth cross harbour railway connecting Tuen Mun, the Lantau Island and Hong Kong West. The Chairman asked whether the Administration would consider constructing the fifth cross harbour railway.

58. STH assured members that the Government would provide necessary transport facilities to meet the transport demand arising from the district development and would accord priority to building transport infrastructure. In this regard, THB would consider the need of constructing large transport infrastructure in view of the development in the northwest of the New Territories. STH added that the development of Lantau Island was under the purview of the Development Bureau. He said that the Lantau Development Advisory Committee was still collecting public views on its recommendations, and the Government would not rule out the possibility of constructing a new railway connecting Tuen Mun, the Lantau Island and Hong Kong West.

#### Corporate governance of MTRCL, MTR fares and services

##### *MTRCL's corporate governance and Fare Adjustment Mechanism ("FAM")*

59. The Deputy Chairman, Mr WONG Kwok-hing, Mr Gary FAN and Mr LEE Cheuk-yan expressed concern over whether the Government and MTRCL would advance the next review of MTRCL's FAM. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan added that under the "Profit Sharing Mechanism" of the current FAM, the amount of fare concessions to be provided by MTRCL would be reduced as a result of the provision of special dividend by MTRCL to shareholders (including the Government as the majority shareholder) due to the cost overrun of the XRL project. He attributed the cost overrun of the XRL project to the failure of the Administration to monitor effectively MTRCL and the management fault of MTRCL.

60. In reply, STH said that according to the Operating Agreement signed between the Government and MTRCL in 2007, FAM would be reviewed every five years. He advised that subject to mutual agreement of the Government and MTRCL, the next FAM review could be advanced. He further advised that MTRCL had publicly announced that it would study the feasibility of advancing the next FAM review and that while the Government was the majority shareholder of MTRCL, the Government could not mandate the advancement of the FAM review according to the said Operating Agreement.

61. Regarding the corporate governance of MTRCL, STH said that the Government had proactively carried out its duty as MTRCL's majority

shareholder by enhancing the corporate governance of MTRCL. He said that MTRCL had set up specific committees to identify early the risks faced by the Corporation in railway works projects. He further said that the Government did not participate in the discussion of providing special dividend by MTRCL at the MTR Board meetings.

### *MTR Services*

62. Mr WONG Kwok-hing indicated that the railway unions under The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions fully supported MTRCL to set up an academy to train up personnel in rail management and operation. He was concerned over whether the academy would be run solely by MTRCL or jointly by MTRCL and other educational institutions. STH said that the Government also supported MTRCL's plan to set up the academy to facilitate the further development of the railway-related professional services.

63. Noting that the Administration aimed to develop Hong Kong into a smart city, Mr YIU Si-wing asked whether the Administration would encourage MTRCL to provide free Wi-Fi services at MTR train compartments and train stations. STH took note of Mr YIU's views and said that the Government could reflect his views to MTRCL.

64. Mr LEUNG Che-cheung expressed concern that while the Government adopted the policy of using railways as the backbone of the passenger transport system, the capacity of MTR trains could not meet the transport demand of passengers. He asked whether the Administration would strengthen the service of other public transport modes to solve the problem.

65. STH explained that although the Government adopted the policy of using railways as the backbone of the public transport system, railway was not the only public transport mode. The Government had been reviewing the roles and positioning of public transport services other than heavy rail under PTSS. PTSS aimed to enhance the existing strategic arrangements of the public transport services in tandem with the further development of the heavy rail network.

### Provision of escalator link/elevator system

66. Mr CHAN Han-pan expressed concern over the implementation progress of hillside escalator links and elevator systems ("hillside escalator links") of which the construction had yet been commenced. He suggested the Administration to consider contracting out the relevant works under design and build contracts to speed up the progress. Given the lengthy time which might

be required to seek funding from the Legislative Council to take forward the projects, he suggested the Administration to set up a fund of \$5 billion in this respect to fund the projects.

67. In reply, STH said that hillside escalator links were complex systems with the lowest cost of about \$100-\$200 million for a project. As they were public works projects, the Government had to follow the established practice to implement them.

68. DHy supplemented that at present, the majority of the hillside escalator links projects were contracted out to consultants to speed up the implementation process. He advised that of the three hillside escalator links projects which were at a relatively advanced planning stage, the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System in Waterloo Hill was being implemented by HyD using internal resources. He said that the Government was also pressing ahead the remaining projects but some projects required more time to obtain consensus at the district level.

69. Pointing out that there were some old private estates which were not barrier-free, Mr WU Chi-wai asked whether the Administration would provide assistance to install barrier-free access ("BFA") facilities at those estates and take up the subsequent maintenance of the installations.

70. STH said that the Government had been installing BFA at public walkways. Starting from the fourth quarter of 2016, the Government planned to invite the 18 District Councils to each select not more than three existing walkways for installation of BFA facilities. The walkways available for District Councils' consideration would no longer be limited to those maintained by HyD, subject to fulfilling certain criteria.

*(At 12:31 pm, the Chairman extended the meeting for 15 minutes.)*

#### Others

71. Ms Claudia MO considered that the policy initiatives stipulated in the 2016 Policy Address only reported regular initiatives of THB without any new initiatives to enhance and facilitate new transport service for the public. She expressed dissatisfaction with the Administration's policy which was not conducive to new market entrants to provide Internet hire car service. She was also concerned over the co-location arrangement at the West Kowloon Terminus of the XRL project.



72. Mr WU Chi-wai enquired whether the Administration would consider bicycle as a mode of transport in planning the road infrastructure as the Administration was promoting low-carbon living in the community. Noting that the Administration targeted to provide the elderly with safe and easy access in the Policy Address, he suggested the Administration to consider allowing aged persons using electric carrier on pavements with regulated speed to facilitate their traveling. STH noted the views of Mr WU and said that it was the policy of the Government to regard bicycle as a mode for commuting for short journeys in new towns and new development areas.

73. Mr YIU Si-wing noted that a few new road cross-boundary transport infrastructures, including HZMB, would be commissioned in the next few years. He asked whether the Administration would consider rationalizing the distribution of cross-boundary traffic among different cross-boundary control points.

74. STH said that the commissioning of new road cross-boundary transport infrastructures would have an impact on the distribution of cross-boundary traffic at different cross-boundary control points. The Government would discuss with the Panel on the local and cross-boundary traffic arrangements of HZMB in February 2016.

**V. Any other business**

75. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 1:10 pm.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
26 August 2016

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9 March 2016

Secretary General  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong  
( Attn : Ms Sophie Lau )

[Fax no.: 2978 7569]

Dear Ms Lau,

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Follow-up Actions of Meeting on 15 January 2016**

**New Franchise for the Bus Network of  
the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

At the meeting on 15 January 2016, Members requested the Government to provide supplementary information relative to the captioned agenda item. Our reply is set out below.

**Fare revenue and non-fare box revenue**

The Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230) (“the Ordinance”) provides that both fare revenue (i.e. fares charged for the carriage of passengers, baggage and goods) and non-fare box revenue (covering any other revenue, including revenue from advertisements, derived from the use of fixed assets) of franchised bus companies are considered as operating receipts and shall be included in the franchise accounts. The existing bus franchises also state that the operating receipts of franchised bus services include fare revenue and non-fare box revenue. This condition will be retained in the new franchise for the bus network of the

Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”).

In processing fare adjustment applications from franchised bus companies, the Government will refer to a basket of factors (which include changes in the companies’ operating receipts and costs) in accordance with the Fare Adjustment Arrangement for Franchised Buses. Since both fare revenue and non-fare box revenue earned from franchised bus services are operating receipts of bus companies, they will be taken into account as we process the fare adjustment applications. In fact, the Government has been encouraging franchised bus companies to increase their non-fare box revenue so as to relieve the pressure for fare adjustments.

### **Facilities for use by bus captains**

Franchised bus companies are already subject to requirements on the provision of facilities including toilets and regulator kiosks under their existing franchises. Among some 280 bus termini<sup>1</sup> across the territory at present, nearly 90% are provided with rest facilities while close to 95% have toilets or with access to toilets within a walking distance of three minutes. Newly constructed bus termini will be equipped with toilets and rest facilities where practicable. For those bus termini which do not have rest facilities or toilets for use by bus captains, it is mainly due to physical constraints of the site (e.g. the bus termini are located beside a narrow pavement or there is a lack of power supply) or views of residents living nearby. The bus companies will continue exploring possible ways to overcome the physical constraints so as to provide such facilities as far as practicable.

### **Arrangement of duty schedules for bus captains**

According to the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks (“the Guidelines”) issued by the Transport Department (“TD”), the maximum duty (including all rest times) of a bus captain on a working day should not exceed 14 hours and the break between successive working days should not be less than 10 hours. Franchised bus companies can arrange duty schedules for bus captains having regard to the Guidelines to meet their operational needs, such as arranging two separate shifts on a single day, or a night shift on the first day to be followed by a morning shift on the next day.

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<sup>1</sup> These are terminating points serving at least one whole-day franchised bus route and at which bus captains must stop over and take a break.

According to KMB's operation record for December 2015 (involving around 200 000 shifts) provided to TD, about 80-90% of bus captains performed one shift on average while the rest were on duty for two peak periods on a single day. Moreover, KMB has advised that when arranging duty schedules for bus captains, it would avoid assigning a bus captain who has performed night shift duty on the first day to take up morning shift duty on the next day. In December 2015, around 0.0002% of the shifts (37 shifts) were night shifts with a morning shift on the following day.

### **Calculation of lost trip rate**

TD has been monitoring the lost trip situation of franchised buses. It reviews and analyses the causes of lost trips so as to formulate improvement measures. In light of the travelling patterns of passengers during the morning and evening peak periods and their expectations over the level of bus service during the respective periods, TD and franchised bus companies have been calculating the lost trip rates of four different periods since 2015 having regard to The Ombudsman's direct investigation report released in 2014 on TD's mechanism of monitoring the frequency of franchised bus services. These four periods are the morning peak period, evening peak period, inter-peak period and after evening peak period. The overall lost trip rate is the average of the rates of these four periods. Any lost trips during a particular period could not be compensated by excess trips made in another period. TD and franchised bus companies can better understand the performance of franchised bus services in different periods with this method. We note that the lost trip situation of KMB has improved. In 2015, KMB's lost trip rate was at a low level of 1.3%, which is slightly better than the industry average of 1.4%. Nevertheless, TD will continue to closely monitor lost trip situations and take follow up actions.

### **Number of beneficiaries under the Government Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities since its launch**

Please refer to Annex for information provided by the Labour and Welfare Bureau on the fare revenue reimbursed by the Government to franchised bus companies in each financial year since the launch of the scheme.

We should be grateful if you can relay the above supplementary information to Members of the Panel on Transport for their reference.

Yours sincerely,

( Louis Leung )  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c.:

Commissioner for Transport ( Attn : Miss Rachel Kwan )

**Fare Revenue Reimbursed by the Government to Franchised Bus Companies Participating in the Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities**

<b>Franchised bus companies</b>	<b>2012-13 (\$'000)</b>	<b>2013-14 (\$'000)</b>	<b>2014-15 (\$'000)</b>
Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited*	95,090	237,125	274,556
New World First Bus Services Limited*	17,949	40,826	42,991
Citybus Limited*	23,076	51,680	55,328
Long Win Bus Company Limited*	2,776	6,680	7,968
New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited#	325	4,414	5,118
<b>Total</b>	<b>139,216</b>	<b>340,725</b>	<b>385,961</b>

\* Joined the Scheme on 5 August 2012

# Joined the Scheme on 3 March 2013

**For discussion  
on 21 June 2016**

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **New Franchise for Bus Network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

#### **Report on the Public Consultation on the New Franchise**

#### **Purpose**

The Government invited the public to offer views on the requirements of the new franchise for the bus network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”). This paper briefs Members on the views received.

#### **Background**

2. The current franchise of the bus network of KMB will expire on 1 July 2017. At the meeting of this Panel on 15 January 2016, Members had no objection to the Government’s plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new franchise. Members also noted the Government’s plan to invite views from the public on the requirements of the new franchise.

#### **Public Consultation**

3. Public consultation took place between 26 January and 18 April 2016. The consultation document was uploaded to the websites of GovHK, Transport and Housing Bureau, Transport Department (“TD”) and Public Affairs Forum of the Home Affairs Bureau. Press releases inviting views from the public were issued on 26 January and 5 April 2016. Moreover, TD invited views from members of the Traffic and Transport Committees (“TTC”) of all District Councils (“DCs”) and at their invitation, attended the meetings of two TTCs<sup>1</sup>.

4. A total of 135 submissions were received during public consultation. 27 of them were from DCs, different political parties, individual members of the Legislative Council and DCs, as well as various groups. The remaining 108

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<sup>1</sup> They are TTCs of Sham Shui Po and Tsuen Wan DCs.

submissions were from individual members of the public. The major comments received during public consultation are summarised at **Annex**. They fall under the following five major categories:

- (a) **Service quality** – to suggest that KMB improve passenger facilities at major bus stops, provide free Wi-Fi in buses and enhance reliability of real-time bus arrival information. Comments on the audio-visual broad casting system installed on board were also received.
- (b) **Fare arrangements** – to suggest that KMB provide more fare concessions of various kinds.
- (c) **Staff management** – to suggest that KMB provide more guidelines and training for its bus captains on improving their driving behaviour and attitude towards passengers, and improve the welfare and rest facilities for its frontline staff.
- (d) **Environmental initiatives** – to suggest that KMB use buses that are more environmentally-friendly and better maintain its buses to reduce exhaust and noise emissions.
- (e) **Government regulation** – to suggest that the Government strengthen regulation over KMB's bus service and monitoring of the financial arrangements in respect of non-fare box revenue.

## Next Step

5. The discussion with KMB on the new franchise will soon commence. During the discussion, we will take into full consideration comments canvassed through the consultation. It is worth noting that the operating environment of the bus industry in the foreseeable future will continue to be rather difficult. Competition from other public transport services will continue and may even intensify. Staff cost will continue to rise (the average annual increase in the salaries of KMB's staff since the commencement of the current franchise in August 2007 is about 3.6% and the cumulative increase comes to 32%). Moreover, the market share of franchised buses will shrink in the coming few years upon the opening of new railway lines<sup>2</sup>. Currently, about 60% of KMB's routes are loss-making and only about 40% is profitable. In face of

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<sup>2</sup> They include the Kwun Tong Line Extension, South Island Line (East) and Shatin-Central Link.



these challenges, KMB has to actively rationalise its existing service to reduce wastage and explore new service areas in response to passenger demand in order to maintain the overall sustainability of its operation. The Government would do its utmost to seek the best possible franchise terms for the public, in a pragmatic manner. We aim to conclude the discussion with KMB within 2016 and will brief this Panel on the outcome.

6. Members are invited to note this paper.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**June 2016**

**Major Comments Received during Public Consultation**

**A. Service quality**

**1. Passenger facilities**

- (a) to enhance the passenger waiting environment at bus stops, termini and major bus-bus interchanges (“BBIs”) (such as by provision of seating facilities and free Wi-Fi, provision of directional signs with better design, and improvement of ventilation and appearance);
- (b) to provide free Wi-Fi in buses;
- (c) to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the bus stop announcement system;
- (d) to provide suitable facilities to allow carriage of bicycles on buses<sup>1</sup>;
- (e) to make the bus ride more comfortable (such as by the use of passenger seats with better design, improvement of ventilation system to cater for temperature changes and avoidance of blocking of natural lighting by bus body advertisement);
- (f) to procure more buses and buses of larger carrying capacity;
- (g) to provide an option to turn off the volume of the audio-visual broadcasting system (the “AV System”) on buses and improve the content and quality of the programmes/airtime for advertisements. There were also comments that the AV System should not be retained<sup>2</sup>; and

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<sup>1</sup> KMB already allows carriage of foldable bicycles on buses as long as such bicycles are properly folded and will not cause hazard to other passengers.

<sup>2</sup> In view of the comments received during public consultation, TD is actively working with KMB on improvement measures to be taken. The outcome will be made public. According to the Public Bus Services Ordinance and franchise conditions, revenue from advertisements shall be regarded as non-fare box revenue and shall be included in the franchise account. Non-fare box revenue helps relieve the pressure for fare increase. At present, a quiet zone has to be designated at the rear end of the lower deck of a bus. The sound volume of the AV System should be set to a level close to the ambient level, with a difference of no more than 2dB. There is also restriction over the airtime allocated for advertisements. A bus company is required to arrange regular checks on the sound volume of the AV System and submit reports to TD. TD also arranges spot checks from time to time. In addition, a bus company has to collect passengers’ views on the AV System regularly and make improvement as necessary.

- (h) to use barrier-free and elderly friendly bus facilities (including low-floor buses).

2. Passenger information

- (a) to enhance reliability of real-time bus arrival information and provide more information (such as vehicle registration number);
- (b) to provide more real-time information (such as information on traffic conditions and weather through display panels at bus stops and on buses);
- (c) to open up bus arrival data to third parties for development of software and applications<sup>3</sup>;
- (d) to provide more details about the BBI schemes; and
- (e) to provide information about the number of vacant seats on upper deck<sup>4</sup>.

3. Bus operation

- (a) to deploy buses more flexibly to maintain service during service disruption and temporary suspension;
- (b) to provide more bus interchanges; and
- (c) to convert jointly-operated cross-harbour routes into solely-operated ones.

4. Bus safety

- (a) to monitor bus captains' driving behavior more closely; and
- (b) to improve safety facilities on buses (such as by installation of additional horizontal bars on exit doors and at front windows on upper deck, as well as the use of stronger materials to build the bus

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<sup>3</sup> Same as other public transport services, franchised bus service is provided by the operators in accordance with commercial principles. The development and operation of real-time bus service information systems by the bus companies is for the purpose of service enhancement. As in the case of other service-related facilities, the bus companies have put in substantial resources in developing and operating the systems. The data are private property of the bus companies and pertain to their commercial operation. Disclosure of data for use by third parties free of charge would require consent of the bus companies.

<sup>4</sup> KMB is studying the feasibility to provide information on the number of vacant seats on upper deck.

body).

## **B. Fare-related arrangements**

### **1. More fare concessions**

- (a) to provide more BBI schemes;
  - (b) to provide more section fares;
  - (c) to introduce new fare reduction schemes (such as monthly pass, discount for same day return, fare saver, and concessionary fares for specific passenger groups (such as students and passengers aged 60 to 64));
  - (d) to narrow the fare differential between the section fare of cross-harbour routes after crossing the harbour and that of parallel local routes<sup>5</sup>;
- 2. to introduce a distance-based fare system or two-way section fares; and
  - 3. to review the fare adjustment arrangement and passenger reward arrangement, and set up a fare stabilisation fund.

## **C. Staff management**

- 1. to provide more guidelines and training for bus captains to improve their driving behaviour and attitude towards passengers; and
- 2. to improve staff welfare and rest time arrangements, and provide more rest facilities for frontline staff.

## **D. Environmental initiatives**

- 1. to expedite the replacement of buses and use buses which are more environmentally-friendly (such as hybrid or electric buses);
- 2. to ensure that compartment temperature is properly adjusted; and

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<sup>5</sup> TD is exploring with the three bus companies operating cross-harbour routes (i.e. KMB, Citybus Limited and New World First Bus Services Limited) a proposal to narrow the fare differential between cross-harbour routes after crossing the harbour and non-cross harbour routes. The target is to launch a small-scale trial scheme on some cross-harbour routes in the fourth quarter of this year.

3. to do a better job on vehicle maintenance for the bus fleet.

## **E. Government regulation**

1. comments are received on franchise arrangements (including views which object or support the discussion with KMB on a new franchise; suggest opening all or part of KMB's bus network to bring in competition<sup>6</sup>; suggest a shorter or longer franchise period, and suggest a more detailed assessment on KMB's performance).
2. Financial monitoring
  - (a) to require advertisement revenue be included in the franchise account and better regulation of related-party transactions;
  - (b) to require profits generated from sale of property/land be included in the franchise account; and
  - (c) to require fuel expenses be shown in the franchise account.
3. Bus service performance
  - (a) to introduce a penalty and reward system in respect of service performance;
  - (b) to strengthen regulation of service frequency; and
  - (c) to allow pets on buses.

## **F. Grantee's public engagement measures**

1. to improve communication with passengers or set up task groups to allow public participation in route planning and daily monitoring of bus

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<sup>6</sup> The TTC of Shatin DC passed a motion to urge the Government to seriously consider opening up the bus franchise and introducing competition with a view to enhancing service quality and setting more competitive fares. In this regard, as we pointed out in our paper to the Legislative Council in January 2016, the Commissioner for Transport was of the view that KMB had all along been providing a proper and efficient bus service based on its service performance and operational efficiency, safety and service enhancement measures, public opinions on bus service and financial performance; KMB was also willing to continue to invest for further enhancement of the bus service and indicated an interest to apply for a new 10-year franchise. Taking all factors into account, the Government is prepared to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise so that KMB can continue to operate its existing bus network.

operation; and

2. to respond to public complaints and enquiries more expeditiously.

## **SETTING LOCAL SPEED LIMITS**

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**January 2013**

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## SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

### Key points

Speed limits should be evidence-led and self-explaining and seek to reinforce people's assessment of what is a safe speed to travel. They should encourage self-compliance. Speed limits should be seen by drivers as the maximum rather than a target speed.

Traffic authorities set local speed limits in situations where local needs and conditions suggest a speed limit which is lower than the national speed limit.

This guidance is to be used for setting all local speed limits on single and dual carriageway roads in both urban and rural areas.

This guidance should also be used as the basis for assessments of local speed limits, for developing route management strategies and for developing the speed management strategies which can be included in Local Transport Plans.

Traffic authorities are asked to keep their speed limits under review with changing circumstances, and to consider the introduction of more 20 mph limits and zones, over time, in urban areas and built-up village streets that are primarily residential, to ensure greater safety for pedestrians and cyclists, using the criteria in Section 6.

1. The Department for Transport has a vision for a transport system that is an engine for economic growth, but one that is also more sustainable, safer, and improves quality of life in our communities.
2. It is clear how setting appropriate speed limits with the aim of achieving safe and appropriate driving speeds can play an important role in supporting this vision. This guidance sets out the framework that traffic authorities should follow when setting and reviewing local speed limits.
3. Roads should be designed so that mistakes made by road users do not result in death or serious injury. Effective speed management is part of creating a safe road environment which is fit for purpose. It involves many components designed to work together to require, encourage and help road users to adopt appropriate and safe speeds below the speed limit. As well as being the legal limit, speed limits are a key source of information to road users, particularly as an indicator of the nature and risks posed by that road both to themselves and to all other road users. Speed limits should, therefore, be evidence-led and self-explaining, and seek to reinforce people's assessment of what is a safe speed to travel and encourage self-compliance. They should be seen by drivers as the maximum speed rather than as a target speed at which to drive

irrespective of conditions. It is often not appropriate or safe to drive at the maximum speed limit.

4. The overall speed limit framework, including the setting of national limits for different road types, and which exceptions to these general limits can be applied, is the responsibility of the government. The three national speed limits are:
  - the 30 mph speed limit on roads with street lighting (sometimes referred to as Restricted Roads)
  - the national speed limit of 60 mph on single carriageway roads
  - the national speed limit of 70 mph on dual carriageways and motorways.

These national limits are not, however, appropriate for all roads. The speed limit regime enables traffic authorities to set local speed limits in situations where local needs and conditions suggest a speed limit which is different from the respective national speed limit.

5. Local speed limits are determined by traffic authorities having regard to guidance issued by the Department for Transport. This guidance applies to England and supersedes that previously contained in DfT Circular 01/2006, which is now cancelled.<sup>1</sup>
6. The guidance retains and builds upon many of the underlying principles of DfT Circular 01/2006, but provides additional evidence of the safety and wider benefits of setting appropriate speed limits. It builds on the responses received to the consultation held by the Department in 2012 as well as to an earlier consultation held in 2009.
7. It is aimed primarily at traffic authorities responsible for setting local speed limits, but is also designed to help improve the wider understanding of why and how local speed limits are determined.
8. The guidance is to be used for setting all local speed limits on single and dual carriageway roads in both urban and rural areas. It brings together some of the main features of other published guidance on speed limit related issues, including speed-related road traffic regulation and signing, street lighting, traffic calming, speed limits in villages, and 20 mph speed limits and zones.
9. The guidance should not, however, be used in isolation, but read in conjunction with the more comprehensive advice on these matters set out in the appropriate Traffic Advisory Leaflets and with the relevant

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<sup>1</sup> In Wales, *Setting Local Speed Limits in Wales*, Welsh Assembly Government Circular No: 24/2009, issued by the Welsh Assembly Government in October 2009, is in use and in Scotland, *Setting Local Speed Limits: Guidance for Local Authorities*: ETLLD Circular 1/2006 applies.

legislation, including the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (TSRGD 2002)<sup>2</sup>.

10. This guidance introduces, in section 5, the Speed Limit Appraisal Tool, a web-based tool available at

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/speed-limit-appraisal-tool>

It has been designed to help local authorities assess the full costs and benefits of any proposed schemes and make robust, evidence-based decisions about which limits they put in place.

### Priorities for action

11. The guidance in this Circular should be used as the basis for:

- assessments of local speed limits;
- developing route management strategies; and
- developing speed management strategies.

12. Traffic authorities are asked to:

- **keep their speed limits under review** with changing circumstances;
- consider the **introduction of more 20 mph limits and zones, over time, in urban areas and built-up village streets that are primarily residential**, to ensure greater safety for pedestrians and cyclists, using the criteria in Section 6.

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<sup>2</sup> Please note that all references to legislation within this Circular are references to that legislation as amended.

## SECTION 2: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CIRCULAR

### Key points

Traffic authorities continue to have the flexibility to set local speed limits that are appropriate for the individual road, reflecting local needs and taking account of all local considerations.

Local speed limits should not be set in isolation, but as part of a package with other measures to manage vehicle speeds and improve road safety.

### Background

13. Setting speed limits at the appropriate level for the road, and ensuring compliance with these limits, play a key part in ensuring greater safety for all road users. The relationship between speed and likelihood of collision as well as severity of injury is complex, but there is a strong correlation. As a general rule for every 1 mph reduction in average speed, collision frequency reduces by around 5% (Taylor, Lynam and Baruya, 2000). For typical types of road traffic collisions the risk of death for drivers and pedestrians involved reduces with reduced vehicle speeds and it is particularly important to consider those speeds where the balance tips in favour of survival.
14. Reported road casualty statistics also show the role of *exceeding the speed limit* and *travelling too fast for the conditions* as contributory factors in road traffic collisions. In 2011 at least one of these two factors was reported in 12 per cent of all accidents and these accidents accounted for 25 per cent of all fatalities. Other reported contributory factors such as *loss of control* or *careless, reckless or in a hurry* can often be related to excess or inappropriate speed, and even where the contributory factors are unrelated to the vehicle speed, higher speeds will often aggravate the outcome of the collision and injuries. It should be recognised that identification of contributory factors is largely subjective and is not necessarily the result of extensive investigation.
15. This updated guidance provides part of the framework for speed limits, where local authorities can set speed limits on their roads below the national limit, in response to local risk factors and conditions. It will help ensure appropriate and consistent speed limits, which will contribute to reducing the number of road deaths, as well as casualties overall; tackling pedestrian and cyclist casualties in towns and cities; improving the safety on rural roads; and reducing variations in safety from area to area and road to road.

16. The objectives of this guidance also fit into the context of some wider transport and cross-government priorities, which those responsible for setting local speed limits should bear in mind:
- The Department for Transport's vision is for a transport system that is an engine for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities.
  - We also want our roads to become safer, less congested and less polluted.
  - We want to encourage sustainable local travel and economic growth by making public transport and cycling and walking more attractive and effective, promoting lower carbon transport and tackling local road congestion.
  - We want to contribute to wider public health and safety outcomes by contributing to a reduction in road casualties.

### **Objectives of the Circular**

17. The key objectives of this guidance are:
- the provision of up-to-date and consistent advice to traffic authorities;
  - improved clarity which will aid greater consistency of speed limits across the country;
  - enabling the setting of more appropriate local speed limits, including lower or higher limits where conditions dictate;
  - achieving local speed limits that better reflect the needs of all road users, not just motorised vehicles;
  - ensuring improved quality of life for local communities and a better balance between road safety, accessibility and environmental objectives, especially in rural communities;
  - improved recognition and understanding by road users of the risks involved on different types of road, the speed limits that apply, and the reasons why;
  - improved respect for speed limits, and in turn improved compliance; and
  - continued reductions in the number of road traffic collisions, injuries and deaths in which excessive or inappropriate speed is a contributory factor.
18. Speed limits are only one element of speed management. Local speed limits should not be set in isolation. They should be part of a package with other speed management measures including engineering and road geometry that respect the needs of all road users and raise the driver's awareness of their environment; education; driver information; training and publicity. Within their overall network management responsibilities, these measures should enable traffic authorities to deliver speed limits and, as importantly, actual vehicle speeds that are safe and appropriate for the road and its surroundings. The measures should also help drivers to be more readily aware of the road environment and to drive at an appropriate speed at all times.

19. Unless a speed limit is set with support from the local community, the police and other local services, with supporting education, and with consideration of whether engineering measures are necessary to reduce speeds; or if it is set unrealistically low for the particular road function and condition, it may be ineffective and drivers may not comply with the speed limit.
20. If many drivers continued to travel at unacceptable speeds, the risk of collisions and injuries would increase and significant and avoidable enforcement activity would be needed

## SECTION 3: THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL SPEED LIMITS

### Key points

The Highways Agency is responsible for determining speed limits on the trunk road network. Local traffic authorities are responsible for determining speed limits on the local road network.

It is important that traffic authorities and police forces work closely together in determining, or considering, any changes to speed limits.

The full range of speed management measures should always be considered before a new speed limit is introduced.

The underlying aim should be to achieve a 'safe' distribution of speeds. The **key factors that should be taken into account in any decisions** on local speed limits are:

- **history of collisions;**
- **road geometry and engineering;**
- **road function;**
- **Composition of road users** (including existing and potential levels of vulnerable road users);
- **existing traffic speeds;** and
- **road environment.**

While these factors need to be considered for all road types, they may be weighted differently in urban or rural areas. The impact on community and environmental outcomes should also be considered.

The minimum length of a speed limit should generally be not less than 600 metres to avoid too many changes of speed limit along the route.

Speed limits should not be used to attempt to solve the problem of isolated hazards, such as a single road junction or reduced forward visibility, e.g. at a bend.

### Responsibility for local speed limits

21. The Highways Agency is responsible for determining speed limits on the trunk road network, and local traffic authorities are responsible for determining speed limits on the local road network. In this Circular, the term 'traffic authority' is used to denote both the Highways Agency and local traffic authorities.

22. It is important that traffic authorities and police forces work together closely and from an early stage when considering or determining any changes to

speed limits. This may be through the local road safety partnership arrangements. It is also important that neighbouring traffic authorities work closely together, especially where roads cross boundaries, to ensure speed limits remain consistent. As part of the process of making a speed limit order, consultation of those affected is of key importance and, together with good information about planned changes, this will improve support for and compliance with new limits. The legislative requirements are summarised in Section 4.

### **Considerations in setting local speed limits**

23. A study of types of crashes, their severity, causes and frequency, together with a survey of traffic speeds, should indicate whether an existing speed limit is appropriate for the type of road and mix of use by different groups of road users, including the presence or potential presence of vulnerable road users (including people walking, cycling or riding horses, or on motorbikes), or whether it needs to be changed. Local residents may also express their concerns or desire for a lower speed limit and these comments should be considered.
24. Where limits for air quality are in danger of being exceeded, compliance with those air quality limits could be an important factor in the choice of speed limit. But depending on the individual circumstances the imposition of a speed limit will not always be the solution. And the visible characteristics of a road affect the speed that a driver chooses: to be effective, the reasons for a limit need to be apparent.
25. It may well be that a speed limit need not be changed if the collision rate can be improved or wider quality of life objectives can be achieved through other speed management measures, or other measures. These alternative measures should always be considered before proceeding with a new speed limit.
26. Where there is poor compliance with an existing speed limit on a road or stretch of road the reasons for the non-compliance should be examined before a solution is sought. If the speed limit is set too low for no clear reason and the risk of collisions is low, then it may be appropriate to increase the limit. If the existing limit is in place for a good reason, solutions may include engineering measures or changes to the road environment to ensure it better matches the speed limit, or local education and publicity. Enforcement may also be appropriate, but should be considered only after the other measures and jointly with the police force.

### **The underlying principles**

27. The aim of speed management policies should be to achieve a safe distribution of speeds consistent with the speed limit that reflects the function of the road and the road environment. This should imply a mean



speed appropriate to the prevailing road environment, and all vehicles moving at speeds below or at the posted speed limit, while having regard to the traffic conditions.

28. The estimated collision and injury savings should also be an important factor when considering changes to a local speed limit. Another key factor when setting a speed limit is what the road looks like to the road users. Drivers are likely to expect and respect lower limits, and be influenced when deciding on what is an appropriate speed, where they can see there are potential hazards, for example outside schools, in residential areas or villages and in shopping streets.
29. A principal aim in determining appropriate speed limits should, therefore, be to provide a consistent message between speed limit and what the road looks like, and for changes in speed limit to be reflective of changes in the road layout and characteristics.
30. The following will be **important factors when considering what is an appropriate speed limit**:
  - **history of collisions**, including frequency, severity, types and causes;
  - **road geometry and engineering** (width, sightlines, bends, junctions, accesses and safety barriers etc.);
  - **road function** (strategic, through traffic, local access etc.);
  - **Composition of road users** (including existing and potential levels of vulnerable road users);
  - **existing traffic speeds**; and
  - **road environment**, including level of road-side development and possible impacts on residents (e.g. severance, noise, or air quality).

While these factors need to be considered for all road types, they may be weighted differently in urban or rural areas. The impact on community and environmental outcomes should also be considered.

31. Before introducing or changing a local speed limit, traffic authorities will wish to satisfy themselves that the expected benefits exceed the costs. Many of the costs and benefits do not have monetary values associated with them, but traffic authorities should include an assessment of the following factors:
  - collision and casualty savings;
  - conditions and facilities for vulnerable road users;
  - impacts on walking and cycling and other mode shift;
  - congestion and journey time reliability;
  - environmental, community and quality of life impact, such as emissions, severance of local communities, visual impact, noise and vibration; and
  - costs, including of engineering and other physical measures including signing, maintenance and cost of enforcement.

The speed limit appraisal toolkit, found at section 5, will help assess the full costs and benefits of any proposed schemes.

32. Different road users perceive risks and appropriate speeds differently, and drivers and riders of motor vehicles often do not have the same perception of the hazards of speed as do people on foot, on bicycles or on horseback. Fear of traffic can affect peoples' quality of life and the needs of vulnerable road users must be fully taken into account in order to further encourage these modes of travel and improve their safety. Speed management strategies should seek to protect local community life.
33. In order to ensure compliance with a new lower local limit, as well as make it legally enforceable, it is important that the limit is signed correctly and consistently. The introduction of a new Speed Limit Order must coincide with the signing of the new limit. Traffic Authorities must ensure that speed limits meet the legislative process and the requirements of the TSRGD. Any new limit should also be accompanied by publicity and, where appropriate, effective engineering changes to the road itself. Without these measures, the new limit is unlikely to be fully complied with.
34. On rural roads there is often a difference of opinion as to what constitutes a reasonable balance between the risk of a collision, journey efficiency and environmental impact. Higher speed is often perceived to bring benefits in terms of shorter travel times for people and goods. However, evidence suggests that when traffic is travelling at constant speeds, even at a lower level, it may result in shorter and more reliable overall journey times, and that journey time savings from higher speed are often overestimated (Stradling *et al.*, 2008). The objective should be to seek an acceptable balance between costs and benefits, so that speed-management policies take account of environmental, economic and social effects as well as the reduction in casualties they are aiming to achieve.
35. Mean speed and 85th percentile speed (the speed at or below which 85% of vehicles are travelling) are the most commonly used measures of actual traffic speed. Traffic authorities should continue to routinely collect and assess both, but mean speeds should be used as the basis for determining local speed limits.
36. For the majority of roads there is a consistent relationship between mean speed and 85th percentile speed. Where this is not the case, it will usually indicate that drivers have difficulty in deciding the appropriate speed for the road, suggesting that a better match between road design and speed limit is required. It may be necessary to consider additional measures to reduce the larger than normal difference between mean and 85th percentile speeds or to bring the speed distribution more in line with typical distributions. The aim for local speed limits should be to align the speed limit to the conditions of the road and road environment.
37. The minimum length of a speed limit should generally be not less than 600 metres to avoid too many changes of speed limit along the route. In

exceptional circumstances this can be reduced to 400 metres for lower speed limits, or even 300 metres on roads with a purely local access function, or where a variable 20 mph limit is introduced, for example outside a school. Anything shorter is not recommended. The length adopted for a limit will depend on the limit applied and also on the conditions at or beyond the end points. The terminal points of speed limits need to take account of the particular local circumstances, such as steep gradients, sharp bends, junctions, access roads, humpbacked bridges or other hazards, and also good visibility of the signs, and an extension of the speed limit may be needed to ensure this.

38. For consistency within routes, separate assessments should be made for each length of road of 600 metres or more for which a different speed limit might be considered appropriate. When this is completed, the final choice of appropriate speed limit for individual sections might need to be adjusted to provide reasonable consistency over the route as a whole.
39. Occasionally it may be appropriate to use a short length of 40 mph or 50 mph speed limit as a transition between a length of road subject to a national limit and another length on which a lower limit is in force, for example on the outskirts of villages or urban areas with adjoining intermittent development. However, the use of such transitional limits should be restricted to sections of road where immediate speed reduction would cause risks or is likely to be less effective.
40. Speed limits should not be used to attempt to solve the problem of isolated hazards, for example a single road junction or reduced forward visibility such as at a bend, since speed limits are difficult to enforce over such a short length. Other measures, such as warning signs including vehicle activated signs, carriageway markings, junction improvements, superelevation of bends and new or improved street lighting, are likely to be more effective in addressing such hazards. Similarly, crossings or, in rural areas, the provision of adequate footways can be a more effective means of improving pedestrian safety than lowering a speed limit over a short distance.
41. Where several roads with different speed limits enter a roundabout, the roundabout should be restricted at the same level as the majority of the approach roads. If there is an equal division, for example where a 30 mph road crosses one with a limit of 40 mph, the roundabout itself should take the lower limit.

## SECTION 4: THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

### Key points

All speed limits, other than those on restricted roads, should be made by order under Section 84 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

Any speed limits below 30 mph, other than 20 mph limits or 20 mph zones, require individual consent from the Secretary of State.

Unless an order has been made and the road is signed to the contrary, a 30 mph speed limit applies where there is a system of street lighting furnished by means of lamps placed not more than 200 yards apart.

Traffic authorities have a duty to erect and maintain prescribed speed limit signs on their roads in accordance with the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (TSRGD 2002).

If traffic authorities wish to deviate from what is prescribed in signing regulations, they must first gain the Secretary of State's authorisation.

Traffic authorities are not permitted to erect different speed limit signs relating to different classes of vehicle.

Vehicle-activated signs must not be used as an alternative to standard static signing, but as an additional measure to warn drivers of a potential hazard or to remind them of the speed limit in force.

### Main speed limit legislation

42. Most road traffic law pertaining to speed limits is contained in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (RTRA 1984). Other relevant legislation includes the Highways Act 1980, in particular Sections 90A-F concerning the construction and maintenance of road humps and Sections 90G-I concerning other traffic-calming works.
43. Part VI of the RTRA 1984 deals specifically with speed limits, with Sections 81-84 dealing with different speed limits and the speed limit order-making process. Section 82(1)(a) defines a restricted road in England and Wales as a road on which there is provided "a system of street lighting furnished by means of lamps placed not more than 200 yards apart". Section 81 makes it an offence for a person to drive a motor vehicle at a speed of more than 30 mph on a restricted road.
44. The establishment of speed limits is also a method through which legal sanctions can be brought to bear on those who exceed the limit set on a

particular road. It is therefore important to preserve carefully all records relating to the making and validity of a speed limit and speed limit signs.

45. All speed limits, other than those on restricted roads or special roads (a highway which is a special road in accordance with s 16 of the Highways Act 1980), should be made by order under Section 84 of the RTRA 1984. This includes the making of a 30 mph speed limit on an unlit road.
46. All speed limits other than the national limits are made by speed limit order. Traffic authorities should comply with their own consultation procedures and must, as a minimum, follow the full consultation procedure set out in legislation, before any new speed limit is introduced. More detail about these requirements is in Appendix A.

### **Restricted roads**

47. Section 82(2) RTRA 1984 (as amended) gives traffic authorities powers to remove restricted road status, and give restricted road status to roads which are not restricted. However, the Department's policy on the use of this power is that it should be used only to reinstate restricted road status in those cases where a road which has a system of street lighting has previously had its restricted road status removed.
48. If a road with street lighting has a 40 mph limit and this is to be reduced to 30 mph, the 40 mph order under Section 84 should be revoked. Assuming the street lamps are no more than 200<sup>3</sup> yards apart, the road will be a restricted road by virtue of section 82(1)(a) RTRA. Similarly, where a speed limit of 30 mph is imposed by order under Section 84 because there is no street lighting, that order should be revoked if street lighting is subsequently provided. The Department considers that it is best practice for traffic authorities to make an order under section 84 RTRA to create a 30mph speed limit on an unlit stretch of road.
49. Any speed limits below 30 mph, other than 20 mph limits or 20 mph zones, require individual consent from the Secretary of State.

### **Street lighting**

50. Direction 11 of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (TSRGD 2002), as amended, defines the requirements for the placing of speed-limit repeater signs. This states that speed-limit repeater signs cannot be placed along a road on which there is carriageway lighting not more than 183 metres apart and which is subject to a 30 mph speed limit. This direction applies regardless of how the speed limit has been imposed.
51. The Department will not make exceptions to this rule. This means it should be assumed that, unless an order has been made and the road is signed

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<sup>3</sup> Older legislation specifies 200 yards; later legislation specifies 183 metres. These are equivalent measures.

to the contrary, a 30 mph speed limit applies where there are three or more lamps throwing light on the carriageway and placed not more than 183 metres apart.

### **Speed limit signing**

52. While increased understanding and acceptance of why a speed limit applies on a certain road will help compliance, drivers are aided by clear, visible and regular signing which enables them unhesitatingly to know what speed limit is in force.
53. Under Section 85 of the RTRA 1984 it is the duty of the traffic authority to erect and maintain prescribed speed limit signs on their roads in accordance with the Secretary of State's directions. The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 prescribe the designs and conditions of use for traffic signs, including speed limit signing, in England, Scotland and Wales.
54. Traffic authorities should generally follow these Regulations when signing speed limits. If a traffic authority wishes to deviate from what is prescribed, it must first obtain the Secretary of State's authorisation, and signing that is not in line with the Regulations must not be installed without such authorisation. Authorisation applications should be sent to the Department for Transport.
55. Speed limit signs which do not comply with the Regulations or which have not been authorised by the Secretary of State are not lawfully placed. Where the sign is not lawfully placed, no offence is committed by a person exceeding the signed speed limit and any prosecutions are likely to fail accordingly. Traffic authorities should therefore remove any unlawful signs, bring them into compliance with the Regulations or obtain authorisation to make them lawful.
56. Lower maximum speed limits apply on certain roads to certain traffic classes of vehicles. These are set out in Schedule 6 of the RTRA 1984 and in the Highway Code. Drivers of these vehicles are expected to be aware of this and follow these special limitations without having to be reminded by specific speed limit signs for particular vehicles. Traffic authorities are not permitted to erect different speed limit signs relating to different classes of vehicle.
57. Vehicle-activated signs (VAS), triggered by an approaching vehicle, have been developed to help address the problem of inappropriate speed. They must not be used as an alternative to standard static signing, but as an additional measure to warn drivers of a potential hazard or to remind them of the speed limit in force. VAS have proved particularly effective in rural areas, including at the approaches to junctions and bends. The Department has provided guidance in Traffic Advisory Leaflet 1/03 *Vehicle Activated Signs* (DfT, 2003).

58. The legislation does not prescribe the use of countdown markers on the approach to speed limit terminal signs, and research has shown that they generally have little or no effect on vehicle speeds and can add to sign clutter.
59. Chapter 3 of the Traffic Signs Manual (Department for Transport, 2008) provides guidance to local traffic authorities on best practice when signing speed limits. It includes tables and pictures to illustrate where speed limit signs should be placed. This complements TSRGD 2002, which sets out the mandatory requirements for signing.

### **Traffic Regulation Orders**

60. If speed limits are to be legally implemented and enforceable, Traffic Orders must be made. Part VI of the Road Traffic Regulation Act (RTRA) 1984 deals specifically with speed limits and includes the powers under which Traffic Authorities may make speed limit orders.
61. The Local Authorities' Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 sets out the procedure to be followed when making these (and other) orders. Traffic Authorities will need to comply with the consultation and publicity requirements before making an order, and with the publicity and traffic signing requirements once an order has been made.
62. Traffic Authorities may find it more efficient to produce speed limit orders for 20 mph zones or limits, or to introduce speed limit changes as a result of rural speed limit reviews, where these cover a number of roads, through one order covering all those roads covered by the new speed limit. If they decide to proceed in this manner it is particularly important to ensure that the order is comprehensive and correct, and that the consultation and publicity is directed at those likely to be affected.
63. Further key pieces of legislation and regulations relating to speed limit and related signing are referred to in Appendix A.

## SECTION 5: THE SPEED LIMIT APPRAISAL TOOL

64. In the Strategic Framework for Road Safety (DfT, May 2011) the Department for Transport announced that it would provide a new speed limit appraisal tool to help local authorities assess the full costs and benefits of any proposed schemes and help make evidence-based decisions to introduce local speeds that reflect the needs of all road users.
65. The tool is available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/speed-limit-appraisal-tool> and local authorities are invited, though not required, to use it. Its use is free of charge and is not restricted to local authorities.
66. The tool has been designed to enable local highway authority officers and other professionals to:
- forecast mean and 85th percentile speeds for speed limit changes
  - forecast changes to: journey times separately for business and personal users; vehicle operating costs including fuel; accidents by severity; CO2 emissions; and NOX emissions; and
  - appraise changes in speed limits to 20mph, 30mph, 40mph, 50mph, 60mph and, on dual carriageways, 70mph.
67. In addition to enabling a local highway authority to decide whether or not to introduce a new speed limit scheme, the tool introduces transparency in the decision making process. It also provides a facility that encourages local highway authorities to adopt a more consistent appraisal process, whilst still allowing the flexibility for the highway authority to take into account local road conditions and the surrounding environment.
68. Full User Guidance is provided with the tool covering instructions on how to run the appraisal tool, and also a practical guide to the assessment of a range of aspects that local authorities should consider when planning to introduce a change in speed limits. The guidance should therefore be read in conjunction with this circular.
69. The tool has been developed to be economical to apply and straightforward to operate, and to provide informative outputs that can be flexibly interpreted in the context of the local highway authority's requirements. At its basic level, it does not call for specialist skills such as demand modelling and environmental analysis.
70. The Guidance describes how the tool deals with those aspects of speed limit changes that can be quantified, such as accidents, journey time savings and CO2 emissions, and those that presently cannot be quantified



because of a lack of evidence, such as journey time reliability, model shift and impacts on public anxiety.

71. Reference is made throughout the document to current DfT guidance and relevant WebTAG<sup>4</sup> units to help the user compile the data that is required to run the tool and to guide the reader to more detailed information, should this be required.
72. The tool outputs are presented in Excel table formats that show economic impacts and other quantifiable impacts, and makes provision for non-quantified information also to be presented in both the data entry tables and the output reporting tables.
73. The output spreadsheets should be considered as a starting point for developing the appraisal into a case that can be readily understood and appreciated by a range of people, and which reflects wider considerations than the quantitative values that the tool provides.
74. Details on how the relationships that are used in the tool were developed are set out in an annex to the User Guidance, enabling the reader to gain an understanding of the background calculations that the tool is performing.

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<sup>4</sup> Department for Transport Web-based Transport Analysis Guidance

## SECTION 6: URBAN SPEED LIMITS

### Key points

Speed limits in urban areas affect everyone, not only as motorists, but as pedestrians, cyclists and residents. As well as influencing safety they can influence quality of life, the environment and the local economy.

Traffic authorities are encouraged to adopt the Institution of Highways and Transportation's<sup>5</sup> urban safety management guidelines (see IHT, 2003), in which road hierarchies are adopted that reflect a road's function and the mix of traffic that it carries.

The national speed limit on street lit roads is 30 mph.

Traffic authorities can, over time, introduce 20mph speed limits or zones on:

- Major streets where there are – or could be - significant numbers of journeys on foot, and/or where pedal cycle movements are an important consideration, and this outweighs the disadvantage of longer journey times for motorised traffic.

This is in addition to

- Residential streets in cities, towns and villages, particularly where the streets are being used by people on foot and on bicycles, there is community support and the characteristics of the street are suitable.

Where they do so, general compliance needs to be achievable without an excessive reliance on enforcement.

Roads suitable for a 40 mph limit are generally higher quality suburban roads or those on the outskirts of urban areas where there is little development. Usually, the movement of motor vehicles is the primary function.

In exceptional circumstances, 50 mph limits can be implemented on special roads and dual carriageways, radial routes or bypasses where the road environment and characteristics allow this speed to be achieved safely.

75. Urban roads by their nature are complex as they need to provide for safe travel on foot, bicycle and by motorised traffic. Lower speeds benefit all urban road users, and setting appropriate speed limits is therefore an important factor in improving urban safety. Traffic authorities are

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<sup>5</sup> IHT are now called Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation, CIHT.

encouraged to adopt the urban safety management guidelines published by the Institution of Highways and Transportation (IHT, 2003), in which road hierarchies are adopted that reflect a road's function and the mix of traffic that it carries. Within this approach the principle should be to ensure that the appropriate traffic travels on the appropriate roads, and at an appropriate speed. This can help balance what can be competing demands for higher or lower speed limits.

76. It is on urban roads that the majority of road casualties occur, including 87% of all pedestrian and 83% of all pedal cyclists casualties (DfT, 2011). Collisions typically involve pedestrians and cyclists, including children, and knowledge of the relationship between vehicle speed and injury severity in any collision must inform decisions on speed limits. Research has shown that the risk of a pedestrian dying in a collision with a car increases slowly up to an impact speed of around 30mph, but at speeds above 30 mph the risk of death increases rapidly (Rosén and Sander, 2009). Car occupants also benefit from lower speeds. Research in London showed that the largest casualty reductions associated with 20mph zones were children killed and seriously injured, and car occupants (Grundy et al, 2008)
77. The standard speed limit in urban areas is 30 mph, which represents a balance between mobility and safety factors. However, for residential streets and other town and city streets with high pedestrian and cyclist movement, local traffic authorities should consider the use of 20 mph schemes. On dual carriageways where the road environment and characteristics allow, traffic authorities can also implement 40 mph and, in exceptional circumstances, 50 mph limits. Generally, efforts should be made to promote the use of suitable routes for urban through traffic and to manage the speed of traffic requiring access to residential streets using traffic calming and associated techniques.
78. In many urban centres, main traffic routes often have a mixture of shopping, commercial and/or residential functions. These mixed priority routes are complex and difficult to treat, but the most successful measures have included speed management to keep speed at appropriate levels in the context of both 20 and 30 mph limits and a reassignment of space to the different functions, taking into account the needs of people on foot or on bikes. Sometimes a decision about a road's primary or most important function needs to be taken.

## **6.1 20 MPH SPEED LIMITS AND ZONES**

79. 20 mph zones and limits are now relatively wide-spread, with more than 2,000 schemes in operation in England, the majority of which are 20 mph zones.
80. **20 mph zones** require traffic calming measures (e.g. speed humps, chicanes) or repeater speed limit signing and/or roundel road markings at regular intervals, so that no point within a zone is more than 50 m from

such a feature. In addition, the beginning and end of a zone is indicated by a terminal sign. Zones usually cover a number of roads.

81. **20 mph limits** are signed with terminal and at least one repeater sign, and do not require traffic calming. 20 mph limits are similar to other local speed limits and normally apply to individual or small numbers of roads but are increasingly being applied to larger areas.
82. There is clear evidence of the effect of reducing traffic speeds on the reduction of collisions and casualties, as collision frequency is lower at lower speeds; and where collisions do occur, there is a lower risk of fatal injury at lower speeds. Research shows that on urban roads with low average traffic speeds any 1 mph reduction in average speed can reduce the collision frequency by around 6% (Taylor, Lynam and Baruya, 2000). There is also clear evidence confirming the greater chance of survival of pedestrians in collisions at lower speeds.
83. Important benefits of 20 mph schemes include quality of life and community benefits, and encouragement of healthier and more sustainable transport modes such as walking and cycling (Kirkby, 2002). There may also be environmental benefits as, generally, driving more slowly at a steady pace will save fuel and reduce pollution, unless an unnecessarily low gear is used. Walking and cycling can make a very positive contribution to improving health and tackling obesity, improving accessibility and tackling congestion, and reducing carbon emissions and improving the local environment.
84. Based on this positive effect on road safety, and a generally favourable reception from local residents, traffic authorities are able to use their power to introduce 20mph speed limits or zones on:
  - Major streets where there are – or could be - significant numbers of journeys on foot, and/or where pedal cycle movements are an important consideration, and this outweighs the disadvantage of longer journey times for motorised traffic.

This is in addition to

- Residential streets in cities, towns and villages, particularly where the streets are being used by people on foot and on bicycles, there is community support and the characteristics of the street are suitable.
85. Successful 20 mph zones and 20 mph speed limits are generally self-enforcing, i.e. the existing conditions of the road together with measures such as traffic calming or signing, publicity and information as part of the scheme, lead to a mean traffic speed compliant with the speed limit. To achieve compliance there should be no expectation on the police to

provide additional enforcement beyond their routine activity, unless this has been explicitly agreed.

86. Evidence from successful 20 mph schemes shows that the introduction of 20 mph zones generally reduces mean traffic speed by more than is the case when a signed-only 20 mph limit is introduced. Historically, more zones than limits have been introduced.
87. A comprehensive and early consultation of all those who may be affected by the introduction of a 20 mph scheme is an essential part of the implementation process. This needs to include local residents, all tiers of local government, the police and emergency services, public transport providers and any other relevant local groups (including for example, groups representing pedestrians, cyclists, drivers, or equestrians). Further details about consultations are set out in Appendix A.
88. It is important to consider the full range of options and their benefits, both road safety and wider community and environmental benefits and costs, before making a decision as to the most appropriate method of introducing a 20 mph scheme to meet the local objectives and the road conditions.

## **20 mph zones**

89. 20 mph zones are very effective at reducing collisions and injuries. Research in 1996 showed that overall average annual collision frequency could fall by around 60%, and the number of collisions involving injury to children could be reduced by up to two-thirds. Zones may also bring further benefits, such as a modal shift towards more walking and cycling and overall reductions in traffic flow, where research has shown a reduction by over a quarter (Webster and Mackie, 1996). There is no evidence of migration of collisions and casualties to streets outside the zone. (Grundy et al, 2008; Grundy et al, 2009).
90. 20 mph zones are predominantly used in urban areas, both town centres and residential areas, and in the vicinity of schools. They should also be used around shops, markets, playgrounds and other areas with high pedestrian or cyclist traffic, though they should not include roads where motor vehicle movement is the primary function. It is generally recommended that they are imposed over an area consisting of several roads.
91. A 20 mph zone is indicated by 20 mph zone entry and exit signs (TSRGD, diagrams 674 and 675). The statutory provisions (direction 16(1) TSRGD) require that no point within the zone must be further than 50 metres from a traffic calming feature (unless in a cul-de-sac less than 80 metres long).
92. The Department has recently made significant changes to facilitate and reduce the cost for providing 20 mph zones in England. Traffic authorities can now place any of the following:

- a) repeater speed sign (TSRGD diagram 670)
  - b) a speed roundel road marking (TSRGD diagram 1065)
  - c) or a combination of both of these signs
  - d) traffic calming features
93. At least one traffic calming feature as defined in direction 16(2) TSRGD must be placed in a 20 mph zone and the features and signing must still be placed at intervals not greater than 100 metres: it is not the intention to remove physical features, but to ensure that the most appropriate measure is used to ensure the continuity of the zone. Only where speeds are already constrained to near the limit should local authorities consider placing the speed limit sign or a roundel marking, in addition to physical features within a zone.
94. These new arrangements should significantly reduce the requirement for signing and traffic calming features. Traffic authorities can now incorporate wider areas within a 20 mph zone, by effectively signing 20mph speed limits on distributor roads where traffic calming features are not suitable, or for small individual roads or stretches of road, where mean speeds are already at or below 24 mph. Where a 20 mph zone leads into a 20 mph limit, it is important to use the correct signing to indicate this. It is not appropriate to use the sign that indicates the end of a 20 mph zone and the start of a different, higher speed limit. Instead, a standard 20 mph terminal sign (TSRGD 2002, diagram 670) must be used.

## **20 mph speed limits**

95. Research into signed-only 20 mph speed limits shows that they generally lead to only small reductions in traffic speeds. Signed-only 20 mph speed limits are therefore most appropriate for areas where vehicle speeds are already low. This may, for example, be on roads that are very narrow, through engineering or on-road car parking. If the mean speed is already at or below 24 mph on a road, introducing a 20 mph speed limit through signing alone is likely to lead to general compliance with the new speed limit.
96. 20 mph limits covering most streets in Portsmouth have demonstrated that it is possible to introduce large-scale 20 mph limits in some built-up environments. Traffic speeds in most of the streets treated were relatively low (less than 20 mph) to start with. The early evidence suggests that it is likely that some speed and casualty reductions have taken place and this is consistent with previous research that has indicated that 20 mph limits without traffic calming reduce mean speeds by about 1 mph on average. A minority of streets in Portsmouth had average speeds of 25 mph or higher before the 20 mph speed limits were introduced and here the reductions in average speed tended to be greater, but insufficient to make the resulting speeds generally compliant with the new 20 mph limits. City-wide schemes may also contribute to changing travel and driving behaviour

positively in the longer run, and the objectives of the Portsmouth speed limits spread well beyond improving road safety. Schemes need to aim for compliance with the new speed limit.

97. The implementation of 20 mph limits over a larger number of roads, which the previous Speed Limit Circular (01/2006) advised against, should be considered where mean speeds at or below 24 mph are already achieved over a number of roads. Traffic authorities are already free to use additional measures in 20 mph limits to achieve compliance, such as some traffic calming measures and vehicle activated signs, or safety cameras. Average speed cameras may provide a useful tool for enforcing compliance with urban speed limits.
98. A 20 mph speed limit is indicated by terminal speed limit signs, and amendments to TSRGD (January 2012) require at least one speed limit repeater sign to be placed. Traffic authorities should ensure sufficient repeater signs are placed to inform road users of the speed limit in force. Chapter 3 of the Traffic Signs Manual provides guidance on the placing of repeater signs.
99. Every English authority has a traffic sign authorisation which permits them to place a 20mph speed roundel road marking as a repeater sign, without the requirement for an upright sign, to reduce unnecessary signing.
100. The amendments regulations to TSRGD (January 2012) have also provided thresholds below which speed repeater signs are no longer required by Direction 11 of TSRGD, but may still be placed if considered necessary. These thresholds are determined by carriageway length and the applicable speed limit.
101. Where traffic calming measures are placed, they should be signed in line with regulations (TSRGD 2002, diagram 557.1–4 and 883).

### **Variable 20 mph limits**

102. Traffic authorities have powers to introduce 20 mph speed limits that apply only at certain times of day. These variable limits may be particularly relevant where for example a school is located on a road that is not suitable for a full-time 20 mph zone or limit, such as a major through road. To indicate these limits, variable message signs are available (TSRGD, Regulation 58). To reduce costs and sign clutter, the Department will consider authorising the placing of a single variable message sign on the approaching traffic lane (rather than signs on both sides of the road) on a case by case basis.
103. The Secretary of State has provided a special authorisation for every English traffic authority to place an advisory part-time 20mph limit sign, with flashing school warning lights. This can be a more cost-effective solution, where appropriate, and reduces the requirement for signing.

## **6.2 TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES**

104. Traffic calming involves the installation of specific physical measures to encourage lower traffic speeds. There are many measures available to traffic authorities to help reduce vehicle speeds and ensure compliance with the speed limit in force. These are required at regular intervals in 20 mph zones and may be used in 20 mph limits. As set out above, speed limit traffic signs and/or speed roundel markings can now also be used by traffic authorities in England.
105. The Highways (Road Humps) Regulations 1999, The Highways (Traffic Calming) Regulations 1999, and Direction 16 of TSRGD 2002 (as amended) give details of the traffic calming measures that meet the requirements for a 20 mph zone.
106. These calming measures range from more substantive engineering measures to lighter touch road surface treatments and include, for example:
- road humps;
  - road narrowing measures, including e.g. chicanes, pinch-points or overrun areas;
  - gateways;
  - road markings; and
  - rumble devices.
107. A recent review of 20 mph zone and limit implementation (Atkins, 2009) shows that the vast majority of traffic calming measures in use are speed humps, tables, cushions or rumble devices, so called vertical deflections, but traffic authorities will want to consider the full set of available measures.

## **6.3 40 MPH AND 50 MPH SPEED LIMITS**

108. 30 mph is the standard speed limit for urban areas, but a 40 mph limit may be used where appropriate and, in exceptional circumstances, a 50 mph limit may be considered.
109. Roads suitable for 40 mph are generally higher-quality suburban roads or those on the outskirts of urban areas where there is little development. They should have good width and layout, parking and waiting restrictions in operation, and buildings set back from the road. These roads should, wherever possible, cater for the needs of non-motorised road users through segregation of road space, and have adequate footways and crossing places. Alternatively, traffic authorities should consider whether there are convenient alternative routes available.
110. In exceptional circumstances a 50 mph limit may also be used on higher-quality roads where there is little or no roadside development and



such speeds can be achieved safely. The roads most suited to these higher urban limits are special roads or those with segregated junctions and pedestrian facilities, such as primary distributors. They are usually dual carriageway ring or radial routes or bypasses that have become partially built up. Traffic authorities should, however, always assess the potential impact upon the local community and non-motorised road users before considering such a limit.

**Table 1 Speed limits in urban areas – summary**

<b>Speed limit (mph)</b>	<b>Where limit should apply</b>
20 (including 20 mph zone)	In streets that are primarily residential and in other town or city streets where pedestrian and cyclist movements are high, such as around schools, shops, markets, playgrounds and other areas, where motor vehicle movement is not the primary function.
30	In other built-up areas (where motor vehicle movement is deemed more important), with development on both sides of the road.
40	On higher quality suburban roads or those on the outskirts of urban areas where there is little development, with few cyclists, pedestrians or equestrians. On roads with good width and layout, parking and waiting restrictions in operation, and buildings set back from the road. On roads that, wherever possible, cater for the needs of non-motorised users through segregation of road space, and have adequate footways and crossing places.
50	On dual carriageway ring or radial routes or bypasses that have become partially built up, with little or no roadside development.

## SECTION 7: RURAL SPEED MANAGEMENT

### Key points

The national speed limit on the rural road network is 60 mph on single carriageway roads and 70 mph on dual carriageways.

Rural dual carriageways with segregated junctions and facilities for vulnerable road users would generally be suitable for 70 mph limits. However, a lower limit may be appropriate if, for example, a collision history indicates that this cannot be achieved safely.

In 2011, 66% of road deaths in Britain occurred on rural roads, and 51% of road deaths occurred on single rural carriageway roads subject to the National Speed Limit of 60 mph limit.

The speed limit on single carriageway rural roads should take into account the history of collisions, the road's function, existing mean traffic speed, use by vulnerable road users, the road's geometry and engineering, and the road environment including level of road-side development.

It is government policy that a 30 mph speed limit should be the norm in villages. It may also be appropriate to consider 20 mph zones and limits in built-up village streets.

It is recommended that the minimum length of a village speed limit should be 600 metres. However, traffic authorities may lower this to 400 metres, and in exceptional circumstances to 300 metres.

111. The vast majority of the rural road network is subject to the national speed limit of 60 mph on single carriageway roads, and 70 mph on dual carriageways. On many of these roads, the majority of drivers are travelling below – sometimes significantly below – the speed limit because of the characteristics of the roads. This is especially evident on the C and Unclassified roads where the geometric characteristics include many narrow roads, bends, junctions and accesses.

112. Rural roads account for 66% of all road deaths, and 82% of car occupant deaths in particular, but only around 42% of the distance travelled. Of all road deaths in Britain in 2011, 51% occurred on National Speed Limit rural single carriageway roads (DfT, 2011). The reduction in road casualties and especially deaths on rural roads is one of the key road safety challenges. Research has assessed the risk of death in collisions at various impact speeds for typical collision types on rural roads. This research suggests that the risk of a driver dying in a head on collision involving two cars travelling at 60 mph is around 90%, but that this drops

rapidly with speed, so that it is around 50% at 48 mph (Richards and Cuerden, 2009).

113. Inappropriate speed, at levels below the legal limit but above those appropriate for the road at the time (for example, because of the weather conditions or because vulnerable road users are present), is a particular problem for rural roads. *Exceeding the speed limit* or *travelling too fast for the conditions* are reported as contributory factors in 16% of collisions on rural roads. Specifically, inappropriate speed is recorded as a contributory factor in 20% of crashes on minor rural roads with a 60 mph limit.
114. Speed limit changes are therefore unlikely to fully address this problem and should therefore be considered only as one part of rural safety management. Where collision and casualty rates are high, traffic authorities should first seek to understand the particular types of crashes taking place and their causes, to allow them to choose effective solutions to reduce the risk.
115. To help in this process the *Accident Analysis on Rural Roads: A Technical Guide* (TRL, 2004) has been developed, which provides information on typical collision rates and typical proportions of different collision types on different types of rural road. This can be used to assess where there are above-average collision rates and provides help to traffic authorities in identifying the types of site or route specific intervention measures that might be appropriate to manage speeds and reduce collisions along the route.
116. Traffic authorities may wish to note the Road Safety Foundation's risk ratings for A roads in Britain. This rates the risk, based on frequency of death and serious injury in relation to amount of traffic on the particular road, into five categories ranging from low-risk, safe roads to high-risk roads.<sup>6</sup>
117. The Road Safety Foundation has assessed the safety of the trunk road network, assessing the protection levels that the design and engineering features of roadsides, medians and junctions on these roads offer in case of a crash. This assessment uses a star-based European Road Assessment Programme (EuroRAP) Road Protection Score, and has found that two-thirds of single carriageway trunk roads achieve only a 2-star (out of 4) rating. Even though this assessment has only been applied to trunk roads it suggests that engineering measures may often be more appropriate to manage speed and reduce collisions on rural single carriageway roads.
118. If high collision rates persist despite these measures, then lower speed limits may also be considered. Again, to achieve a change in motorists' behaviour and compliance with the limit, supporting physical measures, driver information and publicity or other measures are likely to be required.

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<sup>6</sup> Please see [www.eurorap.org](http://www.eurorap.org) for detailed maps.

Such measures could include, for example, the use of vehicle-activated signs (VAS), which have proved particularly effective at the approaches to isolated hazards, junctions and bends in rural areas (Winnett and Wheeler, 2003). There should be no expectation on the police to provide additional enforcement to ensure compliance with a new limit beyond their routine activity, unless this has been explicitly agreed.

119. The aim of speed management actions is to deliver a balance between safety objectives for all road users and mobility objectives to ensure efficient travel, as well as environmental and community outcomes. So every effort should be made to achieve an appropriate balance between actual vehicle speeds, speed limits, road design and other measures. This balance may be delivered by introducing one or more speed management measures in conjunction with the new speed limits, and/or as part of an overall route safety strategy.
120. While routine enforcement should normally only be considered after other speed management measures have been considered, there may be occasions where the use of average speed cameras may offer a solution through calming traffic speed over a stretch of road. The Department has received a small sample of evaluation data of average speed cameras at non-roadworks sites from some local partnerships, and this data suggests a reduction in the percentage of motorists exceeding the speed limit from 55% before installation of cameras, to 18% afterwards, and an average reduction of killed and seriously injured casualties (KSI) per km of around 69%, and of personal injury collisions (PIC) of around 38%, (not adjusted for national trends and regression to mean effect).<sup>7</sup>

## **7.1 DUAL CARRIAGEWAY RURAL ROADS**

121. Dual carriageway roads with segregated junctions and separate facilities for vulnerable road users are generally subject to and suitable for the National Speed Limit of 70 mph. However, a lower limit may be appropriate if, for example, a collision history indicates that this speed cannot be achieved safely and this risk of collisions cannot be addressed through other engineering measures.

## **7.2 SINGLE CARRIAGEWAY RURAL ROADS**

122. In most instances, consideration of collision history, road function, mix of road users including presence of vulnerable road users, road geometry, engineering and environment, and actual traffic speed should enable traffic authorities to determine the appropriate limit on single carriageway rural roads.

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<sup>7</sup> Comprehensive before and after data were obtained for 11 permanent average speed camera sites on A roads with speed limits of 40, 50, 60, and 70 mph, where safety cameras were installed between 2000 and 2006, based on an informal data request. It should be noted that this is not a representative sample, has not been centrally and independently validated and should therefore only be seen as indicative of possible effects of average speed cameras.

123. Roads may have primarily either a through traffic function or a local access function. Both need to be provided safely. Mobility benefits will be more important for roads with a through-traffic function, while environmental and community benefits are likely to be of greater importance for the local access roads.
124. There may be many roads below A and B classification that serve a mixed through-traffic and access function. Where that traffic function is currently being achieved without a high collision rate, these roads should be judged as through-traffic roads. If, however, for all or parts of these roads there is a substantial potential risk to vulnerable road users, these sections should be assessed as roads with a local access function.
125. Within routes, separate assessments should be made for each section of road of 600 metres or more for which a separate speed limit might be considered appropriate. When this is completed, the final choice of appropriate speed limit for individual sections might need to be adjusted to provide consistency over the route as a whole.
126. The choice of speed limits should take account of whether there is substantial roadside development and whether the road forms part of a recognised route for vulnerable road users, including whether there is a footway.
127. Table 2 sets out recommended speed limits for roads with a predominant motor traffic flow function. If walking, cycling, horse riding, community or environmental factors are particularly important on any road section, consideration should be given to using the lower limit.

**Table 2 Speed limits for single carriageway roads<sup>8</sup> with a predominant motor traffic flow function**

Speed limit (mph)	Where limit should apply:
60	Recommended for most high quality strategic A and B roads with few bends, junctions or accesses.
50	Should be considered for lower quality A and B roads that may have a relatively high number of bends, junctions or accesses.  Can also be considered where mean speeds are below 50 mph, so lower limit does not interfere with traffic flow.
40	Should be considered where there are many bends, junctions or accesses, substantial development, a strong environmental or landscape reason, or where

<sup>8</sup> For speed limits in villages, please refer to Section 7.3.

	there are considerable numbers of vulnerable road users.
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128. For C and Unclassified roads with important access and recreational function, the following speed limits are deemed appropriate and traffic authorities should use these as guidance when reviewing the speed limits on these roads:

- The national speed limit of 60 mph is only appropriate for the best quality C and Unclassified roads with a mixed (i.e. partial traffic flow) function with few bends, junctions or accesses. In the longer term, these roads should be assessed against through-traffic criteria. For lower quality C and Unclassified roads with a mixed function and high numbers of bends, junctions or accesses 50 mph may be appropriate.
- A speed limit of 40 mph may be considered for roads with a predominantly local, access or recreational function, for example in national parks or areas of outstanding natural beauty (AONB), or across, or adjacent to, unenclosed common land; or if they form part of a recommended route for vulnerable road users. It may also be appropriate if there is a particular collision problem.

129. It is important to note that the above does not imply that speed limits should automatically be reduced. Indeed, in some cases the assessment may suggest that the existing speed limit may be too low, and a higher speed limit should be considered, as it is likely to be achievable safely.

130. We would welcome applications for zonal rural speed limits, usually 40 mph zones, for example in national parks or AONBs or on other networks of minor rural roads where speeds are already in line with such a limit. Such zones would include entry treatment and painted repeater roundels. The Department is keen to consider the effectiveness of such zones in reducing speeds and signing requirements.

### 7.3 VILLAGES

131. Fear of traffic can affect people's quality of life in villages and it is self-evident that villages should have comparable speed limits to similar roads in urban areas. It is therefore government policy that a 30 mph speed limit should be the norm through villages.

132. It may also be appropriate to consider 20 mph limits or zones in built-up village streets which are primarily residential in nature, or where pedestrian and cyclist movements are high. Such limits should not, however, be considered on roads with a strategic function or where the movement of motor vehicles is the primary function.

133. Traffic Advisory Leaflet 01/04 (DfT, 2004) sets out policy on achieving lower speed limits in villages. It suggests that reasonable minimum criteria for the definition of what constitutes a village, for the purpose of applying a village speed limit of 30 mph, would be that there were:
- 20 or more houses (on one or both sides of the road); and
  - a minimum length of 600 metres.
134. If there are just fewer than 20 houses, traffic authorities should make extra allowance for any other key buildings, such as a church, shop or school. Where the character of a village falls outside this definition, local authorities are encouraged to use their discretion in deciding whether a lower speed limit is appropriate.
135. The criteria above should give adequate visual messages to drivers to reduce their speed. It is recommended that the minimum length for the new limit is at least 600 metres to avoid too many changes in speed limits along a route, and to aid compliance. Traffic authorities may, however, lower this to 400 metres when the level of development density over this shorter length exceeds the 20 or more houses criterion and, in exceptional circumstances, to 300 metres.
136. In some circumstances it might be appropriate to consider an intermediate speed limit of 40 mph prior to the 30 mph terminal speed limit signs at the entrance to a village, in particular where there are outlying houses beyond the village boundary or roads with high approach speeds. For the latter, traffic authorities might also need to consider other speed management measures to support the message of the speed limit and help encourage compliance so that no enforcement difficulties are created for the local police force. Where appropriate, such measures might include a vehicle-activated sign, centre hatching or other measures that would have the effect of narrowing or changing the nature and appearance of the road.
137. Where the speed limit commences at the village boundary, the village nameplate sign (prescribed in diagram 2402.1 of TSRGD 2002) and speed limit roundel may be mounted together. The combined sign should be located at the point where the speed limit starts, and it may be helpful if drivers can see housing at the same time as the signs, reinforcing the visual message for reduced speed.
138. If there are high approach speeds to a village, or the start of the village is not obvious, village gateway treatments can also be an effective way to slow drivers down. Advice can be found in Local Transport Note 1/07 Traffic Calming (DfT, 2007) and Traffic Advisory Leaflets 01/94 *VISP – A Summary* (DoT, 1994a) and 01/04 *Village Speed Limits* (DfT, 2004).
139. In situations where the above criteria for a village are not met and there is a lesser degree of development, or where engineering measures are not practicable or cost-effective to achieve a 30 mph limit, but a

reduction from the national 60 mph speed limit is considered appropriate, traffic authorities should consider alternative lower limits of 40 or 50 mph.

140. A recommendation to use the framework for the assessment of speed limit options on rural single carriageway roads, in place since the publication of the previous Speed Limit Circular (01/2006), is withdrawn.



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## **APPENDIX A: KEY PIECES OF SPEED LIMIT, SIGNING AND RELATED LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS**

1. Key speed limit and safety camera signs diagrams in Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions, (TSRGD) 2002, as amended, include:
  - diagram 670 – 'Maximum speed limit' sign
  - diagram 671 – 'National speed limits apply'
  - diagrams 672 and 673 – Start and end of minimum speed limits respectively.
  - diagrams 674 and 675 – Entrance and end of 20 mph 'Speed limit zone' signs respectively.
  - diagrams 878, 879 and 880 – 'Camera warning' signs
  - diagram 1065 – Carriageway roundel road marking
  - diagram 2402.1 and 2403.1 – Town or village gateway sign (boundary sign) (may be combined on the same post or backing board with a speed limit sign)
  - diagram 7032 – Temporary 'New 30 mph speed limit' sign
2. The main directions for the use and placing of speed limit restrictions in TSRDG 2002, as amended, are:
  - directions 8 and 9 – Beginning of speed limit restrictions
  - direction 10 – Ending of speed limit restrictions
  - direction 11 – Placement of speed limit repeater signs
  - direction 16 – Speed limits of 20 mph
  - directions 41 and 42 – Mounting and backing of signs.
3. Further detailed advice on the form and siting of speed limit signs is given in Chapter 3 of the Traffic Signs Manual (DfT, 2008).

### **Speed Limit Orders**

4. Part VI of the Road Traffic Regulation Act (RTRA) 1984 deals specifically with speed limits and sections 81-84 deal with different speed limits and the speed limit order-making process. The Local Authorities' Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 sets out the process of making traffic orders, which includes speed limit orders. Traffic authorities will need to refer to these Regulations in full. They set out the persons and organisations to be consulted before traffic orders are made, and an extract is below.

#### **“Consultation**

**6.—**(1) An order making authority shall, before making an order in a case specified in column (2) of an item in the table below, consult the persons specified in column (3) of the item.

TABLE

(1) <i>Item</i>	(2) <i>Case</i>	(3) <i>Consultee</i>
1.	Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a road for which another authority is the highway authority or the traffic authority	The other authority
2.	Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a Crown road	The appropriate Crown authority
3.	Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a road subject to a concession	The concessionaire
4.	Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a road on which a tramcar or trolley vehicle service is provided	The operator of the service
5.	Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on,- (a) a road outside Greater London which is included in the route of a local service; or (b) a road in Greater London which is included in the route of a London bus service	In case (a) the operator of the service  In case (b) the operator of the service and Transport for London
6.	Where it appears to the authority that the order is likely to affect the passage on any road of- (a) ambulances; or  (b) fire-fighting vehicles	In case (a) the chief officer of the appropriate NHS trust or NHS Foundation Trust In case (b) the fire and rescue authority
7.	All cases	(a) The Freight Transport Association (b) The Road Haulage Association (c) Such other organisations (if any) representing persons likely to be affected by any provision in the order as the order

making authority thinks  
it appropriate to consult”

5. The regulations also set out the requirements for publication of the proposal before making an order through a notice and further adequate publicity.
6. The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 Schedule 9 Part III s 20 contains a requirement also to consult the Chief Officer of Police.

### **Consultation for traffic calming measures**

7. Full consultation must take place before any traffic calming measures are installed. For road humps, the process is outlined in The Highways (Road Humps) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999 No. 1025) as follows (Regulation 3):

"Where the Secretary of State or a local traffic authority proposes to construct a road hump, he or they shall, as well as consulting the chief officer of police as required by section 90C(1) of the Act, also consult -

- (a) where the proposal is by the local traffic authority in England which is the council of a County, any district council in whose district the highway is situated;
- (b) in all cases, the chief officer of the fire brigade for the area in which the highway concerned is situated and the chief officer of any body providing ambulance services under the National Health Service Act 1977(a) and operating in that area;
- (c) in all cases, organisations appearing to him or them to represent persons who use the highway to which the proposal related, or to represent persons who are otherwise likely to be affected by the road hump."

"The Act" refers to the Highways Act 1980.

8. For all other traffic calming, the consultation process is outlined in The Highways (Traffic Calming) Regulations 1999 as follows (Regulation 4):

"Where a traffic authority proposes to construct a traffic calming work in a highway they shall –

- (a) consult the chief officer of police for the area in which the highway is situated; and
- (b) consult such persons or organisations representing persons who use the highway or who are otherwise likely to be affected by the traffic calming work as the traffic authority thinks fit."

9. Although there is no requirement to consult all the emergency services for traffic calming measures other than road humps, it is strongly recommended that both the ambulance service and the Fire and Rescue Service are included in any consultation for all traffic calming as a matter of course.



## **Translation of news article by the Oriental Daily on 7 October 2017**

*Original article in Chinese:* [www.orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20171007/00176\\_031.html](http://www.orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20171007/00176_031.html)

*Translation:*

### **The bus sector meets to Transport Department to call for a reduction in driving hours**

[Report by Oriental Daily] The fatal traffic incident at Sham Shui Po last month involving a bus mounting a pedestrian pavement has raised concerns in the society on the effect that long working hours may have on driving safety. Multiple bus unions met the Transport Department yesterday to review the working hour arrangements for bus captains, and while there were diverse views within the sector on reducing the working hour limit of bus captains from fourteen hours to twelve hours, there was a consensus that the limit on driving hours should be reduced from the current eleven hours to ten hours. Some unions also asked the bus companies to increase the base salaries of bus captains by at least one thousand and five hundred dollars so as to avoid reducing their income after the reduction in working hours.

The Motor Transport Workers General Union, together with its five unions for the bus companies, met the officials from the Transport Department yesterday. The spokesperson of the General Union, Mr CHEUNG Tsz-kei, stated that the bus companies had been trying to cut costs by not hiring additional staff and asking bus captains to work long hours, which led to an increase in road safety risks. He pointed out that the union was open to the suggestion of reducing the driving hour limit from eleven hours to ten hours, but was of the view that the working hour limit should be kept at fourteen hours in order to



*Representatives of the Motor Transport Workers General Union had a meeting with Transport Department yesterday to review the work conditions of bus captains (photography by NG Yim-ling)*

*[Note: the banner shown in the photograph shows the Chinese name of the Motor Transport Workers General Union, followed by three lines that translate into: "A strong request to the Transport Department to improve the work environment of bus captains and enhance the safety of bus operations"]*

facilitate the arrangement of "split shifts", under which drivers work in the morning and in the evening with a rest break in the middle. He also said that, in recent years, bus companies had been compressing the journey times of many bus routes, such as E42, S1 and A31 which often required more journey time than was given. In the end, some of the bus captains were

asked to start the return trip immediately after arriving at the bus terminus in order to compensate for the time lost, and this reduced the amount of time they had for rests.

*Increasing base salary to avoid impacting overall income*

Ten members of the Federation of Bus Industry Trade Unions also met the officials from the Transport Department yesterday. Chairman LAM Kam-piu stated that the request was to reduce the working hour limit of bus captains from fourteen hours to twelve hours, and the driving hour limit from eleven hours to ten hours, as well as to have the requirement that bus captains be given a rest break of half an hour after working for five hours. To avoid having the reduction of working hours impact the income of bus captains, he recommended that bus companies should increase the base salary of bus captains by one thousand and five hundred dollars. Assuming twelve working hours, and taking into account various subsidies and overtime allowances, the monthly salary can reach twenty six thousand dollars which is roughly on par with the existing arrangements.

After the meeting, the Transport Department was quoted by them to have responded that the Department had heard the requests of the sector and would explore the follow-up actions. The Federation was dissatisfied with the response and hence left the meeting early in protest, while the Motor Transport Workers General Union indicated that they were planning to send a meeting request to Mr Frank CHAN, the Secretary for Transport and Housing.

# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(4)1407/17-18(04)

Ref. : CB4/PL/TP

## **Panel on Transport Meeting on 25 July 2018**

### **Background brief on safety of franchised bus operation**

#### **Purpose**

This paper provides background information on safety of franchised bus operation. It also summarizes the major views and concerns expressed by Legislative Council Members on the subject.

#### **Background**

##### Franchised buses

2. Franchised buses are the largest road-based carriers serving areas without direct railway access as well as providing feeder service connecting the railway network and inter-district service. As at end-2016, the six franchises under five franchised bus operators operate around 580 bus routes with a total of about 5 900 buses in their fleet.<sup>1</sup> They offer around 74 000 trips to serve nearly 4.1 million passengers trips per day.<sup>2</sup> Currently, franchised buses account for around 33% of the public transport patronage.

3. In 2016, the total number of franchised buses involved in accidents was 2 269, which accounted for about 9.7% of all motor vehicles. The figures of motor vehicles involved in accidents by class of motor vehicles, including franchised bus, for 2007 to 2016 are tabulated in **Appendix I**.

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<sup>1</sup> The five franchised bus operators include The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB"), Citybus Limited ("CTB"), New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB"), Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB"). CTB operates two franchises, one for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network and another for Airport and North Lantau Bus Network.

<sup>2</sup> Franchised buses include KMB, CTB, NWFB, LW and NLB. The MTR bus service serving Northwest New Territories is also included.

## Current regime on the provision of franchised bus service

### *Legislative requirements and relevant guidelines to ensure safety of franchised bus operation*

4. The Transport Department ("TD") monitors the operation of franchised bus services and maintenance of the buses in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (Cap. 230), the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374), and their Regulations. They include various requirements to ensure the operational safety, the safety standard and roadworthiness of in-service franchised buses, as well as to ensure that the captains are medically fit for driving buses. To ensure that bus captains have sufficient rest time, TD has promulgated the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks ("the Guidelines") for franchised bus companies to take into account when arranging duty schedules for full-time and part-time bus captains. The Guideline was previously reviewed and revised in October 2010.

### *Recent Development*

5. After the serious traffic accident involving a franchised bus of KMB occurred in Tai Po on 10 February 2018 ("the February 10 accident"), a special meeting of the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") was held on 15 February 2018 to discuss the issues relating to the above mentioned traffic accident. Among others, Panel members had discussed their concerns on the current regime on provision of franchised bus services. Members at the special meeting expressed that the February 10 accident had revealed various inadequacies of the current regime on the provision of franchised bus services, including manpower resources, training, remuneration and working conditions of bus captains and their driving attitudes, and the lack of monitoring of the bus services on the part of both the franchised bus companies and the Administration.

6. On 23 February 2018, the Transport Department announced the results of the review on the Guidelines after meeting the staff unions of bus companies and briefed them on the proposed revisions of the Guidelines. According to the Administration, franchised bus companies should finalize their shift arrangements according to the revised Guidelines, and aimed to implement them progressively from the second quarter of 2018 for full implementation in the second quarter of 2019. The details of the revised Guideline are set out in **Appendix II**.

7. On 13 March 2018, the Chief Executive announced that an Independent Review Committee ("IRC")<sup>3</sup> on Hong Kong's Franchised Bus Service was set up following the fatal incident on Tai Po Road on February 10, and in light of other recent serious incidents involving franchised bus services, to conduct a comprehensive review of the operation and monitoring of franchised buses and to make recommendations to ensure that franchised bus services in Hong Kong are safe and reliable.

## **Major views and concerns of Members**

8. The Panel on Transport ("the Panel") has been actively following up issues relating to safety of franchised bus operation. Council questions on relevant matters were also raised. The major views and concerns of Members are summarized in the ensuing paragraphs.

### Driving safety of franchised buses

#### *Manpower resource and the employment of part-time bus captains and driving safety*

9. After the February 10 accident, members had raised concerns about the issues relating to employment of part-time captains at the special meeting held on 15 February 2018. Given the serious shortage of bus captain in the franchised bus companies, a few members expressed grave concern that suspending part-time bus captains from service might increase the workload and pressure of full-time bus captains, resulting in more conflict between bus captains and passengers and, eventually, a negative impact on road safety.

10. A member asked whether the Administration would consider rationalizing some duplicated bus routes operated by different bus companies to solve the shortage problem of bus captains. In this regard, members noted that the Administration had been reviewing franchised bus services regularly with regard to new transport and housing developments, and discussing with franchised bus companies in drawing up rationalization proposals for franchised bus services under the annual Bus Route Planning Programmes. Members also noted that KMB was discussing with TD on the feasibility of temporarily reducing the bus frequencies of some routes with low utilization to relieve the workload of full-time bus captains.

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<sup>3</sup> The information about the Committee, including its membership and the arrangement of its public hearings, could be found at the website: <https://www.irc-bus.gov.hk/eng/timetable.html>

11. KMB explained that the suspension of part-time bus captains was arranged to address public's concern about the performance of part-time bus captains after the February 10 accident. In this regard, a member opined that the above mentioned arrangement appeared to be a public relation technique rather than a well-conceived arrangement. Another member requested KMB to stop the suspension of hiring of part-time drivers unless the rate of accident involving part-time bus captains was higher than that of full-time bus captains, or the driving attitudes and performance of part-time bus captains were less satisfactory than that of full-time bus captains.

*Health check arrangements for bus captains/professional drivers*

12. At the Council meetings of 23 February 2011 and 26 April 2017, Members raised questions about the measures implemented by the Administration to safeguard the health of professional drivers. Further, at the Panel meetings on 27 November 2012 and 20 January 2017, some members expressed concern about health problems and fatigue of bus captains that had led to a few traffic accidents. Therefore, they considered that all franchised bus operators should review the health check requirements for bus captains, and the working hours and rest time of both full-time and part-time bus captains. There was also a suggestion that the Administration should consider subsidizing the fees for medical check-up taken by professional drivers.

13. The Administration advised that franchised bus operators had devised clear requirements on the age and physical health of bus captains. On the age requirement, the retirement age for bus captains is 60 or 65. Depending on their manpower needs, some operators would flexibly extend the employment period of their bus captains on contract basis up to the age limit of 66 or 67. Franchised bus operators had also put in place a requirement for bus captains to undergo health checks before joining the service, and formulated detailed arrangements for serving bus captains of different ages to undergo annual health checks having regard to their health conditions.

*Training and driving attitude of bus captains*

14. At the Panel meeting held on 15 February 2018, members had raised concerns about the monitoring of the provision of bus driving training by franchised companies and issues relating to driving attitude and traffic conviction records of bus captains. Members noted from the Administration's paper<sup>4</sup> that franchised bus companies provided various types of training for newly-recruited bus captains, including driving skills, incident handling and provided serving bus captains with regular driving enhancement training

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<sup>4</sup> LC paper No. CB4)617/17-18(01)

programmes. If it was found that the bus captains had the need for enhancement on driving attitude and behaviour, franchised bus companies would provide driving improvement course or supplementary driving training for the bus captains to reinforce their driving skills, enhance their safety awareness and foster good driving behaviour. If serving bus captains were involved in traffic accidents or violate traffic laws in driving duty, bus companies would take appropriate disciplinary actions against them or even dismiss them depending on the nature and severity of the incidents.

15. A member asked the Administration to consider mandating bus captains to obtain safety cards/certificates and attend regular training workshops to be provided by the Administration. Another member asked whether part-time bus captains had to gain a certain number of bus driving hours within a specified period of time prior to driving a bus, and if the bus captains failed to meet the required driving hours, whether they had to undergo a re-training programme. KMB advised that if bus captains, regardless of full-time or part-time, had not driven a route for a month or more, they would have to practise driving on that route again. Moreover, in assigning duties to a particular bus captain for a particular route, the bus captain's driving experience for that route would be taken into consideration.

### Structural safety of franchised buses

#### *Design and construction of franchised buses*

16. The design and construction of franchised bus was one of the major concerns of the Panel because in a number of bus accidents, the top of the buses concerned were ripped off, indicating the need for stronger bus body to provide greater protection to passengers. The Administration assured members that the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) had stipulated the requirement for the design and construction of franchised bus. All double-deck buses operating in Hong Kong were imported from Europe and could comply with the European requirements. The major bus manufacturers had also confirmed that the body structure of franchised buses in Hong Kong was the same as those supplied to other countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore.

17. As a result of a spate of franchised bus incidents which involved broken windscreen and passengers being thrown out from the upper deck of a bus after collision with another vehicle, the Panel discussed the measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, including the selection of better materials for windscreen and passenger windows on buses. The Administration reported in March 2007 that it had agreed with franchised bus

companies to apply a transparent protective film onto the upper deck toughened glass windscreens of all existing buses, which would effectively contain the shattered glass fragments in the event of an accident, or to replace them with laminated glass.

*Use of technologies for bus safety*

18. At the Panel meeting held on 15 February 2018, a member expressed concern over some reports that when the February 10 accident occurred, the subject bus was travelling at a speed above the statutory limit of 70 km/h. The member asked whether the speed limiter of the subject bus was out of order, and whether the Administration would consider requiring all bus companies to install devices which could effectively control the vehicle speed when travelling on downhill roads. A member opined that, before all the speed limiters of buses had been replaced, the Administration should consider lowering the speed limits of those meandering or narrow road sections.

19. KMB advised that every KMB bus had been installed with a speed limiter which prevented it from going faster than 70 km/h. However, when the bus was travelling downslope, the speed might exceed the above limit due to gravity. After the February 10 accident, KMB had immediately explored with a number of speed limiter suppliers on measures to address the above problem.

20. A few members urged the Administration to make use of technologies to enhance bus safety and prevent accident. A member pointed out that there had been driver's monitoring system which could detect the driver's attentiveness or even emotional states. The member also suggested making public the information collected from the driving recorder installed on buses to assist members of the public in monitoring traffic blackspots.

21. A member asked KMB for its reasons of not adopting the Electronic Stability Program or similar technologies to improve bus stability and prevent it from over-turning. Another member suggested the Administration and public transport operators to study the feasibility of adopting Lane Departure Warning System and Pre-Crash Safety System to enhance safety.

22. KMB welcomed any suggestions from members on adoption of new technologies to improve bus safety and agreed to study their feasibility. The Administration supported the adoption of any technologies to improve bus safety.



*Installation and wearing of seat belts on franchised buses*

23. At the special meeting held on 15 February 2018, a member suggested that all franchised bus operators should consider retrofitting seat belt to all seats in buses by phases so as to minimize the number of casualties in case of bus accident. Another member, nevertheless, quoted the view of some transport experts that seat belt might not minimize the number of casualties for such kind of serious bus accident. Members noted that the Administration would keep an open mind on the suggestion of retrofitting seat belt at all seats in franchised buses and that in considering this matter, among others, technical feasibility and passengers' acceptability would be taken into account.

*Safety of glass panes of the doors on franchised buses*

24. A member of the Panel raised concern about the two incidents occurred in February 2016 involving shattered glass panes of the doors of franchised buses. In this regard, the Administration explained that the Specification of Safety Glass Notice (Cap. 374H) stipulated that the glass used in a motor vehicle, including a bus, should be glass that met the relevant requirements of Economic Commission of Europe Regulation (ECE 43). In view of the above incidents, TD and franchised bus companies had implemented measures to further safeguard the safety of passengers, such as setting up of a working group by TD with representatives from franchised bus operators and bus manufacturers to review the safety of bus doors; enhancing training for bus captains; and reminding passengers to hold handrail when taking the bus.

Other issues

25. After the February 10 accident, members noted that the Administration had been reviewing the road design and traffic management measures of Tai Po Road. Besides, the Administration had also been discussing with franchised bus companies and staff unions on how to enhance working conditions and remuneration of bus captains.

**Latest development**

26. The Administration will update the Panel on the progress of the proposed new safety devices or new technology to enhance franchised bus operation safety at the Panel meeting to be held on 25 July 2018.

**Relevant papers**

27. A list of relevant papers is in **Appendix III**.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
18 July 2018

**Motor vehicle involvements by class of motor vehicle in accidents from 2007 to 2016**

<b>Class of motor vehicle</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Franchised bus</b>	<b>2 201</b>	<b>2 047</b>	<b>1 916</b>	<b>1 983</b>	<b>2 143</b>	<b>2 217</b>	<b>2 344</b>	<b>2 350</b>	<b>2 279</b>	<b>2 269</b>
Non-franchised bus	448	416	406	459	486	476	503	500	483	453
Motor cycle	2 927	2 613	2 556	2 428	2 328	2 245	2 222	2 281	2 328	2 355
Private car	6 450	5 927	6 085	6 255	6 591	6 859	7 093	7 224	7 757	8 207
Public light bus	1 173	1 080	1 110	1 146	1 142	1 067	1 128	1 085	1 105	1 080
Light goods vehicle	2 952	2 806	2 527	2 726	2 689	2 637	2 706	2 621	2 708	2 947
Medium & heavy goods vehicle	1 081	1 045	907	1 031	1 141	1 105	1 085	1 125	1 063	1 167
Taxi	4 004	3 926	3 801	4 053	4 259	4 240	4 395	4 211	4 332	4 493
Others <sup>*</sup>	281	272	300	326	299	329	357	332	306	320
<b>All motor vehicles</b>	<b>21 517</b>	<b>20 132</b>	<b>19 608</b>	<b>20 407</b>	<b>21 078</b>	<b>21 175</b>	<b>21 833</b>	<b>21 729</b>	<b>22 361</b>	<b>23 291</b>

Source: The Transport Department's website ([http://www.td.gov.hk/mini\\_site/atd/2017/en/section7\\_2.html](http://www.td.gov.hk/mini_site/atd/2017/en/section7_2.html))

<sup>\*</sup> Including other motor vehicles such as tram, private light bus, private bus, etc., but excluding bicycles, handcarts and vehicles with unknown vehicle type.

**Guidelines on Bus Captain  
Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks**

(Revised in 2018)

- Guideline (1) (a) Maximum duty hours<sup>1</sup> in a shift should not exceed 12 hours, and driving hours<sup>2</sup> therein should not exceed 10 hours.
- (b) Duty hours in a special shift duty arranged to cater for service demand in the morning and evening peaks may exceed 12 hours but maximum duty hours should not exceed 14 hours, and driving hours therein should not exceed 10 hours. A rest break of no less than 3 consecutive hours should be provided in the special shift.
- Guideline (2) — The off-duty break between 2 successive shifts should not be less than 10 hours. The total off-duty breaks in 3 successive shifts, other than special shift duties, should not be less than 22 hours.
- Guideline (3) — Bus captains should have a rest break<sup>3</sup> of at least 40 minutes after 6 driving hours<sup>2</sup>, and within that 6-hour duty, they should have short rest breaks<sup>4</sup> totalling not less than 20 minutes, of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of duty. The time bus captains spend at a terminal point preparing for the next departure and monitoring boarding of passengers should not be regarded as rest break/short rest break.
- Guideline (4) — Bus captains working for 8 hours or above in a shift should have a meal break of no less than 1 hour.

Source: Annex to the press release of the Transport Department issued on 23 February 2018  
([http://www.td.gov.hk/en/publications\\_and\\_press\\_releases/press\\_releases/transport\\_department/index\\_id\\_2917.html](http://www.td.gov.hk/en/publications_and_press_releases/press_releases/transport_department/index_id_2917.html))

<sup>1</sup> Duty hours refer to the total number of hours from the beginning to the end of a shift, including all the rest breaks.

<sup>2</sup> Driving hours refer to the total hours performing driving duty plus short rest breaks in a shift.

<sup>3</sup> Inclusive of meal breaks.

<sup>4</sup> Short rest breaks refer to rest times of less than 40 minutes.

## Safety of franchised bus operation

## List of relevant papers

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
24.10.2006	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on safety of franchised bus operations	CB(1)110/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)294/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf</a>
28.2.2007	Council meeting	Hon LI Fung-ying raised a question on incidents involving broken window glasses of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280138.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280138.htm</a>
2.3.2007	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on progress on measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)783/06-07(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1147/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf</a>
23.3.2007		Administration's paper on progress on measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)1149/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1407/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
9.7.2007	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on progress on measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)2023/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)2408/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf</a>
16.1.2008	Council meeting	Hon Albert Jinghan CHENG raised a question on structural safety of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160165.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160165.htm</a>
28.1.2008	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)639/07-08(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf</a>
		Paper on whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in selected overseas places prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat	IN12/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/sec/library/0708in12-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/sec/library/0708in12-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)838/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf</a>
22.2.2008		Administration's paper on safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)639/07-08(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1123/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf</a>
7.1.2009	Council meeting	Hon Miriam LAU Kin-yee raised a question on accidents of buses catching fire and bus maintenance	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/07/P200901070107.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/07/P200901070107.htm</a>
18.3.2009		Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming raised a question on design of road facilities to ensure road safety	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180251.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180251.htm</a>
25.11.2009		Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo raised a question on safety of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250138.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250138.htm</a>
27.11.2009	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on bus accident in Tseung Kwan O and safety of franchised bus operation	CB(1)430/09-10(06) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1188/09-10 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf</a>
17.3.2010	Council meeting	Hon CHEUNG Hok-ming raised a question on health conditions of drivers and road safety	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170161.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170161.htm</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
28.6.2010	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on working hour and rest time arrangements of franchised bus captains	CB(1)2316/09-10(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)105/10-11 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf</a>
23.2.2011	Council meeting	Hon WONG Sing-chi raised a question on drivers' driving behaviour, health problems and working and rest time arrangements	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102230104.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102230104.htm</a>
27.11.2012	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on the serious traffic accident in Chai Wan on 19 November 2012	CB(1)205/12-13(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-205-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-205-1-e.pdf</a>
		Administration's paper on occupational safety and health of professional drivers	CB(1)223/12-13(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-223-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-223-1-e.pdf</a>
		Minutes of meeting	CB(1)1641/12-13 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20121127.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/tp/minutes/tp20121127.pdf</a>
29.4.2015	Council meeting	Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki raised a question on driving safety of New Lantau Bus	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280671.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280671.htm</a>



Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
--	Panel on Transport	Letter dated 17 February 2016 from Hon TANG Ka-piu on the safety of glass doors of franchised buses	CB(4)624/15-16(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-624-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-624-1-c.pdf</a>
		Administration's response	CB(4)730/15-16(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-730-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-730-1-e.pdf</a>
--		Letter dated 18 March 2016 from Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai on the concern of the impact of employing a large pool of part-time bus drivers by The Kowloon Motor Bus Company. (1933) Limited	CB(4)779/15-16(01) <a href="https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-779-1-c.pdf">https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-779-1-c.pdf</a>
		Administration's response	CB(4)1015/15-16(01) <a href="https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-1015-1-e.pdf">https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc_b4-1015-1-e.pdf</a>
29.6.2016	Council meeting	Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming raised a question on manpower in transport industry	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201606/29/P201606290525.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201606/29/P201606290525.htm</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
20.1.2017 & 24.2.2017	Panel on Transport	Motion proposed under the agenda item of "New franchise for the bus network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited " at the meeting on 20 January 2017 and passed at the meeting on 24 February 2017	CB(4)629/16-17(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-629-3-ec.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-629-3-ec.pdf</a>
		Administration's response to the motion	CB(4)699/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-699-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-699-1-e.pdf</a>
12.7.2017	Council meeting	Hon CHAN Han-pan raised a question on maintenance and repair of franchised buses	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201707/12/P2017071200371.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201707/12/P2017071200371.htm</a>
23.9.2017	--	Administration's press release on fatal traffic accident in Sham Shui Po	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201709/23/P2017092300027.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201709/23/P2017092300027.htm</a>
--	Panel on Transport	Letter dated 25 September 2017 from Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki on issues relating to the serious traffic accident in Sham Shui Po involving a franchised bus on 22 September 2017	CB(4)1624/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-1-c.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Letter dated 26 September 2017 from Hon LAU Kwok-fan on issues relating to the serious traffic accident in Sham Shui Po involving a franchised bus on 22 September 2017	CB(4)1624/16-17(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-1624-2-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-1624-2-c.pdf</a>
		Administration's response	CB(4)1652/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-1652-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-1652-1-e.pdf</a>
25.10.2017	Council meeting	Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan raised a question on bus captains' rest time, working hours and rest facilities	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102500474.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102500474.htm</a>
		Hon POON Siu-ping raised a question on working hours and remuneration of bus captains	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102400712.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102400712.htm</a>
11.2.2018	--	Administration's press release on fatal traffic accident in Tai Po	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/11/P2018021100157.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/11/P2018021100157.htm</a>
15.2.2018	Panel on Transport	Administration's paper on the bus accident in Tai Po on 10 February 2018	CB(4)617/17-18(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-617-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/english/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-617-1-e.pdf</a>

Date of meeting	Panel/ Committee	Minutes/Paper	LC Paper No.
		Administration's supplementary information on issues relating to the serious traffic accident on Tai Po Road happened on 10 February 2018 involving a franchised bus (Chinese version only)	CB(4)922/17-18(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-922-2-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-922-2-c.pdf</a>
--		Administration's response to the letters from Hon LAM Cheuk-ting and Dr Hon CHENG Chung-tai on issues relating to management of bus captains as set out in LC Paper Nos. CB(4)711/17-18(01) and (02)	CB(4)785/17-18(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-785-1-e.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/english/panels/tp/papers/tpc b4-785-1-e.pdf</a>

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
18 July 2018

# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

立法會 CB(4)1407/17-18(04)號文件

檔號：CB4/PL/TP

交通事務委員會  
2018 年 7 月 25 日舉行的會議

## 有關專營巴士營運安全的背景資料簡介

### 目的

本文件就專營巴士的營運安全提供背景資料，並概述立法會議員就此議題提出的主要意見和關注。

### 背景

#### 專營巴士

2. 專營巴士是載客量最高的路面交通工具，服務尚未有鐵路直達的地區，並提供接駁鐵路網絡的服務及跨區服務。截至 2016 年年底，5 個專營巴士營辦商營辦合共 6 個專營權，<sup>1</sup> 旗下車隊共有約 5 900 輛巴士，營運約 580 條巴士線，每日提供約 74 000 個班次，為接近 410 萬乘客人次提供服務。<sup>2</sup> 現時，專營巴士的乘客量佔公共交通乘客量約 33%。

3. 在 2016 年，涉及意外的專營巴士共有 2 269 輛，佔所有涉及意外的機動車輛總數約 9.7%。2007 年至 2016 年按機動車輛類別(包括專營巴士)劃分並涉及意外的機動車輛數字載列於**附錄 I**。

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<sup>1</sup> 5 個專營巴士營辦商包括九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司("九巴")、城巴有限公司("城巴")、新世界第一巴士服務有限公司("新巴")、龍運巴士有限公司("龍運")及新大嶼山巴士(一九七三)有限公司("嶼巴")。城巴營辦兩個專營權，一個涵蓋香港島和過海巴士網絡，另一個則涵蓋機場及北大嶼山巴士網絡。

<sup>2</sup> 專營巴士包括九巴、城巴、新巴、龍運及嶼巴。服務新界西北的港鐵巴士服務亦包含在內。

## 現時提供專營巴士服務的制度

### *確保專營巴士營運安全的法例規定及相關指引*

4. 運輸署根據《公共巴士服務條例》(第 230 章)、《道路交通條例》(第 374 章)及這兩條條例的規例，監察專營巴士服務的營運和巴士的維修保養。這些條例及規例包含各項規定，確保現役專營巴士營運安全、達到安全標準及適合在路上行駛，並確保車長健康狀況適合駕駛巴士。為確保巴士車長有足夠的休息時間，運輸署已頒布《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》("《指引》")，供專營巴士公司為全職及兼職巴士車長編更時參考。該署上次在 2010 年 10 月檢討及修訂《指引》。

### *近期發展*

5. 2018 年 2 月 10 日，大埔發生一宗涉及一輛九巴專營巴士的嚴重交通意外("2 月 10 日的意外")。事後，交通事務委員會("事務委員會")在 2018 年 2 月 15 日舉行特別會議，討論與上述交通意外有關的事宜。事務委員會委員討論多項事宜，包括他們對現時提供專營巴士服務的制度的關注。在該次特別會議上，委員表示 2 月 10 日的意外反映了現時提供專營巴士服務的制度有各種不足之處，當中涉及巴士車長的人手資源、培訓、薪酬、工作情況和駕駛態度，以及專營巴士公司和政府當局均沒有監察巴士服務。

6. 在 2018 年 2 月 23 日，運輸署與巴士公司的工會會面，向其交代《指引》的擬議修訂後，公布檢討《指引》的結果。政府當局表示，專營巴士公司須根據修訂《指引》敲定其編更安排，目標是由 2018 年第二季開始陸續實施修訂《指引》，並在 2019 年第二季全面實施修訂《指引》。修訂《指引》的詳情載於**附錄 II**。

7. 行政長官於 2018 年 3 月 13 日宣布，鑒於 2 月 10 日於大埔公路發生該宗致命交通意外，以及近期發生其他涉及專營巴士服務的嚴重事故，現成立香港專營巴士服務獨立檢討委員會("獨立檢討委員會")<sup>3</sup>，全面檢視專營巴士的營運和監管事宜，以及作出建議，確保本港的專營巴士服務安全可靠。

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<sup>3</sup> 有關獨立檢討委員會的資料，包括其成員及公開聽證會的時間表，可瀏覽以下網站：<https://www.irc-bus.gov.hk/chi/timetable.html>

## 議員的主要意見及關注

8. 事務委員會一直積極跟進與專營巴士營運安全有關的事宜。議員亦有就相關事宜提出立法會質詢。議員的主要意見及關注綜述於下文各段。

### 專營巴士的行車安全

#### *人手資源、聘用兼職巴士車長及行車安全*

9. 於 2 月 10 日的意外發生後，委員在 2018 年 2 月 15 日舉行的特別會議上就有關聘用兼職巴士車長的事宜提出了關注。鑒於專營巴士公司巴士車長嚴重不足，數名委員深切關注暫停兼職巴士車長的職務或會增加全職巴士車長的工作量和壓力，導致巴士車長與乘客之間的衝突增加，最終對道路安全造成負面影響。

10. 一名委員詢問，一些由不同巴士公司營辦的巴士路線重疊，政府當局是否會考慮重組該等路線，以解決巴士車長短缺的問題。就此，委員察悉政府當局一直因應在交通及房屋方面的新發展定期檢討專營巴士服務，並與專營巴士公司商討，在每年的巴士路線計劃下制訂專營巴士服務重組方案。委員亦察悉九巴正與運輸署討論是否可暫時減少一些乘客量較低的巴士路線的班次，以紓減全職巴士車長的工作量。

11. 九巴解釋，安排暫停兼職巴士車長的職務，是為了回應 2 月 10 日的意外發生後公眾對兼職巴士車長表現的關注。就此，一名委員認為上述安排似乎是公關技倆，而不是周詳安排。另一名委員要求九巴停止暫停聘請兼職司機的做法，除非涉及兼職巴士車長的意外率較全職巴士車長高，又或兼職巴士車長的駕駛態度和表現較全職巴士車長遜色。

#### *巴士車長/職業司機的健康檢查安排*

12. 在 2011 年 2 月 23 日及 2017 年 4 月 26 日的立法會會議上，議員提出質詢，詢問政府當局實施了何等措施以保障職業司機的健康。此外，在 2012 年 11 月 27 日及 2017 年 1 月 20 日的事務委員會會議上，部分委員關注一些交通意外是因巴士車長身體不適及疲乏不堪所致。因此，他們認為所有專營巴士營辦商應檢討巴士車長的健康檢查規定，以及全職和兼職巴士車長的工作時間和休息時間。有委員亦建議政府當局考慮資助職業司機接受體格檢驗。

13. 政府當局表示，專營巴士營辦商已對巴士車長的年齡及身體狀況訂定明確規定。在年齡規定方面，巴士車長的退休年齡為 60 歲或 65 歲。部分營辦商會視乎人手需要，以合約形式彈性延長巴士車長的聘用期，讓車長可工作至 66 歲或 67 歲的年齡上限。專營巴士營辦商亦已規定巴士車長在入職前須接受健康檢查，並為不同年齡的在職巴士車長制訂每年按其健康狀況接受健康檢查的具體安排。

### *巴士車長的培訓及駕駛態度*

14. 在 2018 年 2 月 15 日舉行的事務委員會會議上，委員就監察專營巴士公司提供駕駛巴士培訓的事宜，以及有關巴士車長駕駛態度和交通違例判罪紀錄的事宜提出關注。委員從政府當局的文件<sup>4</sup>得悉，專營巴士公司為新聘巴士車長提供各類訓練，包括駕駛技術、事故處理，並為現職巴士車長提供定期的駕駛進修訓練課程。如發現巴士車長的駕駛態度及行為有需要改善，專營巴士公司會為巴士車長提供駕駛改進課程或輔助駕駛訓練，以增強他們的駕駛技術、提升他們的安全意識及培養他們有良好的駕駛行為。如在職巴士車長在執行駕駛職務時發生交通意外或違反交通法例，巴士公司會視乎事故的性質及嚴重性，對巴士車長採取適當的紀律行動，甚或解僱他們。

15. 一名委員要求政府當局考慮強制規定巴士車長須取得安全卡/證，以及參加由政府當局定期舉辦的培訓工作坊。另一名委員詢問兼職巴士車長在駕駛巴士前，是否須在指定期間累積若干駕駛巴士時數；巴士車長如未能符合駕駛時數要求，是否須參加再培訓課程。九巴表示，不論全職或兼職，巴士車長如未有行駛某路線一個月或更長時間，將須再次練習行駛該路線。此外，在指派某巴士車長行駛某路線時，會考慮該巴士車長是否有行駛該路線的經驗。

### 專營巴士的結構安全

#### *專營巴士的設計和構造*

16. 專營巴士的設計和構造是事務委員會其中一項主要關注的事項，因為在數宗巴士意外中，肇事巴士的車頂飛脫，顯示巴士車身有需要更為堅固，為乘客提供更大的保障。政府

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<sup>4</sup> 立法會 CB(4)617/17-18(01)號文件



當局向委員保證，《道路交通(車輛構造及保養)規例》(第 374A 章)已就專營巴士的設計和構造作出規定。在本港行駛的所有雙層巴士均從歐洲進口，能符合歐洲的規定。主要的巴士製造商亦已證實，本港專營巴士的車身結構與供應給英國、美國及新加坡等其他國家的巴士的車身結構相同。

17. 由於接連發生專營巴士與其他車輛碰撞，導致擋風玻璃碎裂及乘客從巴士上層車廂被拋出車外的事故，因此事務委員會曾討論有何措施可防止類似事故再次發生，包括為巴士的擋風玻璃和乘客車窗選用更好的物料。政府當局在 2007 年 3 月匯報，當局與專營巴士公司已同意在所有現有巴士上層的強化擋風玻璃貼上一層透明保護膜，以便在發生意外時可有效防止碎裂的玻璃散落，或把玻璃換成夾層玻璃。

#### *使用科技加強巴士安全*

18. 在 2018 年 2 月 15 日舉行的事務委員會會議上，一名委員關注有一些報道指，2 月 10 日的意外發生時，肇事巴士的行車速度超過每小時 70 公里的法定車速限制。該名委員詢問肇事巴士的車速限制器是否發生故障，以及政府當局是否會考慮要求所有巴士公司安裝裝置，以致在車輛行駛下坡路段時可有效地控制車速。一名委員認為，在所有巴士的車速限制器更換前，政府當局應考慮降低迂迴曲折或狹窄路段的車速限制。

19. 九巴表示，九巴每輛巴士都裝有車速限制器，可防止巴士以超過每小時 70 公里的車速行駛。不過，當巴士下坡時，車速可能因重力而超過上述限制。在 2 月 10 日的意外發生後，九巴即時與多個車速限制器供應商探討有何措施可解決上述問題。

20. 數名委員促請政府當局利用科技加強巴士安全及防止意外發生。一名委員指出，曾有監察司機的系統可偵測司機精神是否集中甚或情緒狀況如何。該名委員亦建議公開裝設於巴士的行車紀錄儀收集所得的資料，以協助市民監察交通黑點。

21. 一名委員詢問九巴為何不採用電子車身穩定系統或類似科技，以改善巴士的穩定性及防止翻車。另一名委員建議政府當局及公共交通營辦商研究採用車道偏移警告系統及防撞安全系統是否可行，以加強安全。

22. 九巴歡迎委員提出任何有關透過採用新科技改善巴士安全的建議，並同意研究該等建議是否可行。政府當局支持採用任何科技改善巴士安全。

### *在專營巴士裝設及佩戴安全帶*

23. 在 2018 年 2 月 15 日舉行的特別會議上，一名委員建議所有專營巴士營辦商考慮分階段在巴士所有座位加裝安全帶，以盡量減少發生巴士意外時的傷亡人數。不過，另一名委員引述部分交通專家的意見，該等專家認為安全帶或不能盡量減少該類嚴重巴士意外的傷亡人數。委員察悉，對於在專營巴士所有座位加裝安全帶的建議，政府當局會持開放態度，而在研究此事時，會考慮多項因素，包括技術上是否可行及乘客是否接受。

### *專營巴士車門玻璃的安全事宜*

24. 事務委員會一名委員關注到在 2016 年 2 月發生兩宗涉及專營巴士車門玻璃碎裂的事故。政府當局就此解釋，《指明使用安全玻璃公告》(第 374H 章)訂明，包括巴士在內的汽車所使用的玻璃須符合歐洲經濟委員會規例(ECE 43)的相關要求。運輸署及專營巴士公司已因應上述事故實施進一步保障乘客安全的措施，例如運輸署成立了一個有專營巴士營辦商及巴士製造商代表參與的工作小組，以檢視巴士車門的安全事宜；加強巴士車長的培訓，以及提醒乘客在乘搭巴士時緊握扶手。

### 其他事宜

25. 在 2 月 10 日的意外發生後，委員察悉政府當局一直檢討大埔公路的道路設計及交通管理措施。此外，政府當局亦一直與專營巴士公司及工會討論如何改善巴士車長的工作情況及薪酬。

### **最新發展**

26. 政府當局將於 2018 年 7 月 25 日舉行的事務委員會會議上，向事務委員會匯報為提升專營巴士營運安全而建議採用的新安全設備或新科技的最新進展。

## 相關文件

27. 相關文件一覽表載於**附錄 III**。

立法會秘書處  
議會事務部 4

2018 年 7 月 18 日

## 2007 年至 2016 年按機動車輛類別劃分並涉及意外的機動車輛數字

機動車輛類別	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
專營巴士	2 201	2 047	1 916	1 983	2 143	2 217	2 344	2 350	2 279	2 269
非專營巴士	448	416	406	459	486	476	503	500	483	453
電單車	2 927	2 613	2 556	2 428	2 328	2 245	2 222	2 281	2 328	2 355
私家車	6 450	5 927	6 085	6 255	6 591	6 859	7 093	7 224	7 757	8 207
公共小巴	1 173	1 080	1 110	1 146	1 142	1 067	1 128	1 085	1 105	1 080
輕型貨車	2 952	2 806	2 527	2 726	2 689	2 637	2 706	2 621	2 708	2 947
中型及重型貨車	1 081	1 045	907	1 031	1 141	1 105	1 085	1 125	1 063	1 167
的士	4 004	3 926	3 801	4 053	4 259	4 240	4 395	4 211	4 332	4 493
其他 *	281	272	300	326	299	329	357	332	306	320
<b>所有機動車輛</b>	<b>21 517</b>	<b>20 132</b>	<b>19 608</b>	<b>20 407</b>	<b>21 078</b>	<b>21 175</b>	<b>21 833</b>	<b>21 729</b>	<b>22 361</b>	<b>23 291</b>

資料來源：運輸署網站 ([http://www.td.gov.hk/mini\\_site/atd/2017/tc/section7\\_2.html](http://www.td.gov.hk/mini_site/atd/2017/tc/section7_2.html))

\* 包括電車、私家小巴、私家巴士等機動車輛，但不包括單車、手推車及車輛類別不詳的車輛。

《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》

(2018 年修訂本)

- 指引(1)** (a) 一個最長的更次時間 <sup>1</sup> 不應超逾 12 小時；而當中的駕駛時間 <sup>2</sup> 不應超逾 10 小時。
- (b) 因應上下午繁忙時間的服務需要而安排的特別更次時間可超逾 12 小時，惟最長的更次時間仍不應超逾 14 小時，而當中的駕駛時間則不應超逾 10 小時。在該特別更次內應有一段不少於連續 3 小時的休息時間。
- 指引(2)** — 兩個相連更次之間的休班時間不應少於 10 小時。另外，除特別更次外，三個相連更次內的總休班時間不應少於 22 小時。
- 指引(3)** — 車長駕駛 6 小時<sup>2</sup> 後最少應有 40 分鐘休息時間<sup>3</sup>；而在該 6 小時內應有合共不少於 20 分鐘的小休<sup>4</sup>，其中不少於 12 分鐘的小休應安排在首 4 小時內提供。車長在總站準備開出下一班巴士和監察乘客上車的時間，不應視為休息/小休時間。
- 指引(4)** — 車長在一個更次時間達 8 小時或以上，便應獲提供不少於 1 小時的用膳時間。

資料來源：運輸署於 2018 年 2 月 23 日發出的新聞公報的附件

([http://www.td.gov.hk/tc/publications\\_and\\_press\\_releases/press\\_releases/transport\\_department/index\\_id\\_2917.html](http://www.td.gov.hk/tc/publications_and_press_releases/press_releases/transport_department/index_id_2917.html))

<sup>1</sup> 更次時間是指每一個更次由開始至完結的總時數，當中包括所有休息時間。

<sup>2</sup> 駕駛時間是指所有駕車及小休時間，但不包括每次 40 分鐘或以上的休息時間。

<sup>3</sup> 用膳時間亦視為休息時間。

<sup>4</sup> 小休是指少於 40 分鐘的休息時間。

## 專營巴士的營運安全

## 相關文件一覽表

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
24.10.2006	交通 事務委員會	政府當局就專營巴士營運的安全提供的文件	CB(1)110/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1024cb1-110-3-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)294/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp061024.pdf</a>
28.2.2007	立法會會議	李鳳英議員就專營巴士車窗玻璃碎裂事故提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280143.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200702/28/P200702280143.htm</a>
2.3.2007	交通 事務委員會	政府當局就加強專營巴士營運安全措施的發展提供的文件	CB(1)783/06-07(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0126cb1-783-1-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)1147/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070302.pdf</a>
23.3.2007		政府當局就加強專營巴士營運安全措施的發展提供的文件	CB(1)1149/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0323cb1-1149-3-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)1407/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070323.pdf</a>

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
9.7.2007	交通 事務委員會	政府當局就加強專營巴士營運安全措施的進展提供的文件	CB(1)2023/06-07(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0709cb1-2023-3-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)2408/06-07 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp070709.pdf</a>
16.1.2008	立法會會議	鄭經翰議員就專營巴士結構安全提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160164.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/16/P200801160164.htm</a>
28.1.2008	交通 事務委員會	政府當局就專營巴士的營運安全提供的文件	CB(1)639/07-08(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-c.pdf</a>
		立法會秘書處就選定海外地方是否准許在快速公路行駛的巴士乘客站立擬備的文件	IN12/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/sec/library/0708in12-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/sec/library/0708in12-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)838/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp080128.pdf</a>
22.2.2008		政府當局就專營巴士的營運安全提供的文件	CB(1)639/07-08(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0128cb1-639-3-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)1123/07-08 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp080222.pdf</a>

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
7.1.2009	立法會會議	劉健儀議員就巴士起火意外與安全保養提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/07/P200901070104.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/07/P200901070104.htm</a>
18.3.2009		張學明議員就道路設施的設計確保道路安全提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180246.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200903/18/P200903180246.htm</a>
25.11.2009		鄭家富議員就專營巴士安全問題提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250140.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200911/25/P200911250140.htm</a>
27.11.2009	交通事務委員會	政府當局就將軍澳巴士意外及專營巴士的營運安全提供的文件	CB(1)430/09-10(06) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-430-6-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)1188/09-10 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20091127.pdf</a>
17.3.2010	立法會會議	張學明議員就司機的健康狀況及道路安全提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170145.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201003/17/P201003170145.htm</a>
28.6.2010	交通事務委員會	政府當局就專營巴士車長的工作及休息時間安排提供的文件	CB(1)2316/09-10(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp0628cb1-2316-3-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)105/10-11 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20100628.pdf</a>



會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
23.2.2011	立法會會議	黃成智議員就駕駛者的駕駛行為、健康事宜及作息安排提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102220209.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201102/23/P201102220209.htm</a>
27.11.2012	交通事務委員會	政府當局就 2012 年 11 月 19 日柴灣嚴重交通意外提供的文件	CB(1)205/12-13(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-205-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-205-1-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局就職業司機的職業安全及健康狀況提供的文件	CB(1)223/12-13(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-223-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp1127cb1-223-1-c.pdf</a>
		會議紀要	CB(1)1641/12-13 <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20121127.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/tp/minutes/tp20121127.pdf</a>
29.4.2015	立法會會議	郭家麒議員就新大嶼山巴士行車安全提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280664.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504280664.htm</a>
--	交通事務委員會	鄧家彪議員於 2016 年 2 月 17 日就專營巴士玻璃門安全事宜發出的函件	CB(4)624/15-16(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-624-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-624-1-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局提供的回應	CB(4)730/15-16(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-730-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-730-1-c.pdf</a>

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
--	交通 事務委員會	范國威議員因九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司聘用大量兼職巴士車長所造成的影響令人關注而於2016年3月18日發出的函件	CB(4)779/15-16(01) <a href="https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-779-1-c.pdf">https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-779-1-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局提供的回應	CB(4)1015/15-16(01) <a href="https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1015-1-c.pdf">https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1015-1-c.pdf</a>
29.6.2016	立法會會議	易志明議員就運輸業人力情況提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201606/29/P201606290517.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201606/29/P201606290517.htm</a>
20.1.2017 及 24.2.2017	交通 事務委員會	在2017年1月20日會議上提出，並在2017年2月24日會議上通過有關"九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司巴士網絡的新專營權"的議案	CB(4)629/16-17(03) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-629-3-ec.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-629-3-ec.pdf</a>
		政府當局就議案提供的回應	CB(4)699/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-699-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20170224cb4-699-1-c.pdf</a>
12.7.2017	立法會會議	陳恒鑌議員就專營巴士保養及維修提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201707/12/P2017071200366.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201707/12/P2017071200366.htm</a>
23.9.2017	--	有關深水埗致命交通意外的新聞公報	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201709/23/P2017092300024.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201709/23/P2017092300024.htm</a>

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
--	交通 事務委員會	郭家麒議員於2017年9月25日就有關2017年9月22日在深水埗發生涉及專營巴士的嚴重交通意外的事宜發出的函件	CB(4)1624/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-1-c.pdf</a>
		劉國勳議員於2017年9月26日就有關2017年9月22日在深水埗發生涉及專營巴士的嚴重交通意外的事宜發出的函件	CB(4)1624/16-17(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-2-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1624-2-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局提供的回應	CB(4)1652/16-17(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1652-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-1652-1-c.pdf</a>
25.10.2017	立法會會議	蔣麗芸議員就巴士車長作息安排及休息設施提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102500471.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102500471.htm</a>
		潘兆平議員就巴士車長工作時數及待遇提出的質詢	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102400694.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201710/25/P2017102400694.htm</a>
11.2.2018	--	有關大埔致命交通意外的新聞公報	<a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/11/P2018021100156.htm">http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/11/P2018021100156.htm</a>

會議日期	事務委員會/ 委員會	會議紀要/文件	立法會文件編號
15.2.2018	交通 事務委員會	政府當局就 2018 年 2 月 10 日大埔巴士意外提供的文件	CB(4)617/17-18(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-617-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-617-1-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局就有關於 2018 年 2 月 10 日在大埔公路發生涉及一輛專營巴士的嚴重交通意外的事宜提交的補充資料(只備中文本)	CB(4)922/17-18(02) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-922-2-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20180215cb4-922-2-c.pdf</a>
		政府當局對林卓廷議員及鄭松泰議員就有關管理巴士車長的事宜發出的函件(立法會 CB(4)711/17-18(01) 及 (02) 號文件)所作的回應	CB(4)785/17-18(01) <a href="http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-785-1-c.pdf">http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tpcb4-785-1-c.pdf</a>

立法會秘書處  
議會事務部 4  
2018 年 7 月 18 日

## **Translation of news article of the Oriental Daily on 31 August 2017**

*Original article in Chinese:*

[hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20170831/bkn-20170831003517754-0831\\_00822\\_001.html](http://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20170831/bkn-20170831003517754-0831_00822_001.html)

*Translation:*

### **Ferocious man hurled obscenities and physically assaulted female KMB bus captain after mistaking her for skipping a bus stop**

An assault case causing injury took place in Shek Kip Mei. The incident happened at a bus stop opposite to a Chinese restaurant at Nam Cheong Street near Woh Chai Street. At some time past 10 yesterday night, when a Route 86C KMB bus setting off from Mei Foo to Lee On in Ma On Shan was passing by the location mentioned above and preparing to get close to the bus stop, the female bus captain, surnamed Sin (age 55), noted that a private car was parked near the rear end of the bus stop and therefore tried to get pass the private car in order to approach the bus stop. However, a couple misunderstood this act and thought the bus was going to skip the stop and a man surnamed Chan (age 54) started running after the bus while hurling obscenities at it and afterwards began hitting the doors of the bus with great force.

After the bus stopped to open the doors, the couple immediately boarded the vehicle and Chan rushed to the driver's cabin angrily and punched the female captain. The female captain sustained injuries on her face. After realising he had hurt someone, Chan tried to get off the bus to escape, but many passengers and passers-by saw what happened and they worked together to stop him and called the police while the man resisted. The police arrived soon after receiving the report and



*The bus stop where the incident took place (photography by LEUNG Kwok-hung)*

arrested the man who was suspected to have injured others after subduing him. During the act, a passenger surnamed Wong (age 19) suffered arm and neck injuries and was sent to the hospital along with the female bus captain using an ambulance to receive treatment. And the man surnamed Chan was arrested for causing actual injuries and ordinary assault, and was escorted by the police to the hospital for treatment after he reported that he too had been injured.

*This English translation is for reference only. In the event of any discrepancy between the Chinese original and this English translation, the Chinese original shall prevail.*

本英文譯本僅供參考。如英文譯本與中文原文有任何差異，以中文原文為準。

KMB issued a press statement this morning, saying that they viewed the incident yesterday as well as the serious of physical assaults to bus captains in recent months seriously and that KMB strongly reprimanded the act of assaulting front-line bus captains and would provide all needed assistance to the police in their investigations, as well as provide suitable legal assistance to the colleagues who were assaulted so that justice could be done. KMB would also consider making civil claims against those assaulting bus captains. KMB encouraged all frontline bus captains to immediately report the case to the police when they were assaulted. KMB called for all passengers to obey the law and avoid affecting the safety of bus captains and passengers.




*The injured female bus captain and passer-by were sent to the hospital for treatment (photography by Shum Hau-cheng)*

# Report on Study of Road Traffic Congestion in Hong Kong



Transport Advisory Committee  
December 2014





Lead Designer of "The Vision": Wang Yali, Class of 2014 Master of Urban Design, The University of Hong Kong

Calligraphy: Hui Suet Ming; Photograph: KW Ng; Advisor: Becky PY Loo



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# **Report on Study of Road Traffic Congestion in Hong Kong**

## **Executive Summary**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Hong Kong takes pride in its efficiency. We aspire to have a highly efficient road network to align with the city pace. Nonetheless, long queues of slow moving traffic have increasingly become a more common scene in our city.

2. Roads serve the important function of carrying people and goods around the city, which are like blood vessels circulating nutrients to feed our body. If we do nothing to contain congestion, it will continue to erode the environment, sustainability, quality of life and competitiveness of our city. Immediate action is warranted.

### **THE STUDY**

#### **I. Background**

3. In March 2014, the Transport Advisory Committee (“TAC”) accepted the invitation of the Secretary for Transport and Housing to conduct a study to –

- (a) identify various factors contributing to overall road traffic congestion in Hong Kong;
- (b) suggest short and medium-term measures at territorial level to contain road traffic congestion which are practicable and can be implemented within a reasonable period of time; and
- (c) flag up long-term measures at territorial level for further study by the Government.

The study report will be sent to the Secretary for Transport and Housing for consideration in December 2014.

4. A Working Group on Road Traffic Congestion (“Working Group”) was subsequently set up in April 2014 under the TAC to take forward the task. This is the Working Group’s report. It was fully endorsed by the TAC and is to be sent by the TAC to the Secretary for Transport and Housing for consideration.

## **II. Findings**

### ***Causes of road traffic congestion***

5. The Working Group reckons that, broadly speaking, there are five categories of recurrent causes<sup>1</sup> of road traffic congestion –

- (a) limited scope for more road transport infrastructure;
- (b) excessive number of vehicles;
- (c) competing use of road space;
- (d) management and enforcement issues; and
- (e) road works.

#### ***(a) Limited scope for more road transport infrastructure***

6. The physical and spatial constraints imposed by intensifying urban development in Hong Kong, as well as the diversified views from the public on visual impact considerations, environment concerns, and impact on existing traffic resulted from construction of new roads and highways, etc. render it rather difficult to build new roads. The growth rate of total length of public roads in Hong Kong is expected to slow down to around 0.4% p.a. up to 2020. Such growth rate clearly cannot keep up with the current growth of vehicle fleet (about 3.4% p.a.). Indeed, building more road transport infrastructure alone cannot resolve traffic congestion — it may actually induce more demand for vehicle usage and fuel vehicular growth.

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<sup>1</sup> There are non-recurrent causes which do not occur on a regular basis in terms of location and timing. They include major planned events which occupy road space and/or generate additional traffic (e.g. public processions, major festive and sports events such as marathon), unplanned incidents (e.g. traffic accidents, vehicle breakdowns, burst of water mains) and inclement weather. Non-recurrent causes are not the focus of this Study.

*(b) Excessive number of vehicles*

7. The number of total licensed vehicles grew by about 30% from about 524 000 in 2003 to about 681 000 in 2013, with an annual growth rate of 3.4% in recent years. The larger the vehicle fleet size, the slower the car journey speed in the urban areas.

8. According to the findings of public opinion survey (“POS”) commissioned by the Working Group (detailed findings at **Annex 1C**), the general public and drivers consider that too many vehicles on the road is one of the major causes of road traffic congestion.

*(c) Competing use of road space*

9. Apart from the excessive number of vehicles running on roads, obstruction of traffic in local areas is commonly caused by various activities competing for use of road space. Examples are –

- (a) loading/ unloading activities of goods vehicles;
- (b) picking up/ setting down activities of buses, public light buses, coaches, taxis and private cars (“PCs”); and
- (c) vehicles circulating on roads looking for on-street parking spaces.

10. The Working Group notes that there is a genuine need for the above activities, especially in fully developed areas where the provision of off-street loading/ unloading and picking up/ setting down facilities is limited. However, these activities would cause obstruction to local traffic, resulting in traffic queues upstream and affecting the operation of critical road junctions and busy roads. For example, tourist coach activities (such as prolonged waiting and illegal parking) along Chatham Road South and Salisbury Road in Tsim Sha Tsui are rampant during peak tourist visiting hours. These activities affect the smooth flow of the general traffic.

*(d) Management and enforcement issues*

11. The Working Group notes that while the Government has implemented a host of traffic management measures to enhance the efficiency of available road space (as elaborated in **Chapter 3**), the effectiveness of such measures hinges on

the cooperation of, and compliance by, road users as well as complementary effective enforcement.

12. Although there was an increase of about 98% in the number of fixed penalty tickets issued for congestion-related offences over the past 10 years, there is a general perception in the community that enforcement against congestion related offences is not stringent enough. The Working Group notes that with limited manpower resources and competing priorities, it may be difficult for the Hong Kong Police Force (“the Police”) to accord relatively high priority on enforcement against congestion related offences.

13. More importantly, the level of fixed penalty against congestion-related offences, which has not been raised since 1994, has lost its deterrent effect over time due to inflation and increase in income level. It should be noted that from 1994 to 2013, the Composite Consumer Price Index (“CCPI”) increased by 40%.

*(e) Road works*

14. The Working Group notes that road works are considered by the public and drivers as another major cause of road traffic congestion. The Working Group recognises that road works are essential to the proper maintenance of roads, public utilities and infrastructure projects. As such, better co-ordination among different road works in the vicinity is the key to minimise disruption caused to road users. In this regard, the Working Group notes that the Government has put in place an excavation permit system to manage road works. Details of the system are elaborated in **Annex 3**.

***Consequences of road traffic congestion***

15. Increased travel time is the most direct consequence of road traffic congestion. But it is not the only cost. Congestion incurs both tangible and intangible costs to individual road users as well as our society. For example, apart from time wasted when people are caught in congestion, the low mobility adversely affects the business sectors. When goods or services cannot be delivered on time, the business sectors need to incur additional inventory costs and logistics costs.

16. Long traffic queue in congestion worsens roadside air quality, which not only exacerbates the threat to public health, but also affects the quality of life and the image of Hong Kong as a world-class metropolis. This will undermine Hong Kong's attractiveness for overseas companies to establish regional headquarters/ branch offices in Hong Kong. The passage of emergency vehicles interfered by slow-moving traffic also results in delays in responding to incidents.

17. Details of the causes of road traffic congestion and its consequences are set out in **Chapter 2**.

### *Government's on-going efforts*

18. The Working Group notes that the Government has been endeavouring to maintain the mobility of Hong Kong by adopting a three-pronged transport policy, which comprises –

- (a) improving transport infrastructure;
- (b) expanding and improving public transport ("PT") system; and
- (c) managing road use.

19. In particular, the Working Group notes that under the prong of improving transport infrastructure, the Government has put in place measures to promote non-mechanised means to commute, e.g. through building hillside escalators and improving pedestrian facilities to enhance walkability and connectivity.

20. Details of the host of on-going measures implemented by the Government under the above policy are set out in **Chapter 3**. The Working Group recognises the Government's efforts in this regard and notes that the Government would continue to pursue these on-going measures, review their effectiveness and explore further improvements. Nonetheless, due to physical, environmental and social constraints, the effectiveness of the on-going measures is constrained. The focus of the Study is therefore to identify additional measures which can work in conjunction with these on-going measures.

### **III. Recommendations**

#### ***Urgency and benefits of tackling road traffic congestion***

21. The Working Group sees an urgent need to tackle road traffic congestion. Hong Kong's vehicle fleet size has been growing at an alarming rate. Over the past ten years, the number of vehicles increased by 30% from 524 000 in 2003 to 681 000 in 2013. During the same period, the average car journey speed in urban areas dropped by about 11% from 25.6 km/h in 2003 to 22.7 km/h in 2013.

22. In particular, the car journey speeds on some major traffic corridors, such as Des Voeux Road West, during weekday morning peak hours are recorded to be around or even lower than 10km/h, which are not much faster than the average walking speed of an adult at 4 to 5 km/h.

23. Apart from the slow-moving traffic, congestion also worsens our quality of living. It has become increasingly difficult for road users to plan their itineraries. From the environment point of view, more vehicles on the road mean more road-side emission and more noise pollution, causing health concerns. Motor vehicles are the main source of air pollutants at street level and the second largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Hong Kong. More vehicles on the road means more emission of air pollutants such as respirable suspended particulates and nitrogen dioxide ("NO<sub>2</sub>"). The Working Group notes that the levels of respirable suspended particulates and NO<sub>2</sub> at the roadside in Hong Kong have remained high over the years. In particular, NO<sub>2</sub> levels at roadside increased by 9% from 2009 to 2013, resulting in an increase in the number of days with the roadside air pollution index reaching the "very high" level (i.e. index exceeding 100) in recent years.

24. The Working Group's sense of urgency to tackle traffic congestion is shared by many road users. According to the POS result, about 70% of both the public and drivers agree that there was a need to control the growth of PCs.

25. The benefits of an improved traffic condition may be difficult to accurately quantify, but can easily be felt by all road users. It would mean less travel time for both passengers and motorists and greater mobility. With less time spent on the road, every road user, regardless of their age, social status and



occupation, would have greater flexibility to plan their itineraries and pursue their interests. Tackling congestion would therefore help to facilitate work-life balance.

26. To give some rough estimates on the benefits of improved traffic condition: if we do nothing now, with an assumption that the current PC growth rate of about 4.5% p.a. is to continue, it is estimated that the average journey speed in urban areas would be decreased by about 15% in 10 years' time, with the amount of greenhouse gases generated increased by more than 20%. If our city is able to slow down the PC growth rate from about 4.5% p.a. to, say 1.5% p.a., both the estimated reduction in average journey speed in urban areas and the estimated increase in greenhouse gases caused by vehicle growth can be lessened by about one-half. With less congestion and fewer cars on the road, our environment could be improved. For the logistics industry, there will be savings in operating costs (such as fuel costs), as less time is required to deliver goods and services. Besides, managing car growth could, to a certain extent, address the issue of inadequate parking space.

27. The Working Group considers that Hong Kong cannot afford to sit still and let congestion erode the sustainability and competitiveness of our city. It is necessary to take immediate actions to contain road traffic congestion.

### ***Measures recommended***

28. The recommendations given by the Working Group are intended to be additional measures which can work in conjunction with the Government's on-going measures to tackle congestion. In putting forward the recommendations, the Working Group has taken into account the following factors –

- (a) whether the proposed measures are proven or anticipated to be effective in containing congestion at a territorial level;
- (b) whether the proposed measures are acceptable to the public at large; and
- (c) how the proposed measures would affect the relevant stakeholders.

## Short and medium-term measures

### *A. Managing the PC fleet size*

#### *(a) Raise PC's First Registration Tax and Annual Licence Fee*

29. The Working Group reckons that there is a need to manage the growth of the vehicle fleet to ease congestion, and considers that a more targeted approach in curbing growth of PCs should be adopted on the following grounds –

- (a) PCs have been a major contributor to the overall vehicle growth. From 2003 to 2013, the total number of PCs increased by 40% whilst the growth of other types of vehicles was relatively modest. As of September 2014, the growth rate of the PC fleet stood at an alarming 4.6% p.a.;
- (b) PC is a much less efficient passenger carrier. PCs account for about 40% to 70% of the total traffic flow on most of the major roads<sup>2</sup>, but only carry 16% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings. On the other hand, PT carriers such as buses and light buses carry about 71% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings and only take up about 5% to 25% of the total traffic flow on these major roads; and
- (c) PCs are mainly for private use and are not indispensable in most circumstances, given Hong Kong's generally affordable and well-developed PT system. By contrast, goods vehicles and PT play a more important role in moving goods and people in our community.

The POS results also revealed that over 60% of the general public and over 70% of drivers consider that PCs should not be given priority to use the roads.

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<sup>2</sup> The figures are based on data from 20 major roads during morning peak hours in 2013.

30. Based on past experiences, increases in First Registration Tax<sup>3</sup> (“FRT”) and Annual Licence Fee<sup>4</sup> (“ALF”) are direct and effective means to curb PC growth. In 2011 the FRT was increased by about 15%. However, as there was a concurrent increase in concession for newly registered Environment-friendly Petrol Private Cars (“EFPPCs”) from 30% (with a cap at \$50,000 per car) to 45% (with a cap at \$75,000 per car), the effect in containing PC growth was greatly eroded. The current growth rate of PC still stands at a very high level of about 4.5% p.a.

31. Facing a much larger PC fleet size as compared to 2011, and in order to achieve a significant reduction of the growth of PCs and for a more lasting impact, the Working Group considers that there may be a need to impose an FRT increase higher than that of 2011. Such increase should be equally applicable to EFPPCs. Apart from FRT, the Working Group notes that ALF has not been adjusted for over 20 years and recommends the Government to consider its increase by taking into consideration at least the inflation during the period.

*(b) Tighten up standards for EFPPCs*

32. EFPPCs refer to petrol PCs with lower emissions and higher fuel efficiency. Currently, FRT concession is granted to encourage vehicle buyers to purchase EFPPCs as compared to ordinary petrol PCs, should they find car purchase necessary. The Working Group considers that from a congestion control point of view, an EFPPC is no different from an ordinary PC in that an EFPPC also occupies road space. Further, EFPPCs, which are not with zero emission, still contribute to roadside air pollution. The Working Group thus recommends the Government to continue to tighten up the qualifying standard for EFPPCs and avoid raising the FRT concession further. There may even be a

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<sup>3</sup> FRT is a tax payable upon the first registration of a motor vehicle, including new and imported second-hand ones. An increase in FRT will discourage the acquisition of PCs. Currently, the FRT for a PC ranges from 40% to 115%, and it is linked to and varies with the incremental taxable value of a PC in four bands.

<sup>4</sup> ALF is a tax-loaded fee payable on an annual basis for licensing a motor vehicle in order that it could be driven on roads in Hong Kong. An increase in ALF will add cost to owning an existing one. Currently, ALF for a PC ranges from \$3,815 to \$11,215 depending on the engine capacity. A “fuel levy” of \$1,460 is also added to ALF for diesel PCs.

case to abolish the EFPPC scheme and make FRT concession only available to electric vehicles<sup>5</sup>, which have zero emissions.

*(c) Raise “fuel levy” for diesel PCs*

33. In 1982, the fuel tax on petrol was increased by \$0.7 per litre, but there was no corresponding increase of fuel tax on diesel after due consideration of the operation costs of PT. Noting that diesel PCs would inadvertently be benefitted from such a fuel tax arrangement, \$1,000 was added to the ALF for diesel PCs in the form of a “fuel levy” to “neturalise” the fuel tax gain. The amount of “fuel levy” was subsequently adjusted in tandem with the increases in ALF from 1987 to 1991. Since 2008, the fuel tax for Euro V diesel has been reduced to zero to facilitate the commercial vehicle trade and to encourage them to use cleaner fuel.

34. Given that diesel is tax free while the fuel tax for petrol is currently set at \$6.06 per litre, a PC owner could achieve cost savings in fuel if he/ she opts to use a diesel PC instead of a petrol one. The Working Group is mindful that any proposed increase in ALF will be offset by recurrent fuel savings if motorists opt to use diesel PCs, thus diluting, if not nullifying, the desired effect to manage PC growth. As such, the Working Group recommends that the diesel “fuel levy” should be revised upwards to offset the possible fuel savings.

***B. Efficient use of limited road space***

35. Apart from reducing demand on the limited road space by curbing vehicle growth, the Working Group considers it equally important to maximise the efficiency of available road space. The following two measures are proposed for this purpose.

*(d) Start planning for a congestion charging pilot scheme*

36. A congestion charging (or Electronic Road Pricing (“ERP”)) scheme is a traffic management tool aiming at reducing congestion at a designated area by adopting the “user pays principle”, i.e. charging motorists for entering the designated area at busy times of the day and encouraging travellers to switch to

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<sup>5</sup> Electric vehicles are currently exempted from paying FRT until 31 March 2017.

PT or change their routes. The Working Group considers it a very effective way to tackle congestion in a particularly congested area.

37. The Government has earlier indicated that with the targeted commissioning of the Central - Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link (“CWB”), motorists whose destination is not Central District will be provided with an alternative route to bypass charged areas. The Government would then be in a better position to consider the possibility of ERP application in Central District. Given the importance of Central District as our central business district and its road traffic situation, the Working Group agrees that with the commissioning of the CWB, the Central District should be a suitable location for an ERP pilot scheme.

38. The Working Group notes that the concept of ERP remains a novel one for many road users in Hong Kong and there is not yet a consensus over its use. The Government should therefore engage the public as soon as possible for the planning of an ERP scheme, recognising that it would take longer time to the conduct detailed planning for the implementation of the scheme.

*(e) Increase meter parking charges*

39. Currently, there are some 18 200 on-street metered parking spaces in Hong Kong; these are intended for short-term parking only. The maximum fee for metered parking is \$2 per 15 minutes (equivalent to \$8 per hour)<sup>6</sup>. Because of the convenience of meter parking and its low level of charge compared to nearby commercial car parks, it is common for vehicles circulating/ double parking on roads in busy areas to look or wait for on-street parking. Such activities cause obstructions to normal traffic flow.

40. The Working Group notes that the metered parking fee has remained the same for the past 20 years while the CCPI has increased by about 40% during the same period. The Working Group thus considers that there is a case to raise on-street metered parking charges, in order to discourage motorists from

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<sup>6</sup> While the statutory ceiling of parking fees is \$2 per 15 minutes, the fees for parking meters are determined having regard to a host of factors including the parking demand, the location and public sentiments. For example, for parking spaces in more remote locations or with lower utilisation, a lower fee (such as \$2 per 30 minutes) will be charged.

circulating/ double parking on roads waiting for metered parking spaces. This will have the added benefit of discouraging long-term parking.

### ***C. Stringent penalty and enforcement of traffic offences***

41. While the Working Group appreciates that Police manpower has been deployed for other more pressing commitments in response to the changing needs of the community (such as crowd control and management of the increasing public meetings and public possessions), it is important that congestion-related offences are effectively enforced. The Working Group recommends adopting the following four measures to step up enforcement –

- (a) enhance publicity and education efforts to promote compliance with traffic rules and regulations*

The Working Group considers that a more fundamental way to bring about law-abiding behaviour of road users is through continuous education and publicity. The Government is thus recommended to step up its publicity and education efforts.

- (b) raise the fixed penalty charges for congestion-related offences to restore the deterrent effect*

The current fixed penalty charges are set at \$320 or \$450 for congestion-related offences, such as illegal parking<sup>7</sup>. Such levels have not been adjusted since 1994 while the CCPI increased by about 40% from 1994 to 2013. The deterrent effects of fixed penalty charges have no doubt been gradually eroded over time due to inflation and the increase in income level. The Working Group thus considers that the Government should raise the fixed penalty charges by at least 40%.

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<sup>7</sup> Congestion-related offences include illegal parking, loading/ unloading goods or picking up/setting down passengers in restricted zones, etc. These offences are set out under the Fixed Penalty (Traffic Contraventions) Ordinance (Cap. 237) and the Fixed Penalty (Criminal Proceedings) Ordinance (Cap. 240).

- (c) *adopt a stricter approach and deploy more resources to enforce congestion-related offences by the Police*

Despite the constraints in manpower and resources, the Working Group urges the Police to consider how enforcement against congestion-related offences could be further strengthened. In some particularly congested areas, the Police should take enforcement action which has greater deterrent effect. For example, where appropriate, consideration could be given to issue fixed penalty ticket without any prior warning. The Working Group also notes that the serving number of traffic wardens may sometimes fall short of the establishment because of the lapse between recruitment cycles. Action has been taken by the Police to shorten the duration between the recruitment cycles so as to maintain the traffic warden cadre at its full strength as far as possible. The Working Group considers that the possibility of expanding the establishment of the traffic wardens should also be explored.

- (d) *make further use of information technology in enforcement*

Mindful of the limit on how much additional manpower resources the Police could allocate to enforce against road traffic congestion, the Working Group sees a need to make more use of information technology to streamline the enforcement process. The Police is conducting a trial scheme to issue fixed penalty tickets through an e-ticketing system and the Working Group considers it a move in the right direction. The Working Group considers that the Government could engage the information technology sector or tertiary institutions to explore and develop the use of technology for enforcement purpose, having regard to local circumstances.

42. The Working Group recognises that most of the short and medium-term recommended measures entail financial consequences. These measures are considered necessary in view of the worsening traffic congestion. The other alternatives explored are not as direct and effective in containing car growth and ensuring efficient use of road space. The Working Group opines that the Government must strengthen education and publicity efforts to complement these

measures. The Working Group also proposes a number of long-term measures for the Government to study further.

### **Long-term measures**

#### ***(a) Review parking policy and disseminate real-time information on parking vacancies***

43. Provision of parking spaces is essential to those who need to drive as well as to the operation of commercial transport operators. The Working Group is mindful that a careful balance should be struck in its provision. Letting the pendulum swing to either side is not desirable – over-provision will attract more use of PCs, while under-provision may aggravate illegal parking, causing further obstruction to traffic and straining enforcement resources.

44. It is therefore important to find out the optimum level of parking provision to restrain car growth without bringing too many adverse consequences. The Working Group considers that the Government should conduct a review of the parking policy, in which various stakeholders and the general public should be fully engaged. Meanwhile, the Government should examine how to solicit the support of operators of commercial off-street car parks to make available information on parking vacancies so that motorists do not need to circulate on roads in nearby areas looking for available parking spaces which may aggravate congestion.

#### ***(b) Encourage on-street loading and unloading outside peak hours***

45. The Working Group recognises the genuine need for on-street loading and unloading of goods for business in a densely developed city like Hong Kong. Yet, prolonged or illegal loading and unloading activities will obstruct traffic flow.

46. The Working Group thus considers that the Government should, as a long-term measure, examine how to encourage and facilitate local businesses to carry out more on-street loading and unloading outside peak hours to minimise the impact of these activities on road traffic. Such arrangement can be factored in as one of the features of an ERP pilot scheme by, for example, having differential charging for peak and non-peak hours delivery within a charged zone.



***(c) Provide more park-and-ride facilities***

47. Park-and-ride (“PnR”) car parks allow motorists to drop off their cars at transport hubs to switch to PT. These car parks are usually located at the suburbs or fringe of city centres, with the aim of reducing the amount of traffic entering the most congested parts of the city. The Working Group notes that there are already 11 PnR car parks in Hong Kong (but not all of them are well-utilised), and that most of the respondents of the POS support the provision of PnR car parks as a means to reduce traffic flow in congested areas.

48. While the Working Group appreciates the physical constraints in finding suitable locations at the fringe of congested areas to provide for more PnR car parks, it would like to urge the Government to explore every possibility to do so, particularly in future railway projects, as well as urban redevelopment and new development projects. The Government should also examine how to enhance the patronage of these car parks.

49. PnR facilities may also be provided to cyclists in new towns and new development areas (“NDAs”) for them to connect to PT. The Working Group notes the Government has been providing bicycle parking spaces near public transport interchanges (“PTIs”) and Mass Transit Railway (“MTR”) stations in new towns and NDAs. The Working Group recommends the Government to continue to strengthen its efforts on this front where feasible.

**Other measures**

50. Apart from the above short, medium and long-term measures, the Working Group has examined a number of other measures, most of which are related to the provision of PT services and improvements to the traffic conditions at road harbour crossings. They are not detailed in this report because the Working Group notes that these issues require in-depth studies and hence fall outside the scope of this study which is of limited duration. The Working Group also notes that the Government has already undertaken to conduct the necessary studies, such as commencing the Public Transport Strategy Study to examine various aspects of our PT system.

51. The Working Group has also considered a number of other measures, such as a vehicle quota bidding system, but considers that these more draconian measures, though somehow effective in other cities, may not be suitable for introduction into Hong Kong at this stage. That said, the Working Group wishes to point out that should our city's traffic condition continue to deteriorate after the Government has implemented the recommended additional measures, the Government may need to revisit some of these more drastic options at a later stage. Given the controversy involved, the Government should fully engage relevant stakeholders and the public throughout the process.

#### **IV. A Joint Effort**

52. The Working Group believes that it takes concerted effort of the community to tackle a challenging issue such as road traffic congestion. Everyone in our society, be it individual road users, property owners and business operators, members of the Legislative Council and District Councils can work with the Government to help ease road traffic congestion.

53. To bring the community together in pursuing the goal of easing congestion, the Working Group considers it essential to put in place effective publicity and education programmes to drive home two key messages –

- (a) *Joint effort*: it takes everyone to work together in tackling congestion; and
- (b) *Inconvenience is for a worthwhile cause*: some of the proposed measures to ease congestion may entail inconvenience and even financial consequences to certain quarters of the community, but it is worthwhile for the benefit of the whole community.

54. The Working Group would also like to underline the importance and usefulness of educating the younger generation. The road safety slogan many of us learnt in our youth – “Don’t run but always watch before you walk 'cause the road is dangerous as a tiger’s mouth” (「慢慢走，勿亂跑，馬路如虎口。」) still strikes a chord nowadays. The effects of education and publicity may not be immediate, but they will be lasting. Details of a joint effort are elaborated in **Chapter 5**.

## CONCLUSION

55. Hong Kong, being a world-class city, has been striving to maintain and enhance our competitiveness. Mobility and air quality are two important, and related, attributes in defining the livability and attractiveness of a city. The Working Group therefore appeals to all members of the community to work together to contain road traffic congestion and sustain our city's competitiveness.

56. The Working Group also urges the Government to study and consider the recommendations of this Report. The Working Group hopes that the Government would accept the recommendations and implement them as soon as practicable.

\* \* \* \* \*

## **Chapter 1 – The Study**

### **1.1 Overview**

1.1.1 This Chapter gives a brief account of the background of the study, the terms of reference (“TOR”) and membership of the TAC and the Working Group formed under TAC to take forward the study, and how the Working Group proceeded with its work.

### **1.2 Background**

1.2.1 Hong Kong is a densely populated city. Moving people and goods around has always been a great challenge. As the community develops and economic activities increase, there are intensifying uses of road space, coupled with a growth in vehicle fleet. At the same time, the scope for further expansion of our road network is increasingly limited, in particular in developed urban areas. Road traffic congestion has therefore become a common scene. It affects all road users, not just bringing inconvenience to them but also causing adverse impact on our economic activities, the environment as well as the quality of life.

1.2.2 The worsening of road traffic congestion in recent years can be easily felt by our community. It can also be seen in the regional car journey speeds measured through annual surveys conducted by the Transport Department (“TD”). Over the past 10 years, the average speed on Hong Kong Island (“HKI”) has been the lowest, although it has remained stable at around 20 km/h. On the other hand, while the average speeds in Kowloon (“KLN”) and the New Territories (“NT”) are higher, there is a worsening trend which is a cause for concern. Indeed, the current car journey speeds on some major traffic corridors during the weekday morning peak hours can be close to 10 km/h, which are not much faster than the average walking speed of an adult at 4 to 5 km/h.

1.2.3 The Government is determined to step up its efforts to alleviate road traffic congestion. In March 2014, the Secretary for Transport and Housing invited the TAC to conduct a study to identify various factors contributing to road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and to put forward practicable recommendations

to the Government to tackle road traffic congestion. The TAC welcomed and readily accepted the invitation.

### **1.3 Working Group under TAC**

1.3.1 A Working Group was subsequently formed in April 2014 under the TAC to take forward the task. The Working Group's TOR are –

- (a) to identify various factors contributing to overall road traffic congestion in Hong Kong;
- (b) to suggest short and medium-term measures at territorial level to contain road traffic congestion which are practicable and can be implemented within a reasonable period of time;
- (c) to flag up long-term measures at territorial level for further study by the Government; and
- (d) to submit a report to the TAC for consideration and endorsement for sending to the Government in December 2014.

1.3.2 The membership of the Working Group is at **Annex 1A**. The membership and TOR of the TAC is at **Annex 1B**.

1.3.3 The Working Group held its first meeting in April 2014 and completed its work in early December 2014. During the eight-month study period, it held a total of nine meetings. The Working Group conducted the study through consideration of papers and deliberations in meetings. The Working Group also made use of an independent market research company, engaged through TD, to gauge public opinions<sup>1</sup> on the perceived causes and acceptable solutions for road traffic congestion. The company conducted telephone and face-to-face interviews to collect public views from mid-July to mid-August 2014. Findings

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<sup>1</sup> The POS was conducted to gauge the feedback of the general public and drivers on various road traffic congestion issues in broad terms. The TAC opines that more in-depth surveys may be required later if public views are to be collected on some specific measures.

of the POS and the questionnaires used are set out at **Annexes 1C and 1D** respectively.

1.3.4 Having regard to its TOR, the focus of the Working Group was to identify the main causes of road traffic congestion and recommend possible measures at a territory-wide level. These recommendations are intended to be additional measures which can work in conjunction with the Government's on-going measures to tackle congestion. The Working Group had looked at both local situations and overseas experiences in formulating its recommendations. It had also taken into account the results of the POS, in particular the degree of likely public acceptance of possible measures to contain road traffic congestion, when putting forward its recommendations.

1.3.5 This is the Working Group's report. It was fully endorsed by the TAC and is to be sent by the TAC to the Government for consideration.

\* \* \* \* \*

## Chapter 2 – Road Traffic Congestion Situation in Hong Kong

### 2.1 Overview

2.1.1 This Chapter outlines the road traffic situation in Hong Kong, examines the possible causes of road traffic congestion, and highlights the problems arising from road traffic congestion.

### 2.2 Road traffic conditions in Hong Kong

#### (a) Transport modes

2.2.1 In Hong Kong, most people rely on PT for commuting; close to 90%<sup>1</sup> of the 14.8 million daily passenger boardings are made on the PT system. While railway serves as the backbone of the system, it is supplemented by other PT modes, including franchised buses, public light buses, special purpose buses<sup>2</sup>, taxis, trams and ferries. As shown in the total daily passenger boardings in **Figure 2A**, road-based transport modes account for 68.7% of the daily passenger boardings. This underscores the importance to keep a smooth flow of traffic on the road. PCs, though taking up the major share of the vehicle fleet (about 70%<sup>3</sup>), only carry 11.3% of the total daily passenger boardings.


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<sup>1</sup> According to the Travel Characteristics Survey 2011 conducted by TD, 88.3% of the daily passenger boardings are based on PT.

<sup>2</sup> “Special purpose bus” includes company bus, school bus, resident bus, tourist bus, shuttle bus, cross-boundary bus, etc., but excludes public light bus.

<sup>3</sup> In 2011, the total number of licensed vehicles and licensed PCs were 630 281 and 434 843 respectively.

**Figure 2A: Daily passenger boardings (Weekday) (Million)<sup>4</sup>**



### (b) Car journey speeds

2.2.2 Car journey speed is a good indicator of the degree of road traffic congestion. **Figure 2B** shows the trend of regional average car journey speeds in HKI, KLN and the NT during the morning peak hours<sup>5</sup> on normal weekdays over the past 10 years<sup>6</sup>.


<sup>4</sup> Source: Travel Characteristics Survey 2011.

<sup>5</sup> TD conducts surveys on car journey speeds every year since 1987. In 2013, the surveys involved the measurement of journey times to travel along each of the 61 routes (29 in HKI/KLN and 32 in the NT) on normal weekdays during the morning peak hours (0800 to 0930 hrs).

<sup>6</sup> TD started to survey the journey time on normal weekdays during the evening peak hours (1700 to 1900 hrs) since 2003. In 2013 nine routes were surveyed during the evening peak hours.



**Figure 2B: Car journey speeds  
during the morning peak hours on weekdays (2003 – 2013)**




2.2.3 Among the three regions, the average speed on HKI is the lowest, and remains at around 20 km/h. Such an average regional speed is considered quite low; in fact in some road sections in Central with the worst road traffic congestion, average journey speed close to 10 km/h has been recorded<sup>7</sup>. In KLN, the average speed is slightly higher, but there has been a declining trend of the average speeds, from 27.6 km/h in 2003 to 23.5 km/h in 2013. The average speed in the NT is also undergoing a declining trend, from 42.8 km/h in 2003 to 39.9 km/h in 2013, although it is still higher than that of HKI and KLN in absolute terms. The above figures suggest that road traffic congestion is serious on HKI and is worsening in KLN and the NT.

### (c) Vehicle fleet size

2.2.4 Vehicle fleet size is a major factor contributing to road traffic congestion, especially when there are limitations in further expanding the public road network (more details in **paragraphs 2.2.12 and 2.2.13**). The number of total licensed vehicles increased by about 30% from about 524 000 in 2003 to about 681 000 in 2013. **Figure 2C** shows the vehicle fleet size by vehicle type during the period.

<sup>7</sup> Car journey speeds in some road sections in Central are listed in **Annex 2**.

**Figure 2C: Licensed vehicle fleet size (2003 – 2013)**




2.2.5 PC has remained the highest in number among different types of vehicles, and its growth rate is also the most alarming. Over the past 10 years, the number of PCs increased by about 40%. This increase rate is much higher than the corresponding growth of the total number of all licensed vehicles, which stands at about 30%. In fact, the increase in the number of PCs constituted about 87% of that of the total number of all licensed vehicles during the same period. The share of PCs in the total licensed vehicle fleet has grown over time, reaching 70% in 2013. As of September 2014, the growth rate of PCs is 4.6% p.a., which is very high and substantially higher than the growth rate of 3.4% p.a. for the total licensed vehicle fleet.

2.2.6 In contrast, there was only a moderate increase in the number of buses and light buses, from 19 738 in 2003 to 20 456 in 2013 (+3.6%). The increase is insignificant, compared to the population growth during the period, from 6.76 million in 2003 to 7.22 million in 2013 (+6.8%). Goods vehicles, having an essential and indispensable role in supporting the economy, have recorded moderate growth in number (+6.6%), despite the fact that the economy of Hong Kong has grown significantly, with gross domestic product increasing by 69% from about \$1,257 billion in 2003 to \$2,125 billion in 2013. Compared with the increase in the number of buses, light buses and goods vehicles from 2003 to 2013, the rising trend of PC (+40%) is out of proportion and a real cause for concern.

2.2.7 There is also a reasonably clear correlation between the vehicle fleet size and the car journey speed in the urban areas<sup>8</sup>. **Figure 2D** shows such a historical relationship. As the vehicle fleet size gets larger, more vehicles are driven on the road network, leading to a drop in the average speed and an aggravation of congestion.

**Figure 2D: Historical relationship  
between vehicle fleet size and car journey speed in urban areas**




<sup>8</sup> Only the car journey speed in the urban areas was taken into account in developing the relationship, as the congestion problem in the urban areas is more serious, and that the scope of expanding the road network in urban areas is more limited compared to that of the NT.

#### (d) Vehicle usage

2.2.8 More licensed vehicles result in a larger number of vehicles on the road. The total kilometres travelled by all vehicles (i.e. vehicle-kilometres (“VKM”)) is an indicator of vehicle usage.

2.2.9 **Figure 2E** shows the breakdown of the annual VKM travelled among different vehicle types, from 2003 to 2013. During this period, the annual VKM travelled by PCs increased by 25% and this increase alone accounted for an alarming 65% of the growth in the total annual VKM travelled by all vehicles. The annual VKM travelled by goods vehicles, motor cycles, buses and light buses remained fairly stable in the past 10 years, while the usage of taxis is highly correlated with Hong Kong’s economic performance.

**Figure 2E: Annual VKM by vehicle type (2003 – 2013)**



### (e) Traffic mix on major roads

2.2.10 PCs not only contribute most to the total vehicle fleet size and the total vehicle usage, they also constitute the largest category of vehicles using our limited road space. The vehicle composition on 20 major roads during the morning peak hours in 2013 is shown in **Table 2A**. PCs contribute most to the traffic flow at all the listed tunnels and most of the major roads, where they account for about 40% to 70% of the total numbers of vehicles.

2.2.11 The shares of road space of buses and light buses<sup>9</sup> are generally low to moderate. Except on Nathan Road, they only share about 5% to 25% of the total traffic flow on the major roads. It should be noted, however, that they have high passenger carrying capacity and carry about 71% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings (**paragraph 2.2.1** refers). On the contrary, PCs occupy a lot of space on major roads but only carry 16% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings. PCs are obviously much less efficient passenger carriers.

**Table 2A: Vehicle mix on  
20 major roads during the morning peak (2013)<sup>10</sup>**

	<b>Private Car</b>	<b>Taxi</b>	<b>Goods Vehicle</b>	<b>Bus and Light Bus</b>	<b>Motor Cycle</b>
<b>Island Eastern Corridor</b>	<b>37%</b>	24%	27%	9%	3%
<b>Connaught Road Central</b>	22%	<b>45%</b>	6%	25%	2%
<b>Harcourt Road</b>	<b>44%</b>	34%	11%	9%	2%
<b>Queensway</b>	36%	<b>37%</b>	6%	20%	1%
<b>Aberdeen Tunnel</b>	<b>46%</b>	16%	17%	18%	3%
<b>Cross Harbour Tunnel</b>	<b>48%</b>	7%	24%	14%	7%
<b>Eastern Harbour Tunnel</b>	<b>56%</b>	18%	15%	7%	4%
<b>Western Harbour Tunnel</b>	<b>51%</b>	20%	11%	16%	2%
<b>Chatham Road North</b>	<b>39%</b>	20%	21%	15%	5%
<b>Princess Margaret Road</b>	<b>62%</b>	15%	12%	7%	4%
<b>Prince Edward Road West</b>	<b>43%</b>	24%	15%	17%	1%
<b>Nathan Road</b>	24%	16%	16%	<b>42%</b>	2%
<b>West Kowloon Highway</b>	<b>48%</b>	18%	18%	13%	3%
<b>Lung Cheung Road</b>	<b>44%</b>	17%	27%	7%	5%
<b>Lion Rock Tunnel</b>	<b>57%</b>	8%	21%	12%	2%

<sup>9</sup> Buses and light buses here include franchised buses, special purpose buses, and public and private light buses.

<sup>10</sup> Source: Annual Traffic Census (2013), TD.


	<b>Private Car</b>	<b>Taxi</b>	<b>Goods Vehicle</b>	<b>Bus and Light Bus</b>	<b>Motor Cycle</b>
<b>Tate's Cairn Tunnel</b>	<b>59%</b>	13%	15%	10%	3%
<b>Tai Po Road – Ma Liu Shui</b>	<b>69%</b>	13%	7%	10%	1%
<b>Tolo Highway</b>	<b>58%</b>	7%	28%	5%	2%
<b>Tuen Mun Road</b>	<b>44%</b>	7%	34%	12%	3%
<b>Tseung Kwan O Tunnel</b>	<b>51%</b>	15%	22%	8%	4%

Note: Mode with the highest % on each road is shown in bold.

#### (f) Public roads in Hong Kong

2.2.12 Roads are often constructed in tandem with, or sometimes in anticipation of, the growth of the city. In some instances, construction of roads has also become a measure to accommodate the increase in road usage. The road network in Hong Kong is in fact quite extensive, and the trend of the total length of public road since 2003 is shown in **Figure 2F**.

**Figure 2F: Total length of public road since 2003**



2.2.13 After the noticeable road network expansions between 1980s to 1990s, including the completion of major road links for the new airport and its associated projects, the growth in the total length of public road slowed down with an average growth rate of 0.8% p.a. between 2003 and 2013. With the limited number of new road projects being implemented or planned in the

coming few years<sup>11</sup>, it is expected that the growth rate would drop to around 0.4% p.a. up to 2020. Such growth is much lower than the current growth of total vehicle fleet at about 3.4% p.a.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, road traffic congestion has already become a common scene in both strategic roads and in some local roads in built-up areas, such as Des Voeux Road Central and Chater Road in Central, Cameron Road in Tsim Sha Tsui, etc. Providing new roads to divert the traffic is simply not sustainable due to land and environmental constraints, while the scope for widening local roads or improving road junctions in built-up areas are also very limited (please refer to **paragraphs 2.3.3 and 2.3.4**). Therefore, traffic conditions will only continue to worsen if no action is taken to contain the vehicle growth.

## **2.3 Causes of road traffic congestion**

2.3.1 According to the POS conducted in 2014, the majority of the general public (68%) and in particular drivers (82%) consider that there is moderate to heavy road traffic congestion in Hong Kong. This is in line with the various indicators described in **Section 2.2**, such as the decrease in car journey speeds and the increase in vehicle usage.

2.3.2 There are various recurrent causes of road traffic congestion<sup>13</sup>, which could be broadly categorised into the following five groups –

- (a) limited scope for more road transport infrastructure;
- (b) excessive number of vehicles;
- (c) competing use of road space;
- (d) management and enforcement issues; and
- (e) road works.

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<sup>11</sup> New projects include the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Hong Kong Link Road, CWB, Tuen Mun – Chek Lap Kok Link, Connecting Road between Liantang / Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point and Fanling Highway, etc.

<sup>12</sup> As of September 2014, the current growth of total vehicle fleet is about 3.4% p.a.

<sup>13</sup> Non-recurrent causes do not occur on a regular basis in terms of location and timing. They include major planned events which occupy road space and/or generate additional traffic (e.g. public processions, major festive and sports events such as marathon), unplanned incidents (e.g. traffic accidents, vehicle breakdowns, burst of water mains) and inclement weather. The non-recurrent causes are not the focus of this Study.

## **(a) Limited scope for more road transport infrastructure**

2.3.3 While the public road network has expanded in the past decades, opportunities for building more roads are more limited in the future. In particular, in the densely developed urban areas, there is very limited scope for further expansion of the road network. The physical constraints imposed by the congested urban environment render the planning and provision of new strategic roads extremely challenging, if not impossible. New roads and highways similar to the CWB under construction are becoming more difficult to materialise, due to the challenges of limited space in the urban areas, the restriction on reclamation and visual impact. Environmental issues, such as air quality and noise impact associated with the construction of any new highway within the urban area, are becoming more difficult to overcome. The new Air Quality Objectives, which came into force in January 2014, impose even stricter environmental requirements for the planning of new roads. There is rising public aspiration to minimise, and even avoid, the environmental impact associated with the construction and functioning of a new road. As a result, a number of proposed highways, such as the coastal highway between Kennedy Town and Aberdeen (known as Route 4), and the strategic highway connecting the Northwest NT and North Lantau (known as Route 11), have been shelved in the past, notably due to grave difficulties in overcoming various public objections.

2.3.4 The above constraints are equally applicable to local road improvement works, such as widening of junctions and construction of grade-separated structures (e.g. flyovers, footbridges or subways). These works are also constrained by limited space, crowded underground utilities, visual impact considerations, environmental concerns or impact on existing traffic during construction. Public views, in particular the views from drivers and pedestrians, are often in conflict<sup>14</sup>. It is not uncommon that public support and consensus cannot be secured to implement the necessary junction improvement schemes, and so the junctions that are operating close to or even over their capacity, often remain problematic. Traffic queues build up, and in some particularly congested areas, the traffic queues at one junction may tail back to the junctions upstream, at times leading to a gridlock of the road network in the vicinity.

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<sup>14</sup> For example, both drivers and pedestrians request for longer green times for different phases in a traffic signal cycle.



2.3.5 Spatial constraint in urban areas also imposes difficulties in providing adequate parking spaces. In recent years, the vehicle fleet size has been increasing rapidly while the supply of car parking spaces has lagged far behind<sup>15</sup>. As a result, in 2013, while the number of licensed PCs was 475 800, only around 397 000 parking spaces could be provided in residential developments<sup>16</sup>. The problem of illegal parking, both at the home and non-home ends, has contributed to congestion in local roads and has become an increasing concern in the community.

#### **(b) Excessive number of vehicles**

2.3.6 While the limitations in providing more transport infrastructure may affect the capacity to accommodate the growing vehicle fleet, one may argue that building more roads can in fact fuel the growth of the fleet and induce more car usage. The POS results show that the general public, as well as drivers, consider that too many vehicles on roads is one of the major causes of road traffic congestion, and they support reducing the number of PCs. This coincides with the fact that PCs, with a low passenger-carrying capacity, has increased by about 40% over the past 10 years, which is much higher than the corresponding growth of other vehicles fleet (at 11%). In Hong Kong, we have a well-developed and affordable PT system that accommodates about 90% of the daily passenger boardings. Unlike many overseas countries/ cities, owning and using a PC for commuting is not a basic or essential need, at least for the great majority of the public who do not live in remote areas which are less accessible by PT.

2.3.7 Quite some members of the public also consider that the number of franchised buses can be reduced, probably because of low patronage of some bus routes. As franchised buses are large in size and occupy more road space per vehicle, they could be inefficient road users if the patronage is low, although it should be recognised that some of these low-patronised bus trips are essential trips<sup>17</sup>, e.g. buses near the end of their routes travelling back to bus termini, with

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<sup>15</sup> While the fleet size of PCs has increased by 40% from 2003 to 2013, only 14% more parking spaces for PCs in residential developments were provided during the same period.

<sup>16</sup> Only the night time parking spaces in residential developments are counted here.

<sup>17</sup> There is a need to strike a balance among different factors, including passenger demand, bus operation efficiency, road traffic conditions and environmental benefits.

most passengers having alighted. For more details on the Government's on-going efforts to pursue bus rationalisation, please see **paragraphs 3.5.12 to 3.5.17**. Goods vehicles play an important role in our economy, while public light buses and taxis take up a less significant share of road space as compared with PCs and buses. The general public appears to be generally content with the share of road usage by these vehicles, as not many people consider it necessary to reduce the number of these vehicles, as revealed in the POS findings.

### **(c) Competing use of road space**

2.3.8 Apart from the excessive number of vehicles running on roads, in some local areas, the use of road space is often affected by various competing uses, thus sterilising the road capacity. They obstruct traffic and can cause road traffic congestion. Activities commonly contributing to such competing uses of road space include –

- (a) loading/ unloading activities of goods vehicles;
- (b) picking up/ setting down activities of buses, public light buses, coaches, taxis and PCs; and
- (c) vehicles circulating on roads looking for on-street parking spaces.

2.3.9 The Working Group notes that there is a genuine need for the above activities, especially in fully developed areas where the provision of off-street loading/unloading and picking up/setting down facilities is limited. However, these activities would cause obstruction to local traffic, resulting in traffic queues upstream and affecting the operation of critical road junctions and busy roads. For example, tourist coach activities (such as prolonged waiting and illegal parking) along Chatham Road South and Salisbury Road in Tsim Sha Tsui are rampant during peak tourist visiting hours. These activities affect the smooth flow of the general traffic.

### **(d) Management and enforcement issues**

2.3.10 TD has put in place traffic management measures to maximise the efficient use of limited road space. These will be further elaborated in **Chapter 3**. However, no matter how targeted the measures are designed to be, they can only be effective if road-users are law-abiding. Illegal acts, such as

illegal parking, double parking, loading/ unloading activities in restricted zones, prolonged loading/ unloading in non-restricted zones or vehicles staying inside the yellow-box at road junctions would reduce road capacity or block other traffic. Complementary and effective enforcement to deter non-compliance is therefore essential. While the number of fixed penalty tickets issued for congestion-related offences over the past 10 years has increased by about 98%, there is a general perception in the community that enforcement against congestion-related offences is not stringent enough; the public considers that enforcement action by the Police needs to be strengthened.

2.3.11 The Working Group notes that in recent years, Police manpower has been deployed to perform other duties, such as crowd control and management of the increasing number of public processions and other safety-related offences. This may affect the priority placed by the Police on enforcement against congestion-related offences.

2.3.12 The effectiveness of enforcement is also hampered by the fact that the level of fixed penalty against congestion-related offences has lost its deterrent effect over time. The last successful legislative amendment to raise the level of penalty was made back in 1994, while the CCPI has increased by 40% between 1994 and 2013.

#### **(e) Road works**

2.3.13 Road works are common in Hong Kong. They occupy the road space and in some cases result in or add to road traffic congestion. According to the POS results, the general public and the drivers consider road works as one of the major causes of road traffic congestion.

2.3.14 Road works sometimes cause nuisance and road traffic congestion, but are essential for our society. They are needed for the improvement, maintenance and repair of the concerned road section or the public utilities underground (e.g. water mains, drainage pipes, gas pipes, power and telecommunication cables). Road works may also be required as part of infrastructure projects.

2.3.15 Although scheduling road works at night time when there is generally much less traffic on the road can help reducing the disruption to traffic, it may cause other unnecessary nuisance to the public, notably excessive noise at night. Some road works, e.g. repairs of burst water pipes, also require immediate action. Better co-ordination among different road works in the vicinity is thus the key to minimise disruption caused to road users. The Government has put in place an excavation permit (“XP”) system to manage road works. The details of that system will be further elaborated in **Chapter 3**.

## **2.4 Consequences of road traffic congestion**

2.4.1 Road traffic congestion does not only affect individual motorists, but also results in inconvenience and costs in both tangible and intangible terms to society as a whole.

### **(a) Increase in travel time and cost**

2.4.2 Increase in travel time is often the most significant consequence of congestion as perceived by all road users, be they drivers or passengers of private vehicles, or passengers of road-based PT. Apart from the time wasted during congestion, many people also need to allow extra time for the journey to cater for the uncertainty in trip time due to congestion, and the amount of extra time allowed could be substantial if the consequence of delay is high (e.g. late for work with penalty, late for important meetings, loss of business opportunities, etc.). The longer travel time and the extra time allowed, if not incurred as a result of congestion, could otherwise be spent on economically productive or non-economic activities, including work, meetings, social gatherings, doing sports, watching films and rest, etc.

### **(b) Other tangible costs**

2.4.3 In addition to the costs incurred by individuals as described in **paragraph 2.4.2**, road traffic congestion also impacts on the business sectors and in particular to those involved in delivery services and road-based PT operators. When goods or services cannot be delivered on time, the business sectors need to incur additional inventory costs, logistics costs and even compensation costs.

2.4.4 While stuck in road traffic congestion, vehicles need to stop temporarily and frequently, resulting in a stop-and-go traffic pattern. Such traffic pattern increases the total operating cost of vehicles, as vehicles consume more fuel when being used in such a way. More frequent repair and maintenance of vehicles would also be required. It also causes road surface to deteriorate much quickly, resulting in additional maintenance cost for upkeeping the serviceability of the roads.

**(c) Intangible costs**

2.4.5 Road traffic congestion also brings the following intangible consequences, and the costs involved could be high –

- (a) long traffic queue in congestion worsens roadside air quality, which not only exacerbates the threat to public health, but also affects the quality of life and the image of Hong Kong as a world-class metropolis. This will undermine Hong Kong's attractiveness for overseas companies to establish regional headquarters/branch offices in Hong Kong;
- (b) congestion often interferes with the passage of emergency vehicles and delays them in responding to incidents; and
- (c) the rapid increase in the number of vehicles has resulted in an increasingly rampant illegal parking situation. In Hong Kong, there are many narrow streets in the urban areas and the consequence of illegal parking on these streets and sometimes on the footpaths, or in front of emergency accesses, could be serious and could give rise to public safety concerns.

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## **Chapter 3 – On-going Measures to Manage Road Traffic Congestion**

### **3.1 Overview**

3.1.1 This Chapter outlines the on-going measures which the Government has been pursuing to alleviate the road traffic congestion problem.

### **3.2 On-going measures**

3.2.1 The Working Group has studied a host of measures to ease road traffic congestion. Some of the measures studied are already pursued by the Government on an on-going basis. These on-going measures could be broadly categorised into two groups –

- (a) measures which the Working Group has raised and considered that the Government should continue to pursue and keep their effectiveness under regular review. These will be briefly reported in this chapter; and
- (b) measures which the Working Group considers to have room for strengthening. These will be discussed together with other recommendations in **Chapter 4**.

### **3.3 Transport policy**

3.3.1 The Working Group notes that the objective of the Government's transport policy is to provide a transport system which can maintain a reasonable level of mobility of people and goods necessary to support economic growth and to meet the needs of the community in an environmentally sustainable manner. The Government has been tackling road traffic congestion following a three-pronged approach which comprises –

- (a) improving transport infrastructure;
- (b) expanding and improving PT system; and
- (c) managing road use.

### 3.4 Improving transport infrastructure

3.4.1 Hong Kong has been adopting an integrated approach in land-use planning and transport planning. An extensive road network and other transport infrastructures have been developed over the years to serve the needs of the commuting public and the various social-economic activities. However, land is a scarce resource in Hong Kong and, as discussed in **paragraphs 2.3.3 to 2.3.5**, there are various physical, environmental and social constraints against building more roads to meet the demands of the growing vehicle fleet. The challenge is the greatest in the urban areas where the most severe road traffic congestions often occur.

3.4.2 The development of a comprehensive railway system to serve as the backbone of our PT system is therefore the key in improving the transport infrastructure. At present, the total length of Hong Kong's railways is about 218 km. Upon completion of the five railway projects under construction<sup>1</sup>, the railway network will reach more than 270 km by 2021, and be accessible to more than 70% of the population. In September 2014, the Government announced the Railway Development Strategy 2014 to implement seven more railway projects<sup>2</sup>, extending the railway network to over 300 km by 2031. With these, the railway network is expected to serve areas inhabited by 75% of the population.

3.4.3 To complement the development of railways and to minimise the need for road based transport over short distance, the Government has put increasing emphasis on expanding and improving pedestrian facilities such as the provision of hillside escalator links and elevator systems to promote walking as a transport mode for short distance trips. To enhance vertical connectivity, two hillside escalator projects, viz. the Central Mid-Levels Escalator Link between Des Voeux Road Central and Conduit Road and the Centre Street Escalator Link between Third Street and Bonham Road, were commissioned in 1993 and 2013 respectively to provide comfortable pedestrian links in the areas. Another two

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<sup>1</sup> The five railway projects include the West Island Line, the South Island Line (East), the Kwun Tong Line Extension, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section), and the SCL.

<sup>2</sup> The seven railway projects include the Northern Link and Kwu Tung Station, the Tuen Mun South Extension, the East Kowloon Line, the Tung Chung West Extension, the Hung Shui Kiu Station, the South Island Line (West) and the North Island Line .

pedestrian links, namely, the Pedestrian Link at Tsz Wan Shan and the Yuet Wah Street Pedestrian Linkage, are being implemented under the Shatin to Central Link (“SCL”) project and the Kwun Tong Town Centre Redevelopment respectively.

3.4.4 To enhance the horizontal connectivity, suitable pedestrian facilities have been added to NDAs for better connection to nearby attraction points. Provision of an elevated walkway linking Choi Ying Estate and Choi Fuk Estate at Jordan Valley with the Kowloon Bay MTR station and the pedestrian links<sup>3</sup> in the Kai Tak Development are typical examples. Subway networks have also been developed in urban centres such as Tsim Sha Tsui to improve walkability. To bring further convenience to the public, in particular the elderly, the Government has retrofitted barrier-free access facilities at certain public walkways. The Working Group supports the Government to continue the work in this direction. With enhanced walkability and connectivity, motorists may be more willing to walk and reduce their reliance on cars.

**Figure 3A: Centre Street Escalator Link between Third Street and Bonham Road**



3.4.5 Some people advocate cycling as an alternative to mechanised modes of transport. While cycling has its environmental benefits, roads in Hong Kong’s urban areas are usually busy and crowded, with frequent loading and unloading, as well as setting down and picking up activities. It is difficult to find suitable space in urban areas for building cycle tracks in urban areas without affecting traffic or compromising the safety of road users. Cyclists riding on

<sup>3</sup> In the Kai Tak Development, there will be new and enhanced pedestrian links, including subways, footbridges and footpaths.



carriageways are more vulnerable to traffic accidents. In 2013, there were over 1 000 accidents on the carriageways involving bicycles. As such, in general, the Government does not encourage the public to use bicycles as a transport mode in urban areas. Compared with urban areas, the traffic flow density is relatively lower in new towns or NDAs, providing a more suitable environment for cyclists to commute for short distances. Therefore, the Government has been striving to foster a bicycle-friendly environment in new towns and NDAs for short-distance travel or leisure purposes. Measures adopted include developing new cycle track network, as well as improving existing cycle tracks and bicycle parking facilities.

3.4.6 Despite the constraints in expanding the current road network, the Working Group notes that the Government will continue to review and explore opportunity to build new roads or improve/ widen the existing roads to serve the social and economic needs of the community. Strategic road projects, such as CWB, Tuen Mun – Chek Lap Kok Link, the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Hong Kong Link Road, the connecting road between Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point and Fanling Highway, Widening of Tolo Highway/Fanling Highway – Stage 2, etc., are under construction. The total estimated cost of these strategic road projects is about \$140 billion. In addition, strategic road links such as Tuen Mun Western Bypass, Central Kowloon Route, Tseung Kwan O – Lam Tin Tunnel, etc. are also under active planning.

3.4.7 Apart from the above strategic road projects, the Government will continue to put in place measures to improve the local road network and pedestrian facilities where opportunities arise. The improvements may be in the form of set-backs of building lines for road widening, junction improvements, as well as the provision of grade-separated pedestrian facilities with direct links to the new developments or re-developments. Over the past three years, there are about 20 improvement projects of relatively larger scale (more than \$30 million each) which have been commissioned or are under construction. The total cost of these projects is about \$2.5 billion.

3.4.8 Nonetheless, building more road transport infrastructure alone cannot resolve traffic congestion — it may actually induce more demand for vehicle usage and fuel vehicular growth.

### **3.5 Expanding and improving PT system**

3.5.1 Hong Kong has one of the most efficient PT systems in the world<sup>4</sup>. Our system is highly regarded for its ability to accommodate the mobility need of the city and its quality service.

3.5.2 The Working Group notes that the Government has announced the commencement of a Public Transport Strategy Study (“PTSS”) to look into issues relating to other PT modes following the completion of the Railway Development Strategy 2014. The Working Group agrees that it is important to examine how different non-railway PT modes should continue to complement each other with a view to further improving the PT service amidst the expanding rail network.

3.5.3 In the meantime, the Working Group notes that the Government has adopted a number of measures to continue to expand and improve the PT system. The Working Group considers these measures worth pursuing and should be kept under regular review. These measures are highlighted below.

#### **(a) Enhancement of the attractiveness of PT**

##### *(i) Additional services at new developments*

3.5.4 The Working Group notes that the Government has been monitoring the needs of the public for PT services. To meet the evolving needs of the travelling public, TD updates, on annual basis, the major planning data for the coming five years to facilitate the planning for franchised bus and green minibus (“GMB”) services. Such data include population changes on a district basis, population intakes of public housing developments, and commissioning of new infrastructure. Based on up-to-date planning data, TD, together with franchised bus companies, would devise bus route development programmes (“RDPs”) and consult district councils on those as an annual exercise. Apart from this, where warranted, separate PT re-organisation plans (“PT Plan”) devised specifically for major development or large-scale infrastructure would be drawn up. Where there are new developments, new PT routes will be introduced and/ or existing

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<sup>4</sup> Hong Kong is ranked the first in the world in the Urban Mobility Index, a measure on the ease of commuters to travel around cities, which is compiled by an international consultancy company Arthur D. Little.

PT routes enhanced to serve the needs of passengers. For new developments of substantial scale, a combination of PT modes is often introduced to cater for different needs. Adequate space will also be reserved in the new developments for providing necessary facilities, such as PTIs to accommodate the proposed PT services. A case in point is the intake of the public housing estates at Kai Tak, where it is now served by franchised bus services. Transport provision will be further enhanced by a new GMB service in the near future and the MTR SCL in the longer term. Similarly, the new public housing estates under the Housing Development on Anderson Road (“DAR”) will be provided with franchised bus services, supplemented by GMB service upon population intake in late 2015. According to the Railway Development Strategy 2014, the East Kowloon Line will run along the north Kwun Tong area, connecting the Diamond Hill Station of the Kwun Tong Line (and the future SCL) and the Po Lam Station of the Tseung Kwan O Line, to serve the densely populated areas in Choi Wan, Shun Tin, Sau Mau Ping and Po Tat, as well as the committed major development projects in the area. An indicative implementation window from 2019 to 2025 is recommended for planning purpose to support the planned developments in the Anderson Road/Sau Mau Ping area. The actual implementation of the project is contingent upon the technical and financial studies as well as public consultation at the detailed planning stage.

*(ii) Enhancing the efficiency of PT services*

3.5.5 The Working Group notes that the Government has been working with the PT operators to maximise the efficiency of PT services. For example, for franchised bus services, the same departure points and destinations are often served by more than one group of bus routes (say, one with fewer stops in-between while one meandering through the busier part of the city) to serve passengers with different needs. To minimise lost trips and service delays, TD has formed working groups with bus companies to explore traffic management measures at individual locations to facilitate bus operations. TD has also been actively reviewing the journey time, service frequencies and vehicle allocation of individual routes to better meet passenger demand.

3.5.6 As regards railway services, apart from the plan on expanding the existing network (please refer to **paragraph 3.4.2**), the Government also closely monitors the services provided by the MTR Corporation Limited (“MTRCL”). While the MTRCL has increased train frequencies where the signalling system

permits, it has also put in place various measures, such as deploying platform assistants to better manage the boarding and alighting process and to even out passenger distribution on platforms and in trains (e.g. encouraging passengers to move into the interior of train compartments) with a view to achieving smoother passenger flow and optimising the efficiency of train operations during peak hours. The signalling system of some of the lines of the MTR network, such as Island Line, Tsuen Wan Line, Kwun Tong Line and Tseung Kwan O Line, is due for upgrading in the coming few years. When the work is completed by 2022, train frequencies and hence carrying capacity of these lines will be enhanced. Besides, the maximum carrying capacity of all train compartments of the existing MTR railway lines (excluding Light Rail) are calculated based on accommodating up to 6 persons (standing) per square metre (“ppsm”) on average. That means railway operation would remain safe even when loaded with passengers at this density level. Nevertheless, in today’s actual railway operation, passenger riding habits have changed (e.g. more passengers read newspapers or use mobile devices during their trips that require more personal space) and trains running during the busiest hours on the busiest corridors achieve a passenger density of only around 4 instead of 6 ppsm. Having regard to the actual railway operating environment, the service level of the four new domestic railway lines currently under construction, including the West Island Line, South Island Line (East), Kwun Tong Line Extension and SCL, is pitched at 4 ppsm service benchmark.

*(iii) Alleviation of crowdedness*

3.5.7 Overseas cities adopt various types of time-based PT fare pricing strategy, such as peak surcharges and off-peak discounts to spread peak hour PT travel demand. In Hong Kong, the MTRCL has launched a nine-month “Early Bird Discount Promotion” trial programme since September 2014. Under this programme, passengers using Adult Octopus Card will enjoy a 25% fare discount when they exit from any of the 29 core urban stations between 7:15 a.m. and 8:15 a.m. from Mondays to Fridays (except public holidays). The MTRCL will review the effectiveness of the scheme after the trial period.

*(iv) Bus priority measures*

3.5.8 Bus-only lanes and bus gates have been widely implemented in the territory for many years. With implementation of these bus priority measures,

bus operations, including journey speeds and reliability, could be enhanced, thereby encouraging the use of buses. At present, TD has put in place over 23 km of bus-only lanes and 16 bus gates in the territory. Whilst further bus priority measures would be explored, the Working Group acknowledges that due consideration should be given to possible impact on other transport modes (in particular other PT operators) and general road congestion. Monitoring of the performance of the existing bus priority measures and reviewing the needs for new bus priority measures will continue.

(v) *Improvement to PTIs*

3.5.9 TD has been monitoring and improving the facilities at PTIs regularly. As at October 2014, the Government owned 59 covered PTIs. These were constructed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and standards in terms of design, ventilation, illumination, etc. prevailing at the time. TD has been making efforts to enhance the waiting environment and the facilities at PTIs whenever practicable and subject to availability of resources. Between 2010 and 2013, the Government completed improvement works at 45 PTIs for this purpose. Such improvement works include, for example, improvement to ventilation/ lighting system, provision of barrier free access, installation of LCD display panels to show route information, upgrading of passenger queue railing/ guard railing, and renovation of concrete passenger walkways/ passenger islands.

(vi) *Better dissemination of information*

3.5.10 TD also encourages franchised bus companies to provide passengers with timely service information. For example, Citybus provides real-time bus arrival information on its airport routes (i.e. the “A” routes) through the company’s website and smart phones. The Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Ltd. and Long Win Bus Company have installed an estimated bus arrival time system at the Tuen Mun Road Bus-bus Interchange (“BBI”). So far, such system has proven to be reliable, although it entails considerable capital investment and operating cost. In considering whether to make wider use of this or similar systems, bus companies will take into account passenger needs and cost-effectiveness consideration.

**Figure 3C: Estimated bus arrival time system at Tuen Mun Road BBI**



*(vii) Enhanced services for passengers with special needs*

3.5.11 Other service enhancements, such as installing barrier-free and elderly-friendly features (including equipping double hand-railing at staircase on selected models), have been introduced to provide a higher degree of safety and comfort to passengers on franchised buses. The Working Group understands that the Government will continue to work with the PT operators to bring in other service enhancements.

**(b) Rationalisation of bus services**

3.5.12 Franchised bus is the most popular road-based PT mode. Hong Kong has developed an extensive network of bus routes over the years. However, as our railway network expands and develops, some of the bus routes have become less attractive, with low patronage in some routes during non-peak hours or even during peak hours. The large number of franchised buses with few passengers on board is a cause of road traffic congestion. Since 2013, the Government has redoubled its effort at rationalisation of bus services which aims at providing a more efficient bus network. In 2013, 15 bus routes with low passenger demand or with routings largely overlapped were cancelled or amalgamated, four bus routes were truncated and the frequency of about 100 bus routes was reduced. Resources saved were put to the introduction of seven new routes and enhancement of service for a number of others. Hence, properly implemented,

bus route rationalisation could ease traffic congestion by reducing unnecessary vehicular trips on the road. Over the past 10-year period from 2004 to 2013, the number of franchised bus has decreased from about 6 000 to about 5 800 after the implementation of bus route rationalisation over the territory.


3.5.13 Every year, franchised bus companies submit RDPs comprising service adjustment proposals to the Government based on the forecast bus passenger demands. The RDPs may include proposals to introduce new routes, improve frequency and extend operating hours as well as proposals to reduce frequency, truncate routes, and cancel or amalgamate routes, etc. TD consults the relevant District Councils on their concerned RDPs before implementing the service adjustments.

3.5.14 Recently, the Government and franchised bus companies have been vigorously rationalising bus routes through an “area approach”. Under this approach, bus services are reviewed and re-organised holistically on a district basis, instead of on the basis of individual routes. A bus route rationalisation plan, devised for a particular region or district, may entail the introduction of new BBI schemes or improvement of existing ones, with more route choices and attractive fare concessions. There may also be proposals on introduction of new routes or frequency improvement on routes of high demand by making use of the resources spared from other proposals concerning frequency reduction, re-routeing, as well as cancellation or amalgamation of overlapping and under-utilised routes. To encourage more passengers to make use of the BBI schemes, the Government has also explored with the bus companies provision of attractive fare concession and enhanced interchange facilities at major locations. The Government started to implement in phases the rationalisation plans agreed with the North District and Tuen Mun since August and September 2013 respectively. The RDPs of 2014/15 included the area approach proposals for Yuen Long, Tai Po, Tsing Yi and Sha Tin districts. The plans agreed with the four districts are being implemented in phases since August 2014 for completion within first half of 2015, and it is expected that, upon full implementation of the plans, the efficiency of bus network would be further improved and the passenger demand could be better served. TD and the franchised bus companies will work with the Kowloon urban districts as the next step in the bus route rationalisation exercise.

3.5.15 Overall speaking, it has not been easy to obtain full support from the districts and the community for vigorous route rationalisation. Understandably, passengers who have to change their travelling habits, for example, by having to make a change mid-way instead of having direct point-to-point service, tend not to welcome the rationalisation proposals. It is not uncommon for rounds of discussion between the Government and the District Councils to take place before the bus route rationalisation plans, sometimes with modification, for a district could be finalised for implementation. With the implementation of rationalisation in North District and Tuen Mun, there is generally a better public understanding of the merits of bus route rationalisation and this should help garner public support for future rationalisation proposals.

3.5.16 To facilitate bus route rationalisation, TD has also been actively planning for new BBIs to enhance service efficiency. For example, the BBIs located on Tuen Mun Road (Kowloon-bound) in Siu Lam and on Tuen Mun Road (Tuen Mun-bound) in Tai Lam Kok were commissioned in December 2012 and July 2013 respectively. A total of 24 bus routes currently call at the BBIs for the convenience of residents in Tuen Mun/ Yuen Long and along Castle Peak Road. Since its opening, two bus routes have been cancelled after the rationalisation of the bus network in Tuen Mun, while passengers have a wider choice of destinations through interchanging. The Working Group notes that the BBIs on Tuen Mun Road are well received by bus passengers, with a current daily average of about 10 000 and 14 000 users for Kowloon-bound and Tuen Mun-bound respectively. In view of this promising result, the Government has been exploring with the bus companies setting up more BBIs, of smaller scale though because of site constraints, by making use of existing bus termini or stops.

**Figure 3D: Tuen Mun Road BBI**





3.5.17 The opening of new railways will affect the prevailing travelling pattern, thus affecting the utilisation of different PT modes. In order to better meet the changes in passenger demand and achieve better operation efficiency of the PT network, TD will implement bus route rationalisation proposals with greater vigour and on larger scale upon the planned opening of the MTR West Island Line, South Island Line (East), and Kwun Tong Line Extension, as well as the two-phased opening of the SCL in the years to come. TD normally assesses the impact of a new railway line on other PT modes and devises a PT Plan in the light of the forecast impact two to three years before the new line's opening. Under the PT Plan, service adjustments (in the form of new feeder services and route truncation, cancellation or frequency adjustments for overlapping services) for other road-based PT modes, in particular franchised bus services, will be mapped out. The relevant District Councils will be consulted of the PT Plan before it is finalised for phased implementation. At present, the district council consultation of the PT Plan for the West Island Line has been finalised for phased implementation after the commissioning of the West Island Line in December 2014. Public consultation of the PT Plan for the South Island Line (East) is underway. It is expected that a total of about 160 buses could be reduced if all the proposals in the PT Plans of the above two new railway lines were implemented successfully.

### **3.6 Managing road use**

3.6.1 Another important aspect of the Government's work in tackling road traffic congestion is to better manage the use of road so as to maximise the efficiency of the use of the limited road space. The following paragraphs highlight the traffic management measures currently adopted by the Government.

#### **(a) General traffic management measures**

3.6.2 Economic activities in some older parts of the urban area (such as Central and Tsim Sha Tsui) have generated a lot of road-based transport activities. However, expansion of road infrastructure in these areas is severely constrained. Older developments also lack adequate internal transport facilities (e.g. car parking and internal loading/ unloading spaces) within them. Some of these areas have become particularly congested due to the large amount of kerbside

activities as motorists often make use of the nearby kerbside for loading/unloading goods, picking up and dropping off passengers, waiting and even illegal parking. Such blockage of traffic lanes has caused congestion. With the growing tourist industry in recent years, some areas are becoming overcrowded with tourist coaches boarding and alighting passengers, some of which even illegally parked for long periods while waiting for tour groups.

3.6.3 TD has been closely monitoring the situation in these particularly congested areas and takes appropriate actions whenever possible. On the operation management side, TD has been liaising with different stakeholders, such as building management offices, property owners and transport trades, to explore ways to better manage the kerbside activities. As regards tourist coach activities, TD maintains an active dialogue with the Tourism Commission and tourist trade to explore possible means to address their operational need, while minimising the disruption to traffic. Assistance from the Police would also be sought if traffic is seriously affected.

3.6.4 More specifically, TD has been devising feasible traffic management measures as far as possible to relieve congestion. Measures commonly adopted involve imposing restriction zones to prohibit kerbside activities of all or specific types of vehicles at peak hours, or banning certain vehicle types from using the concerned road sections. Some other common traffic management measures implemented in the districts are also listed below –

- (a) provide additional laybys or lengthen existing laybys to meet the need of kerbside activities, such as loading and unloading for goods vehicles, and picking up and setting down of passengers by coaches, taxis and PCs;
- (b) impose yellow box at road junctions to avoid blockages, which often cause traffic congestion in busy areas;
- (c) prohibit non-essential turning movements, and/or widen local roads to provide for additional traffic lanes to increase junction capacities;
- (d) review and fine-tune traffic signal plans at signalised junctions to maximise junction capacities and minimise traffic delays;
- (e) provide more parking spaces for coaches in or near tourist areas;
- (f) relocate and adjust the length of bus stops and taxi stands; and
- (g) provide bus-only lanes and bus gates to facilitate bus operations.

The Working Group considers that the Government should continue to review the effectiveness of these measures and pursue improvements as and where necessary.

3.6.5 While the above-mentioned traffic management measures may give more convenience to some vehicle types, they may at the same time bring inconvenience to other vehicle types. The trade-offs often involve careful balancing of interests which may not be easy to achieve. In some cases, implementation of the recommended measures faces objection from the local community and the District Councils. In addition, even when the measures are implemented, it is not uncommon that some drivers do not observe them, diminishing their effectiveness. To achieve the desired effect, the cooperation of road users in observing traffic rules is essential. Enforcement action by the Police is also necessary.

#### **(b) Use of information technology**

3.6.6 TD has been striving to improve the efficiency and reliability of the road-based transport system by developing and expanding its intelligent transport systems (“ITS”). For example, the Area Traffic Control System is used to better coordinate the operation of traffic lights within an area to minimise traffic delays at signalised road junctions, thereby improving overall efficiency. The Traffic Control and Surveillance System is used along strategic routes to cope with traffic incidents and emergencies. TD has also developed ITS to facilitate the dissemination of traffic and transport information to the general public. Apart from the availability of closed-circuit television images of critical road sections in real time over the internet, systems such as the Speed Map Panels, the Hong Kong eTransport<sup>5</sup>, the Hong Kong eRouting<sup>6</sup>, etc. are all free public services which can facilitate both PT and road users to select the transport mode or route that best suits their needs. More specifically, motorists can use them to find a faster driving route by avoiding areas experiencing traffic congestion.

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<sup>5</sup> The Hong Kong eTransport, which can be accessed via mobile device or website, provides users with a one-stop portal for a multi-modal PT point-to-point route search service on the Internet. The PT services covered include MTR, Light Railway Transit, franchised bus, GMB, ferry, and tram.

<sup>6</sup> The Hong Kong eRouting, which can be accessed via mobile device or website, provides motorists with point-to-point driving route searching service and real-time traffic information.

**Figure 3E: Hong Kong eRouting**



**Figure 3F: Speed map panel at Tuen Mun Road**



3.6.7 TD is developing a Traffic and Incident Management System (“TIMS”), which is scheduled for completion in about early 2016. Its functions include automatic incident detection, as well as consolidation of traffic and transport contingency plans to facilitate the implementation and dissemination of traffic and transport information to stakeholders (including various Government departments, PT operators, media and the public). After completion of the TIMS, incidents which may cause road traffic congestion can be managed more effectively, and information can be disseminated to the public more efficiently.

### **(c) Coordination of road works**

3.6.8 Road works in Hong Kong are common and unavoidable. While there is a genuine need for road works (please refer to **paragraphs 2.3.13 to 2.3.15**), some of them do sometimes cause a reduction of road space, resulting in some instances in road traffic congestion. The Working Group notes that Highways Department (“HyD”), in coordination with TD and the Police, has put in place an XP system to better manage and coordinate road works and to ensure that they will not take up unnecessary road space, adverse traffic impact or nuisance to the public. Under this system, before commencement of any road works, the proponent shall apply for an XP from HyD and obtain traffic advice from TD and the Police. When the works are in progress, HyD carries out regular inspection to ensure that the road works comply with all XP conditions. TD and the Police also closely monitor the traffic conditions and, where necessary, will request the permittees to appropriately modify their temporary traffic management (“TTM”) schemes to further minimise the traffic impact. **Annex 3** summarises the details of the overall mechanism.

### **(d) Review on speed limit of roads**

3.6.9 Raising the speed limits of some road sections is an option to enhance the efficiency of traffic flow. However, road safety considerations are crucial. To ensure the speed limits on roads are commensurate with the prevailing traffic conditions, TD regularly carries out speed limit reviews on roads in Hong Kong. The reviews take into account various factors, including accident rate, prevailing vehicle speeds, road surface characteristics, length of the road sections, etc. A working group, comprising representatives from TD, the Police, the Hong Kong Automobile Association and the Institute of Advanced Motorists Hong Kong, has been set up to discuss and agree on the findings of the periodic reviews.

## **3.7 Way forward**

3.7.1 The Working Group recognises the Government’s on-going efforts to manage road traffic congestion through improving transport infrastructure, expanding and improving the PT system, and managing road use. It notes that the Government would continue to pursue these on-going measures, review their effectiveness and explore further improvements.

3.7.2 The Working Group notes that, as explained in **Sections 3.4 – 3.6** above, it is unavoidable that the Government will face different kinds of challenges when going about its tasks, including physical, environmental and social constraints against building more roads, diversified views from relevant stakeholders on the proposed traffic management measures, etc. Not all of the challenges can be as successfully addressed in all cases. To that extent, the effectiveness of the on-going measures in alleviating road traffic congestion is constrained. There is a need for the Government to consider applying other measures or strengthening the existing ones. The focus of the Study is therefore to identify additional measures which can work in conjunction with the on-going measures mentioned in this chapter. The Working Group has studied a number of possibilities from which it has selected 12 measures for recommendation to the Government. The details of these recommended measures are set out in **Chapter 4**.

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## **Chapter 4 – Recommendations**

### **4.1 Overview**

4.1.1 This Chapter explains the needs and urgency to tackle road traffic congestion and the resulting benefits. It also sets out the Working Group's recommended measures, the considerations that have been taken into account in shortlisting these measures, and the suggested implementation timeframe.

### **4.2 Needs and urgency for additional measures**

4.2.1 The Working Group sees an urgent need to tackle road traffic congestion. Hong Kong's vehicle fleet size has been growing at an alarming rate. Over the past ten years, the number of vehicles increased by 30% from 524 000 in 2003 to 681 000 in 2013. Such a growth in vehicle fleet size worsened the traffic situation. The average car journey speed in urban areas dropped by about 11% from 25.6 km/h in 2003 to 22.7 km/h in 2013.

4.2.2 In particular, the car journey speeds on some major traffic corridors during weekday peak hours are recorded to be around or even lower than 10 km/h, such as Chatham Road North (from San Lau Street to Hong Chong Road), Waterloo Road (Ferry Street to Argyle Street), Des Voeux Road West (from Western Street to Connaught Road Central) and Chater Road (from Pedder Street to Murray Road). This is not much faster than the average walking speed of an adult at 4 to 5 km/h.

4.2.3 It has also become increasingly difficult for road users to plan their journeys because of the uncertainty of travel time for the same route. Certain road sections are normally not congested, but could become seriously jammed sporadically. The reason is that the road sections concerned are almost nearly fully used. As such, any small increase in vehicular flow can easily lead to traffic congestion. The uncertainty means that road users will have difficulties in planning their journeys to arrive on time. Depending on the level of traffic congestion, a 20-minute journey may easily take 40 to 60 minutes.

4.2.4 If we allow the vehicle fleet to continue to grow at the present rate of 3.4% (as at September 2014), the total number of vehicles would reach nearly one million in the next 10 years. In other words, there will be some 270 000 (+40%) more vehicles. On the other hand, given the social, physical and environmental constraints on constructing new roads, the expected rate of increase in road length up to 2020 will only be about 0.4% p.a. (**paragraph 2.2.13** refers). With many more cars sharing the limited road space, there will certainly be slower journey speeds and greater uncertainty in journey planning. Our economy and living quality will be adversely affected.

4.2.5 From the environment point of view, more vehicles on the road mean more emission by air pollutants and more noise pollution, causing health concerns. The levels of respirable suspended particulates and NO<sub>2</sub> at the roadside in Hong Kong have remained high over the years. Motor vehicles are the main source of these pollutants at street level and the second largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Hong Kong. From 2009 to 2013, NO<sub>2</sub> levels at roadside have increased by 9%, resulting in an increase in the number of days with the roadside air pollution index reaching the “very high” level (i.e. index exceeding 100) in recent years.

4.2.6 The Working Group’s sense of urgency to tackle traffic congestion is shared by many road users. According to the POS results, about 70% of both the public and drivers agreed that there was a need to control the growth of PCs.

4.2.7 Hong Kong cannot afford to sit still and let the worsening traffic affect our quality of life.

### **4.3 Benefits**

4.3.1 The benefits of an improved traffic condition may be difficult to accurately quantify, but can easily be felt by all road users. It would mean less waiting time for both passengers and motorists. With shorter travelling time, there will be greater mobility. With less time spent on the road, every road user, regardless of their age, social status and occupation, would have greater flexibility to plan their itineraries and pursue their personal interests. For example, with less traffic time spent on going to work, our working population could have more room to pursue work-life balance.



4.3.2 The benefits are not only confined to commuting and travelling on the road. With less congestion and fewer cars on the road, our environment could be improved. For the logistics industry, there will be savings in operating costs (such as fuel costs), as less time is required to deliver goods and services. Everyone can better plan their business and personal itineraries. Everyone stands to benefit.

4.3.3 To give some rough estimates on the benefits of improved traffic condition: if we do nothing now, with an assumption that the current PC growth rate of about 4.5% p.a. is to continue, it is estimated that the average journey speed in urban areas would be decreased by about 15% in 10 years' time, with the amount of greenhouse gases generated increased by more than 20%. If our city is able to slow down the PC growth rate from about 4.5% p.a. to, say 1.5% p.a., both the estimated reduction in average journey speed in urban areas and the estimated increase in greenhouse gases caused by vehicle growth can be lessened by about one-half.

4.3.4 Spatial constraints in Hong Kong impose great difficulty in providing more parking spaces (**paragraph 2.3.5** refers). In the developed urban areas, the problem is more acute because the Government can only take the opportunity when there are new developments or redevelopments to provide more parking spaces, and even when such an opportunity arises, it would take years to materialise a limited number of additional parking spaces. The Working Group notes that the scope to supply adequate parking space in urban area would be limited. Managing car growth could, to a certain extent, address the issue.

4.3.5 The Working Group is acutely aware that some traffic congestion relief measures to bring about the above benefits are not without cost. These measures may entail inconvenience and even extra costs to some road users. However, the Working Group wishes to emphasise that with less congestion, Hong Kong as a whole will stand to benefit, and all road users will in turn benefit from shorter travel time and better environment.

#### **4.4 Recommendations**

4.4.1 The Working Group has considered a host of measures to address road traffic congestion in Hong Kong. In shortlisting the recommendations, the Working Group has, in general, taken into account whether the proposed measures are proven or anticipated to be effective in containing congestion at a territorial level, whether the proposed measures are acceptable to the public at large, and how the proposed measures would affect the relevant stakeholders.

4.4.2 The Working Group has further divided the proposed measures into short, medium and long term. Broadly speaking, short-term measures, if taken forward, may be implemented within one to two years, whereas medium term measures may take up to three to four years to implement. Long-term measures may require further study and hence a longer implementation timeframe.

#### **4.5 Short and medium-term measures**

##### **A. Managing the PC fleet size**

##### **(a) *Raise PC's FRT and ALF***

4.5.1 The continuous increase of traffic density on roads, if unchecked, will further worsen congestion. The difficulty in accommodating the parking needs of the increasing number of cars, especially when land is in scarcity, is also of grave concern.

4.5.2 Indeed, according to the POS results, “too many vehicles on roads” is perceived as the most important cause of road traffic congestion.

4.5.3 Instead of restraining the growth of all vehicles, the Working Group considers that a more targeted approach aiming at PCs should be adopted on the following grounds –

- (a) PCs account for about 70% of the vehicle fleet in 2013 and have been a major contributor to the overall vehicle growth. From 2003 to 2013, the total number of PCs increased by 40% whilst the growth of other types of vehicles was relatively modest (**paragraphs 2.2.5 and 2.2.6**

refer). As of September 2014, the growth rate of the PC fleet stood at an alarming 4.6% p.a.;

- (b) PC is a much less efficient passenger carrier. The carrying capacity of a PC is of no comparison to a PT carrier, yet the PC fleet occupies a large amount of road space. More specifically, buses and light buses carry about 71% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings and only take up about 5% to 25% of the total traffic flow on major roads<sup>1</sup>. By contrast, PCs account for about 40% to 70% of the total traffic flow on most of these major roads, but only carry 16% of the total daily road-based passenger boardings (see **paragraphs 2.2.10 and 2.2.11** for details); and
- (c) PCs are mainly for private use and are not indispensable in most circumstances, given Hong Kong's generally well-developed PT system. By contrast, goods vehicles and PT play a more important role in moving goods and people in our community. According to the Travel Characteristics Survey 2011, close to 90% of the public rely on PT for commuting.

The Working Group notes that according to the POS results, over 60% of the general public and over 70% of drivers consider that PCs should not be given priority to use the roads.

4.5.4 Based on past experiences, increases in FRT<sup>2</sup> and ALF<sup>3</sup> are direct and effective means to curb PC growth. While an increase in FRT will discourage the acquisition of PCs, increase in ALF will add cost to owning an existing one. In 1982, a host of fiscal measures was implemented, including doubling of FRT, trebling of ALF and doubling of fuel tax. Nine to twelve months after the increases, the growth rate of licensed PCs reduced sharply by an average of about

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<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data from 20 major roads during morning peak hours in 2013.

<sup>2</sup> FRT is a tax payable upon the first registration of a motor vehicle, including new and imported second-hand ones. Currently, the FRT for a PC ranges from 40% to 115%, and it is linked to and varies with the incremental taxable value of a PC in four bands.

<sup>3</sup> ALF is a tax-loaded fee payable on an annual basis for licensing a motor vehicle in order that it could be driven on roads in Hong Kong. Currently, ALF for a PC ranges from \$3,815 to \$11,215 depending on the engine capacity. A fuel levy of \$1,460 is also added to ALF for diesel PCs.

18% p.a., from about 10%<sup>4</sup> p.a. to about -8%<sup>5</sup> p.a. In 1991, FRT was increased by about 16%, together with an increase of ALF by 10%. Nine to twelve months after the increases, there was an overall drop in the average annual growth rate of licensed PCs from 9.4%<sup>6</sup> by about 1.7% to 7.7%<sup>7</sup>. More recently in 2011, the FRT was increased by about 15% but without a parallel increase in ALF. Nine to twelve months after the FRT increase, the average annual growth rate for ordinary petrol licensed PCs was reduced from 3.6%<sup>8</sup> by about 1.3% to 2.3%<sup>9</sup>. However, on this occasion, the overall impact to the growth rate of all licensed PCs was severely dampened by the additional concession given to EFPPCs (**paragraphs 4.5.7 to 4.5.9** refer).

4.5.5 Due to the one-off nature of FRT increase and the fact that ALF only constitutes a relatively small percentage of the total average monthly expenses<sup>10</sup> in maintaining and operating a PC, implementing either of these fiscal measures alone will be less effective and long-lasting as anticipated than if both measures were introduced together. Indeed, ALF has not been adjusted since 1991 while the CCPI<sup>11</sup> has increased by about 80% between 1991 and 2013. To manage the growth of the PC fleet<sup>12</sup> more effectively, the Working Group recommends the Government to increase both the FRT and ALF for PCs at the same time.

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<sup>4</sup> This figure is the average value between January 1982 and April 1982.

<sup>5</sup> This figure is the average value between January 1983 and April 1983.

<sup>6</sup> This figure is the average value between November 1990 and February 1991.

<sup>7</sup> This figure is the average value between November 1991 and February 1992.

<sup>8</sup> This figure is the average value between October 2010 and January 2011.

<sup>9</sup> This figure is the average value between October 2011 and January 2012.

<sup>10</sup> According to the Travel Characteristics Survey 2011, ALF only constitutes about 9% of the total average monthly expenses in maintaining and operating a PC.

<sup>11</sup> CCPI measures the changes over time in the price level of consumer goods and services generally purchased by households. It does not represent the change of purchasing power of a car owner over time.

<sup>12</sup> The Working Group is aware that a person's decision to buy and keep a PC will be affected by different factors, including personal need and preference, the overall economic situation, car price in real terms (as affected by currency fluctuation and household income), property market and investment opportunities, etc. Many of these factors fluctuate over time and so it would be difficult to accurately predict consumer behavioural change.

4.5.6 In 2011 the FRT was increased by about 15%, but partly for the reason given in **paragraph 4.5.8** below, the effect was greatly eroded and the current growth rate of PC is already at a very high level of about 4.5% p.a. Hong Kong is now facing a much bigger PC fleet size as compared to 2011. In order to achieve a significant reduction of the growth of PCs and to achieve a more lasting impact, the Working Group considers that there may be a need to impose an FRT increase higher than that of 2011, and that the increase should be equally applicable to EFPPCs. For the proposed ALF increase, the Working Group notes that ALF has not been adjusted for over 20 years and recommends the Government to consider its increase by taking into consideration at least the inflation during the period.

*(b) Tighten up standards for EFPPCs*

4.5.7 EFPPCs refer to petrol PCs with lower emissions and higher fuel efficiency. The main purpose of granting FRT concession to EFPPCs is to encourage vehicle buyers to purchase EFPPCs as compared to ordinary petrol PCs should they find car purchase necessary. To qualify as an EFPPC, a PC has to meet prescribed emission standards and fuel efficiency targets, which are annually reviewed by the Environmental Protection Department to ensure that the tax concession restricts to those PCs with comparatively outstanding environmental performance. As at end of October 2014, there were 35 EFPPC models.

4.5.8 When the EFPPC scheme was first introduced in 2007, the FRT concession was 30% (with a cap at \$50,000 per car). In February 2011, FRT for PCs was increased by 15% but at the same time concession for newly registered EFPPCs increased from 30% (with a cap at \$50,000 per car) to 45% (with a cap at \$75,000 per car). This has more or less nullified the FRT increase for EFPPCs. Many potential buyers switched to buy EFPPCs, leading to an average annual growth rate of about 64%<sup>13</sup> for EFPPC nine to twelve months after the FRT increase<sup>14</sup>. This is in sharp contrast to the average growth rate of

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<sup>13</sup> This figure is the average value between October 2011 and January 2012.

<sup>14</sup> In April 2013, EPD tightened the standards for EFPPCs and hence reduced the number of qualifying models. The growth of EFPPCs has slightly slowed down. As at September 2014, EFPPCs constitute about 18% (from 1 January 2014 to 30 September 2014) of newly registered petrol PCs.

ordinary petrol PCs, which slowed down from 3.6% p.a.<sup>15</sup> before the FRT increase to 2.3% p.a.<sup>16</sup> nine to twelve months after the FRT increase.

4.5.9 The Working Group considers that from a congestion control point of view, an EFPPC is no different from an ordinary PC. Further, in environmental terms, EFPPCs still contribute to roadside air pollution as they are not with zero emission. The Working Group thus recommends the Government to continue to tighten up the qualifying standard for EFPPCs and avoid raising the FRT concession further. There may even be a case to abolish the EFPPC scheme and make FRT concession only available to electric vehicles<sup>17</sup>, which have zero emissions.

**(c) *Raise “fuel levy” for diesel PCs***

4.5.10 In 1982, the fuel tax on petrol was increased by \$0.7 per litre, but there was no corresponding increase of fuel tax on diesel after due consideration of the operation costs of PT. Noting that diesel PCs would inadvertently be benefitted from such a fuel tax arrangement, \$1,000 was added to the ALF for diesel PCs in the form of a “fuel levy” to “neutralise” the fuel tax gain. The amount of “fuel levy” was subsequently adjusted in tandem with the increases in ALF from 1987 to 1991.

4.5.11 Since 2008, the fuel tax for Euro V diesel has been reduced to zero to facilitate the commercial vehicle trade and to encourage them to use cleaner fuel. The policy intention of reducing the duty rate on diesel was clearly not to benefit PCs.

4.5.12 Nonetheless, given that diesel is tax free while the fuel tax for petrol is currently set at \$6.06 per litre, a PC owner could achieve cost savings if he/ she opts to use a diesel PC instead of a petrol one. Based on the amount of fuel consumed by reference to the average PC mileage as obtained in the Travel Characteristics Survey 2011, it is estimated that the tax savings achieved by using a diesel PC would be about \$4,720 per year. The current level of “fuel levy” in

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<sup>15</sup> This figure is the average value between October 2010 and January 2011.

<sup>16</sup> This figure is the average value between October 2011 and January 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Electric vehicles are currently exempted from paying FRT until 31 March 2017.

ALF at \$1,460, which has not been adjusted since 1991, is no longer sufficient to “neutralise” the fuel cost savings gained for using diesel PCs.

4.5.13 Although the current number of licensed diesel PCs only accounts for a small percentage of the total PC fleet, the growth rate in recent years has become a potential cause for concern. For the past year, it registered a 57% growth, from 1 974 in August 2013 to 3 107 in August 2014. There are also more models at various price ranges to cater for the market need.

4.5.14 The Working Group is mindful that any proposed increase in ALF will be offset by recurrent fuel cost savings if motorists opt to use diesel PCs, thus diluting, if not nullifying, the desired effect to manage PC growth. As such, the Working Group recommends that the diesel levy should be revised upwards accordingly to reflect the possible fuel cost savings.

4.5.15 The Working Group considers that the legislative amendments to effect the above recommendations concerning PC fleet control could be introduced into the Legislative Council (“LegCo”) within a comparatively short timeframe and hence recommends these three measures as short-term measures. While the POS results show that close to half of the general public and drivers surveyed accept the general policy of increasing the cost of owning or using PCs, the Working Group will not underestimate the difficulties in obtaining the support from the public and LegCo to endorse the proposed increase. Certain stakeholders would undeniably be affected financially. Nonetheless, the Working Group would like to urge the public and our lawmakers to lend their support to these fiscal measures, which have been proven effective in curbing vehicle growth and easing road traffic congestion. The Working Group is certain that our community as a whole would benefit by reducing the number of vehicles on the road.

## **B. Efficient use of limited road space**

4.5.16 Containing the growth of PC fleet is to alleviate road congestion through reducing the demand on our limited road space. On the supply side, in view of the limitations in expanding our road network, the Working Group considers that it is of equal importance to put the available road space to best use through traffic management measures. The Working Group notes that the Government has already implemented a host of on-going traffic management

measures to this end, which are detailed in **Chapter 3**. Nevertheless, the Working Group considers that the following two additional measures should be adopted to further enhance the efficiency in using road space.

*(a) Start planning for a congestion charging pilot scheme*

4.5.17 The Working Group considers that a very effective way to tackle congestion in a particularly congested area is to put in place a congestion charging (or ERP) scheme.

4.5.18 ERP is a traffic management tool aiming at reducing congestion at a designated area by adopting the “user pays principle”, i.e. charging motorists for entering the designated area at busy times of the day and encouraging travellers to switch to PT or change their routes. With less traffic entering the designated area, journey speeds can be increased. As an added benefit, air and noise pollution associated with the use of vehicles will be reduced.

4.5.19 Hitherto, the Government has conducted three studies on ERP to address road traffic congestion. Due to changes in economic situation at the time of the studies, privacy concerns and the lack of community consensus, ERP was not taken forward. One of the major findings of previous studies is that a road pricing scheme can be implemented equitably and effectively only if alternative routes which have adequate capacity for motorists to bypass the charging zone are available. The Government has indicated that with the targeted commissioning of the CWB, motorists whose destination is not Central District will be provided with an alternative route to bypass the charged areas, and that the Government would then in a better position to consider the possibility of ERP application in Central District.

4.5.20 The Working Group notes that while the concept of ERP remains a novel one for many road users in Hong Kong and there is not yet a consensus<sup>18</sup> over its use, ERP or similar charging schemes have already been successfully implemented in a number of overseas cities, e.g. London, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Singapore. The Working Group considers that the Government should start planning for an ERP scheme by developing a conceptual plan for engagement with the public and relevant stakeholders. The conceptual plan

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<sup>18</sup> As shown in the POS results, there is a similar degree of support for and objection against ERP.



could cover the scheme objective, charging zone, charging period, charging rates, charging technology, impact on various activities (such as PT operations, commercial activities, and movement of residents within the charging zone), as well as whether and how exemptions and/ or concession should be provided, etc. The Working Group acknowledges that public consultation is necessary and the Government may revise the details of the scheme in the light of feedback received.

4.5.21 Regarding the designation of a charging zone, the Working Group agrees that the Central District could be a suitable location for a pilot scheme, based on the following considerations –

- (a) Central District is the central business district of Hong Kong. It plays a strategic and symbolic function in our society;
- (b) severe road congestion often occurs on the main road sections in Central, sometimes causing grid-lock in the surrounding road networks, affecting neighbouring districts; and
- (c) the commissioning of CWB will provide an alternative route for motorists to bypass the charging zone.

4.5.22 In planning for a possible ERP pilot scheme in the Central District, the Working Group considers that the Government should explore complementary measures to facilitate road users, e.g. introducing shuttle buses to run circular routes in the Central District to help reduce the number of vehicles entering the area. The Working Group notes that the operation periods and routings for the shuttle bus should be carefully drawn up in order to attract patronage without worsening the traffic condition. Financial viability of the shuttle bus operation also requires careful examination.

4.5.23 As the implementation of an ERP scheme is not straightforward, sufficient time must be allowed for the Government to fully engage the public before the launch of any scheme. As such, the Working Group suggests the Government to engage the public as soon as possible for the planning of an ERP scheme, recognising that it would take longer time to conduct detailed planning for the implementation of the scheme.

**(b) *Increase meter parking charges***

4.5.24 Currently, there are some 18 200 on-street metered parking spaces<sup>19</sup> in Hong Kong; these are intended for short-term parking only. Motorists requiring parking for a longer period of time should use off-street car parks. The Working Group understands that it is the Government's policy objective to maintain a 15% vacancy rate for on-street parking spaces in an area at any time to meet motorists' short-term need.

4.5.25 As metered parking is more convenient and in most cases much cheaper than nearby commercial car parks, it is not uncommon for vehicles to circulate on roads in busy areas looking for on-street parking. Sometimes, some motorists would even double park for a prolonged period to wait for on-street parking spaces, such activities cause obstructions to normal traffic flow. This is certainly not an efficient and effective use of our limited road space.

4.5.26 The maximum fee for metered parking is \$2 per 15 minutes (equivalent to \$8 per hour)<sup>20</sup>, as stipulated in the Road Traffic (Parking) Regulations (Cap. 374C). This maximum fee has been in force since 1994, and has not been adjusted since then.

4.5.27 In 1999, the Government proposed to increase the maximum fee of \$2 per 15 minutes to \$4 per 15 minutes. However, the relevant legislative amendment proposal was voted down by LegCo. While LegCo noted the Government's explanation that one of the objectives of the proposed increase at that time was to help achieve maintaining a 15% availability of metered parking spaces, some LegCo members were concerned about the possible knock-on effect of the proposal on the charges in private car parks.

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<sup>19</sup> There are about 15 250 on-street metered parking spaces for PCs/ vans, about 2 300 for goods vehicles and about 630 for buses/ coaches.

<sup>20</sup> While the statutory ceiling of parking fees is \$2 per 15 minutes, the fees for parking meters are determined having regard to a host of factors including the parking demand, the location and public sentiments. For example, for parking spaces in more remote locations or with lower utilisation, a lower fee (such as \$2 per 30 minutes) will be charged.

4.5.28 The Working Group notes that charges in private car parks have increased manifold despite the fact that the metered parking fee has remained the same for the past 20 years. Indeed, the CCPI increased by 40% from 1994 to 2013.

4.5.29 Given the very low current fee level (\$8 per hour at the maximum), the Working Group considers that there is a case to raise on-street metered parking charges, in order to discourage motorists from circulating/ double parking on roads waiting for metered parking spaces. This will have the added benefit of discouraging long-term parking at metered parking spaces.

4.5.30 The Working Group considers that the Government could introduce the necessary legislative amendments into LegCo within the coming year and hence recommends this as a short-term measure.

### **C. Stringent penalty and enforcement of traffic offences**

4.5.31 Effective enforcement against congestion-related offences is indispensable in ensuring that our road space is put to good use. Given its importance, the subject on traffic offence penalty and enforcement is discussed separately under this section.

4.5.32 Currently, enforcement against traffic offences is performed by police officers and traffic wardens, both under the management of the Police. Statistics-wise, the number of fixed penalty tickets issued for congestion-related offences increased by 98%, from about 524 000 in 2003 to about 1 035 000 in 2013<sup>21</sup>. The bulk of these tickets was issued against illegal parking, from about 506 000 in 2003 to about 1 020 000 in 2013 (registering an increase of 100%).

4.5.33 Despite the increase in the number of fixed tickets issued, there is a general perception that enforcement against congestion-related offences has been rather lenient, resulting in the proliferation of contravention, thus aggravating road traffic congestion.

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<sup>21</sup> The statistics here show the number of fixed penalty tickets issued for offences under the Fixed Penalty (Traffic Contraventions) Ordinance (Cap. 237), and offences of “Unlawfully entering yellow box junction”, “Loading/ unloading goods in a restricted zone” and “Picking up/ setting down passengers in a restricted zone” under the Fixed Penalty (Criminal Proceedings) Ordinance (Cap. 240).

4.5.34 The Working Group appreciates that the strength of enforcement has been constrained by various factors: manpower resources of the Police have been drained to other duties of competing priorities, public expectation on enforcement work has grown tremendously in recent years, and the level of fixed penalty has lost its deterrent effect, etc.

4.5.35 The Working Group recommends adopting the following measures (ranging from short to medium term) to strengthen enforcement –

- (a) enhance publicity and education efforts to promote compliance with traffic rules and regulations;
- (b) raise the fixed penalty charges for congestion-related offences to restore the deterrent effect;
- (c) adopt a stricter approach and seek additional resources to enforce congestion-related offences by the Police; and
- (d) make further use of information technology in enforcement.

**(a) *Step up education and publicity***

4.5.36 The Working Group considers that a more fundamental way to bring about law-abiding behaviour of road users is through continuous education and publicity. Although the effects may not be immediate, the Working Group trusts that education and publicity efforts would bring a lasting impact – as the saying goes, “sow a thought and you reap an action, sow an act and you reap a habit”.

4.5.37 In recent years, the Road Safety Council<sup>22</sup> has been conducting road safety campaigns under different themes, namely “anti-drink driving”, “anti-drug driving”, “cycling safe”, “elderly pedestrian safety” and “driving attentively”. Messages are disseminated through various channels, e.g. announcements of public interests through television and radio broadcasting, banners on flyovers,

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<sup>22</sup> The Road Safety Council is a government advisory body consisting of government officials and community members. It is responsible for formulating road safety publicity and education strategies, and organising road safety campaigns to sustain public awareness and compliance with safety rules on the road.

advertisements on bus bodies and MTR stations, stickers on parking meters, bulletins, websites and education programmes.

4.5.38 The Government is recommended to enhance its publicity and education efforts. Two key messages should be promoted. First, road users, property owners, business operators, LegCo and District Council members and the Government should all make a joint effort to alleviate traffic congestion. Second, even though some congestion relief measures may entail inconveniences, even financial consequences to certain quarters of the community, it is nonetheless for the benefits of the whole society. More details are set out in **Chapter 5**. The Working Group considers that education and publicity efforts could be stepped up quickly; it thus recommends this as a short-term measure.

***(b) Restore deterrent effect of fixed penalty for congestion-related offences***

4.5.39 The current fixed penalty charges are set at \$320 or \$450 for congestion-related offences, such as illegal parking, loading/ unloading goods or picking up/setting down passengers in restricted zones, etc. These offences are set out under the Fixed Penalty (Traffic Contraventions) Ordinance (Cap. 237) and the Fixed Penalty (Criminal Proceedings) Ordinance (Cap. 240). Such levels have not been adjusted since 1994. While we note that the costs of living vary among different cities, our city's penalty levels are comparatively lower than some overseas cities<sup>23</sup>. The Government's last attempt to amend the law to raise the penalty level in 1999 was not approved by LegCo.

4.5.40 From 1994 to 2013, the CCPI increased by about 40%. The deterrent effects of fixed penalty charges have no doubt been gradually eroded over time due to inflation and the increase in income level. Indeed, the Working Group notes that some motorists opt for personal convenience and blatantly park illegally on busy roads, turning a blind eye to the traffic obstruction caused. To restore the deterrent effect of the fixed penalty and to catch up with inflation over the years, the Working Group considers that Government should raise the fixed penalty charges by at least 40%.

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<sup>23</sup> In the cases of London, Sydney and New York, the fixed penalty charges for parking and congestion related offences vary with the severity of contraventions. For more severe offences which would likely cause obstruction to traffic (e.g. double parking, disobeying "no stopping" restrictions), the fixed penalty in London is £130 (about \$1,600), in Sydney AUS\$242 (about \$1,600) and in New York US\$115 (about \$890).

4.5.41 To further strengthen the deterrent effect, the Working Group has examined the following options –

- (a) introducing a tier system of fixed penalty with heavier penalty for repeated offenders; or
- (b) imposing penalty points under the Driving-Offence Points System<sup>24</sup> for contravention against congestion-related offences. The Working Group notes that Singapore has put in place a “Driver Improvement Points System”, which is similar to our Driving-Offence Points System, whereby offenders of certain congestion-related offences will be imposed with demerit points.

4.5.42 Having carefully examined the pros and cons of the above two options, in particular the possible strong concerns of the commercial transport operators and the need to study in greater detail the related operational arrangements, the Working Group considers that the Government should first raise the fixed penalty charge. In case the deterrent effect of the fixed penalty system is still not strong enough, the Government could then review the need to pursue other measures (including the two options in **paragraph 4.5.41** above).

4.5.43 The Working Group considers that the Government could introduce into LegCo the necessary legislative amendments to raise the fixed penalty level within the coming year, and hence recommends this as a short-term measure.

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<sup>24</sup> This system is designed to deter habitual traffic offenders and to improve standards of driving in order to reduce the accident toll. When drivers commit traffic offences connected with road safety (listed in the Schedule of the Road Traffic (Driving-offence Points) Ordinance (Cap. 375)), in addition to the penalties, they will incur driving-offence points that ranges from three to 10. When drivers incur 10 or more points within two years, they would be required by law to attend a Driving Improvement Course. When drivers incur 15 or more points within two years, they can be disqualified from driving by a court from three months to six months.

*(c) Strengthen enforcement action*

4.5.44 The Working Group notes that the Police have recently revised the Selective Traffic Enforcement Policy (“STEP”)<sup>25</sup> to take more stringent enforcement action against double parking. Frontline police officers have been directed that they may now take enforcement action against drivers causing obstruction by double parking, without the need to issue a verbal warning even if the driver is at the wheel. The Working Group welcomes such move.

4.5.45 To further step up enforcement, the Working Group understands that extra manpower and financial resources will be required. In particular, there is a diversion of police resources arising from the changes in social conditions in recent years. As a result, enforcement actions against congestion-related offences might not be of the highest priority amid the many police duties.

4.5.46 Despite the above, the Working Group urges the Police to consider how enforcement could be further strengthened. In some particularly congested areas, the Police should take enforcement action which has greater deterrent effect. For example, where appropriate, consideration could be given to issue fixed penalty tickets without any prior warning.

4.5.47 The Working Group notes that the serving number of traffic wardens may sometimes fall short of the establishment because of the lapse between recruitment cycles. Action has been taken by the Police to shorten the duration between the recruitment cycles so as to maintain the traffic warden cadre at its full strength as far as possible. The Working Group considers that the possibility of expanding the establishment of the traffic wardens should also be explored.

4.5.48 The Working Group sees the urgency to step up enforcement, and hence recommending this as a short-term measure.

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<sup>25</sup> STEP sets priorities for traffic enforcement, which is updated and audited on a regular basis. The primary aim is to enhance road safety through prevention of traffic accidents and maintenance of smooth traffic flow.

***(d) Make more use of information technology in enforcement***

4.5.49 The Working Group recognises that there is a limit on how much additional manpower resources the Police could allocate to tackle road traffic congestion. There is therefore a need to make more use of information technology to streamline the enforcement process. The Working Group understands that the Police are running a trial scheme to issue fixed penalty tickets through an e-ticketing system. The Working Group notes that the Government will take forward the legislative amendments to effect the e-ticketing system, subject to a successful trial run and the availability of resources. The system is expected to be rolled out in 2017. The Working Group considers it a move in the right direction.

4.5.50 Another area where the use of technology could be further explored concerns the enforcement of a road marking commonly known as the “yellow-box junction”<sup>26</sup>. The Working Group notes that motorists’ failure to comply with this road marking has sometimes caused traffic congestion at junctions. It would be useful if technology could be applied to help enforce against obstruction at yellow-box junctions. Nonetheless, the development of yellow-box cameras technology for enforcement purpose is still at a preliminary stage and its application is not yet tested in other parts of the world. The Working Group considers that the Government could engage the information technology sector or tertiary institutions to explore and develop the use of yellow-box cameras, having regard to local circumstances.

4.5.51 Given the time required to explore the feasibility of various technologies, the Working Group recommends this as a medium to long-term measure.

4.5.52 The Working Group recognises that most of the short and medium-term recommended measures entail financial consequences. These measures are considered necessary in view of the worsening traffic congestion. The other alternatives explored are not as direct and effective in containing car growth and ensuring efficient use of road space. The Working Group opines that the Government must strengthen education and publicity efforts to complement these

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<sup>26</sup> A motorist should not drive a vehicle into a yellow-box junction unless he/ she will be able to drive the vehicle wholly out of the yellow-box junction immediately. The purpose is to avoid any blockage of the road junction by vehicles.



measures. The Working Group also proposes a number of long-term measures for the Government to study further.

#### **4.6 Long-term measures**

##### **(a) *Review parking policy and disseminate real-time information on parking vacancies***

4.6.1 The Government's policy on parking provision is to provide sufficient parking spaces to meet demand, but at a level which will not unduly attract potential passengers to opt for PCs in lieu of PT. For example, for developments that are close to railway stations and major PTIs, parking spaces required to be provided by the developer will be fewer.

4.6.2 Generally speaking, lower parking provision will increase the inconvenience of owning and using a vehicle. As far as PCs are concerned, arguably it may be possible to restrain car growth through a conscious under-provision of parking spaces, in particular at home end.

4.6.3 The Working Group notes that parking spaces are essential to those who need to drive, as well as to the operation of commercial transport operators. At a practical level, under-provision of parking spaces may lead to illegal parking, which may cause obstruction to traffic flow and pose a further strain on police enforcement resources. Socially, reducing the supply of parking spaces may lead to speculation. The Working Group notes that the prices of parking spaces are already not low in certain districts of Hong Kong. Further increase in the prices of parking spaces might result in social grievances. Indeed, the POS results show that 55% of the general public and 84% of drivers object to reducing the supply of parking spaces.

4.6.4 As such, it is most important to find out the optimum level of parking provision to restrain car growth without bringing too many adverse consequences. The Working Group considers that the Government should conduct a detailed review of the parking policy, in which various stakeholders and the general public should be fully engaged.

4.6.5 To reduce the need for motorists to circulate on roads looking for available parking spaces and causing more congestion, the Working Group considers that the Government should examine how to provide motorists with real-time information on the vacancies in off-street car parks in nearby areas. Given that the majority of public car parks are owned and operated by the commercial sector, the Working Group appreciates that the Government would need to solicit the cooperation from relevant operators who may not be willing to share commercially sensitive information. Nonetheless, the Working Group would like to urge the Government to continue exploring different ways to garner the operators' support.

***(b) Encourage on-street loading and unloading outside peak hours***

4.6.6 Hong Kong is a vibrant city with big and small shops opening for long hours throughout the year and in every street corner. The need for loading and unloading of goods is immense. However, many old buildings which house these shops and businesses were built according to the then prevailing building standards which did not mandate the provision of internal loading and unloading facilities. As such, the loading/ unloading of goods have to be done on-street.

4.6.7 At the same time, given our limited road space, it is difficult to make available adequate and suitable on-street loading/unloading bays to accommodate these needs, particularly in urban areas. Deliveries of goods for different businesses are sometimes bundled up at a certain time of the day (e.g. during peak hours) to meet business needs. As a result, prolonged or illegal loading and unloading activities obstruct traffic flow, further aggravating the congestion problem. The problem is more acute in some parts of the urban areas, where there are more old buildings which lack internal loading/ unloading facilities and where the roads are narrow.

4.6.8 The Working Group recognises that on-street loading and unloading activities are an important component of our economy. The question is how to minimise the impact of these economic activities on road traffic, which will in turn achieve cost saving and efficiency in goods delivery as delivery vehicles could spend less time on the road and deliver to more shops — a win-win solution.

4.6.9 The Working Group notes that some overseas cities like Sydney and London encourage loading and servicing to take place outside peak hours. This can help ease congestion in the central business district.

4.6.10 As a long-term measure, the Working Group considers that the Government should examine how to encourage and facilitate local businesses to carry out more on-street loading and unloading outside peak hours. In particular, this arrangement could be built in as a feature of the ERP pilot scheme (**paragraphs 4.5.17 to 4.5.23** refer). For example, differential charging for peak and non-peak hours may provide an incentive for operators to switch to off-peak delivery within a charged zone.

**(c) *Provide more PnR facilities***

4.6.11 PnR car parks allow motorists to drop off their cars at transport hubs to switch to PT. These car parks are usually located at the suburbs or fringe of city centres, thus reducing the amount of traffic entering the more congested parts of the city. The POS results show that 81% of drivers and 67% of the general public support the provision of more PnR car parks as a means to alleviate traffic congestion.

4.6.12 The Working Group notes that there are already a number of such car parks in Hong Kong<sup>27</sup> but not all of them are well-utilised. Whether a PnR car park could attract patronage depends very much on its location, connection to PT, parking fees and conditions of usage. While the Working Group appreciates that there are physical constraints in identifying suitable locations at the fringe of congested areas to build more PnR car parks, it would like to urge the Government to explore every possibility to do so, particularly in future railway projects, as well as urban redevelopment and new development projects. The Government should also examine how to enhance the patronage of these car parks.

4.6.13 PnR facilities may also be provided to cyclists in new towns and NDAs for them to connect to PT. The Working Group notes the Government has been

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<sup>27</sup> There are currently 11 PnR car parks located at or near MTR stations, seven of them, at or near Hong Kong Station, Kowloon Station, Tsing Yi Station, Choi Hung Station, Kam Sheung Road Station, Hung Hom Station and Sheung Shui Station, are either managed by TD or the MTRCL, whilst the remaining four, namely at or near Olympic Station, Hang Hau Station, Wu Kai Sha Station and Tuen Mun Station, are managed by private companies.

providing bicycle parking spaces near PTIs and MTR stations in new towns and NDAs. The Working Group recommends the Government to continue to strengthen its efforts on this front where feasible.

#### **4.7 Other measures**

##### ***(a) Separate studies to be/ being considered by Government***

4.7.1 Apart from the above short, medium and long-term measures, the Working Group has examined a number of other measures, most of which are related to the provision of PT services and improvements to the traffic conditions at road harbour crossings. They are not detailed in this report because the Working Group notes that –

- (a) these issues require in-depth studies and hence fall outside the scope of the Working Group's study, which is of limited duration; and
- (b) the Government has already undertaken to conduct the necessary studies.

4.7.2 On PT, the Working Group considers that if motorists are to be encouraged not to own and/ or use PCs, PT services must be further improved in terms of availability, accessibility, as well as dissemination of information so that motorists would have attractive alternatives when they commute. The Working Group notes that the Government has already announced commencing the PTSS to examine various aspects of our PT system, including the inter-modal coordination among different types of PT modes. The Working Group understands that some of the issues discussed in the Working Group meetings would be further explored under the PTSS.

4.7.3 On the three road harbour crossings, the Working Group notes that the Government has announced its plan to revisit the rationalisation of their utilisation through toll adjustment in around 2017, upon the transfer of ownership of the Eastern Harbour Crossing to the Government and the commissioning of the CWB. The Working Group urges the Government to conduct a timely review and, if necessary, explore the feasibility of building another cross-harbour

road connection for long-term need in association with strategic new developments.

***(b) Measures not recommended at this stage***

4.7.4 The Working Group has also considered the following measures –

- (a) introducing a vehicle quota system to restrict number of vehicle licences issued;
- (b) introducing rationing schemes to restrict the number of vehicles on the road, such as only allowing vehicles with car plates ending in odd or even numbers to travel on alternate days of the month;
- (c) raising fuel tax to discourage motorists to make unnecessary trips;
- (d) promoting the use of car-pooling/ car-sharing, such as by imposing single rider surcharge for PCs at tunnels; and
- (e) strengthening enforcement against congestion related offences by contracting out the enforcement work to the private sector.

4.7.5 Some of the above-mentioned measures have been adopted by other cities and have achieved various degrees of success in easing road traffic congestion. For example, Singapore and Shanghai adopt a vehicle quota bidding system, while Beijing issues licences by drawing lots and adopts a rationing scheme to restrict the number of vehicles on the road during weekdays. In Japan, enforcement against illegal parking is outsourced to private contractors.

4.7.6 Nonetheless, the Working Group considers that these more draconian measures, though somehow effective in other cities, may not be suitable for introduction into Hong Kong at this stage. For example, increase in fuel tax would have implications for the transport trades. Outsourcing of enforcement against congestion related offences to private service providers could be controversial. Indeed, some cities (such as the Hull City in the United Kingdom), which have previously privatised the illegal-parking enforcement work, have ceased the arrangement.

4.7.7 That said, the Working Group wishes to point out that should our city's traffic condition continue to deteriorate after the Government has implemented the recommended additional measures, the Government may need to revisit some of these more drastic options at a later stage. Given the controversy involved, the Government should fully engage relevant stakeholders and the public throughout the process.

\* \* \* \* \*

## Chapter 5 – A Joint Effort

### 5.1 Overview

5.1.1 This Chapter explains how different sectors of the community could join hands to tackle road traffic congestion, and the importance for enhanced efforts in publicity and education.

### 5.2 A joint effort

5.2.1 Hong Kong always takes pride in its efficiency. We aspire to have a highly efficient road network to align with the city pace. Achieving this aspiration as our city continues to grow and develop may not be easy, but could be done when all of us, in our respective capacities, join hands to work together.

#### *Road users*

5.2.2. For individual road users, the simple acts of following traffic rules and regulations as part of our civic duty, and being more considerate to the needs of other road users can already make a huge difference to the traffic flow.

5.2.3 Small change in habit helps too. For example, instead of driving their own cars, motorists could consider car-pooling when attending social gatherings. Parents can also set a good example for their children – instead of circulating on the road or even double parking when picking up children from school, they can take PT or park their cars in nearby car parks. When done at an aggregate level, all these simple yet good practices can reduce the number of cars running on the road and lower roadside emissions.

#### *Property owners and business operators*

5.2.4 Prolonged on-street loading and unloading activities, especially in some parts of the urban areas, reduce road capacity and further aggravate congestion. The Working Group notes that TD has been trying to tackle the problem by employing traffic management measures (see **paragraphs 3.6.2 to 3.6.5**).

However, in some cases, the implementation of these measures faces resistance from the affected property owners and business operators.

5.2.5 The Working Group appeals to the affected parties to view these traffic management measures from a broader perspective. For example, relocating a layby may cause immediate inconvenience to loading/ unloading activities, but it could bring about an overall improvement to the local traffic, which will in turn benefit the affected parties through, say quicker delivery of goods. Business operators could also help to alleviate traffic congestion by arranging kerbside loading and unloading activities during non-peak hours.

### ***LegCo and District Councils***

5.2.6 As with the case of other public policies, formulation and implementation of traffic management measures entail a delicate balance between the overall benefits of such measures to the community and the impact on the stakeholders. Take the bus route rationalisation being pursued by the Government as an example. While such proposals can bring about a number of benefits - increasing the efficiency of bus network, relieving the pressure on fare increase, as well as lessening road traffic congestion, it is not uncommon that these proposals are met with local resistance as they necessitate amalgamation and cancellation of bus routes, and a change of travelling habit on the part of passengers.

5.2.7 The Working Group looks to the members of LegCo and District Councils to continue to perform the role as a bridge between the Government and the people. Apart from reflecting the voices of those whom they represent, they shoulder also the important responsibility of advancing the well-being of the community as a whole. The Working Group appeals to members of LegCo and District Councils to help their constituents to understand the long-term benefits of some unpopular yet essential traffic management measures.

### ***Government***

5.2.8 The Working Group notes that the Government has been adopting a three-pronged approach to enhance the city's mobility - improving the transport infrastructure, expanding and improving the PT system, and managing road use (please refer to **Chapter 3**). The Working Group agrees that the Government



should continue with these on-going efforts and work closely with relevant stakeholders in reviewing their effectiveness and seeking further improvements.

5.2.9 That said, for the reasons examined in **Chapter 3**, the effectiveness of the on-going measures are constrained. The Working Group urges the Government to be more innovative exploring and adopting new measures to tackle congestion. The increased application of new technology to traffic management and enforcement, as well as the promotion of walking and cycling for short-distance commuting in new towns and NDAs (the considerations are explained in **Chapter 3**), are steps in the right direction.

5.2.10 As well, the Government needs to be prepared to take forward measures such as ERP which, although doubtless controversial, will be effective in tackling congestion. The Working Group urges the Government to work closely with relevant stakeholders to press ahead with well-justified congestion relief proposals.

### **5.3 Publicity and education**

5.3.1 If innovation nurtures the seed of congestion relief measures and determination is the will to plant the seed, publicity and education are the fertilisers to ensure the steady growth of the plant.

5.3.2. The Working Group considers it essential to put in place effective publicity and education programmes to raise the community's awareness of the importance to keep our city moving and how each of us could help. The Working Group suggests that the Government could promote two key messages –

- (a) *Joint effort*: it takes everyone to work together in tackling congestion; and
- (b) *Inconvenience is for a worthwhile cause*: some of the proposed measures to ease congestion may entail inconvenience and even financial consequences to certain quarters of the community, but it is for the benefits of the whole community.

5.3.3 The Working Group would also like to underline the importance and usefulness of educating the younger generation. The road safety song many of us learnt in our youth – “Don’t run but always watch before you walk ‘cause the road is dangerous as a tiger’s mouth. Obey the traffic rules. Priority to safety is the key to longevity.” (「慢慢走，勿亂跑，馬路如虎口，交通規則要遵守，安全第一，命長久。」) still strikes a chord nowadays. If Hong Kong people, starting from a younger age, could internalise the need to observe traffic regulations and the benefit of using PT and walking, the need for tackling road congestion will hopefully be less pressing one day. Educating children will also bring about additional benefits as they can have positive influence on their family members. To achieve the desired effects, more lively use of promotion means attuned to the younger generation, such as social media, should be used.

5.3.4 Apart from targeting the general public and the younger generation, the Government could also work closely with different transport trades to solicit the support of professional drivers to alleviate road traffic congestion.

## **5.4 Sustaining our competitiveness**

5.4.1 Hong Kong, being a world-class city, has been striving to maintain and enhance our competitiveness. Roads serve the important function of carrying people and goods around the city, which are like blood vessels circulating nutrients to feed our body. An efficient road network is important to a city’s health as it facilitates people’s movement and economic activities. Conversely, congestion erodes the health of our city in ways much more than prolonged travel time.

5.4.2 Mobility has increasingly become an important attribute in defining the living quality and attractiveness of a city<sup>1</sup>. Air quality is another issue which is close to the hearts of the city dwellers. By improving road traffic congestion, we could gain mobility and reduce roadside pollutants in one go. This will certainly help attract more overseas talents and business investment in Hong Kong. The Working Group therefore appeals to all members of the community

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<sup>1</sup> For example, under the Global Liveable Cities Index, quality of the land traffic and transport network, as well as air quality are among the indicators to be looked at in ranking the liveability of major cities. Another example is the Mercer Quality of Living Survey, which takes into account transport and health among other considerations in ranking cities where multi-national companies decide to open offices or plants, and how much to pay employees.

to work together to contain road traffic congestion and sustain our city's competitiveness.

5.4.3 The Working Group urges the Government to study and consider the recommendations of this Report. The Working Group hopes that the Government would accept the recommendations and implement them as soon as practicable.

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**Working Group on Road Traffic Congestion  
formed under Transport Advisory Committee**

**Membership**

Chairman : Mr. KWOK Lam-kwong, Larry, BBS, JP

Members : Mr. FEE Chung-ming, Johnny, JP

Mr. HO Kam-wing, Richard

Ms. LAU Yuk-kuen

Mr. LEUNG Hoi-kwok, Edward

Prof. LO Hong-kam

Prof. LOO Pui-ying, Becky

Ms. NARDI Kar-wai, Agnes

Dr. NG Cho-nam, SBS, JP

Mr. WAN Wai-hei, Wesley

## Transport Advisory Committee

### Membership

Chairman : Mr KWOK Lam-kwong, Larry, BBS, JP  
Members : Prof. CHONG Tai-leung  
Mr. FEE Chung-ming, Johnny, JP  
Mr. HO Kam-wing, Richard  
Mr. HUNG Chung-yam, JP  
Ms. LAU Yuk-kuen  
Mr. LEUNG Hoi-kwok, Edward  
Prof. LO Hong-kam  
Prof. LOO Pui-ying, Becky  
Ms. Shalini MAHTANI  
Ms. NARDI Kar-wai, Agnes  
Dr. NG Cho-nam, SBS, JP  
Mr. WAN Wai-hei, Wesley  
Mr. YAN King-shun, Peter  
Mr. YIP Siu-hong, Nelson, MH  
Permanent Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) or his representative  
Commissioner for Transport  
Commissioner of Police or his representative

### Terms of Reference

To advise the Chief Executive-in-Council on transport matters in accordance with the following principles:-

1. The TAC's function is to advise the Chief Executive in Council on broad issues of transport policy with a view to improving the movement of both people and freight.
2. On any matter within its terms of reference, the TAC is free to communicate with members of the public and with any organization.
3. The TAC may consider financial matters where they directly relate to transport, but the responsibility for proposing public expenditure and taxation lies solely with the administration.
4. The Secretary for Transport and Housing will provide a secretariat for the TAC and will be responsible for administration in connection with it.
5. The TAC will be free to form sub-committees, to participate in joint-committees with other bodies, and to co-opt members for specific purposes. It may organize its work in whatever manner it considers most suitable.
6. The Chief Secretary for Administration may, after consultation with the TAC and the Chief Executive-in-Council, amend the terms of reference from time to time.

## Public Opinion Survey on Road Traffic Congestion

### 1. Introduction

1.1 The POS on road traffic congestion was conducted to collect public views on the road traffic congestion situation in Hong Kong and the major causes, as well as to assess public acceptance on various measures for addressing road traffic congestion. The POS was conducted by an independent market research company. The actual survey work was carried out from 14 July 2014 to 10 August 2014, during which 6 000 telephone interviews of the general public and 3 010 face-to-face interviews of six target groups of drivers were conducted. **Table 1** shows the distribution of the successful interviews. The survey data from the interviews were then grossed up to better represent the entire population and the drivers<sup>1</sup>.

**Table 1: Distribution of successful interviews**

Target Respondents	No. of Successful Interviews
<b>(i) The general public</b>	<b>6 000</b>
<b>(ii) Drivers:</b>	
(a) Private car owners/ drivers	502
(b) Taxi drivers	500
(c) Goods vehicle drivers	501
(d) Franchised bus drivers	502
(e) Public light bus drivers	501
(f) Other bus drivers <sup>2</sup>	504
<i>Subtotal</i>	<b>3 010</b>
<b>Total (i)+(ii)</b>	<b>9 010</b>


<sup>1</sup> Similar to the analysis of other surveys, the survey data from the 6 000 telephone interviews were grossed up in accordance with the distribution of the Hong Kong population by sex and age at end 2013 provided by the Census and Statistics Department. The survey data from the 3 010 face-to-face interviews were expanded by the annual total vehicle-kilometres of the vehicle types represented by the drivers in 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Other buses included tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, cross boundary buses, hotel buses and company buses.

## 2. Survey findings – Road traffic congestion situation in Hong Kong


2.1 The public views on the overall road traffic conditions in terms of congestion level are shown in **Figure 1**. About 82% of the drivers considered that there was moderate to heavy congestion in Hong Kong, while 68% of the general public had the same perception. This indicates that, while the public in general agrees that road traffic congestion in Hong Kong is severe, the drivers, being more affected by road traffic congestion, are more critical of the traffic situation.

**Figure 1: Overall road traffic condition in terms of congestion level**



2.2 Over 60% of both the general public and the drivers considered that there is no deterioration of the road traffic conditions when compared with 12 months ago. About 25% considered that the situation had worsened, while about 10% considered that the situation had improved. The drivers were slightly more critical of the change in the road traffic conditions in the last 12 months. The results are summarised at **Figure 2**.


**Figure 2: Overall road traffic condition compared with 12 months ago**



2.3 With regard to whether there was a need to improve the road traffic conditions, about 84% of the general public considered that there was a need to improve, including about 33% who considered that improvement should be carried out as soon as possible. The corresponding statistics for drivers were 93% and 36% respectively, again showing that the drivers, being more affected by road traffic congestion, were more keen to see improvements. The results are summarised at **Figure 3**.



**Figure 3: The need to improve road traffic congestion**



2.4 On the basis of the discussions in **paragraphs 2.1 – 2.3** above, it can be concluded that –

- (a) the majority of the general public and the drivers in particular consider that there is moderate to heavy road traffic congestion in Hong Kong;
- (b) the majority of the general public and the drivers in particular consider that there is a need to improve road traffic congestion in Hong Kong; and
- (c) the majority of the general public and the drivers do not perceive there is a deterioration of the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong over the last 12 months.

### **3. Survey findings – Causes of road traffic congestion**

3.1 The general public were given a list of eight factors, and asked if they agreed with each of them being the cause of road traffic congestion in Hong Kong. The results are summarised in **Table 2**. The top three factors selected by the general public, each with over 50% agreeing<sup>3</sup> with the factors, were –

- (a) “Too many vehicles on roads” (62%);
- (b) “Too much road works” (54%); and
- (c) “Illegal parking” (52%).

3.2 The drivers were asked the same questions, together with two additional factors (i.e. a total of 10 factors), as further elaborated in **paragraph 3.4** below. The results are also summarised in **Table 2**. Over 50% agree with nine of the factors, and only the factor “Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities of mini-buses on roads” has less than 50% of respondents agreeing to be a cause of road traffic congestion. It shows that the drivers, being more directly affected by road traffic congestion, are more critical of the problem. The top four factors selected by the drivers, which also included the top three factors selected by the general public, were –

<sup>3</sup> For reporting on the statistics in this Annex, “Agree” includes both the figures for “Totally Agree” and “Agree” from the surveys. Similarly, “Disagree” in the Paper includes both the figures for “Totally Disagree” and “Disagree” from the surveys.

- (a) “Insufficient facilities for loading/ unloading at kerbside” (77%);
- (b) “Too much road works” (75%);
- (c) “Illegal parking” (74%); and
- (d) “Too many vehicles on roads” (70%).

**Table 2: Causes of road traffic congestion**

Item	Causes of Road Traffic Congestion	Interviewees	Totally Agree/ Agree	Totally Disagree/ Disagree
1	Too many vehicles on roads	General Public	<b>62%</b>	10%
		Drivers	<b>70%</b>	6%
2	Too much road works	General Public	<b>54%</b>	17%
		Drivers	<b>75%</b>	7%
3	Illegal parking	General Public	<b>52%</b>	21%
		Drivers	<b>74%</b>	7%
4	Illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading on roads	General Public	49%	21%
		Drivers	<b>69%</b>	9%
5	Insufficient land for building new roads	General Public	46%	24%
		Drivers	<b>58%</b>	17%
6(a)	Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities of buses on roads	General Public	37%	30%
		Drivers	<b>56%</b>	17%
6(b)	Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities of tourist coaches on roads	General Public	31%	36%
		Drivers	<b>50%</b>	18%
6(c)	Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities of mini-buses on roads	General Public	25%	36%
		Drivers	36%	24%
7	Insufficient facilities for loading/ unloading at kerbside	General Public	N/A	N/A
		Drivers	<b>77%</b>	6%
8	Some vehicles wait or circulate on roads while looking for on-street parking spaces	General Public	N/A	N/A
		Drivers	<b>67%</b>	11%


3.3 For both the telephone and the face-to-face interviews, the general public and the drivers were also asked whether picking-up/ dropping-off activities of three different types of vehicles, viz. buses, light buses and coaches, were the causes of road traffic congestion. The general public were quite indifferent on whether such activities were the causes of road traffic congestion, and there were no big percentage differences between supporting and not supporting them as the causes of road traffic congestion. On the other hand, more drivers considered that picking-up/ dropping-off activities of buses (56%) and coaches (50%) were the causes of road traffic congestion.

3.4 For the face-to-face interviews of the drivers, two additional factors, viz. “insufficient facilities for loading/unloading at kerbside” and “some vehicles wait or circulate on roads while looking for on-street parking spaces” were included because it was considered that drivers should have paid more attention to these activities when compared to the general public. The majority of the drivers agreed that “insufficient facilities for loading/unloading at kerbside” (77% and ranked the top cause of road traffic congestion among the drivers) and “some vehicles wait or circulate on roads while looking for on-street parking spaces” (67%) were the causes of road traffic congestion.


3.5 Among the causes that the respondents had agreed to be contributing to road traffic congestion, they were further asked to indicate one of them as the most important factor causing road traffic congestion. The results are shown in **Figure 4** and **Figure 5** for the general public and the drivers respectively. The top three factors selected by the general public and the drivers in fact tally with each other, and they are –

- (a) “Too many vehicles on roads”
- (b) “Illegal parking”; and
- (c) “Too much road works”.

**Figure 4: Major causes of road traffic congestion – General public’s view**



**Figure 5: Major causes of road traffic congestion – Drivers’ view**




3.6 The top three “most important causes” in general tally with the results given in **Table 2**, with the exception that, while 77% of the drivers agreed that “Insufficient facilities for loading/ unloading at kerbside” was a cause of road traffic congestion and was the highest of the 10 factors asked, it was only the 5<sup>th</sup> most important factor in **Figure 5**.

3.7 “Too many vehicles on roads” was the top most important cause of road traffic congestion selected by both the general public and the drivers. For those agreeing that “too many vehicles on roads” was one of the causes of road traffic congestion, their views on which type of vehicles should be reduced in number<sup>4</sup> were summarised in **Figure 6**. At the top of the list was PCs. Close to 70% of both the general public and the drivers considered that the number of PCs on the road should be reduced. Franchised bus was the second on the list. Also, there are more drivers (41%) than the general public (29%) supporting to reduce the number of franchised buses. The third on the list was goods vehicles, with 20% of the general public and 19% of the drivers supporting to reduce the number of goods vehicles.

<sup>4</sup> The respondents could choose one or two types of vehicles.

**Figure 6: Types of vehicles to be reduced**



Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% as the respondents might choose one or two transport modes.

3.8 The respondents were given the chance to raise additional factors contributing to road traffic congestion that were not covered in the questionnaire. The additional factors raised by the respondents are –

- (a) too many narrow roads;
- (b) insufficient roads;
- (c) insufficient parking spaces;
- (d) uneven usage of tunnels or road harbour crossings;
- (e) too many signalised junctions;
- (f) too long waiting time at traffic lights; and
- (g) too many traffic accidents.


3.9 On the basis of the discussions in **paragraphs 3.1 to 3.8** above, it can be concluded that –

- (a) “Too many vehicles on roads”, “Illegal parking” and “Too much road works” are regarded by road users (both the general public and drivers) as the most important factors contributing to road traffic congestion in Hong Kong; and
- (b) among those who agree that there being too many vehicles on the road is one of the cause of congestion, most of them (be they members of the general public or drivers) are supportive of reducing the number of PCs.

#### 4. Survey findings – The need to control growth of PCs and priority on use of road space


4.1 The majority of both the general public (69%) and the drivers (75%) agreed that there was a need to control the growth of PCs (see **Figure 7**). This echoes with the discussion in **paragraph 3.7** that PCs top the list of vehicles to be controlled. Interestingly, about 58% of the car owners/ drivers, being the target group of this measure, also considered that the control of the growth of PCs was required. That said, the percentage is the lowest among the other five groups of drivers. The percentage for the other five groups ranges from 84% to 90%.

**Figure 7: Controlling the growth of PCs**




4.2 The majority of both the general public (68%) and the drivers (63%) agreed that road space in Hong Kong is limited, and they supported the Government to give priority to some transport modes to use the road (see **Figure 8**). Among the drivers, franchised buses drivers (90%) supported the measure most and this was followed by other bus drivers (80%).

**Figure 8: Giving priority to some transport modes**




4.3 For those agreeing that priority should be given to some transport modes to use the roads, their views on which type of vehicles to be or not to be given priority<sup>5</sup> are shown in **Figure 9** and **Figure 10** respectively. The majority of both the general public (94%) and the drivers (92%) considered that franchised buses should be given priority, followed by GMBs (about 25% for both the general public and the drivers). On the other hand, more than 63% of the general public and 76% of the drivers considered that PCs should not be given priority, followed by goods vehicles (about 29% for both). Interestingly, over half of the private car owners/ drivers (58%) also agreed that PCs should not be given priority. That said, the percentage is the lowest among the other five groups of drivers. The percentage for the other five groups ranges from 89% to 93%.

**Figure 9: Transport modes to be given priority**



Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% as the respondents might choose one or two transport modes.

**Figure 10: Transport modes not to be given priority**



Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% as the respondents might choose one or two transport modes.

<sup>5</sup> Each respondent was asked to give one to two types of vehicles that should, and one to two types that should not be given priority to use the roads.

4.4 On the basis of the discussions in **paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3** above, it can be concluded that –


- (a) there is strong support to controlling the growth of PCs;
- (b) there is also strong support to giving priority to some transport modes in using the limited road space in Hong Kong;
- (c) there is a dominant view that priority should be given to franchised buses, and there is also some support to give priority to minibuses;
- (d) most people do not support giving priority to PCs, while quite some people do not support giving priority to goods vehicles.

## 5. Survey findings – Acceptance of proposed short and medium-term measures

### (A) Increase the cost of owning/ using a PC

5.1 The respondents were asked if they accepted increasing the cost of owning or using a PC<sup>6</sup> to contain road traffic congestion, and the results are summarised in **Figure 11**. Close to 48% of the general public accepted this measure while 24% of them were against it.

**Figure 11: Acceptance of increasing the cost of owning/ using a PC**



5.2 Among the drivers interviewed, about 46% accepted the use of fiscal measures on PCs to contain road traffic congestion, while about 27% were against it. From the survey results of the 502 private car owners/ drivers in the face-to-face interviews, only about 21% of them accepted the use of fiscal measures on PCs, while the majority (51%) were against it. On the other hand, over half of the respondents among the other five groups of drivers (about 58% - 73%) were supportive of the above measure.

<sup>6</sup> “Increase FRT for PCs” and “Increase ALF for PCs” were quoted as two examples in the interviews.




5.3 From the results of the POS discussed above, it is expected that the private car owners/ drivers, being directly affected by such fiscal measures, would be against them. However, there is moderate support from the general public and the non-private car drivers.

(B) Increase fixed penalties for congestion-related offences

5.4 The degree of acceptance of increasing fixed penalties for congestion-related offences is shown in **Figure 12**. About 66% of the general public accepted this measure, with 13% against it. For the drivers, about 42% of the drivers accepted this measure, with 35% against it. Among the various types of drivers, franchised bus drivers (82%) accepted this measure most, followed by public light bus drivers (57%) and other bus drivers (52%). More than half (55%) of the goods vehicle drivers were against this measure. This is understandable as their daily operations involve many goods loading/ unloading activities and they would be affected most by this measure.

**Figure 12: Acceptance on increasing fixed penalties for congestion-related offences**




5.5 From the results of the POS discussed above, it is expected that there will be strong support from the general public to increase the fixed penalties for congestion-related traffic offences. Some objections are expected from the drivers, and in particular from the goods vehicle drivers, being the most affected.

(C) Strengthen enforcement against congestion-related offences

5.6 The degree of acceptance of strengthening enforcement against congestion-related offences is shown in **Figure 13**. This measure was acceptable to about 71% of the general public, with only less than 10% against it. For the drivers, 57% of the drivers accepted the measure, with 21% against it. Among the various types of drivers, franchised bus drivers (93%) accepted this measure most, followed by public light bus drivers (73%). The goods vehicle drivers were the only group in which less than half supported this measure: 33% supported it and 37% were against it. Again, it is because goods vehicle drivers would be affected most by this measure due to their work nature.

**Figure 13: Acceptance on strengthening enforcement against congestion-related offences**




5.7 From the results of the POS discussed above, it is expected that there will be strong support from the general public for strengthening enforcement against congestion-related offences. The support is indeed slightly higher than the similar measure of increasing the fixed penalties for congestion-related traffic offences. Some objections are expected from the goods vehicle drivers, because they are the most affected group.

#### (D) Increase parking meter charges

5.8 The degree of acceptance of increasing parking meter charges is shown in **Figure 14**. The opinions from the general public were rather diverse. While there were about 38% supporting the measure, 29% were against it, with the remaining 33% neutral. On the other hand, 46% of the drivers were against this measure, with only about 30% of the drivers supporting it, and the remaining 24% neutral. Among the drivers, more than half (53%) of the goods vehicle drivers were against the measure.

5.9 From the results of the POS discussed above, it is expected that there is only moderate support from the general public and the drivers on increasing parking meter charges. In fact, objection from the drivers could be strong.


**Figure 14: Acceptance on increasing parking meter charges**



## (E) Acceptance on implementing ERP

5.10 The survey included a question asking the respondents whether they supported the implementation of ERP in busy areas to reduce the number of specified types of vehicles in these areas. The results are shown in **Figure 15**. Close to 63% of the general public supported this measure, while about 30% were against it. The opinions of the drivers, however, were more diverse. While close to 52% of the drivers supported this measure, it is only marginally higher than those who were against it (about 44%). Among the various groups of drivers, franchised bus drivers (74%) supported ERP most, followed by other bus drivers (64%). For the goods vehicle drivers and taxi drivers, a higher percentage of them were not supportive of this measure (51% and 53% respectively).

**Figure 15: Acceptance on implementation of ERP**




5.11 From the results of the POS discussed above, it is expected that there will be similar degree of support for and objection against ERP. This is an evidence that ERP remains a controversial subject in the community.

## 6. Survey findings – Acceptance of other measures

### (A) Bus route rationalisation

6.1 The acceptance of bus route rationalisation to contain road traffic congestion is shown in **Figure 16**. About 64% of the general public and 86% of the drivers considered the measure acceptable. The drivers welcome this measure more than the general public.


**Figure 16: Acceptance on bus route rationalization**



(B) More BBIs and improve facilities at existing BBIs

6.2 The degree of acceptance of providing more BBI and improving facilities at the existing BBI is shown in **Figure 17**. This measure was considered acceptable to about 69% of the general public and 85% of the drivers. The results are similar to those of bus route rationalisation.


**Figure 17: Acceptance on more BBIs and improving facilities at the existing BBIs**



(C) More PnR car parks at the fringe of congested areas

6.3 The degree of acceptance of providing more PnR car parks at the fringe of congested areas is shown in **Figure 18**. This measure was considered acceptable to about 67% of the general public and 81% of the drivers.


**Figure 18: Acceptance on providing more PnR car parks at the fringe of congested areas**



(D) Reduce the supply of parking spaces

6.4 The degree of acceptance of reducing the supply of parking spaces is shown in **Figure 19**. Only 19% of the general public considered this measure acceptable while 55%, being the majority, considered it not acceptable. The drivers, who would be more directly affected, were more critical and considered it the most unacceptable measure in the survey. Close to 84% of the drivers considered it unacceptable.


**Figure 19: Acceptance on reducing the supply of parking spaces**



(E) Allowing loading/ unloading of goods vehicles in busy areas only during non-peak hours

6.5 The acceptance of allowing loading/ unloading of goods vehicles in busy areas only during non-peak hours is shown in **Figure 20**. This measure was considered acceptable to about 62% of the general public. For drivers, 59% supported this measure. However, as the measure is targeted specifically at goods vehicle drivers, only 33% indicated support, with 43% against it. The majority of the other five groups of drivers, on the other hand, supported the measure.

**Figure 20: Acceptance on allowing loading / unloading of goods vehicles in busy areas only during non-peak hours**



## 7. Survey findings – Other suggestions

7.1 Respondents were invited to propose any measures not covered in the survey (i.e. those discussed in **paragraphs 5.1 to 6.5**) to contain road traffic congestion. There were only a small number of responses and are listed below. Some of these suggestions were indeed similar to those listed in the questionnaire. Measures not covered in the questionnaires are marked with an asterisk.

### ***Reducing the number of vehicles on roads***

1. Controlling the growth of PCs
2. Reducing the number of PCs on roads
3. Reducing the number of buses on roads
4. Implementing odd/ even car number plates restriction\*
5. Implementing road pricing

### ***Strengthening enforcement***

6. Deploying more law enforcement officers
7. Strengthening the enforcement of illegal road traffic operations

### ***Adjustment of tunnel toll***

8. Reducing the toll fees of Eastern and Western Harbour Crossings for diversions of traffic flow\*

### ***Construction of new infrastructures/ facilities***

9. Road widening\*
10. Building more flyovers/ tunnels\*
11. Building more footbridges/ subways\*
12. Building more railways\*
13. Building new roads\*
14. Increasing the number of parking spaces\*

***Better coordination/ control of road works***

15. Speeding up road works\*

16. Reducing road works\*

\* Measures not covered in the questionnaire.



Sup :	Case :
Edit :	Check :

## Public Opinion Survey on Road Traffic Congestion (TIGP)

<b>RESTRICTED WHEN ENTERED WITH DATA</b>
<b>ACCESSIBLE TO AUTHORIZED PERSONS ONLY</b>

Tel. code:	_____	
Name of respondent:	_____	Contact tel no.: _____
Interviewer no.:	_____	Interview date: _____
Time started:	_____	Time ended: _____

### Introduction:

Hello! My name is \_\_\_\_\_, an interviewer of Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd appointed by the Transport Department. We are now carrying out a public opinion survey on road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and would like to conduct a short interview with you. The information you provide will be treated with strict confidence and will be used for an aggregate analysis only. Thank you for your co-operation.

### Screening

- S1. We wish to invite one of your household members to conduct the interview by a random selection method. May I know how many members are there in your household, who aged 15 or above? I mean those who live here at least 4 nights a week. Please exclude live-in domestic helpers.

Record the no. of person(s): \_\_\_\_\_ **[If more than 1, ask S2; if not, invite this member for interview.]**

- S2. Among these \_\_\_\_\_ household members, may I know who has just passed the birthday?  
(If the respondent does not understand: that means... today is the \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_, so whose birthday is the last birthday?)

I am the one → **[Read out]** Thank you. Could I start the interview now? **[Start the interview]**

Others → **[Read out]** I would like to conduct the interview with this member. Is he/ she here? Can I talk to him/ her? **[Repeat the introduction & start the interview]**

**[If the selected respondent is not at home or not available, interviewer should make appointment or call again later]** When should I call him/ her again?

**[If the respondent refuses to conduct the interview, read out]** Your opinion is very important for the Government to improve the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong. Our interview takes a few minutes only. And don't worry, the information you provide will be treated with strict confidence and will be used for an aggregate analysis only.



## Main Questionnaire

Q1.	In the past 3 months, how often did you use the following transport modes? Often, occasionally, seldom or never? <b>[SA]</b>				
	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>	Often	Occasionally	Seldom	Never
<input type="checkbox"/>	(i) Railway (including MTR, Light Rail)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(ii) Franchised buses (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands buses or airport buses)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(iii) Other buses (e.g. tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, shuttle buses)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(iv) Red minibuses	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(v) Green minibuses	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(vi) Taxis	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(vii) Private cars (including drivers and passengers)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(viii) Motor cycles (including drivers and passengers)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(ix) Trams	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(x) Bicycles	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(xi) Ferries	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(xii) Goods vehicles	1	2	3	4
<b>【If answers are all “4”, thank the respondent &amp; terminate the interview】</b>					

Q2a.	In your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Random to readout answers in order of 1-4 or 4-1].</b>	<b>[SA]</b>	
	No congestion	1	
	Slight congestion	2	
	Moderate congestion	3	
	Heavy congestion	4	
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q2b.	When compared with 12 months ago, in your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Random to readout answers in order of 1-3 or 3-1].</b>	<b>[SA]</b>	
	More congested than before	1	
	No change	2	
	Have improved	3	
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q3.	In your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Random to readout answers in order of 1-3 or 3-1].</b>	<b>[SA]</b>	
	No need to improve or Acceptable	1	
	Room for improvement	2	
	Need improve as soon as possible	3	
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q4(i). Do you agree that the following items are the reasons that cause the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong? Using a 5-point scale, "1" denotes "totally disagree" and "5" denotes "totally agree".

Q4(ii). For...[Read out those Q4(i)a – e & g = code 4 – 5 one by one], which one is the **main reason** that causes the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong?

		Q4(i). [SA]						Q4(ii). [SA]
		Totally agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	No comment [Do not read out]	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>							
<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Insufficient lands for building new roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading on roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Illegal parking, which blocks the traffic	5	4	3	2	1	8	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Too many road works	5	4	3	2	1	8	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. Too many vehicles on roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	5
<b>[Ask for e = code 4 – 5] f. Which type of vehicle should be reduced in number? Any others?</b>								
					1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]		
Franchised buses (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands buses or airport buses)					1	1		
Other buses (e.g. tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, shuttle buses)					2	2		
Red minibuses					3	3		
Green minibuses					4	4		
Taxis					5	5		
Private cars					6	6		
Motor cycles					7	7		
Goods vehicles					8	8		
Others, please specify: _____								
<input type="checkbox"/>	g. Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities on roads							
	(i) Buses	5	4	3	2	1	8	6
	(ii) Minibuses	5	4	3	2	1	8	7
	(iii) Tourist coaches	5	4	3	2	1	8	8

Q5. Apart from the above mentioned, are there other reasons that cause the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong? Any others?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q6.	Do you think the Government needs to propose measures to control the growth of private cars?	[SA]
	Yes	1
	No	2
	Don't know or No comment [Do not read out]	8

Q7a. Do you consider the following measures to contain road traffic congestion acceptable? Using a 5-point scale, "1" denotes "not accept at all" and "5" denotes "accept very much". **[SA]**

		Accept very much	Accept	Neutral	Not accept	Not accept at all	No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	h. Increase penalties for illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading and illegal parking	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	i. Strengthen the enforcement against illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading and illegal parking	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	j. Bus route rationalisation (i.e. reduce the number of direct bus routes to congested areas and provide bus-bus interchange fare concessions)	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	k. Provide more bus-bus interchanges and improve facilities at the existing bus-bus interchanges	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	l. Provide more park-and-ride car parks at the fringe of congested areas	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	m. Increase parking charges of public parking spaces	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	n. Reduce the supply of parking spaces	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	o. Allow loading/ unloading of goods vehicles in busy areas only during non-peak hours	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	p. Increase the cost of owning/ using a private car (e.g. First Registration Tax of buying a new private car, Annual License Fee for private car)	5	4	3	2	1	8

Q7b. Apart from the above mentioned, are there other measures to contain road traffic congestion? Any others?

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Q8.	If the Government implements Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) in busy areas (such as Central) to reduce the number of specified types of vehicles driving into these areas, do you support this?	<b>[SA]</b>	
	Yes	1	
	No	2	
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q9.	As road space is limited, do you support the Government to give priority for certain transport modes to use roads?	<b>[SA]</b>	
	Yes	1	→ Ask Q10
	No	2	→ Go to Q12
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	→ Go to Q12

- Q10. Which of the following transport mode **should** be accorded with the highest priority to use roads? Any others?
- Q11. Which of the following transport mode **should not** be accorded with the most priority to use roads? Any others?

		Q10.		Q11.	
		1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]	1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]
<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/>	Franchised buses (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands buses or airport buses)	1	1	1	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other buses (e.g. tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, shuttle buses)	2	2	2	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	Red minibuses	3	3	3	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	Green minibuses	4	4	4	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	Taxis	5	5	5	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	Private cars	6	6	6	6
<input type="checkbox"/>	Motor cycles	7	7	7	7
<input type="checkbox"/>	Goods vehicles	8	8	8	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	Others, please specify: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

- Q12. Do you have any other opinions on the situation of road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and the improvement measures to contain congestion? Any others?

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## Background Information

X1.	Record Gender:	Male Female	[SA] 1 2	
X2.	Which of the following age group are you in? <b>[Read out 1 – 7]</b>	15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 or above Refused to answer	[SA] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9	
X3.	Would you please tell me your highest education attainment? <b>[Read out 1 – 3]</b>	Primary or below Secondary/ matriculation Tertiary or above Refused to answer	[SA] 1 2 3 9	
X4.	Are you a... ? <b>[Read out 1 – 5]</b>	Working person (incl. full-time or part-time) Student Home-maker Retired person Unemployed person  Others (pls specify): _____  Refused to answer	[SA] 1 2 3 4 5  9	→ Ask X5 └         → Go to X6   └
X5.	Are you a professional driver?	Yes No Refused to answer	[SA] 1 2 9	
X6a.	Are you a private car owner or driver?	Yes No	[SA] 1 2	→ Ask X6b → End of interview
X6b.	On average, how many days do you drive in a week? _____ Day(s)			

~ **Thank you for your co-operation!** ~

**[Read out]** Another staff of our company (Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd ) may contact you later to re-confirm the interview that I have done or to clarify some questions. He/ she will ask a few questions only and will not disturb you for a long time.

**Interviewer declaration**

I hereby authenticate the data accuracy and integrity, and the interview was conducted by following the guidelines maintained by the international standard of market research.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_



Sup :	Case :
Edit :	Check :

## Public Opinion Survey on Road Traffic Congestion (FFID)

<b>RESTRICTED WHEN ENTERED WITH DATA</b>
<b>ACCESSIBLE TO AUTHORIZED PERSONS ONLY</b>

Tel. code:	_____	
Name of respondent:	_____	Contact tel no.: _____
Interviewer no.:	_____	Interview date: _____
Time started:	_____	Time ended: _____

### Introduction:

Hello! My name is \_\_\_\_\_, an interviewer of Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd appointed by the Transport Department **[Show the identity card]**. We are now carrying out a public opinion survey on road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and would like to conduct a short interview with you. The information you provide will be treated with strict confidence and will be used for an aggregate analysis only. Thank you for your co-operation.

## Screening

Q1. (Record by interviewer, ask if needed) Are you a... :	<b>[SA]</b>	
Private car owner/ Private car driver	1	
Taxi driver	2	
Goods vehicle driver	3	
Franchised bus (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands bus or airport bus) driver	4	
Public light bus driver	5	
Tourist coach driver	6	
Resident bus driver	7	
School bus driver	8	
Shuttle bus (e.g. cross-boundary, hotel bus, company bus) driver	9	
Other bus driver	10	

Q2a. In your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Show card]</b> .	<b>[SA]</b>	
No congestion	1	
Slight congestion	2	
Moderate congestion	3	
Heavy congestion	4	
Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q2b. When compared with 12 months ago, in your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Show card]</b> .	<b>[SA]</b>	
More congested than before	1	
No change	2	
Have improved	3	
Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q3.	In your opinion, the overall road traffic in Hong Kong now is... <b>[Show card]</b> .		
	No need to improve or Acceptable	1	
	Room for improvement	2	
	Need to improve as soon as possible	3	
	Don't know or No comment [Do not read out]	8	

Q4(i). Do you agree that the following items are the reasons that cause the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong?  
Using a 5-point scale, "1" denotes "totally disagree" and "5" denotes "totally agree".

Q4(ii). For...**[Read out those Q4(i)a – e & g – i = code one by one]**, which one is the main reason that causes the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong?

		Q4(i). [Show card] [SA]						Q4(ii). [SA]
		Totally agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Totally disagree	No comment [Do not read out]	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>							
<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Insufficient lands for building new roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	01
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading on roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	02
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Illegal parking, which blocks the traffic	5	4	3	2	1	8	03
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Too many road works	5	4	3	2	1	8	04
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. Too many vehicles on roads	5	4	3	2	1	8	05
<b>[Ask for e = code 4 – 5] f. Which type of vehicle should be reduced in number? Any others?</b>								
					1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]		
Franchised buses (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands buses or airport buses)					1	1		
Other buses (e.g. tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, shuttle buses)					2	2		
Red minibuses					3	3		
Green minibuses					4	4		
Taxis					5	5		
Private cars					6	6		
Motor cycles					7	7		
Goods vehicles					8	8		
Others, please specify: _____								
<input type="checkbox"/>	g. Too many passengers picking-up/ dropping-off activities on roads							
	(iv) Buses	5	4	3	2	1	8	06
	(v) Minibuses	5	4	3	2	1	8	07
	(vi) Tourist coaches	5	4	3	2	1	8	08
<input type="checkbox"/>	h. Insufficient facilities for loading/ unloading goods at kerbside	5	4	3	2	1	8	09
<input type="checkbox"/>	i. Some vehicles wait or circulate on roads while looking for on-street parking spaces	5	4	3	2	1	8	10

Q5. Apart from the above mentioned, are there other reasons that cause the road traffic congestion in Hong Kong? Any others?

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Q6.	Do you think the Government needs to propose measures to control the growth of private cars?	<b>[SA]</b>
	Yes	1
	No	2
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8

Q7a. Do you consider the following measures to contain road traffic congestion acceptable? Using a 5-point scale, "1" denotes "not accept at all" and "5" denotes "accept very much". **[Show card] [SA]**

		Accept very much	Accept	Neutral	Not accept	Not accept at all	No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/>	j. Increase penalties for illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading and illegal parking	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	k. Strengthen the enforcement against illegal passengers picking-up/ dropping-off or goods loading/ unloading and illegal parking	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	l. Bus route rationalisation (i.e. reduce the number of direct bus routes to congested areas and provide bus-bus interchange fare concessions)	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	m. Provide more bus-bus interchanges and improve facilities at the existing bus-bus interchanges	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	n. Provide more park-and-ride car parks at the fringe of congested areas	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	o. Increase parking charges of public parking spaces	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	p. Reduce the supply of parking spaces	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	q. Allow loading/ unloading of goods vehicles in busy areas only during non-peak hours	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	r. Increase the cost of owning/ using a private car (e.g. First Registration Tax of buying a new private car, Annual License Fee for private car)	5	4	3	2	1	8

Q7b. Apart from the above mentioned, are there other measures to contain road traffic congestion? Any others?

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Q8.	If the Government implements Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) in busy areas (such as Central) to reduce the number of specified types of vehicles driving into these areas, do you support this?	[SA]	
	Yes	1	
	No	2	
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	

Q9.	As road space is limited, do you support the Government to give priority for certain transport modes to use roads?	[SA]	
	Yes	1	→ Ask Q10
	No	2	→ Go to Q12
	Don't know or No comment <b>[Do not read out]</b>	8	→ Go to Q12

Q10.	Which of the following transport mode <b>should</b> be accorded with the highest priority to use roads? Any others?				
Q11.	Which of the following transport mode <b>should not</b> be accorded with the most priority to use roads? Any others?				
		<b>Q10.</b>		<b>Q11.</b>	
		1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]	1 <sup>st</sup> mention [SA]	2 <sup>nd</sup> mention [SA]
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>[Rotate to read out]</b>				
<input type="checkbox"/>	Franchised buses (including KMB, NWFB, CTB, islands buses or airport buses)	1	1	1	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other buses (e.g. tourist coaches, resident buses, school buses, shuttle buses)	2	2	2	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	Red minibuses	3	3	3	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	Green minibuses	4	4	4	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	Taxis	5	5	5	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	Private cars	6	6	6	6
<input type="checkbox"/>	Motor cycles	7	7	7	7
<input type="checkbox"/>	Goods vehicles	8	8	8	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	Others, please specify: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Q12.	Do you have any other opinions on the situation of road traffic congestion in Hong Kong and the improvement measures to contain congestion? Any others?
	_____
	_____

## Background Information

X1. Record Gender:	Male Female	<b>[SA]</b> 1 2	
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X2. Which of the following age group are you in? <b>[Show card]</b>	15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 or above Refused to answer	<b>[SA]</b> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9	
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X3. Would you please tell me your highest education attainment? <b>[Show card]</b>	Primary or below Secondary/ matriculation Tertiary or above Refused to answer	<b>[SA]</b> 1 2 3 9	
--	--	---------------------------------	--

X4. On average, how many days do you drive in a week?	_____ Day(s)
---	--------------

~ **Thank you for your co-operation!** ~

**[Read out]** Another staff of our company (Mercado Solutions Associates Ltd ) may contact you later to re-confirm the interview that I have done or to clarify some questions. He/ she will ask a few questions only and will not disturb you for a long time.

**Interviewer declaration**

I hereby authenticate the data accuracy and integrity, and the interview was conducted by following the guidelines maintained by the international standard of market research.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**Car Journey Speeds on Some Major Roads  
near Central during Morning Peak on Weekdays (2008 – 2013)**

	Car Journey Speed (km/h)					
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
<b>Connaught Road Central</b> <i>(from Des Voeux Road West to Murray Road)</i>	13.8	12.1	11.9	<b>10.6</b>	<b>9.4</b>	13.3
<b>Connaught Road Central</b> <i>(from Murray Road to Des Voeux Road West)</i>	17.7	15.2	14.3	14.4	14.3	15.0
<b>Connaught Road Central Flyover</b> <i>(from Des Voeux Road West to Rumsey Street)</i>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>10.5</b>	16.4	14.9	14.9	14.7
<b>Des Voeux Road Central</b> <i>(from Cleverly Street to Pedder Street)</i>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>10.0</b>	12.5
<b>Des Voeux Road West</b> <i>(from Western Street to Connaught Road Central)</i>	<b>10.5</b>	14.3	<b>9.5</b>	11.6	<b>10.6</b>	<b>8.7</b>
<b>Chater Road</b> <i>(from Pedder Street to Murray Road)</i>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>10.2</b>
<b>Queen's Road Central</b> <i>(from Garden Road to Possession Street)</i>	15.9	20.6	21.1	15.4	18.5	19.4

## **Control of the Impact of Road Works to Traffic Through the XP Mechanism**

### **1. General**

1.1 Road works, which may involve the improvement, maintenance and repair of the concerned road section or the underneath public utilities (e.g. water pipes, drainage pipes, gas pipes, power cables and telecommunication cables), are essential for the development of Hong Kong and the well-being of our daily lives. Utility Undertakings (“UUs”)<sup>1</sup> have to carry out road works to maintain and expand their utility networks so as to provide our daily necessities. Road construction and the associated road works for railway development are vital for maintaining Hong Kong as a world-class city. For the safety and comfort of road users, routine road maintenance and periodic rehabilitation of roads are required. In addition to the above planned road works, emergency road openings<sup>2</sup> may also be required for urgent repair works on underground utilities by UUs, such that the essential utility services can be resumed within a short period of time.

1.2 Given the benefits and genuine needs for the various types of road works, in controlling the impact of road works on road traffic, the focus should be on proper management and co-ordination amongst initiators of road works to minimise unnecessary obstruction to traffic rather than on reducing the number of road works per se.

### **2. Management of road works under the XP mechanism**

2.1 Most road works involve excavation. According to the Land (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 28), the works proponent needs to acquire an XP from HyD for making or maintaining an excavation on public roads. XP mechanisms have been established by HyD to manage and control the planned and emergency road excavation works<sup>3</sup>. Since the Road Traffic

---

<sup>1</sup> UU means any person, undertaking, company, organisation or Government department which supplies or provides utilities (including electricity, lighting, traffic control, telecommunications, cable television, gas, water, drainage, sewerage and tramway) and engages in any associated work.

<sup>2</sup> Emergency road openings usually cause greater traffic disruption than planned road openings. Proper routine maintenance under planned excavation works can help reduce the need for emergency road works and also minimise the traffic impact to road users.

<sup>3</sup> Under Cap. 28, HyD may issue an emergency XP to a UU to carry out emergency excavations not longer than 7 days.

Congestion Study will only focus on recurrent causes of road traffic congestion, only the procedures within the XP mechanism for *planned excavation works* are presented in this note.

### **Planning stage**

#### **(a) Permit period assessment**

2.2 After the registration of an application for an XP, the XP applicant has to go through the permit period assessment process which determines the permit period for carrying out the proposed works on site. Based on the assessment outcome, a reasonable time period is allotted to the applicant for completing the road works, thus avoiding unnecessary taking up of road space.

#### **(b) Coordination of road works**

2.3 If there are several different road works proposed to be carried out in close proximity to each other, the concerned XP applicants will be requested to participate in a *coordination process* before their XP applications can be approved. This process ensures any potential conflict amongst road works of different applicants can be identified and resolved as early as possible. More importantly, it can facilitate the coordination of concurrent or sequential implementation of the road works on the same road section. For example, when two UUs need to carry out works at the same location, UU A may leave the road section open upon completion, so that UU B can start its works immediately without extra drilling or opening. To avoid repeated openings on the same road section which may once a series of coordinated road works have been completed, *HyD will not issue an XP on the same road section within a period of three months except under urgent or unanticipated situations.*

2.4 Further, road openings will not normally be allowed within a period of five years for newly constructed carriageways and one year for newly constructed footways as all excavation works, such as laying utilities and road paving should have been coordinated and completed by relevant parties during the construction stage.

#### **(c) Traffic advice from TD and the Police**

2.5 Under the XP control mechanism, an XP applicant needs to consult TD and the Police for traffic advice. TD and the Police will scrutinise the TTM proposal submitted by the applicant to ensure that the traffic impact is minimised and acceptable. Where appropriate, specific TTM requirement from TD and the Police may be included as part of the XP conditions. For works on certain busy roads, TD and the Police may require an XP applicant to conduct Traffic Impact Assessment to substantiate its TTM proposal.

## **Works stage**

2.6 During the works stage, different Government departments will put in place various monitoring and control measures to ensure that the ground works at the planning stage are properly executed.

### **(a) Road works advice from the Police**

2.7 The Police requires the works proponent or its contractor to apply for a “Road Works Advice” before the works can commence on site. The Police will process the application having regard to the latest traffic conditions, and impose specific TTM requirement where necessary, in consultation with TD.

### **(b) Audit inspections by HyD**

2.8 HyD has established an audit inspection team to carry out audit inspections on XP sites to ensure permittees’ compliance with XP conditions, including specific requirements on TTM. XP sites observed to be left unattended will also be recorded as a non-compliance with XP conditions. Whilst permittees will be notified to rectify non-compliance on site as soon as possible, contractors who execute the road excavation works in a manner not complying with the permit conditions could be held liable under Cap. 28.

### **(c) Additional fee for extension of XP period**

2.9 As mentioned in **paragraph 2.2**, HyD will only allocate reasonable time periods to permittees for completing their road works. A special charging mechanism is set up to encourage the completion of the road works within the approved period. Under this mechanism, a permittee who anticipates that the road works could not be completed on time shall submit an application for extending the permit period. In addition to the administration fee for permit extension, he is also required to pay a penalty charge (ranging from \$1,500/day to \$18,000/day).

## **3. Use of innovative technologies in road works**

3.1 HyD keeps abreast of and promotes the use of innovative technologies that can alleviate the impact of road works to traffic. For instance, the application of rapid hardening concrete or precast concrete panels can greatly reduce or eliminate the time required for curing of reinstated concrete pavement and hence reduce the time of road occupation. Use of thermal patcher can facilitate reinstatement of bituminous pavement located at busy roads with noise sensitive receivers, so that the works can be carried out at night. Trenchless technologies for utility works can also eliminate the need of open excavation on the road surface.

#### **4. Conclusion**

4.1 Road works are undeniably necessary for the development of Hong Kong and sustaining the well-being of our daily lives. It is also true that road works take up road spaces and may induce traffic impact in most cases. A sophisticated XP mechanism has been put in place to coordinate the implementation of various road works so as to minimise the impact on traffic. Continual adoption of new technologies (when site conditions are suitable) will help alleviate the traffic impact of road works.

## Abbreviations

ALF	Annual Licence Fee
BBI	Bus-bus Interchange
CCPI	Composite Consumer Price Index
CWB	Central - Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link
DAR	Development on Anderson Road
EFPPCs	Environment-friendly Petrol Private Cars
ERP	Electronic Road Pricing
FRT	First Registration Tax
GMB	Green Minibus
HKI	Hong Kong Island
HyD	Highways Department
ITS	Intelligent Transport Systems
KLN	Kowloon
LegCo	Legislative Council
MTR	Mass Transit Railway
MTRCL	MTR Corporation Limited
NDAs	New Development Areas
NO <sub>2</sub>	Nitrogen Dioxide
NT	New Territories
PCs	Private Cars
PnR	Park-and-ride
POS	Public Opinion Survey
PT	Public Transport
ppsm	Person (Standing) Per Square Metre
PT Plan	PT re-organisation plan
PTIs	Public Transport Interchanges
PTSS	Public Transport Strategy Study
RDPs	Route Development Programmes



SCL	Shatin to Central Link
STEP	Selective Traffic Enforcement Policy
TAC	Transport Advisory Committee
TD	Transport Department
The Police	The Hong Kong Police Force
TIMS	Traffic and Incident Management System
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTM	Temporary Traffic Management
UUs	Utility Undertakings
VKM	Vehicle-Kilometres
Working Group	Working Group on Road Traffic Congestion
XP	Excavation Permit






# 香港道路交通擠塞 研究報告



交通諮詢委員會

2014年12月

願景...



『願景』總設計：汪亞莉，香港大學，二零一四屆，城市設計碩士  
書法：許雪明；攝影：吳劍偉；顧問：盧佩瑩



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# 香港道路交通擠塞研究報告

## 摘要

### 引言

香港素以高效率著稱。為配合城市的步伐，我們都期望擁有一個高效的道路網絡。然而，道路交通擠塞卻經常出現。

2. 道路對客貨運輸至為重要，就像血管輸送營養到身體各部分一樣。若不處理交通擠塞問題，香港的環境、持續發展、生活質素及競爭力將會繼續受損。我們必須立刻行動。

### 研究

#### I. 背景

3. 2014年3月，交通諮詢委員會(下稱「交諮會」)接受房屋及運輸局局長邀請，就以下範疇進行研究：

- (a) 探究導致香港整體道路交通擠塞的各種因素；
- (b) 建議可在合理時間內實施的全港性短、中期可行措施，以紓緩道路交通擠塞情況；以及
- (c) 提出全港性的長遠方案供政府作進一步研究。

研究報告會於2014年12月提交房屋及運輸局局長，以供考慮。

4. 交諮會於2014年4月成立道路交通擠塞工作小組(下稱「工作小組」)進行研究。這是工作小組的報告，已獲交諮會通過，以提交運輸及房屋局局長考慮。

## II. 研究結果

### **道路交通擠塞的成因**

5. 工作小組認為，引致道路交通擠塞的經常性成因<sup>1</sup>大致可分為以下五類：

- (a) 增建路面運輸基礎設施的空間有限；
- (b) 過多車輛在路上行駛；
- (c) 道路使用者爭相使用路面空間；
- (d) 管理及執法問題；以及
- (e) 道路工程。

#### **(a) 增建路面運輸基礎設施的空間有限**

6. 香港市區發展稠密，空間有限。公眾對景觀、環境及築路期間對交通的影響等往往持不同意見，令建造新道路變得頗為困難。截至2020年，道路的總長度按年增長率估計會下跌至0.4%左右，遠低於目前車輛每年約3.4%的增長率。然而，單靠興建更多路面運輸基礎設施並不足以解決交通擠塞。此舉甚至會令駕駛者增加使用車輛，導致車輛數目增長。

#### **(b) 過多車輛在路上行駛**

7. 在2003至2013年間，本港領牌車輛的總數由約524 000部增至約681 000部，增幅約為30%，按年增長率為3.4%。車輛數目增多，市區的平均行車速度便會隨之下降。

8. 由工作小組進行的民意調查顯示(詳細結果見附件1C)，一般市民及駕駛者均認為路面有過多車輛行駛，是導致交通擠塞的其中一項主因。

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<sup>1</sup> 非經常性成因是指不會經常在特定時間和地點出現，包括佔用路面及／或產生額外交通流量的大型活動(如公眾遊行、大型節慶及體育活動，如馬拉松等)、突發事件(如交通意外、車輛故障、水管爆裂等)，以及惡劣天氣。這些成因並不是本研究的重點。



### **(c) 道路使用者爭相使用路面空間**

9. 除了有過多車輛在路上行駛外，部分地區的路面空間經常會出現不同道路使用者爭相使用路面空間的情況，交通因而受阻。例如：

(a) 貨車上落貨；

(b) 巴士、公共小巴、旅遊巴士、的士及私家車上落客；以及

(c) 車輛在道路上兜圈以尋找路旁泊車位。

10. 工作小組明白，尤其是在已發展地區建築物內，往往因沒有足夠的非路旁上落客貨設施，令上落客貨活動需在路旁進行。然而這些活動可能阻礙交通，形成車龍，並影響到主要路口及繁忙道路的交通。例如尖沙咀漆咸道南及梳士巴利道——在旅客觀光的繁忙時段，有些旅遊巴士會長時間等候乘客和違法泊車，影響交通。

### **(d) 管理和執法問題**

11. 工作小組察悉，政府已實施一系列交通管理措施，以提高使用路面空間的效益(詳情於**第3章**闡述)。這些措施的成效，取決於道路使用者是否合作及守法，並需輔以有效的執法工作。

12. 就與交通擠塞相關的違例事項而言，儘管過去十年香港警務處(下稱「警方」)發出的定額罰款通知書數目增加了約98%，但公眾普遍認為執法未夠嚴厲。工作小組明白，礙於人手所限和職務優次的考慮，警方較難優先對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項執法。

13. 更重要的是，自1994年政府修訂法例，將與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款上調以來，綜合消費物價指數在這段時間已上升了40% (即1994至2013年間)。由於通脹和入息水平增加，相關的罰款額已失去其阻嚇作用，影響了執法工作的成效。

### **(e) 道路工程**

14. 工作小組得悉，一般市民和駕駛者都認為道路工程是導致道路交通擠塞的其中一個主因。工作小組認為，道路工程對妥善保養路面、公用事業設施和基建項目至為重要。因此，要減少道路工程對道路使用者造成的阻礙，最重要是妥善協調鄰近的不同道路工程。據工作小

組所知，政府已實施挖掘准許證制度，管理道路工程，有關制度的詳情載於附件3。

### **道路交通擠塞的後果**

15. 交通擠塞最明顯的後果是增加出行時間，但這不是唯一的後果。交通擠塞會令個別道路使用者，甚至整個社會負擔有形及無形的成本。例如除了因交通擠塞而浪費時間外，車流緩慢亦會影響商業運作。當營商者未能準時送達貨件或提供服務時，他們可能要承擔額外的存貨和物流開支。

16. 交通擠塞所引致的車龍會令路邊空氣惡化，不但危及公眾健康，更會影響市民的生活質素及香港作為國際大都會的形象，削弱香港對海外公司在港設立區域總部／分公司的吸引力。車流緩慢亦會阻礙緊急車輛行駛，延誤其處理事故。

17. 道路交通擠塞的成因及後果詳載於第2章。

### **政府的現行工作**

18. 工作小組察悉，政府為保持客貨運輸流通，一直奉行三管齊下的運輸政策：

- (a) 改善交通基建；
- (b) 擴展和改善公共交通系統；以及
- (c) 管理道路的使用。

19. 工作小組得悉，政府在改善交通基建方面，已推行措施鼓勵市民使用非機動交通工具，例如透過興建上坡地區自動扶梯連接系統及改善行人設施，改善步行環境及加強與鄰近地點的連繫。

20. 政府按上述運輸政策所實施的一系列現行措施，詳載於第3章。工作小組認同政府在這方面的努力，並得悉政府會繼續推行這些措施，檢討其成效，以及探討可改善的空間。儘管如此，鑑於地理、環境及社會上的限制，現行措施未能完全發揮成效。是次研究主要目的是探討有何額外措施，可與這些現行措施一併施行。

### III. 建議

#### **處理道路擠塞的急切性及效益**

21. 工作小組認為香港須盡快處理道路交通擠塞。本港車輛數目的增長速度驚人。過去10年，車輛數目由2003年的524 000輛，增加至2013年的681 000輛，增幅達30%。同期市區的平均行車速度，由2003年的每小時25.6公里，減慢至每小時22.7公里，減幅約為11%。

22. 目前，部分主要道路(如德輔道西)在平日早上繁忙時間的行車速度約為每小時10公里甚至更慢，即僅僅比一般成人的步速(約為每小時4至5公里)快。

23. 道路交通擠塞除減慢車流外，還會影響我們的生活質素。道路使用者要計劃行程也越來越困難。從環境角度來看，路上車輛增多意味著空氣污染物排放和噪音更多，影響健康。多年來，本港路邊可吸入懸浮粒子和二氧化氮的水平，一直偏高，而汽車就是該等污染物的主要路面源頭，也是本港第二大溫室氣體排放源頭。2009至2013年期間，路邊二氧化氮的濃度增加了9%，令近年路邊空氣污染指數達「甚高」水平(即指數超過100)的日數有所增加。

24. 很多道路使用者也同意工作小組的看法，認為處理道路交通擠塞刻不容緩。民意調查的結果顯示，約70%的市民及駕駛者同意有需要控制私家車數目的增長。

25. 雖然改善交通可帶來的效益或難準確量化，但所有道路使用者均能輕易覺察。乘客和駕駛者的等候時間將會縮短，行程省時，令人車往來更加暢順。假如花在路上的時間縮短了，無論老幼貧富、從事何種職業，各人均可以更有彈性地安排日程和追求個人興趣。處理好道路交通擠塞，便能讓市民有更大空間，在工作和生活間取得平衡。

26. 粗略來說，交通情況改善預計可帶來以下的效益：如不馬上行動，並假設私家車現時每年約4.5%的增長率維持不變，我們估計市區平均行車速度會在10年後減慢約15%，而車輛產生的溫室氣體量則會增加超過20%。假如本港私家車的每年增長率能由約4.5%減少至1.5%，則市區平均行車速度的估計減幅和新增車輛所產生溫室氣體量的估計增幅，均可減半。當交通情況好轉，路面車輛減少，本港環境也會得到改善。物流業能縮短運送貨物和提供服務所需的時間，從而節省營

運成本(例如燃料費)。此外，管理車輛數目的增長，可在某程度上紓緩泊車位不足的問題。

27. 工作小組認為，香港社會不能坐視不理，任由塞車問題影響這個城市的可持續發展和競爭力。我們必須馬上行動，紓緩道路交通擠塞。

### **建議措施**

28. 為紓緩道路交通擠塞，工作小組建議的額外措施，應與政府現有措施一併施行。提出有關建議前，工作小組已考慮了下列因素：

- (a) 措施是否行之有效或預期能夠紓緩全港道路交通擠塞；
- (b) 措施會否為社會大眾接受；以及
- (c) 措施對相關持份者的影響。

### **短期和中期措施**

#### **I. 管理私家車數目**

##### **(a) 提高私家車首次登記稅和牌照年費**

29. 工作小組認為，政府有需要管理車輛數目的增長，以紓緩交通擠塞，並應採取更為針對私家車的對策，原因包括：

- (a) 整體車輛數目的增長主要來自私家車。2003至2013年期間，私家車共增加了四成，而其他車種的增幅則相對輕微。截至2014年9月，私家車數目的按年增長率為4.6%，速度驚人；
- (b) 私家車是載客效率甚低的交通工具，在主要道路的總交通流量中佔約40%至70%<sup>2</sup>，但只運載16%的每日總路面乘客量。反觀巴士和小巴，在主要道路總交通流量只佔約5%至25%，卻運載約71%的每日總路面乘客量；以及

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<sup>2</sup> 根據2013年20條主要道路在早上繁忙時間的數據得出。

- (c) 私家車主要作私人用途。由於本港公共交通系統大致完善，收費合理，因此在多數情況下，市民不用依賴私家車。反之，貨車和公共交通工具分別在貨運和客運方面擔當較為重要的角色。

民意調查的結果顯示，逾六成市民和超過七成駕駛者認為不應給予私家車使用道路的優先權。

30. 根據經驗，增加首次登記稅<sup>3</sup>和牌照年費<sup>4</sup>是直接和有效遏止私家車增長的方法。2011年，首次登記稅增加約15%，但同時新登記環保汽油私家車可獲的稅務寬減卻由30%(上限為每輛5萬元)增加至45%(上限為每輛7萬5千元)，大大削弱加稅對控制私家車增長的成效。私家車的按年增長率現時仍處於約4.5%的甚高水平。

31. 與2011年相比，本港私家車數目的基數更大。為了大幅減慢私家車的增長並令效果能較持久，工作小組認為增加首次登記稅的幅度或需比2011年高，而且亦應規定該增幅同時適用於環保汽油私家車。除首次登記稅外，工作小組知悉，牌照年費在過去20多年來未曾作任何調整，因此建議政府在考慮增加牌照年費的幅度時，至少參考這段期間的通脹。

#### **(b) 收緊環保汽油私家車的認可標準**

32. 環保汽油私家車是指廢氣排放量較少而燃料效率較高的汽油私家車。寬減環保汽油私家車的相關首次登記稅的主要目的，是鼓勵認為需要買車的人士選購環保汽油私家車，而非一般汽油私家車。工作小組認為，從控制交通擠塞的角度來看，環保汽油私家車與一般私家車無異，同樣會佔用路面空間。此外，環保汽油私家車並非零排放，仍然會影響路邊的空氣質素。因此，工作小組建議政府繼續收緊環保汽油私家車的認可標準，避免進一步寬減該車種的首次登記稅。政府

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<sup>3</sup> 首次在香港登記的車輛，包括新車和入口二手車，均須繳付首次登記稅。增加首次登記稅，可減低購買私家車的意欲。目前，私家車首次登記稅，按四個應課稅價值稅階的稅率，介乎40%至115%不等。

<sup>4</sup> 牌照年費是包含徵稅成分的費用，領牌汽車必須每年繳費，方可在香港道路行駛。增加牌照年費，可加重擁有已購入私家車的費用。目前，私家車牌照年費介乎3,815元至11,215元不等，視乎引擎容量而定。如果是柴油私家車，除牌照年費外，更要另繳1,460元燃料徵費。

甚至應考慮取消環保汽油私家車的稅務寬減，而只寬減零排放的電動車<sup>5</sup>之首次登記稅。

### **(c) 提高柴油私家車的燃料徵費**

33. 1982年，汽油的燃油稅每公升增加0.7元，但經考慮該增幅對公共交通工具運作成本的影響後，柴油的燃油稅並無相應調高。鑑於該燃油稅安排並非為柴油私家車而設，但該車種卻因而受惠，為「中和」柴油私家車在燃油稅安排方面的得益，政府當時在柴油私家車的牌照年費上增收1,000元作為燃料徵費。於1987至1991年間，燃料徵費按照增加牌照年費的相同百分比提高。自2008年起，歐盟五期柴油的燃油稅寬減至零，以支持商用車輛業界，同時鼓勵業界使用更潔淨的燃料。

34. 由於柴油免稅，而現時汽油的燃油稅則已調整至每公升6.06元，因此如私家車車主選用柴油私家車而非汽油車，將可節省開支。工作小組注意到，如駕駛者選用柴油私家車，將可節省的經常性燃料開支，或足以抵銷牌照年費的擬議加幅。因此管理私家車增長的預期效果，即使不完全被抵銷，也會被淡化。所以，工作小組建議柴油私家車的燃料徵費應相應調高，以反映車主可能節省的燃油開支。

## **II. 善用有限的路面空間**

35. 除遏止車輛增長以減少其對有限路面空間的需求外，工作小組認為，讓路面空間物盡其用，同樣重要。為此，工作小組提出下列兩項建議：

### **(d) 著手籌劃交通擠塞收費試驗計劃**

36. 交通擠塞收費計劃(或電子道路收費計劃)是交通管理工具，旨在透過「用者自付」原則以紓緩指定地區的交通擠塞情況，即向繁忙時間駛進指定地區的駕駛者收費，鼓勵他們轉乘公共交通工具或改行其他路線。工作小組認為此方法可非常有效地紓緩經常塞車地區的交通擠塞情況。

37. 政府表示，預計中環灣仔繞道和東區走廊連接路(下稱「中環灣仔繞道」)通車後，便可為前往中區以外地區的駕駛者提供替代路線繞過收費區，屆時政府便可有更有利條件考慮在中區實施電子道路收費

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<sup>5</sup> 政府現時豁免電動車輛的首次登記稅，直至2017年3月底為止

的可能性。由於中區是香港的商業中心區，加上區內道路交通繁忙，工作小組同意於中環灣仔繞道通車後，中區是推行電子道路收費試驗計劃的合適地點。

38. 工作小組留意到，對於本港很多道路使用者來說，電子道路收費仍是新概念，對於付諸實行與否仍未凝聚共識。工作小組建議政府需就籌劃電子道路收費盡快諮詢公眾，亦明白詳細設計及實施計劃需時較長。

#### **(e) 增加咪錶泊車位的收費**

39. 目前，全港共有大約18 200個設有收費錶的路旁泊車位(下稱「咪錶泊車位」)，供短暫泊車之用，最高收費為每15分鐘2元(相等於每小時8元)<sup>6</sup>。由於咪錶泊車位較為方便，而多數較鄰近商業停車場的收費便宜，因此駕駛者往往在繁忙地區的路上兜圈，甚至會長時間雙行泊車，以尋找或等候路旁泊車位，阻礙正常交通。

40. 工作小組留意到，咪錶泊車位的收費20年來維持不變，但同期的綜合消費物價指數已上升了40%。工作小組認為有理由提高咪錶泊車位的收費，以減少駕駛者在路上兜圈／雙行泊車來等候咪錶泊車位。此建議的另一效益是可減少駕駛者在咪錶泊車位長時間泊車。

### **III. 加重交通違例事項的罰款和加強執法**

41. 工作小組明白，因應社會情況轉變，警方須調配人手應付其他更迫切的職務(例如因公眾集會及遊行日增所帶來的人潮管制及管理工作)，但有效地對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項執法也很重要。工作小組建議實行下列四項措施以加強執法：

#### **(a) 加強宣傳和教育，以鼓勵市民遵守交通規則及規例**

工作小組認為，要令道路使用者守法，基本的方法是透過持續教育和宣傳。因此，工作小組建議政府加強這方面的工作。

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<sup>6</sup> 雖然法定咪錶泊車位收費上限為每15分鐘2元，但咪錶停車位的收費取決於多項因素，包括泊車位需求、泊車位位置和社情民意。例如，較偏遠或使用率較低的泊車位收費會訂於較低水平(例如每30分鐘2元)。

(b) 恢復與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款的阻嚇作用

現時與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的(如非法泊車)<sup>7</sup>的定額罰款為320元或450元，該水平自1994年起未曾調整過，但綜合消費物價指數在1994至2013年間已上升約40%。由於通脹和入息水平增加，定額罰款的阻嚇作用無疑已逐漸減弱。工作小組認為，政府應把定額罰款提高至少40%。

(c) 警方調撥更多資源，對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項採取更嚴厲的執法行動

雖然警方的人手和資源方面均有限，但是工作小組仍促請警方考慮如何進一步對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項加強執法。在某些特別擠塞的地區，警方應採取更具阻嚇力的執法行動。舉例說，如認為合適，警務人員可考慮直接向駕駛者發出定額罰款通知書，而不預先給予口頭警告。工作小組亦知悉，由於招聘週期之間的間隔，現時在職交通督導員的人數有時會較編制少。警方已經採取措施縮短招聘週期之間的間隔，盡量令交通督導員隊伍可達編制總員人數。此外，工作小組認為警方亦可探討能否擴充交通督導員的編制。

(d) 加強應用資訊科技以協助執法

工作小組明白，就應付道路交通擠塞而言，警方可調撥的額外人手資源有限，故需加強應用資訊科技來精簡執法程序。工作小組知悉，警方現正推行試驗計劃，利用電子化系統發出定額罰款通知書，工作小組認為此舉方向正確。工作小組亦認為，政府可邀請資訊科技界或大專院校，因應香港的情況，探索和研發新科技以協助執法。

42. 工作小組留意到大部分短中期措施都會增加駕駛者的財政負擔。然而交通擠塞情況日益惡化，這些措施是有必要的。工作小組考慮過其他方案，但它們均未能如建議措施般能直接有效地控制汽車增長，以確保路面空間得到善用。為配合這些措施，工作小組認為政府

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<sup>7</sup> 根據《定額罰款(交通違例事項)條例》(第237章)和《定額罰款(刑事訴訟)條例》(第240章)，與交通擠塞相關的違例事項包括非法泊車、在限制區內裝卸貨物或讓乘客上落等。



應該加強教育及宣傳。另外，工作小組亦建議數項長期措施，供政府進一步研究。

## **長期措施**

### **(a) 檢討泊車政策和發布空置泊車位實時資訊**

43. 對於需要駕車出入的人士和商營運輸服務機構，泊車位不可或缺。工作小組認為，提供泊車位時必須審慎地尋求平衡。供應過多或不足皆不可取——如果供應過量，便會誘使駕駛者多用私家車；如果供應不足，則會令非法泊車問題加劇，進一步阻塞交通，令執法資源更形緊絀。

44. 因此，就泊車位的供應量定出合適水平，在管理車輛增長的同時又不至帶來過多負面後果，至為重要。工作小組認為，政府應詳細檢討泊車政策，並充分諮詢各持份者和市民的意見。同時，政府亦應探討如何向非路邊商業停車場的營辦商尋求合作，提供停車場泊位空置情況的資料，使駕駛者無需在附近道路兜圈以尋找可用的泊車位，以致令交通更加擠塞。

### **(b) 鼓勵於繁忙時間以外在路旁上落貨物**

45. 工作小組明白，香港是個發展密度高的城市，商戶確有需要在路旁上落貨物。然而，長時間上落貨或是非法上落貨會阻礙交通。

46. 作為長期措施，工作小組認為，政府應研究如何鼓勵和協助商戶安排於繁忙時間以外在路旁上落貨物，以盡量減少該等活動對道路交通的影響。上述安排可作為電子道路收費試驗計劃的一項措施。在繁忙時間和繁忙時間以外實施不同收費，便可提供誘因，鼓勵商戶於繁忙時間以外在收費區內運送貨物。

### **(c) 增建泊車轉乘設施**

47. 泊車轉乘停車場讓駕駛者先把車輛停放在交通樞紐，然後轉乘公共交通工具。該類停車場通常設於近郊或市中心外圍，從而減少車輛駛進最擠塞的地區。工作小組注意到，本港已有11個泊車轉乘停車場(但不是全部均有高使用率)。民意調查的結果顯示，大多數受訪者贊成增建泊車轉乘停車場，以減少擠塞地區的交通流量。

48. 工作小組明白，在擠塞地區外圍物色適當地點增建泊車轉乘停車場有限制，但仍促請政府探討其可能性。日後推展鐵路項目、市區重建項目和新發展項目時，尤應詳加考慮。政府亦應研究如何提高泊車轉乘停車場的使用量。

49. 泊車轉乘設施亦可提供予單車使用者，鼓勵他們接駁公共交通。工作小組知悉政府一直在新市鎮及新發展區的公共運輸交匯處和港鐵站附近提供單車泊車位。工作小組建議政府在可行的情況下繼續加強這方面的工作。

### 其他措施

50. 除上述短期、中期和長期措施外，工作小組亦研究過其他措施，大多是關於提供公共交通服務和改善過海行車隧道的交通情況。工作小組未有在本報告中詳加說明這些措施，因為該等議題需要深入研究，而工作小組的研究設有時限，故此不在研究範圍之內。工作小組亦知悉政府已承諾進行所需研究，例如公布開展《公共交通策略研究》，探討本港公共交通系統的多個範疇。

51. 工作小組亦考慮過其他措施，例如車輛配額制度。雖然當中有部分措施已於其他城市推行，並在紓緩道路交通擠塞方面發揮一定成效，但工作小組認為這些措施相對嚴厲，在現階段未必適合引入香港。儘管如此，工作小組仍欲指出，如本港交通情況在政府採取建議的額外措施後繼續惡化，政府或需考慮這些較嚴厲的措施。由於該等措施備受爭議，政府日後須充分諮詢各持份者和市民的意見。

## IV. 羣策羣力

52. 工作小組深信，要解決道路交通擠塞這個極具挑戰性的問題，社會各界必須通力合作。不論是個別道路使用者、業主、商戶、立法會議員或區議員，均與政府攜手合作，為紓緩道路交通擠塞出一分力。

53. 為凝聚社會各界去共同紓緩道路交通擠塞，工作小組認為政府必須制訂有效的宣傳和教育計劃，以宣傳以下兩項重要信息：

- (a) 羣策羣力：要解決道路交通擠塞，每個人的努力都不可少；以及
- (b) 雖感不便但仍值得以大局為重：某些紓緩交通擠塞的建議或會對部分人士造成不便，甚至增加其財政負擔，但卻可造福整個社會，值得推行。

54. 工作小組亦希望指出教育下一代的重要性。不少人小時候都聽過這首交通安全口號，至今仍能引起共鳴：「慢慢走，勿亂跑，馬路如虎口。」教育和宣傳的效果未必能立竿見影，但成效卻能持久。第5章會闡述社會各界可如何攜手協力，解決道路交通擠塞。

## 結論

55. 香港是世界級的城市，一直竭力維持和提升競爭力。交通便利與否和空氣質素是兩項重要而相關的指標，用以界定一個城市是否適宜居住和具吸引力。因此，工作小組籲請社會各界人士齊心協力解決道路交通擠塞，維持香港的競爭力。

56. 工作小組促請政府研究和考慮本報告所載的建議，並希望政府接納該等建議，在可行的情況下盡快付諸實行。

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## 第 1 章 — 研究

### 1.1 概覽

1.1.1 本章概述是次研究的背景、交諮會及其為開展是次研究而成立的工作小組的職權範圍和成員名單，以及工作小組如何進行研究。

### 1.2 背景

1.2.1 香港人煙稠密，要讓客貨運輸暢通無阻，向來須面對重重挑戰。隨著社會發展和經濟活動增加，路面空間的使用日趨頻繁，車輛數目亦見上升。然而，香港道路網絡再作擴展的空間越來越少，已發展市區的情況尤甚。道路交通擠塞經常出現。道路交通擠塞不僅對所有道路使用者造成不便，也令本港經濟活動、環境和生活質素受到損害。

1.2.2 近年來，社會大眾可輕易感受到道路交通問題日趨惡化。從運輸署年度調查所記錄的分區行車速度可見，港島區的平均行車速度在過去十年維持在每小時 20 公里左右，一直屬最低；九龍區和新界區的平均行車速度雖然較高，但已出現下降趨勢，情況值得關注。部分主要道路平日繁忙時間的行車速度更低至每小時 10 公里，僅較成年人每小時 4 至 5 公里的平均步行速度略高。

1.2.3 政府銳意加強紓緩道路交通擠塞的工作。2014 年 3 月，運輸及房屋局局長邀請交諮會進行研究，探究導致本港道路交通擠塞的各種因素，並向政府提出可行的建議，以應付交通擠塞。交諮會表示歡迎，欣然接受這項工作。

### 1.3 交諮會轄下的工作小組

1.3.1 交諮會於 2014 年 4 月成立工作小組進行研究。工作小組的職權範圍如下：

- (a) 探究導致香港整體道路交通擠塞的各種因素；

- (b) 建議可在合理時間內實施的全港性短、中期可行措施，以紓緩道路交通擠塞情況；
- (c) 提出全港性的長遠方案供政府作進一步研究；以及
- (d) 於2014年12月向交諮會提交報告，經該會討論及同意後向政府提交報告。

1.3.2 工作小組的成員名單，載於**附件 1A**。交諮會的成員名單和職權範圍，則載於**附件 1B**。

1.3.3 工作小組於2014年4月舉行首次會議，並於同年12月初完成相關工作；在八個月的研究期內，共召開了九次會議。工作小組藉審閱文件和開會商議來進行研究，並透過一家經運輸署委聘的獨立市場研究公司蒐集民意<sup>1</sup>，以了解市民認為導致道路交通擠塞的成因，以及對各項紓緩措施的接受程度。該公司在2014年7月中至8月中期間，透過電話和面談收集公眾意見。民意調查的結果和所用的問卷，分別載於**附件1C**及**附件1D**。

1.3.4 根據工作小組的職權範圍，其重點工作是探究道路交通擠塞的主要成因和建議全港性的可行措施。這些建議屬額外措施並應可與政府現有措施一併施行，以解決道路交通擠塞。工作小組在制訂建議前，已檢視本港情況和海外經驗，而在提出建議時，亦已考慮民意調查的結果，特別是公眾對各項紓緩交通擠塞措施的接受程度。

1.3.5 這是工作小組的報告，已獲交諮會通過，以提交政府考慮。

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<sup>1</sup> 民意調查的目的是要蒐集市民和駕駛者對各類道路交通擠塞問題的概括意見。交諮會認為，如須就某些具體措施收集公眾意見，政府稍後或要進行更深入的調查。

## 第2章 — 香港的道路交通擠塞情況

### 2.1 概覽


2.1.1 本章概述香港的道路交通情況、檢視道路交通擠塞的成因，以及扼述道路交通擠塞所引發的問題。

### 2.2 香港的道路交通情況

#### (a) 交通工具

2.2.1 大多數香港人都依賴公共交通工具出行。香港每日總乘客量高達1 480萬人次，其中公共交通系統佔近九成<sup>1</sup>。鐵路是整個系統的骨幹，而其他公共交通工具，包括專營巴士、公共小巴、特別用途巴士<sup>2</sup>、的士、電車和渡輪，則擔當輔助角色。從圖2A所示的每日總乘客量分佈圖可見，路面交通工具佔每日總乘客量的68.7%，因此，保持路面交通暢順至為重要。私家車雖然佔車輛總數很大的比重(約70%<sup>3</sup>)，但只接載每日總乘客量的11.3%。

圖2A：每日乘客量(平日)(百萬人次)<sup>4</sup>



<sup>1</sup> 根據運輸署的《2011年交通習慣調查》，公共交通佔每日總乘客量的88.3%。

<sup>2</sup> 「特別用途巴士」包括公司巴士、學校巴士、邨巴、旅遊巴士、穿梭巴士和跨境巴士等，但不包括公共小巴。


<sup>3</sup> 2011年，領有牌照的車輛總數和領有牌照的私家車數目分別為630 281和434 843部。

<sup>4</sup> 資料來源：《2011年交通習慣調查》。

## (b) 行車速度

2.2.2 行車速度是反映交通擠塞程度的指標。圖2B顯示過去十年<sup>5</sup>港島、九龍和新界區平日早上繁忙時間<sup>6</sup>的平均行車速度。

圖 2B：平日早上繁忙時間的平均行車速度  
(2003 至 2013 年)



2.2.3 三個地區中，港島區的平均行車速度最低，維持在每小時約20公里，實屬偏低。中區部分交通擠塞最嚴重的路段，更錄得每小時只有接近10公里的平均行車速度<sup>7</sup>。相對而言，九龍區的平均行車速度略高，但卻有下降趨勢——車速由2003年每小時27.6公里，下降至2013年每小時23.5公里。至於新界區的平均行車速度，在實際數值上雖然仍較港島區和九龍區為高，但亦出現下降趨勢，從2003年每小時42.8公里，下降至2013年每小時39.9公里。以上數字顯示，港島區的道路交通擠塞情況嚴重，而九龍區和新界區的擠塞情況則日漸轉壞。


<sup>5</sup> 運輸署自1987年起每年調查行車速度。2013年的調查記錄了61條路線平日早上繁忙時間(0800至0930時)的行車時間，其中29條位於港島／九龍，32條位於新界。

<sup>6</sup> 運輸署自2003年起每年調查平日傍晚繁忙時間(1700至1900時)的行車速度。2013年的調查包括記錄九條路線平日晚上繁忙時間的行車時間。

<sup>7</sup> 中區部分路段的行車速度載於附件2。

## (c) 車輛數目

2.2.4 車輛數目是導致道路交通擠塞的主因，當公共道路網絡難有進一步擴展空間時尤甚(詳情請參閱第2.2.12及2.2.13段)。在2003至2013年間，本港領牌車輛的總數由約524 000部增至約681 000部，增幅約為30%。圖2C列出2003至2013年間各類車輛的數目。




2.2.5 私家車的數目一直為各類車輛之冠，其增長率亦最驚人。過去十年，私家車的數目增加了約40%，遠超領牌車輛總數的增長率(約30%)。事實上，私家車數目的增長佔同期領牌車輛總數的增長約87%。此外，私家車佔領牌車輛總數的比率亦不斷上升，在2013年已達70%；截至2014年9月，私家車的按年增長率達4.6%的極高水平，遠超總車輛數目錄得3.4%的按年增長率。



2.2.6 相比之下，巴士及小巴的數目在2003至2013年間只錄得溫和的增長，由19 738部增至20 456部(+3.6%)。與同期人口增長相比(由2003年的676萬人增至2013年的722萬人，增長率為6.8%)，上述增長率相對輕微。另外，本港經濟在2003至2013年有顯著增長，本地生產總值由12,570億元上升69%至21,250億元，但對本港經濟擔當重要角色的貨車，只錄得溫和的增長率(+6.6%)。與巴士、小巴及貨車數目的增長率相比，私家車數目在2003至2013年間的增長率(+40%)實屬偏高，情況值得關注。

2.2.7 車輛數目與市區行車速度之間亦有明顯的關係<sup>8</sup>，就圖2D所示，當車輛數目增多時，道路網絡上會有更多車輛行駛，平均行車速度便隨之下降，加劇交通擠塞。

圖2D：歷來車輛數目與市區行車速度之間的關係




#### (d) 車輛使用情況

2.2.8 當領有牌照的車輛數目越多，路面車輛數目亦會增加。車輛的總行車里數是反映車輛使用量的指標。

2.2.9 圖2E顯示2003至2013年間，按車輛類別劃分的每年行車里數。在這段期間，私家車的每年行車里數上升了25%，佔所有車輛的每年總行車里數增長的65%。貨車、電單車、巴士和小巴的每年行車里數在過去十年大致保持穩定，而的士之使用量則與香港的經濟表現有非常密切的關係。

<sup>8</sup> 由於市區的交通擠塞情況較為嚴重，加上市區可擴展道路網絡的空間與新界相比更為有限，因此在考慮行車速度與車輛數目的關係時，只參考了市區的行車速度。

圖2E：按車輛類別劃分的每年行車里數(2003至2013年)



### (e) 主要道路的車輛組合

2.2.10 私家車不單在車輛總數和車輛總使用量中佔最大比重，也是使用有限路面空間最多的車輛類別。表2A列出2013年20條主要道路早上繁忙時間的車輛組合，當中所有的隧道和大部分主要道路，私家車都佔最大比重，約40%至70%不等。

2.2.11 巴士和小巴<sup>9</sup>佔用路面的比例大致介乎低至中等之間。除彌敦道外，巴士和小巴只佔主要道路總交通流量約5%至25%不等，但巴士和小巴的載客量高，約佔每日總路面乘客量的71%(參閱第2.2.1段)。相反，私家車佔用主要道路的大量空間，但卻只接載每日總路面乘客量的16%，顯然是效率較低的載客工具。

<sup>9</sup> 巴士和小巴包括專營巴士、特別用途巴士和公共及私家小巴。

表2A：20條主要道路早上繁忙時間的車輛組合(2013年)<sup>10</sup>

	私家車	的士	貨車	巴士和小巴	電單車
東區走廊	<b>37%</b>	24%	27%	9%	3%
干諾道中	22%	<b>45%</b>	6%	25%	2%
夏慤道	<b>44%</b>	34%	11%	9%	2%
金鐘道	36%	<b>37%</b>	6%	20%	1%
香港仔隧道	<b>46%</b>	16%	17%	18%	3%
海底隧道	<b>48%</b>	7%	24%	14%	7%
東區海底隧道	<b>56%</b>	18%	15%	7%	4%
西區海底隧道	<b>51%</b>	20%	11%	16%	2%
漆咸道北	<b>39%</b>	20%	21%	15%	5%
公主道	<b>62%</b>	15%	12%	7%	4%
太子道西	<b>43%</b>	24%	15%	17%	1%
彌敦道	24%	16%	16%	<b>42%</b>	2%
西九龍公路	<b>48%</b>	18%	18%	13%	3%
龍翔道	<b>44%</b>	17%	27%	7%	5%
獅子山隧道	<b>57%</b>	8%	21%	12%	2%
大老山隧道	<b>59%</b>	13%	15%	10%	3%
大埔公路－馬料水段	<b>69%</b>	13%	7%	10%	1%
吐露港公路	<b>58%</b>	7%	28%	5%	2%
屯門公路	<b>44%</b>	7%	34%	12%	3%
將軍澳隧道	<b>51%</b>	15%	22%	8%	4%


註：粗體的數字表示其為佔用該條道路比率最高的交通工具。

## (f) 香港的公共道路

2.2.12 興建道路通常與城市發展同步進行，不論是為城市未來的發展而鋪路，或是為了配合道路使用量增長，政府也會築路。香港的道路網路實際上已頗為四通八達，圖2F顯示自2003年起公共道路總長度的增長。

<sup>10</sup> 資料來源：《運輸署交通統計年報(2013年)》。

圖2F：2003年起公共道路的總長度



2.2.13 八、九十年代道路網絡曾大幅擴展，當中包括新機場及相關工程項目。2003至2013年間，公共道路的增長有所放緩，總長度每年平均增長率為0.8%。目前正在興建或規劃中的新道路工程數目有限<sup>11</sup>，至2020年，道路的總長度按年增長率估計會下跌至0.4%左右，遠低於目前車輛每年約3.4%<sup>12</sup>的增長率。不少主要幹道及已發展地區的道路已經常出現交通擠塞，如中環的德輔道中及遮打道、尖沙咀的金馬倫道等。由於土地和環境所限，擴闊或改善已發展地區的道路或路口會遇到很大的困難(參閱第2.3.3和2.3.4段)，單靠興建新道路來分流交通並不能長遠持續。因此，若不控制車輛增長，交通情況只會繼續惡化。

## 2.3 道路交通擠塞的成因

2.3.1 根據2014年進行的民意調查，大多數市民(68%)，尤其是駕駛者(82%)，認為香港的道路交通擠塞情況屬中等至嚴重程度。這與上文第2.2節闡述的各項指標，例如行車速度下降及車輛使用量上升等相吻合。

<sup>11</sup> 新工程項目包括港珠澳大橋香港接線、中環灣仔繞道、屯門至赤鱗角連接路，以及蓮塘／香園圍口岸與粉嶺公路之間的連接路等。

<sup>12</sup> 截至2014年9月，車輛總數的按年增長率為3.4%。

2.3.2 引致道路交通擠塞的經常性成因<sup>13</sup>大致可分為以下五類：

- (a) 增建路面運輸基礎設施的空間有限；
- (b) 過多車輛在路上行駛；
- (c) 道路使用者爭相使用路面空間；
- (d) 管理及執法問題；以及
- (e) 道路工程。

**(a) 增建路面運輸基礎設施的空間有限**

2.3.3 雖然本港的公共道路網絡在過去數十年有所擴展，但未來興建新道路的機會將比以往少，尤其是在發展稠密的市區，進一步擴展道路網絡的空間非常有限。市區的擁擠環境為策劃及興建新主要公路帶來限制，甚或令這類工程無法推展。礙於市區空間有限，加上對填海的限制和對景觀影響的關注，要落實興建新道路(如興建中的中環灣仔繞道)，已日益困難。此外，在市區興建新道路所涉及的环境問題，如空氣質素及噪音等，也變得更難克服。在2014年1月起生效的新空氣質素指標，為規劃新道路定下更嚴格的環保規定。市民越來越期望政府築路時及道路啟用後，可盡量減少甚或避免對環境構成影響。所以，多個擬建的道路項目，例如連接堅尼地城與香港仔的沿海公路(即四號幹線)，以及連接新界西北與北大嶼山的主要公路(即十一號幹線)亦因公眾的反對而擱置。

2.3.4 在進行地區性道路改善工程，例如擴闊路口和興建行車天橋、行人天橋和隧道等設施時，也同樣會遇到上述限制。這些工程還會受其他因素制肘，包括空間有限、地下公用事業設施擁擠、景觀影響、環保考慮，以及施工期間對交通的影響等。公眾的意見，尤其是駕駛者與行人的意見，往往出現分歧<sup>14</sup>。以往有不少例子是路口改善計劃因無法取得公眾的支持和共識而不能推行。結果即使相關路口的交通流量已接近飽和或甚至超出負荷，問題仍未能解決。在一些特別擠塞的

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<sup>13</sup> 非經常性成因指不會經常在特定時間和地點出現，包括佔用路面及／或產生額外交通流量的大型活動(如公眾遊行、大型節慶及體育活動，如馬拉松等)、突發事件(如交通意外、車輛故障、水管爆裂等)，以及惡劣天氣。這些成因並不是本研究的重點。

<sup>14</sup> 例如，駕駛者及行人同時希望在燈號循環中，延長其綠燈時間。

地區，某些路口的車龍甚至會阻塞上游的路口，有時可引致附近一帶的道路網絡出現連鎖擠塞反應。

2.3.5 由於市區的空間有限，要提供足夠泊車位也相當困難。近年來，泊車位的供應已遠遠追不上急劇增加的車輛數目<sup>15</sup>。在2013年，全港共有475 800部領牌私家車，但住宅泊車位只有約397 000個<sup>16</sup>。不論在住宅或非住宅區，非法泊車已導致道路擠塞，並成為社會日益關注的問題。

#### (b) 過多車輛在路上行駛

2.3.6 路面上未能增建更多運輸基礎設施，一方面會減低其容車量，但另一方面有意見認為，興建更多道路會促使車輛數目增加，同時吸引更多使用車輛。民意調查結果顯示，一般市民及駕駛者均認為，路面上行駛的車輛數目過多，是導致交通擠塞的其中一個主要因素，而他們亦支持減少私家車的數目。與此同時，過去十年間，雖然私家車載客量低，但數目增加了約40%，增長遠高於同期其他車輛的總增幅(即11%)。香港擁有發展完善和收費合理的公共運輸系統，每天接載約90%的乘客人次。有別於其他海外國家及城市，香港絕大多數市民並非居住在公共交通工具難以到達的偏遠地區，因此在本港擁有和使用私家車並非基本或必然的需要。

2.3.7 由於某些巴士路線載客量偏低，不少市民認為可減少專營巴士的數目。因為專營巴士體積龐大、佔用路面的空間較多，若其載客量低，或會成為低效率的交通工具。但部分載客量偏低的巴士車程是有其重要性的<sup>17</sup>，例如巴士接近尾站時，大部分乘客已經下車，但巴士仍須接載餘下乘客前往總站。有關政府推行巴士路線重組的工作詳情，請參閱第3.5.12至3.5.17段。至於其他車輛類別，貨車對支持本港經濟有著重要的角色，而公共小巴和的士則比私家車及巴士佔用較少路面空間。民意調查的結果顯示，市民普遍滿意這些車輛佔用道路的比率，較少受訪者認為需要減少它們的數目。

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<sup>15</sup> 在2003至2013年間，私家車的數目增加了40%，但同期住宅私家車泊車位只錄得14%的增幅。

<sup>16</sup> 此處只計算住宅夜間泊車位數目。

<sup>17</sup> 有需要在乘客需求、巴士營運效益、道路交通狀況及環境效益等各方面取得平衡。

### **(c) 道路使用者爭相使用路面空間**

2.3.8 除了有過多車輛在路上行駛外，部分地區經常會出現不同道路使用者爭相使用路面空間的情況，減低道路容車量，阻礙交通，造成交通擠塞。這些活動通常包括：

- (a) 貨車上落貨；
- (b) 巴士、公共小巴、旅遊巴士、的士及私家車上落客；以及
- (c) 車輛在道路上兜圈以尋找路旁泊車位。

2.3.9 工作小組明白，尤其是在已發展地區的建築物內，往往因為沒有足夠的非路旁上落客貨設施，令上落客貨需在路旁進行。然而這些活動可能會阻礙交通，形成車龍，並影響到主要路口及繁忙道路的交通。例如尖沙咀漆咸道南及梳士巴利道在旅客觀光的繁忙時段，有些旅遊巴士會長時間等候乘客和違法泊車，影響交通。

### **(d) 管理和執法問題**

2.3.10 為盡量善用有限的路面空間，運輸署實施了不少交通管理措施(在**第3章**詳加闡釋)。不過，不管措施的設計如何能對症下藥，其成效仍取決於道路使用者是否守法。違例泊車、雙行泊車、在限制區上落客貨、長時間在非限制區上落客貨或把車停在路口黃色方格等違規行為，都會減低道路容車量或阻礙交通。因此，交通管理措施必須輔以有效的執法工作，以阻嚇違規行為。就與交通擠塞相關的違例事項而言，儘管過去十年警方發出的定額罰款通知書數目增加了約98%，但公眾普遍認為執法未夠嚴厲，認為警方必須加強執法。

2.3.11 工作小組注意到近年警方須調配人手應付其他職務，例如因公眾集會日增所帶來的人潮管制及管理工作，以及其他有關安全的違例事項。因此較難優先對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項執法。

2.3.12 政府自1994年成功修訂法例，將與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款上調以來，綜合消費物價指數已上升了40% (即1994至2013年間)。相關的罰款已隨時間流逝，失去其阻嚇作用，影響了執法工作的成效。

## **(e) 道路工程**

2.3.13 道路工程在香港十分常見，除了佔用路面外，有時候亦會導致或加劇道路交通擠塞。根據民意調查結果，一般市民和駕駛者都認為道路工程是導致道路交通擠塞的其中一個主因。

2.3.14 雖然道路工程有時會造成滋擾和導致道路交通擠塞，但對社會卻是非常重要的。道路工程包括改善和維修該路段或其地底的公用事業設施(如水管、排水渠、氣體喉管、供電及電訊電纜等)。進行基建項目亦可能涉及道路工程。

2.3.15 如將道路工程安排在車流較少的晚間進行，雖可減少對交通造成的影響，但卻會對市民造成其他不必要的滋擾，最明顯的就是產生過量噪音。某些道路工程，例如修補爆裂的水管，亦須即時進行。因此，要減少道路工程對道路使用者造成的阻礙，最重要是妥善協調鄰近的不同道路工程。政府已實施挖掘准許證制度，管理道路工程，有關詳情載於**第3章**。

## **2.4 道路交通擠塞的後果**

2.4.1 道路交通擠塞不但會影響個別駕駛者，更會對整個社會造成不便，構成有形及無形的成本。

### **(a) 增加出行時間及成本**

2.4.2 不論是私家車司機或其乘客，又或是路面公共交通工具的乘客，所有道路使用者均普遍認為，交通擠塞最明顯的後果是增加出行時間。除了因交通擠塞而浪費時間外，許多市民亦因未能掌握行程所需時間而須預留更多時間出行。若遲到的後果很嚴重(如上班遲到受罰、出席重要會議時遲到，以及損失生意機會等)，預留的時間便需相應加長。如沒有交通擠塞，這些額外出行時間及預留時間將可用於對經濟有貢獻的活動或經濟範疇以外的活動上，如工作、會議、聯誼、運動、看電影和休息等。



## **(b) 其他有形的成本**

2.4.3 除了第2.4.2段所論述的個人成本外，道路交通擠塞亦會影響商業運作，尤其是運輸服務業及路面公共交通營辦商。當營商者未能準時送達貨件或提供服務時，他們可能要承擔額外的存貨和物流開支，甚至須作出賠償。

2.4.4 堵車時，車輛須不時停車，在且行且停的情況下，車輛的耗油量會增加，以致駕車的整體成本上升。此外，車輛會因此須更頻繁地維修及保養，而路面亦會加速耗損，增加維修保養費用。

## **(c) 無形的成本**

2.4.5 道路交通擠塞亦會帶來以下無形的後果，所牽涉的代價可以非常高：

- (a) 交通擠塞所引致的車龍會令路邊空氣惡化，不但危及公眾健康，更會影響市民的生活質素及香港作為國際大都會的形象，削弱香港對海外公司在港設立區域總部／分公司的吸引力；
- (b) 交通擠塞很多時會阻礙緊急車輛行駛，延誤其處理事故；以及
- (c) 車輛數目急劇增加，令非法泊車問題日趨嚴重。本港市區有很多狹窄的街道，若這些街道、行人路或緊急通道出入口前出現非法泊車，可以引起嚴重的後果，甚至會構成公眾安全問題。

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### 第3章 — 現時處理道路交通擠塞的措施

#### 3.1 概覽

3.1.1 本章概述政府現時為紓緩道路交通擠塞所實施的措施。

#### 3.2 現行措施

3.2.1 工作小組研究了一系列可紓緩道路交通擠塞的措施，當中包括政府一直推行的措施，而這些現行措施大致可分作以下兩類：

- (a) 工作小組審視後認為政府應繼續推行和定期檢視成效的措施，本章會對這些措施作簡單匯報；以及
- (b) 工作小組認為應予加強的措施。第4章會一併討論這些措施及其他建議。

#### 3.3 運輸政策

3.3.1 工作小組察悉，政府的運輸政策目標，是提供一個能維持合理客貨流通的運輸系統，以可持續發展方式支持經濟增長和滿足市民需要。政府一直三管齊下，處理道路交通擠塞：

- (a) 改善交通基建；
- (b) 擴展和改善公共交通系統；以及
- (c) 管理道路的使用。

#### 3.4 改善交通基建

3.4.1 香港一直將運輸和土地用途綜合規劃。多年來，政府建設了龐大的道路網絡及其他運輸基礎設施，滿足市民出行和進行各種社會經濟活動的需要。不過，土地是香港彌足珍貴的資源。一如第2.3.3至2.3.5段所述，地理、環境和社會上的種種問題限制了本港道路的增長，難以應付車輛數目不斷增加。在經常出現嚴重交通擠塞的市區，這項挑戰尤其嚴峻。

3.4.2 因此，發展一個完善的鐵路系統作為本港公共交通系統的骨幹，是改善運輸基建的關鍵。現時，全港鐵路的總長度約為218公里。當正在興建的五個鐵路項目<sup>1</sup>在2021年全部完成後，鐵路網絡總長度將超過270公里，服務覆蓋超過70%人口居住的地區。2014年9月，政府公布《鐵路發展策略2014》，建議推行另外七個鐵路項目<sup>2</sup>。到了2031年，鐵路網絡將擴展至超過300公里。當所有項目完成後，鐵路網絡預計可服務全港約75%的人口。

3.4.3 為輔助鐵路發展和減少使用路面交通作短途代步，政府已加大力度擴展和改善行人設施，例如興建上坡地區自動扶梯連接系統和升降機系統，鼓勵市民步行往返距離較近的地方。就縱向連接方面，連接德輔道中和干德道的中環至半山自動扶梯連接系統，以及連接第三街和般咸道的正街自動扶梯連接系統，已分別在1993和2013年啟用，為有關地區提供舒適方便的行人通道。另外，沙田至中環綫(下稱「沙中綫」)項目和觀塘市中心重建項目現正建造兩個行人連接系統，即慈雲山行人通道系統和月華街行人連接系統。

3.4.4 而橫向連接方面，政府在新發展區已加入合適的行人設施，加強其與鄰近地點的連繫。連接位於佐敦谷的彩盈邨及彩福邨與九龍灣香港鐵路(下稱「港鐵」)站的行人天橋，以及啓德發展區<sup>3</sup>的行人連接設施就是兩個典型的例子。在許多市區的中心地帶(如尖沙咀)，政府亦已提供完善的隧道網絡，以改善步行環境。為進一步便利市民(尤其是長者)，政府已為部分行人通道加設無障礙通道設施。工作小組支持政府繼續沿著此方向工作。改善步行的環境及加強各地點的連繫或可鼓勵駕駛者步行，減少對汽車的依賴。

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<sup>1</sup> 五個鐵路項目包括西港島綫、南港島綫(東段)、觀塘綫延綫、廣深港高速鐵路(香港段)及沙中綫。

<sup>2</sup> 七個鐵路項目包括北環綫及古洞站、屯門南延綫、東九龍綫、東涌西延綫、洪水橋站、南港島綫(西段)及北港島綫。

<sup>3</sup> 啓德發展計劃將會興建新的或加強現有的行人設施，包括隧道、天橋和行人路。

圖 3A：第三街與般咸道之間的正街自動扶梯連接系統



正街自動扶梯連接系統

3.4.5 有些人提倡以單車替代機動交通工具。儘管騎單車有環保效益，但本港市區道路普遍擠迫和繁忙，加上上落客貨活動頻繁，實在難以在不影響交通或道路使用者安全的情況下，在市區騰出合適地方興建單車徑。在行車道上騎踏單車的人士，亦會較容易因交通意外而受傷。2013年間，便有超過1 000宗涉及單車在行車道上發生的交通意外。因此，政府一般不鼓勵市民在市區以單車作為交通工具。相對於市區，交通流量密度較低的新市鎮或新發展區，較有條件讓單車作短途代步。就此，政府一直致力在新市鎮及新發展區締造「單車友善環境」，通過發展新的單車徑網絡和改善現有單車徑及單車停泊設施等，讓市民可以單車作短途代步或康樂用途。

3.4.6 儘管擴展現有道路網絡有不少限制，但工作小組得悉，政府會繼續檢討和研究興建新道路或改善/擴闊現有道路的可能性，以應付社會和經濟發展的需要。興建中的策略性道路工程包括中環灣仔繞道、屯門至赤鱗角連接路、港珠澳大橋香港接線、蓮塘／香園圍口岸與粉嶺公路之間的連接路、以及吐露港公路／粉嶺公路擴闊工程—第二期等。這些項目的總預算約為1,400億元。另外，正在積極策劃的多項策略性道路包括屯門西繞道、中九龍幹線，以及將軍澳—藍田隧道等。

3.4.7 除了上述的策略性道路工程外，政府亦會繼續把握適當的時機，改善地區性道路網絡及行人設施。有關的改善措施包括重建時把建築物後移以擴闊道路、進行路口改善工程，以及提供直接與新發展或重建項目相連的分層行人設施等。在過去三年，已完成或正在進行中而相對大規模(每項工程費用超過3,000萬元)的改善工程約有20個，而這些項目的總預算約為25億元。

3.4.8 然而，單靠興建更多路面交通基礎設施並不足以解決道路交通擠塞。此舉甚至會令駕駛者增加使用車輛，導致車輛數目增長。

### **3.5 擴展和改善公共交通系統**

3.5.1 香港的公共交通系統為全球最具效率之一<sup>4</sup>，滿足市民出行需求的能力及優質的服務向來備受稱譽。

3.5.2 工作小組得悉，政府在完成《鐵路發展策略2014》後，已宣佈展開《公共交通策略研究》，就關於鐵路以外的公共交通服務的事進行檢討。工作小組認同，在鐵路網絡擴展的同時，需要研究如何促進其他非鐵路服務的優勢互補，以進一步提升公共交通服務。

3.5.3 同時，工作小組亦得悉，政府已採取多項措施以繼續擴展和提升公共交通系統。工作小組認為，這些措施應繼續推展，並定期作檢討。這些措施扼述於下文。

#### **(a) 提升公共交通的吸引力**

##### **(i) 為新發展項目提供新服務**

3.5.4 工作小組得悉，政府一直有監察公眾對公共交通服務的需求。為應付市民不斷轉變的交通需求，運輸署每年會更新未來五年的主要規劃數據，從而規劃專營巴士和專線小巴的服務。這些數據包括按地區劃分的人口轉變、公營房屋發展項目的入伙時間，以及新基建項目的啓用日期。運輸署每年會根據最新的規劃數據，與專營巴士公司共同制定巴士路線發展計劃，並諮詢區議會的意見。除此之外，運輸署會按需要特別為個別主要發展項目或大型基建項目制訂公共交通服務計劃。每當有新發展項目，政府會配合乘客的需要，安排新路線及／或加強現有服務。就大型的發展項目而言，政府會同時引入多種公共交通服務以滿足不同乘客的需要。配合擬議的公共交通服務，新發展項目亦會預留充足地方興建包括公共運輸交匯處在內的設施。以新落成位處啓德的公共屋邨為例，現時該處設有專營巴士服務。為進一步提升公共交通服務，該處在短期內將會增設新專線小巴路線，未來亦會連接至港鐵沙中綫。同樣地，安達臣道房屋發展計劃中的新公共屋

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<sup>4</sup> 根據國際顧問公司Arthur D. Little所編製，用以計算城市出行的方程度的「城市流動指數」，香港位居全球之冠。

邨在2015年年底入伙時，除了專營巴士服務外，亦會設有專線小巴服務。根據《鐵路發展策略2014》，東九龍綫將會沿著觀塘北部運行，連接觀塘綫（及未來沙中綫）的鑽石山站和將軍澳綫的寶琳站，以服務彩雲、順天、秀茂坪及寶達等人口稠密的地區，以及該區現有興建的大型發展項目。為配合在安達臣道／秀茂坪地區已規劃的發展，作為規劃參考，東九龍綫初步建議的落實時間為2019至2025年。項目的實際落實事宜，須取決於在詳細規劃階段進行的技術和財務研究，以及公眾諮詢。

## **(ii) 提升公共交通服務的效率**

3.5.5 工作小組得悉，政府一直與公共交通營辦商致力提高公共交通服務的效率。以專營巴士服務為例，普遍會有多於一組的巴士路線往來同一出發點及目的地(如一組設有較少中途站，而另一組則會在較繁忙的地區穿梭)，為有不同需要的乘客提供服務。為減少脫班及延誤，運輸署與巴士公司成立了工作小組，研究個別地點的交通管理措施，以便利巴士的運作。運輸署亦一直積極檢討個別巴士路線的行車時間、服務班次及車輛調配，以更有效滿足乘客需求。

3.5.6 鐵路服務方面，政府除了計劃擴展鐵路網絡(請參閱第3.4.2段)，亦密切監察香港鐵路有限公司(下稱「港鐵公司」)的服務。現時，港鐵公司已在訊號系統可負荷的情況下加密班次，並實施了多項措施，例如調派月台助理維持乘客上落列車的秩序，讓月台和列車上的乘客更平均分布(例如鼓勵乘客移入列車車廂中央)，使繁忙時段的乘客人流更暢順，提升列車的運作效率。在未來數年，港鐵網絡中數條路線，例如港島綫、荃灣綫、觀塘綫及將軍澳綫的訊號系統將相繼進行提升工程。當工程在2022年完成後，這些鐵路線的列車班次及載客量均會有所增加。另外，現時所有行走港鐵路線(不包括輕鐵)的列車車廂，皆以每平方米平均可站立最多六人作為設計標準，以計算車廂內的設計可載客量。即使列車乘客密度達到這個水平，鐵路仍然能安全運作。然而，由於現時乘客的乘車習慣有所轉變(例如越來越多乘客在車箱內閱讀報章或使用流動電子產品，以致佔用較多個人空間)，令到在最繁忙的路段及時段行走的列車只能達到每平方米站立約四人，而非六人的乘客密度。有見及此，四條興建中的新本地鐵路線，包括西港島綫、南港島綫(東段)、觀塘綫延綫和沙中綫的服務水平，將以每平方米站立四人的乘客密度為服務基準。

### **(iii) 紓緩擠迫情況**

3.5.7 很多海外城市的公共交通服務都有不同形式的按時段收費的安排，例如在繁忙時間收取附加費和在非繁忙時間提供折扣，以分散市民於繁忙時間對公共交通服務的需求。在香港，港鐵公司自2014年9月起推出「早晨折扣優惠」試驗計劃，為期九個月。在試驗計劃下，持有成人八達通的乘客在星期一至五(公眾假期除外)早上7時15分至8時15分期間，於29個核心市區車站的任何一個出閘，便可享有七五折車費優惠。港鐵公司會在試驗期結束後檢討計劃的成效。

### **(iv) 巴士優先使用道路措施**

3.5.8 巴士專線和巴士專用入口已在本港廣泛實施多年。這些措施可改善巴士的行車速度和服務穩定性，從而鼓勵更多市民使用巴士服務。目前，運輸署在全港共設有超過23公里巴士專線和16個巴士專用入口。工作小組認為，政府在研究是否可實施更多巴士優先使用道路措施時，須小心考慮這些措施對其他交通工具(特別是其他公共交通營辦商)和道路擠塞的影響。政府並繼續監察現行措施的成效以及引入新巴士優先措施的需要。

### **(v) 改善公共運輸交匯處**

3.5.9 運輸署一向有定期監察和改善公共運輸交匯處的設施。截至2014年10月，政府轄下共有59個有蓋公共運輸交匯處。這些交匯處在設計、通風、照明等方面，都按照當時的相關指引和標準建造。運輸署在可行和資源許可的情況下，一直致力提升交匯處的候車環境和設施。在2010至2013年間，政府已完成45個交匯處的改善工程，當中包括改善通風／照明系統、設置無障礙通道、安裝液晶體顯示屏以提供路線資訊、改善候車處鐵欄／護欄，以及整修乘客通道／乘客候車島。

### **(vi) 更妥善發放資訊**

3.5.10 運輸署亦鼓勵專營巴士公司適時向乘客提供服務資訊。例如城巴公司透過公司網站和智能電話提供其機場路線(即「A」線)的實時巴士到站資料，而九龍巴士(一九三三)有限公司和龍運巴士有限公司亦已在屯門公路巴士轉乘站安裝巴士到站時間預報系統。該預報系統啓用至今相當可靠，但由於涉及較大的投資和營運費用，巴士公司在考慮是否擴展使用同類系統時，須衡量乘客的需要和成本效益。



圖3C：屯門公路巴士轉乘站的巴士到站時間預報系統



**(vii) 增強對有特殊需要乘客的服務**

3.5.11 巴士公司亦已實施其他服務提升措施，例如設置無障礙及方便長者的設施(包括在某些指定巴士型號的梯間設置雙扶手)，為乘客提供更安全及舒適的環境。工作小組理解，政府會繼續與公共交通營辦商合力推出其他服務提升措施。

**(b) 重組巴士服務**

3.5.12 專營巴士是最多人使用的路面公共交通工具。本港在過去多年已建立完善的巴士網絡，但隨著鐵路網絡擴展，部分巴士路線的吸引有所下降，在非繁忙時間或甚至繁忙時間的乘客量均偏低。大量載客量偏低的專營巴士在路面上行走，會引致道路交通擠塞。自2013年起，政府已加大力度推動巴士路線重組，以提升巴士網絡的效率。在2013年，全港共取消或合併了15條乘客需求偏低或行車路線大幅重疊的巴士路線，縮短了4條巴士路線，並減少了約共100條巴士路線的班次。當中節省的資源已用作開設7條新巴士線，以及增強其他路線的服務。因此，巴士路線重組如推行得宜，將可減少不必要的車流，有助紓緩交通擠塞。通過巴士路線重組，全港專營巴士在過去十年間(2004至2013年)由大約6 000部減至5 800部。



3.5.13 專營巴士公司每年會按巴士乘客需求的預測，通過向政府提交路線發展計劃提出服務調整建議，當中或包括開辦新路線、增加班次或延長服務時間，以及縮減班次、縮短路線或取消或合併路線等建議。運輸署會在實施服務調整建議前，就各區的路線發展計劃諮詢相關區議會。


3.5.14 政府與專營巴士公司近年積極以「區域性模式」推動巴士路線重組，即以一個地區(而非個別路線)作為基礎，以宏觀的角度檢視及重組巴士服務。為個別區域或地區制定巴士路線重組計劃時，亦會考慮增設新的巴士轉乘計劃或改善現有的計劃，以提供更多路線選擇和更吸引的票價優惠。此外，通過縮減班次、更改路線，以及取消或合併重疊和使用量偏低的路線，巴士公司可利用所節省的資源因應乘客的需要開辦新路線或增加現有服務的班次。為鼓勵更多乘客使用巴士轉乘計劃，政府與巴士公司亦有探討在主要地點提供更具吸引力的票價優惠以及更完善的轉乘設施。政府分別在2013年8月和9月起，在北區及屯門分階段實施獲當區同意的重組計劃。此外，在2014／15年的路線發展計劃中，元朗、大埔、青衣及沙田區亦以「區域性模式」進行重組。重組計劃已在2014年8月分階段實施，預計可在2015年上半年完成。在所有計劃完成後，巴士網絡的效率將會得到提升，並更能滿足乘客的需求。下一步，運輸署及專營巴士公司將會推動九龍市區的重組工作。

3.5.15 整體而言，政府大力推行巴士重組計劃並不容易得到地區及市民的全面支持。重組計劃令部分乘客需要改變其出行習慣(如由過去的點對點服務改為須在中途轉乘)而不受他們歡迎是可以理解的。事實上，政府往往須與區議會經多輪磋商，有時需修改計劃，才能落實巴士路線重組計劃。隨著北區及屯門實施了巴士路線重組，市民普遍對巴士路線重組的好處有更深入了解，有助在日後實施重組計劃時取得市民的支持。

3.5.16 為推動巴士路線重組，運輸署一直積極策劃新的巴士轉乘站，以提升服務效率。例如，在小欖屯門公路(往九龍方向)的巴士轉乘站及大欖角屯門公路(往屯門方向)的巴士轉乘站，分別在2012年12月及2013年7月啓用。現時共有24條巴士路線途經該兩個轉乘站，為屯門／元朗和青山公路一帶的居民提供便利的巴士轉乘設施。自轉乘站啓用以來，有兩條巴士路線在重組屯門巴士網絡後已取消，但乘客可利用轉乘服務前往更多目的地。工作小組得悉，屯門公路兩個轉乘站受乘客歡迎，現時往九龍方向及往屯門方向的轉乘站每日平均分別約有10 000和

14 000人次使用。有見效果理想，政府已著手與巴士公司研究利用現有的巴士總站或巴士站，增設更多巴士轉乘站，不過礙於空間所限，其規模會較小。

圖3D：屯門公路巴士轉乘站



3.5.17 新鐵路啓用後會影響乘客目前的出行模式及不同公共交通工具的使用情況。為了更有效照顧乘客需求的轉變，並提高公共交通網絡的營運效率，隨著港鐵西港島綫、南港島綫(東段)、觀塘綫延綫，以及分兩階段啓用的沙中綫在未來數年投入服務，運輸署會加大力度推行巴士路線重組計劃。一般而言，運輸署會在新鐵路線啓用的兩三年前，評估新鐵路線對其他交通工具的影響，並因應預計的影響制訂公共交通服務重組計劃(下稱「公共交通計劃」)。在公共交通計劃下，署方會為其他路面的公共交通工具，尤其是專營巴士服務，擬定調整方案(包括開辦新接駁服務、縮短路線、取消路線或調整重疊路線的班次)。在公共交通計劃得以落實及分階段實施前，運輸署會諮詢相關區議會。現時，就配合西港島綫的公共交通計劃而進行的區議會諮詢工作已經完成，計劃會在西港島綫於2014年年底啓用後分階段實施。就配合南港島綫(東段)的公共交通計劃而進行的公眾諮詢目前仍在進行中。如配合這兩條新鐵路線的公共交通計劃建議能全面實施，預計可減少共約160部巴士。

### 3.6 管理道路的使用

3.6.1 政府透過更妥善管理道路的使用，讓有限的路面空間發揮最大的效益，從而處理道路交通擠塞的問題。下文重點闡述政府目前實施的交通管理措施。

#### (a) 一般交通管理措施

3.6.2 在市區一些發展較早的地區(如中環和尖沙咀)，其經濟活動衍生不少路面交通活動，但擴展這些地區的道路基建受到許多限制。較早期的建築物往往缺乏內部運輸設施，例如停車場和上落客貨處，駕駛者因此需要利用路旁上落客貨、停車等候，甚至非法泊車。大量的路旁活動阻塞車道，令這些地區變得特別擠塞。此外，由於近年旅遊業發展蓬勃，部分地區擠滿旅遊巴士上落乘客，當中有些旅遊巴士甚至在等候旅行團期間長時間非法停泊。

3.6.3 運輸署一直密切監察這些特別擠塞的地區，並在可行情況下採取適當的行動。在運作管理方面，運輸署已聯絡不同的持份者，如大廈管理處、業主和運輸業界，探討如何更妥善地管理路旁與交通有關的活動。至於有關旅遊巴士的活動，運輸署一直與旅遊事務署和旅遊業界保持對話，共同探討可行方法，一方面可配合旅遊巴士的運作，另一方面能夠減少其對交通的阻礙。若交通嚴重受阻，警方亦會提供協助。

3.6.4 運輸署亦制定可行的交通管理措施，以紓緩道路擠塞問題。當中常用的措施包括實施限制區，禁止所有或特定車輛類別在繁忙時間在路旁上落客貨，或禁止某些車輛類別使用相關路段。其他在地區常用的交通管制措施包括：

- (a) 增設停車處或延長現有的停車處，以滿足貨車上落貨物，以及旅遊巴士、的士和私家車上落乘客等路旁活動的需要；
- (b) 在路口劃設黃色方格，以避免路口阻塞而導致繁忙地區出現交通擠塞；
- (c) 禁止非必要的轉向及／或擴闊道路以增設行車線，以提高路口容車量；

- (d) 檢討及調整交通燈燈號的控制，盡量提高路口的容車量和避免交通延誤；
- (e) 在遊客區內或附近地方提供更多旅遊巴士泊車位；
- (f) 重置巴士站和的士站及調整其長度；以及
- (g) 提供巴士專線和巴士專用入口以利便巴士運作。

工作小組認為，政府應繼續檢討這些措施的成效，並按需要加以改善。

3.6.5 上述交通管制措施在利便某些車輛類別的同時，或會對其他車輛類別構成不便。當中的取捨往往需要審慎平衡各方的利益，過程殊不容易。有時候，當區居民和區議會會反對某些交通管制措施。再者，有些措施即使實行，或會因部分駕駛者不遵守規則以致成效不彰。要達到預期的效果，道路使用者須合作遵守交通規則，警方亦須採取執法行動，兩者缺一不可。

#### **(b) 資訊科技的應用**

3.6.6 運輸署一直致力透過開發和擴展其智能運輸系統，提升路面交通系統的效率和可靠程度。例如運輸署正使用區域交通控制系統，更妥善地協調指定範圍內交通燈號的運作，盡量避免裝有交通燈的路口受阻，從而提升整體效率。該署亦在主要公路設置交通管制及監察系統，處理交通意外和緊急事故。此外，運輸署亦發展智能運輸系統，以便向公眾發放交通運輸資訊。除了在互聯網上發放主要路段的實時閉路電視影像外，行車速度屏、「香港乘車易<sup>5</sup>」和「香港行車易<sup>6</sup>」等免費公共服務，皆有助公共交通和道路使用者選擇最適合自己需要的交通工具或路線。具體而言，駕駛人士可利用以上工具，尋找最快捷的駕駛路線，避開交通擠塞的地區。

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<sup>5</sup> 「香港乘車易」透過流動裝置或流動網站，提供包含多種公共交通工具的一站式點到點網上路線搜尋服務，所涵蓋的公共交通工具包括港鐵、輕便鐵路、專營巴士、專線小巴、渡輪和電車。

<sup>6</sup> 「香港行車易」透過流動裝置或流動網站，為駕駛人士提供點到點駕駛路線搜尋服務和實時交通資訊。

圖3E：「香港行車易」



圖3F：屯門公路的行車速度屏



3.6.7 運輸署現正開發交通及事故管理系統，預期約在2016年初完成。這個系統的功能包括自動偵測事故、整合交通運輸應變計劃以便利執行、及向持份者(包括各政府部門、公共交通營辦商、傳媒和市民)提供交通運輸資訊。系統完成後，運輸署將可更有效處理可能導致道路交通擠塞的事故，並可更迅速地向市民發放有關資訊。

### (c) 協調道路工程

3.6.8 道路工程在香港十分常見，亦難以避免。雖然道路工程有其確實需要(請參閱第2.3.13至2.3.15段)，但部分工程或會縮減路面空間，有時導致交通擠塞。工作小組得悉，路政署已聯同運輸署和警方推行挖掘准許證制度，更妥善地管理和協調道路工程，確保有關工程不會非

必要地佔用路面空間，影響交通或對市民造成滋擾。根據有關制度，道路工程倡議人在展開工程前，必須先向路政署申請挖掘准許證，並向運輸署和警方徵詢交通意見。工程進行期間，路政署會定期視察，確保工程遵從挖掘准許證的所有條件。運輸署和警方亦會密切監察交通情況，在有需要時會要求准許證持有人適當地更改其臨時交通管理措施，以進一步減低對交通的影響。整個機制的詳情摘錄於**附件3**。

#### **(d) 檢討道路車速限制**

3.6.9 提高部分路段的車速限制，是提升交通效率的方法之一。不過，道路安全是最重要的考慮。為確保道路車速限制能配合交通情況，運輸署會就全港道路作定期檢討，檢討時會考慮不同因素，包括交通意外率、目前的行車速度、路面特徵和路段長度等。定期檢討的結果，會呈交由運輸署、警方、香港汽車會及香港汽車高級駕駛協會代表組成的工作小組討論和通過。

### **3.7 未來路向**

3.7.1 工作小組對政府持續透過改善交通基建、擴展及改善公共交通系統，以及管理道路的使用，致力控制道路交通擠塞予以肯定。工作小組得悉政府會繼續推行這些措施、檢討其成效、以及探討可改善的空間。

3.7.2 一如上文**第3.4至3.6節**所闡釋，工作小組明白到，政府在紓緩道路交通擠塞時難免會遇到各種挑戰，包括增建道路時遇上地理、環境及社會上的限制，以及相關持份者對所建議的交通管理措施持不同意見等。這些挑戰難以全部解決，故現行紓緩道路交通擠塞的措施未能完全發揮成效，政府有必要考慮採取其他措施或加強現行措施。是次研究主要目的是探討有何額外措施，可與本章所提及的現行措施一併施行。工作小組研究各種不同措施後，建議政府採納當中的12項；有關詳情載於**第4章**。

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## 第4章 — 建議措施

### 4.1 概覽

4.1.1 本章先闡釋為何處理本港道路交通擠塞是刻不容緩的，並說明擠塞情況改善後所帶來的效益。本章隨後列出工作小組的建議措施、篩選建議時所考慮的因素，以及建議的實施時間表。

### 4.2 急切需要額外措施

4.2.1 工作小組認為香港須盡快處理道路交通擠塞。本港車輛數目的增長速度驚人，過去10年，車輛數目由2003年的524 000輛，增加至2013年的681 000輛，增幅達30%。車輛數目激增，令交通情況惡化。市區的平均行車速度，由2003年的每小時25.6公里，減慢至2013年的每小時22.7公里，減幅約為11%。

4.2.2 目前，部分主要道路在平日繁忙時間的行車速度約為每小時10公里甚至更慢，即僅僅比一般成人的步速(約為每小時4至5公里)快。這些道路包括漆咸道(介乎新柳街至康莊道)、窩打老道(介乎渡船街至亞皆老街)、德輔道西(介乎西邊街至干諾道中)及遮打道(介乎畢打街至美利道)等。

4.2.3 由於無法確定行車時間的長短，道路使用者要計劃行程也越來越困難。有些路段平日交通暢順，但偶爾卻會出現嚴重擠塞，原因是這些路段的容量其實已經接近飽和，就算車流只是些微增加，也很容易出現擠塞。面對這種情況，道路使用者實在難以準確預計行程。視乎擠塞情況，一趟20分鐘的車程很可能要用上40至60分鐘。

4.2.4 如果我們任由車輛繼續增多，按現時(截至2014年9月)3.4%的按年增長率來推算，車輛總數在未來10年將會接近100萬輛，即增加約270 000輛(+40%)。另外，由於建造新道路須面對社會、實際施工和環境方面的局限，我們預計由現在至2020年道路總長度的平均按年增長率只有大約0.4%(見第2.2.13段)。面對更大量車輛共用有限的路面，行車速度只會變得更慢、出行將更失預算，我們的經濟和生活質素都會大受影響。

4.2.5 從環境角度來看，路上車輛增多意味空氣污染物和噪音更多，影響健康。多年來，本港路邊可吸入懸浮粒子和二氧化氮的水平一直偏高，而汽車就是該等污染物的主要路面源頭，也是本港第二大溫室氣體排放源頭。2009至2013年期間，路邊二氧化氮的濃度增加了9%，令近年路邊空氣污染指數達「甚高」水平(即指數超過100)的日數有所增加。

4.2.6 很多道路使用者也同意工作小組的看法，認為處理交通擠塞刻不容緩。民意調查的結果顯示，約70%的市民及駕駛者同意有需要控制私家車數目的增長。

4.2.7 我們不能坐視不理，任由日益惡化的交通情況影響我們的生活質素。

### 4.3 效益

4.3.1 雖然改善交通可帶來的效益或難準確量化，但所有道路使用者均能輕易覺察。乘客和駕駛者的等候時間將會縮短，行程省時，令人車往來更加暢順。假如花在路上的時間縮短了，無論老幼貧富、從事何種職業，各人均可以更有彈性地安排日程和追求個人興趣。例如上班一族的出行時間縮短，他們便有更大空間，在工作和生活之間取得平衡。

4.3.2 相關效益不只限於人車暢通，本港環境也會因為交通擠塞紓緩和路面車輛減少而得到改善。此外，物流業也能縮短運送貨物和提供服務所需的時間，從而節省營運成本(例如燃料費)。人人都可更有效地計劃業務和個人行程，全民受惠。

4.3.3 粗略來說，交通情況改善預計可帶來以下的效益：如不馬上行動，並假設現時私家車每年約4.5%的增長率維持不變，我們估計市區平均行車速度會在10年後減慢約15%，而車輛產生的溫室氣體量則會增加超過20%。假如本港私家車的每年增長率能由約4.5%減少至1.5%，則市區平均行車速度的估計減幅和新增車輛所產生溫室氣體量的估計增幅，均可減半。



4.3.4 香港的空間有限，難以提供更多泊車位(見第2.3.5段)。在已發展的市區，問題更為嚴重，因為政府只能在推展新發展項目或重建項目時，趁機增設泊車位；即使有此機會，亦需多年才能落實提供有限的新增泊車位。工作小組注意到，要在市區提供足夠泊車位，機會有限。管理車輛數目的增長，可在某程度上解決泊車位不足的問題。

4.3.5 工作小組深切明白，可帶來上述效益的交通擠塞紓緩措施，並不是完全沒有代價。某些措施可能令部分道路使用者感到不便，甚至多付費用。儘管如此，工作小組仍欲強調，減輕交通擠塞，香港肯定整體受惠，而所有道路使用者亦會因行程省時和環境改善而得益。

#### **4.4 建議措施**

4.4.1 工作小組已考慮多項旨在處理本港道路交通擠塞問題的措施。工作小組從中篩選出建議措施時，大致上已考慮了建議措施是否行之有效或預期能夠紓緩全港交通擠塞問題、會否為社會大眾接受，以及對相關持份者的影響。

4.4.2 工作小組把建議措施細分為短期、中期和長期三類。大體而言，短期措施如獲採納，可於一至兩年內實施，中期措施則可能需時三至四年。至於長期措施，由於或需再作研究，實施時間可能較長。

#### **4.5 短期和中期措施**

##### **A. 管理私家車數目**

##### **(a) 提高私家車首次登記稅和牌照年費**

4.5.1 路上車流不斷增加，如不加以遏止，道路交通將會更擠塞。而車輛有增無減，加上土地缺乏，實在難以滿足泊車需求，情況亦令人憂慮。

4.5.2 民意調查的結果顯示，被訪者的確認為「道路上太多車輛」是導致道路交通擠塞的最重要成因。

4.5.3 工作小組認為，與其限制所有車輛的增長，政府應採取更為針對私家車的對策，原因如下：

- (a) 在2013年私家車佔整體車輛數目的七成，而整體車輛數目的增長亦主要來自私家車。2003至2013年期間，私家車共增加了四成，而其他車種的增幅則相對輕微(見第2.2.5和2.2.6段)。截至2014年9月，私家車數目的按年增長率為4.6%，速度驚人；
- (b) 私家車是載客效率甚低的交通工具。雖然私家車的載客量遠遜公共交通工具，但卻佔用大量路面空間。具體來說，巴士和小巴運載約71%的每日總路面乘客量，但在主要道路的總交通流量中只佔大約5%至25%<sup>1</sup>。反觀私家車在主要道路的總交通流量中佔約40%至70%，但只運載16%的每日總路面乘客量(詳見第2.2.10和2.2.11段)；以及
- (c) 私家車主要作私人用途。由於本港公共交通系統大致完善，在多數情況下市民不用依賴私家車。反之，貨車和公共交通工具分別在貨運和客運方面擔當較為重要的角色。根據《2011年交通習慣調查》，接近九成市民上下班都乘搭公共交通工具。

工作小組留意到，民意調查的結果顯示，逾六成市民和超過七成駕駛者認為不應給予私家車使用道路的優先權。

4.5.4 根據經驗，增加首次登記稅<sup>2</sup>和牌照年費<sup>3</sup>是直接和有效遏止私家車增長的方法。增加首次登記稅會減低購買私家車的意欲，而增加牌照年費則會增加私家車車主的支出。1982年，政府實施一系列財政措施，包括徵收雙倍首次登記稅、三倍牌照年費和雙倍燃油稅；加稅和加費9至12個月後，領牌私家車的平均按年增長率銳減約18%，由約10%<sup>4</sup>下降至約-8%<sup>5</sup>。1991年，首次登記稅增加約16%，牌照年費也增加10%；加稅和加費9至12個月後，領牌私家車的平均按年增長率整體

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<sup>1</sup> 根據2013年20條主要道路在早上繁忙時間的數據得出。

<sup>2</sup> 首次在香港登記的車輛，包括新車和入口二手車，均須繳付首次登記稅。目前，私家車首次登記稅，按四個應課稅價值稅階的稅率，介乎40%至115%不等。

<sup>3</sup> 牌照年費是包含徵稅成分的收費，領牌汽車必須每年繳費，方可在香港道路行駛。目前，私家車牌照年費介乎3,815元至11,215元不等，視乎引擎容量而定。如果是柴油私家車，除牌照年費外，更要另繳1,460元燃料徵費。

<sup>4</sup> 該數字是1982年1月至4月的平均值。

<sup>5</sup> 該數字是1983年1月至4月的平均值。

下降，由9.4%<sup>6</sup>跌至7.7%<sup>7</sup>，減少約1.7%。近至2011年，首次登記稅增加約15%，但牌照年費沒有同時調高。加稅9至12個月後，普通汽油領牌私家車的平均按年增長率由3.6%<sup>8</sup>跌至2.3%<sup>9</sup>，減少約1.3%，但由於當時也提高了環保汽油私家車的寬減(見第4.5.7至4.5.9段)，大大削弱該次加稅對遏止所有領牌私家車增長率的力度。

4.5.5 增加首次登記稅只屬一次性措施，而牌照年費僅佔車主每月平均用於私家車保養和使用的支出，相對較小的百分比<sup>10</sup>，故此單獨實施其中一項財政措施，並不及雙管齊下般有效和持久。事實上，牌照年費自1991年起未曾調整，但綜合消費物價指數<sup>11</sup>於1991至2013年間，已增加約80%。為更有效控制私家車數目<sup>12</sup>的增長，工作小組建議政府同時增加私家車的首次登記稅和牌照年費。

4.5.6 2011年，首次登記稅增加約15%，但由於下文第4.5.8段所述的原因與其他因素，加稅的效果大減，私家車的按年增長率現在仍處於約4.5%的甚高水平。與2011年相比，現時本港私家車數目的基數更大。為了大幅減慢私家車的增長並令效果能持續，工作小組認為增加首次登記稅的幅度或需比2011年高，而且亦應規定該增幅同時適用於環保汽油私家車。至於增加牌照年費的建議，工作小組知悉牌照年費逾20年未作調整，因此建議政府在考慮增加牌照年費的幅度時，至少參考這段期間的通脹。

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<sup>6</sup> 該數字是1990年11月至1991年2月的平均值。

<sup>7</sup> 該數字是1991年11月至1992年2月的平均值。

<sup>8</sup> 該數字是2010年10月至2011年1月的平均值。

<sup>9</sup> 該數字是2011年10月至2012年1月的平均值。

<sup>10</sup> 根據《2011年交通習慣調查》，牌照年費在保養和使用私家車的平均每月總支出中只佔大約9%。

<sup>11</sup> 綜合消費物價指數是量度住戶一般所購的消費商品和服務，其價格水平隨時間的變動，但不是車主隨時間變動的購買力的指標。

<sup>12</sup> 工作小組明白人們決定購買和持有私家車與否，取決於多項因素，包括個人需要和喜好、整體經濟情況、按實值計算的車價(受貨幣波動和家庭收入所影響)、物業市場及投資機會等。當中不少因素隨時間變動，因此難以準確預測消費者的行為變化。

## **(b) 收緊環保汽油私家車的認可標準**

4.5.7 環保汽油私家車是指廢氣排放量較少而燃料效率較高的汽油私家車。寬減環保汽油私家車的首次登記稅的主要目的，是鼓勵認為需要買車的人士選購環保汽油私家車，而非一般汽油私家車。要成為認可的環保汽油私家車，相關車輛必須符合指定的排放標準和燃料效率目標。環境保護署每年均會檢討該等標準和目標，以確保只有環保表現卓越的車輛才可享有稅務寬減。截至2014年10月底，有35個型號的私家車獲環境保護署認可為環保汽油車輛。

4.5.8 2007年，當環保汽油私家車稅務寬減計劃首次推出時，該車種的首次登記稅可獲寬減30%(上限為每輛5萬元)。2011年2月，私家車首次登記稅增加15%，但新登記環保汽油私家車可享有的首次登記稅寬減則由30%(上限為每輛5萬元)增加至45%(上限為每輛7萬5千元)，即幾乎完全抵銷私家車首次登記稅的加幅。因此，很多準車主轉購環保汽油私家車，令該車種的平均按年增長率，在加稅的9至12個月後<sup>13</sup>達至64%<sup>14</sup>的甚高水平，與一般汽油私家車的增幅形成強烈對比：一般汽油私家車的平均按年增長率，由加稅前的3.6%<sup>15</sup>，跌至加稅9至12個月後的2.3%<sup>16</sup>。

4.5.9 工作小組認為，從控制交通擠塞的角度來看，環保汽油私家車與一般私家車無異。此外，就環境保護而言，環保汽油私家車並非零排放，仍然會影響路邊的空氣質素。因此，工作小組建議政府繼續收緊環保汽油私家車的認可標準，避免進一步寬減該車種的首次登記稅。政府甚至應考慮取消環保汽油私家車的稅務寬減，而只寬減零排放的電動車<sup>17</sup>之首次登記稅。

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<sup>13</sup> 2013年4月，環境保護署收緊環保汽油私家車的認可標準，認可型號隨之減少，該車種的增長因而稍為放緩。截至2014年9月(即2014年1月1日至9月30日)，環保汽油私家車在新登記汽油私家車中約佔18%。

<sup>14</sup> 該數字是2011年10月至2012年1月的平均值。

<sup>15</sup> 該數字是2010年10月至2011年1月的平均值。

<sup>16</sup> 該數字是2011年10月至2012年1月的平均值。

<sup>17</sup> 政府現時豁免電動車輛的首次登記稅，直至2017年3月底為止。

### **(c) 提高柴油私家車的燃料徵費**

4.5.10 1982年，汽油的燃油稅每公升增加0.7元，但經考慮該增幅對公共交通工具運作成本的影響後，柴油的燃油稅並無相應調高。鑑於該燃油稅安排並非為柴油私家車而設，但該種車卻因而受惠，為「中和」柴油私家車在燃油稅安排方面的得益，政府當時在柴油私家車的牌照年費上增收1,000元作為燃料徵費。於1987至1991年間，燃料徵費按照增加牌照年費的相同百分比提高。

4.5.11 自2008年起，歐盟五期柴油的燃油稅寬減至零，以支持商用車輛業界，同時鼓勵業界使用更潔淨的燃料。寬減柴油稅的政策用意，明顯並非要令私家車受惠。

4.5.12 然而，由於柴油免稅，而現時汽油的燃油稅則已調整至每公升6.06元，因此如私家車車主選用柴油車而非汽油車，將可節省開支。根據由《2011年交通習慣調查》所得的私家車平均行車里數來計算的私家車燃油耗用量，估計使用柴油私家車每年可節省約4,720元。現時藉牌照年費向柴油私家車收取的燃料徵費為1,460元。由於該款額自1991年起未曾調整，故此再不足以「中和」因使用柴油私家車而節省的燃油開支。

4.5.13 雖然現時領牌柴油私家車在私家車總數中只佔少數，但近年增長速度已令人關注。去年，柴油私家車錄得57%的增長率，由2013年8月的1 974輛，增加至2014年8月的3 107輛。此外，柴油私家車為切合市場需要，在不同價錢範圍內均有更多型號可供選擇。

4.5.14 工作小組注意到，如駕駛者選用柴油私家車，將可節省的經常性燃油開支，或足以抵銷牌照年費的建議加幅。因此管理私家車增長的預期效果，即使不完全被抵銷，也會被淡化。所以，工作小組建議柴油私家車的燃料徵費應相應調高，以反映車主可能節省的燃油開支。

4.5.15 工作小組認為，上文關於控制私家車數目的建議，可於相對較短的時間內提交立法會作法例修訂，因此建議將以上三項措施列作短期措施。雖然民意調查的結果顯示，近半數受訪市民和駕駛者接受增加擁有或使用私家車的開支，但工作小組不會低估爭取公眾和立法會支持加費建議的難度。某些持份者無疑會在財政上受到影響。然而，工作小組促請公眾和立法會議員支持推行該等證實能有效遏止車輛增長和紓緩交通擠塞的財政措施。工作小組有信心，減少路上車輛的數目後，社會整體必可受惠。

## B. 善用有限的路面空間

4.5.16 管理私家車數目的增長，可減低車輛對有限路面空間的需求，從而紓緩道路交通擠塞。在供應方面，由於受到各種限制，本港道路網絡難以再作擴展。工作小組認為，透過交通管理措施善加利用路面空間，同樣重要。工作小組留意到，政府已實施多項持續進行的交通管理措施(詳見第3章)。然而，工作小組認為政府應採取下列兩項額外措施，以進一步提升使用路面空間的效率。

### (a) 著手籌劃交通擠塞收費試驗計劃

4.5.17 工作小組認為實施交通擠塞收費計劃(或電子道路收費計劃)，可非常有效地紓緩經常塞車地區的交通擠塞情況。

4.5.18 電子道路收費是交通管理工具，旨在透過「用者自付」原則以紓緩指定地區的交通擠塞情況，即向繁忙時間駛進指定地區的駕駛者收費，鼓勵他們轉乘公共交通工具或改行其他路線。減少駛進指定地區的車流，便可加快行車速度。此外，由行車帶來的空氣污染和噪音滋擾亦會減少。

4.5.19 為處理道路交通擠塞的問題，政府至今就電子道路收費進行了三次研究。由於研究進行期間經濟情況有變，加上私隱考慮和缺乏社會共識，政府並未推行電子道路收費。先前研究所得的其中一個主要結論是，要公平和有效地推行道路收費計劃，必須已有容車量足夠的替代路線可供使用，讓駕駛者繞過收費區。政府表示，預計中環灣仔繞道通車後，便可為前往中區以外地區的駕駛者提供替代路線繞過收費區，屆時政府便可有更有利條件考慮在中區實施電子道路收費的可能性。

4.5.20 工作小組留意到，對於本港很多道路使用者來說，電子道路收費仍是新概念，對於付諸實行與否仍未凝聚共識<sup>18</sup>。然而，海外城市如倫敦、斯德哥爾摩、哥登堡和新加坡等，已順利推行電子道路收費或類似計劃。工作小組認為，政府應為電子道路收費計劃著手籌劃，擬定概念方案，並邀請公眾和相關持份者提出意見。概念方案可涵蓋計劃目標、收費區、收費時段、收費水平、收費技術、對各種活動(例如收費區內公共交通工具的營運、商業活動和居民出行)的影響，以及是

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<sup>18</sup> 民意調查的結果顯示，贊成和反對電子道路收費的被訪者比例相若。

否和如何提供豁免及／或寬減收費等。工作小組認同有需要進行公眾諮詢，政府可按諮詢所得的意見，修訂計劃詳情。

4.5.21 至於收費區方面，工作小組基於下列考慮，同意中區是推行試驗計劃的合適地點：

- (a) 中區是香港的商業中心區，在社會上具有策略和象徵意義；
- (b) 中環主要路段經常出現嚴重交通擠塞的情況，有時引致毗連道路網絡出現連鎖擠塞反應，影響鄰近地區；以及
- (c) 中環灣仔繞道通車後，可為駕駛者提供替代路線繞過收費區。

4.5.22 工作小組認為，政府籌劃在中區推行的電子道路收費試驗計劃，應探討方便道路使用者的配套措施，例如開設在中區內行走的穿梭巴士服務，以減少駛進該區的車輛數目。工作小組注意到，穿梭巴士的服務時段和行駛路線必須小心擬定，才能既吸引乘客，又不致加劇交通擠塞。另外，政府亦應審慎研究開設穿梭巴士服務在財政上是否可行。

4.5.23 由於實施電子道路收費計劃絕不簡單，推出前政府必須有足夠時間廣徵民意。因此，工作小組建議政府需就計劃電子道路收費盡快諮詢公眾，亦明白詳細設計及實施計劃需時較長。

#### **(b) 增加咪錶泊車位的收費**

4.5.24 目前，全港共有大約18 200個咪錶泊車位<sup>19</sup>，供短暫泊車之用。需要較長時間停泊車輛的駕駛者，應使用非路旁停車場。工作小組得悉政府的政策目標，是個別地區內的路旁泊車位應在任何時間維持15%的空置率，以應付駕駛者的短暫泊車需要。

4.5.25 由於咪錶泊車位較為方便，而且多數比鄰近商業停車場的收費便宜，因此駕駛者往往在繁忙地區路上兜圈，尋找路旁泊車位。有時，一些駕駛者甚至會長時間雙行泊車以等候路旁泊車位，阻礙正常交通。以上情況顯然未能善用有限的路面空間。

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<sup>19</sup> 供私家車／小巴使用的咪錶泊車位約有15 250個，貨車約2 300個，巴士／旅遊巴士約630個。

4.5.26 《道路交通(泊車)規例》(第374C章)規定，咪錶泊車位的最高收費為每15分鐘2元(相等於每小時8元)<sup>20</sup>。此收費上限自1994年起生效，此後從未作調整。

4.5.27 1999年，政府曾建議把最高收費由每15分鐘2元增加至每15分鐘4元，但有關修例建議遭立法會否決。當時，政府解釋建議加費的目的之一，是把可供使用的咪錶泊車位維持在15%的水平；立法會雖然知悉有關政策目標，但有些議員擔心加費會產生連鎖效應，影響私人停車場的收費。

4.5.28 工作小組留意到，即使咪錶泊車位的收費20年來維持不變，但私人停車場的收費卻已大幅增加。事實上，1994至2013年期間，綜合消費物價指數已上升40%。

4.5.29 鑑於現時咪泊車位的收費水平甚低(最高每小時8元)，工作小組認為有理由提高收費，以減少駕駛者在路上兜圈／雙行泊車以等候咪錶泊車位。此建議的另一效益是減少駕駛者在咪錶泊車位長時間泊車。

4.5.30 工作小組認為，政府可於來年向立法會提交所需的法例修訂，故建議將此列作短期措施。

## **C. 加重交通違例事項罰則和加強執法**

4.5.31 透過有效執法來打擊與交通擠塞車相關的違例事項，是確保本港路面空間得以善用的必要對策。由於交通違例事項的罰則和執法是個重要議題，我們會在本書詳加討論。

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<sup>20</sup> 雖然法定泊車收費上限為每15分鐘2元，但停車收費錶的收費取決於多項因素，包括泊車位需求、所處位置和社情民意。例如，較偏遠或使用率較低的泊車位收費會訂於較低水平(例如每30分鐘2元)。



4.5.32 目前，交通違例事項的執法工作由警務人員和交通督導員負責，兩類人員均由警方管理。統計數字顯示，針對交通擠塞相關的違例事項而發出的定額罰款通知書，由2003年約524 000張，增加至2013年約1 035 000張<sup>21</sup>，增長率達98%。當中大部分與非法泊車有關，由2003年約506 000張，增加至2013年約1 020 000張(錄得100%增長率)。

4.5.33 儘管所發出定額罰款通知書的數目有所增加，但公眾一般認為對交通擠塞相關違例事項的執法工作相當寬鬆，導致違例個案激增，加劇道路交通擠塞。

4.5.34 工作小組明白執法力度受制於多項因素，例如警方需調動人手資源應付其他更優先的職務、近年公眾對執法工作的期望大為提高，以及定額罰款的水平已失去阻嚇作用等。

4.5.35 工作小組建議實行下列措施(包括短期和中期措施)，以加強執法：

- (a) 加強宣傳和教育工作，以鼓勵市民遵守交通規則及規例；
- (b) 提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款額，以恢復阻嚇作用；
- (c) 警方尋求額外資源，並針對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項採取更嚴厲的執法行動；以及
- (d) 增強應用資訊科技以協助執法。

**(a) 加強教育和宣傳**

4.5.36 工作小組認為，要令道路使用者守法，基本的方法是透過持續教育和宣傳。雖然成效未必立竿見影，但工作小組深信教育和宣傳工作能夠帶來持久效果，正所謂：「思想會變成行動，行動會變成習慣」。

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<sup>21</sup> 本段提及的統計數字，是政府根據《定額罰款(交通違例事項)條例》(第237章)所訂的違例事項，以及根據《定額罰款(刑事訴訟)條例》(第240章)所訂「非法進入黃色方格路口」、「在限制區內裝卸貨物」和「在限制區內讓乘客上落」的違例事項，發出定額罰款通知書的數目。

4.5.37 近年，道路安全議會<sup>22</sup>舉辦不同主題的道路安全運動，包括「反酒後駕駛」、「反毒後及藥後駕駛」、「單車安全」、「長者行人安全」和「專注駕駛」。該議會透過不同渠道發放道路安全訊息，包括在電視和電台播放政府宣傳短片和聲帶、在天橋懸掛橫額、利用巴士車身和港鐵車站作廣告、在停車收費錶貼上宣傳標貼、通過刊物、網站和教育活動作宣傳。

4.5.38 工作小組建議政府加強這方面的宣傳和教育工作，藉此帶出兩項主要訊息。第一，道路使用者、業主、店舖東主、立法會及區議會議員以及政府應羣策羣力以紓緩交通擠塞。第二，雖然有些紓緩擠塞的措施或會帶來不便，甚至會對部分社會人士構成財務影響，這些措施定會為整個社會帶來好處。更多有關宣傳及教育的討論載於第5章。工作小組認為，政府可在短期內加強這方面的教育和宣傳，故建議將此列作短期措施。

#### **(b) 恢復與交通擠塞相關的違例事項定額罰款的阻嚇作用**

4.5.39 與交通擠塞相關的違例事項包括非法泊車、在限制區內裝卸貨物或讓乘客上落等。這些違例事項見於《定額罰款(交通違例事項)條例》(第237章)和《定額罰款(刑事訴訟)條例》(第240章)。其定額罰款現為320元或450元，自1994年起未曾調整。雖然不同城市的生活水平各有高低，但香港的罰款水平相對某些海外城市的為低<sup>23</sup>。政府曾於1999年嘗試修例以提高定額罰款，但不獲立法會批准。

4.5.40 1994至2013年期間，綜合消費物價指數上升約40%。由於通脹和入息水平增加，定額罰款的阻嚇作用無疑已逐漸減弱。事實上，工作小組注意到，部分駕駛者為求個人方便，公然在繁忙道路上非法泊車，對引致交通阻塞視若無睹。為恢復定額罰款的阻嚇作用，並追回多年來的通脹，工作小組認為政府應把定額罰款提高至少40%。

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<sup>22</sup> 道路安全議會是政府諮詢組織，成員包括政府官員和社會人士，負責制訂推廣道路安全的宣傳和教育策略，並舉辦道路安全運動，令公眾可持續地留意和遵守道路安全規則。

<sup>23</sup> 就倫敦、悉尼和紐約而言，泊車和與交通擠塞相關的違例事項定額罰款額隨違例嚴重程度而增加。如屬可能導致交通阻塞的較嚴重違例事項(例如雙行泊車、不遵守「禁止停車」限制)，倫敦的定額罰款是130英鎊(約1,600元)，悉尼是242澳元(約1,600元)，紐約是115美元(約890元)。

4.5.41 為進一步加強定額罰款的阻嚇作用，工作小組研究過下列方案：

- (a) 引入定額罰款分級制度，對屢犯者加重罰則；或
- (b) 在違例駕駛記分制度中<sup>24</sup>，針對交通擠塞相關的違例事項實施記分罰則。工作小組注意到，新加坡實施「駕駛改進記分制度」（類似香港的違例駕駛記分制度），觸犯某些交通擠塞相關違例事項的人士會被記下違例分數。

4.5.42 經仔細考慮上述兩個方案的利弊，特別是商營運輸服務者可能提出強烈關注，以及需要更深入研究相關運作安排，工作小組認為政府應先提高定額罰款。如定額罰款制度的阻嚇作用仍然不足，便可檢討是否需要採取其他措施(包括上文第4.5.41段所述的兩個方案)。

4.5.43 工作小組認為，政府可在來年就提高定額罰款額向立法會提交所需的法例修訂，故建議將此列作短期措施。

**(c) 加強執法行動**

4.5.44 工作小組注意到，警方最近修訂了靈活執行交通法例政策<sup>25</sup>，針對雙行泊車採取更嚴厲的執法行動。警方已指示前線人員，如駕駛者雙行泊車引致阻塞，即使該駕駛者仍在車內，警務人員可在未預先發出口頭警告的情況下執法。工作小組對此表示歡迎。

4.5.45 要進一步加強執法，工作小組明白必須增撥人手和財政資源。近年，社會情況出現變化，警隊資源被分配至其他職務。結果，在眾多警隊職務中，針對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項採取的執法行動，未必會是警方的首要職務。

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<sup>24</sup> 該制度旨在阻嚇屢次觸犯交通違例事項的人士，並提高駕駛水準，以減少意外發生。如駕駛者觸犯有關道路安全的交通違例事項(《道路交通(違例駕駛記分)條例》(第375章)附表所訂違例事項)，除須接受相關懲處外，亦會被記分，所記分數由3至10分不等。如兩年內被記10分或以上，該駕駛者須按法例規定修習駕駛改進課程；如在兩年內被記15分或以上，該駕駛者可能會被法庭取消駕駛資格3至6個月不等。

<sup>25</sup> 該政策訂定交通執法的緩急次序，並會定期更新和審核。該政策的主要目的，是預防交通意外和保持交通暢順，從而加強道路安全。

4.5.46 儘管如此，工作小組促請警方考慮如何進一步加強執法。在某些特別擠塞的地區，警方應採取更具阻嚇力的執法行動。舉例說，如認為合適，警務人員可考慮直接向駕駛者發出定額罰款通知書，而不預先給予口頭警告。

4.5.47 工作小組知悉，由於招聘週期之間的時間，現時在職交通督導員的人數有時會較編制少。警方已經採取措施縮短招聘週期之間的時間，盡量令交通督導員隊伍可達編制總員人數。此外工作小組認為警方亦可探討能否擴充交通督導員的編制。

4.5.48 工作小組認為急需加強執法，故建議將此列作短期措施。

#### **(d) 加強應用資訊科技以協助執法**

4.5.49 工作小組明白，就應付道路交通擠塞而言，警方可調撥的額外人手資源有限，故需加強應用資訊科技來精簡執法程序。工作小組知悉警方正推行試驗計劃，利用電子化系統發出定額罰款通知書。假如試驗計劃成功並取得所需資源，政府會修訂法例，以落實電子化定額罰款通知書系統，並預期會於2017年應用。工作小組認為此舉方向正確。

4.5.50 另一個可再探討如何善用科技的範疇，是對違反被稱為「黃色方格路口」<sup>26</sup>道路標記的執法。工作小組注意到，駕駛者不遵從上述道路標記，有時會引致路口交通擠塞。如可借助科技針對該違例行為執法，將對這方面的工作有相當大的幫助。然而，為執法而研發的黃色方格攝影機，其技術仍未成熟，世界各地未曾就該技術的應用進行過測試。工作小組認為，政府可邀請資訊科技界或大專院校，因應香港的情況，探索和研發黃色方格攝影機的應用。

4.5.51 由於探究不同科技的可行性需時，工作小組建議將此列作中長期措施。

4.5.52 工作小組留意到大部分短中期措施都會增加駕駛者的財政負擔。然而鑑於交通擠塞情況日益惡化，這些措施是有必要的。工作小組考慮過其他方案，但它們均未能如建議措施般能直接有效地控制汽車增長，以確保路面空間得到善用。為配合這些措施，工作小組認為

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<sup>26</sup> 駕駛者除非能立即把車輛完全駛出「黃色方格路口」，否則不應把車輛駛進該路口。該規定是為避免車輛阻塞該路口。

政府應該加強教育及宣傳。另外，工作小組亦建議數項長期措施，供政府進一步研究。

## **4.6 長期措施**

### **(a) 檢討泊車政策和發布空置泊車位實時資訊**

4.6.1 政府的泊車政策旨在提供充足數量的泊車位，以應付需求，但又不致誘使原擬乘搭公共交通的乘客轉用私家車。舉例來說，鄰近鐵路車站或各大公共交通交匯處的發展項目，發展商所須提供的泊車位將會較少。

4.6.2 一般來說，泊車位越少，擁有或使用車輛就越不方便。就私家車而言，理論上可透過減少住宅項目的泊車位，阻遏私家車數目的增長。

4.6.3 工作小組注意到，對於需要駕車出入的人士和商營運輸服務機構，泊車位不可或缺。在實際運作層面，泊車位供應不足會導致非法泊車，進而阻塞交通，令警方的執法資源更形緊絀。而在社會層面，泊車位供應減少可能會導致炒賣。工作小組注意到，某些地區的泊車位售價已經不低，如再上升，或會招致社會怨氣。事實上，民意調查的結果顯示，超過55%市民和84%駕駛者反對減少泊車位的供應。

4.6.4 因此，就泊車位的供應量定出合適水平，以管理車輛增長的同時，又不致帶來過多負面後果，至為重要。工作小組認為，政府應詳細檢討泊車政策，並充分諮詢各持份者和市民的意見。

4.6.5 為阻遏駕駛者在路上兜圈尋找泊車位而令交通更擠塞，工作小組認為政府應研究合適方法，向駕駛者提供實時停車場空置泊車位的資料。鑑於公眾停車場大多由商業機構擁有和營辦，工作小組明白，政府需向相關營辦商尋求合作，而營辦商未必願意分享商業敏感資料。儘管如此，工作小組仍促請政府繼續探討不同方法，以取得營辦商的支持。

### **(b) 鼓勵於繁忙時間以外在路旁上落貨物**

4.6.6 香港是個充滿活力的城市，大小店鋪林立，而很多都是全年長時間營業，對上落貨物的需求甚殷。不過，很多店鋪所處的舊樓，均按當年的標準興建，並無提供室內貨物裝卸設施，因此只能在路旁上落貨物。

4.6.7 同時，由於路面(尤其市區)的空間有限，政府很難提供足夠和合適的路旁貨物裝卸處，應付上落貨物的需求。為配合業務需要，不同店鋪的貨物有時會集中於同一時間(例如繁忙時間)運送，導致長時間上落貨或是非法上落貨阻礙交通，令交通擠塞車問題進一步惡化。在舊樓較多、缺乏室內貨物裝卸設施和街道狹窄的市區地點，問題更見嚴重。

4.6.8 工作小組明白，在路旁上落貨物是經濟活動的重要一環，問題是如何減少它們對道路交通造成的影響，令送貨車輛縮短運送時間及運送貨物到更多店鋪，從而節省成本和提高效率，達致雙贏局面。

4.6.9 工作小組注意到，在悉尼及倫敦等海外城市，當地政府鼓勵送貨車輛於繁忙時間以外時段上落貨物，這有助紓緩商業中心區的交通擠塞。

4.6.10 作為長期措施，工作小組認為，政府應研究如何鼓勵和協助商戶安排於繁忙時間以外在路旁上落貨物。例如，上述安排可作為電子道路收費試驗計劃(見第4.5.17至4.5.23段)的一項措施。在繁忙時間和繁忙時間以外實施不同收費，便可提供誘因，鼓勵商戶於繁忙時間以外在收費區內運送貨物。

### **(c) 增建泊車轉乘設施**

4.6.11 泊車轉乘停車場讓駕駛者先把車輛停放在交通樞紐，然後轉乘公共交通工具。該類停車場通常設於近郊或市中心外圍，從而減少車輛駛進最擠塞地區。民意調查的結果顯示，81%駕駛者和67%市民贊成增建泊車轉乘停車場，以紓緩交通擠塞。

4.6.12 工作小組注意到，本港已有多個泊車轉乘停車場<sup>27</sup>，但不是全部均有高使用率。該類停車場能否吸引駕駛者使用，十分視乎所在位置、與公共交通工具的接駁、泊車費和使用條件。工作小組明白，在擠塞地區外圍物色適當地點增建泊車轉乘停車場有具體限制，但仍欲促請政府探討其可能性。日後推展鐵路項目、市區重建項目和新發展項目時，尤應詳加考慮。政府亦應研究如何提高泊車轉乘停車場的使用量。

4.6.13 泊車轉乘設施亦可提供予單車使用者，鼓勵他們接駁公共交通。工作小組知悉政府一直在新市鎮及新發展區的公共運輸交匯處和港鐵站附近提供單車泊位。小組建議政府在可行的情況下繼續加強這方面的工作。

## 4.7 其他措施

### (a) 政府將會／正在考慮的其他研究

4.7.1 除上述短期、中期和長期措施外，工作小組亦研究過其他措施，大多數關乎提供公共交通服務和改善過海行車隧道的交通情況。基於以下原因，本報告沒有詳加說明：

(a) 該等議題需要深入研究，而工作小組的研究設有時限，故此不在研究範圍之內；以及

(b) 政府已承諾進行所需研究。

4.7.2 就公共交通服務而言，工作小組認為進一步令公共交通服務更為便捷及更容易使用，以及為乘客提供更多資訊，以讓駕駛者在使用私家車外有其他吸引的選擇，會有助鼓勵駕駛者不再擁有或使用私家車。工作小組知悉政府已公布開展《公共交通策略研究》，探討本港公共交通系統的多個範疇，當中包括如何提升各種公共交通服務的互補作用，而部分工作小組曾討論的事宜，會在該研究中再作探討。

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<sup>27</sup> 目前有11個泊車轉乘停車場，位於或鄰近港鐵車站。當中，7個位於或鄰近香港站、九龍站、青衣站、彩虹站、錦上路站、紅磡站和上水站，由運輸署或香港鐵路有限公司管理；其餘4個，即位於或鄰近奧運站、坑口站、烏溪沙站和屯門站的泊車轉乘停車場，則由私人公司管理。

4.7.3 至於三條過海行車隧道，工作小組知悉當東區海底隧道的擁有權交還政府和中環灣仔繞道通車後，政府將約於2017年會重新檢視透過調整隧道費以理順三條隧道的使用情況。工作小組促請政府作出適時檢討。如有需要，政府可探討興建另一條過海行車隧道的可行性，以應付策略性新發展項目的長遠需要。

**(b) 現階段不建議採納的措施**

4.7.4 工作小組亦考慮過下列措施：

- (a) 引入車輛配額制度，以限制車輛牌照發牌數目；
- (b) 引入限駛計劃，以限制路上車輛數目，例如規定車牌以單雙數字作結的車輛隔日行駛；
- (c) 提高燃油稅，以減少駕駛者在不必要時駕車；
- (d) 鼓勵多人共乘一車，例如規定車內只有駕駛者一人的私家車在使用隧道時須繳交附加費；以及
- (e) 把針對交通擠塞相關違例事項的執法工作外判予私人機構，以加強執法力度。

4.7.5 上述部分措施已於其他城市推行，並在紓緩道路交通擠塞方面取得不同程度的成果。例如，新加坡和上海採用車輛配額競投制度，而北京則以抽籤方式發牌，以及採用限駛計劃，限制平日路上車輛的數目。在日本，非法泊車的執法工作已外判予私人承辦商。

4.7.6 然而，工作小組認為，上述較嚴厲的措施雖然在其他城市發揮一定成效，但在現階段未必適合引入香港。例如增加燃油稅會影響交通運輸業，而把交通擠塞相關違例事項的執法工作外判予私人承辦商或會惹起爭議。一些曾把非法泊車執法工作私營化的城市，例如英國的侯城，現已終止有關安排。

4.7.7 儘管如此，工作小組仍欲指出，如本港交通情況在政府採取建議的額外措施後繼續惡化，政府或需考慮這些較嚴厲的措施。由於該等措施備受爭議，政府日後須充分諮詢各持份者和市民的意見。

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## 第5章 — 羣策羣力

### 5.1 概覽

5.1.1 本章闡釋社會各界可如何攜手協力，解決道路交通擠塞，並討論加強宣傳和教育的重要性。

### 5.2 羣策羣力

5.2.1 香港素以高效率著稱。我們都期望擁有一個高效的道路網絡，以配合城市的步伐。隨著本港不斷發展，要實現這期望並非易事，但倘若人人各盡其份，攜手協力，成功指日可待。

#### 道路使用者

5.2.2 個別道路使用者只需履行公民責任，遵守交通規則，以及關顧其他道路使用者的需要，便已可大大幫助改善交通情況。

5.2.3 略為改變習慣也同樣有幫助。例如，駕駛者與其自行駕車出外參與社交聚會，倒不如考慮與朋友共乘一車。父母亦可為子女樹立榜樣，在接他們放學時，可改乘公共交通工具或把私家車停泊在附近停車場，而不是在路上兜圈以尋覓路旁泊車位，甚至雙行泊車。當人人都實踐這些簡單而良好的做法，累積起來，路上車輛的數目和路邊廢氣的排放便可減少。

#### 業主和商戶

5.2.4 車輛若長時間停留在路旁(尤其在部分市區)上落貨物，會減少道路容車量，加劇交通擠塞。工作小組得悉，運輸署一直透過實施交通管理措施來應付相關問題(見第3.6.2至3.6.5段)，但在某些個案中，受影響業主和商戶卻反對落實該等措施。

5.2.5 工作小組籲請受影響人士從較宏觀的角度衡量這些交通管理措施。例如，遷移上落貨物的地點可能會對商戶造成即時不便，但卻可改善區內整體交通情況，從而惠及原本受影響的商戶，令他們運送貨物更加快捷。此外，商戶可安排於非繁忙時間在路旁上落貨物，協助紓緩道路交通擠塞。

## 立法會和區議會

5.2.6 一如其他公共政策，在制訂和落實交通管理措施時，政府必須審慎平衡相關措施為社會所帶來的整體利益和對持份者所造成的影響。以政府推展巴士路線重組為例，重組建議會帶來不少好處，包括提升巴士網絡的效率、減輕加價壓力和紓緩道路交通擠塞。然而，由於計劃涉及合併或取消部分巴士路線，以致部分乘客需要改變乘車習慣，地區人士往往因此反對計劃。

5.2.7 工作小組期望立法會和區議會議員繼續擔當政府與市民之間的橋樑。議員除為其代表的市民反映意見外，亦肩負促進社會整體福祉的重任。工作小組籲請立法會和區議會議員，幫助他們的選民了解一些未必受歡迎但有必要實施的交通管理措施，以及其所帶來的長遠好處。

## 政府

5.2.8 工作小組得悉政府一直三管齊下，利便人車往來，即改善交通基建、擴展和改善公共交通系統，以及管理道路的使用(見第3章)。工作小組同意，政府應繼續推行現行措施，與相關持份者緊密合作，檢討相關措施的成效及探討改善方法。

5.2.9 不過，基於第3章所述的原因，現行措施未能全面發揮成效。工作小組呼籲政府以更創新的思維，探討和採納可解決道路擠塞的新措施。借助新科技協助交通管理和執法，以及鼓勵市民步行或以在新市鎮和新發展區內，以單車作短途代步(有關闡釋已載於第3章)，均為正確方向。

5.2.10 此外，政府需要做好準備，推展具爭議但能有效處理交通擠塞的措施，例如電子道路收費。工作小組促請政府與相關持份者緊密合作，大力推展理據充份的紓緩交通擠塞建議。

## 5.3 宣傳和教育

5.3.1 如果說紓緩交通擠塞的措施好比一棵植物，必須先以創意培育種子、用決心播種，那宣傳和教育就像施肥一樣，可確保植物茁壯成長。

5.3.2 工作小組認為，必須制訂有效的宣傳和教育計劃，讓社會大眾明白保持客貨運輸暢通無阻的重要性，並了解每人如何可為此出一分力。工作小組建議政府宣傳以下兩項重要信息：

- (a) 羣策羣力：要解決道路交通擠塞，每個人的努力都不可少；以及
- (b) 雖感不便但仍值得以大局為重：某些紓緩交通擠塞的建議或會對部分人士造成不便，甚至增加其財政負擔，但卻可造福整個社會，值得推行。

5.3.3 工作小組亦希望指出教育下一代的重要性。不少人小時候都聽過這首交通安全歌曲，至今仍能引起共鳴：「慢慢走，勿亂跑，馬路如虎口，交通規則要遵守，安全第一，命長久。」假若香港人自小便潛移默化，學懂遵守交通規則及理解使用公共交通工具和步行的好處，日後便有望不用迫切地解決交通擠塞。此外，教育小朋友會帶來額外好處，因為他們往往可為其他家庭成員帶來正面影響。政府應考慮透過社交媒體等較生動和適合年青人的方法，以達到預期的宣傳效果。

5.3.4 除了以一般市民和年輕一代作為對象外，政府亦可與運輸業界緊密合作，爭取職業司機的支持，紓緩道路交通擠塞。

## 5.4 維持香港的競爭力

5.4.1 香港是世界級城市，一直竭力維持和提升競爭力。道路對客貨運輸至為重要，就像血管輸送營養到身體各部分一樣。便捷的道路網絡，能促進客運流動和經濟活動，對城市的健康發展相當重要。反之，交通擠塞不僅延長出行時間，更會在多方面窒礙城市的健康發展。

5.4.2 交通便利與否日漸成為界定一個城市生活質素和吸引力的重要指標<sup>1</sup>，而空氣質素也是城市人深切關注的問題。改善道路擠塞，既可使交通更便捷，亦可減少路邊空氣污染，一舉兩得，必然有助香港

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<sup>1</sup> 例如，《全球宜居城市調查》指數會按照陸路交通、運輸網絡及空氣質素等指標，決定各大城市的宜居排名。另一例子是《Mercer全球城市生活質素研究》，該研究根據交通運輸和市民健康等因素把各個城市排名，以協助跨國公司決定會否在某城市開設辦公室或廠房，以及如何釐定員工薪金水平。

吸引更多海外專才和商業投資。因此，工作小組籲請社會各界齊心協力解決道路交通擠塞，維持香港的競爭力。

5.4.3 工作小組促請政府研究和考慮本報告所載的建議，並希望政府接納該等建議，在可行的情況下盡快付諸實行。

\* \* \* \* \*

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交通諮詢委員會轄下道路交通擠塞工作小組

成員

主席： 郭琳廣先生, BBS, JP

委員： 費中明先生, JP

何錦榮先生

劉玉娟女士

梁海國先生

羅康錦教授

盧佩瑩教授

李家慧女士

吳祖南博士, SBS, JP

雲維熹先生

交通諮詢委員會(交諮會)

成員

主席：郭琳廣先生, BBS, JP

委員：莊太量教授	李家慧女士
費中明先生, JP	吳祖南博士, SBS, JP
何錦榮先生	雲維熹先生
洪松蔭先生, JP	任景信先生
劉玉娟女士	葉少康先生, MH
梁海國先生	運輸及房屋局常任秘書長(運輸) 或其代表
羅康錦教授	運輸署署長
盧佩瑩教授	警務處處長或其代表
馬夏邨女士	

職權範圍

交諮會會依照以下原則，就各項交通事務，向行政長官會同行政會議提供意見：-

1. 交諮會之職責乃就交通政策廣泛涉及的各項問題，向行政長官會同行政會議提供意見，使市民的往來及貨物的運送，兩者情況均可獲得改善。
2. 交諮會可就其職權範圍內的各項事務，與市民或任何團體聯絡。
3. 交諮會可研究與交通直接有關的財政問題，但負責在公共開支及稅務等方面提出計劃者則為行政當局。
4. 運輸及房屋局局長得為交諮會設一秘書處，負責有關的行政事宜。
5. 交諮會可下設小組委員會、與其他團體組成聯合委員會、以及增選成員執行特定任務，並可以其認為最適當的方法展開工作。
6. 政務司司長在與交諮會及行政長官會同行政會議協商後，可不時修改委員會的職權範圍及其職務指南。

## 道路交通擠塞民意調查

### 1. 引言

1.1 道路交通擠塞民意調查旨在蒐集市民對本港道路交通擠塞情況及其主要成因的意見，以及評估市民對各種解決道路交通擠塞措施的接受程度。這項調查是由一家獨立的市場研究公司負責，該公司在2014年7月14日至2014年8月10日期間，向一般市民和六個組別的駕駛者分別進行了6 000個電話訪問和3 010個面談訪問。表1載列成功完成訪問的數字。研究公司其後為調查所得的數據進行加權處理，得出更代表整體人口和駕駛者的統計數字<sup>1</sup>。

表1：成功完成訪問的數字

目標受訪者	成功完成訪問的數字
<b>I. 一般市民</b>	<b>6 000</b>
<b>II. 駕駛者：</b>	
(i) 私家車車主／司機	502
(ii) 的士司機	500
(iii) 貨車司機	501
(iv) 專營巴士司機	502
(v) 公共小巴司機	501
(vi) 其他巴士司機 <sup>2</sup>	504
小計	<b>3 010</b>
總計(I)+(II)	<b>9 010</b>

### 2. 調查結果 — 香港道路交通擠塞的情況

2.1 市民對整體道路交通擠塞程度的意見載於圖1。約有82%的駕駛者認為香港的交通情況屬中等擠塞至很擠塞，68%的一般市民持相同


<sup>1</sup> 一如其他調查分析，從6 000個電話訪問中取得的調查數據，會根據政府統計處2013年年底香港人口性別和年齡分布進行加權處理。而從3 010個面談訪問取得的調查數據，則會根據2013年各車輛類別的全年總行車里數進行加權處理。

<sup>2</sup> 其他巴士包括旅遊巴士、邨巴、學校巴士、跨境巴士、酒店巴士和公司巴士。




意見。這顯示市民普遍認同香港道路交通擠塞情況嚴重，但駕駛者則因較受道路交通擠塞影響，故對交通情況更為關注。

圖1：整體路面交通擠塞程度




2.2 超過60%的一般市民和駕駛者都認為，路面交通情況與12個月前比較沒有轉差，另有25%認為情況轉差、約10%認為情況有所改善。對於過去12個月路面交通情況的轉變，駕駛者給予正面評論的比率較一般市民少。有關結果摘錄於圖2。

圖2：與12個月前比較的整體路面交通情況



2.3 問到是否需要改善路面交通情況，約有84%的一般市民認為需要改善，包括約33%認為須盡快改善。至於駕駛者方面，分別有93%及36%持相同意見，再次顯示駕駛者因較受道路交通擠塞影響而更期望見到改善。有關結果摘錄於圖3。

圖3：改善道路交通擠塞的需要



2.4 從上文第2.1至2.3段所作的討論，可得出以下結論：

- (a) 大多數一般市民，尤其是駕駛者，認為香港的道路交通擠塞情況屬中等至嚴重程度；
- (b) 大多數一般市民，尤其是駕駛者，認為需要改善香港的道路交通擠塞情況；以及
- (c) 大多數一般市民及駕駛者，不認為香港的道路交通擠塞情況在過去12個月轉差。

### 3. 調查結果 — 道路交通擠塞的成因

3.1 是次調查向一般市民列舉八項因素，並詢問他們是否同意該等因素是引致香港道路交通擠塞的原因，有關結果摘錄於表2。獲最多一般市民同意<sup>3</sup>的首三項因素(全部超過50%)分別為：

- (a) 「路面有過多車輛行駛」(62%)；
- (b) 「路面有過多道路工程」(54%)；以及
- (c) 「非法泊車」(52%)。

3.2 就同一問題，是次調查向駕駛者列舉多兩項因素(即合共十項)；下文第3.4段將詳述原因。調查結果摘錄於表2。當中，有九項因素獲超過50%駕駛者同意為道路交通擠塞的成因，只有「路面有過多小巴上落客」一項，獲少於50%駕駛者認同。結果顯示駕駛者因較直接受道路交通擠塞影響，而對相關問題反應較強烈。獲最多駕駛者同意的首四項因素(亦包括獲最多一般市民同意的首三項因素)分別為：

- (a) 「路邊上落客貨設施不足」(77%)；
- (b) 「路面有過多道路工程」(75%)；
- (c) 「非法泊車」(74%)；以及
- (d) 「路面有過多車輛行駛」(70%)。

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<sup>3</sup> 在本附件內匯報的統計資料，「同意」包括「非常同意」及「同意」兩者；而「不同意」則包括「非常不同意」及「不同意」兩者。

表2：道路交通擠塞的成因

項目	道路交通擠塞的成因	受訪者	非常同意 ／同意	非常不同意 ／不同意
1	路面有過多車輛行駛	一般市民	62%	10%
		駕駛者	70%	6%
2	路面有過多道路工程	一般市民	54%	17%
		駕駛者	75%	7%
3	非法泊車	一般市民	52%	21%
		駕駛者	74%	7%
4	有道路使用者違例在路邊上落客人或貨物	一般市民	49%	21%
		駕駛者	69%	9%
5	缺乏足夠土地興建新道路	一般市民	46%	24%
		駕駛者	58%	17%
6(a)	路面有過多巴士上落客	一般市民	37%	30%
		駕駛者	56%	17%
6(b)	路面有過多旅遊巴士上落客	一般市民	31%	36%
		駕駛者	50%	18%
6(c)	路面有過多小巴上落客	一般市民	25%	36%
		駕駛者	36%	24%
7	路邊上落客貨設施不足	一般市民	不適用	不適用
		駕駛者	77%	6%
8	有車輛在道路上兜圈或等候泊車位	一般市民	不適用	不適用
		駕駛者	67%	11%

3.3 在電話訪問和面談訪問中，一般市民和駕駛者均被問及是否同意路面上三類車輛(即巴士、小巴及旅遊巴士)的上落客活動，是導致道路交通擠塞的成因。結果顯示，一般市民多持中立態度，同意與不同意兩者的百分比相差不大。相反，有較多駕駛者認為巴士上落客(56%)及旅遊巴士上落客(50%)是導致道路交通擠塞的成因。

3.4 與一般市民比較，駕駛者會更注意到「路邊上落客貨設施不足」及「有車輛在道路上兜圈或等候泊車位」會否導致道路交通擠塞。因此在面談訪問中也蒐集駕駛者對這兩項因素的意見。大部分駕駛者均同意「路邊上落客貨設施不足」(77%，為最多駕駛者同意的成因)及「有車輛在道路上兜圈或等候泊車位」(67%)是導致道路交通擠塞的成因。

3.5 在各項被認同的交通擠塞成因中，受訪者進一步被問及何者屬最主要的原因。一般市民與駕駛者的結果分別載於圖4及圖5。結果顯示，兩方的首三項選擇一致，分別為：

- (a) 「路面有過多車輛行駛」；
- (b) 「非法泊車」；及
- (c) 「路面有過多道路工程」。

圖4：道路交通擠塞的主要成因－一般市民的意見





圖5：道路交通擠塞的主要成因－駕駛者的意見




3.6 首三項「最主要原因」與表2所載的結果大致上脗合，惟「路邊上落客貨設施不足夠」一項雖有77%的駕駛者同意為道路交通擠塞的成因，亦是問卷所載十項成因中獲最多駕駛者認同的一項，但在圖5只位列第五項最主要原因。

3.7 「路面有過多車輛行駛」是一般市民和駕駛者一致選出的首項最主要原因。在同意「路面有過多車輛行駛」為道路交通擠塞成因之一的受訪者中，他們認為最應減少數目的車輛類別<sup>4</sup>摘錄於圖6。從該圖可見，私家車佔首位，近70%的一般市民和駕駛者認為應減少路面上私家車的數目。其次為專營巴士，支持減少其數目的駕駛者比率(41%)較一般市民的(29%)為多。貨車佔第三位，約有20%的一般市民和19%的駕駛者認為需要減少其數目。

<sup>4</sup> 受訪者可選擇一至兩類車輛。

圖6：應減少數目的車輛類別



註：受訪者可選擇一至兩項交通工具，故比率的總和並不等於100%。

3.8 受訪者可提出問卷上沒有提及的其他導致道路交通擠塞成因。他們提出的其他成因包括：

- (a) 路面過於狹窄；
- (b) 道路不足；
- (c) 泊車位不足；
- (d) 過海隧道或其他隧道使用率不均；
- (e) 太多以交通燈控制的路口；
- (f) 停候交通燈時間過長；以及
- (g) 太多交通意外。


3.9 從上文第3.1至3.8段所作的討論，可得出以下的結論：

- (a) 道路使用者(一般市民及駕駛者)認為「路面有過多車輛行駛」、「非法泊車」和「路面有過多道路工程」是導致本港道路交通擠塞的最主要原因；以及
- (b) 在認同「路面有過多車輛行駛」為道路交通擠塞成因之一的受訪者中，他們(不論是一般市民或駕駛者)大多支持減少私家車的數目。

#### 4. 調查結果 — 控制私家車增長的需要和優先使用路面空間


4.1 大多數一般市民(69%)和駕駛者(75%)認為需要控制私家車的增長(見圖7)。這與第3.7段中有關私家車數目最應受控制的論述相脛合。值得注意的是，私家車車主／司機雖然是這項措施的目標對象，但仍約有58%表示需要控制私家車的增長。不過，相比其餘五個駕駛者組別，這個比率仍是最低的；其餘五個組別的比率介乎84%至90%不等。

圖7：控制私家車的增長




4.2 大部分一般市民(68%)和駕駛者(63%)認同本港路面空間有限，並支持政府給予某些交通工具優先使用道路的權利(見圖8)。在各個駕駛者組別中，專營巴士司機(90%)最支持這項措施，其次為其他巴士司機(80%)。

圖8：給予某些交通工具優先使用道路的權利




4.3 在贊成政府給予某些交通工具優先使用道路權利的受訪者中，他們屬意和不屬意獲得優先使用權的車輛類別<sup>5</sup>分別載於圖9和圖10。大多數一般市民(94%)和駕駛者(92%)認為應給予專營巴士優先使用權，其次為綠色小巴(一般市民和駕駛者各約有25%表示支持)。另一方面，超過63%一般市民和76%駕駛者認為不應給予私家車優先使用權，其次為貨車(兩者各約有29%)。值得注意的是，超過半數的私家車車主／司機(58%)也同意不應給予私家車優先使用權。不過，相比其餘五個駕駛者組別，這個比率仍是最低的；其餘五個組別的比率介乎89%至93%不等。

圖 9：應獲道路優先使用權的交通工具



註：受訪者可選擇一至兩項交通工具，故比率的總和並不等於100%。

圖 10：不應獲道路優先使用權的交通工具



註：受訪者可選擇一至兩項交通工具，故比率的總和並不等於100%。

<sup>5</sup> 受訪者獲邀提出一至兩類應該和不應該獲得道路優先使用權的交通工具。



4.4 從上文第4.1至4.3段所作的討論，可得出以下的結論：


- (a) 受訪者很支持控制私家車的增長；
- (b) 受訪者很支持給予某些交通工具優先使用本港有限路面空間的權利；
- (c) 絕大多數受訪者認為應給予專營巴士優先使用權，也有部分受訪者支持讓小巴享有此權利；以及
- (d) 大多數受訪者認為不應給予私家車優先使用權，也有部分受訪者支持不讓貨車享有此權利。

## 5. 調查結果 — 對建議的中、短期措施的接受程度

### (A) 提高擁有或使用私家車的費用

5.1 受訪者被問及是否接受「提高擁有或使用私家車的費用<sup>6</sup>」作為控制道路交通擠塞的措施，有關結果摘錄於圖11。結果顯示，近48%一般市民表示接受這項措施，有24%則反對。

圖11：對「提高擁有或使用私家車的費用」的接受程度



5.2 在駕駛者中，約46%接受對私家車實施財政措施，以控制道路交通擠塞，約27%則表示反對。在502名接受面談訪問的私家車車主／司機中，只有約21%表示接受對私家車實施財政措施，而大部分(約51%)均表示反對。在其餘五組駕駛者中，逾半數(約58%至73%)支持這項措施。


<sup>6</sup> 「提高私家車的首次登記稅」及「提高私家車的牌照年費」為訪問引用的兩個例子。

5.3 根據上述的調查結果，預料直接受影響的私家車車主／司機所反對有關財政措施，但一般市民及其他非私家車司機卻會給予中度支持。

#### (B) 提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款

5.4 受訪者對「提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款」的接受程度，見圖12。約66%一般市民接受這項措施，約13%則反對。至於駕駛者方面，接受和反對措施的各約佔42%和35%。在各組別的駕駛者中，專營巴士司機(82%)最接受這項措施，其次為公共小巴司機(57%)及其他巴士司機(52%)。逾半數的貨車司機(55%)反對這項措施，這是因為他們的日常工作多涉及上落貨物，措施對他們的影響最大。

圖12：對「提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款」的接受程度




5.5 根據上述的調查結果，「提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款」料會得到一般市民的大力支持；但部分駕駛者，尤其受影響最大的貨車司機，則會表示反對。

#### (C) 加強對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的執法行動

5.6 受訪者對「加強對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的執法行動」的接受程度，見圖13。一般市民中約有71%接受這項措施，只有少於10%表示反對。至於駕駛者方面，接受和反對措施的分別佔57%和21%。在各組別的駕駛者中，專營巴士司機(93%)最接受這項措施，其次為公共小巴司機(73%)。只有少於半數的貨車司機支持這項措施：接受和反對者分別有33%和37%；這同樣是由於他們的工作最受這項措施影響。

圖13：對「加強對與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的執法行動」  
的接受程度




5.7 根據上述的調查結果，「加強對交通擠塞相關的違例事項的執法行動」料會得到一般市民的大力支持。事實上，其支持度的確稍高於「提高與交通擠塞相關的違例事項的定額罰款」。貨車司機受措施影響最大，料部分貨車司機會提出反對。

#### (D) 提高泊車咪錶的收費

5.8 受訪者對「提高泊車咪錶的收費」的接受程度，見圖14。一般市民對這項措施的意見有頗大分歧：約有38%支持、29%反對，餘下33%持中立態度。至於駕駛者方面，反對和支持措施的分別佔46%和30%，餘下24%持中立態度。在各組別的駕駛者中，逾半數貨車司機(53%)表示反對。

5.9 根據上述的調查結果，預計一般市民和駕駛者對「提高泊車咪錶的收費」的支持度僅屬一般。事實上，是項措施或會遭駕駛者強烈反對。


圖14：對「提高泊車咪錶的收費」的接受程度



## (E) 實施電子道路收費計劃

5.10 是次調查詢問受訪者是否支持在繁忙地區實施電子道路收費計劃，以減少指定種類的車輛進入有關地區，調查結果見圖15。近63%一般市民接受這項措施，約30%則反對。至於駕駛者的意見則有較大分歧：儘管有接近52%表示支持，但這只是稍高於反對的比率(約44%)。在各組別的駕駛者中，專營巴士司機(74%)最支持實施電子道路收費計劃，其次為其他巴士司機(約64%)。貨車及的士司機皆傾向不支持這項措施(分別為51%及53%)。

圖15：對「實施電子道路收費計劃」的接受程度




5.11 根據上述的調查結果，實施電子道路收費計劃的支持及反對比率料會相若，這證明有關計劃在社會上仍備受爭議。

## 6. 調查結果 — 對其他措施的接受程度

### (A) 巴士路線重組

6.1 受訪者對推行巴士路線重組以控制道路交通擠塞的接受程度，見圖16。約64%的一般市民和86%的駕駛者認為這項措施可以接受，顯示駕駛者比市民更歡迎有關措施。


圖 16：對「巴士路線重組」的接受程度



## (B) 增加巴士轉乘車站和改善現時轉乘站的設施

6.2 受訪者對「增加巴士轉乘車站和改善現時轉乘站的設施」的接受程度，見圖17。約有69%的一般市民和85%的駕駛者認為這項措施可以接受，調查結果與「巴士路線重組」相若。


圖 17：對「增加巴士轉乘車站和改善現時轉乘站的設施」的接受程度



## (C) 在繁忙地區外圍提供更多泊車轉乘停車場

6.3 受訪者對「在繁忙地區外圍提供更多泊車轉乘停車場」的接受程度，見圖18。約有67%的一般市民和81%的駕駛者認為這項措施可以接受。


圖18：對「在繁忙地區外圍提供更多泊車轉乘停車場」的接受程度



#### (D) 減少泊車位供應

6.4 受訪者對「減少泊車位供應」的接受程度，見圖19。在一般市民中，只有19%認為措施可以接受，大多數(55%)認為不可接受。駕駛者因較直接受這項措施影響而反應較大，認為這是調查中最不可接受的措施；近84%的駕駛者認為這項措施不可接受。

圖19：對「減少泊車位供應」的接受程度




#### (E) 在繁忙地區內規定貨車只可以在非繁忙時間上落貨

6.5 受訪者對「在繁忙地區內規定貨車只可以在非繁忙時間上落貨」的接受程度，見圖20。約有62%的一般市民認為這項措施可以接受，而駕駛者則有59%表示支持。不過，由於這項措施特別針對貨車司機，只有33%的貨車司機表示支持，另有43%反對。至於其餘五個組別的駕駛者，大部分支持這項措施。



圖20：對「在繁忙地區內規定貨車只可以在非繁忙時間上落貨」的接受程度



## 7. 調查結果 — 其他建議

7.1 受訪者亦可以提出訪問中未有涵蓋的控制道路交通擠塞的措施(即第5.1至6.5段所討論的措施)。這方面的回應不多，摘錄於下文。部分建議實際上與問卷載列的措施類似，凡問卷未有涵蓋的措施均已標註星號。

### 減少路面車輛數目

1. 控制私家車的增長
2. 減少路面私家車數目
3. 減少路面巴士數目
4. 實施單／雙數車牌號碼限行計劃\*
5. 實施道路收費

### 加強執法

6. 加派執法人員
7. 加強對交通違例事項的執法行動

### 調整隧道收費

8. 降低東區和西區海底隧道的收費以作交通分流\*

### 建設新的基建／設施

9. 擴闊道路\*
10. 興建更多行車天橋／行車隧道\*
11. 興建更多行人天橋／行人隧道\*

- 12. 興建更多鐵路\*
- 13. 建新路\*
- 14. 加泊車位數目\*

**更妥善協調／監控道路工程**

- 15. 快道路工程\*
- 16. 少道路工程\*

\* 問卷未有涵蓋的措施





Sup :	Case :
Edit :	Check :

市民對路面交通擠塞及解決方法意見調查 (TIGP)

當問卷填入數據後即成限閱文件 只有獲授權人士可閱讀本文件內容
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電話編號： \_\_\_\_\_

被訪者稱呼： \_\_\_\_\_ 聯絡電話： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問員編號： \_\_\_\_\_ 訪問日期： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問開始時間： \_\_\_\_\_ 訪問結束時間： \_\_\_\_\_

**介紹：**

你好！我姓\_\_\_\_，係受運輸署委託嘅米嘉道資訊策略有限公司，我哋現正進行一項關於香港路面交通擠塞情況嘅意見調查，希望同你做個簡短訪問。所有資料係絕對保密，只會用作綜合統計分析。多謝你合作。

**甄別被訪者**

- S1. 我哋係用隨機抽樣方式抽選府上一位家庭成員接受訪問嘅。  
請問你屋企包括你在內，有幾多位 15 歲或以上 嘅家庭成員呢？我係指一星期最少有四晚喺嘅嘅家庭成員，但唔包括留宿家庭傭工。
- 記錄人數：\_\_\_\_\_人 [如超過一位，問 S2；否則邀請該位家庭成員接受訪問。]
- S2. 咁喺呢\_\_\_\_\_位家庭成員當中，邊一位係最近過咗生日嘅呢？  
(如被訪者不明白：即係今日係\_\_\_\_月\_\_\_\_日，咁對上係邊位生日呢？)
- 本人 → [讀出] 多謝你接受我哋訪問 [開始訪問]
- 其他人 → [讀出] 我想同呢位家庭成員做訪問，麻煩你可唔可以請佢過嚟聽電話呢？  
[重複介紹，然後開始訪問]  
[若選中的被訪者不在家或暫時不方便接受訪問，必須另行安排日期及時間再作訪問] 請問乜嘢時間 或 日子會搵到佢呢？
- [如被訪者拒絕接受訪問，讀出] 你嘅意見對政府改善香港路面交通擠塞情況十分重要。我哋嘅訪問只需要幾分鐘時間，而且請你放心，所有資料只會用作研究用途，係絕對保密嘅。

## 主要問卷

Q1.	喺過去三個月，你係「經常」、「間中」、「好少」，定係「完全冇」使用以下嘅交通工具呢？ <b>[單選]</b>				
	<b>[輪流讀出]</b>	經常	間中	好少	完全冇
<input type="checkbox"/>	(i) 鐵路 (包括港鐵、輕鐵)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(ii) 專營巴士 (包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(iii) 其他巴士 (如旅遊巴、邨巴、校巴、穿梭巴士)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(iv) 紅色小巴	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(v) 綠色小巴	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(vi) 的士	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(vii) 私家車(包括司機及乘客)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(viii) 電單車(包括司機及乘客)	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(ix) 電車	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(x) 單車	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(xi) 渡輪	1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	(xii) 貨車	1	2	3	4
<b>【如果全部答 4，則終止訪問，並多謝被訪者】</b>					

Q2a.	你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係… <b>[隨機順序讀出 1-4 答案 或 4-1 答案]</b> 。	<b>[單選]</b>	
	唔擠塞	1	
	輕微擠塞	2	
	中等擠塞	3	
	很擠塞	4	
	唔知道 或 冇意見 <b>[不讀出]</b>	8	

Q2b.	咁同 12 個月前比較，你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係… <b>[隨機順序讀出 1-3 答案 或 3-1 答案]</b> 。	<b>[單選]</b>	
	比之前擠塞	1	
	冇改變	2	
	改善咗	3	
	唔知道 或 冇意見 <b>[不讀出]</b>	8	

Q3.	你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係… <b>[隨機順序讀出 1-3 答案 或 3-1 答案]</b> 。	<b>[單選]</b>	
	無須改善 或 尚可接受	1	
	冇改善嘅空間	2	
	須盡快改善	3	
	唔知道 或 冇意見 <b>[不讀出]</b>	8	

- Q4(i). 請問你同唔同意以下項目係可能會引致香港路面出現交通擠塞嘅原因呢？請你以 1 至 5 分表示，1 分代表非常唔同意，5 分代表非常同意。
- Q4(ii) 咁你認為…[逐一讀出 Q4(i)a – e 及 g 答 4 – 5 分嘅項目]，邊一項係導致路面出現交通擠塞嘅最主要原因呢？

		Q4(i). [單選]						Q4(ii)
[輪流讀出]		非常同意	同意	中立	唔同意	非常唔同意	有意見 [不讀出]	[單選]
<input type="checkbox"/>	a. 缺乏足夠土地興建新道路	5	4	3	2	1	8	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. 有道路使用者違例喺路邊上落客人或貨物	5	4	3	2	1	8	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. 非法泊車阻塞道路	5	4	3	2	1	8	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. 路面有過多道路工程	5	4	3	2	1	8	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. 路面有過多車輛行駛	5	4	3	2	1	8	5
[追問 e 答 4 – 5 分] f. 咁你認為邊一種車輛過多而應該要減少呢？咁仲有呢？								
					第一提及 [單選]	第二提及 [單選]		
專營巴士 (包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士)					1	1		
其他巴士 (如旅遊巴、邨巴、校巴、穿梭巴士)					2	2		
紅色小巴					3	3		
綠色小巴					4	4		
的士					5	5		
私家車					6	6		
電單車					7	7		
貨車					8	8		
其他，請註明：_____					_____	_____		
<input type="checkbox"/>	g. 路面有過多車輛上落客							
	(i) 巴士	5	4	3	2	1	8	6
	(ii) 小巴	5	4	3	2	1	8	7
	(iii) 旅遊巴士	5	4	3	2	1	8	8

Q5. 除咗以上所講，你認為仲有冇其他原因令現時香港路面出現交通擠塞呢？仲有無其他呢？

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q6. 你認為政府需唔需要提出措施去控制私家車嘅增長呢？

	[單選]
需要	1
唔需要	2
唔知道 或 有意見 [不讀出]	8

Q7a. 請問你接唔接受以下幾項控制道路擠塞嘅措施呢？請你以 1 至 5 分表示，1 分代表非常唔接受，5 分代表非常接受。[單選]

		非常 接受	接受	中立	唔 接受	非常 唔接受	冇意見 [不讀出]
	[輪流讀出]						
<input type="checkbox"/>	h. 提高違例上落客貨及非法泊車嘅罰則	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	i. 加強對違例路邊上落客貨及非法泊車嘅執法	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	j. 巴士路線重組(即減少開辦直接巴士線前往擠塞地區和提供巴士轉乘的車費優惠)	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	k. 增加巴士轉乘車站和改善現時轉乘站的設施	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	l. 喺繁忙地區外圍提供更多泊車轉乘嘅地點及優惠	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	m. 提高公共泊車位嘅收費	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	n. 減少泊車位供應	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	o. 喺繁忙地區內規定貨車只可以喺非繁忙時間上落貨	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	p. 提高擁有或使用私家車嘅費用 (例如購買全新私家車嘅首次登記稅、私家車嘅每年牌照費用)	5	4	3	2	1	8

Q7b. 除咗以上所講，你認為仲有冇其他措施可以控制道路擠塞呢？

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Q8. 假若政府喺繁忙地區（例如中區）實施電子道路收費計劃，以減少指定種類嘅車輛進入個區，你贊不贊成呢？ [單選]

贊成 1  
唔贊成 2  
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出] 8

Q9. 道路空間有限，如果政府給予某啲路面交通工具優先使用道路嘅權利，你贊不贊成呢？

贊成 1 → 繼續 Q10  
唔贊成 2 → 跳至 Q12  
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出] 8 → 跳至 Q12

Q10. 咁你認為最 <u>應該</u> 優先使用道路嘅路面交通工具係以下邊類呢？咁仲有呢？					
Q11. 咁你認為最 <u>唔應該</u> 優先使用道路嘅路面交通工具係以下邊類呢？咁仲有呢？					
		Q10.		Q11.	
		第一提 及	第二提 及	第一提 及	第二提 及
	[輪流讀出]	[單選]	[單選]	[單選]	[單選]
<input type="checkbox"/>	專營巴士（包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士）	1	1	1	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	其他巴士（如旅遊巴、邨巴、校巴、穿梭巴士）	2	2	2	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	紅色小巴	3	3	3	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	綠色小巴	4	4	4	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	的士	5	5	5	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	私家車	6	6	6	6
<input type="checkbox"/>	電單車	7	7	7	7
<input type="checkbox"/>	貨車	8	8	8	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	其他，請註明：				
<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Q12. 對於香港路面交通嘅擠塞情況及改善措施，你仲有乜嘢其他意見呢？仲有無其他呢？
_____
_____

## 個人背景資料

<b>X1. 記錄性別：</b>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 男 2 女	
<b>X2. 請問你屬於以下邊個年齡組別呢？[讀出 1 - 7]</b>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 15 - 19 歲 2 20 - 24 歲 3 25 - 29 歲 4 30 - 39 歲 5 40 - 49 歲 6 50 - 59 歲 7 60 歲或以上 9 拒絕回答	
<b>X3. 請問你最高學歷係讀到乜嘢程度呢？[讀出 1 - 3]</b>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 小學或以下 2 中學或預科 3 大專或以上 9 拒絕回答	
<b>X4. 請問你係... [讀出 1 - 5] ？</b>  <div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;">           在職人士 (包括全職或兼職)            學生            家務料理者            退休人士            待業人士            其他 (請註明) : _____            拒絕回答         </div>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 2 3 4 5 9	→ 繼續 X5 <div style="border-left: 1px solid black; padding-left: 10px; margin-left: 10px;">           → 跳至 X6         </div>
<b>X5. 請問你係唔係職業司機呢？</b>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 係 2 唔係 9 拒絕回答	
<b>X6a. 請問你係唔係私家車車主或 私家車司機呢？</b>	<b>[單選]</b> 1 係 2 唔係	→ 繼續 X6b → 結束訪問
<b>X6b. 咁你平均一星期揸幾多日車呢？</b>  <div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;">           _____ 日         </div>		

～ 多謝你接受訪問！ ～

[讀出] 遲啲本公司即米嘉道資訊策略有限公司嘅職員有可能會再聯絡你，目的係覆查我嘅訪問或者補問番一啲唔清楚嘅問題，佢哋只會問你幾條簡單嘅問題，唔會阻你好耐。

訪問員簽署

本人特此證明，以上所有訪問資料均正確無訛，並依照市場調查和社會研究慣例國際準則進行。

簽署：\_\_\_\_\_

日期：\_\_\_\_\_



Sup :	Case :
Edit :	Check :

## 市民對路面交通擠塞及解決方法意見調查 (FFID)

當問卷填入數據後即成限閱文件

只有獲授權人士可閱讀本文件內容

電話編號： \_\_\_\_\_

被訪者稱呼： \_\_\_\_\_

聯絡電話： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問員編號： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問日期： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問開始時間： \_\_\_\_\_

訪問結束時間： \_\_\_\_\_

### 介紹：

你好！我姓\_\_\_\_，係受運輸署委託嘅米嘉道資訊策略有限公司 [示工作證]，我哋現正進行一項關於香港路面交通擠塞情況嘅意見調查，希望同你做個簡短訪問。所有資料係絕對保密，只會用作綜合統計分析。多謝你合作。

## 主要問卷

Q1. (由訪問員直接記錄，需要時發問) 請問你係：

- |                              | [單選] |
|------------------------------|------|
| 私家車車主 或私家車司機                 | 1    |
| 的士司機                         | 2    |
| 貨車司機                         | 3    |
| 專營巴士 (包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士) 司機 | 4    |
| 公共小巴司機                       | 5    |
| 旅遊巴司機                        | 6    |
| 邨巴司機                         | 7    |
| 校巴司機                         | 8    |
| 穿梭巴士 (如中港巴士、酒店巴士、公司員工巴士) 司機  | 9    |
| 其他巴士司機                       | 10   |

Q2a. 你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係…[示咗]。

- |                 | [單選] |
|-----------------|------|
| 唔擠塞             | 1    |
| 輕微擠塞            | 2    |
| 中等擠塞            | 3    |
| 很擠塞             | 4    |
| 唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出] | 8    |



Q2b. 咁同 12 個月前比較，你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係…[示咭]。	[單選]	
比之前擠塞	1	
冇改變	2	
改善咗	3	
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出]	8	

Q3. 你認為現時香港整體嘅路面交通情況係…[示咭]。		
無須改善 或 尚可接受	1	
冇改善空間	2	
須盡快改善	3	
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出]	8	

Q4(i). 請問你同唔同意以下項目係可能會引致香港路面出現交通擠塞嘅原因呢？請你以 1 至 5 分表示，1 分代表非常唔同意，5 分代表非常同意。								
Q4(ii). 咁你認為…[逐一讀出 Q4(i)a – e 及 g – i 答 4 – 5 分嘅項目]，邊一項係導致路面出現交通擠塞嘅 <u>最主要</u> 原因呢？								
	Q4(i). [示咭] [單選]						Q4(ii). [單選]	
		非常同意	同意	中立	唔同意	非常唔同意	冇意見 [不讀出]	
[輪流讀出]								
<input type="checkbox"/>	a. 缺乏足夠土地興建新道路	5	4	3	2	1	8	01
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. 有道路使用者違例喺路邊上落客人或貨物	5	4	3	2	1	8	02
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. 非法泊車阻塞道路	5	4	3	2	1	8	03
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. 路面有過多道路工程	5	4	3	2	1	8	04
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. 路面有過多車輛行駛	5	4	3	2	1	8	05
[追問 e 答 4 – 5 分] f. 咁你認為邊一種車輛過多而應該要減少呢？咁仲有呢？								
					第一提及 [單選]	第二提及 [單選]		
專營巴士 (包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士)					1	1		
其他巴士 (如旅遊巴、邨巴、校巴、穿梭巴士)					2	2		
紅色小巴					3	3		
綠色小巴					4	4		
的士					5	5		
私家車					6	6		
電單車					7	7		
貨車					8	8		
其他，請註明：_____					_____	_____		
<input type="checkbox"/>	g. 路面有過多車輛上落客							
	(iv) 巴士	5	4	3	2	1	8	06
	(v) 小巴	5	4	3	2	1	8	07

	(vi) 旅遊巴士	5	4	3	2	1	8	08
<input type="checkbox"/>	h. 路邊上落客貨嘅設施不足夠	5	4	3	2	1	8	09
<input type="checkbox"/>	i. 有車輛喺道路上兜圈或喺路上等候泊車位	5	4	3	2	1	8	10

Q5. 除咗以上所講，你認為仲有冇其他原因令現時香港路面出現交通擠塞呢？仲有無其他呢？

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Q6. 你認為政府需唔需要提出措施去控制私家車嘅增長呢？

[單選]

需要  
唔需要

1  
2  
8

唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出]

Q7a. 請問你接唔接受以下幾項控制道路擠塞嘅措施呢？請你以 1 至 5 分表示，1 分代表非常唔接受，5 分代表非常接受。[示咭][單選]

	[輪流讀出]	非常接受	接受	中立	唔接受	非常唔接受	冇意見 [不讀出]
<input type="checkbox"/>	j. 提高違例上落客貨及非法泊車嘅罰則	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	k. 加強對違例路邊上落客貨及非法泊車嘅執法	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	l. 巴士路線重組(即減少開辦直接巴士線前往擠塞地區和提供巴士轉乘的車費優惠)	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	m. 增加巴士轉乘車站和改善現時轉乘站的設施	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	n. 喺繁忙地區外圍提供更多泊車轉乘嘅地點及優惠	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	o. 提高公共泊車位嘅收費	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	p. 減少泊車位供應	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	q. 喺繁忙地區內規定貨車只可以喺非繁忙時間上落貨	5	4	3	2	1	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	r. 提高擁有或使用私家車嘅費用(例如購買全新私家車嘅首次登記稅、私家車嘅每年牌照費用)	5	4	3	2	1	8

Q7b. 除咗以上所講，你認為仲有冇其他措施可以控制道路擠塞呢？仲有無其他呢？

Q8. 假若政府喺繁忙地區（例如中區）實施電子道路收費計劃，以減少指定種類嘅車輛進入個區，你贊不贊成呢？	[單選]	
贊成	1	
唔贊成	2	
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出]	8	

Q9. 道路空間有限，如果政府給予某啲路面交通工具優先使用道路嘅權利，你贊不贊成呢？	[單選]	
贊成	1	→ 繼續 Q10
唔贊成	2	→ 跳至 Q12
唔知道 或 冇意見 [不讀出]	8	→ 跳至 Q12

Q10. 咁你認為最 <u>應該</u> 優先使用道路嘅路面交通工具係以下邊類呢？咁仲有呢？[示咭]					
Q11. 咁你認為最 <u>唔應該</u> 優先使用道路嘅路面交通工具係以下邊類呢？咁仲有呢？[示咭]					
		Q10.		Q11.	
		第一提 及 [單選]	第二提 及 [單選]	第一提 及 [單選]	第二提 及 [單選]
<input type="checkbox"/>	專營巴士（包括九巴、新巴、城巴、離島或機場巴士）	1	1	1	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	其他巴士（如旅遊巴、邨巴、校巴、穿梭巴士）	2	2	2	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	紅色小巴	3	3	3	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	綠色小巴	4	4	4	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	的士	5	5	5	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	私家車	6	6	6	6
<input type="checkbox"/>	電單車	7	7	7	7
<input type="checkbox"/>	貨車	8	8	8	8
<input type="checkbox"/>	其他，請註明： _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Q12. 對於香港路面交通嘅擠塞情況及改善措施，你仲有乜嘢其他意見呢？ 仲有無其他呢？

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## 個人背景資料

X1. 記錄性別：	男 女	[單選] 1 2	
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X2. 請問你屬於以下邊個年齡組別呢？[示咭]	15 – 19 歲 20 – 24 歲 25 – 29 歲 30 – 39 歲 40 – 49 歲 50 – 59 歲 60 歲或以上 拒絕回答	[單選] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9	
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X3. 請問你最高學歷係讀到乜嘢程度呢？[示咭]	小學或以下 中學 或 預科 大專或以上 拒絕回答	[單選] 1 2 3 9	
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X4. 咁你平均一星期揸幾多日車呢？	_____	日	
--------------------	-------	---	--

～ 多謝你接受訪問！ ～

[讀出] 遲啲本公司即米嘉道資訊策略有限公司嘅職員有可能會再聯絡你，目的係覆查我嘅訪問或者補問番一啲唔清楚嘅問題，佢哋只會問你幾條簡單嘅問題，唔會阻你好耐。

### 訪問員簽署

本人特此證明，以上所有訪問資料均正確無訛，並依照市場調查和社會研究慣例國際準則進行。

簽署：\_\_\_\_\_

日期：\_\_\_\_\_

平日早上繁忙時間中區一帶  
部分主要道路的行車速度(2008至2013年)

	行車速度 (公里／小時)					
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
干諾道中 (由德輔道西至 美利道)	13.8	12.1	11.9	<b>10.6</b>	<b>9.4</b>	13.3
干諾道中 (由美利道至 德輔道西)	17.7	15.2	14.3	14.4	14.3	15.0
干諾道中天橋 (由德輔道西至 林士街)	<b>9.4</b>	<b>10.5</b>	16.4	14.9	14.9	14.7
德輔道中 (由急庇利街至 畢打街)	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>10.0</b>	12.5
德輔道西 (由西邊街至 干諾道中)	<b>10.5</b>	14.3	<b>9.5</b>	11.6	<b>10.6</b>	<b>8.7</b>
遮打道 (由畢打街至 美利道)	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>10.2</b>
皇后大道中 (由花園道至 水坑口街)	15.9	20.6	21.1	15.4	18.5	19.4

## 以挖掘准許證機制 控制道路工程對交通的影響

### 1. 概覽

1.1 道路工程可以改善、保養及維修該路段或其地底的公用事業(例如水管、排水渠、氣體喉管、供電及電訊電纜)，對香港的發展及市民日常生活非常重要。公用事業機構<sup>1</sup>需要進行道路工程，保養和擴展其負責的公用事業設施網絡，以配合市民日常生活所需。此外，興建道路和與鐵路發展相關的道路工程亦非常重要，使香港得以維持世界級都會的地位。例行的道路保養和定期的道路修復工程亦可確保道路使用者的安全及舒適。除了上述可預先計劃的道路工程外，公用事業機構有時還需要進行緊急掘路工程<sup>2</sup>，以緊急維修地底公用事業設施，確保必要的公用事業服務得以在短時間內恢復正常。

1.2 各類道路工程均有其效益和實際需要，因此，要控制道路工程對交通的影響，關鍵在於如何妥善管理及協調不同的道路工程，盡量避免阻礙交通，而非單純減少道路工程的數目。

### 2. 根據挖掘准許證機制管理道路工程

2.1 大部分道路工程都涉及挖掘工作。根據《土地(雜項條文)條例》(第28章)，工程倡議人須向路政署申請挖掘准許證，方可在公共道路上開展或延續挖掘工作。挖掘准許證機制由路政署設立，用以管理和控制預先計劃和緊急的掘路工程<sup>3</sup>。由於是次研究只集中審視道路交通擠塞的經常性成因，本附件只闡述挖掘准許證機制中有關預先計劃的掘路工程的程序。

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<sup>1</sup> 公用事業機構是指任何供應或提供公用事業設施(包括電力、照明、交通控制、電訊、有線電視、煤氣、食水、排水、污水和電車軌道)並從事相關工作的人士、機構、公司、團體或政府部門。

<sup>2</sup> 緊急掘路工程造成的交通阻延往往較預先計劃的掘路工程為大。利用預先計劃的掘路工程妥善進行例行保養，有助減少進行緊急掘路工程的需要和減輕對道路使用者造成的交通影響。

<sup>3</sup> 根據香港法例第28章，路政署可向公用事業機構發出緊急挖掘准許證以進行為期不超過七天的緊急掘路工程。

## **計劃階段**

### **(a) 評估准許證有效期**

2.2 申請挖掘准許證的人士登記申請後，該申請須接受准許證有效期的評估，以決定其可在路面進行工程的時間。按照評估結果，申請人會獲分配一段合理的時間完成道路工程，避免不必要佔用路面空間。

### **(b) 協調道路工程**

2.3 如有多項鄰近的道路工程需要進行，相關的挖掘准許證申請人在其申請獲批前，會先被要求與各申請人互相協調，以儘早發現及解決各工程之間可能出現的衝突。更重要的目的，是要確保在同一路段的道路工程得以同時或按序進行。例如兩個公用事業機構需要在同一地點進行工程時，甲機構可在工程完成後，將挖開了的路段直接交予乙機構，讓乙機構展開工程，而毋需再次鑽掘路面。為避免同一路段被重覆開挖，當一連串經協調的道路工程完成後，路政署在三個月內不會就有關路段發出挖掘准許證，緊急或無法預計的情況則不在此限。

2.4 另外，新建成的車路一般在五年內不會獲批進行掘路工程，而新建成的行人路的限制期則為一年，原因是各有關方面應已在建造新路期間，協調和完成所需的掘路工程，例如鋪設公用事業設施和路面。

### **(c) 向運輸署及警方諮詢交通方面的意見**

2.5 在挖掘准許證機制下，申請准許證人士須向運輸署及警方諮詢交通方面的意見。運輸署及警方會審核申請人所提交的臨時交通管理建議，確保工程對交通的影響可減至最低，並達至可接受水平。如有需要，運輸署及警方所提出的臨時交通管理要求，會成為挖掘准許證的條款之一。對於在繁忙道路進行的工程，運輸署及警方或會要求申請人先進行交通影響評估，以證明其臨時交通管理計劃切實可行。

## **施工階段**

2.6 在施工期間，各有關政府部門會採取不同的監察及管制措施，確保申請人妥善執行計劃階段的準備工夫。

## **(a) 警方的道路工程指引**

2.7 道路工程倡議人或其承建商需於施工前向警方申請「道路工程指引」。警方會按最新的交通情況處理申請，並在有需要時，經諮詢運輸署後，提出臨時交通管理的要求。

## **(b) 路政署的審核巡查**

2.8 路政署成立了一支審核巡查隊伍，負責在挖掘工地進行審核巡查，確保挖掘准許證持有人遵行准許證的條件，包括各項特別臨時交通管理要求。若發現工地內無人工作，路政署會記錄為違反准許證條件，而持證人會接獲通知，需盡快糾正違規情況。根據法例第28章，承建商如沒有遵行准許證條件進行挖掘工程，須承擔法律責任。

## **(c) 延長挖掘准許證有效期的附加收費**

2.9 一如第2.2段所述，路政署會給挖掘准許證持有人分配一段合理的時間以完成道路工程。為鼓勵持證人在核准時間內完工，路政署引入了一個特別的收費機制。在此機制下，持證人如預期未能按時完工，須申請延長准許證的有效期，為此他們須承擔行政費用及繳付罰款(由每日1,500元至18,000元不等)。

## **3. 在道路工程應用創新科技**

3.1 路政署一直留意創新科技的發展，並推廣應用創新科技，減低道路工程對交通的影響。例如使用快硬混凝土或預製混凝土組件，能大大縮短或免除修復混凝土路面所需的時間，從而縮短佔用路面的時間；使用熱能修路機，有助在晚間較寧靜地為繁忙道路修復瀝青路面。此外，以無坑技術進行公用事業設施工程，可免除開挖路面的需要。

## **4. 總結**

4.1 為了本港的發展和市民的生活福祉，道路工程在所難免。不過，道路工程的確會佔用路面空間，很多時甚至影響交通。為此，政府設有完善的挖掘准許證機制，以協調各項道路工程，盡量減少對交通所造成的影響。另外，在工地情況許可下，政府會繼續應用新技術，盡量減輕道路工程對交通的影響。





## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Safety of Franchised Bus Operations**

### **Purpose**

This paper briefs Members on the measures to enhance safety of franchised bus operations.

### **Bus Safety**

2. The total number of accidents which involved franchised buses slightly decreased from 1,772 in 2004 to 1,735 in 2005. This implies a decrease in the number of fatal and serious accidents from 311 to 264 and an increase of slight accidents<sup>1</sup> from 1,461 to 1,471. Whilst franchised buses run high mileage daily, the accident rate per million vehicle-kilometre decreased slightly from 3.162 in 2004 to 3.158 in 2005.

3. There were recent incidents such as broken window glasses and traffic accidents involving franchised buses which arouse public concerns on bus safety and bus maintenance requirement. Concerns such as better protection for passengers from broken window glasses and installation of seat belts have been raised.

### **Measures to Enhance Bus Safety**

4. The Transport Department (“TD”) monitors the operation of franchised bus services and maintenance of the buses in accordance with the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“PBSO”), Cap.230, and the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap.374, and their Regulations. Safety is one of the major areas that TD would have particular concern.

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<sup>1</sup> A slight accident is one in which one or more persons is injured but not to the extent that detention in hospital is required for more than 12 hours. Serious accident involves injury to any person who is hospitalized for more than 12 hours. Fatal accidents refer to an accident causing death to any person within 30 days.

5. Measures to ensure the safety of franchised bus operation have been developed over the years and proved to be effective in ensuring bus safety. These measures are outlined from paragraphs 6 to 14 below.

A. Vehicle inspection and examination

6. The Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, Cap. 374A, stipulates the requirement of design and construction of franchised bus. Every new model of franchised bus has to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements before the buses can be registered and licensed for use on the road. The type approval includes a tilt test to ensure stability of the bus.

7. Under PBSO, Cap. 230, the franchised bus operators are required to carry out maintenance and repair as the Commissioner for Transport may specify. Every franchised bus has to undergo annual examination to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor the proper maintenance of the buses. TD closely monitors the franchised bus operators' maintenance programmes and hold regular meetings with them to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, to formulate actions to enhance bus safety.

B. Safety equipment and facilities

8. The franchised bus operators are encouraged to introduce new safety technology on their buses including speed limiter and blackbox<sup>2</sup>. About 3,000 franchised buses (or 51% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with blackboxes and the bus operators have agreed to retrofit the equipment to the existing and new buses. About 5,800 franchised buses (or 99% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with speed limiting devices and all bus companies have agreed to

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<sup>2</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operation data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and accident investigation.

include the device as standard equipment for buses to be purchased.

9. All the 5,883 franchised buses are equipped with handholds for seated and standing passengers. Majority of the fleet is also equipped with other facilities and equipment to enhance passenger safety such as high back seat and non-slippery floor. About 2,000 franchised buses (or 34% of the total number of franchised buses) are equipped with seatbelt at the exposed seats<sup>3</sup>.

### C. Bus driver training and safety education

10. Franchised bus operators provide various trainings to their drivers, including basic training for new drivers and annual refresher and enhancement courses to serving drivers to enhance their safety awareness:

- (a) Basic trainings for new drivers range from a few days to a few weeks – the programmes cover classroom and on-the-road training which include company rules and code of practice, bus and facilities operation, bus driving techniques such as maneuvering and driving responses and manner on road, and route training and driving practices.
- (b) Refresher and enhancement courses for serving drivers are provided to -
  - (i) strengthen their driving skills and manners (including defensive driving);
  - (ii) help them to understand the potential risks of the routes they serve, e.g. the location of accident black spots and the appropriate reaction including emergency situation handling; and
  - (iii) introduce safety tips.

(c) Franchised bus companies also remind their drivers on safe

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<sup>3</sup> Exposed seats are forward facing seats in a franchised bus which are not immediately behind another forward-facing seat or an internal partition/panel. There are usually 14 exposed seats in a double deck bus: 5 seats at last row on lower deck, 4 seats at third row facing backward-facing seats on lower deck, 4 seats at first row on upper deck and the middle seat at last row on upper deck

driving through regular issue of circulars, notices and in-house magazines.

11. Since 2002, TD has conducted at least four “Road Safety Seminars” for franchised bus drivers per year since 2002 in collaboration with the Police. Road safety experts are invited to highlight tips on safe driving, analyze major accident spots and common contributory factors of bus accidents to share with the bus drivers so as to promote their road safety awareness and proper driving behavior.

12. TD also organizes “Road Safety Forum for Franchised Bus” regularly with all franchised bus operators and the Police to examine the trend of bus accidents, identify major problem areas and formulate improvement measures.

13. To ensure that bus drivers have sufficient rest time, TD reviewed with the franchised bus companies the working schedule of their drivers and issued a set of guidelines on working schedule for bus drivers to franchised bus operators. The guidelines specify the maximum duty length, the maximum driving duty duration as well as the breaks to be provided to drivers during their duty shift and between working days. The franchised bus operators fully comply with the Guidelines according to their quarterly reports to TD.

#### D. Publicity on passenger safety

14. More than 50% of franchised bus accidents involved passengers being injured even the buses had not collided with any other vehicles, objects or pedestrians. Many of these accidents could have been avoided if passengers held tight the handrail while standing or sat properly. To remind passengers to be careful when using bus services, franchised bus operators have put in place publicity programmes through bus body advertisements and on-bus televisions. TD also produces television and radio announcements in the public interest (“APIs”) to promote passenger safety awareness with a view to helping reduce bus accidents. For instance, API was produced in 2001 and 2004 to remind passenger safety

precautions inside a franchised bus. A publicity programme was launched in June 2006. This includes broadcasting of APIs on television, radio and on-bus television, and display of notices and stickers at bus passenger shelters, bus customer service centres and inside bus compartments to remind passengers to hold handrail tightly inside moving buses.

## **Bus Windows**

15. Reg. 28 of the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations, Cap. 374A, stipulates that glass or transparent material used in all windscreens, windows and partitions of a motor vehicle shall be safety glass or safety glazing and of a type approved by the Commissioner for Transport. The standards of windscreens and windows, are specified in the Specification of Safety Glass Notice, Cap. 374H. The two basic types of automotive glass commonly used on franchised buses are laminated safety glass<sup>4</sup> and toughened (tempered) safety glass<sup>5</sup>, both of which can reduce injury when being broken.

16. The driver's windscreens on franchised buses in Hong Kong are laminated glass to prevent the driver's vision from being seriously affected when the glass is broken. Side windows are usually constructed with toughened glass which can be broken to allow passengers to escape in case of accident or emergence.

17. In view of the recent incidents involving broken window glasses on franchised buses, TD in conjunction with bus operators are conducting feasibility study of adhering an anti-shatter protective film on the upper deck windscreen made of toughened glass to give better protection to passengers in case the glasses are broken.

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<sup>4</sup> Laminated glass has a plastic interlayer in between 2 glass layers, and is designed to retain the fragments when the glass is shattered.

<sup>5</sup> Toughened glass is glass that has been heat-treated to increase its strength, and to allow it to fracture into small pieces when broken



## **Seatbelt on Franchised Bus**

18. Under Road Traffic (Safety Equipment) Regulations , Cap.374 F, it is a mandatory requirement to provide seat belt for the driver of a franchised bus. As regards the passenger seats, about 34% of franchised buses have been equipped with seatbelt at exposed seats. These seatbelts had been installed by the bus manufacturers as standard equipment when the buses were purchased. All franchised bus operators have committed that new buses to be purchased by them will have seatbelts installed at the exposed seats. In the light of recent traffic accidents, TD has been reviewing with the franchised bus operators on retrofitting of seat belts on the existing buses, taking into account of the technical difficulties such as the structural strength of the seats, adequate anchorage points and design of the bus, etc.

19. We have conducted a research on overseas practices regarding the fitting and wearing of seat belts in buses. A summary of the corresponding seat belt requirements is at Annex. It can be seen that no overseas country requires fitting of seat belts in passenger seats of buses designed for urban use or for carrying standing passengers. Studies conducted in Australia and Canada indicated that the additional safety benefit of installing seat belt on all seats in a bus might not be as great as envisaged and that it is very difficult to ensure that all passengers will use seatbelts.

20. In view of the above, we consider that it is not appropriate to introduce mandatory requirements for installation and wearing of passenger seat belts for franchised buses. However, we will continue to work with the franchised bus operators to identify measures for better protection of passenger safety.

21. TD will, together with the franchised bus operators, continue to closely monitor the accident statistics, analyse causes and trends of bus accidents, and explore improvement measures to enhance bus safety.

### **Advice Sought**

22. Members are invited to note and give comments on the paper.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
Transport Department  
October 2006



### **Summary of Seat Belt Requirements for Buses in Overseas Countries**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Fitting of Seat Belts in Passenger Seats</b>	<b>Wearing of Seat Belts by Passengers</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
USA	No	N/A	
Canada	No	N/A	
United Kingdom	3-point/ lap-belt <sup>(1)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements are not applicable to buses first used before 1.10.2001 or buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
Australia (Victoria)	Lap-belt <sup>(2)(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to buses specially designed with spaces for standing passengers.
New Zealand	No	N/A	
Netherlands	Lap-belt <sup>(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to public transport buses.
Singapore	No	N/A	

**Notes :** (1) Lap belts may only be fitted in forward facing non-exposed seats where an appropriate energy absorbing seat or surface is present in front.

(2) Seat belts are to be provided for exposed seats.

(3) Lap-belt is the minimum requirement.

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## INFORMATION NOTE

### Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in selected overseas places

#### 1. Background

1.1 At the meeting of the Panel on Transport on 28 January 2008, the Panel discussed safety issues relating to passengers standing on buses operating on expressways. During the deliberations, Members asked the Government to review whether passengers should be allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in Hong Kong, and requested the Research and Library Services Division (RLSD) to conduct a research on whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways in overseas places, and measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers.

1.2 Against this background, enquiries were sent to the major cities of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and Singapore.<sup>1</sup> As at the publication of this information note, Queensland of Australia, Wellington of New Zealand, Toronto and Vancouver of Canada, San Francisco of the United States, and Singapore have responded to RLSD's enquiries. The findings are presented in the Tables below.

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<sup>1</sup> Enquiries were sent to the relevant government departments in New South Wales and Queensland of Australia, Auckland and Wellington of New Zealand, Toronto and Vancouver of Canada, London of the United Kingdom, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco of the United States, and Singapore.

**Table 1 – Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways**

	<b>Australia</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Canada</b>		<b>United States</b>	<b>Singapore</b>
	<b>Queensland</b>	<b>Wellington</b>	<b>Toronto</b>	<b>Vancouver</b>	<b>San Francisco</b>	
Whether passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p> <p>However, according to Section 12 of the Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Standard 2000, there are two circumstances restricting passengers standing on buses:</p> <p>(a) no passengers are allowed to stand for more than 20 km; and</p> <p>(b) the roads the buses may travel on should not be in a steep environment.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p> <p>For bus services across municipal boundaries, there is a regulation that the total number of standing passengers should not be more than one-third of the total number of seats available on a bus. However, this regulation does not apply to bus services which mainly operate within the boundary of Toronto.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>	<p>Yes, passengers are allowed to stand on buses operating on expressways.</p>

**Table 2 – Measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers**

	Australia	New Zealand	Canada		United States	Singapore
	Queensland	Wellington	Toronto	Vancouver	San Francisco	
Measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers	The buses must be equipped with suitable handholds, have sufficient aisle width to carry standing passengers, and must not be overloaded.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  According to the Wellington Regional Transport, overall safety would be improved as the bus fleet would be replaced with more modern vehicles.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  According to the Toronto Transit Commission, there are no additional safety measures, and the number of safety incidents involving passengers standing on buses operating on expressways in Toronto is small.	According to Section 9 of the Passenger Transportation Regulation:  (a) the buses should be equipped with a sufficient number of handholds, straps, rails or other equipment to provide support for the number of standing passengers authorized; and  (b) the vision or movement of the bus drivers should not be impaired in any way by the standing passengers.	No information is available on measures taken to address the safety of standing passengers.  According to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, no safety incidents involving passengers standing on buses operating on expressways have been reported in recent years.	There are handstraps and stanchion poles provided for standing passengers to hold on while travelling on buses.  In addition, the bus drivers must observe the speed limit imposed on the buses.

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## **For Information**

### **Legislative Council Panel on Transport Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

#### **PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the progress in the pursuit of measures to further enhance safety of franchised bus operation.

#### **BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed on 24 October 2006 (LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07(03)) on measures to enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration was asked to update the Panel in three months’ time on the progress of the following safety measures –

- (a) retrofitting seatbelt on franchised bus;
- (b) enhancing the standard of bus windscreen on upper deck;
- (c) installation of black box on franchised bus;
- (d) working schedule for bus captains;
- (e) promoting health of bus captains; and
- (f) employing bus captains under contract term.

#### **LATEST DEVELOPMENT**

##### ***(a) Retrofitting seatbelt on franchised bus***

3. As at November 2006, out of the 5,862 franchised buses, 2,122 buses have seatbelts at their exposed seats<sup>1</sup>. The Transport Department (“TD”) sought the advice of Alexander-Dennis Limited (“ADL”), the major bus body builder which supplied most of the franchised buses in Hong Kong, on the

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<sup>1</sup> Exposed seats are forward facing seats in a franchised bus which are not immediately behind another forward-facing seat or an internal partition/panel. There are usually 14 exposed seats in a double deck bus: 5 seats at last row on lower deck; 4 seats at third row facing backward-facing seats on lower deck; 4 seats at first row on upper deck; and the middle seat at last row on upper deck.

feasibility of retrofitting seatbelts on the existing buses. Their initial assessment regarding retrofitting of the seatbelts on the bus constructed before 1997, which constituted about 50% of the bus fleet, is summarized as follows –

- (a) A number of the older buses were produced by manufacturers who are no longer in operation, e.g. Walter Alexander and Duple Metsec. There may not be complete information on the detailed design of these buses, thus hampering technical analysis on the feasibility of retrofitting works;
- (b) There are some 30 different types of buses, each requiring extensive redesign and destructive physical testing. The cost for evaluation and redesign of one model of bus would be roughly \$3.4M per design. Assuming all information is readily available, it would take around 18 months for the design analysis before modification work can commence;
- (c) Modification work would be required to strengthen the structure of the buses to support the additional loading from the seatbelt mountings, which is substantial and costly, i.e. about \$150,000 per bus. Modification to each bus would take about four weeks to complete; and
- (d) The age of the pre-1997 buses is already 10 years or above. It is likely that their structures have undergone modifications and repairs during their service life. If seatbelts are to be retrofitted to the structures, the condition of each and every bus has to be assessed and repaired individually beforehand. The cost is likely to be very considerable.

ADL is still exploring the feasibility of retrofitting seatbelts on the post-1997 buses without seatbelts.

4. We have collected information from other countries on the requirements of fitting and fastening of seatbelts on buses. So far, we have not found any country that have legal requirements for the provision of seatbelts on passenger seats of buses designed for urban use and are allowed to carry standing passengers. According to the transport authorities of these countries,



the benefit of imposing a seatbelt requirement in their buses is uncertain. A summary of the findings is at **Annex I**.

***(b) Enhancing the standard of bus windscreen on upper deck***

5. The franchised bus companies and TD have carried out tests of the upper deck toughened glass<sup>2</sup> windscreens of the franchised buses and concluded that applying a transparent protective film onto the glass would effectively contain the shattered glass fragments in the event of an accident. This will help protect passengers from potential injury. All franchised bus companies which have double-deck buses have agreed to complete the modification work on the upper deck toughened glass windscreens of all existing buses or replace them with laminated glass<sup>3</sup> by mid 2008.

***(c) Installation of black box on franchised bus***

6. The franchised bus companies have been installing black boxes<sup>4</sup> on their buses to monitor the driving behaviour of their bus captains. New Lantao Bus Company (1973) Limited ("NLB") has completed installation to its entire fleet in March 2006. As for the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") and Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW"), about 75% (or 3,033 buses) of KMB's fleet and 94% (or 144 buses) of LW's fleet have been installed with black boxes as at November 2006. The two bus companies will complete installation of black boxes on their fleets by end 2007. Citybus Limited ("CTB") and New World First Bus Services Limited ("NWFB") are conducting trials on two different types of black boxes on 100 buses. CTB will complete installation of black boxes to its entire fleet by end of 2007, while NWFB would formulate the detailed installation plan taking account of the result of the trial.

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<sup>2</sup> Toughened glass is glass that has been heat-treated to increase its strength, and to allow it to fracture into small pieces when broken.

<sup>3</sup> Laminated glass has a plastic interlayer in between two glass layers, and is designed to retain the fragments when the glass is shattered.

<sup>4</sup> Electronic tachograph installed on vehicles is commonly known as "black box". It records the operation data of the vehicle, such as journey speed, journey time, distance travelled, bus tilting angle, acceleration and deceleration, door opening, etc. It can be used for monitoring the drivers' performance and accident investigation.

***(d) Working schedule for bus captains***

Rest time between trips

7. The franchised bus companies schedule the working and rest time of bus captains based on the “Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers” issued by TD. Copy of the Guidelines is at **Annex II**. All franchised bus companies adopt the following principles to improve the bus captains’ scheduling arrangements –

- (a) review from time to time the driving duties taking account of the traffic situation to ensure that bus captains will have sufficient time to operate the bus trips, and have rest and meal breaks;
- (b) carefully consider the preferences of individual bus captains in assigning driving duties to them; and
- (c) give sufficient notice to bus captains before changing their driving duties.

8. Regarding breaks between trips, bus companies normally provide longer rest-breaks for routes with longer journey time, and will spread out the rest-breaks throughout the day as evenly as practicable. In practice, the length of rest-break is set at around 10% of the scheduled journey time of a bus route. Since the actual journey time of bus trips varies with traffic condition, the companies would deploy extra buses to cater for serious traffic congestion, special traffic incidents and ad hoc break-down of vehicles. This will help maintain the scheduled service timetable and allow the bus captains to have reasonable rest time between trips. The companies also review and adjust the scheduled journey time of the bus routes from time to time, taking into account the traffic conditions, passenger demand as well as the feedback from bus captains, regulators and driver unions.

9. The three major franchised bus companies i.e. KMB, CTB and NWFB operate many bus routes in the urban area where the traffic condition is more variable and sometimes unpredictable. These three companies conducted a survey on the actual between-trip rest-break time of their bus captains recently. About 64,000 bus trips were operated daily by the three companies during the survey period. The survey found that bus captains had rest-breaks of five

minutes or more between trips in 72% of the trips (46,000 trips) and had rest-breaks of two minutes or more between trips in 90% of the trips (57,800 trips). While the companies had arranged the bus captains to take rest-break as far as possible, TD has urged the companies concerned to review the scheduled journey time of the relevant bus routes and to propose realistic adjustments where appropriate.

#### Travelling time to and from work

10. The bus companies have implemented measures to shorten their bus captains' travelling time to and from work. According to KMB and LW, most of their bus captains live within the districts where their bus depots are situated. The companies operate crew buses to carry bus captains to and from depots and bus termini. In case a bus captain moves to other district, he/she may apply for transfer from one depot to another. The two bus companies did not have any outstanding application for transferal from the bus captains as at end November 2006. As for other bus companies, to facilitate bus captains travelling to and from work, CTB and NWFB provide crew bus to their bus captains, whereas NLB provides quarters for bus captains who live in a distant district.

#### ***(e) Promoting health of bus captains***

11. Apart from providing appropriate schedule arrangements for bus captains, to reduce the stress felt by bus captains while on driving duties, the franchised bus companies have been providing them with regular training and refresher courses to improve their driving skill and behaviour. They also regularly review the contents of their training courses in the light of changing traffic environment, passenger requirement, and accident occurrence. In addition, they also facilitate their bus captains in attending the safety courses and forums organized by TD and the Police.

12. All franchised bus companies provide medical care for their employees. In addition to medical treatment and paid sick leave, CTB, NWFB and NLB have been providing annual medical examination for their bus captains aged 50 or above whereas KMB/LW have been providing examination to bus captains aged 60 or above. After consultation with the drivers' unions,

KMB and LW will also provide annual medical examination for their bus captains aged 50 or above with effect from 2007.

13. In addition to the above, the franchised bus companies regularly organize recreational activities such as picnics, hikings and football matches, etc. for their employees in order heighten their awareness of the importance of maintaining a proper work-life balance. They also arrange seminars and counselling service for their bus captains to help them maintain a healthy physical and mental life. In 2007, KMB/LW will launch an Employee Caring Program which will provide counselling services, health talks, stress management tips and family days to their employees and CTB/NWFB will continue to organise Fun Day, etc. TD considers that the health-care services, training and other work-balance activities provided by the franchised bus companies are generally adequate and comprehensive in helping their bus captains to achieve proper work-life balance.

*(f) Employing bus captains under contract term*

14. KMB/LW and CTB/NWFB started to employ new bus captains on contract terms since 2000 and 2003 respectively after consultation with their trade and driver unions. Contract terms range from one to two years and the bus companies advise that 99% of the contracts are renewed on expiry. The number of contract bus captains in the bus companies as at December 2006 is as follows –

<b>Company*</b>	<b>Total no. of bus captains</b>	<b>No. of bus captains under contract terms</b>	<b>% of bus captains under contract terms</b>
KMB	8,170	1,920	23.5%
CTB	2,088	96	4.6%
NWFB	1,668	82	4.9%
LW	331	53	16%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,257</b>	<b>2,151</b>	<b>17.5%</b>

\* NLB has no contract bus captains.

15. KMB has the highest percentage of bus companies employed under contract terms. The company has analysed the accident rates of non-contract

and contract bus captains and a summary of the analysis is at **Annex III**. The findings do not show evidence that the contract bus captains have a higher accident rate than the non-contract bus captains.

16. TD will, together with the franchised bus operators, continue to closely monitor the accident statistics, analyse causes and trends of bus accidents, and explore improvement measures to further enhance bus safety.

#### **ADVICE SOUGHT**

17. Members are requested to note the contents of this paper.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
Transport Department  
January 2007

**Summary of Seat Belt Requirements in Buses in some Overseas Countries**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Fitting of seatbelts in passenger seats</b>	<b>Wearing of seatbelts by passengers</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
USA	No	N/A	-
Canada	No	N/A	-
UK	3-point/ lap-belt <sup>(1)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements are not applicable to buses first used before 1.10.2001 or buses designed for urban use with standing passengers.
Australia (Victoria)	Lap-belt <sup>(2)(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to buses specially designed with spaces for standing passengers.
New Zealand	No	N/A	-
Netherlands	Lap-belt <sup>(3)</sup>	Mandatory	Fitting requirements not applicable to public transport buses.
Singapore	No	N/A	-

**Notes:**

1. Lap belts may only be fitted in forward facing non-exposed seats where an appropriate energy absorbing seat or surface is present in front.
2. Seat belts are to be provided for exposed seats.
3. Lap-belt is the minimum requirement.

**Guidelines on Working Schedule for Bus Drivers**

(Revised on 1 May 2004)

- Guideline A – Drivers should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the drivers should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes.
- Guideline B – Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.
- Guideline C – Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.
- Guideline D – Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.

**KMB's Analysis of Bus Accident Rates of  
Contract and Non-contract Bus Captains**

All KMB bus captains employed before 2000 were not on contract terms, while those employed since 2000 were on contract term. In 2005, KMB compared the accident rates of the contract and non-contract bus captains.

2. As bus driving experience is one of the factors of bus accidents, KMB analysed the accident data of bus captains with less than 24 months bus driving experience in the periods 1998-1999 and 2002-2004. The accident records of two groups of bus captains were analysed:

- (a) those with less than 24 months experience in years 1998 and 1999.  
All of them were not on contract term; and
- (b) those with less than 24 months experience in years 2002 to 2004<sup>1</sup>.  
All of them were on contract term.

3. The findings are summarized below -

		<b>Drivers employed under non- contract terms</b>		<b>Drivers employed under contract terms</b>		
<b>Year</b>		<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
(a)	No. of accidents involving bus captains with experience less than 24 months	307	274	160	99	76
(b)	Average no. of bus captains with experience less than 24 months	1,377	1,395	1,155	834	609
(c)	Accident rate per bus captains (a / b)	0.223	0.196	0.139	0.119	0.125

4. The above findings do not show that KMB's contract bus captains had higher accident rates than the non-contract ones.

<sup>1</sup> Accident records of Years 2000 and 2001 were not used because in these two years, some of the bus captains with less than 24 months bus driving experience were on contract term and some were on non-contract term.



**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**  
**Progress on Measures to Enhance Safety of Franchised Bus Operation**

**PURPOSE**

This paper updates Members on the progress of measures implement to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation.

**BACKGROUND**

2. The Legislative Council Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) was briefed on 24 October 2006 (LC Paper No. CB(1)110/06-07(03)), 2 March 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(1)783/06-07(01)) and 23 March 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(1) 1149/06-07(03)) on measures to further enhance the safety of franchised bus operation. The Administration was asked to update the Panel on the progress of the following actions –

- (a) review on the retrofitting of seat belt on franchised buses;
- (b) review on requiring passengers to wear seat belts where provided;
- (c) review on the working hours of bus captains; and
- (d) other improvement measures to further enhance bus safety.

3. The Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A) stipulates the requirement for the design and construction of franchised bus. All franchised buses that provide services to passengers must meet the safety requirements of the legislation and pass Transport Department’s (“TD”) stringent inspections. Every new model of franchised buses has to undergo a type approval process by TD to ensure that its design and construction comply with the requirements before the buses can be registered and licensed for use on the road. The type approval process includes a tilt test to ensure stability of the bus. Every franchised bus has to undergo an annual examination by TD to ensure its safety and roadworthiness. TD also conducts random spot checks on franchised buses to monitor their proper maintenance. The buses are kept roadworthy by the companies’ own servicing and maintenance programmes. TD closely monitors the franchised bus companies’ maintenance programmes and holds regular meetings with them to discuss bus examination results and, where appropriate, formulate actions to enhance bus safety.

## **LATEST DEVELOPMENT ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE BUS SAFETY**

### **(a) Review on retrofitting of seat belts on franchised buses**

4. In the light of concerns raised by Panel Members, the franchised bus companies have sought expert advice on the need for, and the feasibility of, retrofitting seat belt on their fleets to further enhance passenger safety on double deck buses. The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”), Citybus Limited (“CTB”) and New World First Bus Services Limited (“NWFB”) jointly appointed a major bus manufacturer to carry out a comprehensive study on the bus structure design and the feasibility of retrofitting seat belts. The major findings of the study are as follows -

- (a) The bus manufacturer confirmed that the buses designed for use in Hong Kong are safe and meet the most stringent specifications. The bus body structure has undergone all kinds of stringent tests adopted by the bus manufacturing industry including simulation loading test, physical stress test, accelerated durability test and tilt test before that type of bus is put into service. Their buses of the same designs have been widely used in many places in the world for over 30 years with excellent safety and reliability record.

#### **(b) Pre-1997 design double deck buses**

Retrofitting seat belt on bus types designed before 1997 is not feasible nor cost effective on the following grounds -

- these buses were not designed to have seat belts. If seat belts are to be retro-fitted to these buses, extensive disassembly and rebuilding of the bus body structure would be required so as to provide sufficient structural strength for anchoring the seat belts. Given that the bus was not designed for this process, the modification work might cause significant disturbance to bus components and hence reduce the vehicle reliability.
- There are approximately 29 different bus types which were designed before 1997. If seat belts are to be retrofitted to these buses, each bus type has to be evaluated and tested individually to accommodate the

seat belt configuration. The time required for redesigning each bus type would be about 20 months and the work cannot be done concurrently due to the limitation of resource and facilities. The redesign cost for each bus type of the pre-1997 design would be around HK\$ 4.3 million (or \$124.7 millions for all the 29 types).

(c) Post-1997 design double deck bus

It would be technically feasible to retrofit seat belts to the four exposed seats at the front row directly behind the windscreen on the upper deck without significant redesign and strengthening work as the structure of most post-1997 design buses has been reinforced in this area to take possible seat belt fitment.

- (d) There will be technical difficulty to retrofit a seat belt on the single exposed seat facing the aisle at the back on the upper deck. If a seat belt is to be provided for this seat, extensive disassembly, rework, and reassembly will be required in order to anchor the seat belt to the vehicle structure. The work is not cost effective. In the most common head-on accidents, the crash force usually comes from the front and its impact on this seat would have been greatly reduced by the absorbing effect of the body structure.
- (e) There would be little benefit to retrofit seat belts on the other seats on the upper deck of the post-1997 design buses. Passengers are effectively seated in a cell contained fore-and-aft by the seat and a bulkhead of the high back seat in front. The compartmentalisation effect already provides adequate containment to passengers against being thrown forward.
- (f) To retrofit seat belts to the seats in the lower deck would require extensive redesigning and strengthening of the body structure in order to have adequate mounting points for the seat belts. Notwithstanding the costly and extensive work required, the work may affect the integrity of the bus structure. These seats are all behind the front axle of the vehicle and so passengers are protected against direct impact in the event of a head-on collision. By the time the crash force reaches the back of the bus, it would have been greatly

reduced by the energy absorbing effect of its structure.

5. TD and the bus companies have examined the idea of banning the use of the four exposed seats without seat belts at the first row of the upper deck of buses operating on expressways. As pointed out in paragraph 3 above, all franchised buses which provide services meet the safety requirements of the legislation. All these buses are capable of providing safe service under normal operation and there is no justification to ban the use of the four seats at the first row of the upper deck even they are not fitted with seat belts. Furthermore, if the four seats are not used, the carrying capacity would be reduced, resulting in either a reduction in the level of service, or more buses have to be added to these routes with cost implications.

#### Recommendation on retrofitting of seat belts on franchised buses

6. Taking into account the professional advice of the bus manufacturer, we recommend the following measures to further enhance bus safety:

- (a) to retrofit seat belt at the four seats on the first row on the upper deck of post-1997 design buses. The feedback from the franchised bus companies is positive and work can be completed in 24 months;
- (b) to install/add handrail, armrest or other facilities where appropriate for the other exposed seats to further enhance passenger safety during sharp acceleration/deceleration;
- (c) to install an additional horizontal guard rail across the upper deck windscreen of pre-1997 design buses for further protection to the front seat passengers. The feedback from the franchised bus companies is positive and installation can be completed in 18 months;
- (d) to accord priority to the retrofitting of seat belt or installation of the additional guard rail on buses which operate on expressways;
- (e) to examine with the bus companies advancement of vehicle replacement programme to replace the old buses earlier as far as their financial situation permits; and

- (f) to ensure that new buses purchased by bus companies will have seat belts on all exposed seats.

**(b) Requiring passengers to wear seat belts where provided**

7. TD conducted a preliminary passenger survey in May 2007<sup>1</sup> to gauge the views of bus passengers on the wearing of seat belt. The findings revealed that majority of the respondents agreed to mandating wearing of seat belt where it is available.

8. We note that no overseas countries require fitting of seat belts on passenger seats of buses designed for urban use or for carrying standing passengers. There are also practical difficulties for imposing such requirement on buses deployed on urban bus routes or buses that allow standing passengers. The enforcement of such requirement by the Police on franchised buses is much more difficult than on public light buses since passengers can stand or move around in a bus even when the bus is in motion<sup>2</sup>. That said, we have an open mind and will be prepared to consider making wearing of seat belts if fitted on franchised buses a legislative requirement as and when the majority of franchised buses are fitted with seat belts for the exposed seats on the first row on the upper deck.

9. In the meantime, we will continue to encourage bus passengers to wear seat belt where provided through education and publicity. We have prepared a new version of TV Announcement of Public Interest (“API”) to promote safe use of bus service, including the wearing of seat belts where provided, and this will be launched in July this year.

**(c) Review on working hours of bus captains**

10. To ensure that bus drivers have sufficient rest time, TD issued “Guidelines on Working Schedule for Franchised Bus Drivers”<sup>3</sup> (“the

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<sup>1</sup> The preliminary survey was a household-based telephone questionnaire survey involving 2,221 successful respondents.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, a passenger caught failing to wear a seat belt may have a defence that he was just about to stand and leave the seat for alighting the bus at the coming bus stop.

<sup>3</sup> Guideline A - Captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes.  
 Guideline B - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours.  
 Guideline C - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours.  
 Guideline D - Break between successive working days should not be less than 9 hours.

Guidelines”) to the bus companies. The franchised bus companies fully comply with the Guidelines as reflected in their quarterly reports. As a monitoring process, TD conducted a survey in May 2007 on the bus captains of 42 bus routes operated by KMB, CTB and NWFB to assess the compliance rate. The findings confirm that all bus companies comply with the Guidelines and no discrepancies have been noticed. On average, the bus captains have total service breaks of 30 minutes within the 6-hour duty, which is more than the minimum of 20 minutes as stipulated in the Guidelines.

11. The survey also found that a typical bus captain drive about 8 hours during his working period. All bus captains surveyed have rest time of 20 minutes or more during their 6-hour duty. The survey findings also reveal that the bus companies follow the principle of setting service breaks at about 10% of the journey time of a bus route.

12. TD, in conjunction with the franchised bus companies, reviewed the existing Guidelines and identified room to enhancing the rest time of bus captains. As revision of the Guideline would affect the scheduling of shifts which in turn may affect the working hours and shift arrangements of the bus captains, the bus captain unions were consulted. Taking into account of views of the bus captain unions and bus companies, the following revisions to the Guidelines have been made -

- (a) Guideline A stipulates that bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after six hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes. While maintaining this requirement, it is further refined to stipulate that a rest time of at least 12 minutes in total should be within the first four hours of the duty; and
- (b) Guideline D on the break period between successive working days would be revised from the current 9 hours to no less than 9.5 hours.

13. The bus captain unions support the above revision. The revised Guidelines incorporating the recommended revisions are at **Annex**.

**(d) Other improvement measures to further enhance bus safety**

Bus captain training

14. While the design, construction and maintenance of a bus are important factors ensuring the provision of safe franchised bus service, it is considered that the driving skill and behaviour of the bus captains are equally important. The franchised bus companies have been providing various training programmes to their bus captains including -

- (a) Basic training for new bus captains - All new recruits are required to attend training programmes which include desktop training and on-the-road training. These training programmes last from a few days to a few weeks, aiming to introduce to new bus captains the importance of safe driving, skills and techniques in preventing accidents and handling emergencies, defensive driving techniques, and customer service etc.
- (b) Enhancement / refresh training for serving bus captains - All franchised bus companies have pledged to providing each serving bus captains at least one enhancement / refresher training course every three years. The refresher training aims to enhance the bus captains' defensive driving skills, update them on new driving rules and legislations, draw to their attention accident black spots, and instill on them the importance of safe driving.
- (c) Remedial training - These are tailor-made training courses arranged on a need basis for bus captains.

15. In addition, TD, in collaboration with the Police, other experts, and the bus companies, conduct at least four "Road Safety Seminars" annually for the bus captains. Road safety experts are invited to introduce to the bus captains the latest safety driving techniques and contributory factors to traffic accidents so as to promote safety awareness and proper driving behaviours.

16. Apart from the various training programmes already provided for the bus captains, the bus companies will introduce new driving training programmes later this year. KMB will launch their computer-oriented driving simulator machines to bus captains in July this year. The new training

simulator will sharpen bus captains' reactions when facing emergency situations. CTB and NWFB will revise their training syllabus, putting more emphasis on improving driving behaviour with a view to reducing the "passenger loss balance" accidents inside bus compartment.

#### Publicity on bus safety

17. More than 50% of franchised bus accidents involving passengers injured do not involve collision between the buses concerned and other vehicles, objects or pedestrians. Many of these accidents could have been avoided if passengers sat properly or held the handrail tightly while standing. To remind passengers to be careful when using bus services, franchised bus companies have launched publicity programmes through bus body advertisements, on-bus televisions or other media. TD also produced television and radio APIs to promote passenger safety awareness to reduce bus accidents in 2001, 2004 and 2006. A new API will be launched in July to remind passengers to use bus service safely.

Transport and Housing Bureau  
Transport Department  
July 2007



**Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours**

(Revised in July 2007)

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Guideline A | - Bus captains should have a break of at least 30 minutes after 6 hours of duty and within that 6-hour duty, the bus captains should have total service breaks of at least 20 minutes of which no less than 12 minutes should be within the first 4 hours of the duty. |
| Guideline B | - Maximum duty (including all breaks) should not exceed 14 hours in a day.   |
| Guideline C | - Driving duty (i.e. maximum duty minus all breaks of 30 minutes or more) should not exceed 11 hours in a day.   |
| Guideline D | - Break between successive working days should not be less than 9.5 hours.   |

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(4)1441/17-18  
(These minutes have been seen by  
the Administration)

Ref : CB4/PL/TP/1

**Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of special meeting held on  
Thursday, 15 February 2018, at 10:45 am  
in Conference Room 1 of the Legislative Council Complex**

**Members present :** Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, SBS, JP (Chairman)  
Hon LAM Cheuk-ting (Deputy Chairman)  
Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, GBS, JP  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan, BBS, JP  
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon Claudia MO  
Hon Steven HO Chun-yin, BBS  
Hon YIU Si-wing, BBS  
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP  
Hon CHAN Chi-chuen  
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki  
Dr Hon Fernando CHEUNG Chiu-hung  
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, BBS, JP  
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-kwok, SBS, MH, JP  
Hon Alvin YEUNG  
Hon Andrew WAN Siu-kin  
Hon CHU Hoi-dick  
Hon HO Kai-ming  
Hon CHAN Chun-ying  
Hon LUK Chung-hung  
Hon LAU Kwok-fan, MH  
Hon Kenneth LAU Ip-keung, BBS, MH, JP

Dr Hon CHENG Chung-tai  
Hon Jeremy TAM Man-ho

**Members attending :** Hon James TO Kun-sun  
Dr Hon Priscilla LEUNG Mei-fun, SBS, JP  
Dr Hon CHANG Lai-wan, JP  
Hon Holden CHOW Ho-ding

**Members absent :** Hon WONG Kwok-kin, SBS, JP  
Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP  
Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP  
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH  
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP  
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, SBS, MH, JP  
Dr Hon Helena WONG Pik-wan  
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH  
Hon CHUNG Kwok-pan  
Dr Hon Junius HO Kwan-yiu, JP  
Hon Wilson OR Chong-shing, MH  
Hon Tanya CHAN  
Hon KWONG Chun-yu

**Public Officers attending :** **Agenda item I**  
  
Mr Frank CHAN, JP  
Secretary for Transport and Housing  
  
Ms Mable CHAN, JP  
Commissioner for Transport  
  
Mr Kevin CHOI, JP  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport) 2  
  
Miss Rachel KWAN  
Assistant Commissioner for Transport/  
Bus & Railway

Mr Tony YAU  
Chief Engineer/ Road Safety & Standards  
Transport Department

**Attendance by invitation :** **Agenda item I**

The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited

Mr Norman LEUNG  
Chairman

Mr Roger LEE  
Managing Director

Mr Godwin SO  
General Manager - Corporate Planning & Business  
Development

Mr LEUNG Kin-wang  
Operations Director

Mr Patrick PANG  
General Manager (Depots)

**Clerk in attendance :** Mr Lemuel WOO  
Chief Council Secretary (4)6

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (4)6

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (4)6

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Action

- I. Issues relating to the serious traffic accident on Tai Po Road happened on 10 February 2018 involving a franchised bus**  
(LC Paper No. CB(4)617/17-18(01) - Administration's paper on the bus accident in Tai Po on 10 February 2018

- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| LC Paper No. CB(4)617/17-18(02) | - Paper on safety of franchised bus operation prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief) |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)617/17-18(03) | - Submission from Community for Road Safety  |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)611/17-18(01) | - Joint letter from Hon CHAN Han-pan and Hon CHAN Hak-kan dated 12 February 2018                                 |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)611/17-18(02) | - Joint letter from Hon Jeremy TAM Man-ho and Hon Alvin YEUNG dated 12 February 2018                             |
| LC Paper No. CB(4)611/17-18(03) | - Letter from Hon LUK Chung-hung dated 12 February 2018  |

The Chairman invited all attendees to stand and observe a minute of silence to commemorate and mourn those who lost their lives in the serious traffic accident on 10 February 2018 involving a bus of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited ("KMB") on Tai Po Road ("the February 10 accident") which resulted in a total of 19 fatalities and more than 60 injuries. Members also extended well wishes to the injured for their early recovery.

2. At the invitation of the Chairman, Secretary for Transport and Housing ("STH") briefed members on the follow-up actions taken by the Administration in the aftermath of the February 10 accident; issues relating to the regulation and training of franchised bus captains; and the road safety issues at the road section where the accident took place. STH informed members that the Chief Executive had announced that an independent committee chaired by a judge would be set up to comprehensively review the operation and monitoring of franchised buses so as to ensure that the franchised bus services in Hong Kong were safe and reliable ("the Independent Committee").

3. Mr Norman LEUNG, Chairman of KMB ("Chair/KMB") then briefed members on the follow-up actions taken by KMB in the aftermath of the February 10 accident. He said that KMB would conduct an independent

internal investigation into the February 10 accident and submit a report to the Transport Department ("TD") in a month's time.

Follow-up actions in the aftermath of the February 10 accident

*Investigation into the accident*

4. Dr Fernando CHEUNG considered it important to ascertain the causes of the February 10 accident and review the current regime on the provision of franchised bus services to avoid similar accident from recurring. He supported the setting up of the Independent Committee and hoped that it would review the occupational safety, working environment and remuneration of bus captains which, to his view, would have a bearing on the safe operation of franchised bus services. Dr CHENG Chung-tai cast doubt on the effectiveness of the work of the Independent Committee as it would be led by a judge who was not conversant with transport matters.

5. Mr Steven HO noted that KMB had set up an investigation committee for the February 10 accident ("the KMB committee") which comprised members of its senior echelon who might not have experience of using bus services. He was concerned about how to ensure that the work of the KMB committee would be effective.

6. Chair/KMB said that he was the chairman of the KMB committee, which would come up with recommendations to ensure safer driving by KMB's bus captains. He informed members that he and the other two members of the committee, who were Independent Non-executive Directors of KMB, had first-hand experience in using bus services. Two meetings had been arranged for the KMB committee to meet with the staff unions and supervisors of bus captains.

*Suspension of assigning shifts to part-time bus captains*

7. The Deputy Chairman, Dr CHIANG Lai-wan, Mr LAU Kwok-fan, Dr CHENG Chung-tai noted and queried KMB's decision to suspend assigning shifts to its part-time bus captains the day before today. Given the serious shortage of bus captains in the franchised bus companies, they expressed grave concerns that suspending part-time bus captains from service might increase the workload and pressure of full-time bus captains, causing more frictions between bus captains and passengers and, eventually, a negative impact on road safety.

8. Mr Roger LEE, Managing Director of KMB ("MD/KMB"), admitted that there was a serious shortage of bus captains, and the part-time bus captains had played an important role to meet the extra demand for bus services during peak hours. He explained that, as many members of the public had expressed grave concerns about the performance of part-time bus captains after the February 10 accident, KMB had suspended the hiring of and assigning shifts to part-time bus captains for the time being to address their concerns. Notwithstanding the above arrangement, KMB would ensure that appropriate working hours would be arranged for full-time bus captains.

9. Dr CHENG Chung-tai and Mr James TO asked whether KMB had ever informed or discussed with the Administration about its decision to suspend assigning shifts to part-time bus captains. In response, STH confirmed that KMB had discussed with TD on the above arrangement. He agreed that any decision on changes in bus services should be considered thoroughly and cautiously.

10. Mr LAU Kwok-fan was concerned about whether the suspension of assigning shifts to part-time bus captains was a temporary or long-term arrangement, and enquired about KMB's assessment on its impact on bus service. In reply, MD/KMB advised that there might be lost trips for certain bus routes temporarily caused by the arrangement. He further explained that part-time bus captains were categorized into those working longer hours and those working shorter hours. As KMB had only stopped assigning shifts to those working shorter hours, he believed that the impact of the above arrangement on bus service would be minimized.

11. MD/KMB further said that KMB was discussing with TD on the feasibility of temporarily reducing the bus frequencies of some routes with low utilization to relieve the workload of full-time bus captains. STH advised that such arrangement would affect the day-time service to passengers to a certain extent.

12. Dr Fernando CHEUNG opined that the suspension of part-time bus captains appeared to be a public relation technique rather than a well-conceived arrangement taking the safety of passengers and motorists into account. The Deputy Chairman also considered KMB's arrangement an overreaction to the February 10 accident. He requested that the arrangement should be stopped as soon as possible unless there were proven statistics showing that the rate of accident involving part-time bus captains was higher than that of full-time bus captains, or the driving attitudes and performance of part-time bus captains were poorer than that of full-time bus captains.

*Psychological counselling service provided to affected people*

13. Mr Kenneth LAU pointed out that victims in serious traffic accidents and their families might be suffering from long-term post-traumatic stress disorder. He asked whether psychological counselling services would be provided by the Administration to the affected people in the February 10 accident. In reply, STH advised that the Administration had assigned to each affected family a designated social worker to take care of its members' psychological needs, and to provide other follow-up services until the needs subsided.

14. The Chairman said that psychological counselling services should also be provided to bus captains and asked about KMB's work in this regard. He also hoped that the Administration would appeal to the public for not having hostile sentiments towards bus captains arising from the accident.

15. MD/KMB replied that a telephone hotline for providing psychological counselling service had been in place for bus captains in need. In addition, the management of KMB would liaise closely with the bus captains in coming days to give encouragement and boost their morale.

Admin

16. At the request of Mr Kenneth LAU, C for T agreed to liaise with the Social Welfare Department and the bus company concerned to provide information on the duration of providing psychological counselling services to people who were in need after the serious traffic accident happened on the westbound carriageway of Tuen Mun Road on 10 July 2003.

Current regime on the provision of franchised bus service

17. Dr Priscilla LEUNG considered that the February 10 accident had revealed various inadequacies of the current regime on the provision of franchised bus services, such as manpower resources, training, remuneration and working conditions of bus captains, their driving attitudes, and the bus services were lack of effective monitoring by both the franchised bus companies and the Administration. Dr LEUNG called on the Independent Committee to recommend effective measures to solve the problems of the current regime on the provision of franchised bus services.

18. Mr Steven HO was disappointed to note that, despite the recurrence of serious bus accidents in recent years, KMB had not taken effective improvement measures to address the systemic problems which had affected the performance of bus captains such as improving their working conditions.



19. Dr CHENG Chung-tai recalled that, when the Panel on Transport ("the Panel") was consulted on the proposal to grant a new franchise to KMB in 2017, the Panel had already requested the Administration and KMB to review the operation of KMB's bus services and the working conditions of bus captains. He was concerned about the progress so far.

20. Mr James TO also urged the Administration to take prompt measures to improve bus safety and should not wait until the Independent Committee had concluded its work. He considered that the Administration should provide assistance to franchised bus companies in improving the remuneration of bus captains.

21. In response, STH advised that the issues mentioned by Dr CHENG Chung-tai had been considered by the Administration during the examination of the grant of new franchise to KMB. He also agreed to the view that the Administration should make improvement measures as and when appropriate and should not wait until the Independent Committee had concluded its work.

22. STH further advised that after the February 10 accident, the Administration had been reviewing the road environment and traffic management measures of Tai Po Road. In the past few months, the Administration had also been discussing with franchised bus companies and relevant staff unions on working hours and remuneration of bus captains.

*Manpower resources and the employment of part-time bus captains*

23. Dr Priscilla LEUNG and Mr CHAN Hak-kan asked whether it was due to the lack of resources that KMB had employed a large pool of part-time bus captains. MD/KMB replied that the portion of part-time bus captains deployed by KMB was small. He explained that KMB had been spending its utmost effort in encouraging young people to enter the industry. However, although KMB had been improving the working environment and remuneration of bus captains in the past few years, it still encountered great difficulties in recruiting full-time bus captains. To address the problem, KMB had invited those bus captains who reached the retirement age of 60 to remain in their posts for a certain period of time.

24. MD/KMB further said that all part-time bus captains were required to hold a valid driving licence for buses and were assessed by KMB's instructors to have adequate driving ability before receiving training for two days on one route. He stressed that KMB's priority was to maintain a pool of good quality bus captains. In this regard, KMB had sought the approval from the

Administration and secured additional resources to increase the number of instructors at its training school to 80 for training bus captains.

25. Dr Fernando CHEUNG asked about the number of full-time and part-time bus captains hired by KMB respectively. MD/KMB advised that part-time bus captains constituted about 4% among its pool of 8 600 bus captains.

26. Mr CHU Hoi-dick noted with concern that the number of part-time bus captains employed by KMB as at end 2015, i.e. 1 150 which constituted about 13% of the total number of bus captains, had significantly dropped to 4% at present.

27. Mr Tommy CHEUNG asked whether the Administration would consider rationalizing some duplicated bus routes operated by different franchised bus companies to solve the shortage problem of bus captains. In reply, STH said that the Administration had been reviewing franchised bus services regularly, and discussing with franchised bus companies in drawing up rationalization proposals for franchised bus services under the annual Bus Route Planning Programmes. However, the Administration and franchised bus companies sometimes encountered difficulties in rationalizing bus routes during the consultation of District Councils.

#### *Training for bus captains*

28. Dr KWOK Ka-ki expressed concerns that KMB had shortened the training period of bus captains from 30 days to 18 days, and provided route training to new bus captains for two days only. He pointed out that there was a lack of monitoring of the provision of bus captain training by the Administration. He asked the Administration to consider mandating bus captains to obtain safety permits and attend regular training workshops to be provided by the Administration.

29. Mr LUK Chung-hung, Mr HO Kai-ming and Mr CHU Hoi-dick asked whether the subject bus captain in the February 10 accident had driven on the route himself under the supervision of an instructor as part of his training to familiarize the route. Mr LUK, Mr HO and Ms Claudia MO expressed grave concern over the reports that some new bus captains only learned the route by observing a fellow driver and considered the arrangement unacceptable. Mr LUK was concerned about the role of the Administration on bus captain training.

30. MD/KMB and Mr Godwin SO, General Manager-Corporate Planning & Business Development of KMB ("GM(CPBD)/KMB"), explained that both new full-time and part-time bus captains would receive training on a single bus route first. For part-time bus captains, they would receive one on one route training by an instructor for two days. After bus captains had familiarized with a single route for three months or more, those with adequate skills could learn new routes.

31. MD/KMB and GM(CPBD)/KMB further advised that for certain bus routes, bus captains would learn the route by observation through taking a bus journey of the route. Nevertheless, they stressed that all bus captains had adequate driving skills and good driving records, and route training only aimed to familiarize bus captains with the route. They said that KMB would critically review the current training provided to bus captains.

32. Mr LEUNG Kin-wang, Operations Director of KMB supplemented that the subject bus captain in the February 10 accident had received bus route training by observation through taking a bus journey of the route. He advised that as the accident was under investigation, it was inappropriate for KMB to disclose further information.

33. Mr Jeremy TAM asked whether part-time bus captains had to gain a certain number of bus driving hours within a specified period of time prior to driving a bus, and if the bus captains failed to meet the required driving hours, whether they had to undergo a re-training programme.

34. Mr Patrick PANG, General Manager (Depots) ("GM(D)/KMB") advised that if bus captains, regardless of full-time or part-time, had not driven a route for a month or more, they would have to practise driving on that route again. When arranging duties for bus captains, the supervisors would consider whether a particular bus captain had experience in driving that route in the past month before assigning him/her to that route. C for T supplemented that following the conditions of the bus franchise, the service of each bus route and the type of buses to be deployed had been specified by TD in the Schedules of Service of respective routes.

*Remuneration and working conditions of bus captains*

35. Dr KWOK Ka-ki, Mr LUK Chung-hung and Mr CHU Hoi-dick expressed grave concern that the monthly wage of KMB bus captains had far lagged behind the median monthly wage of employees in Hong Kong and those in the transport sector. Dr KWOK pointed out that, owing to the low basic salary, bus captains had to drive long hours to maintain a living. He also

considered the current guidelines on the maximum duty and driving duty for bus captains in a working day (i.e. not exceeding 14 hours and 11 hours respectively) inappropriate, and asked whether the Administration would introduce minimum wage and a cap on the working hours for bus captains.

36. Mr LUK Chung-hung and Mr Holden CHOW considered that the franchised bus companies should improve the remuneration of bus captains to address the shortage and recruitment problems. Mr LUK asked whether significant improvements would be made in respect of the training and remuneration of bus captains with a view to improving their sense of belonging and morale. He also asked about the Administration's efforts to take care of the welfare for bus captains.

37. In response, STH advised that the Administration noted the views of staff unions about the working conditions and remuneration of bus captains. He said that in 2017, the Administration commenced a thorough review of the Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks ("the Guidelines"), and had engaged the staff unions and franchised bus companies for in-depth discussions. The review was nearly completed and the result could hopefully be announced after the Chinese New Year if a consensus was reached. STH added that the Administration would continue to listen to public views after the review result was announced.

38. Chair/KMB stressed that KMB was caring about its staff and had been increasing the salary of bus captains every year, even during times of financial hardship. He said that while the staff cost of KMB accounted for 58% of the total operating cost in 2016, the Board of KMB agreed in December 2017 to embed the bonus in the salary such that the basic monthly salary of bus captains would be increased to nearly \$16,000. MD/KMB supplemented that KMB would continue to improve the working conditions of bus captains, including the provision of rest rooms and washrooms at bus termini, and the improvement of remuneration for bus captains.

39. Mr CHU Hoi-dick considered that the major franchised bus operators were monopolized by private property developers who had suppressed the wages of bus captains. He asked whether the Administration would require bus operators in the franchise to provide a reasonable remuneration package with dignity to bus captains to promote bus safety.

Admin

40. At the request of Mr CHU Hoi-dick, the Administration agreed to liaise with KMB to provide information about the highest salary received by KMB staff and the basic salary of KMB's bus captains in 1998 and 2018 respectively.

41. Mr Tommy CHEUNG considered that when reviewing the working hours and remuneration of bus captains, the Administration should take into account whether the bus fares were within public affordability. In his view, by solely improving the working hours and remuneration of bus captains, it could not prevent accidents.

42. STH agreed to the view that reducing the working hours and improving the remuneration of bus captains would increase the operating cost of the franchised bus companies, and hence the pressure for fare increase. He said that the Independent Committee would consider measures to provide effective bus service to passengers, on the one hand, and a financially viable environment for bus operators, on the other.

*Driving attitude of bus captains*

43. Noting some reports that the February 10 accident might have been caused by the poor driving attitude of the subject bus captain after getting the blame from passengers, Ms Claudia MO asked whether the Administration would consider requiring all bus companies to deploy staff at busy bus termini to maintain the order of waiting passengers and provide assistance to them, with a view to reducing the grievances of passengers over bus services which might cause conflicts with bus captains.

44. MD/KMB advised that terminus supervisors and bus stop assistants were currently deployed at some large-scale bus termini or busy bus stops/interchanges to provide assistance to waiting passengers. He recognized that conflicts between bus captains and passengers did take place some times and assured members that KMB would work hard on addressing this problem. C for T added that TD would actively follow up with all franchised bus companies, asking them to strengthen the training of bus captains on emotion management.

45. Dr Priscilla LEUNG was concerned about whether the current training on emotion management provided to bus captains was adequate, and whether the health check package conducted for bus captains covered their mental health conditions.

46. Mr Holden CHOW pointed out that, as numerous passengers' lives were at stake, bus companies should make every effort to ensure that bus captains were in good health and mental conditions while performing their duties. He called on KMB to provide adequate training for bus captains on how to face pressure from passengers. Persons who wished to be bus captains should also be made aware of the pressure that they would face at work. Mr Steven HO

asked whether KMB would regularly make available counselling service or psychological treatment to bus captains.

47. In response, GM(D)/KMB advised that all newly recruited bus captains would receive training from experienced instructors to strengthen their emotional resilience in the face of adversity. After their first 6-month service with KMB, bus captains would attend a workshop for sharing their experience with in-service and experienced bus captains. GM(D)/KMB added that bus captains could also obtain psychological counselling service from the hotline mentioned in paragraph 15 above.

48. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen was concerned that, while there were guidelines mandating sufficient rest for full-time bus captains, bus companies had little control over part-time bus captains with regard to their workload and amount of rest outside driving hours. He asked whether KMB was more lenient in monitoring the part-time than full-time bus captains, and whether part-time bus captains were mandated to declare their physical and mental health conditions regularly.

49. GM(D)/KMB advised that the supervisors of bus captains would monitor their mental and health conditions by observation. In addition, bus captains might also be required to undergo random breath tests before performing their duties.

50. Mr LAU Kwok-fan considered that traffic congestion problem might also give rise to conflicts between bus captains and passengers. He hoped that the Independent Committee would propose measures to solve a basket of problems in relation to the franchised bus service.

#### *Traffic conviction records of bus captains*

51. Mr LAU Kwok-fan noted from some reports that the bus captain involved in the February 10 accident had a record of undesirable driving behaviour in his first year of service. He was concerned about whether KMB was too lenient in allowing bus captains who had undesirable driving behavior record to continue serving passengers due to recruitment difficulties.

52. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen recalled that after the February 10 accident, KMB had once provided incorrect information regarding the driving record of the subject bus captain and could not provide statistics about the poor driving record of bus captains at the special meeting of the Tai Po District Council to discuss about the accident. Ms Claudia MO considered that it had given a bad impression to the public.

53. GM(D)/KMB expressed regret for the confusion caused by the information disseminated regarding the driving record of the subject bus captain, and said that KMB had already clarified afterwards that the subject bus captain was convicted of careless driving in August 2014. He stressed that safety had always been the prime concern of KMB in operating the bus service. In recruiting full-time or part-time bus captains, the candidates would be required to apply for certificates of traffic conviction records from the Police for KMB's examination, and there was a mechanism for handling bus captains with traffic conviction records.

54. Mr CHAN Hak-kan, Mr LAU Kwok-fan and Mr Alvin YEUNG asked about the details of KMB's mechanism to deal with bus captains with records of contravention of traffic regulations before and during their services with KMB. Mr CHAN also asked about KMB's measures to remind experienced bus captains to maintain a good driving attitude.

55. In response, GM(D)/KMB advised that a candidate having records of disqualification from driving or dangerous driving would not be employed by KMB as bus captain, full-time or part-time. In-service bus captains who were convicted of dangerous driving offence would be dismissed immediately. For bus captains convicted of careless driving offence, depending on its seriousness, a final written warning would be issued to them who, if committing any traffic offence again within six month after receipt of the warning, would be dismissed immediately.

56. GM(D)/KMB added that bus captains convicted of careless driving offence would have to attend a re-training programme, and would only be assigned driving duties subject to their satisfactory performance certified by instructors. KMB would also deploy plain-clothed inspectors and management staff on buses to monitor the driving attitude of the concerned bus captain and take appropriate actions once malpractice/misconduct was identified.

57. As regards whether bus captains having records of undesirable driving behaviour should not be assigned driving duties, MD/KMB said that it would require further study. He assured members that KMB would never sacrifice road safety because of manpower shortage.

Admin

58. In response to Dr Fernando CHEUNG's enquiry, MD/KMB replied that there were 236 bus captains having a careless driving record in 2016. At the request of Mr CHAN Chi-chuen, the Administration agreed to liaise with KMB and provide information on the number of traffic offences (including careless driving) committed by on-duty bus captains of KMB by categories, the types

of follow-up actions (e.g. issuance of final warnings and deploying plain-clothed staff to conduct on-board monitoring on bus captains' performance) carried out by KMB, and the number by type in the past three years.

Measures to enhance bus safety

*Seat belt and places for standees*

59. The Deputy Chairman suggested that, to minimize the number of casualties in case of bus accident, all franchised bus operators should consider retrofitting seat belt to all seats in buses by phases. Mr LUK Chung-hung recalled that there had been times all seats of certain bus models of Long Win Bus Company Limited ("LW") were retrofitted with seat belt. He asked why there was no such kind of buses at the moment.

60. C for T advised that all the exposed seats of new buses purchased after 2003 had been installed with seat belts. After a serious bus accident in 2007, franchised bus companies had acceded to TD's request for retrofitting seat belts to the exposed seats and front-row seats on the upper decks for buses designed after 1997. TD would, together with KMB and other franchised bus operators, actively study measures to enhance safety, including the technical feasibility of retrofitting seat belt to all seats. MD/KMB supplemented that KMB held an open mind on any suggestion to improve bus safety and would discuss the above suggestion with TD. In reply to Mr LUK Chung-hung, C for T said that LW had once proactively installed seat belts to all seats but no longer provided them having regard to the low usage.

61. Ms Claudia MO noted the view of some transport experts that seat belt might not help reduce the number of casualties for such kind of serious bus accident. She was also concerned that, in case all seats were retrofitted with seat belt, whether there would be difficulties to require all passengers to wear the seat belts. She enquired about the timetable of considering the suggestion of retrofitting all seats with seat belts and whether a consultation would be conducted in this regard.

62. C for T said that the Administration kept an open mind on the suggestion of retrofitting seat belt to all seats in franchised buses. However, apart from technical feasibility, passengers' acceptability should also be taken into account when considering the suggestion of retrofitting seat belt to all seats. It would study the investigation report to be submitted by KMB in one month's time and would examine the suggestion having regard to relevant considerations.



63. Ms Claudia MO further enquired whether the Administration would consider cancelling all places for standees on franchised buses to enhance safety. In reply, C for T advised that while the suggestion could be further discussed, cancelling places for standees might not meet the great demand for bus service.

*Road design and criteria of deploying bus models*

64. Mr CHAN Hak-kan noted the concerns of Tai Po residents and Tai Po District Council about the poor design of the subject section of Tai Po Road. He urged the Administration to introduce improvement measures as soon as possible, such as straightening or reducing the curvature of the road bend, applying anti-skid surface dressing and installing speed enforcement cameras on the subject road section. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok shared the view that the design of Tai Po Road, which had a lot of meandering and narrow road sections, was undesirable. He urged the Administration to review the design of the whole length of Tai Po Road and carry out necessary improvement works.

65. C for T advised that the design of the subject road section had been in compliance with the prevailing standard on road design. According to the record of TD and the Police, from 2013 to 2017, four traffic accidents had occurred at the subject road section. Out of these four accidents, three were minor accidents, and the remaining one was a serious accident involving a motorcycle.

66. C for T added that there was an established mechanism to review the safety of all roads in Hong Kong regularly. For Tai Po Road, TD and the Police would comprehensively review its road environment and relevant traffic management measures including the speed limits, warning traffic signs and road markings with a view to further enhancing road safety. She also said that TD would consult the relevant District Councils before implementing any improvement measures.

67. The Chairman suggested KMB to consult its bus captains about which road sections along Tai Po Road required improvement to expedite the review process. Mr HO Kai-ming considered that, given the poor design of Tai Po Road (Tai Po Kau Section), KMB should review whether it was appropriate to assign a part-time bus captain to drive a full-load bus along such road section.

68. Mr Kenneth LAU requested that apart from Tai Po Road, the Administration should also comprehensively review the design, speed limits,

traffic signs and locations of bus stops of Lam Kam Road, Fan Kam Road and Route Twisk, in particular the traffic blackspots of respective roads.

69. Mr Jeremy TAM enquired about the criteria for considering what suitable models of buses (such as their sizes, single-decked or double-decked) should be deployed for a particular route and requested for a copy of the guidelines, if available. In his view, the Independent Committee should review the appropriateness of the relevant guidelines.

Admin

70. Assistant Commissioner for Transport/Bus & Railway advised that before introducing a new bus route, TD would conduct a road test with the bus company concerned to determine the suitable kind of bus to be deployed for that route, having regard to the patronage and pattern of demand from passengers. She said that in any case, road safety was a prime consideration. She agreed to provide detailed information on criteria for considering the deployment of suitable models of buses as requested by Mr TAM.

*Use of technologies for enhancing bus safety*

71. Dr CHIANG Lai-wan expressed concern over some reports that when the February 10 accident occurred, the subject bus was travelling at a speed above the statutory limit of 70 km/h. She asked whether the speed limiter of the subject bus was out of order, and whether the Administration would consider requiring all bus companies to install devices which could effectively control the vehicle speed when travelling on downhill roads. Dr CHIANG opined that, before all the speed limiters of buses had been replaced, the Administration should consider lowering the speed limits of those meandering or narrow road sections.

72. MD/KMB advised that every KMB bus had been installed with a speed limiter which prevented it from going faster than 70 km/h. However, when the bus was travelling downslope, the speed might exceed the above limit due to gravity. He advised that after the February 10 accident, KMB had immediately explored with a number of speed limiter suppliers on measures to address the above problem.

73. Mr Charles MOK, Mr LUK Chung-hung, Mr Jeremy TAM and Mr Alvin YEUNG urged the Administration to make use of technologies to enhance bus safety and prevent accident. Mr MOK said that there had already been driver's monitoring system which could detect the driver's health or even emotional states. He also suggested making public the bus information to assist members of the public in monitoring traffic blackspots.

74. Mr LUK Chung-hung asked KMB for its reasons of not adopting the Electronic Stability Program or similar technologies to improve bus stability and prevent it from over-turning. Mr Jeremy TAM suggested the Administration and public transport operators studied the feasibility of adopting Lane Departure Warning System and Pre-Crash Safety System to enhance safety.

75. Chair/KMB and MD/KMB welcomed any suggestions from members on adoption of new technologies to improve bus safety and agreed to study their feasibility. STH added that the Administration supported the adoption of any feasible technologies to improve bus safety. He also agreed to promote the use of technology to share instant bus information to facilitate journey planning by passengers.

*(At 12:24 pm, the Chairman extended the meeting for 15 minutes to 1:00 pm.)*

#### Other views

76. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok suggested that KMB be invited to a Panel meeting in the future to report to members about the progress made in implementing the improvement measures following the review conducted by KMB on bus safety.

#### Motions

77. The Chairman advised that he had received three motions respectively proposed by Mr CHAN Hak-kan, Mr LUK Chung-hung and Mr LAM Cheuk-ting. He considered that the proposed motions were directly related to the agenda item under discussion. Members agreed that the motions be proceeded with at the meeting.

78. Mr CHAN Hak-kan moved the following motion, which was seconded by Mr LAU Kwok-fan –

本會對於二月十日大埔公路發生的嚴重車禍導致十九死六十六傷深表悲痛和難過，為避免慘劇再次發生，促請當局：

- 一、 要求專營巴士公司檢討車長人手編制、提供合理的車長工作、休息、用膳時間及薪酬待遇，並必須為全職及兼職車長提供恆常安全駕駛態度及培訓，以確保車長良好駕駛質素；

- 二、 立即在肇事路段鋪設防滑鋼沙、增設減速警示牌、放置偵速攝影機，並檢視全港「高危」路段及盡快提升相關安全措施，以保障道路使用者安全；及
- 三、 研究進一步加強巴士安全裝置，包括改進高危座位的保護設計、增加裝設安全帶座椅並分階段強制乘客配戴、在車長位置安裝外掛攝錄機、改進巴士限速裝置，確保高危路段安全行駛、及安裝自動緊急剎車輔助系統等等，以減低意外發生時乘客受傷的風險。

(Translation)

This Panel expresses deep sorrow and regret at the occurrence of a serious traffic accident on Tai Po Road on 10 February resulting in 19 fatalities and 66 injuries and, in order to prevent the recurrence of such a tragedy, this Panel urges the Administration to:

1. request franchised bus companies to review the staffing establishment of bus captains, provide reasonable working hours, rest time, meal breaks and remuneration packages for bus captains, and provide on a compulsory basis regular training on a safe driving attitude for full-time and part-time bus captains to ensure that bus captains are equipped with the qualities of a good driver;
2. apply anti-skid surface dressing, erect additional deceleration warning signs and install speed enforcement cameras on the subject road section immediately, and review the "high-risk" road sections across the territory and expeditiously enhance the relevant safety measures to safeguard the safety of road users; and
3. explore ways to further strengthen the safety installations on buses, including enhancing the protection for high-risk seats, retrofitting seat belts on more seats and making it compulsory in phases for passengers to wear seat belts, installing an external camera at the bus captain's seat, modifying the speed limiters on buses to ensure safe driving on high-risk road sections, and installing an auxiliary system for automatic emergency braking, so as to reduce the risk of injuries among passengers in an accident.

79. The Chairman put the motion to vote. A total of 13 members voted for the motion, none voted against it and none abstained from voting. The Chairman declared that the motion was carried.

80. Mr LUK Chung-hung moved the following motion, which was seconded by Mr HO Kai-ming –

有鑒於過去本港發生多宗巴士嚴重交通意外，本會促請當局加強有關專營巴士公司對人力資源的監管，以及研究改善巴士硬件，當中包括：為巴士車長提供全面的職前線路及客服培訓、提高車長的薪酬待遇、以吸引具經驗的人才入行，進而提升整體服務質素，以保障行車安全水平。

(Translation)

Given the occurrence of a number of serious traffic accidents involving buses in Hong Kong in the past, this Panel urges the Administration to strengthen franchised bus companies' oversight of their manpower resources and explore ways to improve the hardware of buses, including providing bus captains with comprehensive pre-service training on routes and customer service, enhancing bus captains' remuneration packages to attract experienced talents to join the trade and in turn upgrading the overall service quality with a view to safeguarding driving safety.

81. The Chairman put the motion to vote. A total of 13 members voted for the motion, none voted against it and none abstained from voting. The Chairman declared that the motion was carried.

82. Mr LAM Cheuk-ting moved the following motion –

因應近年多次發生嚴重意外涉及雙層巴士，為盡量減低意外的傷亡，本會要求運輸署及巴士公司研究為所有座位加裝安全帶的可行性，加強保障乘客安全。

(Translation)

In the light of the occurrence of a number of serious accidents involving double-decker buses in recent years, and in order to minimize the casualties of accidents, this Panel requests the Transport Department and the bus companies to study the feasibility of

retrofitting all seats with seat belts so as to enhance the protection of passenger safety.

83. The Chairman put the motion to vote. A total of 13 members voted for the motion, none voted against it and none abstained from voting. The Chairman declared that the motion was carried.

*(Post-meeting note: The Administration's response to the motions passed at the meeting and supplementary information paper were issued to members on 13 April 2018 via LC Paper Nos. CB(4)922/17-18(01) and (02).)*

## **II. Any other business**

84. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 1:00 pm.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
26 July 2018

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運輸及房屋局

運輸科  
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CB(4)922/17-18(01)

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胡日輝先生

[傳真號碼：2840 0269]

胡先生：

**立法會交通事務委員會 2018 年 2 月 15 日特別會議  
有關專營巴士安全的議案**

就委員在上述特別會議上通過的三項有關專營巴士安全的議案，現綜合回覆如下。

2 月 10 日大埔巴士意外

政府非常重視在 2 月 10 日於大埔發生的嚴重交通事故。行政長官宣布成立的香港專營巴士服務獨立檢討委員會已於 3 月 28 日正式投入運作，並由高等法院上訴法庭

副庭長倫明高法官擔任主席。委員會將全面檢視專營巴士營運和監管事宜，確保本港的公共巴士服務安全可靠。政府會全力配合香港專營巴士服務獨立檢討委員會的工作，以維持本港的公共巴士服務安全可靠。

### 道路安全改善措施

政府一向非常重視道路安全，並一直透過三管齊下的策略以促進道路安全，即立法和執法、改善交通設施和管理、以及宣傳教育。此外，運輸署每年在 100 個涉及有人受傷的意外較集中或較嚴重的地點進行調查，從而歸納出涉及意外因素及共通處，推出相關的道路安全改善措施，以加強香港整體道路安全。

就 2 月 10 日大埔巴士意外肇事路段而言，運輸署正全面檢視相關路段的道路環境及交通管理措施，包括研究應否修訂速度限制、研究加強現有警告交通標誌(包括增設減速道路標誌)和道路標記等，以進一步促進道路安全。運輸署已與警方開始籌備安裝新一批固定偵察車速攝影機及攝影機機箱，而肇事路段亦已被納入考慮安裝的名單之內。運輸署亦會檢視在該路段過往的交通意外發生情況，並聯同路政署研究鋪設防滑鋼沙的需要。

### 專營巴士車長工時

政府非常重視專營巴士的營運安全。運輸署已於今年 2 月 23 日優化《巴士車長工作、休息及用膳時間指引》(下稱《指引》)內的安排。當中，巴士車長的最長更次時間及駕駛時間分別由不應超逾 14 小時及 11 小時，縮減為不應超逾 12 小時及 10 小時；而為免車長被安排連續工作



數日而沒有足夠的休班時間，運輸署亦新增規定，除特別更次外，專營巴士公司在編排車長在三個相連更次內的總休班時間不應少於 22 小時。各專營巴士公司正敲定實施修訂《指引》下實際的編更細節安排。待理順有關編更細節安排後，專營巴士公司的目標是本年第二季開始可陸續實施修訂《指引》，並可望於約 2019 年第二季內全面實施。

需要強調的是，有關的《指引》只是規管車長工作時數的上限或休息時數的下限，專營巴士公司可按其營運需要安排車長的工作及駕駛時數少於上限的規定。據運輸署了解，專營巴士公司均表示會視乎增聘車長的進度，計劃逐步將特別更次的工作時數由最長 14 小時縮短至 13 小時。運輸署會繼續不時檢視實際情況，鼓勵專營巴士公司積極作出車長編更的有效安排，以在可行情況下盡量減少車長的工作及駕駛時數，務求達致少於相關上限的規定。

### 車長培訓

根據《道路交通(駕駛執照)規例》，所有專營巴士車長不論全職或兼職，均須持有由運輸署發出的有效駕駛執照，才能駕駛專營巴士。

就車長訓練方面，專營巴士公司會因應日常運作的需要為新聘及現職車長(不論全職或兼職)提供各類型的訓練。新聘車長訓練涵蓋駕駛技術、事故處理、顧客服務、不同車輛型號及路線培訓等範疇。至於現職車長，他們則須定期接受進修訓練，及按需要接受駕駛改進課程或輔助駕駛訓練。

### 車長人手及薪酬待遇

巴士營運屬勞動力密集的行業，專營巴士公司一直以不同方式吸引新人入行，例如改善薪酬福利、工作環境及提升晉升機會，並著力減少車長流失。

除了關注車長人手情況，政府亦關心車長的整體待遇。政府一直呼籲專營巴士公司作為負責任的企業，除了需要保障巴士營運安全外，亦應就薪酬待遇安排保持與員工良好溝通。巴士車長的薪酬待遇需由專營巴士公司與車長協商達成共識。在可行情況下，專營巴士公司應關懷員工的需要和回應員工在薪酬待遇方面的訴求。正如其他行業一樣，巴士車長的薪酬待遇受市場及整體經濟情況等多方面因素影響，而專營巴士公司亦會因應其營運情況靈活訂定合理的車長薪酬安排。

### 巴士安全裝置

在2月10日大埔巴士意外後，運輸署成立了一個包括各專營巴士公司及主要巴士製造商代表的工作小組，探討安裝各巴士安全裝置（包括在所有專營巴士座椅安裝安全帶）的可行性，以期進一步提升專營巴士服務的安全。

運輸及房屋局局長

（蔡志傑



代行)

2018年4月13日

副本送： 運輸署署長

（經辦人：黃志光先生）

*This English translation is for reference only. In the event of any discrepancy between the Chinese original and this English translation, the Chinese original shall prevail.*

*[Logo and address of Transport and Housing Bureau]*

13 April 2018

Mr Lemuel WOO  
Clerk to Panel on Transport  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
Legislative Council Complex  
1 Legislative Council Road  
Central, Hong Kong

[Fax: 2840 0269]

Dear Mr Woo,

**Special Meeting of Legislative Council Panel on Transport on 15 February 2018  
Motions on Safety of Franchised Buses**

At the above special meeting, three motions relating to the safety of franchised buses were passed. Our consolidated response is set out below.

Tai Po Traffic Accident on 10 February 2018

The Government attaches great importance to the serious traffic accident happened in Tai Po on 10 February 2018. As announced by the Chief Executive, the newly set up Independent Review Committee on Hong Kong's Franchised Bus Service formally commenced its work on 28 March 2018 with the Honourable Mr Justice Michael Victor Lunn, Vice-President of the Court of Appeal of the High Court, as the Chairman. The Committee will comprehensively review the operation and monitoring of franchised buses so as to ensure that public bus services of Hong Kong are safe and reliable. The Government will fully collaborate with the work of the Independent Review Committee on Hong Kong's Franchised Bus Service to maintain the safety and reliability of local public bus services.

Improvement Measures on Road Safety

The Government always attaches great importance to road safety and has been promoting road safety by a three-pronged strategy, i.e. legislation and enforcement, improvement to traffic facilities and management, as well as publicity and education. In addition, the Transport Department ("TD") conducts every year investigations at 100 locations with more frequent or more serious traffic accidents involving injuries, with a view to identifying the factors and common aspects of the accidents. The TD will then implement relevant road safety improvement measures for enhancing the overall road safety in Hong Kong.

In respect of the subject road section where the bus accident happened in Tai Po on 10 February 2018, the TD is conducting a comprehensive review of the road conditions and traffic management measures of the relevant road section. This includes studying whether the speed limit should be revised, examining the ways to strengthen the existing warning traffic signs (including erection of more deceleration warning signs) and road markings, etc. to further promote road safety. The TD and the Police have started preparing for installation of a new batch of fixed speed enforcement cameras and camera cases, and the subject road section has already been included in the list of road sections for consideration of installation. The TD will also review the past traffic accidents which happened on the subject road section, and will jointly study with the Highways Department the need of applying anti-skid surface dressing.

#### Working Hours of Franchised Bus Captains

The Government attaches great importance to the operation safety of franchised buses. The TD has improved the arrangements under the “Guidelines on Bus Captain Working Hours, Rest Times and Meal Breaks” (“the Guidelines”) on 23 February this year. Among the revisions, the maximum shift duty hours and driving hours of a bus captain were shortened from not exceeding 14 hours and 11 hours to not exceeding 12 hours and 10 hours respectively. Also, to avoid insufficient rest time for bus captains after being assigned to work on several consecutive days, the TD has added one guideline that the total break time in three successive shifts, other than special shifts, should not be less than 22 hours. The franchised bus companies are finalising their actual shift arrangements in detail for implementation under the revised Guidelines. After rationalising the details of concerned shift arrangements, the franchised bus companies aim at implementing the revised Guidelines progressively from the second quarter of this year, and expect full implementation in the second quarter of 2019.

It should be highlighted that the relevant Guidelines only regulate the maximum duty hours as well as the minimum hours of rest break for bus captains. The duty hours and driving hours of bus captains can be less than the prescribed limit as arranged by the franchised bus companies having regard to their operational needs. To the best of the TD’s knowledge, the franchised bus companies plan to shorten the duty hours in a special shift from 14 to 13 hours gradually depending on the progress in recruiting new bus captains. The TD will continue reviewing the actual situation, and encourage the franchised bus companies to proactively make effective shift arrangements for bus captains with a view to reducing the number of duty and driving hours of bus captains to less than the relevant prescribed limit as far as possible if circumstances warrant.

#### Training for Bus Captains

In accordance with the “Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations”, each franchised bus captain, irrespective of full-time or part-time one, should drive franchised buses only after obtaining a valid driving licence issued by the TD.

Regarding the training for bus captains, the franchised bus companies provide different types of training courses for newly recruited and serving bus captains (irrespective of full-time or part-time ones) taking into account the needs of their daily operation. Training for newly recruited bus captains covers driving skills, handling of incidents, customer service as well as training on different vehicle models and routes, etc.

As for the serving bus captains, they are required to undergo regular refresher courses as well as driving improvement courses or supplementary driving courses on a need basis.

#### Manpower and Remuneration Packages for Bus Captains

Bus operation is a labour intensive trade. The franchised bus companies have been adopting different approaches to attract new blood to the trade, such as improving the remuneration packages and working environment as well as enhancing the promotion prospects. They also have been endeavouring to reduce the wastage of bus captains.

Apart from the concern over the manpower of bus captains, the Government is also mindful of the overall remuneration packages of bus captains. The Government has been calling on the franchised bus companies, being responsible enterprises, to maintain good communication with the staff about the remuneration package arrangements apart from ensuring the bus operation safety. The franchised bus companies need to reach consensus with bus captains on the remuneration packages. If circumstances permit, the franchised bus companies should take care of the needs of their staff and respond to their requests on the remuneration packages. Same as other trades, the remuneration packages for bus captains are affected by many factors, such as the market and overall economic situation, etc. The franchised bus companies will, depending on their operational situations, flexibly devise reasonable remuneration package arrangements for bus captains.

#### Safety Installations on Buses

After the Tai Po bus accident on 10 February, the TD has set up a working group, which includes the representatives of all franchised bus companies and the major bus manufacturers, to explore the feasibility of installing different bus safety equipment (including installation of seat belt on all seats of franchised buses), with a view to further enhancing the safety of franchised bus service.

Yours sincerely,

(Kelvin CHOI)  
for Secretary for Transport and Housing

c.c. Commissioner for Transport (Attn: Mr WONG Chi-kwong, Patrick)

**For discussion  
on 20 January 2017**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

**New Franchise for the Bus Network of  
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited**

**PURPOSE**

The current franchise for the bus network of The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (“KMB”) will expire on 1 July 2017. The Government had briefed Members of the Legislative Council (“LegCo”) Panel on Transport (“the Panel”) on matters concerning the granting of a new franchise twice, in January and June 2016 respectively. Members took note of the Government’s plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise, and offered views on areas relating to service quality and fares, etc. of the new franchise for the Government to follow up with KMB in the discussion. The discussion has largely been concluded. This paper briefs Members on the discussion outcome and the next steps.

**BACKGROUND**

2. Under the Public Bus Services Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) (Cap. 230), the Executive Council may grant to a registered company a franchise conferring the right to operate public bus service for a period not exceeding 10 years. A grantee is required to maintain a proper and efficient public bus service to the satisfaction of the Commissioner for Transport during the franchise period. According to the established practice, a grantee which is able to prove its ability to provide a proper and efficient service and is willing to further invest in franchised bus operation may be considered for the granting of a franchise for a period of 10 years.

3. As KMB has all along been providing proper and efficient bus service and is willing to continue to invest in further service enhancement, the Government briefed the Panel in January 2016 on the plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise for its bus network. The Government also conducted public

consultation to canvass views on the requirements of the new franchise thereafter from January to April 2016, and provided an update to the Panel on the major views canvassed in June 2016. The Panel did not object to the Government's plan to engage KMB for discussion on the granting of a new 10-year franchise, and offered views for the Government to follow up with KMB in the discussion. The Government expressed that it would strive for the most favourable franchise terms for the public as far as possible in a pragmatic manner, and would report to the Panel the outcome upon conclusion of the discussion with KMB.

4. The discussion with KMB on the new 10-year franchise commenced in the third quarter of 2016. We have actively followed up with KMB on various issues raised by the public and the Panel in the course of discussion. Please refer to **Annex A** for details.

## **CONDITIONS & COMMITMENTS OF THE NEW FRANCHISE**

5. The Government has engaged KMB for discussion on the new 10-year franchise and made good progress. The work has largely been completed. In the course of discussion on the new franchise, we noted that the operating environment of KMB had come under mounting pressure since the commencement of KMB's current franchise in 2007 owing to rising operating cost (especially staff cost<sup>1</sup>) and competition from other public transport services. The opening of new railway lines has also affected the prospects of KMB's operation to a certain extent. For instance, following the commissioning of the Kwun Tong Line Extension in October 2016, the overall patronage on KMB's bus routes serving Whampoa and Ho Man Tin has dropped by around 10% in the first month of the new railway's operation. Looking ahead, as the Shatin to Central Link (which is expected to come into operation by two phases in 2019 and 2021) as well as the three priority railway projects under the Railway Development Strategy 2014 (namely Northern Link and Kwu Tung Station, Tuen Mun South Extension and East Kowloon Line) will all be within the service catchment of KMB's network, KMB's market share in public transport services is expected to further shrink. Meanwhile, KMB has expressed that the ageing population is leading to rising long-term financial burden and exerting pressure on its fare

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<sup>1</sup> The cumulative increase in the salaries of KMB's staff since August 2007 is around 38%, i.e. around 3.6% per annum on average.

revenue<sup>2</sup>. With the bus replacement cycle entering its peak in the coming years, it is anticipated that KMB shall make a substantial investment of about \$3.8 billion in replacing its bus fleets in the coming five years.

6. Franchised bus services are regulated pursuant to the Ordinance, under which the Government may grant franchises for the provision of bus services. Generally speaking, generic and long-lasting requirements would be set out as franchise clauses, while specific initiatives or objectives required to be achieved within a certain timeframe are set out in terms of commitments. According to the established practice, the Government would request a grantee to take on board franchise clauses and commitments of the most recently granted franchises, and would introduce new franchise clauses and commitments as appropriate, having regard to the changing circumstances as well as the operating situation of an individual grantee and passenger demand.

7. The most recently granted franchises are those granted to Citybus Limited (Franchise for Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) (“Citybus (Franchise 1)”) and New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited (“NLB”) in 2015. KMB has agreed to fully take on board the new clauses as well as the new commitments on enhancement to services and facilities made under these two franchises. Please refer to **Annex B** for details.

8. The outcome of the discussion with KMB on issues of particular interest to the Panel and the public is summarised in the ensuing paragraphs.

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<sup>2</sup> Since 1993, franchised bus companies have offered concessionary half fares to elderly passengers through the Elderly Concessionary Fare Scheme (“ECFS”). Under the ECFS, franchised bus companies are exempted from the annual vehicle licence fees and receive reimbursement of rentals paid in respect of government land so as to facilitate them to introduce, or continue to offer, fare concessions to the elderly. Franchised bus companies shall absorb the fare revenue forgone which cannot be offset by the subsidy. Under the Government Public Transport Fare Concession Scheme for the Elderly and Eligible Persons with Disabilities (i.e. the “\$2 Scheme”) introduced in 2012, the franchised bus companies still have to absorb any fare revenue forgone arising from the provision of fare concessions for the elderly under the ECFS (i.e. the difference between full fare and the concessionary half fare), while the Government will only reimburse the difference between the \$2 fare and the concessionary half fare to the franchised bus companies. With the ageing population and growing number of elderly passengers, the financial burden borne by KMB for the provision of fare concessions to the elderly has kept on rising even after netting out government subsidies. The amount of fare revenue forgone borne by KMB in 2015 was about \$310 million. KMB expects that such amount will continue to rise progressively over the next decade.



### *Service Quality*

9. KMB has put in much effort over the past few years to enhance the service quality on various fronts. In terms of service reliability, KMB's overall lost trip rate has gradually decreased from the peak level of 8.0% in 2011 to 1.6% in 2016 (up to November). Moreover, KMB has made available real-time bus arrival information for all of its regular routes to passengers through smartphone applications and website, in addition to a total of some 450 display panels at major bus termini, bus stops and bus interchanges. KMB will further enhance its service quality under the new franchise in a bid to satisfy passengers' needs. The major new measures include –

- (a) Offering free Wi-Fi service in bus compartments: KMB will set up Wi-Fi service in around 500 buses per year, and a total of around 2 000 buses (about half of KMB's fleet) will be equipped with Wi-Fi service in phases by end-2020. The Wi-Fi service will be available for use by passengers free of charge. In order to optimise the use of the buses equipped with free Wi-Fi service, KMB will flexibly deploy these buses to operate on long-haul routes or routes with higher patronage to meet passengers' needs as far as possible;
- (b) Enhancing ancillary facilities and passenger waiting environment: KMB will upgrade passenger facilities at highly-utilised bus termini and bus interchanges progressively throughout the period of the new franchise, such as setting up customer service kiosks, providing passengers with free Wi-Fi service, route enquiry service and Octopus card value-adding service, as well as providing passenger toilets subject to individual site conditions;
- (c) Upgrading ancillary facilities at bus stops and setting up more shelters: The Government announced last year to provide subsidy to franchised bus companies (including KMB) for expediting their installation of real-time bus arrival information

display panels and seats at covered bus stops<sup>3</sup>. The preparatory work for the scheme is progressing well. It is expected that all existing and suitable covered bus stops of KMB will be equipped with seats and/or display panels by 2019-2020. Furthermore, KMB will erect or refurbish 20 shelters each year throughout the franchise period (i.e. a total of 200 shelters over the 10-year period of the new franchise). KMB will also explore alternative means to erect shelters at bus stops which have been constrained by the physical environment. To improve the passenger waiting environment and for passengers' convenience, KMB will equip all new shelters with seats and real-time bus arrival information display panels wherever practicable;

- (d) Partnering with "Hong Kong eTransport" to provide real-time arrival information: KMB will partner with the Transport Department ("TD") to provide new features in TD's "Hong Kong eTransport" smartphone application and website so as to provide convenience to users to obtain real-time arrival information of KMB's routes. We expect to introduce the new hyperlink function within the first half of 2017. TD is also discussing similar partnerships with other franchised bus companies;
- (e) Providing information on seat vacancy of the upper deck: KMB will conduct a trial by making use of suitable technology, through which passengers in the lower deck of the bus compartment will be given information on seat vacancy of the upper deck. This will reduce unnecessary passenger movements between the two decks. Subject to the trial's outcome, KMB will provide the same on more buses progressively; and

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<sup>3</sup> The expenditure of the subsidy scheme is estimated at around \$88 million for franchised bus companies to install display panels at around 1 300 covered bus stops with electrical installations and to install seats at around 2 700 covered bus stops. For real-time arrival information display panels, the Government will provide subsidy to franchised bus companies for their installation of the display panels at covered bus stops with electrical installation on a matching basis, i.e. for every display panel (inclusive of the protective case and data receiver) which a franchised bus company has committed to install, the Government will provide funding for the installation of another display panel. As regard seats, franchised bus companies will receive subsidy for installing seats at covered bus stops currently without seats. Franchised bus companies shall remain responsible for funding the installation of seats when erecting new covered bus stops.

- (f) Improving transport for persons with disabilities and introducing hospital routes (i.e. “H” routes): In response to the ageing population, KMB plans to launch a pilot trial to reconfigure the bus compartments of its existing super-low-floor buses so that the lower deck can accommodate two wheelchair passengers at the same time. KMB expects to launch the trial progressively from mid-2017 onwards on a few selected routes serving hospitals, thereby enhancing the transport for persons with disabilities. Subject to passengers’ feedback, KMB will consider further expanding the number of buses with dual wheelchair spaces. In addition, KMB has proposed to introduce two “H” routes, with one route serving United Christian Hospital to ply between Yau Tong and Shun Lee, and another route serving Yan Chai Hospital to ply between Cheung Shan Estate and Lai Chi Kok. These routes will provide local residents (particularly the elderly) with convenient access to these two hospitals. Buses operating on these new routes will be equipped with the aforesaid barrier-free facilities on board. Detailed proposals on their routeings will be submitted to the District Councils concerned for discussion under this year’s Route Planning Programme.

### ***Fare Concessions***

10. Currently, KMB provides a variety of fare concessions to passengers (such as bus-bus interchange (“BBI”) concession schemes and section fares) which basically encompass all of its regular routes. In 2016, an average of about 630 000 passenger trips are benefitted each day. According to KMB, the fare concessions offered under all BBI concession schemes amount to over \$360 million per annum (the fare receipts in 2015 was \$6.53 billion). During our discussion with KMB on proposals for new fare concession initiatives, we have focused on whether the new concession initiatives can address the long-standing requests of passengers and whether they can suit passengers’ needs. KMB has committed that it will offer the following fare concession initiatives to benefit more passengers if granted a new 10-year franchise (please refer to **Annex C** for a list of applicable routes under different initiatives):

- (a) Introducing a long-haul route fare concession scheme for full-time students: KMB has committed to introduce a long-haul route fare concession scheme for full-time students if it is granted a new franchise, under which students can enjoy

concessionary half fare on their return trips on daytime routes solely operated by KMB with adult fare of \$12 or above<sup>4</sup>. A total of 78 KMB routes met these criteria as at end-2016. This concessions will be offered on a regular basis and will be rolled out on the commencement date of the new franchise (i.e. 1 July 2017);

(b) Offering more BBI concessions:

- (i) KMB and Long Win Bus Company Limited (“LW”) have jointly introduced a BBI concession scheme for passengers interchanging between LW’s Airbus routes (“A” routes) and KMB’s routes. Passengers can enjoy a fare discount of up to \$6 under the scheme. The scheme is applicable to a wide range of routes, covering about 310 KMB solely operated routes<sup>5</sup> and 13 LW “A” routes. KMB and LW have introduced the concession scheme in mid-November 2016 such that passengers travelling to and from the Airport could enjoy the fare concessions at the three peak travel periods, namely the Christmas, Lunar New Year and Easter holidays. Passengers’ feedback has been positive, with about 48 000 passenger trips having benefitted from the scheme in the first month;
- (ii) KMB will partner with the Hong Kong Tramways Limited to roll out inter-modal interchange fare concessions by offering free connecting journeys on trams on Hong Kong Island for passengers of 23 cross-harbour routes solely operated by KMB. Passengers who have taken trams can enjoy a fare discount of \$2.3 per trip (equivalent to the existing adult single journey fare on trams) when interchanging for the aforesaid KMB routes on Hong

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<sup>4</sup> Any student must be aged between 12 and 25 and he/she must be currently enrolled in a full-time day course offered by an acceptable institution in Hong Kong in order to be eligible for this concession scheme. To be eligible for the half fare discount on the return journey, a student must use a Personalised Octopus with “Student Status” to take a KMB solely operated route with a single adult journey fare currently at \$12 or above, and to pay for the fare of the return trip on the same route or routes within the same group on the same operative day. Any new routes meeting the fare level under the existing fare scales will be included in the scheme. Certain single bound routes are presently not included in this scheme as they do not have corresponding return trip, or the fares of their return trips fall below \$12.

<sup>5</sup> Racecourse routes, recreational routes, special routes (festive service) and feeder routes connecting Tai Po Market Station (“K” routes) are excluded.

Kong Island. KMB and Hong Kong Tramways Limited plan to launch the interchange concession initiative within the first half of 2017;

- (iii) KMB has committed to introducing 13 new BBI concession schemes, involving 78 routes, for enhancing intra-network interchange services under its new franchise. This will bring the total number of KMB's BBI schemes to around 190 to benefit more passengers, particularly those in new development areas and less accessible areas.
- (c) Alignment of fares for short-haul trips on cross-district routes and shuttle bus routes: At present, while the destinations and journey distances of certain cross-district routes and shuttle bus routes operated by KMB are comparable, their section fares offered at stops along trunk roads or bus interchanges (such as tunnel toll plazas) are different (or no section fare is offered at all). The Government and KMB have looked into the issue, and KMB has agreed to align the section fares of 72 routes with the aforesaid issue with effect from 1 July 2017. Routes with similar destinations and comparable journey distances will be placed under the same group, and the fare level for short-haul trips on all routes within the same group will be aligned with the lowest existing one. This will enable passengers to enjoy more route choices at the same fare<sup>6</sup>.

## NEXT STEPS

11. The new franchise for KMB's bus network will be valid for a period of 10 years until 1 July 2027. Although KMB has been in a profitable position in recent years due to significant drop in fuel prices, having regard to the various challenges over the medium to long term as mentioned in paragraph 5 above, we have been discussing with KMB on the aforesaid commitments in a prudent and pragmatic manner, with the

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<sup>6</sup> For instance, there are currently four KMB routes plying via MTR Tsuen Wan Station with the same terminal point at Allway Gardens but their fares for this section of journey range from \$3.5 to \$6.4. KMB will align the fares of these four routes at \$3.5 for the above section of journey. Another example is the existing 19 KMB routes heading to Tuen Mun via Tuen Road Road and observing Tuen Mun Road BBI en route. KMB will align their fares to \$8.4 for that section of journey while their present fares range from \$8.4 to \$16.6.

focus of the fare concessions and service improvement initiatives placed on areas which could benefit more passengers or specific cohorts, while ensuring that their implementation could be sustainable. While it is our established policy to encourage public transport operators to offer more fare concessions, it should be noted that public transport services are provided by private operators in accordance with commercial principles generally without government subsidies. The provision of fare concessions should thus avoid exerting fare pressure which might eventually affect the basic fare level. On this basis, after granting the new franchise, we will continue to explore with KMB and other operators the feasibility of introducing more practicable fare concessions initiatives. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the prevailing Fare Adjustment Arrangement for Franchised Buses can benefit passengers by enabling them to share the profits<sup>7</sup> yielded by bus operators in a given year with good financial performance through fare concession initiatives from time to time. The 20% same day return discount concessions currently offered by KMB for a period of 88 days is a case in point.

12. Subject to Members' support and subsequent approval by the Executive Council, the granting of a new 10-year franchise to KMB may take place in the coming few months while the new franchise will commence immediately upon expiry of the current one on 1 July 2017. After the granting of the new franchise, we will, as a matter of the procedural formalities in accordance with the past practice, move a resolution at the LegCo for disapplication of the provisions concerning the Profit Control Scheme ("PCS") to the new franchise of KMB<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> There is a Passenger Reward Arrangement under the Fare Adjustment Arrangement for franchised buses, through which any profits achieved by a franchised bus operator in a given financial year in excess of the 9.7% rate of return on average net fixed asset shall be shared equally between the operator and passengers.

<sup>8</sup> The Government decided in 1992 that the PCS would not be applicable to bus franchises granted thereafter. As an established practice, the Government will seek the LegCo's resolutions pursuant to the Ordinance for disapplication of the PCS to a new franchise prior to its commencement. As mentioned in our response to the subcommittee on subsidiary legislation for scrutinising the resolutions for disapplication of the PCS to the new franchises granted of CTB(F1) and NLB in the previous LegCo term, the Government would consider amending the provisions concerning the PCS as and when an opportune opportunity arises, such as when amendments are also required to other provisions of the Ordinance. In the meantime, the Government will continue the practice of moving a resolution to achieve the purpose of disapplication of the PCS to a new franchise.

13. Members are invited to note the above and offer views.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**Transport Department**  
**January 2017**

## **Follow-up on the Views of the Public**

In the course of discussion on the new franchise with KMB, TD has followed up with KMB on the major views canvassed from the public consultation on the new franchise. The following suggestions raised by the public will be implemented through new franchise conditions or specific commitments to be made by KMB –

### **A. Service quality (including passenger facilities and information)**

- to provide free Wi-Fi service in bus compartments (*see paragraph 9(a) of this paper*);
- to enhance passenger waiting environment at bus stops, termini and major bus interchanges (*see paragraphs 9(b) and (c) of this paper*);
- to provide information on seat vacancy on the upper deck (*see paragraph 9(e) of this paper*);
- to provide more comprehensive barrier-free facilities, bus stop announcement system and low-floor buses (*see “Service quality” of Annex B*); and
- to allow carriage of foldable bicycles on board (*see “Service quality” of Annex B*).

### **B. Fare concessions**

- to introduce new fare concession schemes (*see paragraph 10(a) of this paper*);
- to provide more BBI concession schemes (*see paragraph 10(b) of this paper*); and
- to provide more section fares (*see paragraph 10(c) of this paper*).

### **C. Environmental initiative**

- to use more environmentally-friendly buses (*see “Environmental improvement” of Annex B*).



#### **D. Government regulation on bus service**

- to stipulate more clearly the timeframe for responding to passenger complaints and enquiries (*see “Enhancement of government regulation” of Annex B*).

2. Regarding the views on audio-visual broadcasting in bus compartments, there is at present a requirement for the sound volume of audio-visual broadcasting systems to be comparable with the ambient level, with a difference of no more than 2 dB. In addition, a “quiet zone” should also be designated at the rear part of the lower deck of a bus. During the public consultation on the new franchise of KMB, some members of the public have expressed views on the sound volume of the systems. As the existing regulatory arrangements for audio-visual broadcasting systems are applicable to all bus operators, TD has been exploring improvement measures with all operators through the established channels. Starting from mid-2017, the “quiet zone” on the franchised buses will be expanded to cover the entire lower deck. TD will continue to regulate the sound volume of the audio-visual broadcasting systems and follow up on the views of passengers through the established mechanism.

3. During the public consultation period, we have also received some comments on the arrangements concerning the Franchise Accounts (on aspects such as handling of advertising revenue, revenue from the disposal of property/land and fuel expenses). The scope of “operating receipts” under the Franchise Accounts is defined in section 26 of the Ordinance, which is equally applicable to all six bus franchises. Specifically, the provision stipulates that any other revenue, including revenue from advertisements, derived from the use of fixed assets by a grantee, is to be regarded as operating receipts and shall be included in the Franchise Accounts. Such non-fare box revenue may help relieving fare pressure. The same provision also stipulates that the proceeds of the sale of investments or fixed or other assets shall not be included in the Franchise Accounts. Meanwhile, according to the requirements of the respective franchises (including KMB’s existing franchise), all grantees have to publish a booklet of “Fuller Disclosure” annually to disclose their operational and financial information over the past year for public monitoring. This requirement will continue to be included in the new franchise of KMB.

4. As regards the views on permitting the carriage of pets on

buses, the existing Public Bus Services Regulations (Cap. 230A) stipulates that no animal shall be permitted to be carried on the bus (other than a guide dog accompanying a blind person). Due to the limited space in the bus compartment and the crowdedness during certain periods of the day, in considering whether passengers are to be permitted to carry their pets on board the buses, we have to strike a balance among various factors, including the reaction of pets in a crowded and confined environment as well as the impact on other passengers. We will continue to keep in view the public views on this issue so as to consider whether there should be any changes to the existing arrangements.

5. As regards views on other issues, such as staff management (including bus captains' training and rest time arrangements), monitoring of service frequencies, route planning, general facilities and passenger information, daily bus operations, fare structure and adjustment arrangements, as well as enhancement of public engagement, etc., TD will continue to follow up with KMB through the established channels with a view to further enhancing service quality.

**Clauses and commitments of the most recently granted franchises**

KMB has agreed to take on board fully the clauses and commitments as adopted in the two most recently granted franchises in 2015 (i.e. the franchises for Citybus (Franchise 1) and NLB), details of which are provided below -

**Bus service**

- The new franchise will empower the Commissioner for Transport to require KMB to provide facilities and installation for enhancement of bus safety, and provide a barrier-free and elderly-friendly travel environment. Specific initiatives are as follows -

*Service quality*

- (i) adopting bus design with barrier-free and friendly features for the elderly and people with disabilities when setting specifications for new buses. Major ones include low-floor and wheelchair accessible designs, provision of wheelchair parking spaces and the associated safety restraint system, designated priority seats for persons in need, enhanced railing design, easily reached pushed buttons, bus stop announcement system, and large electronic destination and route number display panels;
- (ii) providing facilities and installation to further enhance safety, such as facilities and installation that can prevent or reduce potential fire hazards on all new buses. All buses of KMB will be retrofitted with such facilities by end-2021;
- (iii) allowing foldable bicycles, which are properly folded and will not cause any hazard to other passengers, to be carried on board; and
- (iv) providing passenger seating facilities at newly-built covered bus stops as far as practicable.

### *Passenger information*

- (i) the new franchise will enhance the regulatory power of the Commissioner over the type, form and manner of information to be provided by KMB to passengers to ensure provision of suitable service information to passengers through better means ; and
- (ii) providing real-time bus arrival information through website and smartphone application, and installing display panels at suitable bus stops in phases for disseminating such information.

### **Enhancement of government regulation**

- The new franchise will require KMB to publish the service pledge, setting out a reasonable timeframe for responding to complaints and suggestions from the public, as well as the achievement rate of its passenger service pledge;
- The new franchise will strengthen regulation over the financial and accounting arrangements of KMB, for example, by specifying more clearly in the franchises the calculation of depreciation of fixed assets; and
- The new franchise will require KMB to conduct open tendering for all material procurement contracts as far as practicable, and to seek prior approval of the Board of Directors if open tendering cannot be arranged.

### **Environmental improvement**

- The new franchise will require KMB, as far as reasonably practicable, to acquire the most environmentally-friendly buses in terms of exhaust emissions that are technologically proven and commercially available, with the ultimate objective of switching to zero emission buses. To further improve roadside air quality, KMB is also required to deploy low emission buses (buses of emission standards of Euro IV or above) for operation at low emission zones in Central, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok as delineated by the Environmental Protection Department.

**Bus routes to be covered under new fare concession schemes  
as committed by KMB**

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**Table 1 : Long-haul routes fare concession scheme for full-time students (78 routes meeting the qualifying criteria of the scheme as at end-2016)**

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
52X	Tuen Mun Central – Mong Kok (Park Avenue)
58X	Leung King Estate – Mong Kok East Station
59X	Tuen Mun Pier Head – Mong Kok East Station
60X	Tuen Mun Central – Jordan (To Wah Road)
61X	Tuen Mun Central – Kowloon City Ferry
62X	Tuen Mun Central – Lei Yue Mun Estate
63X	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate) – Jordan (To Wah Road)
66X	Tai Hing – Olympic Station
67X	Siu Hong Court – Mong Kok East Station
68X	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate) / Yuen Long (West) – Mong Kok (Park Avenue)
69C	Tin Shui Wai (Tin Yan) – Kwun Tong Ferry
69X	Tin Shui Wai (Tin Shui) – Jordan (To Wah Road)
74C	Kau Lung Hang – Kwun Tong Ferry
74D	Kau Lung Hang – Kwun Tong Ferry
74E	Tai Mei Tuk – Kwun Tong Ferry
252B	Handsome Court – Tsim Sha Tsui
258D	Po Tin – Lam Tin Station
258P	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate) – Lam Tin Station
258S	Shan King Estate – Lam Tin Station
258X	Po Tin – Kwun Tong Ferry
259B	Tuen Mun Pier Head – Tsim Sha Tsui
259C	Sun Tuen Mun Centre – Tsim Sha Tsui
259D	Lung Mun Oasis / Tuen Mun Pier Head (Siu Hei Court) – Lei Yue Mun Estate
259X	Lung Mun Oasis / Tuen Mun Pier Head (Siu Hei Court) – Kwun Tong Ferry
260B	Tuen Mun Central – Tsim Sha Tsui
260X	Po Tin – Hung Hom Station
261	Sam Shing – Tin Ping Estate
261B	Sam Shing – Kowloon Station
261P	Ng Lau Road (Tsing Lun Road) – Tin Ping Estate
263	Tuen Mun Station – Sha Tin Station
265B	Tin Heng Estate – Mong Kok (Park Avenue)
265S	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Tai Po Industrial Estate
267X	Siu Hong Court – Lam Tin Station
268B	Long Ping Station – Hung Hom Ferry
268C	Long Ping Station – Kwun Tong Ferry

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
268P	Yuen Long (Shan Shui House) – Kwun Tong Ferry
268X	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate) – Jordan (To Wah Road)
269B	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Hung Hom Ferry
269C	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre / Tin Tsz Estate – Kwun Tong Ferry
269D	Tin Fu – Lek Yuen
269S	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Kwun Tong Ferry
270A	Sheung Shui – Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)
270B	Sheung Shui – Sham Shui Po
270C	Luen Wo Hui – Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)
270D	Luen Wo Hui – Sham Shui Po
270P	Sheung Shui – Kowloon Station
270S	Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road) – Fanling (Luen Wo Hui)
277E	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277P	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277X	Luen Wo Hui – Lam Tin Station
278P	Luen Wo Hui – Tsuen Wan (Nina Tower)
278X	Sheung Shui – Tsuen Wan (Nina Tower)
279X	Luen Wo Hui – Tsing Yi Station
373	Sheung Shui – Central (Hong Kong Station Public Transport Interchange)
603	Ping Tin – Central (Ferry Piers)
603P	Central (Ferry Piers) – Ping Tin
603S	Ping Tin – Central
673	Sheung Shui – Central (Hong Kong Station Public Transport Interchange)
934	Bayview Garden – Wan Chai
934A	Allway Gardens – Wan Chai (Fleming Road)
935	On Yam / Shek Lei (Tai Loong Street) – Wan Chai
936	Lei Muk Shue Estate Public Transport Interchange – Causeway Bay (Cotton Path)
960	Kin Sang – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960A	Central (Worldwide House) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
960B	Quarry Bay (King's Road) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
960P	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Yuen Road) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960S	Fu Tai Estate – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960X	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Yuen Road) – Quarry Bay (King's Road)
961	Shan King Estate – Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre)

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
961P	Leung King Estate – Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre)
968	Yuen Long (West) – Causeway Bay (Tin Hau)
968X	Yuen Long (West) – Quarry Bay (King's Road)
978	Fanling (Wah Ming) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
978A	Fanling (Luen Wo Hui) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
978B	Fanling (Chi Fuk Circuit) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
B1	Tin Tsz Estate – Lok Ma Chau Station
T270	Fanling (Cheung Wah) – Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)
T277	Sheung Shui – Lam Tin Station



**Table 2 : Routes to be covered under the new interchange concession scheme with Hong Kong Tramways Limited (23 routes)**

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
108	Kai Yip – Braemar Hill
373	Sheung Shui – Central (Hong Kong Station Public Transport Interchange)
603	Ping Tin – Central (Ferry Piers)
603P	Central (Ferry Piers) – Ping Tin
603S	Ping Tin – Central
673	Sheung Shui – Central (Hong Kong Station Public Transport Interchange)
934	Bayview Garden – Wan Chai
934A	Allway Gardens – Wan Chai (Fleming Road)
935	On Yam / Shek Lei (Tai Loong Street) – Wan Chai
936	Lei Muk Shue Estate Public Transport Interchange – Causeway Bay (Cotton Path)
960	Kin Sang – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960A	Central (Worldwide House) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
960B	Quarry Bay (King’s Road) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
960P	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Yuen Road) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960S	Fu Tai Estate – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960X	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Yuen Road) – Quarry Bay (King’s Road)
961	Shan King Estate – Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre)
961P	Leung King Estate – Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre)
968	Yuen Long (West) – Causeway Bay (Tin Hau)
968X	Yuen Long (West) – Quarry Bay (King’s Road)
978	Fanling (Wah Ming) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
978A	Fanling (Luen Wo Hui) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
978B	Fanling (Chi Fuk Circuit) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange

**Table 3 : Routes to be covered under new BBI concession schemes within KMB's network (78 routes)**

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
1	Chuk Yuen Estate – Star Ferry
1A	Sau Mau Ping (Central) – Star Ferry
2	So Uk – Star Ferry
2D	Chak On Estate – Tung Tau Estate
2F	Tsz Wan Shan (North) – Cheung Sha Wan
3C	Tsz Wan Shan (North) – China Ferry Terminal
3D	Tsz Wan Shan (Central) – Kwun Tong (Yue Man Square)
5M	Kai Tak (Tak Long Estate) – Kowloon Bay Station (circular)
6	Lai Chi Kok – Star Ferry
6D	Ngau Tau Kok – Mei Foo
7	Lok Fu – Star Ferry
11B	Kwun Tong (Tsui Ping Road) – Kowloon City Ferry
11C	Chuk Yuen Estate – Sau Mau Ping (Upper)
11D	Lok Fu – Kwun Tong Ferry
12A	Whampoa Garden – Cheung Sha Wan (Sham Mong Road)
14	Lei Yue Mun Estate – China Ferry Terminal
15	Ping Tin – Hung Hom Ferry
16	Lam Tin (Kwong Tin Estate) – Mong Kok (Park Avenue)
16M	Kwun Tong Station – Lam Tin (Hong Wah Court) (circular)
17	Kwun Tong (Yue Man Square) – Oi Man
24	Kai Yip – Mong Kok (circular)
28B	Kai Tak (Kai Ching Estate) – Choi Fook
38	Kwai Shing (East) – Ping Tin
40	Tsuen Wan (Nina Tower) – Laguna City
42C	Cheung Hang – Lam Tin Station
57M	Shan King Estate – Lai King (North)
58M	Leung King Estate – Kwai Fong Station
58P	Kwai Fong Station – Tin King Estate (Tin Yue House)
59M	Tuen Mun Pier Head – Tsuen Wan Station
60M	Tuen Mun Station – Tsuen Wan Station
61M	Yau Oi (South) – Lai King (North)
61X	Tuen Mun Central – Kowloon City Ferry
62X	Tuen Mun Central – Lei Yue Mun Estate
66M	Tai Hing – Tsuen Wan Station
67M	Siu Hong Court – Kwai Fong Station
69C	Tin Shui Wai (Tin Yan) – Kwun Tong Ferry
74A	Tai Wo – Kai Yip
74X	Tai Po Central – Kwun Tong Ferry
75X	Fu Shin Estate – Kowloon City Ferry

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
80	Mei Lam – Kwun Tong Ferry
80P	Hin Keng – Kwun Tong Ferry
80X	Chun Shek – Kwun Tong Ferry
81K	Sun Tin Wai – Sui Wo Court
82K	Mei Lam – Wong Nai Tau
83A	Shui Chuen O – Kwun Tong Ferry
83X	Wong Nai Tau – Kwun Tong Ferry
84M	Chevalier Garden – Lok Fu
85X	Ma On Shan Town Centre – Hung Hom Ferry
87D	Kam Ying Court / Ma On Shan Town Centre – Hung Hom Station
88X	Sha Tin Station – Ping Tin (circular)
89	Lek Yuen – Kwun Tong Station
89B	Sha Tin Wai – Kwun Tong Station
89C	Heng On – Kwun Tong (Tsui Ping Road)
89D	Wu Kai Sha Station – Lam Tin Station
89X	Sha Tin Station – Kwun Tong Station
91M	Po Lam – Diamond Hill Station
91P	Diamond Hill Station / Choi Hung Station – Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
98A	Hang Hau (North) – Ngau Tau Kok Station (circular)
203C	Tai Hang Tung – Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)
211	Tsui Chuk Garden – Wong Tai Sin Station (circular)
219X	Laguna City – Tsim Sha Tsui (circular)
258D	Po Tin – Lam Tin Station
258P	Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate) – Lam Tin Station
258S	Shan King Estate – Lam Tin Station
259D	Lung Mun Oasis / Tuen Mun Pier Head (Siu Hei Court) – Lei Yue Mun Estate
260C	Sam Shing – Kwai Fong Station
268C	Long Ping Station – Kwun Tong Ferry
269C	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre / Tin Tsz Estate – Kwun Tong Ferry
276B	Tin Fu – Sheung Shui (Choi Yuen)
277E	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277P	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277X	Luen Wo Hui – Lam Tin Station
281A	Kwong Yuen – Kowloon Station
288	Shui Chuen O – Sha Tin Central (circular)
290	Choi Ming – Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange
290A	Choi Ming – Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
296A	Sheung Tak – Ngau Tau Kok Station (circular)
B1	Tin Tsz Estate – Lok Ma Chau Station

**Table 4: Cross-district routes and shuttle routes with fares for short-haul trips to be aligned (72 routes)**

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
1A	Sau Mau Ping (Central) – Star Ferry
2F	Tsz Wan Shan (North) – Cheung Sha Wan
3C	Tsz Wan Shan (North) – China Ferry Terminal
11C	Chuk Yuen Estate – Sau Mau Ping (Upper)
23M	Lok Wah – Shun Lee (circular)
26M	Choi Hung – Kwun Tong (circular)
30	Allway Gardens – Cheung Sha Wan
30X	Allway Gardens – Whampoa Garden
31	Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange – Shek Lei (circular)
34	Kwai Shing (Central) – Bayview Garden
35A	On Yam – Tsim Sha Tsui East
36	Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange – Lei Muk Shue Estate Public Transport Interchange (circular)
36A	Lei Muk Shue Estate Public Transport Interchange – Cheung Sha Wan (Sham Mong Road)
36B	Lei Muk Shue Estate Public Transport Interchange – Jordan (To Wah Road)
37	Kwai Shing (Central) – Olympic Station
38	Kwai Shing (East) – Ping Tin
39A	Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange – Allway Gardens (circular)
40X	Wu Kai Sha Station – Kwai Chung Estate
46X	Hin Keng – Mei Foo
47X	Sha Tin (Chun Shek / Shui Chuen O) – Kwai Shing (East)
48X	Bayview Garden – Wo Che
49X	Kwong Yuen – Tsing Yi Ferry
57M	Shan King Estate – Lai King (North)
58M	Leung King Estate – Kwai Fong Station
58P	Kwai Fong Station – Tin King Estate (Tin Yue House)
61M	Yau Oi (South) – Lai King (North)
61X	Tuen Mun Central – Kowloon City Ferry
67M	Siu Hong Court – Kwai Fong Station
68E	Yuen Long Park – Tsing Yi Station
72	Tai Wo – Cheung Sha Wan
72A	Tai Wai Station – Tai Po Industrial Estate
72X	Tai Po Central – Mong Kok (Park Avenue)
73X	Tsuen Wan (Nina Tower) – Fu Shin Estate
74A	Tai Wo – Kai Yip

<b>KMB Route</b>	<b>Terminating Location</b>
74B	Kowloon Bay – Tai Po Central
74D	Kau Lung Hang – Kwun Tong Ferry
74P	Kwun Tong Ferry – Tai Po Central
74X	Tai Po Central – Kwun Tong Ferry
75X	Fu Shin Estate – Kowloon City Ferry
80	Mei Lam – Kwun Tong Ferry
82K	Mei Lam – Wong Nai Tau
85K	Heng On – Sha Tin Station
85M	Kam Ying Court – Wong Tai Sin (circular)
85X	Ma On Shan Town Centre – Hung Hom Ferry
86	Wong Nai Tau – Mei Foo
86C	Lee On – Cheung Sha Wan
86K	Kam Ying Court – Sha Tin Station
86S	Kam Ying Court – Sha Tin Station
87D	Kam Ying Court / Ma On Shan Town Centre – Hung Hom Station
89D	Wu Kai Sha Station – Lam Tin Station
234X	Bayview Garden – Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)
235	On Yam – Tsuen Wan (circular)
258D	Po Tin – Lam Tin Station
259D	Lung Mun Oasis / Tuen Mun Pier Head (Siu Hei Court) – Lei Yue Mun Estate
261	Sam Shing – Tin Ping Estate
263	Tuen Mun Station – Sha Tin Station
265S	Tin Shui Wai Town Centre – Tai Po Industrial Estate
271	Fu Heng – Tsim Sha Tsui (Canton Road)
274P	Wu Kai Sha Station – Tai Po Industrial Estate
277E	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277P	Tin Ping Estate – Lam Tin Station
277X	Luen Wo Hui – Lam Tin Station
279X	Luen Wo Hui – Tsing Yi Station
286C	Lee On – Sham Shui Po
286M	Ma On Shan Town Centre – Diamond Hill Station (circular)
286X	Hin Keng – Sham Shui Po (circular)
960	Kin Sang – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange
960A	Central (Worldwide House) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
960B	Quarry Bay (King's Road) – Hung Shui Kiu (Hung Fuk Estate)
961	Shan King Estate – Wan Chai (Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre)
978	Fanling (Wah Ming) – Wan Chai (North) Temporary Public Transport Interchange



**審計署署長**

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5 April 2013

The President of the Legislative Council,  
Legislative Council Complex,  
Hong Kong.

Sir,

In accordance with the paper tabled in the Provisional Legislative Council on 11 February 1998 on the Scope of Government Audit in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region — ‘Value for Money Audits’, I have the honour to submit my Report No. 60 on the results of value for money audits completed between October 2012 and February 2013 in accordance with the value for money audit guidelines laid down in the paper. These guidelines are also attached.

Yours faithfully,

( David Sun )

# CONTENTS

The Director of Audit's Report No. 60 contains the following chapters:

<b>Chapter</b>	<b>Subject</b>
1	Conservation of monuments and historic buildings
2	Administration of road safety measures
3	Pre-primary Education Voucher Scheme
4	Development and management of parks and gardens
5	Management of government advertisements and publications by the Information Services Department
6	Tung Chung Road Improvement Project
7	Preventive education and enlisting public support against corruption
8	Provision of GovWiFi service



# VALUE FOR MONEY AUDIT GUIDELINES

## Value for money audit

Value for money audit is an examination into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which any bureau of the Government Secretariat, department, agency, other public body, public office, or audited organisation has discharged its functions. Value for money audit is carried out under a set of guidelines tabled in the Provisional Legislative Council by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee on 11 February 1998. The guidelines were agreed between the Public Accounts Committee and the Director of Audit and have been accepted by the Administration.

### 2. The guidelines are:

- firstly, the Director of Audit should have great freedom in presenting his reports to the Legislative Council. He may draw attention to any circumstance which comes to his knowledge in the course of audit, and point out its financial implications. Subject to the guidelines, he will not comment on policy decisions of the Executive and Legislative Councils, save from the point of view of their effect on the public purse;
- secondly, in the event that the Director of Audit, during the course of carrying out an examination into the implementation of policy objectives, reasonably believes that at the time policy objectives were set and decisions made there may have been a lack of sufficient, relevant and reliable financial and other data available upon which to set such policy objectives or to make such decisions, and that critical underlying assumptions may not have been made explicit, he may carry out an investigation as to whether that belief is well founded. If it appears to be so, he should bring the matter to the attention of the Legislative Council with a view to further inquiry by the Public Accounts Committee. As such an investigation may involve consideration of the methods by which policy objectives have been sought, the Director should, in his report to the Legislative Council on the matter in question, not make any judgement on the issue, but rather present facts upon which the Public Accounts Committee may make inquiry;
- thirdly, the Director of Audit may also consider as to whether policy objectives have been determined, and policy decisions taken, with appropriate authority;

- fourthly, he may also consider whether there are satisfactory arrangements for considering alternative options in the implementation of policy, including the identification, selection and evaluation of such options;
- fifthly, he may also consider as to whether established policy aims and objectives have been clearly set out; whether subsequent decisions on the implementation of policy are consistent with the approved aims and objectives, and have been taken with proper authority at the appropriate level; and whether the resultant instructions to staff accord with the approved policy aims and decisions and are clearly understood by those concerned;
- sixthly, he may also consider as to whether there is conflict or potential conflict between different policy aims or objectives, or between the means chosen to implement them;
- seventhly, he may also consider how far, and how effectively, policy aims and objectives have been translated into operational targets and measures of performance and whether the costs of alternative levels of service and other relevant factors have been considered, and are reviewed as costs change; and
- finally, he may also be entitled to exercise the powers given to him under section 9 of the Audit Ordinance (Cap. 122).

3. The Director of Audit is not entitled to question the merits of the policy objectives of any bureau of the Government Secretariat, department, agency, other public body, public office, or audited organisation in respect of which an examination is being carried out or, subject to the guidelines, the methods by which such policy objectives have been sought, but he may question the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the means used to achieve them.

4. Value for money audit is conducted in accordance with a programme of work which is determined annually by the Director of Audit. The procedure of the Public Accounts Committee provides that the Committee shall hold informal consultations with the Director of Audit from time to time, so that the Committee can suggest fruitful areas for value for money audit by the Director of Audit.

# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(4)1270/15-16  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB4/PL/TP/1

## **Panel on Transport**

**Minutes of meeting held on  
Wednesday, 16 December 2015, at 8:30 am  
in Conference Room 3 of the Legislative Council Complex**

**Members present :** Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP (Chairman)  
Hon TANG Ka-piu, JP (Deputy Chairman)  
Hon LEE Cheuk-yan  
Hon James TO Kun-sun  
Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP  
Hon WONG Kwok-hing, BBS, MH  
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP  
Hon CHAN Hak-kan, JP  
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip  
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, JP  
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH  
Hon YIU Si-wing, BBS  
Hon Gary FAN Kwok-wai  
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP  
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, BBS, MH, JP  
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki  
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP  
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH  
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-ki, SBS, MH, JP  
Hon Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun, BBS, MH, JP  
Hon Tony TSE Wai-chuen, BBS

**Members absent** : Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-ye, GBS, JP  
Hon WONG Yuk-man  
Hon Claudia MO  
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP

**Public Officers attending** : **Agenda item III**

Professor Anthony CHEUNG, GBS, JP  
Secretary for Transport and Housing

Ms Ivy LAW  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)<sup>3</sup>

Mrs Ingrid YEUNG, JP  
Commissioner for Transport

Mr Chris CHAN  
Assistant Commissioner/Planning  
Transport Department

Mr Matthew D LINDSAY  
Chief Superintendent/Traffic  
Hong Kong Police Force

Mr Wayne CHAN  
Superintendent (Law Revision & Projects)/Traffic  
Hong Kong Police Force

**Agenda item IV**

Professor Anthony CHEUNG, GBS, JP  
Secretary for Transport and Housing

Ms Ivy LAW  
Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing  
(Transport)<sup>3</sup>

Mrs Ingrid YEUNG, JP  
Commissioner for Transport

Mr Chris CHAN  
Assistant Commissioner/Planning  
Transport Department

Mr Matthew D LINDSAY  
Chief Superintendent/Traffic  
Hong Kong Police Force

Mr Wayne CHAN  
Superintendent (Law Revision & Projects)/Traffic  
Hong Kong Police Force

**Clerk in attendance :** Ms Sophie LAU  
Chief Council Secretary (4)6

**Staff in attendance :** Ms Macy NG  
Senior Council Secretary (4)6

Ms Emily LIU  
Legislative Assistant (4)6

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Action

The Deputy Chairman said that as the Chairman would attend the meeting later due to other urgent commitments, he would chair the meeting on behalf of the Chairman.

**I. Information papers issued since the last meeting**

(LC Paper Nos. CB(4)248/15-16(01) - Letters from Hon TANG  
and (02) Ka-piu on the transport  
problems at Central and  
design and use of spiral  
roundabout

LC Paper No. CB(4)316/15-16(01) - Letter from Hon TANG  
Ka-piu on the delay of the  
Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao  
Bridge Project

LC Paper No. CB(4)347/15-16(01) - Letter from Hon Claudia  
MO requesting to hold a

public hearing on the franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited)

2. Members noted the above papers issued since the last meeting.

**II. Items for discussion at the next meeting on 15 January 2016**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(01) - List of outstanding items for discussion

LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(02) - List of follow-up actions)

3. Members agreed to discuss the following items at the next regular meeting to be held on 15 January 2016 –

- (a) Briefing by the Secretary for Transport and Housing on the Chief Executive's 2016 Policy Address; and
- (b) Franchise for the bus network of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co. (1933) Limited.

4. To allow sufficient time for discussion, the Deputy Chairman suggested advancing the next meeting to start at 10:15 am and end at 1:00 pm. Members agreed.

*(At 8:43 am, the Chairman took over the Chairmanship.)*

**III. Increase in fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(03) - Administration's paper on increase in fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences

LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(04) - Paper on congestion-related traffic offences prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief))

5. At the invitation of the Chairman, Secretary for Transport and Housing ("STH") briefed members on the Administration's proposal to increase the fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences.

6. STH said that the number of cases involving commission of congestion-related traffic offences had increased by 44% (from about 750 000 to about 1 080 000 fixed penalty tickets issued) between 2010 and 2014. Also, the "Report on Study of Road Traffic Congestion in Hong Kong" submitted by the Transport Advisory Committee ("TAC") recommended the Administration to raise the fixed penalty charges to restore the deterrent effect. In view of these, the Administration proposed to increase the fixed penalty charges by 50%, i.e. traffic offences currently set at \$320 and \$450 would increase to \$480 and \$680 respectively, with effect from 1 January 2017.

7. STH also explained that the Administration considered an increase of fixed penalty charges in tandem with the Composite Consumer Price Index ("CCPI") could restore the deterrent effect eroded by inflation over the years, and any increase of a lower percentage would reduce such effect. He added that on the enforcement side, whilst the Police would continue to prioritize taking action against traffic offences that had road safety concerns, the Police would seek to increase monitoring the particularly congested areas, such as Central and Tsim Sha Tsui.

#### Shortage of parking spaces

8. Relating the transport trade's dissatisfaction with the Administration's proposal to increase fixed penalty for illegal parking, Mr Frankie YICK considered that the shortage of parking spaces was the major reason leading to illegal parking. Due to lack of parking facilities, some drivers had to park their vehicles, in particular commercial vehicles, by the roadside. He therefore suggested that the Administration should increase provision of parking spaces, such as building more public car parks. Further, Mr YICK and Dr KWOK Ka-ki expressed worry that recent closure of some public car parks, such as Middle Road Car Park in Tsim Sha Tsui, would aggravate the shortage problem of parking spaces. Given the shortage of proper loading/unloading bays, Dr KWOK considered that drivers of goods vehicles were forced to park illegally. He therefore asked the Administration to implement measures to address the problem.

9. In reply, STH explained that apart from the proposed increase in fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences, the Administration would actually adopt a multi-pronged approach to tackle the road congestion problem. For instance, the Administration would conduct a parking policy review, with

priority accorded to considering and meeting the parking need of commercial vehicles, and also providing night-time parking spaces for commercial vehicles.

10. Mr CHAN Kam-lam, Mr Charles MOK and Mr WONG Kwok-hing also expressed concern about the shortage of parking spaces. Noting that the problem had been there for many years, Mr CHAN urged the Administration to increase the number of parking spaces in public car parks as soon as practicable. With a view to preventing aggravation of traffic congestion caused by motorists circulating on roads in search of parking spaces, Mr MOK suggested disseminating real-time information on parking vacancies of car parks to the public via smartphone applications.

11. Mr POON Siu-ping expressed that the shortage of parking spaces was particularly acute in the vicinity of popular tourist hotspots. He said that to make things worse, the operation of several temporary car parks for commercial vehicles within the Kai Tak Development Area ceased, following the progressive implementation of the Kai Tak Development. Without provision of adequate parking spaces, he considered that the Administration should shelve its proposal to raise the fixed penalty charges against illegal parking. Mr YIU Si-wing also considered that shortage of parking spaces for tourist coaches aggravated the problem of traffic congestion in certain areas, such as To Kwa Wan. Given the difficulties encountered in increasing provision of such parking spaces, he hoped that the Administration should address the problem before raising any fixed penalty for illegal parking.

12. In reply, STH explained that the Administration would follow up on TAC's recommendations by adopting a multi-pronged approach to tackle road traffic congestion problem, such as enhancing publicity and education efforts to encourage compliance with traffic rules and regulations. He also said that when formulating measures to improve traffic conditions, the Administration would strive to balance the needs of various groups in the community, including those of motorists and local residents.

13. In response to Mr Jeffrey LAM's enquiry about the Administration's long-term measures to alleviate the problem of insufficient parking spaces, STH advised that there were around 645 000 parking spaces for private cars and van-type light goods vehicles, which was greater than the total number of these types of licensed vehicles of around 550 000. Whilst the overall number of parking spaces could generally meet the demand, the Administration would take into account whether supply and demand in certain districts was mismatched.



14. The Deputy Chairman expressed that the aforesaid overall supply for and demand of parking spaces in Hong Kong was unable to indicate mismatch of parking spaces in various districts, such as Tung Chung. Due to land resumption by the Administration so as to increase the supply of residential units, he expressed worry that the number of sites which were being used as temporary car parks were dwindling. STH replied that given scarce land resources in Hong Kong, the Administration spared no effort to balance the needs of housing, social and economic developments.

15. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan also considered that the overall supply and demand of parking spaces presented by the Administration could not truly reflect the existing problem of inadequate parking spaces. He opined that the Administration should pay due regard to this problem, rather than raising any fixed penalty against congestion-related traffic offences. In view of the lack of parking bays along the roads, he expressed worry that workers could not load or unload goods within the shortest distance and consequently, this might pose a threat to their occupational safety. In reply, STH reiterated that the Administration would adopt a multi-pronged approach to tackle the road congestion problem, such as increase in provision of parking spaces in certain districts to meet the parking needs. Also, STH said that the average utilization of certain public car parks was not high, such as around 29% for City Hall Car Park.

16. With a view to better understanding the supply and demand of car parking spaces in Hong Kong, Mr Christopher CHUNG urged the Administration to provide detailed information on the provision of parking spaces in each district. In respect of the aforesaid utilization rate of public car parks, Mr Frankie YICK suggested that the Administration should not only consider average utilization rates, but also the peak-hour figures.

#### Traffic management and enforcement

17. Noting that some drivers parked illegally to pick up/set down their bosses at certain busy areas, in particular Central, Mr WONG Kwok-hing expressed worry that increase in fixed penalty for traffic offences might not solve the problem. Instead, he suggested stepping up traffic enforcement actions, such as towing away illegally parked vehicles to alleviate road traffic congestion. In view of poor traffic management, Mr WONG expressed that some vehicles were forced to stop illegally inside the yellow box marking at intersections during serious traffic congestion and it would be unfair to penalize those drivers. In response, Chief Superintendent/Traffic of the Hong Kong Police Force ("CSP/T") advised that depending on the unique characteristics of

each district, the Police would take appropriate enforcement actions when necessary.

18. Mr Charles MOK, Mr POON Siu-ping, and Mr LEE Cheuk-yan also expressed concern about road traffic congestion caused by drivers who parked illegally to pick up/set down their bosses at certain busy areas, in particular Central. Mr Christopher CHUNG added that illegal parking in business areas, in particular Central, was so rampant that double and even triple parking was common. As such, they urged the Administration to pay due regard to enhance traffic management and enforcement to alleviate road traffic congestion. Besides, Mr MOK suggested that the Police should improve their technology in issuing fixed penalty tickets by drawing experience from other places/countries, say the Mainland.

19. In respect of rampant illegal parking and deteriorating road traffic conditions, Mr Jeffrey LAM suggested strengthening enforcement actions against congestion-related traffic offences by deploying more police officers or traffic wardens to discharge duties in the most affected areas. Similarly, Mr CHAN Kam-lam expressed that the Administration should enhance enforcement actions or otherwise, raising fixed penalty charges would not have any deterrent effect. STH explained that the Police would continue their traffic enforcement actions and if necessary, they would tow away illegally parked vehicles. CSP/T supplemented that the Police would take enforcement actions as appropriate to tackle illegal parking problem.

20. Given the inadequacy of transport service in some newly developed areas such as Yuen Long South, Dr KWOK Ka-ki expressed concern that commuters had no choice but to drive to work. In response, STH explained that the Administration's policy was to encourage the public to use public transport and to avoid commuting by private cars as far as possible.

21. Provided that double parking might pose safety problem to other road users, the Chairman urged the Police to strengthen enforcement actions and to monitor the particularly congested areas more frequently. Making reference to Singapore's experience in road traffic management, he suggested installing Junction Electronic Eyes, a system of surveillance cameras, to monitor the traffic condition at major signalized junctions in Hong Kong. STH replied that the Administration would take into account his views when pursuing relevant policies.

22. Mr Frankie YICK and Mr LEUNG Che-cheung questioned why enforcement actions against illegally parked vehicles were taken after midnight in the past few months. Mr LEUNG expressed that enforcement actions

should be strengthened to alleviate road traffic congestion in the daytime to ensure smooth traffic. He also expressed concern about how the Police prioritized offences that impacted road safety, say dividing each district into different colour zones. In reply, CSP/T explained that the Police would set priorities for traffic enforcement to enhance road safety and would take enforcement actions against serious traffic offences, in particular double parking. If necessary, illegally parked vehicles would be towed away.

#### Impact on the livelihood of professional drivers

23. Mr WONG Kwok-hing relayed the transport trade's opposition to the Administration's proposal to increase fixed penalty for illegal parking as it might adversely affect the livelihood of professional drivers. He therefore suggested conducting a public hearing to collect their views. Members agreed and suggested that the public hearing should discuss increase in fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences as well as implementation of an Electronic Road Pricing Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas, which would be discussed in the following agenda item.

*(Post-meeting note: The public hearing was held on 5 January 2016.)*

24. In the light of the economic downturn and inadequate parking facilities, Mr Jeffrey LAM and Mr LEUNG Che-cheung were worried that increase in fixed penalty for traffic offences would put burdens on professional drivers. Dr KWOK Ka-ki urged the Administration not to increase the fixed penalty for commercial vehicles, but on private car first. The Deputy Chairman also expressed the view that the current fixed penalty charges, equivalent to around half of the daily salary of professional drivers, had already achieved significant deterrent effect. In addition to the expected decrease in the number of total licensed goods vehicles in the coming years, he considered that the Administration should not increase the fixed penalty charges for professional drivers.

25. In response, STH advised that legally speaking the Administration should treat offences committed by all drivers equally. Nevertheless, noting that professional drivers had substantive demand for parking spaces in their daily operation, the Administration's current policy in the provision of parking spaces was to accord, as far as possible, priority to considering and meeting the parking demand of commercial vehicles.

Proposed increase magnitude

26. To alleviate road traffic congestion, Mr Frankie YICK opined that the level of current penalties for congestion-related traffic offences, such as picking up/setting down passengers at restricted zones, could be raised. Nevertheless, he expressed the view that the proposed increase magnitude was too high for the public to accept. Considering that increase in fixed penalty against congestion-related traffic offences by 50% was too substantial, Mr CHAN Kam-lam, Mr POON Siu-ping and Mr YIU Si-wing suggested that the Administration's proposal should be implemented in phases.

27. In reply, STH advised that road traffic condition in Hong Kong had been deteriorating in recent years, and rampant illegal parking and loading/unloading activities in restricted zones further aggravated traffic conditions. The Administration proposed to raise the fixed penalty charges against congestion-related traffic offences by 50% to restore the deterrent effect. STH explained that the level of the fixed penalties was last reviewed in 1994 and remained the same up to the present. Having regard to CCPI increase in the past two decades, the Administration proposed to raise the fixed penalties to restore the deterrent effect of fixed penalty tickets. He added that the Administration welcomed views from members and the public on the said proposal.

Motion

28. After discussion, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan moved the following motion, which was seconded by Mr Frankie YICK –

"本委員會反對政府在未解決車位錯配，執法乏力的情況下，增加違例泊車罰款。"

(Translation)

"That this Panel opposes the Government raising the level of parking fines when the mismatch of parking spaces remains unsolved and law enforcement is lacking in strength."

29. The Chairman put the motion to vote. Eight members voted for, no member voted against it, and one member abstained from voting. The Chairman declared that the motion was carried.

30. In response, STH said that the Administration's proposal to raise fixed penalty for congestion-related traffic offences covered offences not related to parking. The Administration would take into account members' views and concerns.

**IV. Public engagement for Electronic Road Pricing Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas**

(LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(05)) - Administration's paper on Electronic Road Pricing Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas

LC Paper No. CB(4)344/15-16(06) - Paper on electronic road pricing prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (background brief))

31. At the invitation of the Chairman, STH briefed members on the proposed Electronic Road Pricing ("ERP") pilot scheme in Central and its adjacent areas ("the Pilot Scheme").

32. STH said that road traffic congestion had been deteriorating, with a general decline in car journey speed across Hong Kong. On some major traffic corridors (e.g. Des Voeux Road West and Chater Road) on Hong Kong Island, cars only travelled at around 10 km/hour during peak hours, a speed that was not much faster than an adult's average walking speed of 4 to 5 km/hour. Road traffic congestion undermined the mobility, connectivity and livability of the city. STH said that the economy, air quality and image of Hong Kong as a world-class metropolis were also adversely affected by traffic congestion.

33. STH further said that to step up the Government's on-going effort to tackle traffic congestion, he had invited TAC in 2014 to study the matter. The TAC submitted a study report in December 2014 and recommended a total of 12 short, medium and long-term measures to tackle road traffic congestion. The Government agreed in principle with TAC's recommendations and considered it necessary to adopt a multi-pronged strategy to tackle road traffic congestion. One of the recommendations made by the TAC was that the Government should commence the early planning of an ERP pilot scheme in the Central District. STH said that inadequate protection of privacy was one of the public concerns when Hong Kong considered to introduce ERP in the

1980s. Over the years ERP had already been successfully implemented in a number of overseas cities such as Singapore, London and Gothenburg. With the advancement in technology, privacy issues had been addressed to a large extent. STH noted from the information paper prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat that a delegation from the Panel had visited Singapore in 2014 to study their ERP system and the delegation considered that Hong Kong could implement ERP by making reference to Singapore's experience. STH pointed out that the Government agreed with TAC that ERP was an effective traffic management tool to rationalize the traffic flow in congested areas. The Central District, being the central business district of Hong Kong, was a suitable location for implementing an ERP pilot scheme in view of its congested traffic situation, the availability of a free-of-charge alternative route in the future and ample public transport services. Members noted that the Administration had launched a three-month public engagement exercise (i.e. from 11 December 2015 to 18 March 2016) to collect public views on the Pilot Scheme.

#### General views

34. The Chairman and Mr LEE Cheuk-yan indicated their support to the Pilot Scheme. The Chairman said that since the average travelling speed in urban areas had decreased by about 30% in the past decade, the New People's Party supported implementing ERP to solve the traffic congestion problem during peak hours in busy districts. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan conveyed the Labour Party's view that the use of public transport should be encouraged for the benefit of Hong Kong from the perspectives of environment protection and traffic management.

35. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok considered it an opportune time to discuss the need to implement ERP given that the Central-Wan Chai Bypass ("CWB") would be commissioned in the next few years. He requested the Administration to provide more information when conducting the public engagement exercise, including the proposed arrangements and options for motorists whose destinations were not Central but were currently forced to pass through Central to get to their destinations. He considered that it might be necessary for members to solicit views from the professional institutions, transport trades and the general public, and duly reflect their views to the Administration during the public engagement exercise.

36. Mr WONG Kwok-hing, however, opined that from his experience of being a member of the Owners' Corporation at the Provident Centre, strengthening law enforcement against illegal parking might be more effective than implementing ERP to solve the traffic congestion problem. He

suggested the Administration to consider launching a trial scheme for five consecutive weekdays to clamp and tow away vehicles which were illegally parked at relevant rampant blackspots in Central.

37. Mr Christopher CHUNG also expressed concern over the serious problem of illegal parking in Central and the lack of relevant law enforcement actions, as well as the lack of parking spaces in Central. He suggested that the Administration should address the above problems, analyse the traffic data after the commissioning of CWB and new railway lines before considering the implementation of ERP.

38. In response, STH explained that illegal parking was only one of the reasons causing traffic congestion in Central. In fact, the traffic in Central was very heavy. Due to the lack of an alternative route at present, motorists whose origins and destinations were not in Central were forced to pass through roads in Central. He said that when CWB was commissioned, those motorists could choose CWB as an alternative route. However, the Government expected that there would still be many vehicles using the roads in Central.

39. Chief Superintendent/Traffic of the Hong Kong Police Force supplemented that at present, the Police would issue a fixed penalty ticket to an offender of illegal parking. If the offender refused to cease illegal parking, a further fixed penalty ticket would be issued to the offender again. Depending on the circumstances, the vehicles causing obstruction would be towed away. He said that the Police had been taking enforcement actions at busy areas to ensure that there was no double parking. He took note of Mr WONG's views and agreed to enhance the traffic enforcement against illegal parking in the Central area.

40. Mr Frankie YICK indicated that the Liberal Party had been opposing to levying of a tax as a means to solve the traffic congestion problem. While indicating that he did not object to consulting the public on the Pilot Scheme, Mr YICK considered that the Administration should first assess the traffic situation after the commissioning of CWB and other new railway lines before considering the implementation of ERP. He also urged the Administration to discuss with the franchisee of Western Harbour Crossing ("WHC") the buy-back option to facilitate the devising of a toll adjustment scheme to rationalize the traffic distribution among the three road harbour crossings. He believed such rationalization of traffic distribution might alleviate the traffic congestion problem in Central. In addition, the Administration might strengthen the law enforcement against congestion-related traffic offences. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung also reminded the Administration that if ERP was to be implemented in Central, the effectiveness of WHC in traffic diversion

would be greatly reduced as ERP would discourage motorists from driving to Central.

41. Sharing Mr Frankie YICK's view, Mr YIU Si-wing also considered that the Administration should first review the effectiveness of CWB after its commissioning as more updated traffic figures would be available by then for analysis and consideration by the public on the Pilot Scheme. He added that the implementation of ERP in Central might cause traffic congestion in Western District and Wan Chai of Hong Kong Island.

42. In response, Commissioner for Transport ("C for T") advised that the Transport Department ("TD") had indeed assessed the traffic situation in Central while planning for CWB. According to the projections, CWB would divert those motorists whose origins and destinations were not Central from the busy Connaught Road Central. As a result, the volume to capacity ratio at Connaught Road Central would be reduced from over 1.0 (without the commissioning of CWB) to 0.9 (with the commissioning of CWB), which was slightly below the capacity of the relevant road. However, the effectiveness of CWB in reducing the traffic volume at Des Voeux Road Central or Queen's Road Central would be very limited and traffic congestion would still persist. As such, TD considered it necessary to implement additional traffic measures to solve the traffic congestion problem in Central. STH assured members that when concrete options for implementing ERP were proposed in the future, the Administration would certainly take into consideration the latest projections on traffic figures after the commissioning of CWB. STH also emphasised that traffic congestion did not only affect individual motorists, but also resulted in costs to society as a whole. The rationale behind ERP was that all motorists contributing to traffic congestion should shoulder the relevant social costs.

43. Mr Charles MOK expressed the views that ERP should be considered together with other issues including the adequacy of parking spaces to facilitate park-and-ride, the level of penalty for congestion-related traffic offences, the suggestion of designating an area in Central for use by pedestrians and trams only, and bus route rationalization. He also considered that the Administration should establish measures to prohibit employers from transferring the cost of ERP, if implemented, to their driver employees.

44. Dr KWOK Ka-ki pointed out that as reflected by local residents in overseas cities with an ERP Scheme, ERP might be effective at the initial stage of operation. However, its effectiveness would be reduced with time and the traffic congestion level would return to the condition before the ERP implementation. He did not consider ERP an effective means to solve the traffic congestion problem in Central as motorists would have already taken



into account the value of time and the amount of time spent due to traffic congestion before they started their journey. He suggested the Administration to consider other alternatives which were more cost effective to reduce roadside emissions and traffic throughput in a particular area, such as setting up a zone in Central designated for the sole use by environmentally friendly vehicles or public transport having regard to residents' living in the district; or strengthening law enforcement actions against congestion-related traffic offences.

Admin

45. In response, STH explained that ERP had been discussed in Hong Kong over the past 30 years having regard to its effectiveness in overseas cities. He assured members that the Administration would continue to adopt a multi-pronged strategy to tackle traffic congestion and ERP was only one of the measures. At the request of Dr KWOK Ka-ki, STH agreed to provide information on the effectiveness of ERP in respect of reducing traffic volume and increasing average travelling speed within the charging area after ERP had been implemented for a number of years in overseas cities; and the cost of implementing ERP.

46. Mr WU Chi-wai expressed concern that ERP might not be effective in reducing the number of vehicles belonging to the affluent class as they would not mind paying additional charges. He considered that ERP had to be implemented together with a public transport-oriented policy and priority of using the roads would be accorded to users of public transport modes.

47. STH said that discounting those chauffeur-driven cars, the traffic in Central was still very busy. He added that the Government had been adopting a public transport-oriented policy.

*(At 10:22 am, the Chairman extended the meeting for 15 minutes to 10:45 am.)*

#### Views on practical operation of ERP

##### *Charging mechanism and adoption of technology*

48. The Chairman expressed the views that the charging period of ERP should be from 8 am to 8 pm on weekdays only. He also preferred cordon-based charging mechanism which would charge a vehicle each time when the vehicle passed through a charging point during the charging period, and the adoption of the technology of Dedicated Short-range Radio Communication ("DSRC"), which would provide a greater degree of privacy.

He also hoped that the duration of vehicles staying in the charging area could be captured to enable charging of a higher charge for prolonged stay.

49. C for T agreed to consider exploring the feasibility of capturing the time of stay in the charging area by DSRC. However, she pointed out that even a vehicle had stayed in the charging area for a long period of time, the vehicle concerned might have been parked inside a car park without occupying the road space. In such case, DSRC might not be able to capture the actual duration of the vehicle occupying road space. In response to the Chairman's further suggestion of adopting Global Positioning System to capture information on whether the vehicle concerned was on or off the road, C for T said that this might entail the concern on privacy.

50. Mr Charles MOK requested the Administration to adopt the most advanced technology if ERP was to be implemented. He also requested STH to explain how the concern over privacy could be addressed with the advancement in technology.

51. STH assured members that the Administration would make reference to the latest technology if ERP was to be implemented, taking into account the special circumstances of Hong Kong and other relevant factors, including privacy matter. He pointed out that the concern on privacy was also shared by overseas cities which implemented ERP. STH added that the Administration would listen to the views of the public in the next three months and would conduct an in-depth feasibility study to develop detailed options for further discussion by the public.

#### *Areas for implementation*

52. Mr Christopher CHUNG noted that apart from Central, traffic congestion also occurred in other areas like Causeway Bay, Wan Chai and Admiralty. Since Hong Kong was very small, he doubted the effectiveness of implementing ERP in Central only. He noted that very often traffic congestion in Central had indeed been brought by traffic congestion occurred in districts close to it. He attributed the traffic congestion problem to the poor design of roads leading to Central and was of the view that the problem could not be solved by ERP.

53. Mr Tony TSE said that he did not oppose to conducting public consultation on the Pilot Scheme. However, he was aware that apart from Central and its adjacent areas, there were also other road sections on which the car journey speed was very slow. He also pointed out that the effectiveness of ERP hinged very much on the types of vehicles adopting the relevant road

sections as ERP would unlikely reduce the number of commercial vehicles entering the charging areas due to their operational need. As such, he requested the Administration to provide information on the road sections in Hong Kong on which the car journey speed was less than 10 km/hour, the types of vehicles involved and their relevant proportion. Mr Tony TSE and Mr POON Siu-ping respectively asked about the boundary of adjacent areas of Central referred to by the Administration and the Administration's preference in respect of the area in which ERP would be implemented.

Admin

54. STH explained that the public generally considered that the traffic congestion in Central was very serious. Together with the factor that CWB, when commissioned, would provide an alternative route to motorists, the Administration considered it appropriate to conduct the Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas. He said that details of the Pilot Scheme, such as the boundary of the charging area, would be studied at a later stage in the feasibility study having regard to the public views received. At the request of Mr Tony TSE, STH agreed to provide supplementary information regarding the road sections with car journey speed less than 10 km/hour and the types of vehicles involved and their relevant proportion.

55. Dr KWOK Ka-ki considered that ERP, if implemented, should not cover Admiralty because illegally parked private vehicles were mainly found in Central, not Admiralty. Also, such vehicles were not expected to be parked in Admiralty due to the long walking distance to and/or from Central. He also considered it not feasible to implement ERP in many districts due to public objection and high cost of implementation.

*(At 10:29 am, the Chairman proposed further extending the meeting for 10 minutes to 10:55 am to allow sufficient time for discussion. Members raised no objection.)*

#### *Exemption*

56. The Deputy Chairman, Mr WONG Kwok-hing, Mr Frankie YICK, Mr LEE Cheuk-yan and Mr POON Siu-ping considered that if ERP was to be implemented, commercial vehicles should be exempted from the ERP charges. Mr LEE Cheuk-yan also considered that commercial vehicles should be exempted from the ERP charges due to their operational needs as goods vehicles, in particular the heavy ones, could not be replaced by public transport modes. Mr WONG Kwok-hing and Mr Frankie YICK added that public transport should also be exempted from the ERP charges too.

57. Dr KWOK Ka-ki, Mr Christopher CHUNG and Mr LEE Cheuk-yan expressed concern over the impact of ERP on residents living in Central. Mr LEE requested that residents living within the charging area should be exempted as they should not be penalized for using private cars travelling to and from their homes.

58. In reply, STH said that the Administration had an open mind on the criteria of exemption and would like to listen to the views from different stakeholders in this regard. He invited members to note that the more exemptions or concessions given, the less effective an ERP scheme would become. To achieve the desired level of effectiveness, higher charges would then have to be set for vehicle types which were not exempted or given concession.

59. Referring to STH's statement that much higher charges would have to be set for vehicle types which were not exempted or given concession, Mr Tony TSE queried whether the Administration had any plan to recover the cost of implementing ERP by means of collecting charges.

60. STH clarified that the purpose of levying ERP charges was to manage road use instead of raising revenue for the Government. As such, the Administration would not consider the capital cost of implementing ERP while determining the ERP charges.

61. Noting that the extent of exemption in overseas cities was very limited, the Deputy Chairman expressed concerns that ERP would be implemented without exempting commercial vehicles. He asked about the proportion of commercial vehicles entering Central at present.

62. C for T advised that during the 16-hour peak period on a normal week day, private cars accounted for 40% and taxis another 40% of all the vehicles using roads in Central; whereas commercial vehicles and public transport vehicles each accounted for about 10%.

#### Timetable of implementation

63. Mr POON Siu-ping and Mr WU Chi-wai were concerned over the Administration's timetable of implementing the Pilot Scheme. Mr WU enquired whether it would be implemented after CWB was commissioned and whether enactment of legislation would be required.

64. In reply, STH said that after collecting public views through the current public engagement exercise, the Administration would appoint a consultant to

develop feasible options for the Pilot Scheme for discussion in the next phase of public engagement exercise. Subject to the views collected, the Administration would seek the enactment of a new piece of legislation on the Pilot Scheme as well as funding from the Legislative Council for the implementation. After that, with funding approved, detailed design and engineering works would be carried out, followed by test runs. He estimated that about one year would be required to develop feasible options for the Pilot Scheme after the commencement of the feasibility study. He added that the availability of a free-of-charge alternative route was a prerequisite of the implementation of the Pilot Scheme. As such, the Pilot Scheme, if implemented, would be launched after the commissioning of CWB.

**V. Any other business**

65. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 10:55 am.

Council Business Division 4  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
27 July 2016

For discussion  
on 13 April 2018

## **Legislative Council Panel on Security Law Enforcement against Moving Traffic Offences**

### **Introduction**

This paper briefs Members on the Police's enforcement against moving traffic offences.

### **Background**

2. The Police have been fulfilling their duties to safeguard the safety of the public through different means. One of the Police's operational priorities is to ensure road safety and reduce traffic accidents. Hong Kong has an extensive road network of 2 112 kilometres in length. As at end 2017, there were over 2.3 million driving licence holders, as well as over 760 000 licensed vehicles. The Police have been adopting a multi-pronged approach to promote road safety, combat moving traffic offences, and launch publicity activities and educate the public and drivers to comply with road traffic regulations. In the past three years, the number of persons killed in traffic accidents saw a gradual drop of 11.5% from 122 persons in 2015 to 108 persons in 2017; the number of persons seriously injured decreased by 18.1% from 2 703 persons in 2015 to 2 214 persons in 2017. Hong Kong is among the cities in the world with the safest roads. Taking 2016 as an example, the road traffic fatality rate per 1 000 000 population is 18 persons, which is lower than that of such major cities as Singapore, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Seoul.

### **Relevant legislation**

3. According to section 10 of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232), the Police have the duties of taking lawful measures for preventing and detecting crimes and offences, preventing injury to life and property, and controlling traffic. For the enforcement power on roads, section 60 of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) (RTO) provides that a person driving a motor vehicle/rickshaw or riding a bicycle/tricycle on a road shall stop on being so required by a police officer in uniform, or traffic warden in uniform, otherwise the person commits an offence. In addition, section 61 of the RTO provides

that it is an offence for any person driving any vehicle and any pedestrian to neglect or refuse to obey any direction of a police officer in uniform or traffic warden in uniform engaged in the regulation of traffic on a road. Offenders violating the above two provisions are liable to a fine of \$2,000.

4. The RTO and its subsidiary legislation set out the great majority of traffic offences, including moving traffic offences, such as careless driving, dangerous driving, drink driving, drug driving, speeding, etc. Drivers who commit serious moving traffic offences (such as dangerous driving causing death) may be liable to a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years, a fine of \$50,000 and disqualification for a period of not less than five years (a court may order a disqualification for life) upon conviction.

## **Law Enforcement against Moving Traffic Offences**

### Enforcement figures

5. The Police have been taking stringent enforcement actions against moving traffic offences. In the past two years, the relevant enforcement figures (details at **Annex**) increased by 8.4% from 488 997 cases in 2016 to 529 951 cases in 2017. Specifically, the figures of enforcement against “speeding” increased by 10%; the figures of enforcement against “traffic signal offence” increased by 23%; the figures of enforcement against “using handheld mobile phone / telecommunications equipment while the vehicle is in motion” increased by 14.5%; the figures of enforcement against “careless driving” increased by 3.6%, etc.

### Enforcement objectives

6. The Police’s objectives of law enforcement against moving traffic offences are to reduce road traffic accidents and safeguard the safety of drivers and pedestrians. The Police adopt a multi-pronged strategy, including the use of technology and enforcing “Selected Traffic Enforcement Priorities” (STEP) (such as mounting operations that target moving traffic offences of illegal road racing, speeding, use of mobile phones / telecommunications equipment while the vehicle is in motion, drink driving, drug driving etc.)<sup>1</sup>, to make drivers stay alert at all times and reduce the occurrence of road traffic accidents.

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<sup>1</sup> Apart from targeting moving traffic offences, STEP also covers non-moving traffic offences, such as illegal parking, pedestrian and cycling offences, etc.

### Use of technology

7. At present, there are 195 red light cameras and 24 speed enforcement cameras operating at 130 camera housing locations across the territory. Evidence collected from the cameras allows the Police to subsequently identify the concerned vehicles and initiate prosecution without the need to intercept an offending vehicle, thereby effectively improving road safety. The Police have been using the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system since 2015. The system enables traffic enforcement officers to detect relevant traffic contraventions, including those involving expired vehicle licences, registered vehicle owners driving while disqualified or having traffic arrest warrants. In the past three years (2015 to 2017), the Police have issued 996 fixed penalty tickets and arrested 46 persons with the aid of the ANPR system. In addition, the Police have arranged the procurement of digital laser guns with video recording function to replace the existing version of laser guns which are aging. The new version of laser guns is expected to be put into operation in 2018.

### Selected Traffic Enforcement Priorities (STEP)

8. STEP is an important part in the Police's law enforcement against moving traffic offences. Based on the prevailing trend of traffic accidents and related offences, the Police will formulate traffic enforcement operations targeting different road users every year, with the aim of changing the undesirable behaviours of road users that cause accidents, and making it everyone's responsibility to ensure road safety. The overall STEP enforcement figures (covering both moving traffic offences and non-moving traffic offences) increased by 13% from 1 914 502 cases in 2016 to 2 158 452 cases in 2017, among which the figures of enforcement against speeding increased by 10% from 215 012 cases in 2016 to 236 553 cases in 2017. The Police will continue to take stringent enforcement actions based on STEP, persistently strengthening law enforcement.

### Temporary traffic control measures and roadblocks

9. The Police have to implement temporary traffic control measures from time to time, such as stopping of vehicles and control of traffic flow, to ensure road safety and smooth traffic. For example, when there is a serious incident such as a traffic accident, or when there is any obstruction on a road hindering or endangering any person, police officers will conduct immediate traffic control and direction so as to divert the traffic and ease the congestion, with a view to restoring road safety and smooth traffic as soon as possible.



10. Besides, the Police may set up roadblocks in pre-planned operations as necessary. The main objective of setting up roadblocks is to stop vehicles and check the drivers for compliance with relevant traffic regulations. Where appropriate, the vehicles, drivers and/or passengers may also be checked for the prevention and detection of crimes. In operations targeting drink driving, the Police will randomly select drivers for breath testing to check if their alcohol levels exceed the prescribed limit.

11. The Police have established guidelines on the setting up of roadblocks, including the equipment required, manning scale, safety measures, format of roadblocks etc. The locations of roadblocks set up in all pre-planned operations are internally approved beforehand. Should a vehicle passing through the roadblock fail to stop at the instruction of the police officer, the police officer will inform the Regional Command and Control Centre about the information and moving direction of the vehicle, so as to alert all other police officers who may be working outdoor.

12. In their daily work or pre-planned operations, the Police generally will not conduct pursuits. It is only when it is absolutely necessary and when there is no other alternative, and for the purpose of responding to unforeseeable circumstances on the road and to safeguard the safety of road users, such as when there is a need to immediately arrest a person who refuses to stop his vehicle at the instruction of a police officer and attempts to flee, a person who has committed serious driving offences (including drink driving, drug driving or hit and run in a traffic accident), or a person suspected of having committed serious or violent crimes etc., that the Police will conduct pursuits. At all times, the Police's pursuit is conducted against unlawful behaviours, as well as the dangerous and grossly irresponsible drivers. Before each pursuit, the police officer must, in accordance with the actual circumstances, assess the risks that could be brought about by the operation, including the risks posed to the driver concerned, other road users and the police officer himself, as well as whether other road users will be endangered, or whether more serious casualties will result if such persons are not stopped.

13. The Police review the enforcement work against moving traffic offences from time to time. The Police commenced in January this year a new round of review on pursuit, illegal road racing, setting up of roadblocks, international practices etc. In March, a Review Committee chaired by the Chief Superintendent of the Traffic Branch was formally established, with members comprising the traffic units as well as relevant operations and support units of each Region. One of the aims of the review is to thoroughly examine the guidelines on the stopping of vehicles, setting up of roadblocks, pursuit of vehicles etc., and study the areas for improvement.

### **Traffic Accident on Fanling Highway on 11 February 2018**

14. On 11 February 2018, a Police Constable (PC) of Traffic New Territories North patrolling along San Tin Highway found a private car travelling at a high speed towards the direction of Fanling. The vehicle was observed changing lane recklessly, posing a great threat to other road users. Suspecting that the private car driver had committed serious traffic offences, the PC turned on the siren and beacons, and attempted to intercept the private car for investigation. However, the driver did not heed the PC's instruction and accelerated to flee. The PC thus conducted a pursuit and alerted other patrolling officers. When the private car reached Fanling Highway near Fanling MTR Station, it lost control and crashed into the vehicles in front. The traffic accident resulted in serious damages to the private car and three other private vehicles in front, as well as damages to one supporting Police Motorcycle in front. Three civilians and one Traffic Police officer were injured, while the driver and passenger of the private car were killed.

15. The Police are conducting a full investigation into the incident. In accordance with the Coroners Ordinance (Cap. 504), the Police have to investigate cases of reportable death (including death caused by a traffic accident) and submit a death investigation report to the Coroner. After studying the report, the Coroner will decide whether to hold a death inquest. When a death inquest is held by the Coroner, details of the case and its evidence will be disclosed in the course of the hearing. It is therefore inappropriate to publicly discuss the details of the incident at this stage.

**Transport and Housing Bureau  
Security Bureau  
Hong Kong Police Force  
April 2018**

**Annex**

**Figures of enforcement against moving traffic offences**

<b>Offence</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
Speeding	215 012	236 553
Traffic signal offence	59 493	73 026
Traffic sign offence	42 473	40 696
Using handheld mobile phone / telecommunications equipment while the vehicle is in motion	17 749	20 329
Careless driving	17 707	18 345
Double white line offence	15 802	15 951
Seat belt offence	7 513	7 615
Box junction offence	1 475	2 105
Overloading	1 839	1 696
Insecure loading	1 041	1 113
Others	108 893	112 522
<b>Total</b>	<b>488 997</b>	<b>529 951</b>

## Press Releases

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LCQ10: Pilot scheme to combat traffic contraventions

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Following is a question by the Hon James To and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Mr Frank Chan Fan, in the Legislative Council today (May 23):

Question:

It has been reported that the Police implemented a two-month pilot scheme in New Territories North and Kowloon East at the end of last year, under which video cameras were used to assist police officers in taking law enforcement actions against six traffic offences which cause serious traffic obstructions, namely (i) picking up/setting down passengers in restricted zone, (ii) loading/unloading goods in restricted zone, (iii) unauthorised stopping at bus stop/public light bus stand/taxi stand, (iv) stopping bus, public light bus or taxi longer than necessary when picking up/setting down passengers, (v) unlawfully entering box junction, and (vi) "U" turn causing obstruction. Besides, the Energizing Kowloon East Office under the Development Bureau is conducting on-site tests on a Kerbside Loading/Unloading Bay Monitoring System (Monitoring System) in some sections of How Ming Street and Hoi Bun Road in Kwun Tong by making use of surveillance cameras installed on on-street lampposts to assist in monitoring the situation of the loading/unloading bays in these two road segments. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the number of times for which law enforcement actions were taken by the Police under the pilot scheme, broken down by month and the police division to which the law enforcement location belonged;

(2) of the number of prosecutions instituted by the Police under the pilot scheme in respect of each of the aforesaid traffic offences, broken down by the police division to which the law enforcement location belonged;

(3) of the respective numbers of times for which the Police took law enforcement actions under the pilot scheme by ticketing the offenders on the spot and other forms, and the criteria adopted for determining the form of law enforcement action to be taken;

(4) of the criteria adopted by the Police for assessing the effectiveness of the pilot scheme, and the assessment outcome;

(5) as it has been reported that the authorities will expand the coverage of the pilot scheme to the whole territory within the first half of this year, whether the Police have formulated a detailed implementation plan; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(6) whether the authorities will consider using the Monitoring System to monitor the usage of and the illegal parking situation in the loading/unloading bays in the entire Kwun Tong district and the whole territory; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

1424

President,

To effectively combat traffic contraventions, the Hong Kong Police Force (Police) launched a two-month pilot scheme in New Territories North and Kowloon East in December 2017, under which video cameras were used to assist police officers in taking enforcement actions against six traffic offences which cause serious traffic obstructions (Pilot Scheme). The six offences are: (i) picking up/setting down passengers in restricted zone; (ii) loading/unloading goods in restricted zone; (iii) unauthorised stopping at bus stop/public light bus stand/taxi stand/public light bus stopping place; (iv) stopping public bus, public light bus or taxi longer than necessary when picking up/setting down passengers; (v) unlawfully entering box junction; and (vi) "U" turn causing obstruction.

My reply to the various parts of the Hon James To's question is as follows:

(1) The Police took a total of 103 actions under the Pilot Scheme. A breakdown of these actions by police district and month is set out at Annex 1.

(2) The Police issued a total of 540 fixed penalty tickets under the Pilot Scheme. A breakdown of these fixed penalty tickets for each traffic offence by police district is set out at Annex 2.

(3) In the course of the Pilot Scheme, the Police took 53 enforcement actions under the "immediate ticketing" mode and 50 enforcement actions under the "non-immediate ticketing" mode, issuing respectively 243 and 297 fixed penalty tickets.

The Police determined the most appropriate mode of ticketing as warranted. The factors taken into account included the safety of frontline officers and other road users, the volume of traffic on the road, the feasibility of stopping vehicles along the section of the road where enforcement actions were taken, the deterrent effects on offending drivers, as well as manpower deployment at the time.

(4) and (5) The Police have completed the two-month Pilot Scheme, and are currently assessing and reviewing its effectiveness and considering whether to further extend the Pilot Scheme. In reviewing the effectiveness of the Pilot Scheme, the Police will take into consideration whether the scheme can serve its purposes, including assisting frontline officers in more efficient enforcement, enhancing the reliability of evidence, boosting the effectiveness of enforcement and conviction, as well as strengthening the deterrent effect.

(6) The Energizing Kowloon East Office of the Development Bureau has been collaborating with the Police since 2018 to conduct a trial on the "Kerbside Loading and Unloading Bay Monitoring System" in Kwun Tong. The two departments are also studying the implementation of a trial on "Illegal Parking Monitoring System" at suitable road sections in Kowloon East. The trial, which makes use of video analytic techniques to monitor illegal parking activities, is expected to commence within this year.

The Government's objective is to make use of new technologies to assist frontline officers in taking enforcement actions against traffic contraventions and enhance the efficiency of the back-end support process. If the system is proved

practicable by the trial, the Government will consider using such systems at suitable locations to facilitate Police's prosecution against traffic offences.

Ends/Wednesday, May 23, 2018  
Issued at HKT 15:45

NNNN

**Annex 1**

**Number of Actions Taken under the Pilot Scheme**

<b>Police District</b>	<b>December 2017</b>	<b>January 2018</b>
Tai Po	-	8
Sheung Shui	12	26
Yuen Long	6	13
Castle Peak	6	9
Wong Tai Sin	-	1
Ngau Tau Kok	7	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>72</b>

**Annex 2**

**Number of Fixed Penalty Tickets Issued under the Pilot Scheme  
(December 2017 to January 2018)**

<b>Traffic Offence</b>	<b>Police District</b>						<b>Total</b>
	Tai Po	Sheung Shui	Yuen Long	Castle Peak	Wong Tai Sin	Ngau Tau Kok	
(i) picking up / setting down passengers in restricted zone	43	214	31	78	1	89	456
(ii) loading / unloading goods in restricted zone	2	7	0	2	0	3	14
(iii) unauthorised stopping at bus stop / public light bus stand / taxi stand / public light bus stopping place	0	25	0	0	0	0	25
(iv) stopping public bus, public light bus or taxi longer than necessary when picking up / setting down passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(v) unlawfully entering box junction	0	0	41	0	0	4	45
(vi) “U” turn causing obstruction	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>540</b>



中西區區議會  
交通及運輸委員會

廣深港高速鐵路  
西九龍站的本地公共交通服務安排

目的

廣深港高速鐵路(下稱「高鐵」)香港段計劃於二零一八年第三季啓用。本文件旨向委員介紹為配合高鐵香港段的通車，為其西九龍站總站(下稱「西九龍站」)建議實施的公共交通服務安排。

背景

2. 高鐵西九龍站位於尖沙咀西部，毗鄰港鐵東涌線九龍站和西鐵線柯士甸站，並將有合共五條有蓋行人天橋及兩條行人隧道連接至該兩個鐵路站。西九龍站亦連接毗鄰的九龍站公共運輸交匯處，該站以北位置亦設有西九龍站巴士總站<sup>1</sup>。西九龍站外近匯翔道的新連接路則設有供其他車輛使用的停車灣(詳情見附件一)。

公共交通服務安排

3. 為配合市民日後往來西九龍站的交通需求，運輸署已按一貫做法，因應西九龍站的實際情況及現有公共運輸設施，擬訂公共交通服務配套安排，以完善服務網絡。各公共交通服務安排的詳情載於下文第4至10段。

(a) 鐵路服務

4. 現時港鐵網絡已覆蓋全港各區。市民可使用港鐵各鐵路線直接或轉乘至接連西九龍站的柯士甸站或九龍站，預計較多市民會使用港鐵服務往返西九龍站。

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<sup>1</sup> 西九龍站巴士總站將於 2018 年第三季或之前啟用。

**(b) 專營巴士服務**

5. 除了鐵路服務之外，乘客亦可選擇使用專營巴士服務前往西九龍站。現時，西九龍站附近一帶已建立了相當完善的公共交通服務網絡，包括在九龍站公共運輸交匯處、佐敦渡華路臨時巴士總站、廣東道及佐敦道一帶已有合共40多條專營巴士路線提供往返全港各區的巴士服務。配合西九龍站(包括巴士總站及其他公共交通設施)的啟用，運輸署會安排優化現有專營巴士服務(如按需要增設落客點和加密班次)，並建議開辦三條特快的新專營巴士路線：

(一) 金鐘站(西)巴士總站-西九龍站巴士總站 (**附件二**)

(二) 觀塘站公共運輸交匯處-西九龍站巴士總站 (**附件三**)

(三) 上水巴士總站-西九龍站巴士總站 (**附件四**)

6. 此外，我們亦會調整現時在西九龍站一帶相關專營巴士的行車路線，當中包括將現時終點站設於渡華路臨時巴士總站(該總站乃因進行西九龍站工程而臨時設立)的專營巴士路線，遷往日後啟用的西九龍站巴士總站或現有的九龍站公共運輸交匯處。

**(c) 專線小巴服務**

7. 運輸署會將部分現時行經西九龍站附近的專線小巴線增設落客點，方便乘客往來該站。

**(d) 的士服務**

8. 西九龍站內將分別設有市區的士上客和落客區，方便市民乘搭的士往返西九龍站。

**(e) 非專營巴士服務**

9. 位於西九龍站外近匯翔道的新連接路將設有非專營巴士上落客區，而西九龍站巴士總站附近亦會設置30個非專營巴士停泊位，配合非專營巴士營運需要。



## 中西區前往西九龍站的公共交通服務

10. 中西區的居民可乘坐港鐵港島線，並於香港站轉乘東涌線抵達九龍站後再前往西九龍站。專營巴士服務方面，居民亦可使用上文第5段提及新開辦的特快巴士路線由金鐘或中環直達西九龍站，或選乘其他前往西九龍站及附近一帶的巴士路線前往該站，包括過海巴士第914、970、970X、971、973號線及城巴第N11號線。有關由中西區前往西九龍站及附近一帶的巴士服務資料載於附件五。

## 未來工作


11. 按現時計劃，運輸署會於明年初開展籌備工作並適時開辦服務。運輸署會密切注視服務開辦後的使用情況，並會按需求適時調整班次，以滿足需求。

12. 請委員備悉本文件的內容。

運輸署

二零一七年十二月


# 西九龍站附近的公共交通服務設施





# 建議路線 (港島線) 金鐘站(西)巴士總站 - 西九龍站巴士總站

附件二



## 行車路線:

往西九龍站巴士總站: 經夏慤道、紅棉路、琳寶徑、遮打道、昃臣道、干諾道中、干諾道西、西區海底隧道、西九龍公路、高架道路、佐敦道、D1A(S)路、西九龍站上落客區、D1A(S)路、D1A(N)路、西九龍站巴士總站。

往金鐘站(西)巴士總站: 經D1A(N)路、D1A(S)路、西九龍站上落客區、D1A(S)路、佐敦道、高架道路、西九龍公路、西區海底隧道、干諾道西天橋、干諾道中、夏慤道、紅棉路、金鐘道、添馬街、德立街、金鐘站(西)巴士總站。

班次: 20分鐘

## 圖例:


建議路線 (金鐘站(西)巴士總站 - 西九龍站巴士總站)

總站位置

中途站位置




建議路線 (九龍東線)  
觀塘站公共運輸交匯處 - 西九龍站巴士總站





# 建議路線 (新界東線) 上水巴士總站 - 西九龍站巴士總站

附件四



## 行車路線:

往西九龍站巴士總站: 經龍運街、新運路、連接路、掃管埔路、百和路、連接路、粉嶺公路、吐露港公路、大埔公路(元洲仔段)連接路、大埔公路(元洲仔段)、廣宏街、寶湖道、南運路、大埔公路(元洲仔段)、吐露港公路、大埔公路(沙田段)、沙田鄉事會路、沙田車站圍、沙田鄉事會路、大埔公路(沙田段)、大埔公路(大圍段)、青沙公路、西九龍公路、連翔道、佐敦道、D1A(S)路、西九龍站上落客區、D1A(S)路、D1A(N)路、西九龍站巴士總站。

往上水巴士總站: 經D1A(N)路、D1A(S)路、西九龍站上落客區、D1A(S)路、佐敦道、連翔道、青沙公路、大埔公路(大圍段)、大埔公路(沙田段)、沙田鄉事會路、沙田車站圍、沙田鄉事會路、大埔公路(沙田段)、吐露港公路、大埔公路(元洲仔段)、南運路、寶湖道、廣宏街、大埔公路(元洲仔段)、吐露港公路連接路、吐露港公路、粉嶺公路、連接路、百和路、掃管埔路、連接路、新運路、上水巴士總站。

班次: 20分鐘

## 圖例:

- 建議路線 (上水巴士總站 - 西九龍站巴士總站)
- 總站位置
- 中途站位置



附件五

中西區前往西九龍站及附近一帶的巴士服務

巴士路線		起點	終點
1	新開辦路線	金鐘站(西) 巴士總站	西九龍站巴士總站
2	過海巴士第 914 號線	銅鑼灣(天后)	海麗邨
3	過海巴士第 970 號線	數碼港	蘇屋邨
4	過海巴士第 970X 號 線	香港仔	蘇屋邨
5	過海巴士第 971 號線	香港仔(石排灣)	海麗邨
6	過海巴士第 973 號線	赤柱市場	尖沙咀(麼地道)
7	城巴第 N11 號線	中環(港澳碼頭)	機場 (地面運輸中心)



Paper No. 109/2017 of T&TC of the Central & Western District

**Central & Western District  
Traffic and Transport Committee**

**Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link  
Local Public Transport Arrangements for the West Kowloon Station**

**Purpose**

The Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (“XRL”) will come into use in the third quarter of 2018. This paper briefs Members on the local public transport arrangements for the West Kowloon Station Terminus (“West Kowloon Station”) recommended to be implemented to dovetail the commencement of operation of the XRL.

**Background**

2. The West Kowloon Station is located at Tsim Sha Tsui West and is situated in the vicinity of Kowloon Station of the Tung Chung Line and Austin Station of the West Rail Line. There will be a total of five covered footbridges and two pedestrian subways linking the West Kowloon Station to these two railway stations. The West Kowloon Station is also located close to the Kowloon Station Public Transport Interchange, and at the northern side of the West Kowloon Station, there is also the West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus<sup>1</sup>. A parking bay for other vehicles is provided on the new connection road located close to the West Kowloon Station and near Wui Cheung Road (for details, please see [Annex 1](#)).

**Arrangements for local public transport**

3. In view of the future need for members of the public to travel to and from the West Kowloon Station, the Transport Department has followed its established practice and drawn up the local public transport arrangements based on the actual situation at the West Kowloon Station and the existing public transport facilities so as to improve the existing service network. Details of the local public transport arrangements are set out in paragraphs 4 to 10 below.

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<sup>1</sup> The West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus will come into operation in or before the third quarter of 2018.

**(a) Railway service**

4. The existing network of the MTR covers all districts in the territory. Members of the public may make use of the different railway lines of the MTR to go directly or after changing trains to Austin Station or Kowloon Station, both are which are connected to the West Kowloon Station. It is anticipated that most members of the public will access the West Kowloon Station using MTR service.

**(b) Franchised bus service**

5. Apart from railway services, passengers may go to the West Kowloon Station by taking franchised buses. Currently, there is already quite an extensive public transport network in the vicinity of the West Kowloon Station, including the Kowloon Station Public Transport Interchange, the Jordan To Wah Road Temporary Bus Terminus, as well as over 40 franchised bus routes serving between the vicinity of Canton Road and Jordan Road and the other districts of Hong Kong. To dovetail the commencement of operation of the West Kowloon Station (including the bus terminus and other public transport facilities), the Transport Department will make arrangements to improve the existing franchised bus service (e.g. adding bus stops and increasing the frequency of bus trips as necessary), and will also start three new express franchised bus routes:

- (i) Admiralty Station (West) Bus Terminus – West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus (**Annex 2**)
- (ii) Kwun Tong Station Public Transport Interchange – West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus (**Annex 3**)
- (iii) Sheung Shui Bus Terminus – West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus (**Annex 4**)

6. In addition, we will adjust the routing of existing franchised bus routes serving the vicinity of the West Kowloon Station, including the relocation of the existing terminus of bus routes with end points at the To Wah Road Temporary Bus Terminus (this terminus was set up on a temporary basis due to the construction works of the West Kowloon Station) to either the West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus that will come into operation in future or the existing Kowloon Station Public Transport Interchange.

**(c) Green minibus service**

7. The Transport Department will set up additional stops for green minibus routes passing through the vicinity of the West Kowloon Station to facilitate passengers.

**(d) Taxi service**

8. There will be a passenger boarding and alighting area for taxis serving the urban areas located inside the West Kowloon Station to facilitate passengers travelling to and from the West Kowloon Station using taxis.

**(e) Non-franchised bus service**

9. There will be a passenger boarding and alighting area for non-franchised buses on the new connection road located close to the West Kowloon Station and near Wui Cheung Road, and there will be 30 parking spaces for non-franchised buses near the West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus in view of the needs of non-franchised buses.

**Local public transport services for those heading to the West Kowloon Station from the Central & Western District**

10. Residents of the Central & Western District may take the trains of the MTR Island Line and change trains at the Hong Kong Station to arrive at Kowloon Station of the Tung Chung Line and then head to the West Kowloon Station. For franchised bus services, residents may take the new express bus route mentioned in paragraph 5 above which travels directly from Admiralty or Central to the West Kowloon Station, or take any of the other buses heading to the vicinity of the West Kowloon Station, including the cross-harbour routes of 914, 970, 970X, 971 and 973 as well as route N11 of Citybus. Information on bus routes serving between Central & Western District and the West Kowloon Station and its vicinity is at **Annex 5**.

**Way forward**

11. Based on the existing work plan, the Transport Department will begin the preparatory work early next year and set up the services at an appropriate juncture. The Transport Department will closely monitor the usage of these services and will adjust the schedules as need arises in order to meet the demand.

12. Members are invited to note the contents of this document.

Transport Department  
December 2017

## **Translation of a news article by the Oriental Daily on 4 August 2018**

*Original article in Chinese:*

[http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20180804/00176\\_013.html](http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20180804/00176_013.html)

*Translation:*

### **Three bus routes serving Yuen Long and Tuen Mun planned to be re-routed to stop by the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station**

[Report by Oriental Daily] The Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link is expected to come into use next month, and the Transport Department has, in addition to starting three new express bus routes for the Express Rail Link, recommended the re-routing of three existing bus routes of the Yuen Long and Tuen Mun Districts, namely routes 268B, 269B and 260X, so as to add an additional bus stop outside the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station for passenger boarding and alighting.

A document submitted by the Transport Department to the Yuen Long District Council and Tuen Mun District Council shows that the Department recommends, for the purpose of facilitating residents of the two districts to travel to the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station using the bus networks in the districts, the re-routing of three bus routes, namely route 268B serving between Long Ping Station and Hung Hom Pier, route 269B serving between Tin Shui Wai Town Centre and Hung Hom Pier, and route 260X serving between Po Tin and Hung Hom Station.

#### *A new bus stop to facilitate passengers of the Express Rail Link*

After the routing of the three bus routes, there will be a new bus stop for buses heading to Hung Hom at the newly constructed road “Wui Man Road” located between the eastern side of the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station and Austin Station of the West Rail Line; for buses heading to New Territories West, the new bus stop will be on the west-bound lane of Jordan Road near the northern side of the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station. Both of the new bus stops will be located very close to the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station to provide convenience to passengers.

The Transport Department announced last month the tendering results of the starting of the three new bus routes for the Express Rail Link. The route serving between Admiralty (West) Bus Terminus and West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus would be operated by Citybus, while

*This English translation is for reference only. In the event of any discrepancy between the Chinese original and this English translation, the Chinese original shall prevail.*

本英文譯本僅供參考。如英文譯本與中文原文有任何差異，以中文原文為準。

the other two routes, namely the route serving between Kwun Tong Station Public Transport Interchange and West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus as well as the route serving between Sheung Shui Bus Terminus and West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus, would be operated by Kowloon Motor Bus. The newly completed West Kowloon Station Bus Terminus is located at the northern side of the West Kowloon Express Rail Link Station on the stretch of land between Man Wah Sun Chuen in Jordan and the temporary bus terminus on To Wah Road.

*This English translation is for reference only. In the event of any discrepancy between the Chinese original and this English translation, the Chinese original shall prevail.*

*本英文譯本僅供參考。如英文譯本與中文原文有任何差異，以中文原文為準。*

## **Typhoon Mangkhut strikes Hong Kong: 3 KMB buses crashed into the tree crotches causing damage to the buses, passengers were frightened**

*Original new articles of Oriental Daily in Chinese:*

[http://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20180918/bkn-20180918101832837-0918\\_00822\\_001.html](http://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20180918/bkn-20180918101832837-0918_00822_001.html)

18 September (Tuesday)

Updated at 13:35

Established at 10:18



2 accidents of KMB buses crashing into tree crotches happened in the morning

*This English translation is for reference only. In the event of any discrepancy between the Chinese original and this English translation, the Chinese original shall prevail.*

*本英文譯本僅供參考。如英文譯本與中文原文有任何差異，以中文原文為準。*



93K crashed into the tree crotch when it was driven through Po Lam North Road.



Cracking of the front windscreen.

After the typhoon, there were still a large number of broken trees

blocking the roads in various districts, some of the tree crotches and branches even caused obstacles. Although different departments had tried their best to clean up, and the roads were generally smooth, the lanes were still blocked by big trees and other obstacles even after the traffic was resumed. At around 11 o'clock in this morning (18th), when a KMB bus of route no. 85 was driven to the Fo Tan Road near Shan Mei Street after departing from the terminus, the roof of the bus crashed into a collapsed trunk, causing damage to the bus. The bus captain stopped the bus and reported the case. No one was injured in the accident.

Two other accidents happened in Tseung Kwan O and Kowloon City respectively. At around 9 o'clock in the morning, when a KMB bus of route no. 93K was driven through Po Lam North Road, the front part of the bus crashed into the collapsed tree crotch on the roadside, part of the tree crotch broke into the windscreen, the bus captain discovered and stopped the bus immediately and report to the police. No one was injured in the accident. At around 8 o'clock in the morning, a citizen claimed the bus was hit by a large tree when he/she was taking the KMB bus of route no.1 to Mong Kok through Prince Edward Road West, causing the cracking and damage of the front windscreen of the upper deck. The passenger informed the bus captain, fortunately, no one was injured in the incident. The bus then returned to the depot for maintenance.

Apart from KMB, a Citybus of route no. 118, at around 8 o'clock in this morning, was driven from Siu Sai Wan to Cheung Sha Wan. During the journey, a passenger found that the roof of the bus was broken into by a tree branch of about 1.5m long when he/she was getting on board. The tree branch fell onto the seat near the rear part of the bus in the upper deck. The passenger informed the bus captain, but the bus continued to run until it was driven to Cheung Sha Wan and the bus captain removed the tree branch. The bus was then driven back to the depot for maintenance.



**[Typhoon Mangkhut] “Mangkhut” aftermath has not yet come to a halt, there were at least 6 incidents of buses being hit by tree crotches today, among which one person was injured and sent to the hospital**

*Original news article of Economic Times in Chinese:*

<https://topick.hket.com/article/2163647/>

19:35 2018/09/18



The right side of the Citybus of route no. 682 was being cut open (the picture of fb of Chai Wan People Chai Wan Matters)

The aftermath of “Mangkhut” has not yet come to a halt, which has caused incidents of injuries to date. At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, there was another double-decker bus of route no. 682 of Citybus travelling along Chai Wan Road and it was hit by a large tree from the top at the opposite of Law Uk Folk Museum. The right side of the bus was cut open like “a can being opened” and the glass was fully destroyed. The police and firefighters arrived at the scene upon receiving the report. A 20-year-old male passenger was injured in the head and hands. After being bandaged by the ambulanceman, he was sent to the Eastern Hospital for treatment.

As there were still tree branches crumbling on the scene, the firefighters

had to call the elevating vehicle to assist, and the workers being elevated removed those dangerous trees.

In addition, at around 6 o'clock in the evening, a route no. 64k was driven from Tai Po Market to Yuen Long West. During the journey, the roof of the bus crashed into a collapsed tree crotch. No injuries were reported initially.

Along with the four incidents involving tree branches hitting buses or breaking the glass of buses happened in this morning, the number of incidents had at least increased to six till now, with three incidents of broken glass and one incident of the bus roof being hit. It is reported that the buses involved had returned to the depots for maintenance.

## **Tree collapsed, cutting open the roof of the bus. Passengers were sent to hospital**

*Original news article of Apple Daily in Chinese:*

<https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20180919/20502754>

19 September 2018



The roof of the bus of New World First Bus involved was damaged in the tree collapse. The photo was provided by a reader

[News] Typhoon Mangkhut resulted in numerous tree collapse incidents, severely affecting the traffic. It also constituted safety risk. Although the government has ordered a prompt clearance of the collapsed trees, the collapsed trees in some areas such as some road sections in Fan Kam Road had not yet been cleared last morning. Some road sections required one-lane two-way traffic. The road section which is opposite to Ta Shek Wu San Tsuen was still close. Villagers going to Kowloon should go to Yuen Long via Kam Tin or go the Sheung Shui Center on foot, spending one and a half hours.

When workers were busy at clearing, there was a tree collapse accident happened in Chai Wan which damaged a bus of New World First Bus. At around 2 p.m. yesterday, a tree next to the road collapsed when a bus of New World First Bus drove to a position opposite to Hing Wah Estate. The right roof was cut through. The driver reported the matter to the police. The police and firemen arrived at the scene to move away the tree branches which were on the bus roof. A 20-year-old man had his head and hands bruised in the incident and was sent to Eastern Hospital for treatment. Moreover, at 11 a.m. yesterday in Regency Park (Wah King Hill Road, Kwai Chung), when three cleaning workers (aged 44 to 68) were clearing collapsed trees at a slope next to the swimming pool, a 3-meter x 6-meter security barbed wire fence collapsed. The three workers were squashed and had their hands and feet bruised . They were sent to hospital.

# LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON TRANSPORT

## Speed Limit in Hong Kong

### PURPOSE

This paper presents -

- (a) the structure of speed limit categorisation and the criteria of setting speed limits on roads in Hong Kong;
- (b) the review of speed limits in Hong Kong; and
- (c) the relationship between traffic accidents and speed limit.

### BACKGROUND

2. On 17 December 1999, the Administration presented to the LegCo Panel on Transport a proposal to increase the fixed penalty and Driving-Offence Points for serious speeding offences as measures to combat speeding. At the meeting, Members expressed reservations over the appropriateness of the structure of our existing speed limit categorisation and asked the Administration to provide further information on the subject.

### SPEED LIMIT STRUCTURE IN HONG KONG

#### Speed limit categorisation

3. In Hong Kong, speed limits are imposed primarily to promote road safety. At present, our speed limit structure comprises the following 3 main categories:-

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Low band    | - 50 km/h for urban or new town built-up areas  |
| Middle band | - 70/80 km/h for areas outside urban or new town built-up areas                                   |
| High band   | - 100 km/h for high standard expressways, North Lantau Highway being the one exception (110/km/h) |

4. In general, 50 km/h is the standard speed limit on roads in the built-up areas, whether they are in Hong Kong, Kowloon or the New Territories. For areas outside the built-up areas in Hong Kong and Kowloon, the speed limit is 70 km/h. For areas outside the built-up areas in the New Territories, the speed limit is 70/80 km/h. For high standard expressways, the speed limit is 100 km/h<sup>1</sup>.

5. Under the existing legislation, the maximum speed limit for medium/heavy goods vehicles and buses shall remain at 70 km/h when they are travelling on roads with speed limits over 70 km/h.

### **Study on Hong Kong's Speed Limit Structure**

6. During the review of speed limits in 1999, the Administration commissioned the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) in the U.K., an independent leading transport research establishment in the world, to carry out a Study on the Speed Limits in Hong Kong. The purpose of the consultancy study is to research into the latest overseas practices of major countries for reviewing Hong Kong's current speed limit standards/practices and to ascertain whether the speed limit structure as stated in paragraph 3 above is best fitted for Hong Kong.

7. It is an international practice that different speed limits are set for different types of roads. Most European countries (as well as Japan, Canada and Australia) adopt a four-tier or even five-tier speed limit structure (usually stepwise increase of 10-20 km/h). A comparison of the speed limits adopted for different types of roads in Europe is at **Annex A**.

8. For built-up or urban areas, it is noted that 50 km/h is commonly adopted by many countries as the general speed limit. On fast urban roads, the speed limits are mainly set in the region of 60 to 80 km/h. These roads may, or may not, be dual carriageways but will have controlled junctions, pedestrian separation and limited frontage access. These generally correspond with Hong Kong's rural and urban trunk roads and primary distributor roads whose standard speed limits and design speeds are 70 km/h.

9. On motor roads, the speed limits commonly adopted are in the range of 90 to 100 km/h for light vehicles. These roads generally correspond to Hong Kong's urban expressways and older rural dual-carriageways, such as the Tuen Mun Road and other highways built to difficult geometry. In Hong Kong, the speed limits for these roads are 70 or 80 km/h. Whilst these limits may appear low as compared with international standards, the study showed that

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Note 1 : There is an exception of adopting a speed limit of 110 km/h on North Lantau Highway which is a longer distance road, engineered to higher design speeds, and with minimal interference from slip roads, etc.



the traffic mix and difficult geometry of many Hong Kong roads would make a lower speed limit more appropriate.

10. On motorways, which are usually dual carriageway roads with limited access and with grade-separated junctions, the international practice generally sets speed limits in the range of 100-130 km/h. International practice is also that the design speeds of such motorways will at least equal the speed limit. There are views that a speed limit of 100/110 km/h for motorways in Hong Kong may be conservative. However, the design speeds for Hong Kong's new motorways are usually set at 100 km/h. The adoption of a higher speed limit requires a more stringent [design standard on requirements such as the minimum radius of horizontal and vertical curves, sight distances, signing, etc.](#) Raising the design speed of existing and new roads to these standards would have significant implications on cost and land take. Also, the limited lengths of such highway in Hong Kong would make any savings in journey time minimal.

11. The study concludes that the speed limit structure adopted in Hong Kong generally accords with international practice, and TRL recommends that our present speed limit structure is suitable and that no changes should be made.

### **Criteria in determining the speed limit of roads in Hong Kong**

12. Currently, the standard speed limits applied to new roads in Hong Kong are set out in paragraph 3 above and in detail in the Transport Department's Transport Planning & Design Manual Volume 6. The design speed for highways is generally determined according to the road type, and the speed limit for these highways is usually set at, or slightly below, the design speed for road safety reasons.

## **REVIEW OF SPEED LIMITS**

13. Review of speed limit is an on-going exercise. Relaxation would only be recommended if it would not impair road safety. When carrying out a detailed examination of the concerned road section, the Administration would take into account the following factors -

- (a) the number of changes in speed limit on a stretch of roads should be minimised. For local hazards, consideration should be given to providing appropriate warning rather than lowering the speed limit. The length of road section under consideration should not be less than 1 km;
- (b) the design speed and environment of the road section;

- (c) the accident history of the road section;
- (d) the prevailing speed adopted by the majority of drivers of light vehicles during off-peak periods, i.e. 85th percentile vehicle speed; and
- (e) the road surface characteristics if the speed limit of a road is to be relaxed to 80 km/h or above.

14. Since March last year, a review of speed limits on more than 40 major road sections has been completed and the speed limits on 19 of them (18 already implemented and 1 being circulated for comments prior to implementation) have been relaxed. The speed limits for the remaining road sections are maintained.

### **Examples of application of review procedures**

15. As explained in paragraph 12 above, the design speed of a highway would normally govern its speed limit. For example, the design speed for Island Eastern Corridor (IEC) is 70 km/h which sets constraints on the geometric design of IEC in terms of curvature (radii), super-elevation, sight-line requirement, spacing of junctions and weaving lengths, etc. It is also noted that the junctions along the road are relatively close with high weaving/merging activities. It is considered that any increase in speed limit higher than the design speed of this road as a whole is undesirable. Increase in speed limit over different stretches of the road is also not recommended for reasons of consistency.

16. In reviewing the speed limit of our roads, the Administration has adopted a general principle of avoiding frequent and abrupt changes. We would, as far as possible, adopt a single speed limit for the whole stretch of a road where appropriate. For example, we have raised the speed limit of a short section of West Kowloon Corridor at Cheung Sha Wan (about 1.6 km long) and a short section of Castle Peak Road between Tuen Mun and Yuen Long from 50 km/h to 70 km/h in order to maintain a uniform speed limit throughout all the road sections.

17. On the other hand, the speed limits of North Lantau Highway (about 14 km) and West Kowloon Highway (about 4 km) have been relaxed from 100 to 110 km/h and from 80 to 100 km/h respectively because of good road geometry and environment, good accident records, the prevailing vehicle speed and support from the concerned parties including motoring association and the police.



### **Different speed limits along different sections of road**

18. Different speed limits are normally adopted for different sections of a major road to suit the gradual change of road environment, say from the urban setting to the rural conditions or expressway standards, and vice versa. For instance, Route 3 includes West Kowloon Highway (100 km/h); Tsing Kwai Highway, Cheung Tsing Tunnel, Cheung Tsing Highway, Ting Kau Bridge and Tai Lam Tunnel (80 km/h); and Yuen Long Approach Road (100 km/h).

19. The speed limits of Tsing Kwai Highway, Cheung Tsing Tunnel, Cheung Tsing Highway, Ting Kau Bridge and Tai Lam Tunnel could not be relaxed because of their geometry constraints and/or tunnel/bridge configuration. Their consistent speed limit of 80 km/h is highly desirable. Also, they have a total length of about 15.3 km.

20. On the other hand, Route 3 – Cheung Tsing Highway is connected to Route 9 – Lantau Link at west Tsing Yi. They both have a speed limit of 80 km/h. The speed limit of Lantau Link is not recommended to be relaxed because of bridge configuration without any hard shoulder. It is about 4.5 km long. The speed limit of the toll plaza at the western end has now been relaxed to 80 km/h for the airport bound direction. The speed limit in the Kowloon bound direction is being planned to be relaxed soon. In this way, there would be only one change of speed limits at the toll plaza instead of two changes within a short distance. North Lantau Highway, having a speed limit of 110 km/h, is about 14 km long.

21. Toll plazas are special areas which are required to be treated with caution. Motorists are required to slow down to pay their tolls in passing through the areas. High speed travelling in these areas should be discouraged. In the past, a speed limit of 50 km/h was used to control the vehicle speed. However, to avoid frequent and abrupt changes, it is now recommended that the speed limit at the toll plaza should be the same as that of the adjoining road sections. If there are more than one adjoining roads leading to the toll plaza and they have different speed limits, the lower one should be adopted. We would erect advance warning traffic signs and road markings on the approach to the toll plaza to advise motorists to adjust their speeds.

22. As a first step, the speed limits of selected toll plazas, including Lantau Link, would be relaxed. In the light of experience, these arrangements would be extended to other toll plazas.

### **Feasibility of different speed limits for fast and slow lanes of a highway**

23. The standard speed limits are briefly described in paragraph 3. Any review of the existing speed limits including any road sections of merging traffic ahead should be carried out in accordance with the criteria as stated in paragraph 13. We are not aware of any overseas countries which practise different speed limits on different lanes of a highway. We have reservations over this arrangement because it would encourage frequent lane changing and/or overtaking activities which are highly undesirable for safety reasons, especially on high speed roads. In addition, it would be difficult for the Police to take enforcement action.

### **Installation of warning signs to indicate change of speed limit**

24. To provide advance warning to motorists, we have introduced a new traffic sign so that they can have sufficient time to prepare and adjust their speeds for the lowering of 20 km/h or more in speed limit along the mainline. This sign will be erected in pairs at about 100 m ahead of the change and under special circumstance, an additional pair at about 200 m in advance. We do not recommend the erection of warning sign for the lowering of 10 km/h in speed limit as the change is small and drivers can easily comply with it without difficulty. We also do not recommend the erection of warning sign for the lowering of speed limit at exits from the mainline as there is a physical change of the road environment and adequate directional signs have been provided.

25. To improve the readability of the speed limit signs, we would increase the size of the signs including repeater signs, if site condition permits. We have also decided to remove the wording of "km/h" in the sign face as motorists are already accustomed to the metric unit of km/h. This would allow the use of a larger size numeral for 2 or 3 digit speed limit. Implementation of the proposal has already commenced. We expect that all the existing speed limit signs would be replaced with new signs within two years.

### **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCIDENTS AND SPEEDING**

26. There are a number of overseas studies on the relationship between accidents and speeding. An American study (1990) showed that following a revision of the speed limit of the interstate highways from 88 km/h to 104 km/h, there was an increase of 3 - 6 km/h in the mean rural interstate speed which has resulted in an increase of 19 - 34 % in fatalities in traffic accidents. This suggested that for every 1.6 km/h change in the mean traffic speed, there is an associated change of 8 or 9 % in the number of fatalities. The above findings are broadly in line with an earlier German study (1977) on West German motorways which indicated a 9.7% change in accidents for 1.6 km/h change in mean speed.

27. The study carried out by TRL indicates that there appears to be a strong relationship between the actual traffic speed and accidents. Overseas studies also show that the imposition of a speed limit, or the lowering of an existing speed limit, is usually associated with significant reductions in road accidents and vice versa.

28. The setting of speed limits on our roads depends on a number of factors which include road geometry and conditions, the actual travelling speed, accident records and vehicle flows etc. We found from the review that it is still within the safety margin to relax the speed limits of some road sections to tally with the actual travelling speeds of most drivers on the road. Therefore, we do not expect that our revised speed limits will cause significant increase in vehicle speeds. Also, a preliminary assessment indicates that in the past few months, only two road sections recorded an increase in traffic accidents after relaxation. However, it is too early at this point to carry out any meaningful surveys of the “after” situation these road sections as the traffic patterns have yet to fully stabilised and the traffic accident data available are for a limited period only. We are now monitoring the situation and have requested Police to step up enforcement particularly in the latter two road sections.

## **BREAKDOWN OF SPEEDING STATISTICS**

29. We do not have a breakdown of speeding offences in excess of the speed limit with reference to different speed limits of roads. However, because of our recent installation of speed enforcement cameras, we could provide some speeding statistics on Fanling and Tolo Highways for 1999 (see **Annex B**).

30. From these statistics, we can see that about 9% of the speeding cases occurring on roads with speed limit of either 80 or 100 km/h are of a serious nature (i.e. over 30 km/h). This is in line with the general speeding statistics that about 10% of the cases are in excess of the speed limit by over 30 km/h and would pose a significantly higher potential danger to other road-users. It is also noted that for roads with a higher speed limit of 100 km/h, the majority of the speeding cases (two-third) are in excess of the speed limit by 11 to 15 km/h while for roads with a lower speed limit of 80 km/h, the majority of the speeding cases (70%) are in excess of the speed limit by 16 to 30 km/h.

## **CONSULTATION WITH MOTORISTS**

31. The present structure of speed limit categorisation is developed over the years as our road network continues to expand. Before arriving at the present structure, we have listened to different views from the general public who forwarded their suggestions directly to us or through different channels including the Transport Advisory Committee and the Legislative Council. In addition, we have regular meetings with the transport trade and close contact with the motorists associations and the local universities so that feedback from the users could be obtained from time to time.

Transport Bureau  
24 January 2000

**General speed limits in build-up areas by vehicle category in km/h**

	<b>Vehicle type</b>				
	<b>car</b>	<b>caravan</b>	<b>bus</b>	<b>light truck</b>	<b>heavy truck</b>
Austria	50	50	50	50	50
Denmark	50	50	50	50	50
Finland	50	50	50	50	50
Germany	50	50	50	50	50
Greece	50	50	50	50	50
Netherlands	50	50	50	50	50
Portugal	50	50	50	50	50
Spain	50	50	50	50	50
Sweden	50	50	50	50	50
UK	48 (30 mph)	48 (30 mph)	48 (30 mph)	48 (30 mph)	48 (30 mph)
Hungary	50	50	50	50	50
Iceland	50	50	50	50	50
Israel	50	50	50	50	50
Latvia	50	50	50	50	50
Lithuania	50	50	50	50	50
Norway	50	50	50	50	50
Romania	60	60	40	40	40
Slovakia	60	60	60	60	60
Slovenia	60	60	60	60	60
Switzerland	50	50	50	50	50
Hong Kong	50	50	50	50	50

**General speed limits on motor roads by vehicle category in km/h**

	<b>Vehicle type</b>				
	<b>car</b>	<b>caravan</b>	<b>bus</b>	<b>light truck</b>	<b>heavy truck</b>
Austria	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	80	70	80	70	70
Finland	100	80	80/100	80	80
Germany	100	80	80/100	80	80
Greece	110	110	90	80	80
Netherlands	100	80	80	80	80
Portugal	100/90	80	90	80	80
Spain	100	80	90	80	80
Sweden	90/110	70	90	90	90
UK*	96/113	80/96	64/96	80/96	64/80
	(60/70 mph)	(50/60 mph)	(40/60 mph)	(50/60 mph)	(40/50 mph)
Hungary	100	70	70	70	70
Iceland	90	80	90	80	80
Israel	90	90	90	90	90
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	90	90	70	70	70
Norway	80/90	60/80	80	80	80
Romania	80	80	50	50	50
Slovakia	90	90	90	90	90
Slovenia	100	80	80	80	70
Switzerland	100	80	100	80	80
Hong Kong	70/80	As towing vehicle	70	70/80	70

\* In the UK, they do not have a category known as “motor roads”. The speed limits referred to in the table are those for the dual-carriageways or primary distributor roads which generally correspond to the motor roads in other European countries.

**General speed limits on motorways by vehicle category in km/h**

	<b>Vehicle type</b>				
	<b>car</b>	<b>caravan</b>	<b>bus</b>	<b>light truck</b>	<b>heavy truck</b>
Austria	130	130	100	130	80
Denmark	110	70	80	70	70
Finland	80/100/120	80	80/100	80	80
Germany	no limit	80	100	80	80
Greece	120	120	90	90	80
Netherlands	120	80	80	80	80
Portugal	120/110	90/100	90	90	90
Spain	120	80	100	100	90
Sweden	90/110	70	90	90	90
UK	113	96	113	113/96	96
	(70 mph)	(60 mph)	(70 mph)	(70/60 mph)	(60 mph)
Hungary	120	80	80	80	80
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	100	100	100	100	100
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	110	110	100	100	100
Norway	90	80/60	80	80	80
Romania	80	80	50	50	50
Slovakia	130	80	110	80	80
Slovenia	120	80	80	80	70
Switzerland	120	110	100	100	100
Hong Kong	70/80/100/110	As towing vehicle	70	70/80/100/110	70

**Annex B**

**Tolo and Fanling Highways - Speed Enforcement Camera 1999**  
**Summary on numbers of vehicles driving over posted speed limit**

Locations	Speed Over (km/h)					Total
		11 to 15	16 to 30	31 to 45	46	
Tolo Highway (Posted Speed 80 km/h)	Mar	0	335	28	6	369
	April	265	65	3	1	334
	May	0	181	21	5	207
	June	0	0	0	0	0
	July	0	0	0	0	0
	Aug	89	17	0	0	106
	Sept	0	575	64	17	656
	Total :	<b>354</b>	<b>1173</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1672</b>
	Percentage:	21%	70%	7%	2%	100%
Tolo / Fanling Highway (Posted Speed 100 km/h)	Mar	0	387	55	21	463
	April	568	126	15	8	717
	May	680	165	13	0	858
	June	36	8	34	9	87
	July	429	93	90	20	632
	Aug	549	146	27	7	729
	Sept	378	88	18	7	491
	Total:	<b>2640</b>	<b>1013</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>3977</b>
	Percentage:	66%	25%	6%	2%	100%
Grand Total:		2994	2186	368	101	5649
Percentage:		53%	39%	7%	2%	100%



## Transport Department - The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

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Transport Department

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## New speed limit road markings to enhance road safety

The Transport Department (TD) has been laying newly-designed road markings at road surface where the speed limit is lowered to 50 kilometres per hour (50km/h) to further enhance road safety.

A spokesman for the department said today (May 1) that the road markings, in addition to speed limit reduction ahead warning signs at the same locations, were to alert motorists of the need to reduce speed before the change to a lower speed limit.

A half-year trial laying of the 50 km/h speed limit road markings at the following four locations was carried out by TD in mid-2001 to see whether motorists can read and recognise the markings easily:

- ❖ Man Po Street eastbound near the elevated walkway from Central;
- ❖ Kwun Tong Road eastbound near Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate block one;
- ❖ Shing Mun Tunnel Road Sha Tin bound slip road to Tai Wai; and
- ❖ Castle Peak Road - Kwai Chung Section Kowloon bound near the slip road to Wah Yuen Chuen.

"Upon completing the trial, TD found that most of the motorists would slow down when approaching the road markings.

"We have also received positive feedback from the public that the 50 km/h speed limit road marking is effective and should be extended to other suitable locations in the territory," the spokesman said.

He added that in view of the encouraging result, TD had decided to lay the speed limit road markings at all entry points to urban areas where the speed limit was lowered to 50 km/h by end 2002.

"If the results continue to be encouraging, we will consider applying this road marking to other suitable locations," he said.

The trial laying of the road markings was advised by the Working Group on Speed Limit Review (WG), which is set up by the Government to deliberate findings of the regular review of speed limit of trunk roads throughout the territory, in a bid to combat speeding and enhance road safety.

The WG comprises representatives from TD and Police, as well as the Hong Kong Automobile Association and the Institute of Advanced Motorists Hong Kong to benefit from their expert views.

During the latest review in late 2000 to 2001, the Government examined 53 road sections with a speed limit of 50 or 70 km/h, taking into account factors including the accident history, geometry and environment of the road sections.

With the endorsement of the WG and relevant Districts, speed limit of the following six road sections have been relaxed from 50 to 70 km/h since late 2000:

- ❖ Castle Peak Road (between Tai Wo Interchange and Yip Shing Street);
- ❖ Hoi On Road;
- ❖ Hung Hom Road (between Hung Luen Road and Hung Hom Bypass);
- ❖ Hung Hom Bypass (between Salisbury Road and Hung Hom Road);
- ❖ Kwun Tong Road (between Hong Tak Road and Ngau Tau Kok Road); and
- ❖ Tai Po Tai Wo Road (between On Cheung Road and Yuen Shin Road).

Moreover, the WG also recommended the lowering of speed limit of Pokfulam Road between Chi Fu Road and Victoria Road from 70 to 50 km/hr to address the relative high accident rates on the road section. The adjustment was implemented in January 2002.

The Government will continue to conduct regular speed limit review and install additional warning signs and road markings to alert motorists as appropriate.

End/Wednesday, May 1, 2002

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**For information**

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

**Progress Report of Speed Limit Review 2004/05**

**Purpose**

This paper sets out the progress of the speed limit review exercise conducted in 2004/05 for Members' information.

**Background**

2. We carry out regular reviews on the speed limits of trunk roads and primary distributors. Since 2001, we have been providing this Panel with annual reports on the reviews.

**Review of Speed Limits**

3. In 2004/05, we have examined 22 sections of trunk roads and primary distributors. They are set out in **Annex A**. The list includes seven road sections with a speed limit of 50 km/h, seven road sections with a speed limit of 70 km/h, five sections with a speed limit of 80 km/h, two road sections with a speed limit of 100 km/h and one road section with a speed limit of 110 km/h.

**Review Criteria**

4. In reviewing the speed limits of all road sections, our primary concern is to ensure the safety of road users. Relaxation will be considered only if road safety would not be adversely affected. As in the previous review exercises, we take into consideration the following factors in carrying out the assessment -

- (a) the accident history of the road section, i.e. the personal injury accident rate of the road section concerned as compared with the figure for the whole territory;

- (b) the geometry and environment of the road section, i.e. the gradient and sightline of the road section concerned, the number of signalised road junctions, and the extent of pedestrian activities, etc.;
- (c) the number of changes in speed limit on a stretch of road should be minimised. For local hazards, consideration would be given to providing appropriate warning signs rather than lowering the speed limit; and
- (d) the speed under which the majority of drivers of light vehicles during off-peak periods would travel, i.e. the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile vehicle speed.

#### Speed Limit Review Working Group

5. We have formed a Working Group on Speed Limit Review (the Working Group) to carry out the task. In addition to representatives from the Transport Department, the Working Group also comprises representatives from the Police, the Hong Kong Automobile Association and the Institute of Advanced Motorists Hong Kong.

#### Review Findings

##### *(a) Upward adjustment of speed limit*

6. In view of the similarity of road characteristics with the adjoining road sections, the Working Group recommends that the speed limit of Island Eastern Corridor from Shun Tai Road slip road to a point near Chai Wan Road roundabout be adjusted upwards from 50 km/h to 70 km/h so as to match with that of the adjoining roads.

##### *(b) Downward adjustment of speed limit*

7. Amongst the road sections reviewed, there are no recommendations for downward adjustment of speed limit.

*(c) Speed limit to be retained*

8. The Working Group recommends that the speed limits of the other 21 road sections be retained.

9. Details of the findings of the speed limit review are at **Annex B**.

**Consultation**

10. The Eastern District Council and transport trades have been consulted on the proposed adjustment of speed limit in paragraph 6, and they have no objection to the proposal.

**Way Forward**

11. We will continue to conduct speed limit reviews on a regular basis.

Environment, Transport and Works Bureau  
October 2005

**Trunk Roads and Primary Distributors with a Speed Limit  
of 50 km/h, 70 km/h, 80 km/h, 100 km/h or 110 km/h  
included in the Speed Limit Review in 2004/05**

**(A) Speed Limit of 50 km/h**

No.	Road Sections
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>	
1	Garden Road
2	Island Eastern Corridor between Shun Tai Road Slip Road and Chai Wan Road Roundabout
<b>New Territories</b>	
3	Pak Wo Road between Chi Fuk Circuit and Yat Ming Road/Wah Ming Road
4	Ma On Shan Road between Hang Hong Street and On Chiu Street/Sai Sha Road
5	Po Lam Road North between Po Hong Road and Po Ning Road
6	Kam Tin Road between Au Tau Roundabout and Kam Tin Western Roundabout
7	New Hiram's Highway between Clear Water Bay Road Interchange and Nam Pin Wai Road Roundabout (downhill section)

**(B) Speed Limit of 70 km/h**

No.	Road Sections
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>	
8	Island Eastern Corridor between North Point Interchange and Sai Wan Ho
9	Aberdeen Tunnel
10	Island Eastern Corridor between Public Riding School and Shun Tai Road
<b>Kowloon</b>	
11	West Kowloon Corridor Southbound between Mong Kok and Yau Ma Tei
12	Ching Cheung Road between Lai Chi Kok Road and Lung Cheung Road
<b>New Territories</b>	
13	New Hiram's Highway between Clear Water Bay Road Interchange and Nam Pin Wai Road roundabout (uphill section)
14	Jockey Club Road between Pak Wo Road and Sha Tau Kok Road, Fanling

**(C) Speed Limit of 80 km/h**

<b>Hong Kong Island</b>	
15	Connaught Road between Gilman Street and Sai Cheung Street North
<b>New Territories</b>	
16	Tsing Kwai Highway between West Kowloon Highway and Cheung Tsing Tunnel
17	Cheung Tsing Tunnel
18	Ting Kau Bridge
19	Lantau Link

**(D) Speed Limit of 100 km/h**

No.	Road Sections
<b>Kowloon</b>	
20	West Kowloon Highway
<b>New Territories</b>	
21	San Tin Highway

**(E) Speed Limits of 110 km/h**

No.	Road Sections
<b>New Territories</b>	
22	North Lantau Expressway between Lantau Link Toll Plaza and the Airport

**Summary of the Results of the Speed Limit Review in 2004/05**

**(A) Speed Limit of 50 km/h**

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>			
1	Garden Road	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speed is 53 km/h which is below the threshold of 63 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- Steep gradient and the presence of 3 frontage accesses make relaxation of the speed limit not suitable.</li> </ul>
2	Island Eastern Corridor between Shun Tai Road Slip Road and Chai Wan Road Roundabout	<p>(a) Speed limit to be raised to 70 km/h for the section from Shun Tai Road slip road to a point near Chai Wan Roundabout.</p> <p>(b) Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained for the remaining section.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We recommend to increase the speed limit from 50 to 70 km/h, as the characteristics of this road section are similar to those of its adjacent section that have a speed limit of 70km/h.</li> <li>- The remaining section is the approach to Chai Wan Road Roundabout and the standard speed limit for such approach roads is 50 km/h.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre



No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>New Territories</b>			
3	Pak Wo Road between Chi Fuk Circuit and Yat Ming Road/Wah Ming Road	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 63 km/h for Sheung Shui bound and 56 km/h for Fanling bound, which are just at or below the threshold of 63 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- Relatively high personal injury accident rate of 1.42 per million veh-km.</li> <li>- The section of this road is short (only 0.9 km) with signalised junctions, bus bays, frontage accesses and side roads. The radius of the existing road bend will become substandard if the speed limit is raised.</li> </ul>
4	Ma On Shan Road between Hang Hong Street and On Chiu Street/Sai Sha Road	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High personal injury accident rate of 1.60 per million veh-km.</li> <li>- The section of this road is short (only 0.8 km) with 2 signalised junctions, 1 priority junction with the presence of at-grade pedestrian crossings and bus bays. Relaxation of the speed limit is not suitable.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
5	Po Lam Road North between Po Hong Road and Po Ning Road	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained for the section between Po Hong Road and Po Fung Road (0.78 km)  Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained for the section between Po Fung Road to Po Ning Road (0.78km)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High personal injury accident rate of 1.67 per million veh-km.</li> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speed is 61 km/h for northbound which is below the threshold of 63 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- Bus bays, main accesses to housing estates and signalized junctions with pedestrian crossings are present at close intervals. Relaxation of the speed limit is not suitable.</li> </ul>
6	Kam Tin Road between Au Tau Roundabout and Kam Tin Western Roundabout	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 59 km/h for eastbound and 60 km/h for westbound, which are below the threshold of 63 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- There are 23 run-ins and 4 signalised junctions along the road section. Relaxation of the speed limit is not suitable.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
7	New Hiram's Highway between Clear Water Bay Road Interchange and Nam Pin Wai Road Roundabout (downhill section)	Existing speed limit 50 km/h to be retained for downhill section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speed is 61 km/h, which is below the threshold of 63 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- This short road section has a steep downhill gradient of 10%. Given that the speed limits of the adjoining road sections are 50 km/h, an increase in speed limit for this section is not warranted.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-
 

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

**(B) Speed Limit of 70 km/h**

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>			
8	Island Eastern Corridor between North Point Interchange and Sai Wan Ho	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 65 km/h for eastbound and 71 km/h for westbound, which are below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- High personal injury accident rate of 0.41 per million veh-km.</li> <li>- The radius of the road will become substandard if the speed limit is raised.</li> </ul>
9	Aberdeen Tunnel	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 76 km/h for southbound and northbound, which are below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- Relatively high personal injury accident rate of 0.33 per million veh-km.</li> </ul>
10	Island Eastern Corridor between Public Riding School and Shun Tai Road	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 65 km/h for eastbound and 70 km/h for westbound, which are below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-
 

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>Kowloon</b>			
11	West Kowloon Corridor Southbound between Mong Kok and Yau Ma Tei	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	- Concern has been expressed by local residents about the increase in traffic noise if the speed limit is raised above 70 km/h.
12	Ching Cheung Road between Lai Chi Kok Road and Lung Cheung Road	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 76 km/h for both bounds, which are below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit .</li> <li>- The presence of double bends makes the relaxation of speed limit not suitable.</li> <li>- The existing speed limit of the connecting roads, i.e. Kwai Chung Road and Lung Cheung Road is 70 km/h.</li> </ul>
<b>New Territories</b>			
13	New Hiram's Highway between Clear Water Bay Road Interchange and Nam Pin Wai Road Roundabout (uphill section)	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained for uphill section	- The 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile speed is 74 km/h, which is below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit.

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
14	Jockey Club Road between Pak Wo Road and Sha Tau Kok Road, Fanling	Existing speed limit 70 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 67 km/h for Fanling bound and 68 km/h for Kowloon bound, which are below the threshold of 80 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- The presence of bus bays, pedestrian crossing and frontage accesses makes relaxation of the speed limit not suitable.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

**(C) Speed Limit of 80 km/h**

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>			
15	Connaught Road between Gilman Street and Sai Cheung Street North.	Existing speed limit 80 km/h to be retained	- The 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 70 km/h for westbound and 75 km/h for eastbound, which are below the threshold of 93 km/h for raising the speed limit.
<b>New Territories</b>			
16	Tsing Kwai Highway between West Kowloon Highway and Cheung Tsing Tunnel	Existing speed limit 80 km/h to be retained	- The 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 84 km/h for Kowloon bound and 81 km/h for Airport bound, which are below the threshold of 93 km/h for raising the speed limit. - There is a large volume of merging and diverging traffic and double bends which make relaxation of the speed limit not suitable.

Note :

- The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
- The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
17	Cheung Tsing Tunnel	Existing speed limit 80 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 81 km/h for Kowloon bound and 86 km/h for Airport bound, which are below the threshold of 93 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- Relatively high personal injury accident rate of 0.33 per million veh-km.</li> <li>- Motorists need to adapt to the controlled reduction of lighting levels due to the tunnel effect and travelling at a speed higher than 80 km/h will cause safety hazards.</li> </ul>
18	Ting Kau Bridge	Existing speed limit 80 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 86 km/h for southbound and 79 km/h for northbound, which are below the threshold of 93km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- There is a very high percentage of heavy vehicles.</li> </ul>
19	Lantau Link	Existing speed limit 80 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 84 km/h for Kowloon bound and 90 km/h for Airport bound, which are below the threshold of 93 km/h for raising speed the limit.</li> <li>- Strong wind conditions could cause vehicles travelling at 100 km/h to be out of control.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre



**(D) Speed Limit of 100km/h**

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>Kowloon</b>			
20	West Kowloon Highway	Existing speed limit 100 km/h to be retained	- The 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 96 km/h for Kowloon bound and 98 km/h for Airport bound, which are below the threshold of 110 km/h for raising the speed limit.
<b>New Territories</b>			
21	San Tin Highway	Existing speed limit 100 km/h to be retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 85<sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 93 km/h for southbound and 90 km/h for northbound, which are below the threshold of 110 km/h for raising the speed limit.</li> <li>- The existing speed limits of the connecting roads, i.e. Fanling Highway and Yuen Long Highway are 100 km/h and 80 km/h. If the speed limit of this section is raised, there will be frequent changes of speed limits.</li> </ul>

Note :

1. The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
2. The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-
 

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

**(E) Speed Limit of 110km/h**

No.	Road Sections	Decision	Justifications
<b>New Territories</b>			
22	North Lantau Expressway on Lantau between Lantau Link Toll Plaza and Airport	Existing speed limit 110 km/h to be retained.	The 85 <sup>th</sup> percentile speeds are 103 km/h for Kowloon bound and 110 km/h for Airport bound, which do not warrant an increase in the speed limit.

Note :

- The personal injury accident rates for individual road sections quoted in this Annex are estimated on the basis of a 12-month period prior to the respective reviews.
- The following are the average personal injury accident rates for various types of road in the territory-
 

Expressway	0.30 per million vehicle-kilometre
Tunnels	0.16 per million vehicle-kilometre
All Roads	1.29 per million vehicle-kilometre

\*  
December 30, 2006

Road safety

## 50kph speed limit should stay

A Transport Department review has confirmed the maximum speed limit of 50kph for the majority of urban roads should stay.



### Speed limit

**Road reminder:** Speed limit road markings and warning signs alert drivers to check their speed.

Overseas experience showed that fatal accidents fell by as much as 44% after lowering the speed limit for urban roads from 60kph to 50.

The recent review made reference to practices in the US, the UK, France, Holland and Canada. It found most countries have adopted a maximum speed limit of 50kph for urban roads, due to the presence of more pedestrians and business activities.

The department's Road Safety & Standards Division Chief Engineer Leung Tak-fai said Australia cut fatal traffic accidents by 44% after it switched to the 50kph limit in 2000.

"A World Health Organisation report also found the survival probability of a pedestrian hit by a car with a speed of 50kph is about 40%, but with a speed of 60kph only 10%," Mr Leung said.

### Fatality risk

The WHO World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention noted the higher the speed, the shorter the time a driver has to stop and avoid a crash and the more severe the impact is when a collision occurs. A pedestrian's fatality risk is near 60% if the impact speed of a car is 50kph, and 90% if the speed is 60kph.

The report said older pedestrians are more vulnerable. The probability that a pedestrian aged 65 or more will be killed by a car going 75kph is more than 60%, versus 20% for a pedestrian under 15. To read the report summary, click [here](#).

Mr Leung said a review will be conducted regularly, adding the maximum cap will be adjusted for individual road sections when

the situation warrants.

In revising the speed limit, considerations are given to road characteristics and designs, the traffic accident rate and survey results on the average speed of vehicles travelling on the specific road section.

"We will also avoid imposing different speed limits on a short road section, as this may cause inconvenience to drivers and impact road safety," Mr Leung added.

### **151 roads reviewed**

Since the 2001 set up of a working group on the speed limit review, 151 road sections have been examined. The speed limit of 25 sections were increased and lowered in 10 sections.

There were 199,449 prosecutions related to speeding from January to November, down 5.8% on the same period in 2005.

Mr Leung reminded drivers the speed limit imposed on a road is the maximum speed that is legally allowed which must not be exceeded at any time. They should also pay heed to the ever-changing traffic situation.

# 立法會 *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(1)1374/03-04  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB1/PL/TP/1

## **Panel on Transport**

### **Minutes of meeting held on Friday, 27 February 2004, at 10:45 am in Conference Room A of the Legislative Council Building**

**Members present :** Hon LAU Kong-wah, JP (Chairman)  
Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo (Deputy Chairman)  
Dr Hon David CHU Yu-lin, JP  
Hon Albert HO Chun-yan  
Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, JP  
Hon Mrs Selina CHOW LIANG Shuk-yee, GBS, JP  
Hon CHAN Kwok-keung, JP  
Hon Andrew WONG Wang-fat, JP  
Hon LAU Chin-shek, JP  
Hon Miriam LAU Kin-yee, JP  
Hon TAM Yiu-chung, GBS, JP  
Dr Hon TANG Siu-tong, JP  
Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, JP  
Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, JP  
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip  
Hon LEUNG Fu-wah, MH, JP  
Hon WONG Sing-chi  
Hon LAU Ping-cheung

**Non-Panel Members :** Hon James TO Kun-sun  
**attending** Hon SIN Chung-kai  
Hon Audrey EU Yuet-mee, SC, JP

**Public Officers  
attending**

**: Agenda item IV**

Dr Sarah LIAO  
Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works

Miss Margaret FONG  
Acting Permanent Secretary for the Environment, Transport  
and Works

Mr Martin GLASS  
Deputy Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury  
(Treasury)

**Agenda item V**

Ms Annie CHOI  
Deputy Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works

Mrs Sharon YIP  
Principal Assistant Secretary for the Environment, Transport  
and Works

Mr T F LEUNG  
Chief Engineer/Road Safety and Standards  
Transport Department

**Attendance by  
invitation**

**: Agenda item IV**

MTR Corporation Limited

Mr C K CHOW  
Chief Executive Officer

Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation

Mr Samuel LAI  
Acting Chief Executive Officer

**Clerk in attendance :**

Mr Andy LAU  
Chief Council Secretary (1)2

**Staff in attendance** : Ms Alice AU  
Senior Council Secretary (1)5

Miss Winnie CHENG  
Legislative Assistant 5

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Action

**I Confirmation of minutes and matters arising**

- (LC Paper No. CB(1)936/03-04 - Minutes of meeting held on 5 December 2003; and  
LC Paper No. CB(1)1021/03-04 - Minutes of meeting held on 14 January 2004)

1. The minutes of meetings held on 5 December 2003 and 14 January 2004 were confirmed.

**II Information papers issued since last meeting**

- (LC Paper No. CB(1)988/03-04(01) - Information paper on "Western Harbour Crossing Tolls" provided by the Administration; and  
LC Paper No. CB(1)988/03-04(02) - A letter from the Western Harbour Crossing Tunnel Company Limited on "Gazetting of toll table to take effect from 24 February 2004")

2. Members noted the above information papers issued since last meeting.

**III Items for discussion at the next meeting scheduled for 26 March 2004**

- (LC Paper No. CB(1)1075/03-04(01) - List of outstanding items for discussion; and  
LC Paper No. CB(1)1075/03-04(02) - List of follow-up actions)

3. The Chairman advised members that the Administration had proposed to discuss the following items at the next meeting scheduled for 26 March 2004:

- (a) Measures to curb taxi touting activities;
- (b) Staffing proposals related to the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Project;
- (c) Replacement of the tunnel lighting system in Cross Harbour Tunnel; and

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- (d) Staffing proposals related to the proposed merger of the two railway corporations.

4. Members agreed to discuss items (a) to (c) at the next meeting to be held on 26 March 2004.

5. Regarding item (d), some members questioned the timing for staffing proposals related to the proposed merger of the two railway corporations as the negotiations on the merger were only expected to be completed by August 2004. In view of such, the Panel agreed to defer decision on the matter until further clarification had been made by the Administration on the scope of the staffing proposals and why it was necessary for the Panel to consider the proposals in March 2004.

**IV Possible merger of MTR Corporation Limited and Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation**

(Ref. ETWB(T)CR 1/986/00 Pt 9 - Legislative Council Brief issued by the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau on 24 February 2004)

6. The Chairman said that the Government announced on 24 February 2004 that the two railway corporations would be invited to enter into merger talks. At the Administration's request, he had agreed to include an urgent briefing on the subject on the agenda of the present meeting. The item on "Report on the progress of the project on electronic audible traffic signals" originally scheduled for discussion at the meeting would instead be circulated in the form of an information paper.

7. The Chairman welcomed the representatives of the Administration, the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) and the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC) to the meeting. Mr Abraham SHEK declared interest as a Member of the KCRC Managing Board.

8. The Chairman relayed the earlier query raised by some members regarding the need to consider the staffing proposals related to the proposed merger of the two railway corporations in March 2004. The Acting Permanent Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works explained that the Administration's intention was to consult the Panel before the relevant staffing proposal was submitted to the Establishment Subcommittee for consideration. Although the deadline of negotiations between the two railway corporations was August 2004, the Administration would need to start work before then to monitor and facilitate the talks between the two corporations. In view of the prorogation of the current term of the Legislative Council in July 2004, the Administration's plan was to submit the relevant staffing proposal to the Establishment Subcommittee and the Finance Committee for consideration in April and May 2004 respectively.



## Action

9. Notwithstanding the Administration's explanation, members considered that the Administration should first provide a paper setting out details of the proposals and, in particular, the timing for creation of the proposed posts before a decision was made on whether the item would be put on the agenda of the meeting on 26 March 2004.

*(Post-meeting note: The item was subsequently included in the agenda of the meeting on 26 March 2004.)*

10. In response to the Chairman, the Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works (SETW) referred members to the Legislative Council Brief issued by the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau on 24 February 2004 (Ref. ETWB(T)CR 1/986/00 Pt 9) for details about the Government's decision to invite the two railway corporations to start negotiations on a possible merger. The two corporations would be asked to give a clear undertaking in respect of all the parameters set out in paragraph 14 of the paper, and to submit the outcome of their negotiations, including preliminary transaction terms and the framework of a draft integrated operating agreement with key terms on, inter alia, fare adjustment mechanism and safeguards and measures to deal with service disruption. The Administration would then decide on the way forward. A report on the outcome of the negotiations was expected to be made to the Panel in the next term.

### Fare adjustment mechanism

11. Ms Miriam LAU requested the Administration to elaborate on its thinking as to how the proposed merger could provide an opportunity for the adoption of a more objective and transparent fare adjustment mechanism for railway fares, given that the fare autonomy currently enjoyed by KCRC and MTRCL was clearly stipulated in the relevant legislation/Operating Agreement. She asked whether this would imply a fundamental change to the way railway corporations were operating in Hong Kong, in particular the requirement that railway corporations should operate according to prudent commercial principles.

12. In response, SETW said that the present difficulty with fare adjustments was that there was no set mechanism to allow for fare reduction during deflationary economic conditions while fare increase proposals from public transport operators often faced opposition from certain sectors of the community, leading to political debates which were not conducive to efficiency and harmony. Hence, the Government proposed to adopt a new fare adjustment mechanism based on a price-cap model with a trigger mechanism that could allow public transport fares to go up or down in light of the relevant factors and by reference to a specified formula which would balance the interests of the public and public transport operators while ensuring that fare adjustments would not be politicized. Since the proposal was announced in August 2003, the Administration had been consulting public transport operators including the two railway corporations on the details. It was one of the parameters for the merger talks that the framework of the draft integrated operating agreement for the merged corporation to be

Action

produced by end August 2004 should contain key terms on introduction of a more objective and transparent fare adjustment mechanism.

13. Mrs Selina CHOW opined that the objective of implementing the new fare adjustment mechanism as part of the merger proposal should be to safeguard the interest of the travelling public while creating a stable operating environment for the merged corporation. Notwithstanding possible fare reductions in the initial stage, railway fares should be allowed to go up or down in light of the relevant factors through a more objective and transparent process.

Synergies and reduction of railway fares

14. Mr Abraham SHEK expressed support for the Government's decision on account of the perceived benefits a merger between the two railway corporations could bring to the overall development of Hong Kong in future. For the travelling public, they could enjoy lower fares with the abolition of the second boarding charge. Mr LAU Chin-shek opined that as merger talks were now formally in progress, the two railway corporations should give consideration to removing the second boarding charge immediately so as to bring early relief to the travelling public from the heavy burden of transport costs.

15. Mr WONG Sing-chi asked whether the merger could present further opportunities for the offer of more fare concessions and discounts to the passengers, say in the form of monthly or weekly passes or day fare ticket. Mr CHENG Kar-foo was of the view that notwithstanding the outcome of the merger talks, the Administration must continue its efforts in bringing down railway fares to benefit the travelling public.

16. Dr TANG Siu-tong said that the likely synergies of a merger should be reflected in the fares to be determined for Kowloon Southern Link (KSL) and Shatin to Central Link (SCL).

17. Mr TAM Yiu-chung said that according to some academics, the presence of certain negative factors, such as high interest payments of the two corporations and the uncertainty of government funding support through property development rights, might result in less-than-expected synergies. This could impact adversely on the level of fare reductions to be achieved. Hence, the Administration should also clearly account for the down side risks involved so as to avoid creating any unrealistic expectation among the public.

18. Responding to members' views and concerns, SETW said that there continued to be strong community demand for fare reduction and the possible merger provided a very good opportunity for the corporations to review their overall position in meeting public aspirations. At present, MTRCL and KCRC operated their separate rail networks. It was the corporations' policy that a second boarding charge would apply for interchanging between the two networks. Hence, the removal of the second boarding charge could only materialize upon implementation of a merger. However, this would likely impact adversely on fare revenue. In order that an overall reduction in fare was

## Action

achieved, the railway corporations would have to review comprehensively their fare structures so as to rationalize the fare levels in the light of the likely synergies and the removal of the second boarding charge arising from a merger. In the long-run, fare levels would be determined according to a new fare adjustment mechanism which would allow upward as well as downward fare adjustments.

19. SETW added that it would be too early to speculate on the exact levels of synergies or fare reductions to be achieved as such matters would require detailed consideration by the two corporations in the merger talks. Nonetheless, she believed that for the merger proposal to be acceptable, it should balance the interests of passengers and shareholders.

## Valuation

20. Mrs Selina CHOW considered that given the Government's shareholding in the two railway corporations, the proposed merger should not be regarded as a case of merger between two private enterprises. Valuation of assets should suitably reflect the long-term public interest to be achieved for the community as a whole as the operational efficiency of the railway network would be improved. To ensure early benefits to the travelling public, she said that the merger, once decided on, should be completed as soon as practicable. This could also help minimize the uncertainties involved for all stakeholders.

21. Mr CHENG Kar-foo however pointed out as reflected by the falling share prices of MTRCL after the announcement, merger might not be an attractive option to the minority shareholders as the rate of return of the merged corporation would only be in the range of 2% to 4%. Citing public interest in terms of fare reductions on one side and the investment returns of minority shareholders on the other, he considered that it would be very difficult to come up with a proposal that could balance such conflicting interests. Mr CHENG further enquired about the Administration's proposed measures to ensure an overall reduction of fare levels through co-operation of the two corporations in case the merger proposal was not acceptable to minority shareholders.

22. SETW responded that as railway operation was essentially a long-term investment, short-term increase in return on investment would be only one of the various factors the minority shareholders would take into account. Through a merger, business prospects would improve as the competitive position of railways against other modes of transport would be consolidated. Synergies and productivity gains achievable were all positive factors for the minority shareholders to consider. She added that under the clearly-defined parameters for the merger talks, the two corporations could work out the necessary framework that allowed for stable and long-term growth prospects for the merged corporation.

Action

23. Mr C K CHOW, the Chief Executive Officer of MTRCL (CEO/MTRCL), also stressed that the Corporation's aim was to create a merger that would benefit the customers, shareholders and staff. The decision as to whether to accept the merger proposal would ultimately rest with the minority shareholders. In the meantime, MTRCL would continue to serve the public by maintaining reliable and efficient services to the passengers.

24. Mr Albert HO considered that the timing of the merger proposal was not right as there were many uncertainties surrounding KCRC's operation, in particular the financial viability of its new railways. In order to gain the acceptance of MTRCL's minority shareholders, the Government might need to provide a substantial discount to KCRC's asset value. As these assets belonged to the people of Hong Kong, he did not see how public interest could be served in such case.

25. SETW said that the Administration had given due regard to all perspectives including financial and transport factors when considering the timing for the merger proposal. The Administration believed that it was an opportune time to take forward the merger proposal as the rail network in Hong Kong was expanding. This would provide opportunities for synergies and more effective utilization of resources for the two corporations. She reiterated that in the course of the merger talks, the two corporations would work out an acceptable framework that could balance public interest on one hand and the interest of minority shareholders of MTRCL on the other.

26. While welcoming the merger of the two corporations in principle, Mr Albert CHAN considered that in order to obviate the need for a substantial discount on KCRC's asset value, the Administration should consider buying out the minority shareholders as they had already been adversely affected by the proposed merger as reflected in the falling share prices of MTRCL.

27. The Deputy Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury) (DS(Tsy)) said that the Administration did not see the need for providing any guarantee to minority shareholders of MTRCL as it was ultimately their decision on whether to accept the merger proposal or not. The Government, being a connected party, could not exercise its right as the majority shareholder in the vote of MTRCL.

28. DS(Tsy) further said that valuation was an important issue in the merger talks. The right balance would need to be struck between public interest and the interest of minority shareholders. Over the next six months, the Administration would, with the assistance of a financial adviser to be appointed soon, examine the valuation issues surrounding KCRC. He added that one of the preferred tool of valuation was the discounted cash flow method. This could be able to give the fairest picture of KCRC's value.

Action

29. Mr SIN Chung-kai queried why a financial adviser was engaged by the Government at such a late stage to look into these important financial issues when the general benefits of a merger had already been endorsed by the Government in principle.

30. In response, both SETW and DS(Tsy) stressed that a final decision had yet to be made on whether to proceed with the merger. DS(Tsy) further said that the Administration had conducted an internal assessment before the preliminary decision was made to invite the two corporations to enter into merger talks. However, it would not be appropriate to release any figures or findings which were intended for internal use. In the coming months, the Government would work with the two corporations to establish an optimum way for the merger to work.

31. In view of the major public interest at stake, Mr CHENG Kar-foo requested the Administration to release the findings of its assessment on the merger proposal for members' consideration.

32. DS(Tsy) reiterated that the objective of the internal assessment was to come up with a framework within which the two corporations could proceed with the negotiations on a possible merger. Such information should be kept confidential. If a decision was eventually reached, there would be transparency as the relevant proposals would require scrutiny and approval by the Legislative Council.

33. Mr CHENG Kar-foo did not accept the Administration's explanation. Mr Albert CHAN also cited the case of the development of the new airport and Airport Express Line, and called on the Administration to provide members with detailed financial information on a similar basis. Noting the members' request, DS(Tsy) agreed that the Administration would go back and consider how best information that would be useful to members could be divulged at this stage. He also undertook that a response would be provided to members soon.

Admin

34. In reply to Mr SIN Chung-kai's further enquiry, Mr Samuel LAI, the Acting Chief Executive Officer of KCRC (Acting CEO/KCRC), said that a financial adviser had yet to be appointed by KCRC. CEO/MTRCL also said that MTRCL was planning on the appointment of a financial adviser for the proposed merger within the next few weeks.

Funding support for railway development

35. Mr LAU Ping-cheung enquired about the Government's thinking on future arrangements to provide funding support for railway development through property development rights as the terms and conditions of existing agreements made between the Government and the two corporations were quite different.

Action

36. DS(Tsy) replied that property development rights were granted to the two railway corporations to fulfil the different development requirements of new railway projects. While the Government had no intention to alter previous agreements entered into with the corporations, it would adopt an open attitude when considering how best funding support should be provided in future.

37. Mr CHENG Kar-foo however considered that such uncertainty would impact adversely on the interest of shareholders. The Administration should, in the context of the merger talks, work out a clear framework for providing funding support for railway development in future.

38. Advising members from KCRC's perspective, Acting CEO/KCRC said that the corporation would continue to undertake property development along the East Rail and East Rail Extensions and act as the Government's agent for developments along the West Rail. CEO/MTRCL also said that property development was one of the main business of MTRCL and it should not be affected by the merger proposal.

Safeguarding minority shareholders' interest

39. Dr TANG Siu-tong stressed the need for protecting the interest of minority shareholders of MTRCL, and asked whether the Administration would conduct an independent assessment before a final decision was taken.

40. In response, SETW said that the Administration had made it very clear that a merger would only proceed with the agreement of minority shareholders of MTRCL. CEO/MTRCL added that it was the Board of Directors' duty to look out for the interest of its minority shareholders. To this end, an independent committee would be established to assess the fairness of any proposed merger terms to the minority shareholders. As a listed company, MTRCL would carefully evaluate the terms and structure of the merger to gain minority shareholders' approval. For this purpose, the Corporation would engage a financial adviser to advise on the terms of any merger proposal to be discussed with KCRC and the Government.

Further privatization through public share offer

41. Referring to the longer-term possibility of further privatization through an initial public offering (IPO), Ms Miriam LAU said that the Administration should consider whether some of the synergies resulting from the merger should be retained within the merged corporation so as to ensure a reasonable offering price. This would be beneficial to public interest.

42. Mr CHENG Kar-foo asked whether similar arrangement as the securitization of revenue from government toll tunnels and bridges would be adopted for the further privatization of the merged corporation.

## Action

43. DS(Tsy) said that to put things in perspective, the merger proposal must first be accepted by the minority shareholders of MTRCL before the merger could proceed. Thereafter, consideration on other issues relating to any eventual IPO would be made in due course if contemplated.

## Competition

44. Mr WONG Sing-chi considered that under the Government's rail-based transport policy, it was increasingly difficult for franchised bus services to compete with rail services on a level playing field. In considering a merger, the Government must ensure that the merged corporation would not monopolize the public transport market so as to safeguard commuters' choice.

45. SETW said that notwithstanding a possible merger, franchised buses were still the major passenger carrier in the public transport system. In view of the strong competition from buses and other modes of public transport, it was unlikely that the merged corporation would become a monopolistic player in the market. In pursuing the transport policy of railway as the backbone of HongKong's transport system, the Government was mindful of the need to ensure better co-ordination of public transport services while safeguarding commuters' reasonable choice. Considering the huge investments spent on railway development, there was general agreement in the community that bus services should be suitably rationalized as new railways went into operation bringing about substantial increase in public transport capacity. This would also have the benefit of improving roadside air quality and reducing traffic congestion.

## Convenience to the travelling public

46. Ir Dr Raymond HO stated support for the merger proposal. However, he pointed out that synergies that came from the full integration of the two railway networks would take a long time to achieve as their operating systems including types of trains, signalling and electrification systems were completely different. In the short term, he said that the merger proposal should be taken forward as soon as possible so as to facilitate early resolution of interchange arrangements for projects under planning, notably SCL and KSL.

47. Noting Ir Dr HO's concern about the need to provide seamless interchange arrangements for new projects being planned, CEO/MTRCL replied that this would be an important issue for the two corporations to consider in the context of the merger talks.

48. In view of the Government's present decision, the Chairman asked whether KCRC would take the opportunity to engage MTRCL in more discussions with a view to further refining the interchange arrangements for SCL. Ms Miriam LAU also called on KCRC to expedite such discussions so as to avoid further delays in the implementation programme of SCL.

Action

49. Acting CEO/KCRC replied that KCRC had been maintaining close liaison with MTRCL on this matter. Depending on the progress of the merger talks, KCRC would strive to incorporate the necessary refinements to the SCL final scheme design proposal to be submitted to the Government in mid 2004.

Staff and management

50. Mr LEUNG Fu-wah expressed grave concern about the impact of a merger on the employment situation of the two railway corporations. He sought clarification on the scope of "front-line staff" whose job security was specifically required to be taken into account in the merger talks. As the Government would decide on whether to proceed with the merger or not, he considered that the Administration should play a pivotal role in safeguarding the employment conditions and remuneration packages of existing staff of the two corporations. Such important matters should not merely be left to the two corporations to consider.

51. Both Ir Dr Raymond HO and Mr LAU Ping-cheung stressed that the interest of management and technical staff in the middle ranks of the two corporations should not be ignored.

52. CEO/MTRCL said that as Hong Kong's rail network would continue to grow and expand with a number of new lines to be commissioned in the coming years, front-line staff was not expected to be affected as a result of the merger. Notwithstanding, he assured members that due consideration would be given to safeguarding the interest of all the staff as a whole. Such assurance had been communicated to and accepted by the staff of MTRCL when they were briefed about the matter on the day of the Government's announcement. Throughout the process, MTRCL would maintain open communication with its staff to ensure that they were kept up-to-date on the progress.

53. Acting CEO/KCRC advised that KCRC had also accorded priority to the interest of its staff. From the operational point of view, KCRC did not anticipate any major impact on its front-line staff as KCRC was still expanding its network with a number of new railway projects in the pipeline. Nonetheless, the management of KCRC was aware of the concerns raised by the staff and would continue to communicate with all staff in an open and transparent manner in addressing such concerns.

54. Mr LEUNG Fu-wah concurred with the prudent manner of the two corporations in taking the matter forward, and called on the Government not to maintain a divisive approach when considering matters affecting the staff of the two corporations. In view of its shareholding in the two corporations, the Government should give a clear undertaking that any impact on the staff of the two corporations would be minimized as far as possible.



Action

55. In response, SETW stressed that the Government was mindful of the importance of maintaining stability during the negotiation/transition process so as to ensure smooth operation of railway services. Notwithstanding, the Administration also saw the need to give the corporations a certain degree of flexibility when considering manpower issues in the merger talks. As such, the Administration had specifically required the two corporations to address the issue of job security for front-line staff as one of the key parameters of negotiations. The corporations would consider if they could provide additional assurance to their staff. Meanwhile, the Administration would ensure that timely and accurate information on progress of the deliberations would be communicated effectively by the corporations to their staff.

56. Mrs Selina CHOW considered that since there was already a clear undertaking on the job security for front-line staff, the two railway corporations should be allowed certain flexibility to achieve cost savings through the streamlining of the management structure. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the corporations to achieve synergies for the benefit of the community at large. In this respect, Mr LEUNG Fu-wah enquired about the likely changes to senior positions in the two corporations to tie in with the streamlining of senior management structure as a result of the merger.

57. SETW responded that it was the duty of senior management to act in the best interest of a corporate entity as a whole. She firmly believed that the senior management of the two corporations would act on that basis in considering the merger proposal and put forward their professional and unbiased opinion to the Board for consideration.

Government regulation

58. Mr Albert CHAN considered that at present, the Government and the public did not have adequate powers to monitor the operation of the two railway corporations. He called on the Administration to improve the situation when considering the necessary legislative amendments to govern the operation of the merged corporation.

59. SETW replied that at present, the two corporations were under a statutory duty to maintain a safe and efficient service. If the merger proposal was to proceed, a carefully drafted piece of legislation which set out clearly the rights and obligations of the merged corporation coupled with an Operating Agreement stating clearly the quality and safety requirements for the services to be provided would be key elements to ensure proper regulation of the merged entity.

60. Concluding the discussion, the Chairman said that the Administration should arrange to brief Members again on the development of the merger after the negotiations between the two corporations were completed. In the meantime, the Administration should provide the information as requested by members on the preliminary financial assessment it had conducted.

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**V Report on the progress of the review of speed limit**

(LC Paper No. CB(1)1075/03-04(04) - Information paper provided by the Administration)

61. The Chairman invited members to note the paper provided by the Administration (LC Paper No. CB(1)1075/03-04(04)) which set out the findings of the speed limit review conducted in 2003.

Review on specific road sections

62. Mrs Selina CHOW pointed out the serious road safety risks as a result of frequent changes in speed limits on short sections of a road. She quoted the examples of certain sections of North Lantau Highway (Airport Bound) and Western Harbour Crossing northbound (between toll plaza and West Kowloon Highway), and asked whether these road sections had been reviewed.

Admin

63. The Chief Engineer/Road Safety and Standards of the Transport Department (CE/RS&S) replied that the section of Western Harbour Crossing northbound (between toll plaza and West Kowloon Highway) was not covered in the speed limit review in 2003. The Administration would review the situation at this road section.

64. Regarding the section of North Lantau Highway (Airport Bound), CE/RS&S advised that as the speed limit of North Lantau Highway was 110 km/h, discussions were being held with the Airport Authority to relax the speed limit at the connecting road section within its premises from 70 km/h to 80 km/h so to achieve a smoother transition in speed limit.

Admin

65. Ms Miriam LAU recalled that when the proposal to impose heavier penalties for excessive speeding was discussed by Members in the context of the Road Traffic Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2000, concerns had been raised about the existence of road traps due to the unrealistically low speed limits on certain road sections. It was against this background that the Administration was requested to review the situation so that the speed limit of certain road sections could be relaxed if road safety would not be impaired. However, the findings of the present review ran contrary to this objective as the Administration was now seeking to lower the speed limit of four road sections even though their accident rates were not particularly high. Concerned about the justifications behind the Administration's recommendations, she specifically requested the Administration to re-examine the practicality of the proposals in respect of the following road sections:

- (a) Wan Po Road between Pung Loi Road and Pung Loi Avenue where the speed limit was to be reduced from 70 km/h to 50 km/h; and

Action

- (b) Yuen Long Highway where the speed limit of 70 km/h was to be retained despite strong request from the transport trades that the said speed limit should be relaxed to 80 km/h.

66. In response, CE/RS&S briefly explained that a downward adjustment of speed limit could be triggered off by a number of factors such as a relatively high percentage of heavy vehicles as well as the presence of a number of bus bays close to each other and signalized junctions. Taking note of Ms Miriam LAU's concern, the Deputy Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works (DS for ETW) agreed that the Administration would further consider the said road sections and consult local views before reverting to the Panel. In this connection, Ms LAU requested the Administration to consult the transport trades through the regular conferences of the Transport Department.

67. Dr TANG Siu-tong also said that the speed limit of Yuen Long Highway could be suitably relaxed. He also referred to the proposed reduction of speed limit for Kam Tin Road, and called on the Administration to ensure that clear and adequate warnings signs/road markings were provided to warn the motorists of the change in speed limit as proposed.

Consultation mechanism

68. Mr CHAN Kwok-keung highlighted the problems caused to professional drivers as a result of abrupt change in speed limits in a road section, and called on the Administration to suitably consult the views of professional drivers when conducting speed limit reviews. He suggested that the Administration should enlarge the membership of the Working Group on Speed Limit Review (the Working Group) to include representatives of professional drivers so that a proper balance could be struck between ensuring road safety and bringing convenience to drivers. Mr CHENG Kar-foo also agreed that it would be useful to consult the views of professional drivers.

69. DS for ETW said that the Administration would welcome all views on how improvements could be sought for individual road sections. She assured members that when contemplating any changes in the speed limit for specific road sections, the Administration would consult the local District Council as they would be in the best position to advise on the traffic conditions.

70. Regarding Mr CHAN Kwok-keung's suggestion on the membership of the Working Group, DS for ETW said that in view of the large number of transport trade associations, there might be difficulty in the selection of representatives to sit on the Working Group. Nonetheless, she said that the Administration would seek to incorporate any views from the transport trades where possible. Under the present arrangement, input from the drivers' perspective would be provided through the representation of the Hong Kong Automobile Association and the Institute of Advanced Motorists Hong Kong in the Working Group.

Action

Review criteria

71. Mr CHENG Kar-foo noted that in reviewing the speed limit of any road sections, the accident history would be considered as one of the factors. He suggested that it might be useful to adopt an objective criteria by reference to the percentage changes in the accident rate of the road sections as a trigger point for a review on speed limit. His view was noted by the Administration.

Admin

72. Concluding the discussion, the Chairman said that the Administration should further review the relevant road sections which were of concern to some members by consulting the views of local community and the transport trades. In future, the Administration should make arrangements to consult the transport trades on relevant matters through the regular conferences of the Transport Department. The Administration was requested to provide written response to address these issues raised by members after the meeting.

**VI Any other business**

73. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 1:15 pm.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
25 March 2004

## **Legislative Council Panel on Transport**

### **2018 Policy Address and Policy Agenda**

#### **Transport-related Policy Initiatives of the Transport and Housing Bureau**

#### **Introduction**

The 2018 Policy Address and Policy Agenda set out the Government's initiatives in the coming year. This paper elaborates on those initiatives that are relevant to the land transport portfolio.

#### **2018 Policy Agenda – New initiatives**

##### **(a) Improving Road Traffic**

2. Hong Kong has limited road space. We could not merely rely on building roads continuously to tackle traffic congestion. We propose implementing traffic management measures in areas where the traffic is particularly congested, such as tunnels and business districts. Such measures include adopting the concept of “Congestion Charging” to study possible upward and downward adjustments of levels of tolls for different types of vehicles using government tolled tunnels and the Tsing Ma and Tsing Sha Control Areas, in order to enable efficient people carriers and vehicles that support economic activities to enjoy lower tolls while vehicle types with low carrying capacity would need to pay higher tolls, thereby making more efficient use of road space. With the impending commissioning of the Central-Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link, we will continue to press ahead with the Electronic Road Pricing Pilot Scheme in Central and its adjacent areas, and put forward specific proposals for the Pilot Scheme in the first half of 2019 for stakeholder consultation.

3. To effectively alleviate cross-harbour traffic congestion and minimise the impact on non-cross-harbour traffic, we propose that, with effect from

1 January 2020, the actual tolls payable by private cars, taxis and motorcycles for using the Western Harbour Crossing (“WHC”) be lowered, while the corresponding tolls of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel (“CHT”) and Eastern Harbour Crossing (“EHC”) be increased at the same time in order to achieve effective traffic re-distribution. The alleviation of traffic congestion will bring about economic and environmental benefits, thereby benefiting society as a whole. The Government and the WHC franchisee have agreed in principle on a toll compensation scheme.

4. The vehicle fleet size in Hong Kong has been growing rapidly over the past decade at an average rate of 3% per annum. With a modest average annual growth of only 0.9% in car parking provision, we need to provide more car parking spaces to respond to public aspirations, with priority accorded to meeting the parking needs of commercial vehicles in order to support economic and commercial activities. The Government will follow the principle of “single site, multiple use” to provide public car parking spaces in suitable G/IC facilities and public open space (“POS”) projects. For example, the Government plans to provide public car parking spaces beneath the POS at Sze Mei Street, San Po Kong and at the Joint-user Government Office Building in Area 67, Tseung Kwan O. If technically feasible, we expect that at least 1 500 public car parking spaces will be provided in suitable government facilities and POS over the next five years. Furthermore, when the Government constructs disciplined services quarters, we will increase the number of car parking spaces as far as technically feasible, taking into full account the unique operational requirements of the disciplined services.

## **(b) Enhancing Public Transport Services**

### **Waiving the toll of tunnels and roads on franchised buses to relieve the fare increase pressure**

5. The operating costs of franchised buses are on the rise. The franchised bus operators are facing various degrees of fare increase

pressure and have submitted fare increase applications to the Government<sup>1</sup>. While we will continue to rationalise the bus service network with a view to enhancing operational efficiency, we suggest waiving the toll of Government tunnels and roads<sup>2</sup> charged on franchised buses. Each of the franchised bus operators should set up its own dedicated fund account, known as the “Franchised Bus Toll Waiver Fund”, for keeping such toll saving. The Fund is reserved for relieving fare increase pressure of the specific franchised bus operator. In other words, when the franchised bus operator applies for fare increase, the magnitude of fare increase to be shouldered by passengers as approved by the Government would be suitably reduced through the application of this Fund. Hence, the public can enjoy a more affordable yet efficient franchised bus service. We will also set a cap for the Fund. If the amount of the Fund reaches the cap and the franchised bus operator is still financially healthy without the need to apply for fare increase, the concerned franchised bus operator would need to use the toll saving exceeding the cap to provide passengers with fare concession.

6. The waiving of toll of Government tunnels and roads will involve amendments to subsidiary legislation. Our target is to submit the relevant subsidiary legislation amendments to the Legislative Council for the “negative vetting” procedures by the end of this year and implement the proposal early next year. Regarding the two tunnels that are still operating under the “Build-Operate-Transfer” (“BOT”) model (i.e. WHC and Tai Lam Tunnel), we propose that the Government should pay the toll on behalf of the franchised bus operators, and the franchised bus operators would then set aside such toll saving to their respective Franchised Bus Toll Waiver Funds to further relieve the fare increase pressure. As regards

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<sup>1</sup> Citybus Limited (Franchise for the Hong Kong Island and Cross-Harbour Bus Network) and New World First Bus Services Limited applied for fare increases of 12% in August last year. Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited and Long Win Bus Company Limited applied for fare increases of 8.5% in September this year. New Lantau Bus Company (1973) Limited also applied for fare increase of 9.8% in September this year. The Government is now processing the fare increase applications in accordance with established procedures.

<sup>2</sup> The revenue foregone by the Government for waiving the toll of Government tunnels and roads on franchised buses is about \$280 million per year.

WHC, the relevant arrangement is expected to take effect on 1 January 2020 together with the proposal on rationalisation of traffic distribution among the harbour-crossing tunnels mentioned in paragraph 3 above. Meanwhile, the Government is exploring with the BOT franchisee of Tai Lam Tunnel on the same arrangement for franchised buses using the tunnel (i.e. the Government pays the relevant toll).

7. Please refer to the separate document issued to the Panel by the Transport and Housing Bureau (“THB”) on 10 October 2018 on further information about the proposals set out in paragraph 3, 5 and 6 above.

### **Ferry and “Water Taxi”**

8. In response to the community’s suggestion of exploring more in-harbour ferry routes and the suggestion of introducing “water taxi” in the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry<sup>3</sup>, the Transport Department (“TD”) is working towards enhancing vibrancy of the Hung Hom harbourfront, through preparing for re-commissioning the “Central-Hung Hom” ferry route and launching a pilot “water taxi” service plying Kai Tak, Hung Hom, Tsim Sha Tsui East, West Kowloon and Central; and through injecting commercial elements into the Hung Hom (South) Pier. In this regard, TD invited submissions for indication of interest in operating the two licensed ferry services during 27 August – 27 September 2018. TD received two submissions during the specified period. TD is reviewing the submissions and will formulate ferry service proposals with further details for consulting relevant stakeholders. Subject to the consultation progress, TD plans to carry out a tender exercise for the two ferry services in early 2019, with a view to commencing the service of the “Central – Hung Hom” route and “water taxi”<sup>4</sup> around Q2/2019 and Q1/2020 the earliest respectively.

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<sup>3</sup> The Commerce and Economic Development Bureau and the Tourism Commission suggest exploring the provision of “water taxi” serving locations with major tourist attractions within harbour, (e.g. Central, West Kowloon, Kai Tak and Tsim Sha Tsui) in the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry.

<sup>4</sup> The gearing up time (and hence the commencement timeframe) of the “water taxi” service might vary depending on the features of the new service.



## **Providing real-time arrival information for green minibuses**

9. To further facilitate the planning of trips by passengers, the Government proposes to fund and develop a data collection system and a mobile application, as well as install global positioning devices on around 3 300 green minibuses (“GMBs”) in the territory, so as to enable passengers to get access to the real-time arrival information of GMB routes through TD’s website and “e-Mobility” mobile application. The relevant data will also be released in machine-readable format via DATA.GOV.HK for public use. GMB operators can make use of the data for fleet management with a view to enhancing the operational efficiency, while the Government can apply the data for the purpose of traffic management or transport planning (e.g. making use of big data for analysing patronage behaviour and market demand, etc.) The Government will implement the proposal in the coming three financial years<sup>5</sup>, and it is expected that the real-time information system will be launched officially in early 2022<sup>6</sup>. The Government will also continue to actively encourage and facilitate the further opening up of real-time operating data in machine-readable format by public transport operators to enable broader application.

## **Further enhancing the operating safety of franchised buses**

10. To further enhance the operating safety of franchised buses, the

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<sup>5</sup> The development of data collection system and mobile application (including procurement of hardware and software for the system, etc.) will involve around \$8 million, while the installation of the global positioning devices on around 3 300 GMBs in the territory will involve around \$23 million (the estimated cost of a set of global positioning system device is currently around \$7,000). The total cost is therefore around \$31 million. Furthermore, the estimated annual recurrent cost involved after the system is launched is about \$7.2 million. The recurrent cost is for maintaining the global positioning devices (including the monthly fee for the mobile network required for data transmission), as well as the managing and maintenance of the data collection system and mobile application, etc.

<sup>6</sup> The works of development and technical set-up is expected to take about three years to complete. The Government will appoint a system contractor through tender, to perform duties including the development, technical set-up and testing of the data collection system and mobile application, as well as the installation of devices on GMBs.

Government proposes to set aside \$500 million<sup>7</sup> to subsidise franchised bus operators for retrofitting three safety devices on appropriate existing buses, including the Electronic Stability Control (“ESC”) which can improve vehicle stability and reduce the risk of rollover, speed limiter with slow-down function (“speed limiting retarder”)<sup>8</sup> and the installation of seat belts on all seats in the upper deck of buses deployed for long-haul routes which are operated via expressways with relatively fewer bus stops<sup>9</sup>. The Government proposes to subsidise the franchised bus operators 80% of the relevant costs. The remaining costs and maintenance in future will be borne by the franchised bus operators. The subsidy scheme is expected to be rolled out in the 2019-20 financial year.

11. Besides, all franchised bus operators have undertaken that all new double-deck buses procured from July 2018 will be equipped with ESC and speed limiting retarder. All passenger seats of these newly procured buses will also be installed with seat belts with a view to further enhancing the safety and reliability of franchised bus service in Hong Kong.

### **Relaxing the vehicle length restriction of light bus**

12. The Government has been promoting the policy objectives of barrier-free transport and green transport. When taking forward the “low-floor wheelchair-accessible light bus trial scheme” (details of the scheme at paragraph 34 below), the Government notes that the vehicle length of the light bus models with more environmental benefits and/or barrier-free facilities available on the market often exceeds the current

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<sup>7</sup> Based on the prevailing cost of installing the three safety devices, each double-deck bus will receive a subsidy of around \$20,000 for installing ESC, around \$16,000 for installing the speed limiting retarder and \$192,000 for installing seat belts on all seats in the upper deck.

<sup>8</sup> Of the total of around 6 000 existing franchised buses, about 3 300 double-deck buses are suitable for installing ESC and speed limiting retarder. The total subsidy amount for the installation is about \$118.8 million.

<sup>9</sup> According to the information provided by the franchised bus operators, about 2 000 buses are deployed for these routes. The total subsidy amount for installing seat belts on seats in the upper deck of these 2 000 buses is about \$384 million.

statutory restriction<sup>10</sup>. Having reviewed the current statutory restriction and the light bus models available in the market, the Government proposes to relax the vehicle length restriction of light bus to 7.5 metres, so as to facilitate the introduction of light buses with more environmental benefits and barrier-free facilities by the trade. The proposal will involve legislative amendments, and our target is to submit the relevant legislative amendments to the Legislative Council in the 2019-20 legislative year. Before the passage of the legislative amendments by the Legislative Council, the Commissioner for Transport will continue to consider individual applications for vehicle type approval of specific light bus models, and exercise her discretion to grant requisite exemption to those light bus models with better environmental benefits (e.g. achieving the prevailing best emission standard or above) and/or barrier-free facilities (e.g. low-floor wheelchair-accessible light bus)<sup>11</sup>.

### **(c) Improving Pedestrian Environment**

13. To facilitate access to walkways by the public, the Government is proactively implementing retrofitting barrier-free access (“BFA”) facilities under the Universal Accessibility (“UA”) Programme. Apart from those items being taken forward, the Highways Department (“HyD”) is carrying out the relevant preparatory work with a view to commencing a feasibility study in the first half of 2019 on lift retrofitting proposals for the remaining some 120 eligible walkways across districts under the current ambit of the Programme and subsequently taking forward those feasible items expeditiously, so as to benefit the elderly and citizens in need (referred to as the “Third Phase” of the UA Programme). The Government will also

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<sup>10</sup> At present, the statutory vehicle length restriction of light bus is 7 metres. By virtue of the power empowered by regulation 4 of the Road Traffic (Construction and Maintenance of Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374A), the Commissioner for Transport may, depending on individual circumstances, exercise her discretion to grant exemption on the vehicle length restriction on a light bus model. When introducing the low-floor light buses, the Commissioner for Transport has already exercised her discretion in this regard.

<sup>11</sup> After the passage of the legislative amendments, if any individual model exceeds 7.5 metres but fulfilling specific policy needs, the Commissioner for Transport will continue to consider individual application pursuant to her statutory power.

conduct a review in 2019 to explore whether there is scope for further expanding the ambit of the UA Programme.

14. For the funding requirements of the respective proposals as mentioned above, we will seek funding approval from the Legislative Council in accordance with the established procedures.

### **2018 Policy Agenda – On-going initiatives**

#### **(d) Taking Forward Transport Infrastructure Projects**

15. We are planning to take forward the “Strategic Studies on Railways and Major Roads beyond 2030” (“RMR2030+ Studies”) on the basis of the conceptual spatial requirements to be firmed up under the “Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030” (Hong Kong 2030+ Study), which is being conducted by the Development Bureau and the Planning Department. Based on the latest planning information available (up to 2041), the RMR2030+ Studies will examine the demand and supply of the transport infrastructure (including railways and major roads) in Hong Kong between 2031 and 2041, which will cover the loading of the heavy rails in the Northwest New Territories. The RMR2030+ Studies will also focus on the transport infrastructure for supporting the Strategic Growth Areas recommended for long term implementation in the Hong Kong 2030+ Study. The RMR2030+ Studies will look into the layout of the proposed railway and major road infrastructure to ensure that the planning of large scale transport infrastructure can meet the needs of long term overall land use developments. The RMR2030+ Studies will also examine the impact of the proposed transport infrastructure on the existing transport network and formulate relevant transport strategies accordingly. This Panel has expressed support for the Study in June 2017. Since the Hong Kong 2030+ Study has not yet been finalized, we will strive to seek funding approval for the RMR2030+ Studies thereafter, with a view to commencing the strategic studies on railways and major roads in a timely manner.

## **Developing Railways**

16. The Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Hong Kong Express Rail Link was commissioned on 22 September 2018 and formally commenced operation on the following day (23 September 2018), connecting Hong Kong with the currently more than 25 000 km-long and ever-expanding national high-speed rail network. At present, high-speed trains travel between the Hong Kong West Kowloon Station and 44 Mainland destinations. These cover six short-haul destinations, namely Futian, Shenzhen North, Guangmingcheng, Humen, Qingsheng and Guangzhou South, as well as 38 long-haul destinations, including Beijing, Shanghai, Kunming, Guilin, Guiyang, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Fuzhou, Xiamen and Shantou etc., offering speedy, convenient and comfortable railway service to passengers. The project fosters commercial and cultural exchanges between Hong Kong and major Mainland cities, enhances Hong Kong's status as a regional transport hub, and also enables Hong Kong to tap into the synergy and opportunities brought about by the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.

17. Under the principle of “centred on public transport with railway as the backbone”, we will enhance the accessibility to and the transport connectivity among different areas in Hong Kong, including the implementation of the seven new railway projects under the Railway Development Strategy 2014 in an orderly manner. Having regard to the potential housing supply that may be brought about by railway development, the Government is reviewing the proposals for the Tuen Mun South Extension and Northern Link (and Kwu Tung Station) and will strive to undertake public consultation on these proposals as soon as possible. At the same time, we will carry on with the detailed planning for the East Kowloon Line, Tung Chung West Extension (and Tung Chung East Station) and North Island Line, and will embark on detailed planning for Hung Shui Kiu Station and the South Island Line (West).

18. As regards the Shatin to Central Link (“SCL”), the 11-month delay caused by the archaeological findings at the To Kwa Wan Station and other

engineering factors has delayed the commissioning of the project for one year, i.e. the “Tai Wai to Hung Hom Section” is extended to end-2019 and the "Hung Hom to Admiralty Section" is extended to 2021. With the efforts of the engineering team, the delay recovery measures implemented in the "Tai Wai to Hung Hom Section" have achieved results. Therefore, it was originally expected to be completed in advance to around mid-2019. However, in view of the issue of reinforcement connection in the diaphragm wall and platform slab construction of the Hung Hom Station Extension and the related investigation works being carried out, the Government must ensure that the SCL is commissioned only if it is fully compliant with the construction specifications and safety. Hence, the target commissioning date of the "Tai Wai to Hung Hom Section" will need to be further reviewed, whilst the target commissioning date of the "Hung Hom to Admiralty Section" still remains to be 2021. We will continue to coordinate and supervise the construction works of the SCL and follow up on the recommendations of the Expert Adviser Team<sup>12</sup> and the investigation results of the Commission of Inquiry<sup>13</sup>, with a view to commissioning the project as soon as possible.

## **Route 11**

19. In view of the long-term developments in NWNT, including the

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<sup>12</sup> The Transport and Housing Bureau established on 15 August 2018 an Expert Adviser Team for the SCL project. The Team comprises three senior retired government officers, i.e. Dr Lau Ching-kwong (former Director of Civil Engineering), Mr Hui Siu-wai (former Director of Buildings) and Mr Wong Hok-ning (former Head of Geotechnical Engineering Office).

<sup>13</sup> A Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the Chief Executive in Council on 10 July 2018, in accordance with the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (Chapter 86), with Mr Michael John Hartmann, former Non-Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal, as Chairman, to inquire into the facts and circumstances of steel reinforcement fixing works in respect of the diaphragm wall and platform slab construction works at the Hung Hom Station Extension under the SCL project implemented by the MTR Corporation Limited. The Commission of Inquiry will also review the MTR Corporation Limited's project management system, supervision system, etc., and the Government's monitoring and control mechanisms; and to make recommendations on suitable measures with a view to promoting public safety and assurance on quality of works. The Commission conducted a preliminary hearing on 24 September, and will commence the substantive hearings on 22 October.

proposed Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area and Yuen Long South development, we need a new strategic route (“Route 11”) to connect NWNT and the urban areas to cope with the increase in transport demand. At the same time, we need to improve the “external connectivity” of Lantau and the airport island. The Route 11 will provide a third strategic access to Lantau on top of Tsing Ma Bridge and Tuen Mun-Chek Lap Kok Link, thus enhancing the robustness of the road network connecting to the airport. Route 11 is a complex and large-scale project. Based on past experience in the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects, it will generally go through the investigation, detailed design and construction stages from preliminary planning to commissioning, and will take more than 10 years to complete. This Panel had expressed support for the feasibility study for Route 11 in March 2017, and we obtained funding approval by LegCo on the same in April 2018. HyD commenced the feasibility study thereafter, which is expected to complete in 2020.

### **Central-Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link**

20. The Central-Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link (“CWB”) project, which is a large-scale and complex road infrastructure project, has encountered various unforeseeable difficulties and risks since the commencement of construction in end 2009, affecting the works progress. With the concerted efforts of various parties, CWB is expected to be fully commissioned in end 2018 or in the first quarter of 2019 to serve as a strategic east-west road along the north shore of Hong Kong Island. Upon commissioning, it will only take around 5 minutes to drive to the Island Eastern Corridor at North Point from Central. The east-west traffic on Hong Kong Island will become more direct and smoother.

### **Route 6 and Cross Bay Link, Tseung Kwan O**

21. We are pressing ahead with the Route 6 project: the main tunnel of Tseung Kwan O-Lam Tin Tunnel forming the eastern section of Route 6 commenced construction in the third quarter of 2016 for completion in 2021; the Central Kowloon Route forming the western section of Route 6 also commenced construction in late 2017 for completion in around 2025.

If we could obtain funding approval within this legislative year for the Trunk Road T2 and Cha Kwo Ling Tunnel which form the middle section of Route 6 for commencement of construction in the latter half of 2019, the entire Route 6 is expected to be commissioned in around 2025. By then, the journey time in peak hours between Tseung Kwan O (“TKO”) Town Centre and Yau Ma Tei Interchange along the Route 6 will be substantially reduced from about 65 minutes now to about 12 minutes. Besides, the Cross Bay Link, TKO connecting the east of the Route 6 is expected to be completed in 2022. When the entire Route 6 is commissioned, it will provide the public with a more convenient express access between TKO New Town and Kowloon West.

### **Road Widening Works**

22. With funding approval obtained from the Legislative Council Finance Committee in May 2018, the widening works at Tai Po Road (Sha Tin Section) between Fo Tan Road, Sha Tin and Sha Tin Rural Committee Road have commenced. We are pressing ahead with this project with a view to completing it in the latter half of 2023 to relieve the traffic congestion at the concerned road section. Moreover, we plan to seek funding approval from the Legislative Council within this legislative year for the widening of a section of Lin Ma Hang Road between Ping Yuen River and Ping Che Road, with a view to enhancing the capacity of the concerned section for meeting the increased traffic demand arising from the opening up of certain regions of the Frontier Closed Area.

### **(e) Enhancing External Transport Links**

#### **Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge**

23. Spanning over Lingdingyang, the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (“HZMB”), an unprecedented mega transport infrastructure project jointly built by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, will connect the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the east and the Macao Special Administrative Region and Zhuhai of Guangdong in the west. The entire HZMB project consists of two parts: (i) the HZMB Main Bridge (i.e. a



22.9 km-long bridge and a 6.7 km-long subsea tunnel) situated in Mainland waters which is implemented by the HZMB Authority; and (ii) the link roads and boundary crossing facilities under the respective responsibility of the three governments.

24. With the efforts in the past years, the HZMB has been completed and will be commissioned soon. It will be a key infrastructure in the Greater Bay Area, providing a good platform to foster the harmonious and prosperous development amongst the three places. As regards the commissioning date of the HZMB, the governments of the three places are striving to improve the clearance conditions of the ports and the commissioning date of the HZMB will be announced once confirmed by the Central Authorities. Construction works for the Hong Kong Section have been completed and we are now focusing on the pre-commissioning preparatory work so as to dovetail with the commissioning of the Main Bridge situated in Mainland waters.

25. To tie in with the commissioning of the HZMB, the governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao strive to formulate a set of cross-boundary transport arrangements which can meet the needs of local residents, travellers and the trades of the three places, with an aim to facilitating traffic and promoting the flow of people and goods within the Greater Bay Area. The three governments have already implemented various types of major cross-boundary transport for the HZMB (including cross-boundary shuttle buses, cross-boundary coaches, cross-boundary hire cars, cross-boundary goods vehicles and cross-boundary private cars) and simplified the requirements for the application for licences.

### **Tuen Mun-Chek Lap Kok Link**

26. The total length of Tuen Mun-Chek Lap Kok Link (“TM-CLKL”) is about 9 km. Upon completion, it will provide a strategic link connecting the Northwest New Territories with the HZMB Hong Kong Port, North Lantau and the Hong Kong International Airport. In view of the technical difficulties of the project, the construction programme is very tight. For example, modification of the design and construction scheme for a tunnel

section of the Northern Connection is required; the contractor of the Southern Connection has to ensure the safe and proper operation of the concerned navigation channel, railway and highway during construction and the construction works have to be executed in compliance with the airport height restrictions. As the Government announced in May 2018, HyD has been striving for the completion of the Mainline of the TM-CLKL Southern Connection (i.e. the section connecting Hong Kong Port to the urban areas through North Lantau Highway) within 2018, whereas the section of the Southern Connection connecting the Hong Kong Port to Tung Chung through North Lantau Highway is anticipated to be completed in the first half of 2019. Regarding the TM-CLKL Northern Connection, it is anticipated to be completed in 2020 at the earliest. HyD will continue to closely monitor the construction works for the early commissioning of the TM-CLKL.

#### **(f) Innovation and Technology**

27. We will continue to implement “Smart Mobility” initiatives, develop intelligent transport system and enhance traffic management through the application of technology. TD commenced a design and application study on the installation of in-vehicle units to work out the detailed arrangements of promoting the installation of such devices in Hong Kong in July 2018. The relevant study is expected to complete in the second half of 2019. Subject to the findings of the study and discussions with relevant stakeholders, we will explore the feasibility of installing in-vehicle units by owners of different types of vehicles on a voluntary basis to more effectively manage tunnel toll payment arrangements and allow motorists to receive timely traffic information, etc. To tie in with the electronic toll collection at, and the commissioning of, the Tseung Kwan O- Lam Tin Tunnel, it is expected that the Government will issue in-vehicle units to vehicle owners starting from mid-2020.

28. TD will continue to facilitate trials of autonomous vehicles at appropriate locations and adopt a “regulatory sandbox” approach, that is, allowing the industry to conduct trials of innovative technology under an environment where risks are manageable and maintain close liaison with the

regulator so as to put forward joint solutions to address the issues related to regulatory aspects identified during the trials. Apart from facilitating various trials on roads through issuing movement permits, TD will continue to render appropriate facilitation to organisations intending to set up testing facilities for autonomous vehicles.

29. The Government will commence installation of a new generation of on-street parking meters that could provide real-time information on vacant parking spaces and support remote payment of parking meter fees through mobile applications starting from 2019-20. We will strive to table a Bill to the Legislative Council within the current legislative session on the legislative amendments arising from the proposed operational arrangement and new functions of the new generation of parking meter system, as well as adjustment to the maximum fee for metered parking spaces, in order to tie in with the implementation timeframe of the first batch of new generation of parking meters.

#### **(g) Implementing Recommended Measures under the Public Transport Strategy Study**

##### **Public Transport Strategy Study**

30. THB and TD will organise a multi-stakeholder exchange session by end-2018 for different stakeholders in the public transport sector to discuss on how best to rationalise their respective roles to improve Hong Kong's public transport ecosystem.

##### **Pilot trials of new long-haul bus services and mid-sized single-deck bus services**

31. TD consulted the relevant District Councils ("DCs") on the trial details of the new franchised bus services (i.e. (i) new long-haul bus services providing more spacious seating and all-seater service with more comprehensive passenger amenities in the bus compartment and fewer stops; and (ii) mid-sized single-deck buses that provide short-haul shuttle services for individual districts in the New Territories which currently have

relatively lower population density but with growth potential) in the first half of this year. TD is now discussing the details of the proposals with the relevant franchised bus operator. The trial services are expected to be rolled out progressively in the first half of 2019 when the newly procured buses arrive Hong Kong and complete the relevant inspections.

### **Introducing “Franchised Taxis”**

32. THB will continue to actively prepare for the bill for the introduction of franchised taxis and target to introduce the bill into the Legislative Council in 2018-19 to meet the new demand in the community for personalised and point-to-point public transport services.

### **(h) Ancillary Facilities for Public Transport**

#### **Other ongoing initiatives for enhancing public transport services**

33. The Government has been pursuing a public transport-oriented policy. At present, about 90% of passengers use public transport services with some 12 million passenger trips daily. We will continue to strive to enhance the level of public transport services and provide more comprehensive ancillary facilities that keep with the time to create a more convenient and comfortable passenger waiting environment. On raising the quality of services, TD will continue to make use of established mechanisms to pursue rationalisation of bus routes and adjust their services having regard to the changes in passenger demand, thereby reducing unnecessary bus trips, alleviating traffic congestion on busy trunk roads and reducing roadside air pollution. Franchised bus companies may redeploy the resources so saved to introduce routes or increase frequencies which can meet passengers' demands with a view to enhancing the efficiency of our franchised bus network. The Government will continue to implement various measures to enhance the quality and operating environment of taxi services through the Committee on Taxi Service Quality. As regards enhancing ancillary facilities, the Government will continue to provide subsidies to franchised bus companies for their installation of display panels for real-time bus arrival information and seats

at suitable bus stops, take forward pilot renovation projects to enhance the design and facilities of covered public transport interchanges and ferry piers, and subsidise the Tramways to replace tram tracks at key locations with new technology.

34. In addition, to further promote “Transport for All”, the Government continues to actively take forward the “low-floor wheelchair-accessible light bus trial scheme”. The trial scheme has been implemented on two hospital routes (including routes operating via Queen Mary Hospital and Princes of Wales Hospital respectively) by phases since the first quarter of 2018, while the other low-floor light bus is expected to be put into service on the route operating via St. Teresa’s Hospital in the fourth quarter of 2018. TD will review the effectiveness of the trial scheme in tandem with its regular survey on the market occupancy rate of light buses, which will be launched in the fourth quarter of 2018. If the trial scheme is proven feasible and desirable, we will discuss with the trade the feasibility of further promoting low-floor light buses.

35. TD will continue to proactively work with various public transport service operators in the implementation of the aforesaid initiatives, with a view to enabling passengers to enjoy better public transport services.

#### **(i) Public Transport Fare Subsidy Scheme**

36. The Government is actively taking forward the preparatory work of the non-means tested Public Transport Fare Subsidy Scheme (“the Scheme”) for implementing the Scheme on 1 January 2019 to relieve the fare burden of commuters. Commuters do not have to apply for the Scheme. Under the Scheme, commuters with monthly public transport expenses exceeding \$400 are eligible for subsidy. The Government will provide subsidy amounting to 25% of the actual public transport expenses in excess of \$400, subject to a maximum of \$300 per month. The Scheme covers the MTR, franchised buses, GMBs, ferries, trams, as well as designated routes of red minibuses, Kaitos, non-franchised buses providing residents’ services and employees’ services approved by TD. Fares paid by Octopus cards and designated transport tickets of the abovementioned

public transport services purchased by any payment means will be taken into account in the calculation of monthly public transport expenses.

37. Commuters can collect the public transport fare subsidy of January 2019 starting from 16 February 2019. The method for collection of subsidy is simple. Commuters can collect the subsidy through the Octopus App, at around 50 Octopus Service Points, or by tapping their Octopus cards at the dedicated Subsidy Collection Points set up at 94 MTR stations, five Light Rail Customer Service Centres and designated ferry piers, or the Octopus readers of any outlets of convenient stores including 7-Eleven and Circle-K, as well as Wellcome supermarkets. The subsidy will then be credited to the Octopus cards. Commuters can collect the subsidy of the previous month from the 16<sup>th</sup> of each month through the same channels from then onwards. To allow sufficient time for commuters to collect subsidy, the subsidy is valid for collection within three months.

## **(j) Improving Pedestrian Environment**

### **Take Forward “Walk in HK”**

38. We will continue to take forward “Walk in HK” by creating a pedestrian-friendly environment and encouraging citizens to walk more for first and last mile connection between public transport interchanges and residences/offices, so as to reduce the use of mechanised transport for short-distance commuting. Specific measures include relaxing existing standards stipulated in the Transport Planning and Design Manual for adding covers to walkways, and providing covers on certain walkways connecting to public transport facilities progressively; studying and testing out innovative measures in two pilot areas, namely Central and Sham Shui Po, for a comfortable walking environment; continuing to enhance pedestrian wayfinding system having regard to the experience gained from the pilot system launched in Tsim Sha Tsui; extending the coverage of the walking route search function under TD’s integrated mobile application “HKeMobility” to Yau Ma Tei and Mong Kok; and continuing the study on enhancing pedestrian connectivity between Wan Chai and Sheung Wan.

## **Hillside Escalator Links and Elevator Systems**

39. The Government established in 2009 a set of scoring criteria for assessing proposals for hillside escalator links and elevator systems (HEL) to determine the priority for conducting preliminary technical feasibility studies for the 20 proposals received at that time. Upon completion of the assessment, the assessment results were reported to the Legislative Council Panel on Transport in February 2010. Two proposals were screened out initially, and 18 others were ranked. The Government indicated at the time that preliminary technical feasibility studies for the proposals ranked top ten in the assessment would be conducted first by batches, and that the remaining proposals would be followed up after the smooth implementation of the top 10 proposals.

40. Among the 18 ranked proposals, the Pedestrian Link at Tsz Wan Shan, the Yuet Wah Street Pedestrian Linkage and the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Lai King Hill Road and Princess Margaret Hospital (ranked 1<sup>st</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> respectively) have been opened for public use. There are four items under construction: the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System at Cheung Hang Estate, Tsing Yi, the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Kwai Shing Circuit and Hing Shing Road, the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System at Waterloo Hill and the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Tai Wo Hau Road and Wo Tong Tsui Street (ranked 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> respectively). These items are targeted for completion progressively from mid-2019 to 2021. In addition, we obtained funding approval from the Legislative Council in June 2018 for the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Castle Peak Road and Kung Yip Street, Kwai Chung (ranked 6<sup>th</sup>) and plan to commence its construction in the first quarter of 2019 for target completion in the second quarter of 2023.

41. At the same time, HyD has completed the preliminary technical feasibility studies for the Escalator Link between Hong Sing Garden and Po Hong Road, the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Saddle Ridge Garden and Sai Sha Road and the Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Hing Shing Road and Tai Wo Hau Road (ranked 14<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>

and 17<sup>th</sup> respectively). The studies showed that the above proposals are technically feasible upon preliminary assessment, and HyD will progressively conduct ground investigation, carry out preliminary design and consult DCs as well as relevant stakeholders.

42. Overall, three out of the 18 proposals have been completed and opened for public use; four are under construction; one proposal has just obtained funding approval for construction; five are in various phases of planning, investigation and design; three with their preliminary technical feasibility studies just completed; one is at the preliminary technical feasibility study stage; and another is having its scope determined to facilitate the subsequent preliminary technical feasibility study. The current progress of the 18 proposals is set out at **Annex**.

43. On the other hand, TD commenced a consultancy study in December 2017 to review the assessment mechanism for HEL proposals. TD will, on the basis of the revised mechanism, carry out screening, shortlisting and prioritisation of the over 110 proposals received in the past years. The consultancy study will take about 30 months to complete. Upon completion of the study, we will seek resources for implementing the selected proposals progressively.

### **Walkway Improvement Works**

44. To enhance pedestrian link facilities for the local community, we propose to take forward the retrofitting of escalators for the footbridge across Castle Peak Road - Kwai Chung near MTR Tai Wo Hau Station Exit B, so as to provide a comfortable and convenient pedestrian link for commuters travelling between the MTR Tai Wo Hau Station and the Tai Wo Hau Estate and Kwai Chung Estate. Upon completion of the relevant statutory procedures, we target to seek funding approval from the Legislative Council in the second quarter of 2019.

45. We also propose replacing the existing Wang Tong River Bridge with a new twin-bridge to widen the river crossing and segregate pedestrians from cyclists for the enhancement of road safety. Upon completion of



relevant statutory procedures, we plan to seek funding approval for the project from the Legislative Council in the second quarter of 2019.

### **Pedestrian Environment Improvement Scheme**

46. To further alleviate the pedestrian congestion in Yuen Long Town, HyD completed 10 improvement measures under the Pedestrian Environment Improvement Scheme in Yuen Long Town in 2015 including widening of footpaths and pedestrian crossings at road junctions and a rather large-scale improvement measure of streetscape enhancement along both sides of Fung Yau Street North. For the Elevated Pedestrian Corridor in Yuen Long Town connecting with Long Ping Station which is also a large-scale improvement measure, the Public Works Subcommittee discussed the item at its meetings on 23 and 26 May 2018 and endorsed the proposal. In the light of Members' concerns and comments from the community, we are formulating the detailed arrangement for the implementation of the project. As the work is in progress, we will submit the item to the Finance Committee for deliberation at an opportune time in future.

47. In addition, HyD consulted local groups and relevant stakeholders on the preliminary scheme of the footbridge system in Mong Kok in 2017 and is reviewing and improving the scheme in the light of public opinions collected. HyD will consult the District Council and relevant stakeholders on the enhanced scheme in due course. In view of the latest developments in Causeway Bay, HyD has also commenced a consultancy study to review the proposals under the Pedestrian Environment Improvement Scheme of the district for taking forward the project.

### **“Universal Accessibility” Programme**

48. As briefly mentioned in paragraph 13 above, the Government has been retrofitting BFA facilities at public walkways (i.e. public footbridges, elevated walkways and subways maintained by HyD), where technically feasible, on the recommendation of the Equal Opportunities Commission. We launched the UA Programme in August 2012 to continue enhancing the

BFA facilities at existing public walkways, and announced in the 2016 Policy Address to expand the ambit of the UA Programme whereby BFA facilities could be retrofitted not only at public walkways but also at other walkways not maintained by HyD provided that certain criteria<sup>14</sup> are met. We are now taking forward 250 BFA-retrofitting items (among which 105 items were selected by the 18 DCs, upon the Government's invitation, from the public proposals) to facilitate the commuting of the public, especially the elderly. As at end-September 2018, 93 items were completed, 98 items were under construction while the remaining 59 items were under investigation/design.

### **(k) Bicycle-friendly Environment**

49. We will continue to foster a “bicycle-friendly” environment in new towns and new development areas and improve the supporting facilities. In accordance with the completed “Traffic and Transport Consultancy Study on Cycling Networks and Parking Facilities in Existing New Towns in Hong Kong”, TD identified and proposed improvement to around 900 locations. The improvement measures include providing more public bicycle parking spaces and providing additional safety facilities in order to ensure the safety of cyclists. The first batch of improvement works involving around 100 locations was completed in June 2018, providing about 980 additional bicycle parking spaces. The second batch of improvement works involving about 540 locations will provide about 3 500 additional bicycle parking spaces. The actual number of additional bicycle parking spaces to be provided will be adjusted in light of the outcome of the consultation with DCs. In this regard, TD has started consulting the relevant DCs since May 2018 on the improvement works,

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<sup>14</sup> The walkways need to meet the following criteria and the retrofitting works should not involve land resumption -

- (i) the walkways span across public roads maintained by the HyD;
- (ii) they are open for public access from public roads at all times;
- (iii) the walkways are not privately owned; and
- (iv) the parties responsible for the management and maintenance of these walkways agree to such lift retrofitting proposals and are willing to cooperate with the Government during the implementation of the said lift retrofitting works as well as the subsequent management and maintenance works of the lifts.

and has arranged to commence the works in 2019.

**Transport and Housing Bureau**  
**October 2018**

**Current progress of the proposals of  
the Hillside Escalator Links and Elevator Systems**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Progress of Project</b>
1	Pedestrian Link at Tsz Wan Shan	The pedestrian link is implemented under the Shatin to Central Link project and involves 15 facilities. The construction works commenced in July 2012. The pedestrian link has been opened for public use since October 2017.
2	Braemar Hill Pedestrian Link	<p>HyD consulted and obtained the support from the Planning, Works and Housing Committee (PWHC) of the Eastern District Council (EDC) on the design scheme in September 2016. Prior to gazettal of the works, HyD further consulted the residents on the design scheme and attended residents' meetings in November and December 2017. In view of the comments raised by various parties, HyD reviewed the scheme with a view to obtaining a majority consensus for the project scheme.</p> <p>HyD attended the PWHC meeting in February 2018, arranged site visits with EDC members, Legislative Council members and residents in March 2018, held a public meeting in April 2018 and conducted focus group meetings with schools and residents in May and June 2018 to introduce the revised design scheme and discuss with various stakeholders.</p> <p>In view of the comments from various stakeholders, HyD consulted PWHC again on 19 June 2018. HyD presented various design revisions and the recommended</p>

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Progress of Project</b>
		revised design scheme, and obtained the support of the majority of PWHC members. HyD is now carrying out the detailed design and preparing for the gazettal of the project scheme.
3	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System at Cheung Hang Estate, Tsing Yi	The Government obtained funding approval from the Legislative Council in May 2016. The construction works commenced in February 2017 for anticipated completion in mid-2019.
4	Escalator Link and Pedestrian Walkway System at Pound Lane	HyD consulted the Central and Western District Council (C&WDC) and held a public forum on the refined proposal in 2015. In view of the diverse views received and the many issues involved, HyD plans to consult the C&WDC further on the project.
5	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Kwai Shing Circuit and Hing Shing Road	The Government obtained funding approval from the Legislative Council in May 2016. The construction works commenced in June 2017 for anticipated completion in 2020.
6	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Castle Peak Road and Kung Yip Street	The Government obtained funding approval from the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council on 30 June 2018. The construction works are scheduled to commence in the first quarter of 2019 for anticipated completion in the second quarter of 2023.
7	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Lai Cho Road and Wah Yiu Road	The preliminary technical feasibility study has been completed. HyD has engaged consultants to carry out the investigation and preliminary design.
8	Pedestrian Link near Chuk	HyD consulted and obtained the general support from the Traffic and Transport

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Progress of Project</b>
	Yuen North Estate	Committee (T&TC) of the Wong Tai Sin District Council (WTSDC) on the preliminary design in July 2016 and March 2017. However, some schools and some of the residents in the district subsequently raised objections. After consideration of their objections, HyD revised the design and consulted the T&TC again in January 2018; the support from the T&TC was obtained. TD and HyD are now collating and analysing the relevant views and actively reviewing the details of the proposal. Relevant stakeholders and the T&TC will then be consulted on the latest developments. The preliminary technical feasibility study has been completed.
9	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System at Waterloo Hill	The Government obtained funding approval from the Legislative Council in May 2016. The construction works commenced in December 2016 for anticipated completion in mid-2019.
10	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Lai King Hill Road and Lai Cho Road	It was revealed in the preliminary technical feasibility study that the project involved two dangerous private slopes. The owners of the slopes completed the repair works for the slopes in February 2018. HyD has resumed the preliminary technical feasibility study for the project.
11	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Tai Wo Hau Road and Wo Tong Tsui Street	The Government obtained funding approval from the Legislative Council in December 2017. The advance works for diversion of utilities commenced in January 2018. The main works are anticipated to commence in the fourth quarter of 2018 for completion in the fourth quarter of 2021.

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Progress of Project</b>
12	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System at Luen On Street	HyD consulted and obtained support from the Traffic and Transport Committee of the Kwun Tong District Council (KTDC) on the preliminary design scheme in February 2018. As the proposal needs to span across private lots and is in close proximity to existing buildings, HyD will consult the relevant residents and stakeholders as suggested by the KTDC.
13	Yuet Wah Street Pedestrian Linkage	To complement the Kwun Tong Town Centre Redevelopment, the Civil Engineering and Development Department commenced construction for this project in April 2013. The Linkage has been opened for public use since October 2015.
14 (same ranking)	Escalator Link System between Hong Sing Garden and Po Hong Road	The preliminary technical feasibility study has been completed and the project is considered technically feasible. HyD is now preparing to commence the next phase of the pre-construction stage.
14 (same ranking)	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Lai King Hill Road and Princess Margaret Hospital	The Hospital Authority commenced the project in November 2015. The works have been completed and the facility has been opened for public use since January 2017.
16	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Saddle Ridge Garden and Sai Sha Road	The preliminary technical feasibility study has been completed and the project is considered technically feasible. HyD is now preparing to commence the next phase of the pre-construction stage.
17	Lift and Pedestrian Walkway System between Hing Shing Road and Tai	The preliminary technical feasibility study has been completed and the project is considered technically feasible. HyD is now preparing to commence the next phase

Rank	Proposal	Progress of Project
	Wo Hau Road	of the pre-construction stage.
18	Escalator Link System between Sha Tin Sui Wo Court and MTR Fo Tan Station	The proposed item involves works of relatively large scale and is rather complex as a substantial part of the proposed alignment runs through lots held by the Hong Kong Housing Authority and private owners. TD is actively following up on the proposal with a view to determining its scope as soon as possible, so as to allow the relevant department to commence the preliminary technical feasibility study.



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LCQ7: Bus-only lane and designated bus gate ▼

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LCQ7: Bus-only lane and designated bus gate  
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Following is a question by the Hon Frankie Yick and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Mr Frank Chan Fan, in the Legislative Council today (June 13):

**Question:**

In order to optimise the use of limited road resources, the Transport Department has all along been implementing measures which give priority to public transport modes over road use. Among them, the most commonly adopted measure is the designation of "bus-only lanes". However, some members of the public have relayed to me that during busy traffic hours, while the volumes of bus traffic on certain bus-only lanes are considerably low, the adjacent traffic lanes are extremely congested, thus causing a wastage of road resources. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the details of each bus-only lane in Hong Kong at present, including (i) the District Council district to which the lane belongs, (ii) the names of the road and road section on which the lane is located, (iii) the daily operating time, (iv) the length of the lane, (v) the daily average volume of bus traffic and vehicle speed, and (vi) how such average traffic volume and vehicle speed compare with the corresponding figures of the adjacent traffic lane(s) (set out in a table);

(2) whether the authorities cancelled in the past five years the designation of a certain bus-only lane on the ground that the volume of bus traffic on the lane was below a certain level; if so, of the details;

(3) as the last-term Government made an undertaking to me that it would study the conversion of bus-only lanes into "public transport-only lanes", so that the traffic lanes concerned would be open for use by other public service vehicles such as taxis and public light buses, whether the current-term Government has followed up such task; if so, of the results of the study; if not, the reasons for that; and

(4) whether it has studied arrangements in overseas countries for and usage of public transport-only lanes; if so, of the details; if not, whether it will consider conducting the relevant study?

**Reply:**

President,

Hong Kong residents mainly commute by public transport, which accounts for about 90 per cent of the total passenger trips each day. To support the priority use of roads by public transport services so to benefit the public at large, the Transport Department (TD) has been introducing bus-only lanes (Note 1) and designating bus gates (Note 2) on appropriate roads. In pursuing such bus priority measures, the TD will consider the actual road situation and traffic conditions, including the design of roads and junctions, the number of traffic lanes, the number of bus routes and bus service frequencies, the traffic volume of other types of vehicles, availability of alternative routes, the impact on the flow of other vehicles, etc., and will carefully assess the feasibility of such measures in order to strike a proper balance. The TD will continue to keep in view the operation of bus-only lanes and designated bus gates after implementation, and review and enhance the arrangements of these facilities in a timely manner.

My reply to the various parts of the Hon Frankie Yick's question is as follows:

(1) Information on bus-only lanes and designated bus gates, viz. the District Council districts, locations and sections of the roads, restriction days and hours, applicable vehicle types and length, is set out in Annex 1 and Annex 2 respectively. The TD has not compiled any statistics on the daily average volume of bus traffic and vehicle speed in respect of each bus-only lane and designated bus gate, and the average traffic volume and vehicle speed of the adjacent traffic lane(s).

(2) The TD reviews from time to time traffic facilities on different road sections. Also, there are suggestions from the community (including individual District Council members) on the addition of bus-only lanes at various locations. In the past three years (from 2015 to 2017), the TD extended the operation hours of six bus-only lanes and introduced a new bus-only lane, the details of which are in Annex 3. The TD did not cancel any bus-only lane or designated bus gate in the past five years.

(3) and (4) Buses are road-based public transport mass carriers with the highest carrying capacity and can efficiently carry people to their destinations. To provide maximum convenience to bus passengers, the Government introduces bus-only lanes and designates bus gates so to reduce the chance of bus service schedules being affected by traffic congestions. For other public transport modes, the Government has also been designating taxi pick-up/drop-off points and, where traffic situations permit, relaxing some no-

**Attachment**



LCQ7 Annex 1



LCQ7 Annex 2



LCQ7 Annex 3

stopping restrictions for taxis and green minibuses to facilitate their operation and enhancement of service quality.

As regards the proposal of designating "public transport-only lanes" on busy roads for buses to share the use of such lanes with other public transport modes such as taxis and public light buses, the TD will follow up and study the proposal, including making reference to the overseas experience. The study will also consider possible reduction of bus operation efficiencies on such lanes vis-à-vis the original bus lanes caused by additional traffic flow from, and picking up/dropping off activities of, other public transport vehicles. Furthermore, if "public transport only-lanes" are to be set up, the number of traffic lanes on the concerned road sections for use by other vehicles (e.g. goods vehicles and private cars) will be reduced, potentially affecting the traffic condition. Hence, the TD has to study the proposal in detail and consult various stakeholders.

Note 1: Bus-only lane is a traffic lane designated for use by "franchised bus" or "franchised and non-franchised bus" only. Other vehicles have to make use of other traffic lanes next to the bus-only lane or other alternative routes.

Note 2: Designated bus gate generally refers to a short section of bus-only lane that, while the road capacity is normally not affected, facilitates buses to access their destinations or change to other travelling routes more directly.

Ends/Wednesday, June 13, 2018  
Issued at HKT 15:00

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**Annex 1****Bus-only Lane** <sup>Note 1</sup>  
**(As at May 2018)**

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length</b> <sup>Note 2</sup> <b>(km)</b>
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>					
Central and Western	Connaught Road West westbound (between Tung Loi Lane and Hong Kong Macau Ferry Bus Terminus)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Des Voeux Road Central westbound (between Man Wa Lane and Hillier Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Man Yiu Street (between Man Kwong Street Roundabout and Central Ferry Pier Bus Terminus)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Pok Fu Lam Road eastbound (between Mount Davis Road and Pok Fu Lam Road Playground)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Queensway westbound (between Murray Road and Jackson Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.2
Wan Chai	Gloucester Road westbound (between O’Brien Road and Fenwick Street)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2
	Cross-Harbour Tunnel Egress to Central westbound (between Tunnel Exit and Hung Hing Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Canal Road Flyover underneath southbound (between Hennessy Road and Yiu Wa Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.2

<sup>Note 1</sup> Bus-only lane is a traffic lane designated for use by “franchised bus” or “franchised and non-franchised bus” only. Other vehicles have to make use of other traffic lanes next to the bus-only lane or other alternative routes.

<sup>Note 2</sup> Less than 0.1km is also regarded as 0.1km.

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
	Morrison Hill Road southbound (between Sports Road and Queen's Road East)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	16:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Hennessy Road westbound (between Jardine's Bazaar and Lee Garden Road)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Hennessy Road westbound (between Tang Lung Street and Canal Road East)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Hennessy Road westbound (between Tin Lok Lane and Tonnochy Road)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Hennessy Road westbound (between Stewart Road and Fleming Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Eastern	Shau Kei Wan Road westbound (between Tai On Street and Tai Hong Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Fu Yee Road southbound (between Cheerful Garden and Siu Sai Wan Road)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 09:00	Franchised buses	0.1
	King's Road eastbound (between Ngan Mok Street and Fortress Hill Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.8
	King's Road eastbound (between North Point Road and Tin Chiu Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.7
	King's Road eastbound (between Man Hong Street and Java Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.5
	Nam On Street eastbound (between Nam On Lane and Shau Kei Wan Bus Terminus)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Siu Sai Wan Road westbound (between The Chinese Foundation Secondary School and Harmony Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Southern	Wong Chuk Hang Road westbound (between Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza and Wong Chuk Hang Road near Grantham Hospital)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	16:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
	Wong Chuk Hang Road eastbound (between Grantham Hospital and Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.5
	Wong Chuk Hang Road up-ramp to Aberdeen Tunnel northbound (between Shouson Hill Road and Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.5
	Wong Chuk Hang Road eastbound (near Nam Long Shan Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Nam Long Shan Road southbound (between Wong Chuk Hang Road and Bus Terminus)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.3
	Heung Yip Road eastbound near Nam Long Shan Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
<b>Kowloon</b>					
Yau Tsim Mong	Nathan Road southbound (between Playing Field Road and Bute Street)	Daily	07:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	Nathan Road southbound (between Fife Street and Nelson Street)	Daily	07:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2
	Nathan Road northbound (between Dundas Street and Nelson Street)	Daily	07:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	The slip road from Hong Chong Road southbound to Cross-Harbour Tunnel	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00; 17:00 – 19:00	Franchised buses	0.2
	Hong Chong Road southbound (outside Cross-Harbour Tunnel Administrative Building)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.3
	Hong Chong Road northbound (near Cross-Harbour Tunnel Toll Plaza)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Cherry Street eastbound (from Palm Street to Tong Mi Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
	Lai Chi Kok Road eastbound (from Arran Street to Nathan Road)	Daily	07:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Nathan Road southbound (from near Shantung Street to near Hamilton Street)	Daily	07:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
Sham Shui Po	Nam Cheong Street southbound (between Ap Liu Street and Yu Chau Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Yen Chow Street northbound (between Yee Kuk Street and Lai Chi Kok Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Nam Cheong Street southbound (from Woh Chai Street to Berwick Street)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	West Kowloon Corridor eastbound (from Pei Ho Street to Tai Kok Tsui Road)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:30 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.4
	Lai Chi Kok Road westbound (between Mei Lai Road and Kwai Chung Road)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised buses	0.1
	Cheung Sha Wan Road eastbound (between Kwai Chung Road and Mei Lai Road)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised buses	0.2
Kowloon City	To Kwa Wan Road southbound (between San Ma Tau Street and Chi Kiang Street)	Daily	08:00 – 10:00; 17:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	To Kwa Wan Road northbound (between Shek Tong Street and Chi Kiang Street)	Daily	08:00 – 10:00; 17:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	To Kwa Wan Road northbound (between Chi Kiang Street and Sheung Heung Road)	Daily	08:00 – 10:00; 17:00 – 20:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	Junction Road southbound (from Carpenter Road to Prince Edward Road West)	Daily	07:00 – 10:00; 16:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2
	Prince Edward Road East westbound (near Rhythm Garden)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
	Shing Tak Street (between Ma Tau Chung Road and Fu Ning Street)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
Wong Tai Sin	Hammer Hill Road southbound (between Lung Cheung Road and Choi Hung Road Roundabout)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised buses	0.1
	Choi Hung Road eastbound (between Prince Edward Road East & 65 metres south of Lok Sin Road)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Lung Cheung Road eastbound (near Wong Tai Sin MTR Station)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised buses	0.3
Kwun Tong	New Clear Water Bay Road northbound (outside United Christian College)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Lei Yue Mun Road southbound (from Block 1 to Block 8 of Sceneway Garden)	Daily	07:00 – 24:00	Franchised buses	0.2
<b>New Territories</b>					
Sha Tin	Che Kung Miu Road westbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00; 16:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.3
	Hung Mui Kuk Road southbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00; 16:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	1
	Lion Rock Tunnel Road westbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00; 16:00 – 19:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.8
	Siu Lek Yuen Road eastbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Tate's Cairn Highway southbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
	Tate's Cairn Highway slip road southbound (near Siu Lek Yuen Road)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.2
Tai Po	Tai Po Road - Yuen Chau Tsai eastbound	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:00 – 10:00	Franchised buses	0.1
	On Po Road near On Tai Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.5
Tuen Mun	Tuen Mun Road eastbound (from Harrow International School to Sham Tseng Interchange)	Mon – Fri (No restriction if that day is a public holiday)	07:30 – 09:00	Franchised and non-franchised buses	9
	Tuen Mun Road southbound near Lam Tei	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.5
	Tuen Mun Road northbound near Lam Tei	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.2
	Sam Shing Street westbound	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Yuen Long	Castle Peak Road westbound (between Yuen Long Hong Lok Road and Kik Yeung Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Ma Miu Road southbound outside Yuen Long District Office Building	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Kwai Tsing	Kwai Chung Road southbound (fronting Fung King House of Lai King Estate)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.2
	Lai King Hill Road northbound (opposite Ching Lai Commercial Centre of Ching Lai Court)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Fung Shue Wo Road eastbound (entry road to Tsing Yi Pier Public Transport Interchange)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Tsing Yi Heung Sze Wui Road northbound (from Tsing Yi Bridge roundabout to Chung Mei Road)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1



<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
Tsuen Wan	Cheung Pei Shan Road eastbound (next to Shing Mun Tunnel Bus-to-bus Interchange)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Tai Ho Road southbound (near Tsuen Wan West MTR Station)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Sai Kung	Kai King Road westbound (entry road to Po Lam Public Transport Interchange)	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Po Shun Road northbound near the slip road leading to Tseung Kwan O Tunnel Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1

**Designated Bus Gate** <sup>Note 1</sup>  
(As at May 2018)

District Council District	Location	Restriction Day	Restriction Hours	Applicable Vehicle Type	Approximate Length <sup>Note 2</sup> (km)
<b>Hong Kong Island</b>					
Wan Chai	Gloucester Road westbound near Canal Road Flyover upramp	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Canal Road Flyover northbound exit to Cross Harbour Tunnel	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
	Hung Hing Road eastbound to Cross Harbour Tunnel portal	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
<b>Kowloon</b>					
Kowloon City	The right-hand lane of the slip road linking Lung Cheung Road westbound and Waterloo Road northbound	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
Yau Tsim Mong	The Chatham Road North slip road from Chatham Road North westbound to Hong Chong Road southbound	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
Sham Shui Po	Nam Cheong Street southbound from Berwick Street to Tai Po Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
<b>New Territories</b>					
Sha Tin	The slip road of Hang Tai Road to Ma On Shan Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised and non-franchised buses	0.1
Sai Kung	Po Hong Road northbound right turning onto Wan Lung Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Tai Po	On Chee Road near On Po Road	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1

<sup>Note 1</sup> Designated bus gate generally refers to a short section of bus-only lane that, while the road capacity is normally not affected, facilitates buses to access their destinations or change to other travelling routes more directly.

<sup>Note 2</sup> Less than 0.1km is also regarded as 0.1km.

<b>District Council District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Restriction Day</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Applicable Vehicle Type</b>	<b>Approximate Length<sup>Note 2</sup> (km)</b>
North	San Wan Road near Landmark North	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Fanling Station Road near Fanling Station Playground	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
	Luen On Street right turning onto Wo Mun Street Regentville Bus Terminus	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Tsuen Wan	Cheung Shan Estate Road West near Cheung Shan Estate Road East	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1
Yuen Long	Access Road from Siu Sheung Road to Yuen Long Highway	Daily	24 hours	Franchised buses	0.1

**Addition / Change of Bus-only Lane  
(from 2015 to 2017)**

<b>Bus-only Lane</b>	<b>Restriction Hours</b>	<b>Progress</b>
To Kwa Wan Road southbound (between San Ma Tau Street and Chi Kiang Street)	The afternoon operation hours were extended from the period between 17:00 and 19:00 to the period between 17:00 and 20:00 daily; the morning operation hours remained unchanged.	Implemented since 18 December 2015.
To Kwa Wan Road northbound (between Chi Kiang Street and Sheung Heung Road)	The afternoon operation hours were extended from the period between 17:00 and 19:00 to the period between 17:00 and 20:00 daily; the morning operation hours remained unchanged.	Implemented since 18 December 2015.
Wong Chuk Hang Road westbound (between Aberdeen Tunnel Toll Plaza and Wong Chuk Hang Road near Grantham Hospital)	The operation hours were extended from the period between 16:00 and 19:00 to the period between 16:00 and 20:00 on Mondays – Fridays (no restriction if that day is a public holiday).	Implemented since 22 January 2016.
The slip road from Hong Chong Road southbound to Cross-Harbour Tunnel	The operation hours were extended from the period between 07:00 and 10:00 to the periods between 07:00 and 10:00 and between 17:00 and 19:00 on Mondays – Fridays (no restriction if that day is a public holiday).	Implemented since 11 April 2016.
Nathan Road southbound (between Fife Street and Nelson Street; and from near Shantung Street to near Hamilton Street)	The operation hours were extended from the period between 07:00 and 19:00 to the period between 07:00 and 20:00 daily.	Implemented since 11 May 2016.
Nathan Road northbound (between Dundas Street and Nelson Street)	The operation hours were extended from the period between 07:00 and 19:00 to the period between 07:00 and 20:00 daily.	Implemented since 11 May 2016.
Heung Yip Road eastbound near Nam Long Shan Road	An additional 24-hour daily bus-only lane commenced operation.	Implemented since 28 December 2016.